LEJANO v PEOPLE

FACTS: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her two daughters were brutally slain at their
home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and
eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a
mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what
everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later, the NBI announced that it had
solved the crime. It presented star witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that
she witnessed the crime. She pointed to the accused Herbert Jeffrey Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy”
Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada,
Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer Gerardo
Biong as an accessory after the fact. On December 14, 2010, the Court reversed the judgment of
the CA and acquitted the accused in this case on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010, complainant Lauro Vizconde, an immediate relative of the
victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision claiming that it denied the prosecution due
process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted
in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint would put the accused twice in jeopardy.

RULING: YES. The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice
in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. In criminal
cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to
prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and
capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the
accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But
the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his
pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. Ultimately, what the complainant actually
questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution
witnesses' credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Court's Ending that Alfaro was not a credible
witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense. In other
words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another
judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a
repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al.'s conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al. is
final and can no longer be disturbed
PEOPLE v RELOVA

FACTS: On 1 February 1975, Members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the
Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas
City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage
owned and operated by private respondent Manual Opulencia. Police discovered electric devices
and contraptions which were alleged by petitioners “designed purposely to lower or decrease
the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the electric plant. During the
subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused
the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric
meter." On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court
of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series
of 1974, Batangas City.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2
February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime
there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered
was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976,
the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing
that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of
discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than
nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen days later, another information against Opulencia has been filed, this time for
theft of electric power under Art. 308 in relation to Article 309 (1) of the RPC. Before he could be
arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash alleging that he had been
previously acquitted of the offense charged in the 2nd information and that the filing thereof was
violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Respondent judge granted the
accused’s motion to quash and ordered the case dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can invoke double jeopardy.

RULING: YES. There are two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. First, the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the Hrst and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. Second, the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged
under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute
such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of
acts. This case falls under the terms of the second instance.
When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion
and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary
design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable
of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments. In the case, the
relevant acts took place within the same time frame. The taking of electric current was integral
with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
Furthermore, for the constitutional plea to be available, not all the technical elements
constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense.
The law seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses
which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or
overlapping sets of technical elements.
The fact that Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint
against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Opulencia.