Environment
and Safety
A brief guide to fire zone analysis
Every process plant has a dedicated
disposal system to ensure that gases from
equipment, instruments and pressure
safety valves are flared to follow environ-
mental norms for the gases vented to the
atmosphere from the flare stack.
To estimate the combined relief load
for the external fire scenario, the maxi-
mum extent of the fire should be esti-
mated. API 5211 defines a fire impact area
of 230 m2 to 460 m2 around the source
of fire. However, it does not define the
exact shape of the area. For a simplified
approach, the shape is always considered
as a circle, often referred to as a fire circle.
This ensures that every piece of equip-
ment in the fire circle radius is considered
for estimating the combined relief load.
Various considerations, such as actual
layout of the plant, the location of the fire
source and provision of the drainage and
dikes, need to be addressed while defin-
ing fire circles. Basic steps for defining fire
circles and fire zones are outlined in the
following sections.
Identification of fire source. Equip-
ment that handles flammable fluid or
combustible liquid above flashpoint is
considered a source of fire. A list of such
equipment should be prepared, and these
items should be identified on an equip-
ment layout. Note: API does not specify
the height (elevation from the grade) lim-
it to identify equipment as a source of fire.
It dictates only the limit of the fire, which
is 7.6 m from the grade or any solid floor
where a pool fire can occur.
In the absence of an international code,
the user may assume that, even if the equip-
ment is elevated 7.6 m above fire height,
it can still accumulate enough liquid on
the ground to trigger a pool fire. There-
fore, that equipment may be considered a
N. KADAM, IBI Chematur Engineering
and Consultancy, Mumbai, India
source of fire irrespective of the elevation pass across other equipment, then
aboveground. To simplify the procedure, those pieces of equipment are
equipment located below 7.6 m is consid- considered to form a composite
ered a source of fire in most cases. fire zone.
• Provision of dike. Tanks handling
Marking a fire circle. As an optimized flammable liquid or combustible
approach, the fire impact area is considered liquid above flashpoint are provided
to be 230 m2 in most cases. Fire circles are with a dike to avoid spillage to other
then marked, considering the source of equipment. As a general rule, each
the fire as a nucleus. The radius of the fire dike is considered to be a fire zone.
circle is 8.6 m, which is equivalent to a fire
impact area of 230 m2. Relieving load for Checking protection against fire. Af-
the fire scenario must be calculated for all ter marking fire circles around the sources
equipment inside the fire circle. of fire, the pieces of equipment inside
each fire circle are checked for protec-
Identification of fire zones. Identify- tion against fire contingency. To comply
ing fire zones is a subjective process, and with requirements, process safety valves
the criteria varies on a case-by-case basis. (PSVs) on this equipment must be sized
Two terms can be used to explain the cri- for the fire scenario. If any equipment in-
teria in brief: side the fire circle is not provided with a
• Ground slope direction. For ease PSV, then a PSV must be provided and
of calculations, each fire circle sized specifically for the fire case.
is considered to be a fire zone. The following example gives a clear
However, in some cases, if ground picture of the procedure. FIG. 1 shows the
slope direction is such that spillage layout of equipment with a sloping grade
from one piece of equipment can and a trench location. The first step to
Dike
D-01
D-02 T-03 T-02
T-01
Dike
E-01A V-05
V-01 V-08
V-09 V-07
V-03
E-03
E-01B FL-01
E-04
V-06
V-04
E-02
E-01C
V-02
C-01
V-10
Legend
Slope direction Fire Zone 4
Fire Zone 1 Fire Zone 5
Fire Zone 2 Trench (drainage)
Fire Zone 3 Equipment located above 7.6 m
FIG. 1. Equipment layout for fire zone consideration.
Hydrocarbon Processing | JULY 2018 83
 Environment and Safety

around E-03 and V-06. As

TABLE 1. Equipment and fire source identification.
explained above, these pieces
Equipment tag Fluid Elevation from grade Source of fire of equipment could form a fire
C-01 Flammable Above 7.6 m No
zone. However, referring to
FIG. 1, the sloping of the grade is
D-01 Not flammable At grade No such that, in the event of spillage
D-02 Not flammable At grade No from E-02 or E-03, liquid would
E-01A/B/C Flammable Below 7.6 m Yes not flow toward vessel V-06.
E-02 Flammable Below 7.6 m Yes
Also, in the event of spillage
from V-06, liquid would not flow
E-03 Combustible Below 7.6 m Yes toward E-02 or E-03. Therefore,
(above flashpoint)
different fire zones have been
E-04 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No defined considering the slope
FL-01 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No direction. E-02 and E-03, along
T-01 Not flammable At grade No with V-02 and V-03, form Fire
Zone 2, whereas V-06 and F-01
T-02 Flammable At grade Yes
together form Fire Zone 3.
T-03 Not flammable At grade No o Fire Zone 4: T-02, which
V-01 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No handles a flammable liquid, is
V-02 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No provided with a dike to hold up
a total tank inventory in the case
V-03 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No
of spillage. A dedicated fire zone
V-04 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No for this tank may also serve as a
V-05 Flammable Above 7.6 m No dike. T-02 forms Fire Zone 4.
V-06 Flammable Below 7.6 m Yes o Fire Zone 5: V-09 forms Fire
Zone 5.
V-07 Flammable Above 7.6 m No
• Checking safeguards against fire.
V-08 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No TABLE 2 shows lists of equipment
V-09 Flammable Below 7.6 m Yes contained within different fire
V-10 Not flammable Below 7.6 m No zones. Relief designers must check
the safeguards provided to this
equipment against various fire
located above 7.6 m are not scenarios. As an example, before
TABLE 2. Equipment contained within
fire zones.
considered to be sources of fire, fire zone analysis, V-02 and V-03
even if they handle flammable fluid. were not provided with PSVs since
Zone Source of fire Equipment Equipment pieces C-01, V-05 and these vessels handle condensate.
in fire zone
V-07 in FIG. 1 are drawn with dotted However, since they are located in
Zone 1 E-01A/B/C E-01A/B/C lines to identify them as being a fire zone, PSVs must be provided
Zone 2 E-02 E-02 located 7.6 m above the grade. to these vessels to protect them in a
E-03 E-03
• Marking a fire circle. A circle with fire scenario.
a radius of 8.6 m shall be marked Considerations for fire zone analysis
V-02
around equipment identified in vary based on user discretion. However,
V-03 TABLE 1 as sources of fire. the procedure outlined here can be fol-
Zone 3 V-06 V-06 • Defining fire zones. As shown lowed if no special requirements exist to
FL-01
in FIG. 1, five fire zones have been define fire zones.
defined considering the layout,
Zone 4 T-02 T-02 sloping and other parameters: LITERATURE CITED
Zone 5 V-09 V-09 o Fire Zone 1: E-01A/B/C handle 1
American Petroleum Institute, API Standard 521,
flammable fluid and are located “Pressure-relieving and depressuring systems,” 6th
below 7.6 m. The fire circle Ed., 2014.
identify fire zones in this area is to iden- around E-01B intersects with
tify the sources of fire. TABLE 1 shows a list the fire circle around E-01A and NIKHIL KADAM is a Principal
of equipment and identifies certain pieces E-01C. A fire in either of these Process Engineer with IBI Chematur
Engineering and Consultancy in
as sources of fire. exchangers would affect the Mumbai, India. He has more than 11
• Identifying sources of fire. other exchangers. Together, these yr of experience in front-end
Referring to TABLE 1, equipment exchangers form Fire Zone 1. engineering and design (FEED) and
detailed engineering, and has
located below 7.6 m and handling o Fire Zone 2 and Fire Zone 3: worked on various oil and gas, refinery and chemical
flammable fluid are considered The fire circle around E-02 projects. He holds a BS degree in chemical
to be sources of fire. Equipment intersects with the fire circles engineering from Mumbai University in Mumbai, India.

84 JULY 2018 | HydrocarbonProcessing.com