Bernardo vs Legaspi

Facts:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained by plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a
collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also
dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages against the
plaintiff on the ground that the injuries sustained by the defendant's automobile in the
collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's machine, were caused by the
negligence of the plaintiff in handling his automobile.

Issue:

Whether the negligence of the plaintiff extinguishes the charge against the defendant.

Ruling :
The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character
and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering.

The law applicable to the facts also requires an affirmance of the judgment appealed
from. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to
the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes
thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true of the defendant; and as both of them, by
their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can
recover.

PLDT VS CA
Facts: This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the former Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental by private respondent spouses against petitioner
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and
fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation
of its underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio
Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the
creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident,
respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face,
leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips.
In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. It was found that the plaintif
husband drived with dimmed lights despite the drizzle and he also ran quite fast as
suggested by the tiremarks.
Issue: Whether or not PLDT acted with negligence, to the injury of the Spouses Esteban.

Ruling: No. The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and
thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to,
hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care
and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of petitioner.
It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own
failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal
norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own
protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to
petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday
and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his
negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger; hence he is solely responsible for
the consequences of his imprudence.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies
on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the
existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.

Manila Electric vs Remoquillo

FACTS: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his
stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a
leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. Standing on
said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet
to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came
into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the
Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his
death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company.

trial court rendered judgment in their favor CA affirmed:

(MANILA electric lost)
ISSUE: WON CA CORRECT? NO company absolved
HELD: the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by
the too close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company
by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of
said illegal construction of the “media agua”.

the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8
inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the (3 feet was the distance provided by
the ordinance) “Media agua” as illegally constructed and the electric wires.

added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval by the city through its
agent, possibly an inspector.

Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence
in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that
distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its
electrician or engineer.

Plaintif’s own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the
injury in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause.

the City of Manila authorities and the electric company could get together and devise means of
minimizing this danger to the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city
thoroughfares may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers of motor vehicles
may expect danger and slow down or even stop and take other necessary precaution upon
approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since these high voltage wires
cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the
outskirts of the city where there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step-down to a
voltage where the wires carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better
protection of the public.
M.H Rakes vs The Atlantic
Facts:The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant,
was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the
malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant
has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car
or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope.
At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either
canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards
amputated at about the knee.This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident
happened through the negligence of the defendant. The detailed description by the defendant's
witnesses of the construction and quality of the track proves that if was up to the general
stranded of tramways of that character, the foundation consisting on land of blocks or
crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the surface of the
ground, upon which at a right angle rested stringers of the same thickness, but from 24 to 30
feet in length. On the across the stringers the parallel with the blocks were the ties to which the
tracks were fastened. After the road reached the water's edge, the blocks or crosspieces were
replaced with pilling, capped by timbers extending from one side to the other. The tracks were
each about 2 feet wide and the two inside rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It
was admitted that there were no side pieces or guards on the car; that where no ends of the rails
of the track met each other and also where the stringers joined, there were no fish plates. the
defendant has not effectually overcome the plaintiff's proof that the joints between the rails were
immediately above the joints between the underlying stringers.
Issue:Whether MH Rakes contributory negligence will bar the action .
Holding:No, contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured party's negligence.There are may cases in the supreme court of
Spain in which the defendant was exonerated, but when analyzed they prove to have been
decided either upon the point that he was not negligent or that the negligence of the plaintiff
was the immediate cause of the casualty or that the accident was due to casus fortuitus. Of the
first class in the decision of January 26, 1887 (38Jurisprudencia Criminal, No. 70), in which a
railway employee, standing on a car, was thrown therefrom and killed by the shock following the
backing up of the engine. It was held that the management of the train and engine being in
conformity with proper rules of the company, showed no fault on its part.Of the second class are
the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in
Alcubilla's Index of that year; and of the third class the decision of the 4th of June, 1888
(64Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 1), in which the breaking down of plaintiff's dam by the logs of the
defendant impelled against it by the Tajo River, was held due to a freshet as a fortuitous
cause.The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested on two bases,
one, that the defendant was not negligent, because expressly relieved by royal order from the
common obligation imposed by the police law of maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the
other, because the act of the deceased in driving over level ground with unobstructed view in
front of a train running at speed, with the engine whistle blowing was the determining cause of
the accident. It is plain that the train was doing nothing but what it had a right to do and that the
only fault lay with the injured man. His negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and was of
such an efficient nature that without it no catastrophe could have happened. Article 568 of the
latter code provides:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if done with malice would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished.And article 590 provides that the following shall be
punished:
Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without committing any infraction of
regulations, shall cause an injury which, had malice intervened, would have constituted a crime
or misdemeanor.
The cour de cassation held that the carelessness of the victim did not civilly relieve the person
without whose fault the accident could not have happened, but that the contributory negligence
of the injured man had the effect only of reducing the damages.
Austrian Code provides that the victim who is partly changeable with the accident shall stand his
damages in proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is incapable of ascertainment, he
shall share the liability equally with the person principally responsible.And finally by articles 19
and 20, the liability of owners and employers for the faults of their servants and representatives
is declared to be civil and subsidiary in its character.he contributory negligence of the injured
man had the effect only of reducing the damages. The French law, held that contributory
negligence did not exonerate the defendants whose fault had been the immediate cause of the
accident, but entitled him to a reduction of damages. Other similar cases in the provincial courts
have been overruled by appellate tribunals made up of common law judges drawn from other
provinces, who have preferred to impose uniformally throughout the Dominion the English theory
of contributory negligence.the judgment of the trial court, Court ruled in Favor of MH Rakes but
modified the award.
MAO-AO SUGAR VS CA
FACTS: Julio Famoso was riding with a co-employee with the caboose or “carbonera” of
Ply-mouth No. 12, a cargo train of Mao-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. when the locomotive
was suddenly derailed. Famoso and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the
train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels, pinned him down and he died.
Because claims for death and other benefits were denied by Mao-ao, HerminiaFamoso
field a suit. The trial court ruled in her favor but deducted 25% from the total damages
awarded because of Julio’s contributory negligence. This was sustained by the appellate
court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the
deduction.

ISSUE: whether Julio was guilty of contributory negligence

RULING: No. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring
with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held
that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body." There is no showing that the caboose where
Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there
despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
NPC VS HEIRS PF CASIONAN
FACTS: NkbleCasionan worked as a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.

Sometime in the 1970’s, petitioner NPC installed hightension electrical

transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the
transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only
about eight to ten feet. This posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed to the
danger of electrocution especially during the wet season. The danger it may cause was
called for by the Mayor though a letter sent to NPC.
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at
Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. Noble carried the shorter
pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through
the trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work
place. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole
he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was
walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Noble’s pole
touched the wire for only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the
ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. As such
parents of Noble filed a complaint against NPC.

NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the safety of the high tension transmission
lines.
RTC favored heirs of casionan. On appeal, ca sustained its decision. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the high tension wires above the trail did
not cause the victim’s death. Instead, it was Noble’s negligent carrying of the bamboo
pole that caused his death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he allowed the
bamboo pole he was carrying to touch the high tension wires. This is especially true
because other people traversing the trail have not been similarly electrocuted.
ISSUE: Whether Noble is guilty of contributory negligence as such damage should be deleted?

RULING: NO. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.11 On the other hand,
contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard
which he is required to conform for his own protection.12 There is contributory
negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight
that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger.
If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper
to reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision
that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the
injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to
his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his
injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health
and body. This Court held then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence
as there was no showing that the caboose where he was riding was a dangerous place
and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending
danger.16 In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly
used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform
passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch
the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary
routine to other workers in the area.