CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 1
SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW - MANILA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES
ARTICLE III Bill of Rights
SECTION 14
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND
PUBLIC TRIAL
PEOPLE vs. TEE
A state should not be deprived the opportunity to prosecute
A trial is always subject to reasonable delays or postponements, but
absent any showing that these delays are capricious and oppressive, the
State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prosecute
the criminal action.
Speedy Trial defined
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of
criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, the Court held that where a prosecuting
officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in
this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or
if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
Concept of Speedy Trial is relative
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as
to whether the right has been violated involves the weighing of
several factors such as
(a) the length of the delay,
(b) the reason for the delay,
(c) the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and
(d) the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well
as
(e) the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.
Speedy Trial Act of 1998
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for
criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180) days.
However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number
of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;
or
(3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.
No capricious conduct in the case at bar
In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness
Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing days, there is no showing
whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratiques absences
so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights.
On record, after Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking
of his testimony, the prosecution went to the extent of praying that the
trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance
at trial. The prosecution likewise tried to get the NBI to produce
Abratique as the latter was in the Bureaus custody, but to no avail.
Eventually, the trial court ordered the prosecution to waive its right to
present Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already offered.
No unreasonable delay in the case at bar
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an
unreasonable length of time. Delay of less than two months has been
found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of time.
Motion of reopening of cases
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the
proceedings below. A motion to reopen may properly be presented
only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their
evidence, but before judgment.
FLORES vs. PEOPLE
Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial
The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent
decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, "means one free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, ... ."
Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest
time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a
prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to
the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his
opportunity to present any valid defense.
Remedy
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As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a
non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus
for the final dismissal of the case."
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took
effect, People v. Castañeda, as was pointed out by the ponente, Justice
Laurel:
"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal
obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the
accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from
the custody of the law."
Trail at the earliest opportunity
: "An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity.
... He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for
an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are
deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed."
Also applicable to operation commenced by private person
"The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be
availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and
undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is
prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of
the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced.”

CONDE vs. RIVERA
Remedy of the Accused
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or
if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
MATEO, JR. vs. VILLALUZ
Duty of the judge
It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the
absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the
legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the
application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not
play favorites.
There must be a cold neutrality on the part of the Judge
For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice
Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge."
He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth
of commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to legal
norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in cheek the tug and pull
of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the
rest of his fellow mortals."
A judge then, to quote from the latest decision in point, Geotina v.
Gonzales, penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times
"wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary
due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty
of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity." Nor is this to imply that prior to
Gutierrez, there had been no awareness of the due process aspect of an
impartial tribunal even if not explicitly referred to.
Fundamental requisite of impartiality for due process
Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the
fundamental requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied,
the Rules of Court provision on disqualification when revised three
years later in 1964 contains this additional paragraph:
"A judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above."
Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of
(a) pecuniary interest,
(b) relationship or
(c) previous participation in the matter that calls for
adjudication,
(d) there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the
trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 2
Better course of the judge to disqualify himself
That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to
preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore,
that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist,
the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself.
That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity
and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of
an impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
Thus is due process vindicated. There is relevance to what was said by
Justice Sanchez in Pimentel v. Salanga, drawing "attention of all
judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to
try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way
of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with
bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct
a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that: the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A
salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party
might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on
the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether
remote.
He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore,
exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or
withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could
in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another
judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to
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others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to
sit may depend to a great extent the all important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary.
If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in
a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his
action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the
law who forestalls miscarriage of justice
Greater deference in the due process requirement of impartiality
"All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of the cold
neutrality of an independent, wholly free, disinterested and impartial
tribunal. It has been said that "next in importance to the duty of
rendering a right judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will
beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge."
Judges must avoid tasks incumbent upon executive officials
To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges
are well-advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to
leave to others the role of notarizing declarations. The less an occupant
of the bench fritters away his time and energy in tasks more incumbent
on officials of the executive branch the less the danger of his being a
participant in any event that might lend itself to the interpretation that
his impartiality has been compromised. There is much to be said for
displaying zeal and eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role
is hardly fit for a judge who must bide his time until the case is before
him. He must ever be on guard lest what is done by him, even from the
best of motives, may be thought of as eroding that objectivity and
sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial conduct. Thus should he
attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his.

GARCIA vs. DOMINGO
Trial should be public
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later
Justice, Jose P. Laurel:
"Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of
conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner."
Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the
United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver:
"This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an
accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage. He then
observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely
evolved long before the settlement of the [United States] as an
accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial."
What does public trial signify
Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where
language is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in
the words employed. The trial must be public.
It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the
litigants is of no moment.
No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies
behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with
regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.
It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the
importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to
arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed
embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is
quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be
heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of events that
individuals desirous of being present are free to do so.
Exception
There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as
"offensive to decency or public morals."
Courtrooms
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than
others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re
Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being
public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel
present, no matter with what offense he may be charged."
PEOPLE vs. TEEHANKEE, JR.
Right to a fair trial is not incompatible with Free Press
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.
To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a
fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been
regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 3
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused
to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-
to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired
his impartiality.
For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench
from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as
they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms.
These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and
fictions of life.
Idea of a fair and impartial judge
For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a
hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the
jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest
they lose their impartiality.
Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit
and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed:
"When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity
swears that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with
him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is
worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men
of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?"
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.
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Test of Actual Prejudice
we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity.
In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media
coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a
fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
IN RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO AND TV COVERAGE OF
THE TRIAL IN SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH ESTRADA
Reasons for televised recording
1. the hearings are of historic significance. They are an
affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is
under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex
non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
2. the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to know how their
government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by
audio-visual presentation.
3. audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and
civic training of the people.

Purpose of the audio-visual records
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings
for documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving
the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite
do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will
be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the
proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or
becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE
OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.
Putts Law
Putts Law states that technology is dominated by two types of
people:
1. those who understand what they do not manage, and
2. those who manage what they do not understand.
Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don
the experts gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all
serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside the
courtroom.
Win-win situation
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that
shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice,
sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the
integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance
with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable
solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while,
at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in
the two previous cases.
Basic principles enunciated
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─
[a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance
to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment
[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to
it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our
judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation that [m]assive
intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can
so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and
decorum stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due
process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and
considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less
distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and
limited to
(a) shots of the courtroom,
(b) the judicial officers,
(c) the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings.
No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial
proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to
prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 4
last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to
PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings.
Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
restricted as above indicated.
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the
question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in
a criminal case. It held that
[t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press
and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a
fair and impartial trial. The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and
scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any
person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety
nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly
addressed, is a price too high to pay.
Doctrine from Estrada
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by
Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when
it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary
purposes, under the following conditions:
(a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should
not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure;
(b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
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courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings;
(c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except
such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them;
(d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the
cases against the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of
violations of the prohibition;
(e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated
by it; and
(f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual
recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.

Totality of Circumstances Test
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the
impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial
must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v.
Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto,
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of
the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere
fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice
resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Remedy of the Accused
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies.
1. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment
arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional
right.
2. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early
on move for a change of venue,
3. for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated,
4. for disqualification of the judge, and
5. for closure of portions of the trial when necessary.
6. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt
and issue gag orders.
Right on Public Trial
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to
him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance.
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secrete conclaves of long ago.
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the
trial process.
In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities
for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not
too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then
be totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings.
Guidelines
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre
cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for
transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of
application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the
audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have
the necessary technological equipment and technical plan
to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will
faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and
cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of
judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity
shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application
duly approved by the trial court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 5
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single
wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No
panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly
highlighting or downplaying incidents in the
proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall
be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official
or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment
should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light
rays. Signal lights or signs showing the equipment is
operating should not be visible. A limited number of
microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not
wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places
indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court
Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical
set-up of the camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the
courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such
a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured
in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings
and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the
camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account
of the media entities, which should employ technology that can
i. avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the
courtroom,
ii. minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of
technicians, and
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iii. preclude undue commotion in case of technical
glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the
media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual
recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside
the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform
from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images
and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time
audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day
must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon
motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in
instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved
identification issues or there are issues which involve the
security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony
(e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material,
minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the
pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or
both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the
proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall
be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except
during the period of recess called by the trial court and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II NOTES & DOCTRINES 6

during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is
ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from
the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast
without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them
at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall
observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt
power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be
allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief
footages and still images derived from or cartographic
sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule
and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
PEOPLE vs. VALERIANO
Trial in absentia
. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits
trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned provided he has
been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for
his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in
absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation
may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket
with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice
requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served through his
bondsmen or warden and counsel.

(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in

the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.

(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made

under the supervision and control of the trial court which
may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency
requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant
of application by the media entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall

forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate
arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative
matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live

JAMES BRYAN SUAREZ DEANG © 2017 (09265563619/jbsdeang.jbd@gmail.com)

broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance
with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee
shall also report and recommend on the feasibility,
availability and affordability of the latest technology that
would meet the herein requirements.It may conduct
consultations with resource persons and experts in the field
of information and communication technology.

(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the

proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording
devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable
number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be
observed in addition to these guidelines.

PEOPLE vs. MAPALAO

Fair Trial
The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a provision as
there were quite a number of reported instances where the proceedings
against a defendant had to be stayed indefinitely because of his non-
appearance. What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not
continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved.
With the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence
cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That
is the way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that came should not go unpunished.