Damming Afghanistan

Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State
Author(s): Nick Cullather

Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 2, History and September 11: A Special
Issue (Sep., 2002), pp. 512-537
Published by: Organization of American Historians
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Damming Afghanistan:
Modernizationin a Buffer State
Nick Cullather
For suggestionson how to use this articlein the United Stateshistory surveycourse,
see our "Teaching the JAH" Web site supplement at <http://www.indiana.edu/
_jah/teaching>.
In May 1960, the historianArnoldJ. Toynbeeleft Kandaharand drove ninety miles

on freshlypaved roadsto LashkarGah, a modern planned city known locally as the
New Yorkof Afghanistan.At the confluence of the Helmand and Arghandabrivers,
close against the ancient ruins of Qala Bist, LashkarGah'seight thousand residents
lived in suburban-styletracthomes surroundedby broadlawns. The city boasted an
alabastermosque, one of the country'sbest hospitals, Afghanistan'sonly coeduca-
tional high school, and the headquartersof the Helmand ValleyAuthority,a multi-
purpose dam project funded by the United States.This unexpectedproliferationof
modernity led Toynbee to reflect on the warning of Sophocles: "the craft of his
engines surpassethhis dreams."In the areaaroundKandahar,traditionalAfghanistan
had vanished. "The domain of the Helmand Valley Authority,"he reported, "has
become a piece of Americainserted into the Afghan landscape.... The new world
they are conjuring up out of the desert at the Helmand River'sexpense is to be an
America-in-Asia."I
Toynbee'simage sits uneasilywith the visualsof the recentwar.In the granitebat-
tlescapescapturedby the camerasof the Al-Jazeeranetworkin the days afterSeptem-
ber 11, 2001, Afghanistanappearedas perhapsthe one spot on earth unmarkedby
the influence of American culture. When correspondentsreferredto Afghanistan's
Nick Cullatheris associateprofessorof history at Indiana University.

This essaywas researchedand written between the beginning of the bombing campaign in late Septemberand
the mopping up of Taliban resistancearound Tora Bora in early December 2001. Like many colleagues, I found
myself called upon, without benefit of expertise,to place the war in a historicalcontext. The lecture that became
this essaywas based on materialsfound in the Indiana University Libraryand online and in a few archivaldocu-
ments sent by friends. This is a preliminarystudy that I hope will inspire additional researchon the history of the
United States in Afghanistan. I am grateful to Lou Malcomb and the staff of the Government Publications
Department of the Indiana University Library,Melvyn Leffler,Andrew Rotter, and Michael Latham for helpful
comments; to David Ekbladhfor his contribution of documents; and to Alison Lefkovitzfor researchassistance.
Readersmay contact Cullatherat <ncullath@indiana.edu>.
1 Mildred Caudill, Helmand-ArghandabValley Yesterday,

Today,Tomorrow(LashkarGah, 1969), 55-59; Hafi-
zullah Emadi, State, Revolution,and Superpowersin Afghanistan (New York, 1990), 41. Sophocles quoted in
Arnold J. Toynbee, BetweenOxusandJumna (New York, 1961), 12; ibid., 67-68.
512 The Journalof AmericanHistory September2002

DammingAfghanistan: in a BufferState
Modernization 513
history it was to the Soviet invasion of the 1980s or the earlier"greatgame" that
ended with the British Empire'sdeparturefrom South Asia in 1947. There was a
silence about the three decadesin between. During that time, Afghanistanwas aptly
called an "economicKorea,"divided between the Soviet Union in the north and the
United Statesin the south.2In the 1950s and 1960s, the United Statesmade south-
ern Afghanistana showcaseof nation building with a dazzlingproject to "reclaim"
and modernize a swath of territorycomprising roughly half the country. The Hel-
mand venture is worth rememberingtoday as a precedent for renewed efforts to
rebuildAfghanistan,but it was also part of a largerproject-alternately called devel-
opment, nation building, or modernization-that deployed science and expertiseto
reconstructthe entire postcolonialworld.
When PresidentHarryS. Trumanannounced Point IV, a "bold new program...
for the improvement . . . of underdeveloped areas," in January 1949, the global
responsewas startling.Truman "hit the jackpot of the world'spolitical emotions,"
Fortunenoted. National delegationslined up to receiveassistancethat a few yearsear-
lier would have been seen as a colonial intrusion.Development insertedinto interna-
tional relations a new problematic and a new concept of time, asserting that all
nations followed a common historicalpath and that those in the lead had a moral
duty to those who followed. "We must franklyrecognize,"a State Department offi-
cial observedin 1953, "thatthe hands of the clock of historyareset at differenthours
in different parts of the world." Leaders of newly independent states, such as
Mohammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan and JawaharlalNehru of India, accepted
these terms, merging their own governmentalmandatesinto the stream of nations
moving toward modernity. Development was not simply the best but the only
course. "Thereis only one-way trafficin Time,"Nehru observed.3
Aided by social science theory,developmentcame into its own by the mid-1950s
both as a policy ideology in the United Statesand as a global discoursefor assigning
obligations and entitlements among rich and poor nations.4Nationalism and mod-
ernization held equal place in the postcolonial creed. As EdwardShils observed in
2
Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan,the Canny Neutral,"Nation, Sept. 21, 1964, p. 135.
3 Harry S. Truman,inauguraladdress,Jan. 20, 1949, in PublicPapersof the Presidents,HarryS. Truman,1949:
Containingthe PublicMessages,Speeches,and Statementsof the President,January1 to December31, 1949 (Washing-
ton, 1964), 114-15. "Point IV,"Fortune(Feb. 1950), 88. Henry A. Byroade,"The World'sColonies and Ex-Col-
onies: A Challenge to America,"Departmentof State Bulletin, Nov. 16, 1953, p. 655. JawaharlalNehru, The
DiscoveryofIndia (New York, 1960), 393.
4 On the history of development ideas, see H. W. Arndt, EconomicDevelopment:The Historyof an Idea (Chi-
cago, 1987); Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seers, eds., Pioneersin Development(New York, 1984); M. P. Cowen
and R. W Shenton, Doctrinesof Development(New York, 1996); Nick Cullather, "Development Doctrine and
ModernizationTheory,"in EncyclopediaofAmericanForeignPolicy,ed. AlexanderDeConde, RichardDean Burns,
and FredrikLogevall (3 vols., New York, 2002), I, 477-91. On development as discourse, see Arturo Escobar,
EncounteringDevelopment:TheMaking and Unmakingof the Third World(Princeton, 1995); and Tim Mitchell,
"America'sEgypt: Discourse of the Development Industry,"Middle East Report,169 (March-April 1991), 18-34.
On the social sciences and modernization theory, see Robert A. Packenham,LiberalAmericaand the Third World:
Political DevelopmentIdeas in ForeignAid and Social Science(Princeton, 1973); Nils Gilman, "Pavingthe World
with Good Intentions: The Genesis of ModernizationTheory, 1945-1965" (Ph.D. diss., Universityof California,
Berkeley,2001); FrederickCooper and Randall Packard,eds., InternationalDevelopmentand the Social Sciences:
Essayson the Historyand Politics of Knowledge(Berkeley, 1997); and Christopher Simpson, ed., Universitiesand
Empire:Money,Politics,and the Social Sciencesduring the Cold War(New York, 1998).

Pan American Airlines technician Richard Frisius instructs Afghan pilot candidates in
1960. U.S. development aid through the Helmand Authority helped establish the
national airline, Ariana, and build a modern airport at Kandahar.The airport is today
the U.S. Army'sforwardbase in Afghanistan. Reprintedfrom U.S. OperationsMission to
Afghanistan,AfghanistanBuilds on an Ancient Civilization, 1960.
1960, nearlyeverystate pressedfor policies "thatwill bring them well within the cir-
cle of modernity."But nation-buildingschemes,even successfulones, rarelyunfolded
quietly.The struggles,often subtle and indirect,over dam projects,land reforms,and
planned cities generallyconcernedthe meaningof development,the persons,author-
ities, and idealsthat would be associatedwith the spectacleof progress.To modernize
was to lay claim to the future and the past, to define identitiesand values that would
survive to guide the nation on its journey forward.It was this double sense of time,
according to Clifford Geertz, that gave "new-statenationalism its peculiar air of
being at once hell-bent toward modernity and morally outraged by its manifesta-
tions."5
Vulnerableto shifts in policy, funding, or theoreticalfashion, Cold War-eradevel-
opment schemes sufferedfrom deficienciesreasonablyattributedto their piecemeal
approachand shortagesof commitment, resources,or time. Such failures,JamesFer-
guson has observed,only reinforcedthe paradigm,as modernizationtheory supplied
the necessary explanations while new policy furnished solutions.6 The Helmand
5Edward Shils, "PoliticalDevelopment in the New States,"ComparativeStudiesin Societyand History,2 (April

1960), 265. Clifford Geertz, TheInterpretationof Cultures(New York, 1973), 243.
6 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development,Depoliticization, and BureaucraticPower in the
Third World(New York, 1990), 254-56; see also Michael E. Latham, Modernizationas Ideology:AmericanSocial
Scienceand 'Nation Building"in the KennedyEra (Chapel Hill, 2000), 181.

Modernization 515
schemehad no suchexcuse.It cameunderAmericansupervisionin 1946 and con-

tinueduntil the departureof the last reclamation expertin 1979, outlastingall the
theoriesandrationaleson whichit wasbased.It waslavishlyfundedby U.S. foreign
aid,multilateral loans,andtheAfghangovernment, andit wasthe oppositeof piece-
meal.It wasan "integrated" developmentscheme,with education,industry,agricul-
ture,medicine,andmarketingundera singlecontrollingauthority.Nationbuilding
did not failin Afghanistanforwantof money,time,or imagination.In the Helmand
Valley,the enginesand dreamsof modernization rantheirfull course,spoolingout
acrossthe desertuntiltheyhit limitsof physics,culture,andhistory.
Plannerspresentedthe Helmandprojectas appliedscience,as a rationalization of
natureandsocialorder,buttheyalsotrafficked in dreams.Becauseof its scaleandlon-
gevity,the Helmandventureassumedrolesin a successionof modernizingmyths.
Modernization, MichaelLathamnotes,demandeda "projection of Americaniden-
ExportinganAmericanmodelof progress
tity."7 requiredcontinualredefinition of the
sourcesof Americangreatness andrenewedeffortsto plantits uniquecharacteristics in
foreignlandscapes. The New Deal,the New Look,andthe New Frontiereachrevised
thestakesandsymbolismof development, andeachhadto interlacethesefilamentsof
meaningwith the webs of significanceAfghanswove aroundthe project.Within
Afghanistan's government, the impulseto modernizewentbackto the earlytwentieth
centurywhentribalandethnicloyaltieswerereformedas a nationalidentity.Planting
a moderncitynextto the colossalruinsof QalaBistwasa calculated gestureasserting
an imaginedline of successionfrom the eleventh-and twelfth-century Ghaznavid
dynastyto the royalfamilypresidingin Kabul.The Helmandprojectsymbolizedthe
transformation of thenation,representingthelegitimacyof themonarchy, the expan-
sion of statepower,and the destinyof the Pashtunrace.Everydevelopmentscheme
involvesrepresentations of this kind,and a complexprojectcan accommodate over-
lappingsetsof symbolicmeaningsthatjustifyandsustainit, evenin failure.
The AccidentalNation
Afghanistan,at its origin,wasan emptyspaceon the mapthatwasnot Persian,not
Russian,not British,"apurelyaccidentalgeographic unit,"accordingto LordGeorge
N. Curzon,who put the finishingtoucheson its silhouette.Boththe monarchyand
the nationemergedfromstrategiesBritainusedto pacifythe Pashtunpeoplesalong
India'snorthwestfrontierin the last half of the nineteenthcentury.Consistingof
nomadic,seminomadic,and settled communitieswith no common languageor
ancestry,Pashtuns(Pathansin Hindustani)madeup for colonialofficialsa single
racialgrouping.8Theyoccupieda strategically vitalregionstretchingfromthesouth-
ernslopesof theHinduKushrangethroughthe northernIndusValleyinto Kashmir.
I Michael Latham, "Introduction:Modernization
Theory, InternationalHistory, and the Global Cold War,"in
StagingGrowth,ed. David Engermanet al. (Boston, forthcoming, 2002); Akhil Gupta, PostcolonialDevelopments:
Agriculturein the Making ofModern India (Durham, 1998), 40-42.
8 Lord George N. Curzon quoted in Cuthbert Collin Davies, The Problemof the North-WestFrontier,1890-
1908 (Cambridge, 1932), 153. Defining the Pashtun threat in the absence of reliable linguistic or pigmentary
markerswas a vital strategicand scientific undertaking.A summary of the early ethnographicwork is contained in

60 64 68 72 76
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John Cowles Prichard,Researches into the PhysicalHistoryofMankind (4 vols., London, 1844), IV, 81-9 1; see also
H. G. Raverty,"The Independent Afghan or PatanTribes,"ImperialandAsiatic QuarterlyReviewand Orientaland
Colonial Review,7 (1894), 312-26; R. C. Temple, "Remarkson the Afghans Found along the Route of the Tal
Chotiali Field Force in the Spring of 1879,"Journalof theAsiatic Societyof Bengal,49 (no. 1, 1880), 91-106; and
H. W. Bellew, The Racesof Afghanistan:Being a BriefAccount of the Principal Nations Inhabiting That Country
(Calcutta, 1880). See also Conrad Schetter, "The Chimera of Ethnicity in Afghanistan,"Neue ZfircherZeitung,
Oct. 31, 2001 <http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/2001/10/31Lafghanistan.html>(Nov. 9, 2001). On the
importance of ethnology to the colonial mission, see Gyan Prakash,AnotherReason:Scienceand the Imaginationof
ModernIndia (Princeton, 1999), 26-30.
9 George McMunn, Afghanistanfrom Darius to Amanullah (London, 1929), 225-28; SultanaAfroz, "Afghani-
stan in U.S.-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1960," CentralAsian Survey,8 (no. 2, 1989), 133.

Modernization 517
uplandgrazingareas,the DurandLinerestrictedPashtunautonomyand facilitated

newformsof indirectinfluenceoverpeopleson bothsidesof it.10
Ratherthandemarcating the spatiallimit of Britishsovereignty,
the DurandLine
markeda divisionbetweentypesof imperialcontrol.On the Indiaside, a smaller
Pashtunpopulation,the "assured clans,"couldbe co-optedand deployedas a proxy
armyagainstPashtunson the Afghanside,precludingthe emergenceof a regimein
Kabulhostileto Britishinterests.The Mohammadzai-theclanof ZahirShah,ruler
of Afghanistan from1933 to 1973-was sucha subalternforce,benefitingfromBrit-
ish powerwithoutbeingfullyconstrainedby it."1Straddlingthe KhyberPass,they
usedsubsidiesandarmsto overwhelmtheirrivalson theAfghanside.Thisvarietyof
indirectrule,knownas the ForwardPolicy,keptAfghanistanfirmlyunderBritish
influenceforthe firsthalfof the twentiethcentury.'2
The DurandLinecomplementeda culturalstrategyof pacificationknownas the
Pathan(Pashtun)Renaissance,throughwhich colonialagentsalignedtheir own
interestswith thoseof theirtribalallies.Cultivatinga Pashtunidentityas a unitary
Cpure" racein contrastto the "mixed"Tajiks,Baluchis,Hazaras,and otherswith
whom theyweremingled,colonialofficialsinventedthe reputationof the Pashtuns
as a warriorcaste.They were"ourchaps,"naturalrulers,the equalsof the British.
"You're whitepeople,sons of Alexander,and not like common,blackMohammed-
ans,"the title characterof RudyardKipling'sTheMan WhoWouldBe King(1891)
explainedto theAfghans.Pashtunswereentitledto subsidies,to rankin the Indian
army,and to a directrelationshipto the Crown.Schoolinginternalizedthe racial
taxonomy,supplantingallegiancesto village,family,andclanwhilelinkingPashtun
identitywith modernization.Edwardesand Islamiacolleges,foundedin Peshawar
in the earlytwentiethcentury,inculcateda consciousnessof Pashtunnationhood
and suggested"theplacewhichthe Pathanmightfill in the developmentof a sub-
continent."An awareness of racedistinguishedthe literatefew fromthe vastmajor-
ity of uneducatedAfghans,who wereunableto discriminatebetweenethnographic
types.13
10 Davies, Problem of the North-WestFrontier, 162-63; C. L. Sulzberger,"Nomads Swarming over Khyber

Pass,"New YorkTimes,April 24, 1950, p. 6. On the British construction of "Afghanistan,"see Nigel J. R. Allan,
"Defining Place and People in Afghanistan,"Post-SovietGeographyand Economics,41 (no. 8, 2001), 545-60.
" W K. Fraser-Tytler,Afghanistan:A Study of Political Developmentsin Centraland SouthernAsia (London,
1953), 332. British officials located the Mohammadzai'shomeland in Hastnagar,now in Pakistan:India Army,
General Staff,A Dictionaryofthe Pathan Tribes(Calcutta, 1910), 34.
12 J. G. Elliott, TheFrontier,1839-1947 (London, 1968), 53. Afghan nationalistsbelieved Britain had secretly
annexed Afghanistanby supporting the Mohammadzai,leading the constitutionalistYoungAfghan movement to
assassinateboth the king, Nadir Shah, and his brother, Mohammad Aziz, who was ambassadorto Germany. In
1933 an attempt was also made on the British embassy. Hasan Kakar,"Trendsin Modern Afghan History,"in
Afghanistanin the 1970s, ed. Louis Dupree and Linette Albert (New York, 1974), 31; McMunn, Afghanistanfrom
Darius to Amanullah, 228.
13 Akbar S. Ahmend, "An Aspect of the Colonial Encounter in the North-West Frontier Province,"Asian
Affairs, 9 (Oct. 1978), 319-27. Rudyard Kipling, The Man Who WouldBe King (1891), in The One Volume
Kipling (New York, 1932), 735. Olaf Caroe, The Pathans,550 B.C.-A.D. 1957 (Karachi, 1958), 429-30. In 1962,
the anthropologist Louis Dupree tried a free association experiment on students at Kabul University using the
terms "Afghanistan,""United States,"etc. Students identified Afghanistan and the United States as "white"coun-
tries, Pakistanand India as "black-skinned."Louis Dupree, "LandlockedImages: Snap Responses to an Informal
Questionnaire,"AmericanUniversitiesField StaffReports,SouthAsia Series,6 (June 1962), 51-73.

518 TheJournalof AmericanHistory September
2002
As it was meant to, the sublimationof the Pashtunsreconfiguredpolitics on both

sides of the frontier.When Nadir Shah crossed the Durand Line and seized Kabul
from the Tajiksin 1929, he establisheda monarchy based on Pashtun nationalism
with overtonesof scientific racism.Comprisingless than half the Afghan population,
Pashtunsclaimed an entitlement based on their statusas an advancedrace, the bear-
ers of modernityand progress.14 PunitiveexpeditionsagainstTajiksin the north and
Hazarasin the south and west, in which German-madeaircraftsupportedmounted
troops, broke the autonomous power of these regions,opening them to Pashtunset-
tlement. Nadir Shah built a professionalarmy-new in Afghan tradition-of forty
thousandtroops,linked by kinship and personalloyaltyto the monarchyand trained
by Frenchand Germanadvisers.15 A systemof secularizedschools and a changeof the
national language from Dari, a Persian dialect, to Pashto demonstrated the new
regime'sdeterminationto bring Afghanistan'sungovernabletribes under the control
of a rationalized,centralstate.
For Nadir Shah and his son Zahir,who assumedthe throne afterhis father'sassas-
sination in 1933, political survivaldependedon enlargingand deepeningthe author-
ity of the state. To its new rulers, Afghanistanwas an unknown and dangerous
country.It had few roads,only six miles of rail (all of it in Kabul), and few internal
telegraphor phone lines. For most of the ten or twelve million Afghans (Afghanistan
has never completed a census), encountersof any kind with the centralgovernment
were rare and unpleasant.Laws were made and enforced in accordancewith local
custom and without referenceto the state; internaltaxes existed only on paper.Evi-
dence of royal authority-easily visible on Kabul streets patrolled by Prussian-hel-
meted palace guards-disappeared as rapidly as the pavement beneath a traveler
leavingthe city in any direction.There were no cadastralmaps, city plans, or housing
registries,an absencethat madeAfghanistanless legible,and thereforeless governable,
than countriesthat had been formallycolonized."6Modern states are able to govern
through manipulation of abstractions-unemployment, public opinion, literacy
rates,etc.-but in Afghanistaninterventionsof any kind, and the reactionsto them,
were brutally concrete. The prime minister, the king's uncle, on his infrequent
inspection tours of the countryside,traveledunderheavyguard.17
Zahir Shah sought help from Japanese,Italian, and German advisers,who laid
plans for a modern networkof communicationsand roads. In 1937 a German-built
radio tower in Kabul allowed instant links to remote villages and the outside world
14 Arnold Fletcher,Afghanistan:Highway of Conquest(Ithaca, 1965), 245. Alfred Janata, "Afghanistan:The

Ethnic Dimension," in The CulturalBasisofAfghanNationalism,ed. EwanW Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree
(New York, 1990), 62.
15 The campaign against the KuhestaniTajiksnorth of Kabul was particularlysevere. Prisonerswere executed
by being blown from the mouths of cannon. "ElevenAfghans Blown from Guns at Kabul,"New YorkTimes,April
6, 1930, p. 8; "AfghanRevolt Reported,"ibid., Nov. 21, 1932, p. 7; Vladimir Cervin, "Problemsin the Integra-
tion of the Afghan Nation," Middle EastJournal,6 (Autumn 1952), 407; BhalwantBhaneja,Afghanistan:Political
Modernizationof a Mountain Kingdom(New Delhi, 1973), 20.
16 Louis Dupree, "ANote on Afghanistan,"AmericanUniversities Field Staff Reports,SouthAsia Series,4 (Aug.
1960), 13. Afghanistan was the type of "illegible"state described by James C. Scott, Seeing like a State (New
Haven, 1998), 77-78.
17 Rosita Forbes,"AfghanDictator,"LiteraryDigest, Oct. 16, 1937, P. 29.

Modernization 519
for the firsttime.Througha nationalbankandstatecartels,the governmentsuper-

viseda cautiousand tightlycontrolledeconomicmodernization. Germanengineers
built textilemills, powerplants,and carpetand furniturefactoriesto be run by
monopoliesunderroyallicense.'8Taxcodesand statetradingfirmsbeganto bring
lawlesssectors,such as stock raisingand trading,within reachof accountantsand
assessors in Kabul.Theseeffortsmetwithsporadic-andoccasionally bloody-resis-
the in
tance,but regimepersisted slowly,firmly,laying "thebarren politicsof abstrac-
tion andprinciple" over"thewarm,cruelpoliticsof the heart."'9
DuringWorldWarII the UnitedStatesreplacedGermanyas the externalpartner
in the young king'splans.The Holocaustand submarinewarfarecausedAfghani-
stan'sexternaltradeto undergoa suddenandadvantageous reorientation.One of the
country'schiefexportswaskarakul,the peltof the Persianfat-tailedsheepconverted
in the handsof skilledfurriersinto the glossyblackfurknownas astrakhan, karacul,
or Persianlamb. The formercentersof fur making,Leipzig,London,and Paris,
closeddown duringthe waryears,and the industrymovedin its entiretyto New
York.From1942 throughthe 1970s,New Yorkfurriersconsumednearlythe entire
Afghanexport,two and a half millionskinsa year,which resoldas lustrousblack
coatsandhatsrangingin pricefrom$400 to $3,500.A tinyfractionof the retailrev-
enue went back to Afghanistan,but the fractionsadded up. The government
employedexchangeratemanipulations to exactan effectivetax rateof over50 per-
cent on karakul,makingit the country'smostlucrativesourceof exchangeaswellas
revenue.Afghanistan endedWorldWarII with $100 millionin reserves,and,in the
midst of the postwar"dollargap"crisisin internationalliquidity,Afghanistanwas
favoredwitha smallbutsteadysourceof dollarearnings.20
The collapseof the BritishEmpirecreateda chancefor Pashtunreunification and
lent new significanceto the modernization project.Fromthe vantageof Kabul,the
partitionof Indiain 1947 endedwhateverjustificationthe DurandLinehad once
had.A Pashtunseparatistmovementemergedin Peshawar and Kashmir,and,with
the encouragement of India,ZahirShahproposedthe creationof an ethnicstate-
Pushtunistan-consistingof most of northernPakistan,which would give the
assuredclansan option to mergewith Kabulat somefuturedate.It wasa hopeless
proposal-the frontierwas internationally recognized-but the king stuck to it
ratherthan allowPakistanto inheritthe decisiveinstrumentsand influenceof the
ForwardPolicy.The assuredclansrepresenteda continuingthreatto the Afghan
state.After 1947, membersof the royalfamilyspokeof buildingin Afghanistana
secure,prosperous baseforthe recoveryof Pashtunlands.21
18
Donald N. Wilber, ed., Afghanistan(New Haven, 1956), 238-43.
19LawrenceDurrell, ProsperosCell (New York, 1996), 72.
20
"KarakulSheep,"Life,July 16, 1945, pp. 65-68; Peter G. Franck, "Problemsof Economic Development in
Afghanistan,"Middle EastJournal, 3 (July 1949), 302. Abdul Haj Kayoumy, "Monopoly Pricing of Afghan Kara-
kul in International Markets,"Journal of Political Economy 77 (March-April 1969), 219-37; Ali Mohammed,
"Karakulas the Most ImportantArticle of Afghan Trade,"Afghanistan(Kabul), 4 (Dec. 1949), 48-53. The 'dollar
gap"was a global shortage of dollar reservesand dollar earnings that threatened to stifle economic recoveryand
internationaltrade. See William S. Borden, ThePacificAlliance: UnitedStatesForeignEconomicPolicyandJapanese
TradeRecovery,1947-1955 (Madison, 1984).
21
Najibullah Khan, "SpeechDelivered over the Radio,"Afghanistan(Kabul), 3 (April-June 1948), 13.

2002
Over the next two decades the Pushtunistancontroversydrew Afghanistaninto

the Cold War. U.S. diplomats dismissed it as fantasy,but to the Afghan monarchy
Pushtunistanwas as solid as France.A visitor in 1954 found governmentoffices in
Kabul hung with maps on which the "narrow,wriggly object" plainly appeared,
"wedgedin betweenAfghanistanon one flank, and the remainsof West Pakistanon
the other."The dispute periodicallyturned hot, with reciprocalsackingof embassies
and border incidents that graduallyconverted the Durand Line into the kind of
politico-geographicfeaturethat typified the Cold War,an impassableboundary.The
movement of goods acrossthe frontierwas tightly restricted,and in 1962 Pakistan
closed the passes to migration, terminatingthe seasonal movement of the herds.22
From the mid-1950s until the end of the Soviet occupation, Afghan exports and
imports moved almost exclusively through the Soviet Union, which discounted
freightratesto encouragethe dependency.23
In the immediateaftermathof WorldWarII, however,the SovietUnion was preoc-
cupied with internalreconstruction,and Afghanistanlooked to the United Statesfor
help in consolidatinga centralizedstatethat could assumeresponsibilityfor the public
welfare.24Through its developmentprograms,the monarchyassumeda relationship
of trusteeshipover the nation, presentingthe king as retainingcustody of the state
duringa dangeroustransitionalperiod but readyto relinquishpoweronce modernity
was achieved.Official terminologycoupled underdevelopmentand Afghan identity.
"Afghanistanis a backwardcountry,"insistedMohammedDaoud, the king'sbrother-
in-law, cousin, and prime minister. "We must do something about it or die as a
nation."25Large-scaledevelopment projects,visible signs of national energy,would
stake a claim to the future for the Pashtunsand to the present for the royal family.
One such schemeparticularlyappealedto the king;he wanted to build a dam.
A TVAfor the Hindu Kush
Nothing becomes antiquatedfasterthan symbols of the future, and it is difficult, at

only fifty years remove, to envision the hold concrete dams once had on the global
imagination.In the mid-twentiethcentury,the austerelines of the Hoover Dam and
its radiatingspans of high-tension wire inscribed federal power on the American
landscape.Vladimir Lenin famously remarkedthat Communism was Soviet power
plus electrification,an equationcapturedby the David Lean film Dr. Zhivago(1965)
in the image of water surging, as a kind of redemption, from the spillway of an
immense Soviet dam. In 1954, standing at the Bhakra-Nangalcanal, Nehru
describeddams as the temples of modern India. "'Whichplace can be greaterthan
22
Ian Stephens, HornedMoon (Bloomington, 1955), 263. See the series of reports by Louis Dupree, "'Push-
tunistan':The Problem and Its LargerImplications,"American UniversitiesField Staff Reports,SouthAsia Series,5
(Nov.-Dec. 1961), 19-51.
23 S. M. M. Quereshi, "Pakhtunistan: The FrontierDispute between Afghanistanand Pakistan,"PacificAffairs,
39 (Spring-Summer 1966), 99-144; on the U.S. position, see Dennis Kux, The UnitedStatesand Pakistan,1947-
2000 (Baltimore,2000), 42-43, 78; and Afroz, "Afghanistanin U.S.-PakistanRelations,"138-40.
24
Paul Overby,Holy Blood:An Inside Viewof theAfghan War(Westport, 1993), 30.
25
Louis Dupree, "AnInformalTalk with Prime Minister Daoud," Sept. 13, 1959, American UniversitiesField
StaffReports,SouthAsia Series,3 (Sept. 1959), 18.

Damming Afghanistan:Modernizationin a BufferState 521
Morrison Knudsen engineers surveyed and built the

Helmand Valley project's major works between 1946
and 1960. The Soviet pressdescribedthe company as "a
kind of training centre where young Afghans are
moulded to [an] American pattern. Reprintedfrom
Collier's,Aug. 2, 1952.
this,"he declared,"thisBhakra-Nangal,where thousandsof men have worked, have

shed their blood and sweat, and laid down their lives as well? . .. When we see big
works, our staturegrows with them, and our minds open out a little."2 For Nehru,
for Zahir Shah, for China today,the greatblankwall of a dam was a screenon which
they would projectthe future.
Dams also symbolized the sacrificeof the individual to the greatergood of the
state. A dam project allows, even requires,a state to appropriateand redistribute
land, plan factoriesand economies, tell people what to make and grow, design and
build new housing, roads,schools, and centersof commerce.Tour guides are fond of
telling about the worker (or workers)accidentallyentombed in dams, and construc-
tion of these vast works customarilyrequireshuge, unnamed sacrifices.To displace
thousands from ancestralhomes and farms, bulldoze graveyardsand mosques, and
eraseall traceof memory and historyfrom the land is a processfamiliarto us today as
ethnic cleansing. But when done in conjunction with dam construction, it is called
land reclamationand can be justified even in democraticsystems by the calculus of
development. India'sinterior minister,MorarjiDesai, told a public gatheringat the
unfinished Pong Dam in 1961 that "wewill requestyou to move from your houses
26JawaharlalNehru, "Speechat the Opening of the Nangal Canal,"July 8, 1954, in JawaharlalNehru'sSpeeches

(4 vols., Delhi, 1958), III, 353.

522 TheJournalof AmericanHistory 2002
September
afterthe dam comes up. If you move, it will be good. Otherwisewe shall releasethe
watersand drownyou all."27
A dam-building project would vastly expand and intensify the authority that
could be exercisedby the centralgovernmentat Kabul.Remakingand regulatingthe
physicalenvironmentof an entire regionwould, for the first time, translateAfghani-
stan into the legible inventoriesof materialand human resourcesin the manner of
modern states. In 1946, using its karakulrevenue,the Afghan governmenthired the
largestAmericanheavy engineeringfirm, Morrison Knudsen, Inc., of Boise, Idaho,
to build a dam. MorrisonKnudsen, builder of the Hoover Dam, the San Francisco
Bay Bridge,and later the launch complex at Cape Canaveral,specializedin symbols
of the future.The firm operatedall overthe world, boringtunnels throughthe Andes
in Peru, laying airfieldsin Turkey.Its engineers,who called themselvesEmkayans,
would be drawing up specifications for a complex of dams in the gorges of the
YangtzeRiver in 1949 when Mao Zedong's People'sLiberationArmy drove them
out.28The firm set up shop in an old Moghul palace outside Kandaharand began
surveyingthe Helmand Valley.
The Helmand and Arghandabriversconstitute Afghanistan'slargestriversystem,
draininga watershedcoveringhalf the country.Originatingin the Hindu Kush a few
miles from Kabul,the Helmand travelsthroughuplanddells thick with orchardsand
vineyards before merging with the Arghandabtwenty-five miles from Kandahar,
turning west acrossthe arid plain of Registanand emptying into the Sistan marshes
of Iran. The valley was reputedly the site of a vast irrigationworks destroyed by
Genghis Khan in the thirteenthcentury.The entire areais dry,catchingtwo to three
inches of rain a year.Consequently,riverflows fluctuateunpredictablywithin a wide
range,varyingfrom 2,000 to 60,000 cubic feet per second.29Beforebeginning, Mor-
rison Knudsenhad to createan infrastructureof roadsand bridgesto allow the move-
ment of equipment.Typically,they would also conduct extensivestudies on soils and
drainage,but the companyand the Afghangovernmentconvinced themselvesthat in
this case it was not necessary,that "evena 20 percent marginof error. .. could not
detractfrom the project'sintrinsicvalue."30
The promise of dams is that they are a renewableresource,furnishingpower and
waterindefinitelyand with little effortonce the projectis complete, but dam projects
aresubjectto ecologicalconstraintsthat are often more severeoutside of the temper-
ate zone. Siltation, which now threatensmany New Deal-era dams, advancesmore
quicklyin aridand tropicalclimates.Canalirrigationinvolvesa specialset of hazards.
ArundhatiRoy, the voice of India'santidammovement, explainsthat "perennialirri-
gation does to soil roughlywhat anabolicsteroidsdo to the human body,"stimulat-
27 On the political uses to which dams have been put, see Ann Danaiya Usher, Dams as Aid: A PoliticalAnat-
omy of NordicDevelopmentThinking(New York, 1997). MorarjiDesai quoted in Arundhati Roy, The Costof Liv-
ing (New York, 1999), 13.
28 Robert De Roos, "He Changes the Face of the Earth,"Colliers,Aug. 2, 1952, pp. 28-30.
29 A. H. H. Abidi, "Irano-AfghanDispute over the Helmand Waters,"InternationalStudies(New Delhi), 16
(July 1977), 358-59; Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan,8.

30 Aloys Arthur Michel, The Kabul, Kunduz, and Helmand Valleys and the National EconomyofAfghanistan:A
Studyof RegionalResources and the ComparativeAdvantagesof Development(Washington, 1959), 153.

DammingAfghanistan:
Modernization
in a BufferState 523
ing ordinaryearth to produce multiple crops in the firstyearswhile slowly rendering

the soil infertile.31Largereservoirsraise the water table in the surroundingarea, a
problem worsened by extensive irrigation.Waterloggingitself can destroy harvests,
but it producesmore permanentdamage, too. In waterloggedsoils, capillaryaction
pulls soluble salts and alkaliesto the surface,leading to desertification.Earlyreports
warnedthat the Helmand Valleywas vulnerable,that it had gravellysubsoilsand salt
deposits.The Emkayansknew Middle Easternriverswere often unsuited to extensive
irrigationschemes. But these apprehensions'"impactwas minimized by one or both
parties."32From the start, the Helmand projectwas primarilyabout nationalprestige
and only secondarilyabout the social benefitsof increasingagriculturalproductivity.
Signs of trouble appearedalmost immediately.Even when only half completed,
the first dam, a small diversion dam at the mouth of the Boghra canal, raised the
water table to within a few inches of the surfaceof the ground.A snowy crust of salt
could be seen in areasaround the reservoir.In 1949, the engineersand the govern-
ment faced a decision. Tearingdown the dam would have resultedin a loss of face for
the monarchy and Morrison Knudsen, but from an engineering standpoint the
projectcould no longer be justified.The necessaryreconsiderationnever took place,
however,becauseit was at this moment that the unlucky Boghraworkswas enfolded
into the global projectof development.
Truman'sPoint IV addressreconfiguredthe relationshipbetween the United States
and newly independentnations. The confrontationbetween colonizerand colonized,
rich and poor, was with a rhetoricalgesturereplacedby a world order in which all
nationswere either developedor developing.The presidentexplicitlylinked develop-
ment to Americanstrategicand economic objectives.Povertywas a threatnot just to
the poor but to their richerneighbors,he argued,and alleviatingmiserywould assure
a generalprosperity,lessening the chances of war.33But the "triumphantaction"of
development supersededthe merely ideological conflict of the Cold War:Commu-
nism and capitalismwere competing carriersbound for the same destination.Devel-
opment justified interventions on a grand scale and made obedience to foreign
technicians the duty of every responsible government. Afghanistan-solvent,
untouched by the recent war, and able to hire technicianswhen it needed them-
suddenly became "underdeveloped" and, owing to its position borderingthe Soviet
Union, the likely recipient of substantialassistance.Point IV's technical aid could
take many forms-clinics, schools, new livestock breeds, assays for minerals and
31 Scientists believe the ecological effects of large dams may include global climate change, seismic distur-
bances, and a quickening of the earth'srotation; for an inventory of environmental effects, see Egil Skofteland,
FreshwaterResources: EnvironmentalEducationModule (Paris, 1995); FranceBequette, "LargeDams," UNESCOCou-
rier,50 (March 1997), 44-46; Robert S. Divine, "The Troublewith Dams,"AtlanticMonthly(Aug. 1995), 64-74;
and PeterColes, "LargeDams-The End of an Era,"UNESCOCourier,53 (April2000), 10-11. Roy, Costof Living,
68.
32 VandanaShiva, The Violenceof the GreenRevolution(London, 1997), 121-39. Michel, Kabul, Kunduz, and
Helmand Valleysand the National EconomyofAfghanistan,152-53.
33 Gilbert Rist, TheHistoryof Development: From WesternOriginsto GlobalFaith, trans. PatrickCamiller (New
York, 1997), 70-75. Harry S. Truman, "Remarksto the American Society of Civil Engineers,"Nov. 2, 1949, Pub-
lic Papersof the Presidents,HarryS. Truman,1949, 547.

2002
petroleum-but the uncompleted Boghra works was an invitation to something

grander,a reproductionof an Americandevelopmentaltriumph.
When Trumanthought of aid, he thought of dams, specificallyof the Tennessee
ValleyAuthority(WVA),the complexof dams on the TennesseeRiverthat transformed
the economy of the upper South. "ATVA in the YangtzeValleyand the Danube,"he
proposedto the TWAs director,David Lilienthal;"Thesethings can be done and don't
let anybodytell you different.When they happen,when millions and millions of peo-
ple are no longer hungryand pushed and harassed,then the causesof war will be less
by that much."Truman'sinternationalization of the TVA repositionedthe New Deal for
a McCarthyiteage. Dams were the Americanalternativeto Communist land reform,
ArthurM. Schlesingerarguedin The Vital Center.Insteadof a "cruderedistribution"
of land,Americanengineerscould create"wonderlandsof vegetationand power"from
the desert.The WVAwas "aweapon which, if properlyemployed,might outbid all the
socialruthlessnessof the Communistsfor the supportof the peoplesof Asia."34
The TVA had totemic significancefor Americanliberals,but in the diplomaticset-
ting it had the additionalfunction of redefiningpolitical conflict as a technicalprob-
lem. Britain'ssolution to Afghanistan'stribalwars had been to script feuds of blood,
honor, and faith within the linear logic of boundarycommissions, containing con-
flict within two-dimensionalspace. The United Statesset aside the maps and replot-
ted tribalenmities on hydrologiccharts.Resolutionbecamea matterof apportioning
cubic yardsof water and kilowatt-hoursof energy.Assurancesof inevitableprogress
furtherdisplacedconflict into the future;if all sides could be convinced that resource
flows would increase,problemswould vanish,in bureaucraticparlance,downstream.
Over the next two decadesthe United Stateswould propose riverauthorityschemes
as solutions to the most intractableinternationalconflicts: Palestine ("Waterfor
Peace")and the Kashmirdispute. In 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson famouslysuggesteda
Mekong RiverAuthorityas an alternativeto the Vietnam War.35
Afghanistanapplied for and receiveda $12 million Export-ImportBank loan for
the Helmand Valleyin 1950, the first of over $80 million over the next fifteen years.
Afghanistan'sloan requestcontaineda line for soil surveys,but the bank refusedit as
an unnecessaryexpense.Point IV supplied technicalsupport.36In 1952, the national
government created the Helmand Valley Authority-later the Helmand and
ArghandabValley Authority (HAvA)-removing 1,800 square miles of river valley
from local control and placing it under the jurisdiction of expert commissions in
34 Truman quoted in Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalismand Its Challengers: FDR to Reagan(New York, 1985), 72-
73. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Vital Center:ThePoliticsof Freedom(London, 1970), 233.
35 On the JordanValley project, see "PressConference:Statement by the Secretary,"
Departmentof State Bulle-
tin, Nov. 30, 1953, p. 750; and "EricJohnston Leaveson Mission to Near East,"ibid., Oct. 26, 1953, p. 553.
David Ekbladh, "AWorkshop for the World: Modernization as a Tool in U.S. Foreign Relations in Asia, 1914-
1974" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University,2002); Lloyd C. Gardner,Pay Any Price:LyndonJohnsonand the Wars
for Vietnam(Chicago, 1995), 191.
36 C. L. Sulzberger,"AfghanShah Asks World Bank Loan,"New YorkTimes,April 20, 1950, p. 15; Cynthia
Clapp-Wincek and Emily Baldwin, The Helmand ValleyProjectin Afghanistan(Washington, 1983). On the soil
survey refusal,see Lloyd Baron, "SectorAnalysis-Helmand ArghandabValley Region: An Analysis,"typescript,
Feb. 1973, p. 15 (Libraryof Congress, Washington, D.C.). On Point IV, see Department of State, International
Cooperation Administration,Fact Sheet:Mutual Securityin Action,Afghanistan(Washington, 1959).

The Arghandab Dam, 200 feethigh anda thirdof a milelong,washeraldedat its completionin
1952 as a majesticsymbolof technologicalprowess.Later,U.S. diplomatscomplainedthat the
Americanreputationhung on "astripof concrete."Reprintedfrom Missionto
U.S. Operations
Afghanistan
Afghanistan, Buildson anAncientCivilization,1960.
Kabul. The monarchypoured money into the project;a fifth of the centralgovern-
ment's total expenditureswent into HAVA in the 1950s and early 1960s. From 1946
on, the salariesof Morrison Knudsen'sadvisersand techniciansabsorbedan amount
equivalentto Afghanistan'stotal exports.Without adequatemechanismsfor tax col-
lection, the royal treasurypassedcosts on to agriculturalproducersthrough inflation
and the diversion of export revenue, offsetting any gains irrigation produced.37
Although it pulled in millions in internationalfunding, HAVA soaked up the small
reservesof individual farmersand may well have reduced the total national invest-
ment in agriculture.
HAVA supplemented the initial dam with a vast complex of dams. Two large
dams-the 200-foot-high ArghandabDam and the 320-foot-high KajakaiDam-
for storage and hydropowerwere supplementedby diversiondams, drainageworks,
and irrigationcanals. Reaching out from the reservoirswere three hundred miles of
concrete-linedcanals. Three of the longer canals, the Tarnak,Darweshan,and Sha-
malan, fed riparianlands alreadyintensivelycultivatedand irrigatedby an elaborate
system of tunnels, flumes, and canalsknown as juis. The new, wider canalsfurnished
an ampler and purportedlymore reliablewater source. The Zahir Shah Canal sup-
plied Kandaharwith water from the Arghandabreservoir,and two canals stretched
out into the desert to polders of reclaimeddesert:Marjaand Nad-i-Ali. Each exten-
sion of the project requiredmore land acquisition and displaced more people. To
remain flexible, the royal government and Morrison Knudsen kept the question of
who actuallyowned the land in abeyance.No system of titles was instituted, and the
bulk of the reclaimedland was farmedby tenants of MorrisonKnudsen, the govern-
ment, or contractorshired by the government.38
37Wilber, ed., Afghanistan,169. Emadi, State, Revolution,and Superpowersin Afghanistan,53. Nake M. Kam-
reny,Peacefil Competitionin Afghanistan:Americanand SovietModelsfor EconomicAid (Washington, 1969), 29.
38 Senate, U.S. Congress, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, South Asia: Reporton U.S.
ForeignAssistancePrograms,85 Cong., 1 sess., March 1957, p. 23. Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"17, 31.

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Modernization 527
The new systems magnified the problems encounteredat the Boghraworks and
added new ones. Waterloggingcreateda persistentweed problem.The storagedams
removed silt that once rejuvenatedfields downstream.Deposits of salt or gypsum
would erupt into long-distancecanalsand be carriedoff to deaden the soil of distant
fields. The Emkayanshad to contend with unpredictableflows triggeredby snow-
melt in the Hindu Kush. In 1957, floods nearly breacheddams in two places, and
water tables rose, salinating soils throughout the region. The reservoirsand large
canalsalso loweredthe watertemperature,makingplots that once held vineyardsand
orchardssuitableonly for growinggrain.39Aftera decadeof work, HAVAcould not set
a scheduleor a plan for completion. As its engineeringfailuresmounted, HAvA-s sym-
bolic weight in the Cold Warand in Afghanistan'sethnic politics steadilygrew.
Like the TvA, HAVAwas a multipurposeriverauthority.U.S. officialsdescribedit as
"a major social engineeringproject,"responsiblefor river development but also for
education, housing, health care, roads, communications, agriculturalresearchand
extension,and industrialdevelopmentin the valley.The U.S. ambassadorin Kabulin
1962 noted that, if successful,HAVAwould boost Afghanistan's"earningsof foreign
exchangeand, if properlydevised,could fosterthe growthof a strataof small holders
which would give the country more stability."This billiard-ballalignment of capital
accumulation,class formation, and political evolution was a core propositionof the
social science approachto modernizationthat was just making the leap from univer-
sity think tanks to centersof policy making.An uneasinessabout the massive,barely
understoodforces impelling two-thirdsof the world in simultaneousand irreversible
social movement-surging population growth, urbanization,the collapse of tradi-
tional authority-overshadowed policy toward "underdeveloped" areas.Moderniza-
tion theory offeredreassurancethat the techniquesof Point IV could disciplinethese
processesand turn them to the advantageof the United States. Development, the
economistsWaltW. Rostowand Max Millikanof the MassachusettsInstituteof Tech-
nology assuredthe cIA (CentralIntelligenceAgency) in 1954, could create"anenvi-
ronmentin which societieswhich directlyor indirectlymenaceourswill not evolve."40
A StrangeKind of Cold War
Following behavioralexplanationsof development, U.S. aid officials sought to ally

themselveswith tutelaryelites possessingthe transitionalpersonalitiesthat could gen-
erate nonviolent, nonrevolutionarychange. At first glance, the king and his retinue
appearedalmost ideallysuited. Educatedin Europeand the United States,royalgov-
ernment officials spoke in familiarterms of ways to engineer progress.Mohammed
Daoud presided as supreme technocrat. Educated (like the king) in Franceand at
39 Ira Moore Stevens and K. Tarzi,EconomicsofAgriculturalProductionin Helmand Valley, Afghanistan(Den-

ver, 1965), 30, 38.
40 Department of State, "Elements of U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan,"March 27, 1962, p. 17, Declassified
DocumentsReferenceSystem(microfiche, Carrollton Press, 1978), fiche 65B; see also Clapp-Wincekand Baldwin,
Helmand ValleyProject,5. Department of State, "Elementsof U.S. Policy towardAfghanistan,"17. Max Millikan
and Walt W. Rostow, "Notes on Foreign Economic Policy,"May 21, 1954, in Universitiesand Empire,ed. Simp-
son, 41.

2002
English schools in Kabul, he became prime minister in 1953. "We membersof the
royalfamily,"he told the anthropologistLouis Dupree, "wereall trainedin the West
and have adopted Western ideas as our own.""4Since coming to power in 1953,
Daoud had acceleratedthe tempo of economic development,believing that without
rapidgrowthAfghanistanwould dissolveinto factionalismand be divided among its
neighbors.He was sure that U.S. and Soviet generositysprangfrom temporarycon-
ditions and that his governmenthad only a short time in which to take all it could.
To American officials, Afghan modernizersappearedtoo eager, too ready to jump
ahead without the necessary planning and information-gatheringsteps, and too
readyto take aid from any source. Daoud's receptivenessto Soviet and Chinese aid
was particularlytroubling.As Dupree put it, "Anation does not accept technology
without ideology.A machineor a dam is a productof a culture."42
Daoud's regime made no effort to disguise its chauvinism.Controlling positions
in government,the army,the police, and the educationalsystem were held by Pash-
tuns to such a degree that the appellationAfghan commonly referredonly to Pash-
tuns and not to the minorities who collectively constituted the majority.A U.S.
diplomat describedthe kingdom as a Soviet-style"policestate, where there is no free
press, no political parties,and where ruthlesssuppressionof minorities is the estab-
lished pattern."43But despite their favored status, Pashtuns revolted against the
Mohammadzaieight times between 1930 and 1960. Open violence betweenminori-
ties was less common than conflict that pitted clan autonomy againstcentralauthor-
ity. In 1956, Daoud welcomed Soviet military aid and advisers.His securityforces
kept orderwith a heavyhand, and, when mullahsin Kandaharagainled a movement
againstthe governmentin 1959, the army used tanks and MiGs to crush the rebel-
lion.44Daoud had broughtthe Cold War to Afghanistan.
To the Eisenhoweradministration,MorrisonKnudsen'soutpost in Kandaharwas
the scientific frontier of Americanpower in CentralAsia, guardingthe high passes
between risk and credibility.The company was "one of the chief influences which
maintainAfghan connections with the West,"Secretaryof StateJohn FosterDulles
believed."Itsdeparturewould createa vacuumwhich the Sovietswould be anxiousto
fill."He wanted to preserveAfghanistan'sbufferrole, but the perennialprovocations
along the Durand Line conjuredscenariosin Dulles'smind in which a Soviet-backed
Afghan army attacked U.S.-allied Pakistan-another Korea, this time beyond the
reachof U.S. air and navalpower.Daoud'sPashtunextremismled his governmentto
41 On the importance of psychology in modernization thinking, see Ellen Herman, The RomanceofAmerican
Psychology(Berkeley,1995), 136-48. Dupree, "InformalTalk with Prime Minister Daoud," 19.
42 Dupree, "Afghanistan, the Canny Neutral," 134-37. Dupree, "InformalTalk with Prime Minister Daoud,"
4; State Department, Bureauof Intelligence and Research,"BiographicReport:Visit of Afghanistan'sPrime Min-
ister SardarMohammad Daoud," June 13, 1958, DeclassifiedDocumentsReferenceSystem(microfiche, Carrollton
Press, 1996), fiche 11. National Security Council, "ProgressReport on South Asia,"July 24, 1957, ForeignRela-
tions of the UnitedStates,1955-1957 (25 vols., Washington, 1985-1990), XIII, 49.
43 Leon Poullada described it as "a government of, by, and for Pashtun":Leon Poullada, "The Search for
National Unity,"in Afghanistanin the 1970s, ed. Dupree and Albert, 40. Leon B. Poullada, ThePushtunRolein the
Afghan Political System(New York, 1970), 22. Angus C. Ward to Department of State, Dec. 14, 1955, Foreign
Relationsof the UnitedStates,1955-1957, VIII, 204.
4 Wilber, ed., Afghanistan,103. Poullada, "Searchfor National Unity,"44.

in a BufferState
Modernization
DammingAfghanistan: 529
welcome Soviet armswhile instigatingmob attackson Pakistaniconsulatesand bor-

der posts. In 1955, Dulles dissuadedPakistanfrom a plan to overthrowthe royalfam-
ily, while his brother,Allen, head of the cIA, suggestedusing againstDaoud the same
methods that had recentlyworked to depose Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran.45The
United Stateswanted to separatethe dual ambitionsof Pashtunnationalism,preserv-
ing Daoud'smodernizationdrivewhile disposingof the Pushtunistanissue.
The Helmand project offered a way to counter Soviet influence by giving Daoud
what he wanted, a Pashtunhomeland.As originallyenvisioned, HAVA would irrigate
enough new fertileland to settle eighteen to twenty thousandfamilieson fifteen-acre
farms.Workingwith Afghan officials,U.S. adviserslaunched a programto immobi-
lize the nomadic Pashtuns,whose migrationswere a source of friction with Paki-
stan.46To Americanand royal governmentofficials, this floating population and its
disregardfor laws, taxes,and borderssymbolizedthe country'sbackwardness.Settling
Pashtun nomads in a belt from Kabul to Kandaharwould create a secure political
base for the government and bring them within reach of modernizationprograms.
Diminishing the transborderflows would reduce smuggling and the periodic inci-
dents that inflamed the Pushtunistan issue. A complementarydam development
projectin the Indus Valley,also funded by the United States,settled Pashtunnomads
on the other side of the Durand Line.47
HAvAvs mandate included the social reconstructionof the region. Those seeking
land, as well as families alreadyoccupying ancestralplots, were requiredto apply to
HAVA for housing, water,and implements.In the late 1950s, HAVA began constructing
whole communities for transplantedpastoralistsin the Shamalan,Marja,and Nad-i-
Ali districts,while simultaneouslytryingto breakthe authorityof nomadic clan lead-
ers known as maliks. Maliks would lead their people, "Moses-like,to the promised
land,"accordingto a U.S. report. HAVA "alwaysinformed the new settlersthat they
could choose new village leaders,to be called wakil, if they so desired.None did."48
Resettled families would receive a pair of oxen, a grant of two thousand Afghanis,
and enough seed for the firstyear.To replacethe need for winter pastures,the United
Nations broughtin Swissexpertsto teach nomads to use long-handledscythesto cut
foragefor sheep from high plateaus.But even with the closing of the borderand the
attraction of subsidies and well-wateredhomesteads, it proved difficult to entice
Ghilzai Pashtun to become ordinaryfarmers.Freerand wealthierthan the peasants
whose lands they crossed,the nomads regardedtheir new Tajikand Hazaraneighbors
with contempt. This may have served Kabul's purposes, too. The government,
accordingto HafizullahEmadi, planned to "usethese new settlersas a death squadto
45 John Foster Dulles to U.S. Embassy in Pakistan,July 12, 1955, ForeignRelationsof the United States,1955-
1957, VIII, 189. Editorial note, ibid, VIII, 202.
46 For proposed settlement figures, see Franck, "Problemsof Economic Development in Afghanistan,"425.
Clapp-Wincek and Baldwin, Helmand ValleyProject,8; "Export-ImportBank Loan to Afghanistan,"Department
of State Bulletin, May 31, 1954, p. 836; Tudor Engineering Company, Reporton Developmentof Helmand Valley
Afghanistan(Washington, 1956), 16, 90; RichardTapper,"Nomadism in Modern Afghanistan,"in Afghanistanin
the 1970s, ed. Dupree and Albert, 126-43; Cervin, "Problemsin the Integrationof the Afghan Nation," 400-416.
47 JamesW Spain, The Wayof the Pathans(Karachi,1962), 126.
48 Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"18.

530 TheJournalof AmericanHistory 2002
September
crush the uprisingsof the non-Pashtunpeople of the west, southwest, and central
part of the country."49
The Helmand project symbolized Pashtun power, and the royal government
resistedeffortsto attachalternatemeaningsto it. U.S. advisersmade severalattempts
to imitate the "grassroots"inclusivityof the PVA. Aiming to dispel tribal feuds and
foster a common professionalidentity among farmers,they establishedlocal co-ops
and 4-H clubs, but Daoud's security forces broke them up. Courting the Muslim
clergywas also forbidden.Agriculturalexpertsfound the mullahs to be a progressive
force, "constantlylook[ing] for things to improve their communities, better seed,
new plants, improvedlivestock."50 Regardingreligionas an inoculationagainstCom-
munism, policy makers wanted to associate the Helmand project with Islam. In
1956, the U.S. InformationAgency produced "a 45-minute full color motion pic-
ture, which featured economic development, particularly the Helmand Valley
Project, and the religious heritage of Afghanistan."Daoud, however,regardingthe
mullahsas a subversiveelement, discouragedtheir contact with foreignadvisers,and
resented,accordingto U.S. intelligence,"anyreferencemade in his presenceto Islam
as a bulwarkagainstcommunism or as a unifying force."51
In 1955, Afghanistanbecamethe first targetof PremierNikita Khrushchev's"eco-
nomic offensive,"the Soviet Union's first venture in foreign aid. Over $100 million
in creditsto Afghanistanfinanceda fleet of taxis and buses and paid Soviet engineers
to construct airports, a cement factory, a mechanized bakery,a five-lane highway
from the Soviet borderto Kabul, and, of course, dams. The Soviets constructedthe
Jalalabaddam and canal and organized a river development scheme for the Amu
Darya River.By the 1960s, Afghanistanhad Soviet, Chinese, and West Germandam
projectsunderway.It was receivingone of the highest levels of developmentaid per
capita of any nation in the world. U.S. News and WorldReportdescribed it as a
"strangekind of cold war,"fought with money and techniciansinstead of spies and
bombs. The Atlantic called it a "showwindow for competitive coexistence."52 Pub-
licly, U.S. officialssaid this was the kind of Cold War they wanted, just a chance to
show what the differentsystemscould do in a neutralcontest.
Afghanistanhad become a new kind of buffer,a neutralarenafor a tournamentof
modernization.James A. Michener toured Afghanistan in 1955 and assessed the
49 Ritchie Calder,"Hope of Millions,"Nation, Aug. 1, 1953, pp. 87-89; Wilber, ed., Afghanistan,222. Emadi,
State,Revolution,and Superpowers in Afghanistan,41.
50 Dana Reynolds, "Utilizing Religious Principles and Leadershipin Rural Improvement,"[1962], box 125,
John H. Ohly Papers(Harry S. TrumanLibrary,Independence, Mo.).
51 National Security Council, "ProgressReport on NSC 5409," Nov. 28, 1956, ForeignRelationsof the United
States, 1955-1957, VIII, 15. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "BiographicReport ...
Daoud."
52 Robert J. McMahon, "The Illusion of Vulnerability:American Reassessmentsof the Soviet Threat, 1955-
56," InternationalHistoryReview, 18 (Aug. 1996), 591-619. "Soviet-AfghanCommunique," Pravda, April 30,
1965, in CurrentDigest of the SovietPress,May 19, 1965, p. 26. Many of the other projectswere as poorly con-
ceived as the Helmand scheme. In the early 1970s, West Germany built a hydroelectric dam at Mahipar that,
becauseof low rainfall,held water only four months a year.A 1973 study concluded that it "mayneverbe produc-
tive."Marvin Brandt, "RecentEconomic Development,"in Afghanistanin the 1970s, ed. Dupree and Albert, 103.
Ibid., 99. "StrangeKind of Cold War,"U.S. News and WorldReport,Nov. 15, 1957, p. 160; "AtlanticReport:
Afghanistan,"Atlantic (Oct. 1962), 26.

Modernization 531
priceandthe stakesof the developmental contest.The turbulentHelmand"symbol-

ize[d]the wild freedomof Afghanistan," andhe regretted"thatsucha rivermustbe
broughtundercontrol."53 Historianshaveobservedthatnovels,films,andBroadway
musicalsvalidatedmodernization by associatingit withmythicconventionsin which
anAmericanovercomes Asianhostilityby a displayof competence.54
In Caravans,his
1963 novelof Afghanistan, Michenerinvitesreadersto choosebetweenfuturesimag-
inedby two characters: NurMohammed,religious,proud,andsuspiciousof change,
and Nazrullah,a foreign-educated expert,impatient,outspoken,and eagerfor help
fromthe Americansif possible,the Sovietsif necessary. Nazrullahwas an engineer,
dammingthe Helmandwith bouldersblastedfroma nearbymountain."Eachday
we mustthrowsimilarrocksinto the humanriverof Afghanistan," he tellstheAmer-
ican narrator."Herea school,therea road,down in the gorgea dam. So far,our
humanriverisn'tawarethat it's been touched.But we shallneverhalt until we've
modifiedit completely."55
Competitionalteredthe significance,but not the fortunes,of the Helmand
projectin the 1960s.Launchingthe "Development Decade,"JohnF.Kennedydeter-
mined not only to surpassSovietinitiativesbut to demonstratethe superiorityof
Americanmethodsof development.Since the superpowers were offeringsimilar
kindsof aid, distinctionswerenot easilymade,but catastrophic cropfailuresin the
SovietUnionandChinain 1959 and 1960 clarifiedthe difference."Wherever com-
munismgoes,hungerfollows,"Secretary of StateDeanRuskdeclaredin 1962. Fam-
ine in ChinaandNorthVietnamprovedthatthe "humaneandpragmaticmethods
of free men are not merelythe rightway,morally,to developan underdeveloped
country;theyaretechnicallythe efficientway."Kennedycharacteristically linkedthe
newpolicyto the rejuvenation of the UnitedStatesandthe world,callingfor a "sci-
entificrevolution"in agriculture
thatwouldengagetheenergiesof "anewgeneration
of youngpeople."Diplomatsand aid officialscarriedthe messagethatfreemen ate
better.The presidentialemissaryAverellHarriman,sent to Kabulin 1965, compli-
mentedAfghanofficialson the new Sovietfactoriesbut observedthatthe realmea-
sureof modernitywasthe abilityto growfood.The Sovietscouldnot, he explained,
"dueto character of farmworkwhichrequireshardworking withpersonal
individuals
stakein operation,ratherthanhourlypaidfactoryhandspacedby machine."56
53JamesA. Michener, Caravans(New York, 1963), 161; see also JamesA. Michener, "Afghanistan:Domain of
the Fierceand the Free,"Reader'sDigest (Nov. 1955), 161-72.
54 Richard Slotkin, GunfighterNation: The Myth of the Frontier in TwentiethCenturyAmerica (New York,
1992), 449; James T. Fisher,Dr. America:The Livesof ThomasA. Dooley,1927-1961 (Amherst, 1997); Christina
Klein, "Musicalsand Modernization:Rodgers and Hammerstein'sTheKing and I," in StagingGrowth,ed. Enger-
man et al.; and JonathanNashel, "The Road to Vietnam: ModernizationTheory in Fact and Fiction,"in Cold War
Constructions,ed. ChristianAppy (Amherst,2000), 132-54.
55 Michener, Caravans,161.
56 On John F. Kennedy'sforeign aid programs,see W W Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy,and ForeignAid (Aus-
tin, 1985); and Stephen G. Rabe, "Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress,and Cold
WarAnti-Communism," in Kennedy'sQuestfor Victoryed. Thomas G. Paterson(New York, 1989), 105-22. Dean
Rusk, "The Tragedyof Cuba," Vital Speechesof the Day, Feb. 15, 1962, p. 259. J. F. Kennedy, "Statementat the
Opening Ceremony of the World Food Congress,"June 4, 1963, in PresidentJohn F Kennedy'sOfficeFiles, 1961-
1963, ed. Paul Kesarisand Robert E. Lester(microfilm, 103 reels, University Publicationsof America, 1989), Part
1, reel 11, frame 1018. Embassy Afghanistan to Department of State, March 3, 1965, ForeignRelationsof the
UnitedStates,1964-1968 (34 vols., Washington, 1992- ), XXV,1051.

2002
Evidence for the efficiency of American techniques was scarce in the Helmand
Valley.The burden of American loans for the project and the absence of tangible
returnswas creating,accordingto the New YorkTimes,"adangerousstrain on both
the Afghan economy and the nation's morale"which "may have unwittingly and
indirectlycontributedto drivingAfghanistaninto Russianarms."57 Waterlogginghad
advancedin the Shamalanareato the point that structuralfoundationswere giving
way; mosques and houses were crumbling into the growing bog. In the artificial
oases, the problem was worse. An impermeablecrust of conglomerateunderlaythe
Marja and Nad-i-Ali tracts, intensifying both waterlogging and salinization. The
remedy-a system of dischargechannelsleadingto deep-boredrains-would remove
10 percent of the reclaimedland from cultivation.A 1965 study revealedthat crop
yields per acre had actually dropped since the dams were built, sharply in areas
alreadycultivatedbut evident even in areasreclaimedfrom the desert.Withdrawing
support from HAVAwas impossible."With this project,"the U.S. ambassadornoted,
"theAmericanreputationin Afghanistanis completelylinked."58For reasonsof cred-
ibility alone the United States kept pouring money in, even though by 1965 it was
clearthe projectwas failing. Diplomats complainedthat the reputationof the United
Stateshung on "astrip of concrete,"but therewas no going back.Afghanistanwas an
economic Korea, but Helmand was an economic Vietnam, a quagmire that con-
sumed money and resourceswithout the possibility of success, all to avoid making
failureobvious.
Revisions in modernization theory reinforcedthe new emphasis on agriculture
and the urgencyof changingstrategyin the Helmand. Dual economy theory,posit-
ing a division of each economy into a self-propellingmodern industrialsector and a
retrogradebut vitally important agriculturalsector, gained the attention of policy
makers in the early 1960s. "Agriculturaldevelopment is vastly more important in
modernizinga society than we used to think,"Rostow noted. Agriculturewas "asys-
tem"like industry,and modernizingit required"thatthe skills of organizationdevel-
oped in the modern urbansectorsof the society be broughtsystematicallyinto play
aroundthe life of a farmer."Development was still fundamentallya problemof scar-
city, but, while the Emkayanshad filled voids with waterand power,the U.S. Agency
for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) sought to build reservoirsof organization,tal-
ent, and mentality. RejuvenatingAfghan agriculture,aid officials believed, would
require"arevolutionin mental concepts."59
The Kennedy and Johnson administrationsrenewed the U.S. commitment to
HAVA with a fresh infusion of funds and initiatives,raising the annual aid disburse-
57 Peggy Streit and PierreStreit, "Lessonin ForeignAid Policy,"New YorkTimesMagazine, March 18, 1956, p.
56. The loan repaymentproblem was worsening by the 1960s; see Fletcher,Afghanistan,268.
58 Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"55. Stevens and Tarzi,EconomicsofAgriculturalProductionin Helmand Valley,29.
Department of State, "Elementsof U.S. Policy towardAfghanistan."
59 Gustav Ranis, "ATheory of Economic Development,"AmericanEconomicReview,51 (Sept. 1961), 533-65;
Dale W Jorgensen, "The Development of a Dual Economy,"EconomicJournal, 66 (June 1961), 309-34. W W
Rostow, "Some Lessonsof Economic Development since the War,"Departmentof StateBulletin,Nov. 9, 1964, pp.
664-65; see also W. W. Rostow, Viewfromthe SeventhFloor(New York, 1964), 124-31. Morrison Knudsen left in
1960, turning its operationsover to USAID; Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"52.

.~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I
Modernization meantcreatingorderlylandscapes
suchas the one picturedin the foreground,
over
which authoritycould be exercised.YetAfghanistan's
cultivatedexpansesproducedlesswealth
thanits unchartedmountainoushighlands,seen herein the distance,wherenomadicshepherds
fiercelyguardedtheirautonomy.ReprintedfromUS. Operations MissiontoAfghanistan, Afghani-
stanBuildson anAncientCivilization,1960.
ment from $16 million to $40 million annually.The "greenrevolution"approach

pioneered by the RockefellerFoundation would bring a new organizationalsystem
into play around the farmer.In 1967, USAIDand the royalgovernmentimported 170
tons of the experimentaldwarfwheat developedby Norman Borlaugin Mexico. The
high-yield seed, together with chemical fertilizersand tightly controlled irrigation,
were expected to produce grain surpluses that would be distributed through new
marketingand credit arrangements.Resettlementsubsidieshad paid off by the mid-
1960s, and the Helmand Valleywas beginning to have a lived-in look. The largecor-
porateand state farmshad vanished,and nearlyall of the land that could successfully
be farmed was privately held, much of it by smallholders. Legal titles were still
clouded by HAvAvsinattention to land surveys, but the settlers had nonetheless
sculpted wide tracts of empty land into irregularfifteen-acre parcels divided by
meandering juis, the tree-lined canals that served as boundary,water source, and
orchardfor each farm.60
Unfortunately, the juis system proved incompatible with the new plans. The
small, hilly, picturesquelymisshapenfields contributedto runoff and drainageprob-
60"TangibleTokens," Time,April 7, 1967, p. 18. Lester R. Brown, Seedsof Change:The GreenRevolutionand
Developmentin the 1970s (New York, 1970), 19. Public AdministrationService,A Final Reporton the Land Inven-
toryProjectofAfghanistan,January 1972 (Chicago, 1972), 9; Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"44.

2002
lems and preventedthe regular,measuredapplicationsof water,chemicals,and

machinecultivationnecessaryfor modernagriculture. A greenrevolutionwould
require,in effect,a land reformin reverse:mergingsmallholdingsinto largelevel
fieldsdividedat regularintervalsby lateralsrunningfromcontrolgateson the main
canals.As the wheatimprovementprogramgot underway,a teamof U.S. Depart-
mentof Agriculture advisersproposedthatHAVAremoveall of the resettledfamilies,
"levelthe wholeareawith bulldozers," andthen redistribute
property"inlarge,uni-
form,smoothlandplots."'6' HAVA adoptedthe landpreparation scheme,but imple-
mentationproveddifficult.Farmersobjectedto the removalof trees,which had
economicvalueandpreventedwinderosion,but theyobjectedchieflyto the vague-
nessof HAVA'sassurances.
HAVAitselfacknowledged,
as bulldozing that
proceeded,
questionsof whatto do with the populationwhilethe landwasbeingprepared, how
to redistributethe land aftercompletion,and whetherto chargelandownersfor
improvements were"yetto be workedout."Whenfarmers"metthe bulldozerswith
rifles,"accordingto a USAID report,it presenteda "veryrealconstraint"
that "con-
sumedmostof the timeof theAmericanandAfghanstaffsin the Valleythroughout
the 1960s."62
The valley'sunrestcoincidedwith Afghanistan's briefexperimentwith political
Daoudsteppeddownin 1963,andthemonarchyissueda constitution
liberalization.
permittingan independentlegislatureand governmentministries.The economy
remainedundercentralguidance.Politicalpartieswerebanned,andthe kingcontin-
ued to controlthe armyand maintaina paternalsupervisionovergovernment,but
highministerial postswentforthe firsttimeto personsoutsidethe royalfamily.Laws
requiringwomen to wearthe burkawerelifted (althoughcustommaintainedthe
practicein muchof thecountry),andrestrictions on speechandassemblywereeased.
In Kabul,an energeticstudentand cafepoliticsemerged,with dailystreetdemon-
strationsby socialist,Maoist,andliberalfactions,whileoutsideof the capitaldissent
coalescedaroundIslamicmullahswho articulated,accordingto U.S. embassyoffi-
withthe low levelof economicdevelopmentandprogress
cials,"latentdissatisfaction
in the Afghanhinterland." In the partylessparliament,ethnicpoliticstook prece-
dence as minorityrepresentatives attackedPashtunprivilegeswhile the majority
defendedthem.63Legislativedeadlock,the stallingmodernizationdrive,and the
growingburdenof externaldebt fed perceptionsof officialineptitude.The govern-
ment of prime ministerMohammadMaiwandwal,which initiated the wheat
improvement effort,neededmodernization to producetangibleresults.
By 1969,the newgrainshadspreadto a modest300,000acres,leadingto expecta-
tions of an approaching"yieldtakeoff,"but the 1971 El Ninfodroughtdestroyed
61
Proposalsquoted in Clapp-Wincek and Baldwin, Helmand ValleyProject,5; and Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"
50. See also Shafie Rahel, ed., TheKabul TimesAnnual, 1970 (Kabul, 1970), 359.
62
Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"53. USAID report quoted in Clapp-Wincekand Baldwin, Helmand ValleyProject,5.
63 Louis Dupree, "The Decade of Daoud Ends,"American UniversitiesField Staff Reports,SouthAsia Series,7
(May 1963), 7. U.S. Embassy Kabul to Department of State, "Afghanistan'sClerical Unrest: A TentativeAssess-
ment," June 24, 1970, in National SecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBook No. 59, ed. William Burr, Oct. 26,
2001 <http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB59> (Nov. 8, 2001). Janata,"Afghanistan:The Ethnic
Dimension," 62.

Modernization 535
much of the crop. Monsoon rains failed through 1973, reducing the Helmand to a
rivulet. In 1971, the Arghandabreservoirdried up completely,a possibilitynot fore-
seen by planners.With the coming of detente in 1970, levels of aid from both the
United States and the Soviet Union dropped sharply.The vision of prosperous,irri-
gation-fedfarmsluring nomads into theirgreenembraceprovedbeyond HAvAs grasp.
Wheat yields were among the lowest in the world, four bushels an acre (Iowa farms
produced 180); farm incomes in the valley were below averagefor Afghanistanand
declining. State Department officials found it difficult to measurethe magnitudeof
the economic crisis "inAfghanistanwhere there are no statistics,"but student strikes
and the suspension of parliamentpointed to a "creepingcrisis"in mid-1972. "The
food crisis,"the embassy reported, "seemsto have been the real clincher for which
neither the King nor his governmentwere prepared."64 In July 1973, military units
loyal to Mohammed Daoud deposed the king, who was vacationingin Europe, and
terminatedboth the monarchyand the constitution. U.S. involvement in HAVAwas
scheduled to end in July 1974, and USAIDofficials strenuouslyopposed suggestions
that it be renewed. Nonetheless, when Henry Kissingervisited Kabul in February,
Daoud describedthe Helmand Valley as an "unfinishedsymphony"and urged the
United States not to abandon it.65 Kissinger relented. Land reclamation officers
remainedwith the project, while making little progressagainst its persistentprob-
lems, until the pro-SovietKhalqpartyseized power in 1978.
Soviet economic development also failed to create a stable, modernizing social
class. The Khalq was not broadly enough based to hold onto authority unaided.
Against the threat of takeoverby an Islamic party, the Soviet Union launched the
invasion of 1979. During the Soviet war, both sides found ways to make use of the
Helmand Valley'sinfrastructure.In early 1980, according to M. Hassan Kakar,
"about a hundred prisoners"of the Khalq "werethrown out of airplanesinto the
Arghandabreservoir."The project'sconcrete water channels provided cover for the
anti-SovietMujaheddinfighters,and its broken terrainwas the site of intense fight-
ing between the resistanceand Soviet forcesand among ethnic factionsafterthe Sovi-
ets withdrew in 1988. The warriors felled trees, smashed irrigation canals, and
planted mines throughout the fields and orchards,driving the population into refu-
gee camps in Pakistan.66 The Talibanmovement began here in 1994 as an allianceof
Pashtun clans supportedwith arms and money from acrossthe Durand Line. Even
afterthe captureof Kabulin 1996, Kandaharremainedthe Talibancapital.The Hel-
mand Valley provided the new regime'schief source of revenue.The opium poppy
growswell in dry climatesand in alkalineand saline soils. In 2000, accordingto the
United Nations Drug Control Programme,the Helmand Valleyproduced39 percent
64 Baron, "SectorAnalysis,"50; Mike Davis, Late VictorianHolocausts:El Nino Faminesand the Making of the
Third World(London, 2001), 244. Kamreny,PeacefulCompetitionin Afghanistan,36; Clapp-Wincek and Bald-
win, Helmand Vally Project,4. Embassy quoted in Robert A. Flaten, "AfghanPolitics, the Creeping Crisis,"May
31, 1972, in National SecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo. 59, ed. Burr.
65 Clapp-Wincekand Baldwin, Helmand ValleyProject,6.
"6 The misfortunes of the Khalq are analyzed in M. Hassan Kakar,Afghanistan:The Soviet Invasionand the
Afghan Response,1979-1982 (Berkeley,1995). Ibid., 203. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban:Militant Islam, Oil>and Fun-
damentalismin CentralAsia(New Haven, 2000), 20.

2002
of the world's heroin.67During its five years in power, the Taliban government
investedin the dams and finishedone projectbegun but not completedby the Amer-
icans: linking the KajakaiDam's hydroelectricplant to the city of Kandahar.Work
was finished in early 2001, just a few months before American bombers destroyed
the plant.68
Official and unofficial postmortems identified misperceptionsat the root of the

project'sfailures.Lloyd Baron, an economist given access to the U.S. aid mission's
recordsin the 1970s, noted a "developmentmyopia"that identifiedwater scarcityas
the sole obstacle to agriculturalabundance. Plannerssubordinatedcomplex social
and political problems within the more manageableengineering problem of over-
coming the water constraint.An official USAIDreview in 1983 concluded that the
projectsufferedfrom a commitment/leverageparadox.The perceptionthat HAVAwas
a "donorproject"relievedthe Afghan governmentof ultimate responsibilityand left
the United Stateswithout influenceto demand correctivesteps.69
The ongoing critique of modernization theory furnishes a broader context for
these conceptual flaws. James C. Scott explains that the "high modernist"experi-
ments of the mid-twentiethcenturywere founded on a schematicview of the human
and naturalworld that failed to account for the full range of variation-in motiva-
tions, climate, effects ("evena 20 percentmarginof error"),and human ingenuity-
actually encountered. The project'shuman subjects were rendered as productive
units, "abstractcitizens"whose motives conformed to the goals of the planner."Any
anthropologistcould have predictedwith confidence,"Arnold Fletcherobservedin
1965, "that the happy notion of settling Afghan nomads on the reclaimed lands
would not work out."70Nonetheless, that predictionwas not made or, if made, not
listened to, just as two years later HAVAfailed to anticipate settlers' unsurprising
objection to being turnedoff the land so their homes could be bulldozed.
The goals and effects of the projectwere neverviewed outside the distortingmir-
ror of modernizationtheory.Pastoralistsproducedthe country'sprimaryexport and
most of its foreignexchangerevenue,and yet HIAVAsplan to convertthem into wheat
67 Tim Weiner, "With Taliban Gone, Opium FarmersReturn to Their Only Cash Crop,"New YorkTimes,
Nov. 26, 2001, p. B1; ChristopherGrey-Wilson,Poppies:A Guide to the PoppyFamily in the Wildand in Cultiva-
tion (Portland, 2000), 24; United Nations Drug Control Programme, Afghanistan Programme, Afghanistan:
Annual OpiumPoppySurvey2000 (Islamabad,2000). Afghanistanproducesthe bulk of the world'sopium, largely
as a result of poverty and war. Production has grown steadily since the Soviet invasion, peaking in 1999, when
90,000 hectareswere under cultivation. In 2000, the Taliban, seeking internationalaid and to sell existing stocks
at an elevatedprice, imposed an opium ban, which eliminated cultivation in the Helmand and the principal pro-
ducing areasin the 2001 growing season. Production resumed in the fall of 2001. United Nations Economic and
Social Council, WorldSituation with Regardto Illicit Drug Traffickingand Reportsof SubsidiaryBodiesof the Com-
missionon NarcoticDrugs (Vienna, 2001).
68 Richard Lloyd Parry,"Campaignagainst Terrorism:Warning-UN Fears 'Disaster' over Strikes near Huge
Dam," Independent(London), Nov. 8, 2001, p. 4.
69 Lloyd Baron, "The Water-Supply Constraint: An Evaluation of Irrigation Projects and the Role in the
Development of Afghanistan"(Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1975), 2; Clapp-Wincek and Baldwin, Helmand
ValleyProject.
70 Scott, Seeing like a State, 347-49. On humans as productive units, see also C. Douglas Lummis, Radical
Democracy(Ithaca, 1996), 64. Fletcher,Afghanistan,268.

Modernization 537
farmerswas neverseriouslyquestioned.The outcomesthat were hoped for-tax

earnings,politicalstability,creationof a middleclass,resolutionof the Pushtunistan
issue,credibility,and legitimacy-wereseen as concomitantsof eventualdevelop-
mentalsuccessratherthanas goalsto be pursueddirectly.Precautionary moveswere
easilybrushedasideby the sameassurance thattimeandeffortwouldbringimprove-
ment.Beliefin developmentimposes,accordingto GilbertRist,a "socialconstraint"
on the expression of shareddoubts.7'
If illusionsdoomedthe project,they also createdand sustainedit. HAvAvsevolu-
tionaryadvantage wasan abilityto takeon the protectivecolorationof a succession
of modernizingmyths.The disastrouseffectsof dam buildingwerevisiblein 1949
and only becamemoreobviousas the projectgrew.But, camouflaged by dreamsof
Pashtunascendancy andAmericaninfluence,HAVAwasas resilientas modernization
theoryitself,ableto surviverepeateddebunkingswhilesheddingthe blameand the
memoryof failure.Proponentsof a freshnation-building venturein Afghanistan,
unawareof the resultsof the lastone, haveresurrected its imaginings.Supportersjus-
tifydevelopmentaidto the newPashtun-led governmentin Kabulasa formof inter-
nationalsocialcontrol.It will providea bufferagainstterrorismand "prevent future
Osamabin Ladensfromarising."72 The centerpieceof the modernization effort,a
writerfor the New YorkTimessuggests,shouldbe "damsto providewaterfor irriga-
tion."73
71 Rist, Historyof Development,239.

72 Nicholas D. Kristof, "Give the Afghans a Hand," New YorkTimes,Dec. 13, 2001, p. A31.
73 M. Ishaq Nadiri, "Rebuildinga RavagedLand,"ibid., Nov. 26, 2001, p. A17.


Damming Afghanistan

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Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State

Author(s): Nick Cullather

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In May 1960, the historianArnoldJ. Toynbeeleft Kandaharand drove ninety miles

Nick Cullatheris associateprofessorof history at Indiana University.

1 Mildred Caudill, Helmand-ArghandabValley Yesterday,

512 The Journalof AmericanHistory September2002

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5Edward Shils, "PoliticalDevelopment in the New States,"ComparativeStudiesin Societyand History,2 (April

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schemehad no suchexcuse.It cameunderAmericansupervisionin 1946 and con-

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r844 4Yse005/A T-OM PN

Stretching acoss he~~ souther hafo fhnsath emn alydvlopmeIYnt was

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uplandgrazingareas,the DurandLinerestrictedPashtunautonomyand facilitated

10 Davies, Problem of the North-WestFrontier, 162-63; C. L. Sulzberger,"Nomads Swarming over Khyber

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As it was meant to, the sublimationof the Pashtunsreconfiguredpolitics on both

14 Arnold Fletcher,Afghanistan:Highway of Conquest(Ithaca, 1965), 245. Alfred Janata, "Afghanistan:The

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for the firsttime.Througha nationalbankandstatecartels,the governmentsuper-

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Over the next two decades the Pushtunistancontroversydrew Afghanistaninto

A TVAfor the Hindu Kush

Nothing becomes antiquatedfasterthan symbols of the future, and it is difficult, at

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Morrison Knudsen engineers surveyed and built the

this,"he declared,"thisBhakra-Nangal,where thousandsof men have worked, have

26JawaharlalNehru, "Speechat the Opening of the Nangal Canal,"July 8, 1954, in JawaharlalNehru'sSpeeches

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(July 1977), 358-59; Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan,8.

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ing ordinaryearth to produce multiple crops in the firstyearswhile slowly rendering

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petroleum-but the uncompleted Boghra works was an invitation to something

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A StrangeKind of Cold War

Following behavioralexplanationsof development, U.S. aid officials sought to ally

39 Ira Moore Stevens and K. Tarzi,EconomicsofAgriculturalProductionin Helmand Valley, Afghanistan(Den-

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welcome Soviet armswhile instigatingmob attackson Pakistaniconsulatesand bor-

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priceandthe stakesof the developmental contest.The turbulentHelmand"symbol-

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ment from $16 million to $40 million annually.The "greenrevolution"approach

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lems and preventedthe regular,measuredapplicationsof water,chemicals,and

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Official and unofficial postmortems identified misperceptionsat the root of the

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farmerswas neverseriouslyquestioned.The outcomesthat were hoped for-tax

71 Rist, Historyof Development,239.

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