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Teresita Reyes-De Leon v.

Del Rosario

Facts: An action for Partition filed by Pantaleon U. del Rosario and his son, respondent Vicente B. del
Rosario, before the Regional Trial Court, 7 th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of Cebu City. In this action
petitioner was impleded as a party being an heir of del Rosario. The properties to be partitioned included
the Tupas Properties, Asinan Properties, Figueroa Property, Barili Properties, Mambaling
Properties, Negros Properties, and Other Properties. Respondent therein claimed that petitioner executed
a deed of absolute sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario covering all of her shares in the properties
sought to be partitioned.

Petitioner denied the allegation claiming that she did not execute any deed of sale in favor of Vicente del
Rosario and that only her share over the Asianan and Negros properties were sold to Pantaleon and

In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale with damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City alleging that she sold her one-half (1/2) share in the Asinan
Properties to Pantaleon U. del Rosario and was shocked when she learned from her cousins Vicente B. del
Rosario was claiming all of her shares in the estate of Ceferina Llamas. In connection with the complaint
respondent sought for the suspension of the partition proceedings that was granted by the Court.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners Complaint, alleging that, having failed to raise the issue of
nullity as a compulsory counterclaim in her Answer in the partition case, petitioner is barred from filing
the action for declaration of nullity.

The declaration of nullity of sale was dismissed by the trial court ratiocinated that the issue of ownership
should be determined and resolved in the partition case.

Issue: Whether the declaration of nullity was barred by forum shopping.


Petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

The question of validity or nullity of the deed of sale, as well as the claim for damages, is necessarily and
logically intertwined with the partition case. It held that as the partition court, it should determine and
resolve the issue of ownership of the properties subject of the disputed deed of absolute sale. Hence, it
would be in the interest of justice that the partition court hears all the actions and incidents concerning
the properties subject of the partition in a single and complete proceeding. After all, the issue of nullity
can be properly ventilated before the partition court. Thus, even with the dismissal of the action for
nullity, petitioner is not without recourse. She can still dispute the execution of the deed of absolute sale
and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said instrument in the partition case. There is no need
for a separate case to resolve the matter.

On the issue of compulsory counterclaim

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (1)
Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim?
and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

Clearly, petitioners action for declaration of nullity and respondents claim anent his share in the partition
case stemmed from the same disputed deed of sale. An adjudication of validity or nullity of the deed of
sale in any of the two cases would constitute res judicata.

Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot (predecessor of Tomas Maglucot)

Facts: OCT. 6775 was issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis,
Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. On 19 April 1952, Tomas
Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639. As a result the lot was partitioned in six portions.

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Subsequently, respondents
also rented the land and paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who
represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying
rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint for recovery of
possession and damages alleging that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D, which was originally part of
Lot 1639.

Trial Court: it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its
absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the
existence of an approved partition against the other co-owners who claim that there was one and that the
tax declarations over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are constructed on the
lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by
the latter.

CA: The sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of

Petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject
lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondents acquiescence
because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the

Respondent alleged that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised or notified of
the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently confirmed the same, that
petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition and that Lot No. 1639 remain
undivided since to date.

Issue: Whether there was partition

Stages of partition

First phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a
co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. The second phase is when co-owners make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon or in case the parties
are unable to agree upon the partition, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and
the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, it has become final and executory and cannot now be

Respondent is estopped from denying partition

Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are
not binding upon the parties. However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves
actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. Parties to a partition proceeding, who
elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to
question title to portion allotted to another party. In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them
by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. Here, respondents,
by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance
with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to
question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-
D also in accordance with the sketch plan.

Respondents was also estopped when they paid rent.

Whether the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any partition of Lot No. 1639.

The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who
may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve
the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder. The act of registering a document is never necessary in
order to give it legal effect as between the parties.

Validity of oral partition

Although the 1948 oral partition was initially tentative(executory), the actual possession of specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for
a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity
will proper cases where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in
severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize
and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder.

A part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It
has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part
performance, a court of equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties

-parol partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppels

-A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in
and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty.

Yu v. Pacleb (1st petition was specific per., 2nd petition for forcible entry; 3rd petition

Respondent Baltazar N. Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the registered owners of an
18,000-square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. The Langcaan Property
became the subject of three (3) documents purporting to transfer its ownership.

- February 27, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between Spouses Baltazar N.
Pacleb and Angelita Chan and Rebecca Del Rosario
- On May 7, 1992, a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between Rebecca Del Rosario and
Ruperto L. Javier (Javier).|||
- On November 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and petitioner
spouses Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu.

On petitioner filed an action for specific performance against Javier to compel the latter to deliver to
them ownership and possession, as well as title to the Langcaan Property alleging that Javier represented
that the land was not tenanted but was really tenanted by respondent. Because of this, they sought for the
cancellation for the sale but Javier promised that he was making arrangement with respondent that the
latter vacate the property. Hence, they proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell canceling the Agreement mentioned. However, Javier
failed to comply with his obligations.|||

RTC: Granted petitioner’s petition.

The decision became final

On March 10, 1995, petitioner spouses and Ramon and the latter's wife, Corazon Bodino,
executed a "Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng
Pagtalikod sa Karapatan." Under the said agreement, petitioner spouses paid Ramon the
amount of P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the Langcaan
Property. |||}

On October 12, 1995, respondent filed a Complaint alleging that the purported deed of sale was executed simulated and that their signatures were
forged. Respondent then moved to dismiss the case, and the trial court granted the motion in its Order 17 dated April 11, 1996, dismissing the case
without prejudice.|||
On November 23, 1995, petitioner spouses filed an action for forcible entry against respondent alleging that they had prior physical possession
over the property through Ramon.

MTC and RTC: Granted petitioner’s suit for forcible entry.

Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts and found that it was respondent who had prior physical possession of the property as
shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon. |||

On May 29, 1996, respondent filed the instant case for removal of cloud from title with
damages alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife and Rebecca Del Rosario, who is not known to them,
could not have been possibly executed.

RTC: dismissed respondent's case and held that petitioner spouses are purchasers in good faith |||

CA: reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court

whether petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. The

second is whether ownership over the Langcaan Property was properly vested in