AMELITO R.
MUTUC, petitioner, Issue: WON the COMELEC has the authority to prohibit candidates from using jingles
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Amelito Mutuc is a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a
special civil action for prohibition assailing the validity of Commission on Elections from
enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, thus it is an absence of any
express power granted by the Constitutional Convention Act.
October 29, 1970 - Mutuc filed a special civil action for prohibition to the COMELEC in his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleging that the
COMELEC sent him a telegram informing him that his certificate of candidacy was given
due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound
systems and loud speakers. He accorded that this is violative of his constitutional right,
specifically freedom of speech.
The next day, the Court adopted a resolution requiring COMELEC to file an answer not
later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday
November 3, 1970.
November 2, 1970 – the COMELEC answered without denial. According to the COMELEC,
justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."
Furthermore, the COMELEC contended that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner
is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material,
which is subject to confiscation.
November 3, 1970- Mutuc appeared in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena
arguing in behalf of the COMELEC.
The Court issued a resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence
of statutory authority on the part of the COMELEC to impose such a ban in the light of the
doctrine of ejusdem generis (of the same nature) as well as the principle that the
construction placed on the statute by Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts
about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner.
during campaign period
Ruling:
No. Such authority was not granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. Thus, provisions
referred above are the unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets,
mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
"and the like."
For the COMELEC, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order but the court
viewed the matter differently.
Principle of ejusdem generis - the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. What
was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.
COMELEC failed to manifest a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be
interpreted to assure its being in consonance with any constitutional command or
prescription. Administrative Code provisions provide that "construction which should be
more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law."
The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from
legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the
ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision between what a statute provides and
what the Constitution requires.
Issue: WON the prohibition violate his freedom of speech
Yes.
If the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act prohibits the use of the taped jingle,
then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. The Constitution
prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. This preferred freedom calls all for
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to
make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
COMELEC imposed censorship on Mutuc, an evil against which this constitutional right is
directed. The justification that if Mutuc would not resort to taped jingle, would be free,
either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. The constitutional
guarantee is not emasculated by a mere speaker but to what he utters through tape or
other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain COMELEC, then the effect
would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It
would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures.

Issue: WON the COMELEC has the right to such prohibition

No.

According to the present Chief Justice, the COMELEC is limited to purely 'administrative
questions.’ Hence, COMELEC cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of
the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. Our decisions which liberally
construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its
responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be
adequately fulfilled. There could be no justification to any ruling or order issuing from
COMELEC, when such effect would be to nullify vital a constitutional right as free speech.

Constitution as the fundamental law sets the criteria for the validity of any public act
whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of
our system of government. To manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to
that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.

The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard
lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its
task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon
to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial
review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount.
It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there
is a recognition of its being the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly

summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged in violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The court conducted preliminary investigation which resulted upon finding a probable
cause that the crime charged is committed by Manantan.
The trial started, Manantan plead of not guilty and moved to dismiss the information on
the ground that as justice of the peace he is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied his motion to dismiss holding that a
justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs.
Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of peace is excluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Hence, the lower court dismissed the information
against the Manantan upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Issue: WON a justice the peace is among the officers included in Section 54
Ruling:
Yes.
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or
employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in an election or take part
therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a
peace officer.
Manantan’s argument that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. And that such was taken from
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or
employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the
right to vote.
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the peace," the
omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from
its operation.
The argument overlooks one fundamental fact. Under Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified by the phrase "of First instance",
while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists.
Justice of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code because the kinds of judges were specified such as the judge of the First Instance
and justice of the peace. In Section 54, it was not necessary to include justices of the
peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic
and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and was
intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance,
Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and
justices of the peace.
It is a well-known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in
this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public
officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority.
According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to
decide litigated questions according to law. The term includes all officers appointed to
decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace,
and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
The history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word
"justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not
in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in
the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No.
357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge"
was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would
follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted.
NOTE: the pattern of congressional phraseology justifies the conclusion that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend
to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as
already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
Issue: WON a justice of peace is not an officer of a province
Ruling:
No. A justice of peace neither a provincial official nor a municipal official. It is a national
official.
Manantan further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in
Section 54 because the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any
province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice
of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any
province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason
that they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of
the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials.
The said phrase qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as
provincial officers.
Issue: WON Manantan is exempt from Section 54 by virtue of the rule casus omisus pro
omisso habendus est
Ruling:
No. It does not apply.
Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally.
The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established. Moreover, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace
from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-
appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has
more particular application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out
that Section 54 must be strictly construed against the government since proceedings
under it are criminal in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should
be strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes,
defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict
construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line
is passed, in language that the common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in
McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a
case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person,
object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.
REASON 1: There has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling
the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single
factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been
recognized time and again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that
the intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted
that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of
the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and
reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers
(Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has
well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of
it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in
the sense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v.
Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal
statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent
with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen,
Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
REASON 2: The purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices
of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not
included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such
were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace
within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor
General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First
Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised
 Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was
to include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges,
whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges
of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to
so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political
activities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand,
there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices
of the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of
the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given
authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-
123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and
exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an
elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be open
to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp.
708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached is the fact that the administrative
or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R.
No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside,
among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of
the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is
worthy of note that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that
he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the
Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was
filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the
peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political
participation. The argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress
impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from
partisan political activities.
even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning
of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what
weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the
peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to
render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating
in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No.
1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative
Code. Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com.
Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
"expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the
peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the
rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not
be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the
peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the
peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has
given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously
applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to
particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why
other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and
manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio
unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p.
307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set
aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed
amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act
No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing
election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has
become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the
motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature
RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC.
vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
Facts:
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. appealed from a resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals for
dismissing its appeal from a decision of the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila,
assessing additional fees on Lopez & Sons for a certain importation of wire netting.
Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the customs duties on the importation on the basis of
consular and supplies invoices. The said customs duties were paid and the shipments
were released. Additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and
imposed upon Lopez & Sons as a result of reassessment for freight of the wire netting.
Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs
duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Solicitor General filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
May 23, 1955 - the Tax Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of
Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez &
Sons appealed for a reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Issue:
WON the CTA has jurisdiction to review the decisions of Collector Customs of Manila
Ruling:
No.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125 relied upon by the Tax Court and the Solicitor General
states that:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided —
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law
or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected;
fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of
Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals in case involving the
assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the assessment
Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.
Section 11 of the same Act invoked by the Lopez & Sons:
SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person, association or corporation
adversely by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of
Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the
Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling.
No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue or the Collector of the Customs shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint,
and/or sale of any property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as
provided by existing law: Provided, however, that when in the opinion of the Court the
collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs may
jeopardize the interests of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of
the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit
the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount with
the Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is really a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11 above reproduced.
Section 7 provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue, decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs and decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals
on cases mentioned in said section.
Section 11, in listing and enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal as well as
the effect of said appeal, mentions those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector
of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or City Board of
Assessment Appeals, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs.
Taken literally, a person affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal to
the Court of Tax Appeals; and since no mention is made about decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs, a person affected by said decision may not appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeals. However, section 7 of the Act above reproduced specially provides that
the Court of Tax Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs.
That legal provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Tax Appeals to review
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs would be empty, meaningless, and
unenforceable because under Section 11, no person affected by the decision of the
Commissioner of customs may appeal to the Tax Court. These are meaningless and
unenforceable because Section 11 should be harmonized and reconciled if possible, in
order to give effect to the whole Act.
We are in entire accord with the Tax Court and the Solicitor General that a clerical error
was committed in section 11, mentioning therein the Collector of Customs.
It should be the Commissioner of Customs. Under the Customs Law found in sections 1137
to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Commissioner of Customs (Insular
Collector of Customs) is the Chief of the Bureau of Customs and has jurisdiction over the
whole country as regards the enforcement of the Customs Law.
Whereas, there are about sixteen Collectors of Customs for the sixteen collection districts
and principal parts of entry into which the Philippines has been divided. These Collectors
of Customs are subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has
supervision and control (section 1152, Revised Administrative Code).
Under section 1405 of the Revised Administrative Code, when any new or unsettled
question shall be determined by the Collector of Customs, he shall notify the
Commissioner of his decision, submitting an adequate statement of acts involved. What
is more important is the provision of section 1380, which reproduce below:
SEC. 1380. Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved by the decision of the
Collector of Customs in any matter presented upon protest or by his action in any case of
seizure may, within fifteen days after notification in writing by the collector of his action
or decision, give written notice to the collector signifying his desore to have the matter
reviewed by the Commissioner.
The Collector of Customs shall transmit all the papers in the cause to the Commissioner,
who shall approve, modify, or reverse the action of his subordinate and shall take such
steps and make such order or orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision.
Under this section, any person affected or aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of
Customs may appeal the decision to the Commissioner of Customs.
From all this, it is clear if we followed the literal meaning and wording of section 11 of
Republic Act No. 1125, in the sense that persons affected by a decision of the Collector of
Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control
of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, and his right to review
their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would not
only be gravely affected, but even destroyed.
It is more reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the Legislature
meant and intended to say the Commissioner of Customs instead of Collector of Customs
in the first paragraph and the first part of the second paragraph of said section.
In thus holding, the Court are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation. They are merely
endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in
order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the Legislature. This the
Courts should and can validly do.
Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather the spirit of the
law and intention of the Legislature that is important and which matters.
When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words
would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would contravene the clear purposes of
the Legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
far as necessary, the latter of the law. Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within
the literal meaning of the terms, for that which is clearly within the intention of the
Legislature in enacting the law is as much within the statute as if it were within the latter.
Here the error (clerical and misprint) is plain and obvious. It is within the province of the
courts to correct said error. This is not to correct the act of the Legislature, but rather to
carry out and give due course to the true intention of said Legislature.
Furthermore, section 11 of Republic Act 1125 may well be regarded as a mere
complement or implementation of section 7. Since section 7 provides that the Tax Court
has jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, and decisions of provincial or city Boards of
Assessment Appeals, so section 11 naturally provides that persons adversely affected by
said decisions may appeal to the Tax Court. However, in enumerating the governmental
bodies or agencies rendering said decisions that may be appealed, it erroneously listed
the Collector instead of the Commissioner, of Customs. The error is plain.
As a matter of fact, the Court of Tax Appeals in its resolution of dismissal of May 23, 1955
cites in support thereof a resolution promulgated by it on January 22, 1955 in C.T.A. Case
No. 17, entitled "Acting Collector of Customs vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs",
wherein it said:
The phrase "Collector of Customs" appearing in the above-mentioned provision (section
11) of Republic Act No. 1125 is clearly an oversight on the part of Congress. It should read
"Commissioner of Customs" to make the provision conform with section 7 of the said
Republic Act section 1380 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:

WON Section 11 of RA 1125 should be adopted in the sense that the CTA has jurisdiction
with the Commissioner of Customs over Appeals from decisions of Collectors of Customs,
so that a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs is given the
choice of appealing the said decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the
Courts of Tax Appeals

Ruling:

No. The contention is untenable.

In the first place, the two remedies suggested are entirely different, one from the other;
an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas an appeal
to the Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. It is a rule that before one resorts to the
Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should first be exhausted.

In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the petitioner would result in
confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs
could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with the Commissioner of Customs
or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide because,
if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy
before the Commissioner of Customs because if the Court of Tax Appeals decide against
him, he may not appeal said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the
Commissioner as an administrative officer may not review the decision of the Court. On
the other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his
appeal to the Commissioner of Customs and receives an adverse decision, he may yet
appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.

In the third place, even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of
Customs took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, under the literal meaning of section
11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the case of Lopez &
Sons, on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction
to review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limits its appellate
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and
Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal,
decisions of the Collector of Customs. The appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOSE A. ROÑO Minister, Ministry of Local Government; THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF OZAMIZ CITY; THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. FUENTES,
Vice Mayor of Ozamiz City and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz
City; THE HONORABLE ANTONIO G. CABALLERO, JESUS S. ANONAT, MANUEL T. CORTES,
IRENE S. LUANSING, REMEDIOS J. RAMIRO, DOMINADOR B. BORJE, FILOMENO L.
ROMERO, FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, and HARRY S. OAMINAL Members, Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City
Rationale: The case is about the question of WON an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, who is running for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in
May 14, 1984 elections should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence
upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
The resolution of the controversy hinges on the construction to be given to Section 13 of
Batas Pambansa Blg, 697, which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Integrated National Police, as well as officials and employees
of government-owned and government-controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, however, that the
Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Members of the
Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall continue in the offices they
presently hold notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.
(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or
barangay officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy
be considered on forced leave of absence from office. (Emphasis
supplied)
Facts:
Sanciangco was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City in the May
17, 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected President of the Association of
Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association.
As the President of the Association, he was appointed by the President of the Philippines
as a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
March 27, 1984 – Sanciangco filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984
Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao
Alliance, but failed the election.
Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 (supra), Sanciangco informed
Vice-Mayor Benjamin Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he
was resuming his duties as member of the body. The matter was elevated to Minister of
Local Government Jose A. Rono who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official,
he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy.
Sanciangco questioned the said ruling on the ground that since Section 13(2) of Batasan
Pambansa Blg. 697 makes no distinction between elective and appointive officials, the
legislative intent is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered
by the said provision.
Issue:
WON Sanciangco may resume his office as a regular member of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod
Ruling:
No. he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, considers the nature of the positions
of the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various
sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish between elective
positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the
all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding public appointive office or position,"
is clear.
He was appointed by the President as a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod by
virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils. This
was pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for
the elective or Appointive Positions in Various Local Governments and for Other
Purposes), which provides that:
Sec. 3. Cities. —There shall be in each city such elective local officials as
provided in their respective charters, including the city mayor, the city
 vice-mayor, and the elective members of the sangguniang
panglungsod, all of whom shall be elected by the qualified voters in the
city. In addition thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang
panglungsod members consisting of the president of the city
association of barangay councils, the president of the city federation
of the kabataang barangay, and one representative each from the
agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by, the
president (Prime Minister) whenever, as determined by the
sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in the
city to warrant representation. (emphasis supplied)
The appointive character of petitioner's position was reiterated in Section 173 of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), reading as follows:
Sec 173. Composition and Compensation. — (1) the sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall be composed of
the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang
panlungsod members, and the members who may be appointed by the
President of the Philippines consisting of the presidents of the
Katipunan panglungsod ng mga barangay and the Kabataang
barangay, city federation. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Sanciangco is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
He contends that the fact that he is merely an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City "is really of no moment since subsection 2, Section 13. B.P.
697, makes no distinction between elective and appointive officials, and at any rate,
legislative intent makes clear that appointive officials are deemed covered by the
provision.
Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, considers the nature of the positions
of the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the various
sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish between elective
positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the
all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding public appointive office or position,"
is clear.
It is a rule of statutory construction that "when the language of a particular section of a
statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the
evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a
whole, must be followed."
A statute's clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials
mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials,
can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa recorded as follows:
Mr. Valdez. I see. Now we come to the other portion
which refers to elected barangay official. Why is it
that the provision isolates the nature of the official
of the barangay who had been elected, not
appointed, is he supposed to be within the purview
of paragraph 2?
Mr. Albano. No. Mr. Speaker, I will call the
Gentleman's attention to paragraph 1: Any person
holding a public appointive office or position ... I
presume and I assume that the office in the
barangay council is still contemplated in the words
'appointive office.'
Mr. Valdez. Under paragraph l?
Mr. Albano. Yes, Mr. Speaker. 3 (Emphasis
supplied)
Nor do we perceive any violation of the equal protection clause, as petitioner contends,
since Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all persons subject to such legislation
under like circumstances and conditions. Neither can petitioner justifiably contend that
he was removed from office without due process of law since it was of his own choice
that he ran for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa. The consequence that followed his
unsuccessful attempt at the elections arose from law.
It goes without saying that although petitioner, by filing his certificate of candidacy for
the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso facto, to be an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective Barangay Captain from which position
he may be considered as having been on "forced leave of absence." He also continues as
President of the Association of Barangay Councils but will need a reappointment by the
President, as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks of
"members who may be appointed by the President."
VIRGILIO CAPATI, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DR. JESUS P. OCAMPO, defendant-appellee.
Facts:
Virgilio Capati is a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga who was the contractor of the Feati
Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur.
May 23, 1967 - Capati entered into a sub-contract with the Jesus Ocampo, a resident of
Naga City, where he undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior walls and columns of
the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated in the contract.
Ocampo further bound himself to complete said construction on or before June 5, 1967,
and so he affixed his signature below the following stipulation written in bold letters in
the sub-contract: "TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE' 67."
Claiming Ocampo finished the construction only on June 20, 1967, Capati filed in the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages in the sum
of P85,000.00 with interest, plus attorney's fees and costs. The complaint alleged that
"due to the long unjustified delay committed by Ocampo, in open violation of his express
written agreement with Capati, the latter has suffered great irreparable loss and damage
... "
Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was
improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the
contract which reads:
14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be
instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Naga.
Capati filed an opposition to the motion claiming that their agreement to hold the venue
in the Court of First Instance of Naga City was merely optional to the contracting parties.
He cited the use of the word "may " in relation with the institution of any action arising
out of the contract.
The lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint and ruled that there was no sense
in providing the quoted stipulation, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court, if the parties are given the discretion or option of filing the action in their respective
residences.
Issue:
WON the a complaint may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
Ruling:
Yes.
The parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of First
Instance of Naga. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without
waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule
4 of the Rules of Court which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff."
The said section is qualified by the following provisions of Section 3 of the same rule:
By written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be
changed or transferred from one province to another.
Ocampo contends that because of par. 14 of the contract, he cannot
be sued in any court except the Court of First Instance of Naga City. We
are thus called upon to rule on the issue as to whether the stipulation
of the parties on venue is restrictive in the sense that any litigation
arising from the contract can be filed only in the court of Naga City, or
merely permissive in that the parties may submit their disputes not
only in Naga City but also in the court where the defendant or the
plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as provided for by
Section 2 (b) Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and operates
to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the
term "may be" connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty.
"May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or
possibility. 1
In Nicolas vs. Reparations Commission 2, a case involving the interpretation of a
stipulation as to venue along lines similar to the present one, it was held that the
agreement of the parties which provided that "all legal actions arising out of this contract
... may be brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper courts in the City of
Manila," is not mandatory.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where the
plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule
4 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. Let the records be returned to
the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against defendant-appellee.
GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION
PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON.
SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications, respondents.
COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
The case is about the consolidated petitions for the review and reversal of the CA decision
declaring the National Telecommunications Commission to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546[3] and ordering the NTC to sit and act en banc, i.e., with the
concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of its quasi-judicial
functions.
Facts:
October 19, 1993 - Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. filed with the NTC an
Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install,
Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to
Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority,
docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. At the time of the filing of this application, BellTel had
not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications
service.
Since BellTel was still an unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations
for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service[4]. Thus, only GMCR, Inc.,
Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International
Communications Corporation were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area
assignments in April and May, 1994.
March 25, 1994 - Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private BellTel a
congressional franchise which gave private BellTel the right, privilege and authority
to carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in provinces, cities, and
municipalities in the Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage,
lease, maintain and purchase telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and
wired or wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive
systems, and other telecommunications systems and their value-added services such as,
but not limited to, transmission of voice, data, facsimile, control signals, audio and video,
information service bureau, and all other telecommunications systems technologies as
are at present available or be made available through technical advances or innovations
in the future, or construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmitting and
receiving stations and switching stations, both for local and international services, lines,
cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficiently carry out the purposes
of this franchise.
July 12, 1994 - BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application praying for the issuance of
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation and
maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and
tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio,
satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture
antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. This second application was docketed as
NTC Case No. 94-229. In this, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten
(10) years using the most modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and
to provide a 100% digital local exchange telephone network.
BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481, hence
the order was withdrawn without prejudice.
The second application of BellTel docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a
Hearing Officer for reception of BellTels evidence.
Written opposition and other pleadings were filed by GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications,
Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as
oppositors. Other oppositors to BellTels application were Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern
Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc., Midsayap
Communication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation,
Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office.
December 20, 1994 - BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-chief. Upon
the proceedings, the witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined by the oppositors.
December 21, 1994 - BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the
technical, financial and legal documents in support of its application. Pursuant to its rules,
the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD)
for study and recommendation.
February 6, 1995 -the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to Deputy
Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum manifesting his findings and
recommending that based on technical documents submitted, BellTels proposal is
technically feasible.
Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD, conducted a
financial evaluation of the project proposal of BellTel. On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez
made the finding that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project
at least for the initial two (2) years.
Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy
Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly
signified their approval thereto by making the following notation on the aforestated
Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6, 1995:
With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application merits
due/favorable consideration.
Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez affixed
their signatures and the date, 4/6/95.
In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC,
the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft of the order granting provisional
authority to BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo
Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
Petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding procedure
and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate and promulgate any and
all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the Chairman who at the time
is Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is
recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders,
resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez have no voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes
the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
BellTel filed on May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the
Issuance of a Provisional Authority. Reference was explicitly made to the findings of the
CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez that were all
favorable to BellTel. Mention was also made of the aforementioned working draft of the
order granting a provisional authority to BellTel, which draft was made by the Legal
Department of the NTC and initialed by the said deputy commissioners.
No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on May 12, 1995, private
respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion reiterating its earlier prayer.
Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition to the aforestated two motions of BellTel.
May 16, 1995 - Commissioner Simeon Kintanar of the NTC set the said motions for a
hearing on May 29, 1995. On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the
same was reset on June 13, 1995.
June 13, 1995 - BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve) In
said motion, it prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a
provisional authority to BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already
been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together,
constitute a majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its
prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTC was a collegial body and that as
such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes by the members of the
commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.
June 23, 1995 - petitioners-oppositors filed their Joint Opposition to the aforecited
motion.
July 4, 1995 - the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
July 17, 1995 - BellTel filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition seeking the nullification of the Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion
to Promulgate.
July 26, 1995 – the court issued a Resolution referring said petition to the respondent
Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of
B.P. Blg. 129.
Solicitor General filed with the appellate court a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment in
which the Solicitor General took a legal position adverse to that of the NTC. After a close
examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and a studious analysis of
certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) orders, NTC circulars,
and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent to the issue of collegiality of the
NTC, the Sol. Gen. made the following recommendations:
(a) declare National Telecommunications Commission as a collegial body;
(b) restrain Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from arrogating unto himself alone the
powers of the said agency;
(c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecoms application
under NTC-94-229;
(d) declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void; [and]
(e) uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614.[17]
September 23, 1996 - Court of Appeals rendered a decision
1. Granting petitioners petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition. That the NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex J of the Petition, Memorandum Circular No. 3-
1-93, Annex K of the Petition and the Order of Kintanar, Annex L of the Petition, are
hereby SET ASIDE for being contrary to law. The Respondents and all those acting for and
in their behalf are hereby enjoined and prohibited from implementing or enforcing the
same;
2. Petitioners petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED in that the Respondent NTC,
composed of Kintanar and deputy commissioners Perez and Dumlao, are hereby directed
to meet en banc and to consider and act on the draft Order, Annex B of the Petition, within
fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision. Without pronouncement as to costs.
The herein assailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar and
petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
International Communications Corporation as oppositors in the application of private
respondent BellTel for a provisional authority, they filed with this court separate petitions
for review.
Commissioner Kintanars petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526, ascribes to the
respondent appellate court errors.
On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R. No. 126496
December 16, 1996 - BellTel filed an Omnibus Motion praying for, among others, the
consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
December 18, 1996 - BellTel filed its Comment. On the same day, the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion echoing the prayer for the
consolidation of the G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation/Motion
reiterating that its legal stance in this case is adverse to that of the NTC and praying that
it be excluded from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, th court resolved to excuse the Solicitor General
from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC, require the NTC to file its own comment in
G.R. No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
March 6, 1997 - the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion praying that the latters petition in G.R. No. 126526 be adopted as
their comment in the consolidated cases.
Issue:
WON NTC is a quasi-judicial agency.
Ruling:
Yes.
The NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the
commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. The vote alone of the
chairman of the commission being absent the required concurring vote coming from the
rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not
sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone
does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and
the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation
concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the
NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-
judicial agency, it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a
three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating
the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one
logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the
time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of the respondent
Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the NTC:
In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the National Assembly
passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service Commission
(PSC). While providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service Commissioner and a
Deputy Commissioner, the law made it clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by
stating that the Deputy Commissioner could act only on matters delegated to him by the
Public Service Commissioner. As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was
transformed into and emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public Service
Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment provided that
contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into law, Presidential
Decree No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, in turn,
created the Board of Communications (BOC) in place of the PSC. This time, the new
regulatory board was composed of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
x x x The Board of Communications shall be composed of a full time Chairman who shall
be of unquestioned integrity and recognized prominence in previous public and/or
private employment; two full-time members who shall be competent on all aspects of
communications, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and the other an economist x
xx
January 25, 1978 - the BOC promulgated its Rules of Procedure and Practice in connection
with applications and proceedings before it.
July 23, 1979 - President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546, creating the Ministries
of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board
of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single entity, the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then
President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides
that --
x x x The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy
Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an economist. x x
x and procedure before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order No.
Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979. However, the NTC did not
promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice. The existing Rules of Procedure and
Practice promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC.
In the meantime, the Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of the NTC
which rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners non-participative in the task of
decision-making. This prompted the then Minister of Transportation and Communication
Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal opinion of the then Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
as to whether the NTC was a collegial body or not. On January 11, 1984, Minister Puno
sent a letter-opinion x x x to the effect that the NTC was not a collegial body but a single
entity and thus the then practice of only the Chairman of the NTC signing the Decisions of
the NTC was authorized by law. x x x
Admittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight x x
x.However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x. We find and
declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not correct. Admittedly, EO 546
does not specifically state that the NTC was a collegial body. Neither does it provide that
the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial functions. But the absence of such provisions does not militate against the
collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules
of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said
Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En Banc:
x x x In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions and
resolutions disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction shall be reached
with the concurrence of at least two regular members after deliberation and consultation
and thereafter assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion. Any member
dissenting from the order, ruling, decision or resolution shall state in writing the reason
for his dissent.
In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings, decisions and
resolutions pertinent to the case assigned to him. Copy of the decision on the merit of the
case so assigned shall be furnished the Chairman of the Board.
xxx
Inscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a member
thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc,
by the full membership of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at least two (2) of
the membership of the BOC is necessary for a valid Decision x x x. While it may be true
that the aforesaid Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive
Order No. 546, however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice
546. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200 when
it declared that:
The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board of
Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC x x x govern the rules of
practice and procedure before the BOC then, now respondent NTC. x x x
Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor,
the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body.
Kintanars and NTCs pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is vested with authority to sign
and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is antithetical to the nature of a commission as
envisaged in Executive Order No. 546. It must be borne in mind that a Commission is
defined as:
[a] body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform some
public service. (City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus Public Housing
Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286).
A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and
empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or
service x x x (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authority that a
commission is synonymous with board (State Ex. Rel. Johnson versus Independent School
District No. 810, Wabash County, 109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596).Indeed, as
can be easily discerned from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the
Commission is composed of a Commissioner and two (2) deputy commissioners x x x not
the commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The conjunctive word and is not
without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the law. It means
in addition to (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern
Reporter, 330, page 332). The word and, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or
full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another x x
x.
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the theory that it
was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of dissonant provisions.As the
aphorism goes, that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed x x x.If it was the
intention of President Marcos to constitute merely a single entity, a one-man
governmental body, instead of a commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not
have constituted a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the
Commission is composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and
the two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission composed
not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting together in the performance
of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, conformably with the Rules of Procedure
and Practice promulgated by the BOC and applicable to the NTC.
The barefaced fact that x x x of Executive Order 546 used the word deputy to designate
the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of
the NTC. x x x The collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal
designation of the membership thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal
designations are without functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose
of administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. x x x
In hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the NTC when he
promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614 x x x. Even then Commissioner
Mariano Benedicto openly expressed his vehement opposition to the Department Order
of Secretary Garcia and opted to seek refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice
Puno x x x. It was only when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent Kintanar
was designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flip-flapped
[sic], and suddenly found it expedient to recall his Department Order No. 92-614 and
authorize Kintanar to decide, all by himself, all cases pending with the NTC in frontal
violation of the Rules of Procedure and Practice before the NTC, more specifically Rule 15
thereof x x x.
xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their argument x
x x because under the House Bill, the NTC is transformed into a collegial body. Indeed, We
find Respondents pose tenuous. For, it can likewise be argued, with justification, that
House Bill No. 10558 indeed confirms the existing collegial nature of the NTC by so
expressly reaffirming the same.
xxx
In sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 x x x Memorandum
Circular No. 3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x declaring the NTC as a single entity
or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law and thus null and void and should be, as they
are hereby, set aside.[26]
Issue: WON NTC Memorandum Circulars issued by the then and now Commissioners are
violative to E.O. No. 546
Yes. The implementation of these illegal regulations resulted in the institutionalization of
the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal
practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No.
546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations
are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the
selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
It must be remembered that administrative regulations derive their validity from the
statute that they were intended to implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-
93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. They
were nullified by Court of Appeals because they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are
without any force and effect.
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are null and void for being totally violative
of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no
court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations.
Issue: WON NTC and Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
Yes. In its certiorari action before the respondent Court of Appeals, BellTel was
proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the their adherence and
defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the Kintanar. Thus, only the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties. After all, it is they
whom BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for having acted in grave
abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final
determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of
Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTC because the task of defending
them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to
find that certiorari lies against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors cause
could not be significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of
discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but
into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits of a case, that the same
be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the commission.
The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of private
respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises to be the most
technologically advanced telephone service in the country. This court is not in any way
concerned with whether or not private respondent BellTels project proposal is technically
feasible or financially viable, and this court should not, in fact, delve into these matters
which are patently outside of its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals
passed upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar
committed grave abuse of discretion, and so we must review and ascertain the
correctness of the findings of the respondent appellate court on this score, and this score
alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of indispensable
parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229, is untenable.
Issue: WON the CA ordered the NTC to sit and meet en banc to grant BellTel application
for a provisional authority
Issue: WON the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to private
BellTel, was obtained by the latter through illegal means.
However, not a single piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove this
charge.
No. BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working draft. In BellTels Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Resolve Application and For Issuance of Provisional Authority, it is alleged
that said working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of the Legal Department of
the NTC. The working draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr. Edgardo Cabarios and
by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. The working draft is attached to the records
of NTC Case No. 94-229 which may be borrowed by any person for any stated purpose.
Significantly, no one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working
draft or declared it to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have utterly failed to
offer proof of any illegality in the preparation or procurement of said working draft.

Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read the second part of the dispositive portion The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be diverted from
of the herein assailed decision rendered by respondent Court of Appeals. the principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality of the NTC. In the ultimate, the
issue of the procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or
No. When the Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar, Dumlao and Perez to administrative investigation than in the instant proceedings largely addressed to the
meet en banc and to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting resolution of a purely legal question.
provisional authority to BellTel, the CA was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en
banc as a collegial body, and the subject of the deliberation of the three-man commission
would be the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be taken
on BellTels application for a provisional authority. The Court of Appeals, however, did not
order the NTC to forthwith grant said application. This is understandable since every
commissioner of the three-man NTC has a vote each to cast in disposing of private
respondent BellTels application and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt
the exercise by the members of the commission of their individual discretion in private
respondent BellTels case.

There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus in

causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for
adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this discretion is to be
exercised, however, is a realm outside the office of the special civil action of mandamus. It
is elementary legal knowledge, after all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.

appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed with the consideration
of BellTels application for provisional authority, for the same has been ripe for decision
since December, 1994. With the marked propensity of Commissioner Kintanar to delay
action on the said application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to promulgate
any and all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals order for the NTC to sit and
meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTels application for a provisional
authority, attains deep significance.
People VS Santayana Issue: WON the appointment of Santayana as special agent authorizes him to carry and
possess firearms and exempts him from securing a license
February 19, 1962, Jesus Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" by Colonel Jose C.
Maristela, the Chief of the CIS. Ruling:

March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt for equipment was issued in the name of the
Santayana regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col.
Maristela issued an undated certification that Santayana was an accredited member of
the CIS and the pistol described in the Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue
of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the
same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection.
October 29, 1962 - Santayana was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the said pistol
with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An
investigation was conducted and a complaint was filed against the Santayana. The case
underwent trial and Santayana was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding
penalty.
Issue: WON the subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court
No. Municipal Courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296 provides that the Court of First Instance have original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for
more than six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00);
Yes. Santayana as a special agent incurred no criminal liability.
Santayana was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his
personal protection. It also appears that he was informed by Col. Maristela that it was
not necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the said firearm because it was
government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in
appellant's name. Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom Santayana received the firearm
also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are
already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of Santayana’s apprehension, the prevailing doctrine was the case of People
vs. Macarandang wherein the court held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret
agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes
sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs.
Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the
Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret
agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.

and the offense charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of
not less than one (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

the jurisdiction of Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases where the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two
hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to
said courts.

But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the
Santayana was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1)
year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of
not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent
jurisdiction over the same.
People VS Estenzo
Facts:
In the case of People of the Philippines versus Gregorio Ojoy, of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, the defendant’s counsel manifested that for his witnesses he was filing only their
affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the
affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and material to the case.
Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario objected to the proposed procedure but
the respondent Judge gave his conformity and subsequently issued the questioned Order.
Contending that Judge gravely abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders
violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that
the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Issue: WON the petition is valid
Ruling:
Yes.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly
require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. The afore-cited
Sections 1 and 2 provide:
SECTION 1. Testimony to be given in open court. — The testimony of witnesses shall be
given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation.
SEC. 2. Testimony in superior courts to be reduced to writing.- In superior courts the
testimony of each witness shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype, the name, residence,
and occupation of the witness being stated, and all questions put to the witness and his
answers thereto being included. If a question put is objected to and the objection is ruled
on, the nature of the objection and the ground on which it was sustained or overruled
must be stated, or if a witness declines to answer a question put, the fact and the
proceedings taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A transcript of the record made
by the official stenographer or stenotypist and certified as correct by him shall be prima
facie a correct statement of such testimony and proceedings.
The main purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure
for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent" demands
confrontation, not for the Idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon
by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the
direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers."
An advantage of the personal appearance of the witness before the judge is it enables the
judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness
deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the
witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of
his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight
of his testimony. The physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate
observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his
character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court.
Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court
is based upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took
advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. This has been explained by
Chief Justice Appleton, thus:
The witness present, the promptless and unpremeditatedness of his answers or the
reverse, their distinctness and particularity or the want of these essentials, their
incorrectness in generals or particulars, their directness or evasiveness are soon detected.
... The appearance and manner, the voice, the gestures, the readiness and promptness of
the answers, the evasions, the reluctance the silence, the contumacious silence, the
contradictions, the explanations, the intelligence or the want of intelligence of the
witness, the passions which more or less control-fear, love, have, envy, or revenge are all
open to observation, noted and weighed by jury.
Thus, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in determining the superior weight
of evidence on the issues involved, the court may consider the "witness manner of
testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony orally in open court".
If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the
evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is
much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the evidence from a
typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the
actions and utterances of the witnesses.
There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct testimony of
the witness be given orally ill court. Rules governing the examination of witnesses are
intended to protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business
of the courts. Under the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which,
under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the issue of
the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness in testify only on those facts which
he knows of his own knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not
allowed, except or, preliminary matters, or when there is difficult in getting direct and
intelligible answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or
feebleminded, or a deaf mute.8 It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and
the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted if trial judges are allowed, as
in the case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than
what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.
CORNELIA MATABUENA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PETRONILA CERVANTES
Facts:
Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation
made while her brother was living maritally without benefit of marriage
to Petronila Cervantes, was void. After noting that it was made at a time before Cervantes
was married to the donor, the lower court sustained the latter's stand.
In the decision of the CA to the case of Buenaventura v. Bautista, by the then Justice J. B.
L. Reyes is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion
reached is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and
is "null and void as contrary to public policy." Such a view merits fully the acceptance of
this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965 of the lower court, after stating that in Matabuena’s
complaint questioning absolute ownership of the parcel of land, she specifically raised the
question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to Petronila Cervantes was null and
void under the article of the Civil Code, and that Cervantes did assert ownership precisely
because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take
place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965,
there was a stipulation of facts which it quoted:
Matabuena and Cervantes assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and
stipulate:
1. That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question;
2. That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila
Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation
was accepted by defendant;
3. That the donation of the land to Cervantes which took effect immediately was made
during the their common-law relationship as husband and wife and later were married on
March 28, 1962;
4. That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962;
5. That the Matabuena claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest
collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance
taxes thereon.
The judgment of the lower court was adverse to Matabuena. It reasoned out that a
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the
spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor
of the Cervantes on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were
not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed.
Issue: WON a donation made between common-law spouses during the marriage is void
Ruling:
Yes. Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void when a "donation between the spouses
during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
In the decision of the CA in the case of Buenaventura v. Bautista, interpreting a similar
provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient
law; 'porque no se engañendespojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno,'
[according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale
'Ne mutuatoamore invicem spoliarentur' of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat,
inter virum et uxorem);
Then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together
as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent
to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over
the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), 'it
would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better.' So long as marriage remains the cornerstone
of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the
above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would
be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation
which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated,
the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is
right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly, a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as
what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision
would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely
literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed
objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser
la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus disposiciones.

Issue: WON the Matabuena has the exclusive right to the disputd property.

No.

The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to

defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship
between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28,
1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint
with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plain-
tiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case
is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the
above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Alfon VS Republic 2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name;

Facts:
A petition was filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner's prayer
for a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over
the facts which are well-stated in the questioned Order
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her
friends and acquaintances know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
Issue: WON a petition praying a change of name is valid

April 28, 1978 - Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Ruling:
Rosauro Alvarez filed a petition praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
No.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the
Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:
morning was published in the Times Journal on July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy
thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall
if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge
December 14, 1978- the time for the hearing, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the
that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General,
Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat,
the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica
submit the same for resolution of the Court. Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the
surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become
known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that Maria Estrella
authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that her
Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital and she was
father is Filomeno Duterte. She also admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow her to
registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte.
change surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's
surname.
June 15, 1952 - she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St.
Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and
Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon.
Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner
Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

When she started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first
grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon.
After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished
Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show
that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. She has exercised her right of
suffrage under the same name and she has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.
She has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle
who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition
for change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to
the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
TEODULO RURA vs. THE HON. GERVACIO A. LEOPENA Upon the other hand, the petitioner argues:

Facts: We beg to disagree. There is no previous conviction by final judgment

This case involves the application of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended),
specifically Section 9 which disqualifies from probation those persons:
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day
and or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa on different
dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated
as Criminal Case Nos. 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527.
The five cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on August 18, 1983.
Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (17) months and twenty-five (25)
days. In each criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol but court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of
judgment, Rura applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer
of Bohol on the ground Rura is disqualified for probation under Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation
law quoted above. And so the court denied the application for probation.
Issue: WON the petitioner is disqualified for probation.
to speak of. The five (5) cases of Estafa were tried jointly and there is
only one decision rendered on the same date—August 18. 1983. It
could not be presumed that accused-petitioner had been convicted
one after the other for the five cases of Estafa because the conviction
in these cases took place within the same day, August 18, 1983 by
means of a Joint Decision, and not in a separate decision.
Previous conviction, we submit, presupposes that there is a prior
sentence or that there was already a decision rendered which
convicted the accused. In this instant cases, however, there is only one
decision rendered on the five (5) counts of Estafa which was
promulgated on the same date. In other words the effects of
conviction does not retract to the date of the commission of the
offense as the trial court held. (Id., pp, 8-9.)
We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction
by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the
judgment which was the subject of his application. The statute relates "previous" to the
date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondent judge is directed to give due
course to the petitioner's application for probation. No costs.

Ruling:

No.

When Rura applied for probation, he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When
he applied for probation, the only conviction against him was the judgment which was
the subject of his application. The statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction, not
to the date of the commission of the crime.

In denying the application for probation, the respondent judge said:

Though the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided by the court
convicting the accused thereof, yet the dates of commission are
different. Upon conviction he was guilty of said offenses as of the dates
of commission of the acts complained of. (Rollo, p, 58.)
NHA VS JUCO
Facts:
The case is about the question of whether employees of the National Housing Corporation
(NHC) are covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service
Benjamin Juco was a project engineer of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) from
November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
Juco was implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214
pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation which was allegedly committed on
March 5, 1975. His services were terminated by (NHC) effective as of the close of working
hours on May 14, 1975.
March 25, 1977 - he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner (NHC) with
Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor docketed as R04-3-3309-77. The said
complaint was certified by Regional Branch No. IV of the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
where it was docketed as Case No. RB-IV-12038-77 and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ernilo
V. Peñalosa.
Penalosa conducted the hearing, and by agreement of the parties, the case was submitted
for resolution upon submission of their respective position papers. Juco submitted his
position paper on July 15, 1977. He professed innocence of the criminal acts imputed
against him contending "that he was dismissed based on purely fabricated charges
purposely to harass him because he stood as a witness in the theft case filed against
certain high officials of his establishment" (NHC) and prayed for 'his immediate
reinstatement to his former position in the (NHC) without loss of seniority rights and the
consequent payment of his will back wages plus all the benefits appertaining thereto.
July 28, 1977, the NHC filed its position paper alleging that the Regional Office Branch IV,
Manila, NLRC, "is without authority to entertain the case for lack of jurisdiction,
considering that the NHC is a government owned and controlled corporation; that even
assuming that this case falls within the jurisdiction of this Office, the firm maintains that
Juco was separated from the service for valid and justified reasons, i.e., for having sold
company properties consisting of 214 pieces of scrap G.I. pipes at a junk shop in Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter appropriating the proceeds thereof to his own
benefit."
The pertinent portion of the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reads:
The fact that in the early case of Fernandez v. Cedro (NLRC Case No. 201165-74, May 19,
1975) the Commission, (Second Division) ruled that the respondent National Housing
Corporation is a government-owned or controlled corporation does not preclude us from
later taking a contrary stand if by doing so the ends of justice could better be served.
For although adherence to precedents (stare decisis) is a sum formula for achieving
uniformity of action and conducive to the smooth operation of an office, Idolatrous
reverence for precedents which have outlived their validity and usefulness retards
progress and should therefore be avoided. In fact, even courts do reverse themselves for
reasons of justice and equity. This Commission as an Administrative body performing
quasi-judicial function is no exception.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby, set aside.
In view, however, of the fact that the Labor Arbiter did not resolve the issue of illegal
dismissal we have opted to remand this case to the Labor Arbiter a quo for resolution of
the aforementioned issue.
The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corporation organized in
accordance with Executive Order No. 399, the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporations, dated January 5, 1951. Its shares of stock are owned by the Government
Service Insurance System the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the
Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation, and the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation. Pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 118, the capital
stock of NHC was increased from P100 million to P250 million with the five government
institutions above mentioned subscribing in equal proportion to the increased capital
stock. The NHC has never had any private stockholders. The government has been the
only stockholder from its creation to the present.
There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of government-
owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service
rules and regulations.
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XI I which stated:
A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be
provided by law.
The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the embrace of
the civil service shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug an earlier loophole which
allowed government-owned or controlled corporations to avoid the full consequences of
the an encompassing coverage of the civil service system. The same explicit intent is
shown by the addition of "agency" and "instrumentality" to branches and subdivisions of
the Government. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
The amendments introduced in 1973 are not Idle exercises or a meaningless gestures.
They carry the strong message that t civil service coverage is broad and an- embracing
insofar as employment in the government in any of its governmental or corporate arms
is concerned.
The constitutional provision has been implemented by statute. Presidential Decree No.
807 is unequivocal that personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations
belong to the civil service and are subject to civil service requirements.
It provides:
SEC. 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations Personnel. — All permanent
personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations whose positions are now
embraced in the civil service shall continue in the service until they have been given a
chance to qualify in an appropriate examination, but in the meantime, those who do not
possess the appropriate civil service eligibility shag not be promoted until they qualify in
an appropriate civil service examination. Services of temporary personnel may be
terminated any time.
The very Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent NLRC wants to
apply in its entirety to the private respondent provides:
ART. 277. Government employees. — The terms and conditions of employment of all
government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their
salaries shall be standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the New
Constitution. However, there shall be reduction of existing wages, benefits and other
terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption
of the Code.
Our decision in Alliance of Government Workers, et al v. Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment et all. (124 SCRA 1) gives the background of the amendment which includes
government-owned or controlled corporations in the embrace of the civil service.
We stated:
Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the deliberation held relative
to what is now Section 1(1), Article XII-B, supra, the issue of the inclusion of government-
owned or controlled corporations figured prominently.
The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor leader, vehemently objected to the
inclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil Service. He argued
that such inclusion would put asunder the right of workers in government corporations,
recognized in jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution, to form and join labor unions
for purposes of collective bargaining with their employers in the same manner as in the
private section (see: records of 1971 Constitutional Convention).
In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
enlightened the members of the Committee on Labor on the divergent situation of
government workers under the 1935 Constitution, and called for its rectification. Thus, in
a Position Paper dated November 22, 197 1, submitted to the Committee on Labor, 1971
Constitutional Convention, then Acting Commissioner of Civil Service Epi Rey
Pangramuyen declared:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by
reason of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of the public
service, it must necessary regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as
not applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interests of all people in
the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private
labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they
employ.
Moreover, determination of employment conditions as
well as supervision of the management of the public service is in the hands of legislative
bodies. It is further emphasized that government agencies in the performance of their
duties have a right to demand undivided allegiance from their workers and must always
maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline among their staff members. It
would be highly incompatible with these requirements of the public service, if personnel
took orders from union leaders or put solidarity with members of the working class above
solidarity with the Government. This would be inimical to the public interest.
Moreover, it is asserted that public employees by joining labor unions may be compelled
to support objectives which are political in nature and thus jeopardize the fundamental
principle that the governmental machinery must be impartial and non-political in the
sense of party politics. (See: Records of 1971 Constitutional Convention).
Similar, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing for the inclusion of government-owned or
controlled corporations in the Civil Service, argued:
It is meretricious to contend that because Government-owned or controlled corporations
yield profits, their employees are entitled to better wages and fringe benefits than
employees of Government other than Government-owned and controlled corporations
which are not making profits. There is no gainsaying the fact that the capital they use is
the people's money. (see: Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention).
Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on the inclusion of
Government-owned or controlled corporation Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo
de Manila University Professional School of Law, stated that government-owned
corporations came under attack as g cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher
than their counterparts in the various branches of government, while the capital of these
corporations belongs to the Government and government money is pumped into them
whenever on the brink of disaster, and they should therefore come under the strict
surveillance of the Civil Service System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes
and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524).
Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as amended, and
the Civil Service Decree as amended and the precedent in the Alliance of Government
Workers decision, it is clear that the petitioner National Housing Corporation comes
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs governmental
functions and not proprietary ones.
The NHC was organized for the governmental objectives stated in its amended articles of
incorporation as follows:
SECOND: That the purpose for which the corporation is organized is to assist and carry
out the coordinated massive housing program of the government, principally but not
limited to low-cost housing with the integration cooperation and assistance of all
governmental agencies concerned, through the carrying on of any or all the following
activities:
l) The acquisition, development or reclamation of lands for the purpose of construction
and building therein preferably low-cost housing so as to provide decent and durable
dwelling for the greatest number of inhabitants in the country;
2) The promotion and development of physical social and economic community growth
through the establishment of general physical plans for urban, suburban and
metropolitan areas to be characterized by efficient land use patterns;
3) The coordination and implementation of all projects of the government for the
establishment of nationwide and massive low cost housing;
4) The undertaking and conducting of research and technical studies of the development
and promotion of construction of houses and buildings of sound standards of design
liability, durability, safety, comfort and size for improvement of the architectural and
engineering designs and utility of houses and buildings with the utilization of new and/or
native materials economics in material and construction, distribution, assembly and
construction and of applying advanced housing and building technology.
5) Construction and installation in these projects of low-cost housing privately or
cooperatively owned water and sewerage system or waste disposal facilities, and the
formulations of a unified or officially coordinated urban transportation system as a part
of a comprehensive development plan in these areas.
The petitioner points out that it was established as an instrumentality of the government
to accomplish governmental policies and objectives and extend essential services to the
people. It would be incongruous if employees discharging essentially governmental
functions are not covered by the same law and rules which govern those performing other
governmental functions. If government corporations discharging proprietary functions
now belong to the civil service with more reason should those performing governmental
functions be governed by civil service law.
The respondent NLRC cites a 1976 opinion of the Secretary of Justice which holds that the
phrase "government-owned or controlled corporations" in Section 1, Article XII-B of the
Constitution contemplates only those government-owned or controlled
corporations created by special law. The opinion states that since the Constitution
provides for the organization or regulation of private corporations only by "general law",
expressly excluding government-owned or controlled corporations, it follows that
whenever the Constitution mentions government-owned or controlled corporations, it
must refer to those created by special law. P.D. No. 868 which repeals all charters, laws,
decrees, rules, and provisions exempting any branch, agency, subdivision, or
instrumentality of the government, including government- owned or controlled
corporations from the civil service law and rules is also cited to show that corporations
not governed by special charters or laws are not to be brought within civil service
coverage. The discussions in the Constitutional Convention are also mentioned. It appears
that at the time the Convention discussed government-owned or controlled corporations,
all such corporations were organized only under special laws or charters.
The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government may be
created by special charter does not mean that such corporations not created by special
law are not covered by the civil service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and
special laws granting exemption from the civil service law imply that government
corporations not created by special law are exempt from civil service coverage. These
charters and statutes are the only laws granting such exemption and, therefore, they are
the only ones which could be repealed. There was no similar exempting provision in the
general law which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the Constitutional
Convention discussed only corporations created by special law or charter cannot be an
argument to exclude petitioner NHC from civil service coverage. As stated in the cited
speech delivered during the convention sessions of March 9, 1972, all government
corporations then in existence were organized under special laws or charters. The
convention delegates could not possibly discuss government-owned or controlled
corporations which were still non-existent or about whose existence they were unaware.

Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the phrase
"government-owned or controlled corporation."

"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible and all taken
one by one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a corporation created as a
government-owned or controlled entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms
taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment
on these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.

The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention or

emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution It would be possible for a
regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under the
Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could
create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the
best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free
from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of
the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive
restraints of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment.
Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could be created, no
longer by special charters, but through incorporation under the general law. The
constitutional amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service
would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
AGRIPINO DEMAFILES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE, in its capacity as Board
of Canvassers for the newly created Municipality of Sebaste of the Province of Antique,
and BENITO B. GALIDO, respondents.
The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election of officers in
the general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and
the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty.
On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal
board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard,
as "obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the
said return shows that 195 voters were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according
to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct
as of October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over
the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then
proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally
gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed
mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste.
On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's
action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of
Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico
Escaño, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the
COMELEC resolved on November 28, 1967:
To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new
municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of
Antique;
To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to
the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass
anew the results of the election for local offices of Sebaste, Antique, in
accordance with the Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the
Resolution of the Commission No. RR-544, particularly No. 5-K thereof, and
thereafter to proclaim the winning candidates for local offices of said
municipality.
In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two members of the
provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified from sitting only when the
board was acting as a provincial, but not as a municipal, board of canvassers and that the
COMELEC resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued
without giving him an opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December 4, 1967 the
respondent Commission reconsidered its previous order and held "that the canvass and
proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands".
Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed the present
petition for mandamus and certiorari to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC, to annull the proclamation of Galido, and to secure an order directing the
COMELEC to appoint substitute members of the provincial board and to order a new
canvass of the returns, including that from precinct 7.
The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1) whether the
respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its power in rejecting the
return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election registrar's certificate that a less
number of voters than that shown in the return had registered; (2) whether the provincial
board members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the
board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers; and (3) whether the Commission
on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a return from a given precinct.
These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be discussed seriatim, but
we must first proceed to dispose of the preliminary question raised by the respondent
Galido, namely, that this case is moot because he had taken his oath and assumed office
on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.
Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads:
The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste shall
be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified
[sic].
In our view, the last portion of the provision — "and shall have qualified" — is devoid of
any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the
respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste
begins immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the
legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a
becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently,
from supplying.itc-alf "If there is no meaning in it," said the King in Alice in Wonderland,
"that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any." Frankfurter, who
himself was fond of quoting this passage, admonishes that "a judge must not rewrite a
statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of
policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration."2 Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that the term of office of
municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, 3 and so
the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic issues in
this case, which we need not reach and resolve.
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function — that of compiling and
adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. This is the teaching
in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections:4"the canvassers are to be satisfied of
the, genuineness of the returns — namely, that the papers presented to them are not
forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers.
When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of informalities in them or
because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the elections."5 Thus, they cannot pass upon
the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground
that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal.6
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it
is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were
195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar
states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967. Lagumbay v. Commission
on Elections7 is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were palpably false
as it was indeed statistically improbable that "all the eight candidates of one party
garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the
eight candidates of the other party got precisely nothing.itc-alf" In other words, the aid
of evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud [being] so palpable from the return
itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and
give it prima facie value.
On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from which the
canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is only when it is compared
in the certificate of the election registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of
registered voters. The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to
justify its exclusion.
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered voters were
allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the petitioner claims that
after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to register (making a total of 190,
voters), and on the day of the election 5 voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were
allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that was where they were really assigned. The point
is simply that this question should be threshed out in an election contest.itc-
alf Lagumbay itself explicitly says —
Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should be handled
— and finally settled — by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That
is the general rule, where testimonial or documentary evidence is necessary. . .
. power to direct that certain copies of election returns be used in preference to other
Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be annulled.8
Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four
members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being
candidates for reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v. Commission on Elections:9
And added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the Provincial Board
of Oriental Mindoro is the fact that its members were disqualified to act it
appearing that they were all candidates for reelection. This is clear from Section
28 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any member of the
provincial board who is a candidate for an elective office shall be incompetent
to act in said board in the performance of its duties in connection with the
election.
Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido argues that
reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only when
the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them fro canvassing their
own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers.
With respect to the canvass and proclamation made the provincial board of Oriental
Mindoro, three issues raised in Salcedo, in resolving which this Court held (1) that a
provincial board cannot act as a municipal board of canvassers where a municipal council
has been formed; (2) that provincial board members who are candidates for reelection
are disqualified to sit in the board and (3) that a board of canvassers which excludes from
canvass the return from a precinct acts "in contravention of law."
At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive Thus:
Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who is a candidate
for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on said body in the
performance of the duties the of relative to said election . . . .
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board
of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body new
municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec
nos distinguere debemos.
Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul an illegal
canvass and an illegal proclamation as when they are based on incomplete returns, and
order a new canvass to be made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded. 10 If it has
copies of the same returns,11 there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to
count all turns which are otherwise regular.itc-alf Indeed, it is its duty to do so, failing
which it may be compelled by mandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is the ministerial
function a board of canvassers to count the results as they appeal in the returns which on
their face do not reveal any irregularities or falsities.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the Commission on
Elections are set aside, and the canvass of returns made and the subsequent proclamation
of the respondent Benito B. Galido are annulled. The respondent Commission on Elections
is hereby directed. (1) to appoint new members of the board of canvassers in substitution
of Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, and (2) immediately thereafter to order the board
of canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes including those appearing in
the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance with the results of such canvass, proclaim
the winning candidates. Costs against the private respondent Galido.
ARABAY,INC. vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, BRANCH
II, THE CITY OF DIPOLOG and EMILIO L. TAGAILO, in his capacity as City Treasurer of the
City of Dipolog, et al., respondents.
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch II, dismissing the complaint of the herein petitioner Arabay,
Inc., for annulment of a tax ordinance of the Municipal Council of Dipolog, Zamboanga
del Norte, and for refund of the taxes it had paid thereunder. On December 17, 1965 the
Municipal Council of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 amending Section I of Ordinance
No. 53 series of 1964. As thus amended the said Section I reads as follows:
Section 1. There shall be charged for the selling and distribution of
refined and manufactured mineral oils, motor and diesel fuels, and
petroleum based on the monthly allocation actually delivered and
distributed and intended for sale, in any manner whatsoever, by the
Company or supplier to any person, firm, entity, or corporation,
whether as dealer of such refined and manufactured mineral oils,
motor and diesel fuels, and petroleum or as operator of any station
thereof, the following tax payable monthly:
Gasoline — P0.01 per liter
Lubricating oils — P0.01 per liter
Diesel Fuel oils ¼ centavo per liter
Petroleum or P0.05 per gallon can
kerosene or
— P0.02 per half gallon tin
Provided, however, that retail seller of not more than 5 gallon cans or
its equivalent shall be exempted from the provisions of this ordinance.
Section 2. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1966.
On June 21, 1969 Republic Act No. 5520 was approved. It provided for the creation of the
City of Dipolog from the then of the Municipality of Dipolog, to take effect on January 1,
1970.
On July 28, 1971 the Arabay, Inc., a distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte a complaint against the City
of Dipolog contesting the validity of the above-mentioned Section 1 of Ordinance No. 53
on the ground that the same imposed a sales tax which is beyond the power of a
municipality to levy under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act of 1959. Said Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2 Taxation — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all chartered
cities, municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority to impose municipal
license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising
privileges in chartered cities, municipalities or municipal districts by requiring them to
secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council of the city, the
municipal council of the municipality, or the municipal district council of the municipal
district; to collect fees and charges for service rendered by the city, municipality or
municipal district; to regulate and impose reasonable fees for services rendered in
connection with any business, profession or occupation being conducted within the city,
municipality or municipal district and otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and
uniform taxes, licenses or fees: Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall,
in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon
nor impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue: Provided, however, That no city, municipality or
municipal district may levy or impose any of the following: ... (emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1972 the Arabay, Inc. filed a supplemental complaint which prayed, among
others, for a refund of the taxes it had paid under the ordinance in question.
On October 30, 1972 the parties entered into a stipulation of facts which, inter alia, states:
2. That plaintiff, pursuant to the above ordinance, paid sales taxes for the sale of Diesel
fuel oils, lubricating oils, petroleum, kerosene and other related petroleum products, to
the defendant City of Dipolog, from December, 1969 to July, 1972 in the total amount of
FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P5,400.00). A schedule of the payments made
by plaintiff is hereto attached as Annex "A" and is made an integral part hereof. However,
the payments made from April, 1972 to July, 1972, in the total amount of P69.80 have
been refunded by defendant City of Dipolog to plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing stipulation of facts and of the Memorandum
of Arguments to be submitted by the parties, the latter, through, their respective
counsels, hereby submit the case for the determination of this Honor.
On January 16, 1973 the court a quo rendered judgment upholding the validity of the
questioned provision of Ordinance No. 53, as amended, essentially on the grounds that
the Arabay, Inc. failed to present evidence that the tax provision in question imposed a
sales tax, and the tax prescribed therein was, moreover, not a specific tax on the products
themselves but on the privilege of selling them.
The basic issues in the case at bar are: (1) whether or not the questioned tax provision
imposes a sales tax; and (2) if it imposes a sales tax, whether the Arabay, Inc. is entitled
to a tax refund, considering that Dipolog is now a city.
1. It is settled rule in this jurisdiction that for purposes of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy
Act, supra, a municipal tax ordinance which prescribes a set ratio between the amount of
the tax and the volume of sales of the taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void
for being beyond the power of a municipality to enact.1
In our view, the questioned section of Ordinance No. 53 of the Municipal Council of
Dipolog levies a sales tax, not only because the character of the ordinance as a sales tax
ordinance was admitted by the parties below, but as well because the phraseology of the
said provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on the sale of oil,
gasoline and other petroleum products. Thus, the ordinance provides: "There shall be
charged for the selling and distribution of refined and manufactured oils ... based on the
monthly allocation actually delivered and distributed and intended for sale ... by the
Company or supplier to any person ... whether as dealer ... or as operator of any station
... the following tax payable monthly: ..." It is quite evident from these terms that the
amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon or bears a direct
relationship to the volume of sales which the owner or supplier of the itemized products
generates every month. The ordinance in question therefore exacts a tax based on sales;
it follows that the Municipality of Dipolog was not authorized to enact such an ordinance
under the local Autonomy Act.
2. The obligation of the City of Dipolog to refund the sum collected under the void
provisions of an ordinance enacted while it was still a municipality, is not open to doubt.
In San Miguel Corporation vs. The Municipal Council of Mandaue, Cebu, supra, the Court
ordered, the return to the taxpayer of the sums paid under an ordinance enacted under
circumstances similar to the case at bar, and rejected the argument that the municipality
of Mandaue had in the meantime been converted into a city. The Court said:
Respondent however claim that with the conversion of Mandaue into a city pursuant to
Republic Act No. 5519, which was approved on June 21, 1969, the issue has already
become moot, since the prohibition contained in section 2 of Republic Act 2264 applies
only to municipalities and not to chartered cities. The same contention has been rejected
in City of Naga v. Court of Appeals, and Laoag Producers' Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. vs. Municipality of Laoag, where We ruled that the legality of an
ordinance depends upon the power of the municipality at the time of the enactment of
the challenged ordinance. Since the municipality of Mandaue had no authority to enact
the said ordinance, the subsequent approval of Republic Act No. 5519 which became
effective on June 21, 1969, did not remove the original infirmity of the ordinance. Indeed
there is no provision in the aforecited statute which invests a curative effect upon the
ordinances of the municipality which when enacted were beyond its statutory authority.
The right of the Arabay, Inc. to a refund of the local sales taxes it had paid under the
questioned ordinance may not, however, include those levied on its gasoline sales. The
relevant proviso of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act states:
... Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no
case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes on articles
subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code:
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing proviso of Section 2 of R.A. 2264, two courses of action in the
exercise of their taxing powers are denied to municipalities and municipal districts, to wit,
(1) to levy any sales tax in whatever form; and (2) to levy any tax on articles subject to
specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. It is not difficult to see that these
two prohibitions overlap in the sense that while the first clause of the said proviso forbids
the levying of sales taxes of whatever form or guise, the second clause of the
same proviso forbids the levying of "taxes" without any distinction as to the kind of tax,
i.e.' whether percentage tax, sales tax, specific tax or license tax, although this latter
prohibition applies only to a limited class of articles, viz., those subject to the specific tax
under the Tax Code.
Such an overlap would probably carry or connote no legal significance but for the
exclusion of gasoline from the prohibition contained in the second clause of the
mentioned proviso. For, with the exemption of gasoline from the coverage of the same,
it becomes relevant to determine the effect which such exclusion has on the previous
prohibition against the levying of the sales tax.
In our opinion, a reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of theproviso in
question results in the conclusion that Congress, in excluding gasoline from the general
disability imposed on municipalities and municipal districts to exact any kind of taxes on
articles subject to specified tax under the Tax Code, deliberately and intentionally meant
to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of
taxes the latter may deem proper to levy on gasoline including a sales tax or one in that
form. There is after all no clearly demonstrable and convincing reason why the law would
allow municipal imposition of taxes on gasoline and yet withhold such power if the
imposition is in the form of a sales tax, when it was a known fact at the time of the
enactment of the Local Autonomy Act in 1959 — and this still is true to this day — that
gasoline is of no profitable use to the companies which own it unless turned over to the
consuming public which, perforce, must pay for the right to obtain that commodity.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is set aside. The City of Dipolog is hereby ordered to
refund to the Arabay, Inc. the taxes the latter has paid under Section 1 of Ordinance No.
53, series of 1964, as amended, deducting therefrom the amount representing the taxes
paid by the Arabay, Inc. on its gasoline sales. No costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA,
EDWIN BENITO, PEDRO PARAAN, and JOSEPH FABITO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo
Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon
them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the
shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove
away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the road when the jeepney started to
move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he sustained. Catugas
survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan,
Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon,
and another unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken into police custody a few
hours after the incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim
was found dead three days after the incident in question, while the others have remained
at large. Three separate criminal complaints for murder,[1] frustrated murder,[2] and
violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended)[3] were filed against
them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter-affidavits, accused
Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito did not submit their counter-affidavits.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order[4] declaring the accused to have
waived their right to be heard in preliminary investigation; finding a prima facie case
against the accused; recommending that they be charged with and prosecuted for the
crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended; and
ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three separate informations for
murder, frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended,
against the aforenamed persons.The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
94-00617-D, 94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The first was later amended. The
accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay
Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with knives with
intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO LANDINGIN inflicting upon him stab
wounds which caused his instant death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[5]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay
Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with knives and
with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and taking advantage of superior
strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y CASTAEDA
inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, the accused having then performed all the acts
of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but
which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused and that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio
Catugas y Castaeda which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at barangay
Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with knives by
means of violence against person by stabbing to death TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver
of a passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely and thereafter with
intent to gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away said passenger jeep bearing
Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely owned and driven by Teofilo Landingin without
the latters consent, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended.[7]
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by Judge
Crispin C. Laron (hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter consolidated and jointly
tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the said court presided by Judge Silverio Q.
Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of innocence in
each case.
I shock due to internal hemorrhage.[12] Nora Landingin, wife of Teofilo Landingin,
THE CASES IN THE LARON COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (Frustrated
Murder) in the LARON court, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Virgilio
Catugas, policemen Dominguillo Gulen and Bernardo Clemente, Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma.
Nora Landingin, and Dr. Roberto Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was recalled as rebuttal
witness. In their defense, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness
stand. They also presented as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot, Shirley Lomboy,
Conrado Benito, policeman Bernardo Clemente, and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence in
chief and Julia Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front of the CS1
Supermarket in Dagupan City waiting for a transportation to take him to his home at
Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Later, a passenger jeepney plying the Dagupan City -
Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo Landingin arrived. He boarded it and occupied that
portion of the passengers' seat behind the drivers seat. There were already some
passengers inside the jeepney, but they disembarked before the jeepney reached the
boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving behind Landingin, Catugas, and two other
passengers.[8]
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel, Calasiao, nine persons
flagged down the jeepney and boarded it. One of them, whom Catugas identified to be
accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the driver; the rest took the passenger seats behind the
drivers seat. Catugas fully recognized Benito because there was light at the ceiling of the
jeepney and at the signboard portion of the jeepney and the latter sometimes turned his
face toward the back where Catugas was seated. Catugas had further observed Benitos
face, ears, and eyes.[9] He also recognized accused Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan.[10]
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for Pangasinan Village Inn (PVI)
in Bued, Calasiao. But when they reached PVI, one of them said that his companions did
not know where they were going, and informed Landingin that he would take care of the
fare upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon reaching Nansangaan,
one of the nine passengers asked Landingin to drive a little farther. Later, Mejia asked
Catugas whether he was Landingins companion; Catugas answered in the
affirmative. Mejia then announced: [T]his is a hold-up; while Benito said: [N]obody will be
able to be saved his life [sic]. Another companion of Mejia said: Proceed. All of the nine
drew their daggers and stabbed Landingin and Catugas.[11]
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who conducted an autopsy on
Landingins cadaver, found three stab wounds - two of which were fatal. According to him,
the cause of Landingins death was cardiorespiratory arrest resulting from hypovolemic
spent P1,500 daily during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for his burial; and P16,000
for the tomb. Nora felt sad because of his death.[13]
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and landed on the road,
was brought by some people to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital.[14]Dr. Roberto
Valenzuela performed on Catugas exploratory laparatomy debridement and found three
multi-lacerations in the right upper extremities and several others on the left upper
extremities which could have been caused by bladed instruments.[15] Catugas survived
and was confined for seven days.He spent more than P50,000 for his hospitalization and
medical expenses.The hospital billed him in the amount of P44,667.25.[16]
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of the Mabini
Police Station, Mabini, Pangasinan, was approaching his residence at the poblacion in
Sual, Pangasinan, on board a police patrol car, he saw six men walking in front of his
house. When he stopped the car, the men ran away. He gave chase and caught two of
them, namely, accused Mejia and Benito. Gulen thought that they belonged to an akyat-
bahay gang. When asked what they were doing, the two answered that they were not
doing anything and that they were not robbers. They told Gulen that they were from Sta.
Barbara. Benito even showed his drivers license and told Gulen that he did not commit
any crime and that he was willing to go to the police station. Gulen then brought the two
and turned them over to the police station in Sual, Pangasinan.[17]
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994,
entered in the police blotter this turn-over and talked to the two.In the course of their
conversation, Benito reported that they rode on a jeepney, which was abandoned
somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided to make a follow-up of this report. With Benito as
their guide, Clemente and three other policemen were able to find the jeepney with the
marking LOVELY in Sitio Nipa, Barangay Baguioen, Sual, Pangasinan. The jeepney had
bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought it to the police station and had the
matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente then instructed the radio operator to call
the police station of Sta. Barbara and inform it of the turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At
1:45 a.m. of 11 March 1994, the PNP elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and
received the two, as well as the passenger jeepney.[18]
Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of Sual apprehended
Joseph Fabito in Sitio Looc, Poblacion Sual, as a murder suspect.He was turned over to
the Sual Police Station. After having been informed of this arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police
Station took him into its custody. These facts were entered in the Sual Police Station
blotter.[19]
The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded Landingins jeepney that
fateful evening of 10 March 1994, but denied having committed the crimes. They claimed
that it was Romulo Calimquim and his companions who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas,
and drove away the jeepney. The following is a summary of their version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, was the driver of
the Elf truck of Lito Lomboy of Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which was used in hauling sand
and gravel. His co-accused Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering sand and gravel,
the accused returned the truck and went to the house of Fabitos brother-in-law in San
Miguel, Calasiao. After two hours of waiting in vain for the brother-in-law, Paraan
suggested that they go to the house of his future brother-in-law in Bacayao Norte,
Calasiao. After some snacks they proceeded to the town proper and strolled for a
while. Then, Benito thought that it was time to go home to Sta. Barbara and suggested
that they should. They proceeded to a waiting shed near the National High School to wait
for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. At the waiting shed, they saw Romulo Calimquim
with three other companions, who were also waiting for a transportation for Sta.
Barbara. Calimquim then flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney. He and his
companions boarded it. So did Benito and his companions. Calimquim sat beside the
driver. The rest took the back seat.[20]
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a huge body, who sat beside the
driver.[21]
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta. Barbara and that leading
to the national highway, the man who sat beside the driver (Calimquim, according to
Benito; Mamaril, according to Paraan) ordered the driver to proceed to the national
highway; the driver did. But after reaching the highway, in Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, the
former ordered the latter to stop, announced that this is a hold up, then stabbed the
driver several times, pulled his body out of the jeepney, took over the wheel, and drove
the jeepney.[22] In the meantime, at the back seat, one of the companions of Calimquim
pointed a knife at Benito; while the others told Benitos companions to lie on their belly.It
was when Catugas attempted to fight back that he was stabbed.[23] Catugas was then
thrown out of the jeepney.[24]
Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim from alighting
from the jeepney. Upon reaching a mountain in Sual, Pangasinan,[25] the man on the
wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito to alight from the jeepney. The group of
Calimquim pointed knives[26] and a gun[27]at them. Then suddenly there was a light
coming from below. They ran away from the group of Calimquim.[28]
Benito and Mejia were together.[29] Later, a policeman saw them. The two told the
policeman that they are not "troublesome persons. The policeman brought them to the
Police Station of Sual. There, Benito reported what had happened and accompanied the
policemen to the place where the jeepney in question was located.[30] Afterwards, the
two were detained at Sta. Barbara Police Station. While in detention, they were informed
that Calimquim was killed and his body was found in Alaminos.[31]
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March 1994 and went to the
house of Roland, his brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him to request a barangay
councilman to accompany him to the police station. It was the barangay captain who
accompanied him the following day to the police station. There, the police authorities
told him that he was among the assailants of Landingin and that he was the one who
stabbed Catugas in the night of 10 March 1994 and one of the suspects in the carnapping
of the jeepney of Landingin.[32] Paraan was forthwith placed inside the jail.
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, he was by the
seashore. He stayed there until 6:00 a.m. and inquired from someone the location of the
police station. He went to that station which happened to be Sual Police Station. There,
he narrated to the policemen what had happened. When a policeman asked him whether
he was the killer, he answered in the negative. At around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to
the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail, where he was detained for three months. Then, he was
committed to the Provincial Jail.[33]
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was already driving a
tricycle, the parents of the accused met with him and informed him that the accused told
them that they (the accused) did not commit any wrong.Catugas answered that he had
suffered several wounds and spent much for his hospitalization and that since the accused
were the ones apprehended, he would just tell a lie so he could recover the amounts he
spent. Catugas then asked P20,000 from each of the accused, or a total of P80,000, and
repeated this demand five to six times.[34]
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente, also proved that
Romulo Calimquim died due to a gunshot wound on 13 March 1994 in Barangay Paitan
West, Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced by Entry No. 4338 of Page 260 of the Police
Blotter.[35]
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed Landingin
and that accused Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones who stabbed him. He further
declared that it was the parents of the accused who offered to pay him, but he refused
because such an offer could not be accepted by [his] conscience.[36]
The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She denounced as untrue
the testimony on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of accused were the ones who
offered to pay him money. Julia declared that they visited Catugas to ask him whether it
was true that their children committed the crime. On their first visit, Catugas told them
that he could not yet answer that question; but when they returned, Catugas told them
that they had to pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the
accused.[37]
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on the
identification of the accused by Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive on the part of the
latter, and the offer of the parents of the accused to compromise the cases.
In its decision dated 17 November 1994,[38] the LARON court convicted accused Mejia,
Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of the crime of murder and of frustrated murder, with
treachery as the qualifying circumstance and nighttime and band as aggravating
circumstances. Accordingly, it sentenced the first three accused to suffer the penalty of
death for the crime of murder; and ten years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen
years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal for the crime of frustrated
murder. It credited Paraan with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, he
being only seventeen years old at the time of the commission of the crimes charged; and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder, and six years of prision correccional to
ten years and one day of prision mayor for frustrated murder. The Court also ordered the
four accused to pay the heirs of Teofilo Landingin the amounts of P50,000 as death
indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and P12,000 for funeral expenses; and to
pay Catugas the amount of P44,687.25 for hospital expenses, plus costs.
II
THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act) in the CASTILLO
Court, the prosecution presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas and Nora
Landingin. The former was recalled as rebuttal witness. The accused Mejia, Benito,
Paraan, and Fabito took the witness stand and presented as additional witnesses Conrado
Benito and Felicidad Fabito. Their testimonies were substantially the same as those they
made in the murder and frustrated murder cases in the LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed, he was
thrown out of the jeepney to the shoulder of the road and that one of the culprits took
the wheel of the jeepney, started off its engine, and drove off.[39] He further declared
that while he was confined at the hospital, the policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated
him, showed him pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspects names,[40] and took his
statement.[41] After he was discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with the father of
accused Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization expenses and asked P80,000, as
a settlement of the case, to be paid by the parents of the accused on an agreed date; but
before that date came, he had already testified against the accused.[42]
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin, further testified that her
husband owned the passenger jeepney in question, as evidenced by Certificate of
Registration No. 19253856,[43] and Official Receipt No. MVRR 91354948.[44] The
jeepney was worth P140,000.[45]
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked the
version of the defense on account of the following inculpating evidence, which, according
to it, bolstered its finding that the accused were the authors of the crime charged:
1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan speak of
innocence and fear for their lives during the ruthless incident, unfortunately they never
sustained any bodily injury on their bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt anybody, they could not have
concentrated on the persons of Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but they
should have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their persons (accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did not do anything except to
passively stay at the back seat of the jeepney motionless from the place of stabbing
incident in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in Sual, Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to carnapp [sic] the passenger jeepney
of Teofilo Landingin then the logical conclusion that can be had in the instant situation is
for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all passengers for that matter, including
the four (4) accused to eliminate the presence of eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok in going to Sual, Pangasinan
without offering any slight resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that, Mok and company belonged
to the group of the four (4) accused who were responsible in perpetrating the offense
charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are the real offenders, why is it
that during the long span of travel from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never made any attempt
to jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they show any positive signs to invite the
attention of PNP members stationed along the long route starting in Dagupan City,
Binmaley, Lingayen, Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.
4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly claim innocence of the crime
charged. In fact, they averred that upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they reported to the
responding peace officers what happened to them and that their reports was recorded in
the Police Blotter of Sual Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with absolute falsity and is debunked
by the entry in the Police Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the subject certification
negates accuseds statement of innocence. The subject entry which is contained in the
Book of Events of Sual Police Station belies any complaint/report made by accused Edwin
Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were kidnapped or deprived of their liberty with the use
of guns and bladed weapons. Upon the other hand, the Certification squarely bespeaks
of the incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at Sual Police Station
for they were suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney involved in the above
case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan, they likewise vehemently
denied the accusation lodged against them. Unfortunately, their conclusion of innocence
crumbled when they joined the group from the crime scene starting in Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan up to their destination in Sual, Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual,
Pangasinan they scampered and run away to different directions to avoid apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making any report to the nearest
authority i.e. Barangay Captain of the place they decided to escape which they did with
impunity. The records in the Police Blotter of Sual is negatived (sic) of any entry about the
whereabouts of accused Paraan and Fabito.[46]
The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and
Joseph Fabito guilty of the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. It
sentenced the first three accused to death; and Paraan, to reclusion perpetua on account
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. It also ordered them to pay the
costs.
III
THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court is
automatic pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659,[47] the convicted accused filed with
this Court their notices of appeal from the decision of the LARON court and of the
CASTILLO court on 18 November 1994 and 22 February 1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos.
118940-41, and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed as G.R. No. 119407.
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellants Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-41
and in G.R. No. 119407, the appellants filed a motion for the consolidation of these cases,
which we granted on 27 February 1996.
In their Appellants Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants impute upon the trial court
the following errors: (a) in giving full faith and credence to the unsubstantiated testimony
of prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas relative to the incident in question; (b) in holding
them as the persons who stabbed the jeepney driver and Virgilio Catugas in the evening
of 10 March 1994 despite the fact that clear and convincing evidence were proffered to
point at the real culprits, Romulo Calimquim and his companions; (c) in rendering a verdict
of conviction notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and (d) in convicting them of the crimes charged instead of the crimes
homicide and frustrated homicide -- on the assumption that they are guilty.
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned errors. They submit
that:
(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the identification of the appellants
leaves much to be desired. He should not be believed, for he could not even remember
who among the appellants were wearing short pants, hat, and shoes at that time. If
policeman Gulen could not even identify in court appellant Mejia whom he apprehended
in the evening of 10 March 1994 and brought to the Sual Police Station, it was with more
reason that Catugas could not have identified the assailants since it was nighttime. The
possibility that Catugas got confused, if not mentally and physically drained, as a result of
the shocking incident is not far-fetched. There is then a very strong and compelling reason
to believe that Catugas mistook the appellants as the real hold-uppers.
(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their children did not commit
any wrong, but Catugas vacillated and testified falsely against accused-appellants when
they were not able to produce the amount of P20,000.00 each as earlier demanded from
them. Catugas denial of their testimony is self-serving and cannot overcome the positive
testimony of Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin Benito augurs well with their
claim of innocence, when they were apprehended. Benito readily showed his drivers
license, answered questions propounded by policeman Clemente, and without hesitation
he helped or guided the policemen in locating the jeepney at the place where it was
abandoned. He did not try to hide or conceal anything when he was confronted about the
incident.Moreover, when Benito and Mejia were picked up by a policeman on that fateful
night, they were not tainted with blood.
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be liable for homicide and
frustrated homicide, since treachery was not established.
In their Appellants Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following assignment of errors:
(a) the facts charged in the information do not constitute violation of the crime of Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended; (b) The court a quo erred in convicting them of the
crime charged on the basis of surmises and conjecture; and (c) the court a quo erred in
convicting them by relying fully on the evidence of the prosecution and completely
disregarding the evidence of the defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an essential ingredient of
the crime of carnapping, was not proved. They claim that from the evidence adduced it is
very clear that the incident was only a hold-up and that the jeepney was taken to Sual as
escape vehicle.
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they discussed jointly, the
appellants submit that:
(1) The trial courts conclusion on their culpability was based on mere surmises and
conjectures and contradicted by the evidence on the record. The fact that the group of
Calimquim did not hurt any of the four appellants and that the latter offered no resistance
does not prove appellants membership in Calimquims group. That they did not even jump
off the passenger jeepney or show positive signs to invite the attention of the PNP
stationed along the route from Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of fear since
Calimquims group pointed knives at each of them and ordered them to lie down in
stooping position. The absence of conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after
they were released as hostages, they ran in separate directions and did not join the group
of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that Benito and Mejia were
suspected of having carnapped the passenger jeepney does not bind them, for it was
made by a police officer and was contrary to what they had reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and Fabito had escaped.
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of Catugas whose identification
of the appellants was based only on the pictures and on the information of the
policemen. It was impossible for Catugas to narrate in detail the participation of each
accused, considering that the light in the jeepney was dim and his principal attention was
concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellants reporting of the incident disproved their membership in the group of
Calimquim. If they were members, their natural course would have been to hide from the
authorities. Their voluntary submission to the police immediately after the incident
should have been given credence as part of the res gestae.
In the Consolidated Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to
affirm in toto the challenged decisions for failure of the appellants to show that the trial
court committed error in finding the prosecution evidence clear, sufficient, and
convincing to convict. Catugas, who made an eyewitness account, had the opportunity to
observe the appellants during the commission of the crime and had no ill-motive to
implicate the appellants falsely. As to the charge that he perjured because the appellants
were not able to produce the amount of P80,000 which he allegedly demanded from
them,the same should not be believed. The truth is, it was the parents of the appellants
who approached Catugas and offered him P80,000 in order that he would not testify
against the appellants. Catugas did not accept the offer, as it was against his principles to
tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence, the trial court was
correct in convicting the appellants of murder for the death of Teofilo Landingin and
frustrated murder for stabbing Virgilio Catugas. Their conviction for violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act is also proper, since their main purpose was to get the jeepney and they
killed Landingin in order that they could get it. They presented no evidence to prove that
they ran away with the jeepney for any lawful purpose.
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the identification made
by the prosecution witness Catugas cannot be denominated as clear, positive, and
convincing; for, while it may be true that he could have taken glimpse or glance at the
faces of all the accused-appellants, this fact alone is not adequate and fell short of the
required test of positive identification. They strongly suggest that Catugas had ill-motive
to testify falsely against them in that he was not paid the P80,000 he demanded.
IV
THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS
Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in order.The crimes
charged in the informations filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO court are
irretrievably linked with or related to one another. They arose out of the same incident,
are founded on the same factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses. The three cases then should have been consolidated and jointly tried in one
branch of the RTC of Dagupan City. What were jointly tried were only the cases for murder
and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the
same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly
at the courts discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against
oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short, the attainment of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.[48] In Raymundo v. Elipe,[49] we held
that although consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and the same
subject matter is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, joint hearing
becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge, or even
filed with the different branches of the same court, provided one of such cases has not
been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO court nor any
of the parties caused, or moved for, a consolidation of the case for violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act (which has the higher docket number) with the cases for murder and
frustrated murder in the LARON court (which have lower docket numbers). It was only
after the filing of their separate Appellants Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No.
119407 that the appellants moved to consolidate the latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could contribute some
difficulty in the appreciation of the evidence. The principal witnesses of the parties
testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of their testimony and credibility in
the LARON court must not be influenced by their testimonies in the case before the
CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was
unclear in some details of the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other
hand, there were details he disclosed in one of the courts which were not given in the
other court. The same observation may be had on the testimonies of the appellants
before both courts. As one reads the transcripts of the testimonies of these witnesses in
both cases, it would be quite difficult to avoid forming impressions in light of the totality
of their testimonies in both courts. Our minds and mental processes must be kept away
from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on evidence and the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants dictate that we resolve the appeals
in the cases before the LARON court and the case before the CASTILLO court solely on the
basis of the evidence presented before such courts, respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of murder in Criminal
Case No. 94-00617-D and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D are
absorbed in the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993[50] is applicable to these cases
because the crimes were committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping
Act was amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 and now imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof. This Section, as amended, reads in full as follows:
SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. -- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed
without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment
for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when
the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Underscoring
supplied for emphasis).
In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:
and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping. (stress
supplied).
Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life
imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the
phrase in the commission of the carnapping to in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The latter makes clear the intention of the law to
make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4
of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the crime of carnapping
which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form. In short, considering the phraseology of
the amended Section 14,[51] the carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be
considered as a single or indivisible crime or a special complex crime which, however, is
not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words IS KILLED, no distinction must be made
between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the
course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof makes no difference insofar as the
penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin -- whether it be homicide or
murder -- cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should only be considered to
qualify the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of qualified carnapping or
carnapping in an aggravated form, the prosecution had still to prove the essential
requisites of the homicide or murder of Landingin and that of carnapping. This should
have been another reason for the consolidation of the carnapping case in the CASTILLO
court with the cases before the LARON court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
include the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little differently, does murder
or homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify carnapping if it is committed in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof? The answer must be in
the negative in light of the use in said Section 14 of the words IS KILLED. The unmistakable
import thereof is that it refers only to the consummated felony of either murder or
homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, then it must be deemed to fall
under the clause (of Section 14) when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person.
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the
carnapping of Teofilo Landingin's passenger jeepney, which is a motor vehicle under the
definition in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539.[52] The passenger jeepney was taken, with intent
of gain, from Landingin by means of violence against him which caused his death and
against a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of the appellants? The
LARON and the CASTILLO courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved.[53] To overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution.[54] Save in certain
circumstances as where, for instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts
alleged to constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden is never
shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of his defense. Indeed, unless the
prosecution successfully discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf.[55]
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is
forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State,
both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the
accused. Every circumstance favoring the accuseds innocence must be duly taken into
account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that
on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged.[56] If the
prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to be freed;
it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty to acquit him.[57]
After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the stenographic notes of
the testimonies of the witnesses in the cases before the LARON court and the CASTILLO
court, we are not convinced with moral certainty that the appellants committed the
crimes charged. Reasonable doubt burdens our conscience; our minds cannot rest easy
on a verdict of conviction.
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants and the five others,
namely, Romulo Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a certain Mondragon, and
another described as John Doe. All nine were forthwith charged with the crimes of
murder, frustrated murder, and carnapping in Criminal Cases Nos.
3310,[58] 3313,[59] 3311,[60] respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, and then in the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D,[61] and 94-
00619-D[62] of the LARON court and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D[63] of the CASTILLO
court, respectively.
The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the group of Romulo
Calimquim. The prosecution has no proof to prove otherwise; but the LARON and the
CASTILLO courts, through inferences from certain facts, concluded that the appellants
were. The conclusion is rather tenuous. While the rigorous cross-examination of the
appellants in all these cases has established close relationship among the appellants by
reason of their residence and work, (Benito, as sand-and-gravel truck driver and Mejia,
Fabito, and Paraan as his keepers), it miserably failed to establish any relationship
between them and the five others headed by Calimquim. What then looms large in our
minds is that the appellants and the five others happened to be passengers of Landingins
jeepney by accident, not by design. If the appellants were with the five others until Sual,
Pangasinan, it was because they were intimidated and made to lie down on their bellies
inside the jeepney.
Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not belong to the group of
Calimquim. Upon arrival in the mountains of Sual, they fled from the Calimquim group
when the first opportunity to do so came. We find to be absolutely without basis the
statement of the CASTILLO court that the appellants abandoned Landingins jeepney in
Sitio Nipa, Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, upon seeing the arrival of concerned citizens and
members of the Sual Police Station; the responding peace officers effected the recovery
of the subject jeepney sans the accused/culprits. No prosecution witness so testified.In
the CASTILLO court, no policeman was presented as witness for the prosecution. The
evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense reveal that after appellants
Benito and Mejia were picked up by Policeman Gulen on the latters suspicion that they
were members of an akyat-bahaygang, they voluntarily informed the police authorities
of the Sual Police Station of what had happened. It was this information that brought the
policemen to where the subject jeepney was located. Benito even accompanied the
policemen. This resulted in the recovery of the jeepney by the policemen.Appellant
Paraan also presented himself later to the Police Station of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito,
although apprehended by concerned citizens of the place to where he had fled,
voluntarily reported what he knew to the police authorities of Sual and Sta. Barbara.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters of
the police stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the
appellants had declared in court is not conclusive evidence that they did not report the
incident to the police authorities. They had no participation in the preparation of the
entries. Entries in the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative
value, for they are normally incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial
suggestion of for want of suggestion or inquiries.[64] The entries in question are sadly
wanting in material particulars. At the very most, they only recorded the impression that
the appellants were suspects.
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the
prosecution had to rely solely on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas.The totality of his
testimony in the cases before the LARON court leaves much to be desired. The prosecutor
who conducted the direct examination was unable to propound sensible questions to
elicit clear answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the
commission of the alleged crimes. This deficiency thus tempted the trial judge to ask more
questions.Despite the latters participation, the testimony of Catugas fails to convince us
that the appellants indeed participated in the commission of the crimes. On cross- Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring to Edwin Benito)?
examination in the LARON court, Catugas categorically admitted that he did not know the
names of the appellants and that he could recognize only three of the nine accused. Thus: A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir.[65]

ATTY. TAMINAYA: Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the following admissions
on cross-examination:
Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you mentioned the names of the
person and I will now read: Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat besides [sic] the driver, is it not?

Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you know them? A Yes, sir.

A In fact I do not know, however, based on the police investigation of Sta. Barbara PNP, Q Please point to him?
they were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito, Pedro Paraan, Mok Calimquim,
alyas Dennis, Alex Mamaril, Dennis Abrigo alyas Mondragon and one unidentified person.
A He was wearing a dark color.

can you tell this Court why these persons were written in your statement?
Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?

A Because of the police investigation.

A I cannot tell, sir.

Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not able to identify the accused,
Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you pointed to this person wearing
is that correct?
in red T-shirt?

A I can recognize the others, sir.

A I can no longer remember, sir.

Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize?

Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do you remember his shirt?

A Three (3) of them, sir.

A I dont know, sir.

COURT:
Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?

Q What you do mean when you said that that you can recognize three (3) of them?
A I cannot remember, sir.

A I can remember those persons who sat near me.

Q You cant remember also whether one of these accused was wearing a hat at that time?

Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you?
A I cannot remember, sir.

A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the four accused.
In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was stabbed by the nine
persons. Thus:
Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] person who is [sic] wearing in [sic] red T-
shirt?
COURT:

A I saw his face, sir.

Q Who were involved in stabbing?
A All of them, sir. A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.

Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed? Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab blows with respect to the
other stab blow who delivered this stab blow?
A The 9 persons, sir.
A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.
Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who participated in the stabbing
incident and who were the victims? COURT:

A Me and the driver, sir. Proceed.

PROS. MARATA: ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons, four of whom were inside the Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are you referring to the five (5) other
courtroom? persons as the companions of Gregorio Mejia who participated in stabbing you?

A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed wounds, sir.[66] A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir.[68]

Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the appellants He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab wound, and then
inflicted any of the stab wounds on his body. Further compounding the uncertainty and declined to point to anyone of the herein four appellants as the person who did it. Thus:
unreliability of Catugas testimony, he candidly admitted on cross-examination that only
one person stabbed him. Thus: COURT:

ATTY. TAMINAYA: Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you anymore?

Q How many times were you stabbed by them? A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness showing his scar near the
shoulder.)
A Twice, sir.
Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who stabbed you among these nine
Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your? (9) persons?

A I can identify him, sir. A I could not remember anymore, sir.

Q How many persons stabbed you then? Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this Court whether it was one
among the four (4) accused in this case who stabbed you on your right upper arm?
A Only one (1) person, sir.[67]
A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my shoulder because that is the last
Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the nine stabbed him: stab wound, sir.[69]

COURT: It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from Catugas testimony in
the CASTILLO court that the appellants had inflicted any of the stab wounds on Catugas.
Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?
Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court, Catugas categorically A Yes, sir.
admitted that none of the appellants participated in the stabbing of Landingin. Thus:
COURT:
COURT:
Proceed.
xxx
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo Landingin, can you inform the
Court if the four (4) accused now or these two persons are among the four (4) accused Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that P80,000.00 because they are poor?
now?
A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have agreed of another date for them
A They are not here, sir.[70] to pay, sir.

Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating the COURT:
appellants. He admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of the appellants,
but before they could give the money on the agreed date, he testified against the
Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?
appellants in the LARON court. The following exchanges between him and counsel for the
defense before the CASTILLO court are revealing:
A That is already their counter proposal, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you agreed to pay you P80,000.00
but he cannot pay you at that very moment?
Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able to talk with the father of
Edwin Benito?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is that correct?
Proceed.
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that correct?
Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00?
A I was asking P80,000.00, sir.
COURT:
COURT:
That is the settlement money.
Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
A Because he pleaded to me, sir.
Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you should not have testified in
this case?
Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are settling the case with Edwin
Benito the amount of P80,000.00?
A PROSECUTOR MARATA:
Improper, your honor. A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so much for his hospitalization,
and he said also that they were the persons who were apprehended and so, I will just tell
ATTY. TAMINAYA: a lie for the same because how could I collect for the amount I spent if I will not tell a lie?

As follow-up question, your Honor. COURT:

COURT: Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a liar?

Sustained. Hypothetical. A Yes, sir.

ATTY. TAMINAYA: ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened on the agreed date? Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that expenses?

A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, sir. A I said, then we can at least help you, because he is saying that he suffered several
wounds.
COURT:
Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?
Q When you said you have already testified, you are referring to your testimony in RTC
Branch 44? A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give P20,000.00 each.

A Yes, sir.[71] COURT:

In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the impact of Q How many times did he tell you?
Catugas demand for payment of P80,000 in consideration of his exculpatory testimony. It
wanted to prove that the parents of the appellants were in fact the ones who A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him.[72]
proposed. But the testimony of Conrado Benito, which the prosecution failed to
satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to see him to verify whether their children But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for they could not afford
had indeed committed the crimes; but Catugas replied that since the appellants were the it. Conrado so declared, thus:
ones apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that he could recover what he had
spent. He then demanded P80,000, which he equally apportioned among the parents of
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
the four appellants. Conrado Benito testified as follows:
Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can you tell this court if he made
Q What did you tell him?
mention to the wife of Teofilo Landingin?

A I told him that our children telling us that they did not commit any wrong and I told
A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us that we would not tell the same
them to tell the truth and we are not consenting them to whatever they have done if they
to Mrs. Landingin.
have done something wrong.
Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?
Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?
A No sir, not even a single centavo.
Q Why?

A We cannot pay because even payment for attorneys fees, we cannot afford.[73]

The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the
incident as offer of compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of
guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[74] There is no
evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his parents to approach
Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the
explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred
for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible in
evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule
130.

On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of the
appellants in the commission of the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (for Murder) and
Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of Branch 44 and in Criminal Case
No. 94-00620-D (violation of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City are REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin
Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt
therefor has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt or with moral certainty.Their
immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid
grounds for their further detention exist.

No costs.