JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES vs. HON. MANUEL B.
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a
GAITE (G.R. No. 165276. November 25, 2009)
FACTS: Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster
mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes
Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care of the former
by the girl's grandmother and petitioner's sister Leonila Angeles
Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age
of four. Petitioner's love for the child extended to her siblings,
particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a former
drug-addict, and the latter's family who were regular
beneficiaries of the undersigned's generosity. In the evening of
11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for
his failure to do a very important errand for which he was
severely reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from
then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him
and that he was no longer welcome at petitioner's residence.
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts retaliated
on 12 April 1999 by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to
leave petitioner's custody.
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner,
accompanied by her friend Ines Francisco, sought Michael
Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan to
confront him about the whereabouts of his half-sister. He
disclosed that he brought the girl to the residence of her
maternal relatives in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner
then reported the matter and requested for the assistance of the
303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective Group Field Office in
Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl. Consequently, PO3 Paquito
M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred Ramirez accompanied petitioner
and her friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan where they coordinated with
police officers from the said place. The group failed to find the
girl. Instead, they were given the run-around as the spouses
Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia
Nazareno misled them with the false information that Maria
Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito
Guevarra and the latter's wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon
Province. On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for
Kidnapping under Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael
Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and
Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes
Vistan.
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought
Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt himself cornered by
the police dragnet laid for him. Prompted by his overwhelming
desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook
from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately,
maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical,
emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes
Vistan, all of which were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and
development. Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a
complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of
Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise
known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation
of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000,
Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended
upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but
recommended that only one Information be filed against Michael
Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed.
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the
recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael
Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also approved the
recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of
PD 1829.
Petition for Review before the Office of President. The petition
was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied
before said forum anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58
which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except
those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the action filed by petitioner
correct?
HELD: No. Petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They
are mere suppositions without any basis in law. Petitioner
argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an
invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of
the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. This argument is
absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to the
Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is
well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political
agency, long been established in our jurisdiction. The President
himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order
to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that
the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the
Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief
Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the
former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely
speculative to say the least.
Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a
violation of Section 1 (e) of PD No. 1829, the same is quoted
hereunder as follows: (e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal
case by obstructing the service of processes or court orders or
disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in Tanodbayan, or
in the courts. Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's
act of going underground obstructed the service of a court
process, particularly the warrant of arrest. This Court does not
agree. There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance
taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement
objection in the manner the CA had disposed of the said issue,
this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the position
taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on
"obstruction of justice," As correctly observed by the CA, the
facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not warrant the
filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1 (e) of
PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the
evidence presented by petitioner, the failure on the part of the
arresting officer/s to arrest the person of the accused makes the
latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a
commission of another offense of obstruction of justice.
Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in
favor of the accused. Courts must not bring cases within the
provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act
can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by
statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of
a statute can be brought within them. Any reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused.
 JACKSON PADIERNOS y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS y
GERMAN and ROLANDO MESINA y JAVATE vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 181111. August 17, 2015)
FACTS: The petitioners were charged as accessories to the
crime of illegal possession of lumber, in violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines. According to the Information, the petitioners took
away the truck that carried the lumber to prevent its use as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture.
The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on
November 15, 2002, the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (DENRO) Felimon Balico (Balico)
approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a
national highway in Dingalan, Aurora (Dingalan). The truck bore
the name "JEROME" with Plate No. TFZ-747. Balico requested
from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, Mostera,
the lumber's supporting documents but they failed to produce
any. Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa
(Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit. Thereafter, he proceeded
to the DENR office to report the incident. The DENRO group
decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station
at Poblacion. They transferred the lumber first from November
15 to November 16, 2002, and left the truck at the national
highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and some police
officers. Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck, 7 agreed
with the DENROs and the police officers to bring the truck to the
police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina who
volunteered to drive the truck; while Padiernos asked Balico
where the seized lumbers were. Since the truck was then parked
opposite the direction to the police station, Balico thought that
Mesina would maneuver the truck so that they could proceed to
the police station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the truck's
speed and headed towards the direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving
behind their two policemen escorts.
Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching
television with his wife and children when his former employer,
Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the latter's truck to
Cabanatuan City. He refused Santiago's request because he
knew that the truck had been engaged in illegal activities.
Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of
everything and that there was really no problem with the truck.
Mesina finally agreed and rode in Santiago's car. On reaching
the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the
car and walked towards the back of the truck; Padiernos crossed
the street. Mesina saw Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and
several other persons for about 25 to 30 minutes. The petitioners
unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or
tapping on the truck to stop them. They also did not notice any
motorcycle following them as the truck's side mirrors were
broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City because the
Philippine Army flagged them down.
The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as
accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705. The RTC ruled
that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck
that earlier had been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or the
Forestry Reform Code. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and
adopted its factual findings, but modified the penalty imposed on
the petitioners. The CA considered the subject truck as an
"instrument" in the commission of the offense, within the
meaning of Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D.
705 is mala prohibita, their intent, motive, or knowledge need not
be shown. Nevertheless, their defense of denial must fail in view
of the evidence on record and their own admissions that they
were aware of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity at the
time that they drove it towards Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: Can petitioners be considered accessories because the
DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the
crime and had, in fact, control over the truck when the petitioners
drove it towards Nueva Ecija?
HELD: Insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts
alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present
case do not make the petitioners liable as accessories for
violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for violation of
Section 1 (b) of P.D. 1829.
The controlling charge against the petitioners is not the
allegation that they were accessories to the crime, which is
merely the public prosecutor's conclusion of law or the technical
name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of
the RPC, but the factual charges against them. In short, their
alleged acts control in defining the crime for which they should
stand trial. These material factual allegations pertain to their act
of conspiring with each other to take and carry away the subject
truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its
confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or
instrument of the crime. Notably, the petitioners had been
sufficiently apprised of these factual allegations, against which
they should defend themselves. In the present case, the crime
punishable under P.D. 705 — the illegal possession of lumber
— had already been discovered at the time the petitioners took
the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and
the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002. The petitioners took
the truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation. In these
lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime
charged in the Information as the legal definition of the technical
term "accessories" does not coincide with the factual allegations
in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge
against the petitioners.
P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which
obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the
successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during
trial, show that the petitioners' acts actually constituted a
violation of Section 1 (b) above. First, the Information duly
alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of
justice under Section 1 (b). The factual allegations in the
Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying
away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to
avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government
as a tool or instrument of the crime. Second, the petitioners
deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular
evidence. The term "suppress" means to subdue or end by
force. Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the
truck as evidence, with the intent to impair its availability and
prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation or
proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.
ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU
LAMBINO , vs . THE HON. OMBUDSMAN (G.R. No. 131492.
September 29, 2000)
FACTS: Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the
University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his
fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter
dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then
Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in
determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response
to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the
Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P.
on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla
Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu,
also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the
suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have
warrants of arrest with them. Dizon then filed a complaint in the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas,
Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security
Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D.
1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. There is no probable
cause to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and
Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable
cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well
founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court).
The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or
reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the
students had committed a crime, the absence of any law
punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show
that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with
Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show
that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were
acting within the bounds of law. Petitioners had a right to prevent
the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their
attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have
interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in
fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in
investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just
because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did
not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard
constitutional requirements.

Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office

recommended the dismissal of the case. But the
recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated
September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the
Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners
in the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting

petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829

HELD: No. There can be no arrest without a warrant as provided

for under Rule 113 Sec. 5 of the ROC, however there are
exceptions. The present case does not fall within the exceptions
as the arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime
being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice
nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. Indeed, at the
time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere
near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his
men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not
committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would
create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the
contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P.
police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to
the violence on the campus.

The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds

to believe that the suspects were guilty. The question is whether
the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant
issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the
attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in
Rule 113, §5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not
very well have authorized the arrest without warrant of the
students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts
could decide the question of probable cause since the students