1. Provinces – A political and territorial corporate body consisting of several municipalities and cities.
2. Municipalities – Consist of groups of barangays, including municipal districts.
b. Cities not raised to highly urbanized category but their charters prohibit their voters from
voting in provincial elections.
5. Autonomous Regions – A political and territorial subdivision that has a certain degree of freedom from
the national government.
Atty G. : Autonomous region: 1. Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 2. Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR). With the passage of BANGSAMORO BASIC LAW, the ARMM now will be abolished.
A LGU may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either:
1. By law enacted by Congress in case of province, city, municipality or any other political sub-
division;
2. By an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod con-
cerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such lim-
itations and requirements prescribed in the Local Government Code (LGC). (Local Govern-
ment Code, Sec. 6)
3. And as declared by the Supreme Court in SEMA vs. COMELEC, the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has given the power to create local government, particularly,
baranggays and municipalities. But in so far as the expressed power granted to it by the Con-
gress to create cities and provinces, that is unconstitutional because it will lead to a scenario
where the regional assembly may dictate the composition of Congress. Because the mere cre-
ation of a province, it automatically entitles the province to a seat in Congress. It created a
“Legislitavie District” which only the Congress should create.
Atty. G: Under the Article 10 of the Constitution, it is provided that no Local Government Unit shall
be divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the
createria prescribed by the Local Government Code.
The Congress was mandated by the Constitution to Enact a Local Government Code. And pursuant
to that mandate, the Congress enacted the Local Government Code of 1991 or the R.A. 7160.
WHAT ARE THE VIABLE INDICATORS OF Creation Division, Merger. Abolition, or subtantial
alteration of LGU?
I.
1. Income
2. Population
3. Land Area
I.
1. Income requirement – Must be sufficient and based on acceptable standards to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions, commensurate with the size of its
population as expected by the LGU concerned.
Atty. G: This is an essential requirement. Hindi pwedeng mawala even if the LGU to be created is a
municipality, city or province.
Income Requirement:
Average annual income for the last consecutive year should be at least:
a. Province – P 20M
b. Highly Urbanized City – P 50M
c. City – P 100M (R.A. 9009 amending Sec. 450 of LGC)
d. Municipality – P 2.5M
NOTE: The income requirement for the conversion of municipality to a component city only includes
locally generated average annual income. (RA. 9009, amending Sec. 450 of LGC)
2. Population requirement – determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdiction of the LGU concerned. The required minimum population shall be:
a. Barangay – 2,000
XPN: barangays located in:
i. Metro Manila – 5,000
b. Municipality – 25,000
c. City – 150,000
d. Highly Urbanized Cities – 200,000
e. Province – 250,000 (Atty. G: Take Note of that case in Alababa vs. Comelec. That
before the city can be entitled to a legislative district, it must satisfy first the population
requirement of 250,000. It doesn’t follow that upon the creation od a city, it will be
entitled to a legislative disctrict)
Atty. G: As I was saying, income is an essential requirement, and either of the two requirements
(Land area, and population). Meaning to say, it is not required to comply all. It is only
required to have 2 out of the 3 indicators, provided that income will always be present.
That is applicable in the creation of municipality, province, or a city. As far as I can
remember, di na kailangan to complete the 3 requirements. Mejo nag f’falter na ung
memory ko, in so far as the municipality.
As expressedly provided for in the Local Government Code, in case of the creation of the
municipality or a city which are composed of one or more islands, it is exempt from
land area requirement. Meaning to say, it did not complay witht he land area require-
ment of 100 sq. km. for a city, and 50 sq. km. for a municipality.
But there is no provision exempting the provinces, which is also composed of one or more
islands, from the land requirement. Wala. Pag-dating the province, adsent yun, di mo
makikita sa local government coode.
But then, in the IRR of the LGC, there is a provision applying the exemption to a province.
CASE: Navarro vs. Executive Secretary———Ang decision ng Supreme Court dito
flip-flopping. It changed 3 times. Pero mas matindi yung sa case ng League of Cities.
Iwan ko muna ung Navarro.
Now, for Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (Nasa book ni Atty. G, page 258). This involves
Dinagat Islands. The Court said that even though the province, which is composed of
several isalands, was not exempted in the land area requirement per the LGC, but in
so far as the IRR included it, reflecting the true legislative intent, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight. It is not ultra vires, that is, the IRR
cannot go beyond the mandate of the substantive law.
In this case. Dinagat island complied with the income requirement, but not with the popu-
lation and land area requirement. That means, considering that 2 requirements should
be complied, it cannot be a province. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of
the creation of Dinagat Islands. The Court said that considering the physical config-
uration of the Philippines, it is more likely that a province will be composed of islands.
Nakalimutan lang daw ng Congress na ilagay ung land area exempting provision.
II. Plebiscite
1. Plebiscite requirement – Must be approved by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
such purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. (Local Government Code, Sec. 20)
NOTE: The residents of the mother province must participate in the plebiscite to conform to the
constitutional requirement. (Tan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986; Padilla v. COME-
LEC, G.R. No. 103328, October 19, 1992)
Involves province of Nueva Ecija, and the conversion of Cabanatuan to a highly urbanized
city. Now, there should be a plebiscite, to know whether or not the electorate will
approve. The Plebiscite shall be conducted in the political unit directly affected. Nga-
yon, sa Cabanatuan lang ung nag plebiscite. The propriety of the plebscite was ques-
tioned. Saying that the entire Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebiscite because
it will be directly affected it will also lose an some electorate, and reduction of income.
(Note that in the creation of a legilative Unit, plebiscite is not a requirement, because there
is no creation or alteration in the boundaries of the local government unit. )
HELD: The Plebiscite shall be participated to by all registered voters of Nueva Ecija con-
sidering that there will be substantial alteration in economic and political composition
of the province. Hindi lang physical alteration ang consideration dito sa alteration.
POWERS of LGU (SEE ATTY. G’s book, page 262 to 264)
1. Police Power——- Note: The limitation to the national gov’t is also applicable in LGUs (In so
far as National Government, it can abolish or destroy a trade or calling, but LGUs
cannot restrict trade, it can only REGULATE. Cases: 1. City of Manila vs. Judge
Lagio—-zoning ordinance; 2. White Light vs. City of Manila——prohibiting
washup rates; 3. ACEBEDO Optical vs. CA)
2. Eminent Domain———
3. Taxing Power——-(Case: Republic vs. City of Parañaque; MIAA vs. City of Pasay; property of
the gov’t cannot be taxed; Bayantel; exemption granting a franchise an exemption
from tax cannot be struck doem by LGU.)
Poilice Power and Eminent Domain are delegated power, through the LGC. But the taxing power is
directly granted to by the Constitution, in the creation of resources of revenues. Sub-
ject to the taxation limitations as provided for in the Constitution (Ex: Tax exemption
to religious establishment etc., progressive system of taxation…)
Closing and Opening of Roads (See page 241 and 242 of GN)
Note: The presidong officer does not vote. It is only in case of tie, that the presiding officer votes.
Grounds to disapprove: Ultra-vires (The ordinance is beyond the power of the LGU Sanggunian Con-
cerned. In case of Sangguniang Barangay, the ordinance is inconsistent with the Municipal-
ity/City Ordinance.)
SUCCESSION RULE: (Page 252, GN; Page 267, Notes in Atty. G’s Book)
In case the governor or mayor dies, or is incapacitated, or removed from office, the successor is the
vice-Governor or the vice-Mayor.
In case of leave of absence, or travel abroad by the Chief Executive, it is the Vice Mayor who auto-
matically assumes.
But, what if the Chief executive is outside the jurisdiction but not abroad. Is it automatic that the Vice
Mayor automatically assumes acting capacity? No. If the absence is not more than 3 days, the
chief excutive can appoint an officer in-charge. If no appointed, there will be no acting mayor
for the period of 3 days. But the Vice-Mayor shall assume acting capacity on the 4th day.
With no power to appoint, or to dismiss.
Sanggunian: In case of resigned, incapacity, removal from office, or death of the presiding officer,
the highest rtanking sangguniang shall be the presiding officers.
How to determine who is the highest ranking sanggunian?
-by the number of votes, and correlate that with the number of electorate in the district.
For exmple:
In case of temporary vacancy, in case of presiding officer, who assumes the position? It is the highest
ranking sanggunian member
Q: What if the presiding officer is only temporarily not arround in a particular session?
A: The council will vote who will be the presiding officer
Scenario: Vmayor died. Under rule of succession, Highest ranking sanggunian assumes
VMayor’s office. The #2 Sanggunian will become the #1 Sanggunian. What if kung 6
ang Sanggunian, edi mawawala ung 6th…
A: It will be taken from the Political Party of the officer who caused the vacany. In this case, it
is not the Vice Mayor who caused the vacancy, it is the #1 Sanggunian, who assumed the
office of VM. So, the vacancy will be filed from the Political Party of the #1 sanggunian.
In case of independent officer, it is subject to the discretion of the appointing power, kasi
walang affected na party representation (In case of the sangguniang panlalawigan, it is
the President; In case of component cities and Municipalities, the Provincial Governor;
Sangguniang Baranggay, the Mayor.)
——————————-
a. Highest ranking Sanggunian member; in case of the permanent disability of highest ranking
Sanggunian member.
For purposes of succession, in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district
in the immediately preceding local election. [LGC, Sec. 44 (d)(3)]
GR: The successor (by appointment) should come from the same political party as the sanggunian
member whose position has become vacant.
XPN: In the case of vacancy in the Sangguniang barangay. (The reason for the rule is to maintain the
party representation as willed by the people in the election. )
———————————
POWER OF REMOVAL
RECALL
4. Percentage requirements (RA 9244 effective February 19, 20014) of the voting population for the
conduct of recall:
25% of the voting population must sign the recall petition, if the voting population is not more than
20k
20% if the voting population is 20k, but not more than 75k. Provided tha the required petitioners shall
not be less than 5k.
15% if 75k, but not more than 300k. Provided tha the required petitioners shall not be less than 15k.
10% if more than 300k, provided the petitioners should not be less than 45 thousand.
Note: Voluntary renunciation is not an interruption to the term of office. Ex: If he resigns on
the 2nd year, it is considered 1 full term.
A disqualification case. Arlene Chua was a candidate in City COunci, in one of the districts in
Manila. A nurse, and a dual citizen. She went to the Philippines after req-acquiring her citizen-
ship pursuant to R.A. 9225. She never executed an oath of renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Now, a petition titled “Cancellation of COC” was filed. But the prayer provides that she be
disqualified. It is confusing whether it is denial in due course, or cancellation of COC.
Note: the Period for cancellation of COC or deny in due course is 25 days upon filing of COC, If
nuissance 5days after the last day of filing of COC, And for Disqualification, file after the filing of
COC, but prior to proclamation.
Argument of Chua: It is filed out of time because it is a case of denial in due course, filed beyond the
reglamentary period. The filing is at the time of campaign period. The case remained pending.
After the election. Arlene Chua landed in the 6th place (The last place). The 7th place is Bacani.
The one who filed for disqualification is not Bacani. Now Arlene Chua was proclaimed as city coun-
cilor. Now, Bacani intervened in the complaint, arguing that in the event Chua is declared as diswual-
ified, he should be proclaimed as the 6th councilor.
Chua argued that Bacani has no personality to intervene because he is already lost. And in the even
that she will be disqualified, the rule of succession should apply. That in case of the vacancy, the one
to fill muct come fromt the political party where she belongs.
HELD: Chua should be disqualified because she did not took an oath of renunciation of foreign citi-
zenship. But take note that there are two kinds of disqualification:
1. Upon filing of COC, you are a qualified candidate, but due to commission of prohibited acts, you
become disqualified, in which case, you are prohibited to continue as a candidate.
2. COC is invalid from the time of filing, because from the time of filing, you are clearly disquali-
fied, not in possession of the requirements for the office. As if not a candidate. As if no COC.
In this, since Arlene Chua is lacking the citizenship requirement, her disqualification reverts from the
time of her COC filing. As if she did not file a COC, and is not considered a candidate. All the votes
to her are considered strain votes. Thus, Bacani, among the qualified candiates, obtained the 6th place.
Succession will not apply.
CASES:
-Involves mayor capco of Pateros. He originally run as Vice Mayor, but during his 1st term, the mayor
died, so he became the mayor. He served full term. Run again, won, served in 2nd term, and 3rd term.
In the 4th term, a disqualification case was filed against him arguing that there is violation of 3 term
limit rule. HELD: NO VIOLATION.
In this case, Capco, in his 1st term, was elected originally not as Mayor, but as Vice Mayor. And he
did not served the full term as Mayor. The 4th term is actually the 3rd term as Mayor.
-Montebon run and won as the highest ranking Sanggunian. During his term as Sanggunian, the Vice
Mayor retired. He assumed as VM. On his supposed 2nd term and 3rd term, he run again as sanggu-
nian. He won. On the 4th term, is it a violation of the 3 term limit rule? HELD: NO. Because he did
not serve the full term of his first term, because there is involuntary succession in office. It is a duty
imposed by law.
RIVERA vs. COMELEC
-Morales from Mabalacat. He run as Mayor. He won. Served 1st term. In 2nd term, he won, but there
is election protest. The protest remained unresolved until the term was served, and resolved only on
the 3rd term. The result in the 2nd term showed that he lost. The protestant is the winner, but there is
no longer term to serve, it will be an exercise in futility. on the 4th term, he run again, and a protest
was filed against him. Morales argued that he was disqualified in the 2nd term. Court said *L*L ka
(hahahha), nothwithstanding the disqualification, he was still able to serve the full term. Thus, he is
disqualified as MAyor in the 4th election.
The decision disqualifying him as mayor in 4th term was however rendered in May 2007, few days
prior to the next election. He vacated the office. And run again on the supposed to be 5th term…
-Disqualification against Morales, for having serve 5th term. Sabi ni Morales, there is an effetive
interruption during his supposed 4th term. So technically his 5th term is his 1st term. SC said TAMA
KA NA. However short the interruption is, it is still an interruption.
Fast forward, in 2016, Mabalacat is now a city. Morales run again, saying that it will be his 1st term
as city mayor. HELD: G*G* KA! (haha) Even though Mabalacat is now a city, there is still same
constituents and same territory. So exceeded na and term. He is disqualified
-Latasa served 3 consecutive term as municipal Mayor. But on the 4th term, the municipality was
converted to a city. Latasa alleged that he will be serving his 1st term as Mayor of the city. HELD:
Even though now a city, there is still same constituents and same territory. So exceeded na and term.
-Hagedorn served his full term as Mayor. Did not run in 4th term knowing his limiation.
Other mayor served. But on the 2nd year of the new mayor, there is a recall election, where the
incumbent mayor is the automatic candidate. Hagedorn Run in the recall election and Won.
Having won thereof, a case was filed praying to disqualify him forviolatingt he TERM LIMIT RULE.
Because upon winning the recall election, he is as if to serve in his 4th term. HELD: The Court said,
there is an effective interruption because the ousted mayor served for period of 1yr prior to the recall
election, where Hagedorn won.
-Won in the recall election. Run in supposed 2nd and 3rd term. Alleged to be disqualified for running
again in 4th term, for violation of the 3 term limit rule. HELD: Did not fully served the 1st term
because the ousted mayor served 1 yr prior to the recall election. This is an effective interruption.
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PUBLIC OFFICERS
1. It is a Public trust – The principle of “public office is a public trust” means that the officer
holds the public office in trust for the benefit of the people—to whom such officers are re-
quired to be accountable at all times, and to serve with utmost responsibility, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives (1987 Constitution, Art. XI,
Sec. 1).
2. It is not a Property – The concept "public office is not a property” means that it is outside
the commerce of man; hence, it cannot be the subject of a contract. (Santos v. Secretary of
Labor, G.R. No.L-21624, Feb. 27, 1968)
3. It is personal to the Public officer – It is not a property transmissible to the heirs of the pub-
lic officer upon the latter’s death (Santos v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No.L-21624, Feb. 27,
1968).
5. It is not a Natural right – Under our political system, the right to hold public office exists
only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.
3. Pursuant to an authority of law (Public office given a power ti create public office. Ex: Presi-
dent can create a public office. CASE: Biraogo—-Creation of Truth Commission——
but this was struck as unconstitutional for reason other than the power of the President
to create an office pursuant to its mandate to make sure that laws are properly exe-
cuted.)
MODES AND KINDS OF APPOINTMENT (SEE ATTY. G’s BOOK, page 269)
1. Permanent
2. Temporary
3. Regular
4. Ad interim
CASE:
Matibag vs. Benepayo; By-passed confirmation of an ad interim appointee is not equivalent to ser-
vice of term, thus, can be re-appointed;
Fetalino vs. COMELEC—- ad interim appointment not confirmed is not considered as service of
office, thus cannot be entitled to retirement benefits.
PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA—-It is within the prerogative of the President as to whom will the regular
or ad interim appointment be extended
CASE:
Funa vs. Ermita (Only occupy other office if expressedly provided for by law)
Funa vs. AGRA
Funa vs. Duque
An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office on any of the fol-
lowing grounds:
Before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against the municipal offi-
cial, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of
the charges and trial by the provincial board." [Mindano v. Silvosa, et al]
4. Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude, or an offense punishable by at least pri-
sion mayor
5. Abuse of authority
c. Bayan
d. Barangay
6. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of
another country
7. Such other grounds as may be provided by the Code and other laws. (LGC, Sec. 60)
NOTES: Non payment of just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Kahit hindi related sa office.
3. Given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence. [LGC, Sec. 63(b)]
NOTE: It is immaterial that no evidence has been adduced to prove that the official may in-
fluence possible witnesses or may tamper with the public records. It is sufficient that there
exists such a possibility. (Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995)
PERIOD
1. CSC-90 days
2. LGC
a. A single preventive suspension shall not extend beyond 60 days. (Rios v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 129913, September 26, 1997)
b. In the event that there are several administrative cases filed, the elective official cannot be
preventively suspended for more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of his first suspension. [LGC, Sec. 63(b)]
3. Ombudsman
DE facto office- person who assumes public officer with a color of unknown appointment
A: Qualify. If he is usurping the office, there is a need to return, and if there is no person entitled to
the office, then need not return.
3. Resignation
4. Recall
5. Removal
6. Abandonment
8. Abolition of office
10. Impeachment
11. Death
14. Filing of a COC (CASE: Quinto vs. COMELEC: Difference bet an appointive official and
elective official in case there is filing of COC; Appointive—- ipso facto resigned; Elective,
not ipso facto resigned, he shall assume office upto end of term.)
IMPEACHMENT (Page 275-280 of Atty. G’s Book; Page 174 Golden Notes)
Who precides?
1 YEAR BAR RULE—— interpretation of the “Initiate” /Cases (See Page 279, Atty. G’s Book;)
OMBUSDMAN (Page 280-287, Atty. G’s book; Page 175 Golden Notes)
CASE: Gonzales vs. Office of the president ( POwer of the president to remove deputy Ombdsman
will violate the independence of OMBUDSMAN)
CONDONATION DOCTRINE
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