] Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 . . .
11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. GUILLERMO P. particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank
VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
THE PROVINCIAL-SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian
and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller, . .
UNCHUAN, and INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION ." 2 The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12.
CORPORATION, Respondents. Respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of
jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
Solicitor General Felix V . Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of
for Petitioner. the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and
notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." 3 In the
Andres T . Velarde & Marcelo B. Fernan for Respondents. answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B.
Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that
the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40. 4
DECISION
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge
is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so.
challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in makes the law on which the right depends." 5 Sociological jurisprudence
pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision,
very least, grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 with its
facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not
indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private
entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to have acted parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
nullified. principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend
summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such
rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined." 7
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made
amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may
1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and
the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of
Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, . . . 10. On the Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-settled doctrine
strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the `monies general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action `only up to the completion
due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution’ and that the power of the
cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution’; the Philippine Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Court of First Instance of Manila, GEORGE F.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding MOORE, ET AL., Respondents.
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law." Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for petitioner.
10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that
had accrued in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent.
Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt
on that score. Thus: "A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that
money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may
not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
For the purposes of this decision, the following
Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit facts gathered from and based on the pleadings,
indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to
be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of may be stated. The plaintiffs named Pedro,
the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are
may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids the undivided joint owners of three apartment
it." 12 buildings situated in the City of Manila known as
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia
Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
Apartments and Michel Apartments located at
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and 1131 M. H. del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar and
setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision
of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The 1188 A. Mabini Streets, respectively. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made
permanent.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs
Zaldivar, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. executed three lease contracts, one for each of
Barredo, J., did not take part. the three apartments, in favor of the United
States of America at a monthly rental of P1,775
for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the
South Syquia Apartment, and P3,335 for the
EN BANC Michel Apartments. The term or period for the
three leases was to be "for the duration of the
G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949 war and six months thereafter, unless sooner
terminated by the United States of America." The
PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and apartment buildings were used for billeting and
LEOPOLDO SYQUIAPetitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces
ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of stationed in the Manila area.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts of To advance the proposition that the Government
justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in which of the United States of America, soon after
the foreign government enters into private liberating the Philippines from the invading
contracts with the citizens of the court's Japanese forces, had entered with the petitioners
jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run in to the lease contract in question with the
against all principles of decency and violative of knowledge that petitioners could not bring an
all tenets of morals. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City. chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Petitioners, likewise, invoked the constitutional mandate that the State shall
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic afford full protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of
immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3).
the United Nations. In support thereof, private respondent attached a letter
from the Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that private respondent is
acknowledged its immunity from suit. The letter confirmed that private covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. Private respondent is a
respondent, being a special fund administered by the United Nations, was specified agency of the United Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the
covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United United Nations: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an appeal was filed
with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaints in its Resolution Corollary to the cited article is the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
dated January 25, 1993. chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, to which the Philippines was
a signatory (Vol. 1, Philippine Treaty Series, p. 621.) We quote Sections 4 and
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a 5 of Article III thereof: jgc:chan robles .com.p h
Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
doctrine of immunity granted to the United Nations and its specialized
agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. chanrobl esvirt uallawl ibra ry
SO ORDERED.
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by Did the International Rice Research Institute
the letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the
immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute
and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a which arose from an employer-employee
party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic
immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive relationship? chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry
branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies (The Holy See v.
Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr., G.R. No. 101949, Dec. 1, 1994; International
Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, supra). chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
We rule in the negative and vote to dismiss the
petition.
Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s vi rtual law lib rary
waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations,
Art. III, Sec. 4).
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a evidence, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to
driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 to petitioner on December 7, 1990. 4
December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990, while
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on
Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter for
the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry
illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity
pay with moral and exemplary damages and
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a attorney's fees.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan rob les virtual law l ibra ry
The NLRC found merit in private respondent' s waived by the Director-General of the Institute or
appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its his authorized representatives.
immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the
In the case of International Catholic Migration
Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint
Commission v. Hon. Calleja, et al. and Kapisanan
dismissed. 10
ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. Secretary of
Hence, this petition where it is contended that the Labor and Employment and IRRI, 12the Court
immunity of the IRRI as an international upheld the constitutionality of the aforequoted
organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential law. After the Court noted the letter of the Acting
Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of
at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by Labor dated June 17, 1987, where the immunity
virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the of IRRI from the jurisdiction of the Department of
handling of dismissed employees in relation to Labor and Employment was sustained, the Court
P.D. 1620." 11 stated that this opinion constituted "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the
It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of Government that . . . IRRI enjoy(s) immunities
his complaint before the Labor Arbiter leaves him accorded to international organizations, which
no other remedy through which he can seek determination has been held to be a political
redress. He further states that since the question conclusive upon the Courts in order not
investigation of his case was not referred to the to embarass a political department of
Council of IRRI Employees and Management Government. 13We cited the Court's earlier
(CIEM), he was denied his constitutional right to pronouncement in WHO v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino,
due process. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary
et al., 14to wit:
It is a recognized principle of international law the Department of Labor in these instances would
and under our system of separation of powers defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political shield the affairs of international organizations, in
question and courts should refuse to look beyond accordance with international practice, from
a determination by the executive branch of the political pressure or control by the host country to
government, and where the plea of diplomatic the prejudice of member States of the
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the organization, and to ensure the unhampered the
executive branch of the government as in the performance of their functions. 16 chanroble s virtual law lib rary
Further, we held that "(t)he raison d'etre for 1620" dated July 26, 1983, is misplaced. The
these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded Memorandum reads, in part:
performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned. Time and again the Institute has reiterated that it
will not use its immunity under P.D. 1620 for the
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to . . purpose of terminating the services of any of its
. and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their employees. Despite continuing efforts on the part
international character and respective purposes. of IRRI to live up to this undertaking, there
The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality appears to be apprehension in the minds of some
and interference by the host country in their IRRI employees. To help allay these fears the
internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by following guidelines will be followed hereafter by
the Personnel/Legal Office while handling cases of From the last paragraph of the foregoing
dismissed employees. quotation, it is clear that in cases involving
dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its
xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary
IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM), IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
petitioner similarly fails to persuade the Court.
libra ry
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law
for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for issued but the drivers refused to accept the
Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated receipts.. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and
[5]
April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ of Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the
replevin.. h Y
[2]
Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal
complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795,
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are
for violation of Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705
as follows:
as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code. Mis sc
[6]
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody
apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as
of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to
follows:
file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against
Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, in an Order dated April 24, 1992. Petitioners filed a
.[10]
dismissed by the Public Prosecutor. .[7] motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court. [11]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the
number FCN 143, was again apprehended by a Supreme Court the present Petition for Certiorari,
composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan and Prohibition and Mandamus with application for
Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining
at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent
with forest products with an equivalent volume of RTC judge from conducting further proceedings in the
1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and
a certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal forest products seized from the custody of the
Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68 [78], petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to
Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. .[8] seized are kept in a secured place and protected from
deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court. In a
.[12]
Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court
reasonable doubt. But note the trial court ordered that a referred said petition to respondent appellate court for
copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of appropriate disposition. .[13]
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They was found without merit. Rtc spped
[18]
No. P-98-1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the
involves property to be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
replevin suit. But said property were already impounded liable.. However, the protection afforded to public
[23]
by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities
already forfeited in favor of the government by order of within the scope of their authority in good faith and
the DENR. We said that such property was deemed without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present
[24]
in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called
the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. to account were performed by them in the discharge of
The appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform their official duties. The acts in question are clearly
the trial court of the situation by way of partial Sheriffs official in nature. In implementing and enforcing
[25]
Return, and wait for the judges instructions on the proper Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the
procedure to be observed. seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their
duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia within the limits of their authority. There was no malice
legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit. In nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the
Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated
further:
petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the
State. It cannot prosper without the States consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not [G.R. No. L-9990. September 30, 1957.]
pursue the Office of the Solicitor Generals line for the
defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V. HERRERA, in their behalf and as
minority stockholders of the Allied Technologists, Inc., Plaintiffs-
administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that Appellants, v. HON. SOTERO B. CABAHUG, Secretary of National
exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, Defense, Col. NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the Engineer Group, Office of
the Secretary of National Defense, THE FINANCE OFFICER of the
even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading Department of National Defense, the AUDITOR of the Department of
asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked
.[26] the National Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED
TECHNOLOGISTS, INC., Defendants-Appellees.
at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be
deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of Diokno & Sison for Appellants.
The facts upon which plaintiffs’ first cause of action are based are alleged as THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESENT SUIT IS ONE
follows:cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE VALIDLY
ENTERTAINED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS
On July 31, 1950 the Secretary of National Defense accepted the bid of the CONSENT.
Allied Technologists, Inc., to furnish the architectural and engineering services
in the construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700. The plans, II
specifications, sketches and detailed drawings and other architectural
requirements submitted by the Allied Technologists through three of its
architects, Messrs. Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V. Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT 3083,
were approved by the United States Veterans Administration in Washington, AS AMENDED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT 327 ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE;
D.C. Because of the technical objection to the capacity of the Allied IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED
Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice of the WITH THE AUDITOR GENERAL.
Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part of the Allied
Technologists, Inc. by E. J. L. Ruiz as President and P. D. Panlilio as Architect. III
When the defendants-officials paid the Allied Technologists the contract price
for the architectural engineering service, they retained 15 per cent of the sum
due, for the reason that defendant Panlilio has asserted that he is the sole and THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MINORITY SUIT IS
only architect of the Veterans Hospital to the exclusion of plaintiffs Ruiz and UNTENABLE.
Herrera, assertion aided and abetted by defendant Jimenez. Unless defendants
are prevented from recognizing defendant Panlilio as the sole architect of the
IV
contract and from paying the 15 per cent retained, plaintiffs will be deprived of
the monetary value of their professional services and their professional
prestige and standing would be seriously impaired.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
INJUNCTION.
Under the second cause of action the following facts are alleged: Under Title II
of the contract entered into between plaintiffs and the Secretary of National
Evidently, the plaintiffs-appellants do not question the dismissal of the second
Defense, at any time prior to six months after completion and acceptance of
cause of action. So, the appeal has relation to the first cause of action only.
the work under Title I, the Government may direct the Allied Technologists,
Inc. to perform the services specified in said Title II. But notwithstanding such
A careful study of the allegations made in the amended complaint discloses the
completion or acceptance, the Government has refused to direct the plaintiffs
following facts and circumstances: The contract price for the architectural
to perform the work, entrusting such work to a group of inexperienced and
engineering services rendered by the Allied Technologists, Inc. and the
unqualified engineers.
plaintiffs is P231,600. All of that sum has been set aside for payment to the
Allied Technologists, Inc. and its architects, except the sum of P34,740,
The prayer based on the first cause of action is that defendants desist from
representing 15 per cent of the total costs, which has been retained by the
recognizing Panlilio as the sole and only architect of the Veterans Hospital and
defendants-officials. Insofar as the Government of the Philippines is concerned,
from paying him the 15 per cent retained as above indicated, and that after
the full amount of the contract price has been set aside and said full amount
hearing Ruiz, Herrera and Panlilio be recognized as the architects of the
authorized to be paid. The Government does not any longer have any interest
Veterans Hospital. Under the second cause of action it is prayed that the
in the amount, which the defendants-officials have retained and have refused
defendants be directed to turn over the supervision called for by Title II of the
to pay to the plaintiffs, or to the person or entity to which it should be paid.
contract.
And the plaintiffs do not seek to sue the Government to require it to pay the
amount or involve it in the litigation. The defendant Jimenez is claimed to have
The court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved is
"aided and abetted defendant Panlilio in depriving the Allied Technologists, Inc.
one against the Government, which may not be sued without its consent. It is
and its two architects (Ruiz and Herrera) of the honor and benefit due to them
also held that as the majority of the stockholders of the Allied Technologists,
under the contract Annex ‘C’ thereof." It is further claimed by plaintiffs that the
Inc. have not joined in the action, the minority suit does not lie. It dismissed
defendant-officials are about to recognize Panlilio as the sole architect and are
the second cause of action on the ground that the optional services under Title
about to pay him the 15 per cent which they had retained, and thus deprive
II have already been performed.
plaintiffs of their right to share therein and in the honor consequent to the
recognition of their right. The suit, therefore, is properly directed against the
On this appeal the plaintiffs assign the following errors: chan rob 1es virt ual 1aw li bra ry
officials and against them alone, not against the Government, which does not agents, is as well settled in the jurisprudence of this country as is the general
have any interest in the outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs on the rule first above mentioned; for in such a suit no relief is demanded which
one hand, and Panlilio on the other. The suit is between these alone, to requires any affirmative action on the part of the state. Such a suit is only to
determine who is entitled to the amount retained by the officials; and if the the end that the officers and agents of the state stay off the private property of
latter did aid and abet Panlilio in his pretense, to the exclusion and prejudice of the citizen and cease to damage that property, the state having no right or title
plaintiffs, it is natural that they alone, and not the Government, should be the thereto." (State Mineral Lease Commission v. Lawrence [1934], 157 So. 857,
subject of the suit. Had said officials chosen not to take sides in the 898- 899.)
controversy between the architects, and had disclaimed interest in said
controversy, the suit would have been converted into one of interpleader. But We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended
they have acted to favor one side, and have abetted him in his effort to obtain complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against
payment to him of the sum remaining unpaid and credit for the work, to the the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel
exclusion of the plaintiffs. Hence, the suit. them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending
architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the
We are not wanting in authority to sustain the view that the State need not be contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in
a party in this and parallel cases. the funds retained and in the credit for the work done. The order of dismissal is
hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a quo for
"There is no proposition of law which is better settled than the general rule that further proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.
a sovereign state and its political subdivision cannot be sued in the courts
except upon the statutory consent of the state. Numerous decisions of this Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,
court to that effect may be cited; but it is enough to note that this court, in Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
banc in a recent case, State v. Woodruf (Miss.) , 150 So. 760, has so held; and
therein overruled a previous decision which had adjudicated that such consent
could be worked out of a statute by implication, when express consent was
absent from the terms of that statute.
"But the rule applies only when the state or its subdivision is actually made a
party upon the record, or is actually necessary to be made a party in order to
furnish the relief demanded by the suit. It does not apply when the suit is
against an officer or agent of the state, and the relief demanded by the suit
requires no affirmative official action on the part of the state nor the FIRST DIVISION
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the state in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants disclaim [G.R. No. 52179. April 8, 1991.]
any personal interest in themselves and claim to hold or to act only by virtue of
a title of the state and as its agents and servants. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, Petitioner, v. HON.
JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, LAUREANO
"Thus it will be found, as illustrative of what has been above said, that nearly BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA ORJA
all the cases wherein the rule of immunity from suit against the state, or a BANIÑA AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA, Respondents.
subdivision thereof, has been applied and upheld, are those which demanded a
money judgment, and wherein the discharge of the judgment, if obtained, Mauro C . Cabading, Jr. for Petitioner.
would require the appropriation or an expenditure therefrom, which being
legislative in its character is a province exclusively of the political departments Simeon G. Hipol for Private Respondent.
of the state. And in the less frequent number of cases where no money
judgment is demanded, and the rule of immunity is still upheld, it will be found
in them that the relief demanded would be, nevertheless, to require of the
state or its political subdivision the affirmative performance of some asserted DECISION
obligation, belong to the state in its political capacity.
"When, therefore, officers or agents of the state, although acting officially and MEDIALDEA, J.:
not as individuals, seize the private property of a citizen, the state having no
valid right or title thereto, or trespass upon that property or damage it, the
jurisdiction of the courts to eject the officers or agents, or to enjoin them from
further trespass or damage, in a suit by the owner against the officers or
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action
of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as
N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First the proximate cause of the collision. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
23, 1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979; September
7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated (1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against
October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Bernardo Balagot;
Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for
funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity (2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the
of the deceased, attorney’s fees and costs of suit and dismissing the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the hearing
complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot. on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lack of
jurisdiction;
The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring the resolution of the grounds
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal for the Motion to Dismiss until the trial;
corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is (4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration
impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having
First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While private been filed out of time;
respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta
Baniña, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the (5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for
deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976;
before the aforesaid court.
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for
At about 7 o’clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision decision it appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and memoranda despite the court’s direction; and
owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven
by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck (7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner’s motion for
of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. reconsideration and or order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross
Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano examination.
Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4)
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion is hereunder quoted as follows: jgc:chanro bles. com.ph
No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private
respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular "The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras
employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. and Bernardo Balagot.
sued without its consent." cra law virtua1aw lib ra ry
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the Ledesma, Guytingco, Veleasco & Associates for respondent
performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule Ernest E. Simke.
131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. cralawnad
CORTES, J.:
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. v. Province of Ilocos
Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the court decision which reads as follows:
driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental
activities."
cralaw vi rtua1aw l ib rary
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent The facts of the case are as follows: c hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group
proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. chanr obl es virtual awlibr arychanrobles virtual l aw libr ar y
I
chanr obl es virtual law librar y
The next day, December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for Invoking the rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent, petitioner
about three hours. chanrobles virtualawlibr ar yc hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
the CAA was sued only in a substituted capacity, the National Airports
Corporation being the original party. Second, in the Teodoro case, the cause
Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills, of action was contractual in nature while here, the cause of action is based
consequential damages for the expenses of two lawyers who had to go on a quasi-delict. Third, there is no specific provision in Republic Act No.
abroad in private respondent's stead to finalize certain business transactions 776, the law governing the CAA, which would justify the conclusion that
and for the publication of notices announcing the postponement of private petitioner was organized for business and not for governmental purposes.
respondent's daughter's wedding which had to be cancelled because of his [Rollo, pp. 94-97]. c hanrobles virtualawli brar yc hanr obl es virtual law librar y
accident [Record on Appeal, p. 5]. c hanr obl es virtual awlibr arychanrobles virtual l aw libr ar y
Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the following assignment of xxx xxx xxx chanr obl es vir tual law libr ary
errors:
... To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that the present the CAA Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or
is really a suit against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and
without its consent, which was not given in this case. c hanrobles virtualawlibr ar yc hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
in its own name. The better practice there should have been to make the
Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the injuries of National Airports Corporation. [National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra, p.
respondent Ernest E. Simke were due to petitioner's negligence - although 208.] chanr obl es vir tual law libr ar y
there was no substantial evidence to support such finding; and that the
inference that the hump or elevation the surface of the floor area of the xxx xxx xxx
terrace of the fold) MIA building is dangerous just because said respondent
tripped over it is manifestly mistaken - circumstances that justify a review by
Second, the Teodoro case did not make any qualification or limitation as to (24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the
whether or not the CAA's power to sue and be sued applies only to Manila International Airport and all government-owned aerodromes except
contractual obligations. The Court in the Teodoro case ruled that Sections 3 those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including
and 4 of Executive Order 365 confer upon the CAA, without any qualification, such powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design, construct, equip, expand,
the power to sue and be sued, albeit only by implication. Accordingly, this improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air
Court's pronouncement that where such power to sue and be sued has been navigation facilities; (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind
granted without any qualification, it can include a claim based on tort or with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity; ... . c hanr obl es virtual awlibr ar ychanrobles virtual l aw libr ar y
private entity.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx chanr obl es vir tual law libr ary
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the CAA is tasked with private or non-
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of the
entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports rule on State immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in the
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run Tedoro case states:
what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It xxx xxx xxx chanr obl es vir tual law libr ary
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when the Teodoro case was promulgated Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have
was Exec. Order 365 (Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration and assumed to act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits
Abolishing the National Airports Corporation). Republic Act No. 776 (Civil against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to
Aeronautics Act of the Philippines), subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather
did not alter the character of the CAA's objectives under Exec, Order 365. than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as
The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. 3 and 4 suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stock or
of Exec. Order 365, which led the Court to consider the CAA in the category property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations
of a private entity were retained substantially in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32 through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character,
(24) and (25). Said Act provides: and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. (59 C.J., 313)
[National Airport Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. 206-207; Emphasis
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. Subject to the general - supplied.]
control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have
among others, the following powers and duties: c hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine
National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 631, where
xxx xxx xxx chanr obl es vir tual law libr ary it was held that the Philippine National Railways, although owned and
operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it does not
exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions.
Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of These factual findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Hence,
airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail the CAA cannot disclaim its liability for the negligent construction of the
of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing elevation since under Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with the duty of
strictly governmental functions. chanrobles virtualawli brar yc hanrobles virtual law li brar y planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, improving, repairing
or altering aerodromes or such structures, improvements or air navigation
II
chanr obl es vir tual law libr ary
facilities [Section 32, supra, R.A. 776]. In the discharge of this obligation, the
CAA is duty-bound to exercise due diligence in overseeing the construction
Petitioner tries to escape liability on the ground that there was no basis for a and maintenance of the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. chanr obl es virtualawlibr ar yc hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm to the
public. c hanrobl es virtual awlibrar yc hanr obl es virtual law librar y
... This Court after its ocular inspection found the elevation shown in Exhs. A
or 6-A where plaintiff slipped to be a step, a dangerous sliding step, and the The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury... chanrobles virtualawlibr ar yc hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
2176 of the Civil Code which provides that "(w)hoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
xxx xxx xxx chanr obl es vir tual law libr ary
for the damage done... As the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous
elevation which it claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the
This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and plans and specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open
defective condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and 57; Rollo, p. 391, its failure to
through the years. It has observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep of have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing hazard constitutes
the MIA terrace, typical of many government buildings and offices. Aside such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon
from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace, pot holes cause by CAA. chanrobles virtualawli brar yc hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
not easily be noticed because of its construction. As the trial court found:
Concerning the P20,200.00 alleged to have been spent for other expenses
such as the transportation of the two lawyers who had to represent private
In connection with the incident testified to, a sketch, Exhibit O, shows a
respondent abroad and the publication of the postponement notices of the
section of the floorings oil which plaintiff had tripped, This sketch reveals two
wedding, the Court holds that the same had also been duly proven. Private
pavements adjoining each other, one being elevated by four and one-fourth
respondent had adequately shown the existence of such losses and the
inches than the other. From the architectural standpoint the higher, pavement
amount thereof in the testimonies before the trial court [CA decision, p. 81. At
is a step. However, unlike a step commonly seen around, the edge of the
any rate, the findings of the Court of Appeals with respect to this are findings
elevated pavement slanted outward as one walks to one interior of the
of facts [One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
terrace. The length of the inclination between the edges of the two
5379053972, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 4161 which, as had been held time
pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the inclination
and again, are, as a general rule, conclusive before this Court [Sese v.
because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he would not have lost
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66186, July 31, 1987,152 SCRA
his balance. The same sketch shows that both pavements including the
585].
inclined portion are tiled in red cement, and as shown by the photograph
chanr obl es virtualawlibr ar yc hanrobles virtual l aw libr ar y
Exhibit A, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would therefore be difficult
for a pedestrian to see the inclination especially where there are plenty of With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral damages, the Court holds
persons in the terrace as was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There private respondent entitled thereto because of the physical suffering and
was no warning sign to direct one's attention to the change in the elevation of physical injuries caused by the negligence of the CAA [Arts. 2217 and 2219
the floorings. [Rollo, pp. 2829.] (2), New Civil Code]. c hanr obl es virtual awlibr arychanrobles virtual l aw libr ar y
With respect to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code explicitly, WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari
states: is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R
is AFFIRMED. chanrobles virtualawlibr ar yc hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under Art. 1. REMEDIAL LAW; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTION. — A defendant in a civil suit
2208 (1) of the Civil Code, the same may be awarded whenever exemplary must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized
by law to be sued.
damages are awarded, as in this case, and,at any rate, under Art. 2208 (11),
the Court has the discretion to grant the same when it is just and 2. ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS OR CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE NOT
equitable. chanrobles virtualawlibr ar yc hanrobles virtual l aw li brar y
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that
— Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of
reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such can be sued by private
have filed its present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for individuals.
money, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 327, which state the
conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed. The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide: jgc: chan robles .com.p h
8. ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IMMUNE FROM SUIT. — The Bureau of "SECTION 1. Who may be parties. — Only natural or juridical persons or
Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
private business.
"The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the
Act No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1, 1957), and it Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
states:jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph Secretary, Office of the President, and is ‘charged with the execution of all
printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by
"SECTION 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles. — The the National Government and such other work of the same character as said
Bureau of Customs shall have exclusive supervision and control over the Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive
receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers Secretary, be authorized to undertake. . . .’ (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It
at all ports of entry and in the exercise of its functions it is hereby authorized has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the
to acquire, take over, operate and superintend such plants and facilities as may General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the
be necessary for the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and Government, it is primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not engaged in
the convenience and comfort of passengers and the handling of baggage, as business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
well as to acquire fire protection equipment for use in the piers: Provided, That
whenever in his judgment the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of x x x
articles can be carried on by private parties with greater efficiency, the
Commissioner may, after public bidding and subject to the approval of the
department head, contract with any private party for the service of receiving, ". . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private
handling, custody and delivery of articles, and in such event, the contract may printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business
include the sale or lease of government-owned equipment and facilities used in concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental
such service." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry
to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in
character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary
In Associated Workers Union, Et Al., v. Bureau of Customs, Et Al., L-21397, function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general
resolution of August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held "that the foregoing governmental functions.
statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of
the right to render said arrastre services necessarily imply that the same is x x x
deemed by Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function." The
issue in said case, however, was whether laborers engaged in arrastre service
fall under the concept of employees in the Government employed in "Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or judicial
governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in Section 11, Republic personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of
Act 875 to the effect that "employees in the Government . . . shall not strike," Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any
but "may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government
obligation to strike or to join in strike" which prohibition "shall apply only to itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its
employees employed in governmental functions of the Government. . . ." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary
consent much less over its objection. (See Metran v. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz.,
2835; Angat River Irrigation System, Et Al., v. Angat River Workers Union, Et
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had Al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957.)"
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of
its present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for money, under
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under
repeat, is part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with which money claims against the Government may be filed.
no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its
primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from
revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of
charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R. A. 1937). To this function, arrastre sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and
service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and Dependencies, Sec. 96, p. 314; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359
customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct. 785.) From the provision authorizing the
importer’s or ship agent’s or consignee’s declaration of merchandise being Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations to private parties, We see no
imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it undertakes to
and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the
actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service,
hauled from the ship’s side to a suitable place in the customs premises to pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its
enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation. 1 prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to
the contrary.chanroblesv irtuallaw lib rary:re d
"Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under
Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant
concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on
sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for
[G.R. No. L-15751. January 28, 1961.]
the use of any property under its management.
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO
"These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our
LEDESMA, Petitioners, v. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES
opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is
ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA,
implied from the power to transact private business . . .
PONCIANO ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, Respondents.
x x x Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons 1. JURISDICTION; FUNCTIONS OF BUREAU OF PRINTING NOT EXCLUSIVELY
of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed PROPRIETARY IN NATURE; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE BROUGHT AGAINST THE
BUREAU. — The Bureau of Printing is primarily a service bureau and is not relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary benefit. Although it receives Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus
outside jobs and many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised
working days and on holidays, these facts do not justify the conclusion that its by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Hence, the Court of Industrial merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The motion
Relations is without jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints for unfair was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an
labor practice filed against the Bureau of Printing. order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the
theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SUITS AGAINST THE STATE; BUREAU OF PRINTING in nature," and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration
NOT SUBJECT TO SUIT WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. — As an office of the of this order having been also denied by the court en banc, the petitioners
Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of brought the case to this court through the present petition for certiorari and
Printing cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. prohibition.
(Angat River Irrigation System, et. al. v. Angat River Workers’ Union, et. al.,
102 Phil., 789.) We find the petition to be meritorious.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations
did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of Printing, and is thus
SECOND DIVISION
devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already
held in a long line of decisions that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to
hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against
G.R. No. L-30044 December 19, 1973
institutions or corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an
industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial Peace Act
was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the
LORENZO SAYSON, as Highway Auditor,
relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes Bureau of Public Highways, Cebu First
of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, Et. Al. v.
CIR, Et Al., G.R No. L-15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas v. Engineering District; CORNELIO FORNIER, as
Villanueva, Et Al., G.R No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited Regional Supervising Auditor, Eastern
therein.)
Visayas Region; ASTERIO, BUQUERON,
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of
ADVENTOR FERNANDEZ, MANUEL S.
Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any LEPATAN, RAMON QUIRANTE, and
effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government
itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its
TEODULFO REGIS, Petitioners, vs. FELIPE
consent, much less over its objection. (See Metran v. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz., SINGSON, as sole owner and proprietor of
2835; Angat River Irrigation System, Et. Al. v. Angat River Workers’ Union, Et
Al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957). Singkier Motor Service, Respondent.
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of
administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar
Printing Employees’ Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts
prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees of the Bureau
of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted Teodoro Almase and Casiano U. Laput for
officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized
to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. respondent.
For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it,
which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with
the discipline of government employees under them, would be to interfere with FERNANDO, J.:
the discharge of such functions by said officials.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders The real party in interest before this Court in
complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against this certiorari proceeding to review a decision of
the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the
respondent court. the Court of First Instance of Cebu is the Republic
Bengzon, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
of the Philippines, although the petitioners are the
public officials who were named as
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
respondents 1 in a mandamus suit below. Such is
the contention of the then Solicitor General, now Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier
Associate Justice, Felix V. Makasiar, 2 for as he Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to
did point out, what is involved is a money claim immediately deliver the items listed therein for
against the government, predicated on a the lot price of P43,530.00. ... It would appear
contract. The basic doctrine of non-suability of that a purchase order signed by the District
the government without its consent is thus Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the
decisive of the controversy. There is a governing Procurement Officer, was addressed to the
statute that is controlling. 3 Respondent Felipe Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the
Singson, the claimant, for reasons known to him, Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway
did not choose to abide by its terms. That was a Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made
fatal misstep. The lower court, however, did not inquiries about the reasonableness of the price.
see it that way. We cannot affirm its decision. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of
the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of
As found by the lower court, the facts are the Public Highways that the prices of the various
following: "In January, 1967, the Office of the spare parts are just and reasonable and that the
District Engineer requisitioned various items of requisition was also approved by no less than the
spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer, ... . Secretary of Public Works and Communications
The requisition (RIV No. 67/0331) was signed by with the verification of V.M. Secarro a
the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and representative of the Bureau of Supply
the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment
S. Lepatan. ... It was approved by the Secretary in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of
of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. ... His reason for
Raquiza. It is noted in the approval of the said withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 was
requisition that "This is an exception to the to submit the voucher with the supporting papers
telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The
Public Works and Communications." ... So, a voucher ... was paid on June 9, 1967 in the
canvass or public bidding was conducted on May amount of P34,824.00 to the petitioner
5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted [respondent Singson]. On June 10,1967, Highway
the bid of the Singkier Motor Service [owned by Auditor Sayson received a telegram from
respondent Felipe Singson] for the sum of Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic
P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by message of the General Auditing Office which
the Secretary of Public Works and states: "In view of excessive prices charge for
Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the
purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by of the then Solicitor General Makasiar. Thus: "It
vouchers already submitted this Office direct all is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of
highway auditors refer General Office payment action is a money claim against the government,
similar nature for appropriate action." ... In for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost
the interim it would appear that when the of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of
voucher and the supporting papers reached the Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the
GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts validity of such claim, although as will be shown
among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or
USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the consideration is contrary to law, morals or public
spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce
Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its the collection of such claim against the State but
quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 a ordinary action for specific performance ... .
less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus
the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers
the Secretary of Public Works in a third for payment, is a suit against the State, which
indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court
then circularized a telegram holding the district except with the consent of the State ... . In other
engineer responsible for overpricing." 4 What is words, the respondent should have filed his claim
more, charges for malversation were filed against with the General Auditing Office, under the
the district engineer and the civil engineer provisions of Com. Act 327 ... which prescribe the
involved. It was the failure of the Highways conditions under which money claim against the
Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led government may be
to the filing of the mandamus suit below, with filed ...." 5 Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite
now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of explicit. It is therein provided: "In all cases
Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the other than those of accountable officers, the
contract in question having been upheld. Hence Auditor General shall act and decide the same
this appeal by certiorari.
chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts
1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity or claims need reference to other persons, office
of the stand taken by the Republic. The lower or offices, or to a party interested, the period
court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last
of non-suability. So it was stressed in the petition
comment necessary to a proper decision is WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First
received by Instance of Cebu of September 4, 1968 is
him." 6 Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is reversed and set aside, and the suit for
indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final mandamus filed against petitioners, respondents
decision of the Auditor General in the settlement below, is dismissed. With costs against
of an account or claim may, within thirty days respondent Felipe Singson.
from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in
writing: (a) To the President of the United States, Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio
pending the final and complete withdrawal of her
sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the
President of the Philippines, or (c) To the
Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant
is a private person or entity." 7 chanroble s virtual law lib rary
matter should have been elevated is this Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the
Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad
the matter. What transpired was anything but Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer
that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded
the imprint of validity.
chanro blesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ib rary
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on Highways for the recovery of ownership and
February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the possession of the 6,167 square meters of land
government of any right or interest in the traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
property appears at the back of the certificate. She also sought the payment of compensatory
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal
the government used a portion of said lot, with occupation of her land, moral damages in the
an area of 6,167 square meters, for the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of
construction of the Mango and Gorordo P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan roble s virtual law lib rary
Avenues. chanroble svi rtualaw lib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
the defendants. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared
quo a complaint, which was later amended on for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so
April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, the trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court
rendered its decision holding that it had no government without thereby violating the
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
the recovery of possession and ownership of the without its consent. We there said: .
portion of her lot in question on the ground that
the government cannot be sued without its ... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate be compensated for property taken for public use
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of
for compensatory damages in the sum of this character should not be summarily dismissed.
P50,000.00, the same being a money claim The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
against the government; and that the claim for cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it injustice on a citizen. Had the government
have jurisdiction over said claim because the followed the procedure indicated by the governing
government had not given its consent to be sued. law at the time, a complaint would have been
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable filed by it, and only upon payment of the
to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently tender to the party entitled to such payment of
certified the case to Us, there being no question the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter
of fact involved. chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in
The issue here is whether or not the appellant the judgment." If there were an observance of
may properly sue the government under the facts procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
of the case.chanroble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then
that precisely because there was a failure to
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First abide by what the law requires, the government
Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if
of the value of a portion of land used for the not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms
widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were
Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, to be maintained. It is not too much to say that
held that where the government takes away when the government takes any property for
property from a private landowner for public use public use, which is conditioned upon the
without going through the legal process of payment of just compensation, to be judicially
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
party may properly maintain a suit against the the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought
then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could court a quo for the determination of
still be appropriately invoked. compensation, including attorney's fees, to which
the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No
Considering that no annotation in favor of the pronouncement as to costs.
government appears at the back of her certificate
of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of
the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of the
portion of land in question at anytime because G.R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977
possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
portion by the government is neither convenient vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, the
nor feasible at this time because it is now and has Presiding Judge of the court of first Instance
been used for road purposes, the only relief of Manila (Branch VII), and YELLOW BALL
available is for the government to make due FREIGHT LINES, INC., Respondents.
compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine the due Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant
compensation for the land, the basis should be Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan, Solicitor
the price or value thereof at the time of the Oscar C. Fernandez and Special Attorney Renato
taking. 2 chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
P. Mabugat for petitioner.chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is Jose Q. Calingo for private respondent.
entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on
the price of the land from the time it was taken FERNANDO, Acting C.J.: chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
law libra ry
To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its The PCGG's posture that to the owner of the
being considered as a receiver insofar as the sequestered shares rests the burden of paying
sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are the membership dues is untenable. For one, it
concerned.12 PCGG also acknowledges that as lost sight of the reality that such dues are
such receiver, one of its functions is to pay basically obligations attached to the shares,
outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered which, in the final analysis, shall be made liable,
entity or property,13 in this case the 227 NOGCCI thru delinquency sale in case of default in
shares in question. It contends, however, that payment of the dues. For another, the PCGG as
membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as
considered as an outstanding debt for which stressed earlier, duty bound to preserve the value
PCGG, as receiver, must pay. It also claims to of such shares. Needless to state, adopting timely
have exercised due diligence to prevent the loss measures to obviate the loss of those shares
through delinquency sale of the subject NOGCCI forms part of such duty and due diligence.
shares, specifically inviting attention to the
injunctive suit, i.e., Civil Case No. 5348, it filed The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly
before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin the be faulted for finding the PCGG liable for the loss
foreclosure sale of the shares. of the 227 NOGCCI shares. There can be no
quibbling, as indeed the graft court so declared in
The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, its assailed and related resolutions respecting the
without more, cannot plausibly tilt the balance in NOGCCI shares of stock, that PCGG's fiscal
favor of PCGG. To the mind of the Court, such agents, while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of
filing is a case of acting too little and too late. It Directors agreed to the amendment of the rule
cannot be over-emphasized that it behooved the pertaining to membership dues. Hence, it is not
PCGG's fiscal agents to preserve, like a amiss to state, as did the Sandiganbayan, that
responsible father of the family, the value of the the PCGG-designated fiscal agents, no less, had a
shares of stock under their administration. But far direct hand in the loss of the sequestered shares
from acting as such father, what the fiscal agents through delinquency and their eventual sale
did under the premises was to allow the element through public auction. While perhaps anti-
climactic to so mention it at this stage, the jurisdiction.16The abuse must be so patent and
unfortunate loss of the shares ought not to have gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
come to pass had those fiscal agents prudently duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
not agreed to the passage of the NOGCCI board enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
resolutions charging membership dues on shares of law as where the power is exercised in an
without playing representatives. arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.17 Sadly, this is completely
Given the circumstances leading to the auction absent in the present case. For, at bottom, the
sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, PCGG's assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan did no
lament about public respondent Sandiganbayan more than to direct PCGG to comply with its part
having erred or, worse still, having gravely of the bargain under the compromise agreement
abused its discretion in its determination as to it freely entered into with private respondent
who is at fault for the loss of the shares in Benedicto. Simply put, the assailed resolutions of
question can hardly be given cogency. the Sandiganbayan have firm basis in fact and in
law.
For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong
in its findings, which does not seem to be in this Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the
case, it is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence shares in question had, as both public and private
that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of respondents asserted, long become final and
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Corollarily, executory. Petitioner's narration of facts in its
errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's present petition is even misleading as it
findings and conclusions are beyond the conveniently fails to make reference to two (2)
corrective hand of certiorari .14The extraordinary resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We
writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a refer to that court's resolutions of December 6,
showing, in the minimum, that the respondent 199418 and February 23, 199619 as well as
tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi- several intervening pleadings which served as
judicial functions has acted without or in excess basis for the decisions reached therein. As it
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of were, the present petition questions only and
discretion.15 focuses on the March 28, 199520 and March 13,
199721 resolutions, which merely reiterated and
The term "grave abuse of discretion" connotes clarified the graft court's underlying resolution of
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as December 6, 1994. And to place matters in the
is equivalent to excess, or a lack of proper perspective, PCGG's failure to comply with
the December 6, 1994 resolution prompted the petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its
issuance of the clarificatory and/or reiteratory immunity from suit and placed itself in the same
resolutions aforementioned. level of its adversary. When the State enters into
contract, through its officers or agents, in
In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and
petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
state immunity from suit.22 As argued, the order whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and
for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State
would fix monetary liability on a government may be sued even without its express consent,
agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of precisely because by entering into a contract the
public funds to satisfy the judgment claim.23 But, sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its
as private respondent Benedicto correctly consent to be sued is implied from the very act of
countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of entering into such contract,26breach of which on
the exceptions to the state immunity principle, its part gives the corresponding right to the other
i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as party to the agreement.
in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State
itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, Finally, it is apropos to stress that the
immunity from suit cannot be effectively Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034
invoked.24 For, as jurisprudence teaches, when envisaged the immediate recovery of alleged ill-
the State, through its duly authorized officers, gotten wealth without further litigation by the
takes the initiative in a suit against a private government, and buying peace on the part of the
party, it thereby descends to the level of a private aging Benedicto.27 Sadly, that stated objective
individual and thus opens itself to whatever has come to naught as not only had the litigation
counterclaims or defenses the latter may have continued to ensue, but, worse, private
against it.25Petitioner Republic's act of filing its respondent Benedicto passed away on May 15,
complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a 2000,28 with the trial of Civil Case No. 0034 still
waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the in swing, so much so that the late Benedicto had
plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot to be substituted by the administratrix of his
set up its immunity against private respondent estate.29
Benedicto's prayers in the same case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
In fact, by entering into a Compromise DISMISSED.
Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,
SO ORDERED. Counsel for the respondents are warned that a repetition of
their contemptuous act to delay the execution of a final and
executory judgment will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. [2]
to the Court of Appeals. Respondent Santiago and her co- was the extent to which back salaries and emoluments
parties moved for the dismissal of the appeal for being were due to respondent Santiago. The appellate court
dilatory and frivolous but the appellate court denied their held that she was entitled to her salaries from October,
motion. Thus, they elevated the case on certiorari before 1983 to December, 1986.
this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-39288-89, Heirs of
And for the second time, the City Government of
Abelardo Palomique, et al. vs. Marcial Samson, et al. In
Caloocan appealed to this Court in G.R. No. 98366, City
our Resolution dated January 31, 1985, we held that the
Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al. The
appellate court erred in not dismissing the appeal, and that
petition was dismissed, through our Resolution of May 16,
the appeal of the City Government of Caloocan was
1991, for having been filed late and for failure to show any
frivolous and dilatory. In due time, the resolution lapsed
reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
into finality and entry of judgment was made on February
resolution subsequently attained finality and the
27, 1985.
corresponding entry of judgment was made on July 29,
In 1986, the City Government of Caloocan paid 1991.
respondent Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of her
On motion of private respondent Santiago, Judge
backwages, thereby leaving a balance of P530,761.91.
Mauro T. Allarde ordered the issuance of an alias writ of
Her co-parties were paid in full. In 1987, the City of
[3]
clarification from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on Allarde issued an order dated November 10, 1992,
whether respondent Santiago was considered to have decreeing that:
rendered services from 1983-1986 as to be entitled to
backwages for that period. In its Resolution No. 91-1124, WHEREFORE, the City Treasurer (of Caloocan), Norberto
the CSC ruled in the negative. Azarcon is hereby ordered to deliver to this Court within five
(5) days from receipt hereof, (a) managers check covering the
On November 22, 1991, private respondent Santiago amount of P439,378.00 representing the back salaries of
challenged the CSC resolution before this Court in G.R. petitioner Delfina H. Santiago in accordance with Ordinance
No. 102625, Santiago vs. Sto. Tomas, et al. On July 8, No. 0134 S. 1992 and pursuant to the final and executory
1993, we initially dismissed the petition for lack of merit; decision in these cases.
however, we reconsidered the dismissal of the petition in
Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., another motion with this Court, a Motion to Declare in
however, refused to sign the check intended as payment Contempt of Court; to Set Aside the Garnishment and
for respondent Santiagos claims. This, despite the fact Administrative Complaint against Judge Allarde,
that he was one of the signatories of the ordinance respondent Santiago and PNB. Subsequently, the City
authorizing such payment. On April 29, 1993, Judge Government of Caloocan filed a Supplemental Petition
Allarde issued another order directing the Acting City formally impleading PNB as a party-respondent in this
Mayor of Caloocan, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, to sign the case.
check which had been pending before the Office of the
The instant petition for certiorari is directed this time
Mayor since December 11, 1992. Acting City Mayor
against the validity of the garnishment of the funds of the
Malonzo informed the trial court that he could not comply
City of Caloocan, as well as the validity of the levy and
with the order since the subject check was not formally
sale of the motor vehicles belonging to the City of
turned over to him by the City Mayor who went on official
Caloocan. More specifically, petitioners insist that Judge
leave of absence on April 15, 1993, and that he doubted
Allarde gravely abused his discretion in:
whether he had authority to sign the same. [8]
Thus, in an order dated May 7, 1993, Judge Allarde (a) ordering the garnishment of the funds of the City of
ordered Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo to immediately garnish Caloocan deposited with the PNB, since it is settled that public
the funds of the City Government of Caloocan funds are beyond the reach of garnishment and even with the
corresponding to the claim of respondent Santiago. On [9] appropriation passed by the City Council, the authority of the
the same day, Sheriff Alberto A. Castillo served a copy of Mayor is still needed for the release of the appropriation;
the Notice of Garnishment on the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), Sangandaan Branch, Caloocan City. When PNB (b) ordering the levy and sale at public auction of three (3)
immediately notified the City of Caloocan of the Notice of motor vehicles owned by the City of Caloocan, which vehicles
Garnishment, the City Treasurer sent a letter-advice are necessary for public use and cannot be attached nor sold in
informing PNB that the order of garnishment was illegal, an execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the City
with a warning that it would hold PNB liable for any of Caloocan;
damages which may be caused by the withholding of the
funds of the city. PNB opted to comply with the order of (c) peremptorily denying petitioner City of Caloocans urgent
Judge Allarde and released to the Sheriff a managers motions to vacate and set aside the auction sale of the motor
check amounting to P439,378. After 21 long years, the vehicle with PLATE NO. SBH-165, notwithstanding that the
claim of private respondent Santiago was finally settled in auction sale by the Sheriff was tainted with serious
full. irregularities, more particularly:
On June 4, 1993, however, while the instant petition i. non-compliance with the mandatory posting of the notice of
was pending, the City Government of Caloocan filed yet sale;
ii. non-observance of the procedure that a sale through public garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
auction has to be made and consummated at the time of the appropriation as required by law: [11]
the three (3) motor vehicles based on an alias writ that has long
expired. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. The functions and public services rendered by the
The petition has absolutely no merit. The trial court State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
committed no grave abuse of discretion in implementing the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
the alias writ of execution to settle the claim of respondent specific objects, as appropriated by law. [13]
of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or challenged the trial courts order garnishing its funds in
instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, payment of the contract price for the construction of the
remain government funds and may not be subject to City Hall, we ruled that, while government funds deposited
in the PNB are exempt from execution or garnishment, this
rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been CERTIFICATION
enacted for the payment of the Citys obligations
This is to certify that according to the records available in this
Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioner- Office the claim for backwages of the HON. JUDGE
appellants moved for its quashal alleging among other things DELFINA H. SANTIAGO has been properly obligated and
the exemption of the government from execution. This move can be collected in accordance with existing accounting and
on the part of petitioner-appellants is at first glance laudable auditing rules and regulations.
for all government funds deposited with the Philippine
National Bank by any agency or instrumentality of the This is to certify further that in case the claim is not collected
government, whether by way of general or special deposit, within the present fiscal year, such claim shall be entered in
remain government funds and may not be subject to the books of Accounts Payable and can still be collected in the
garnishment or levy. But inasmuch as an ordinance has already next fiscal year x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
been enacted expressly appropriating the amount
of P613,096.00 as payment to the respondent-appellee, then Petitioners reliance on Municipality of Makati vs. Court
the herein case is covered by the exception to the general of Appeals, et al., and Commissioner of Public Highways
[15]
rule x x x x vs. San Diego, does not help their cause. Both cases
[16] [17]