Tamargo vs CA

GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of
Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with
whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto
Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted
child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of
parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the
child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto
was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties
to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused
by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as
to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no
actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it
permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article
35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody
period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting
incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

Petition for review was hereby granted.

LAHOM VS SIBULO
Posted by kaye lee on 7:49 PM
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the
petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas
and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his
dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom
to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5,
1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest
of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552,
and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was
months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972.
By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after
RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule
under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the
lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is
a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context
of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege
that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.
Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before
it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture
of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament,
may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors,
natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her
brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married
there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent
to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known
is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests
of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the
natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense
with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
 BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as
beneficiary

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He

was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died
due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless
and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biologicalmother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered
as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

 The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the
minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is

concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if
the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor
of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is
not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate
of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis
the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.