expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term
HONORABLE DOMINGO IMPERIAL and HONORABLE of six years of Commissioner Enage. RODRIGO D. PEREZ, Respondents. The Solicitor General concludes that the respondents G.R. No. L-8684 March 31, 1955 Commissioners Imperial and Perez have ceased to Topic: Staggering of terms have any legal or valid title to the positions of Chairman and Member, respectively, of the Facts: According to the Solicitor General, the first Commission on Elections, and that therefore, their commissioners of Elections were duly appointed and positions should be declared vacant. qualified on July 12, 1945, with the following terms of office: Issue: Whether or not the terms respondents Imperial and Perez have expired. Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on July 12, 1954. Ruling: The legal terms of office of the respondents Perez and Imperial have not as yet expired. Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on July 12, 1951. Section 1, paragraph 1, of Article X of the Constitution reads as follows: Hon. Vicente Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July 12, 1948; SEC. 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Chairman Vito died in May 1947 and Member Elections composed of a Chairman Vicente de Vera was promoted Chairman to serve and two other Members to be until July 12, 1954, when the original term of Vito appointed by the President with will expire (this is in accordance with the ruling of the consent of the Commission on the Court in Nacionalista Party vs. Vera and Appointments, who shall hold Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista that office for a term of nine years and successors should only serve for the remaining may not be reappointed. Of the unexpired term of his predecessor). Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for Chairman Vera then died in August, 1951, before the nine years, another for six years, expiration of the maximum term of nine years (on and the third for three years. The July 12, 1954) of Vito. Respondent Imperial was Chairman and the other Members appointed Chairman to succeed Vera "for a term of the Commission on Elections expiring July 12, 1960". The Solicitor General argues may be removed from office only that the term for which Imperial could legally serve by impeachment in the manner as Chairman legally expired on July 12, 1954, that is, provided in this Constitution. the expiration of the nine-year term for which the first Chairman, Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, was The provision that of the first three commissioners appointed. appointed, "one shall hold office for 9 years, another for 6 years, and the third for 3 years," when taken The respondent Perez on the other hand was together with the prescribed term of office for 9 appointed Member of the Commission on December years, without reappointment, evidences a 8, 1949, for "a term of nine years expiring on deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in November 24, 1958", when Enage retired on the membership of the commission, by having November, 1949. The Solicitor General also argues subsequent members appointable only once every that the term of office of respondent Perez legally three years. The operation of the rotational plan requires two was named for a full nine-year term. However, on conditions: (1) that the terms of the first three the principles heretofore laid, the nine-year term of commissioners should start on a common date; and Commissioner Perez should be held to have started (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or in June 21, 1947, to expire on June 20, 1956. disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the The second vacancy happened upon the death of term. Chairman Vito on May 1947. Commissioner Vicente de Vera was appointed to succeed Vito. Such The fact that such appointments would make the appointment could legally be only for the unexpired appointees serve for less than 9 years in case of period of the Lopez Vito's term, up to June 20, 1950. death or resignation does not mean that the nine- year term can be lifted out of context and To fill the vacancy created by Vera's assumption of independently of the provision limiting the terms of the Chairmanship, Commissioner Leopoldo Rovira the terms of the first commissioners to nine, six and was appointed on May 1947. Pursuant to the three years. In filling the vacancy, only the tenure of principles laid down, Rovira could only fill out the the successor is shortened, but not the term of balance of Vera's term, until June 20, 1953. office. Commissioner Vera's tenure as Chairman expired, as The court then ruled that the terms of the we have stated, on June 20, 1950, the end of Lopez commissioners should begin on the organization of Vito's original term. A vacancy, therefore, occurred the Commission on Elections under Commonwealth on that date that Vera could no longer fill, since his Act 657, on June 21, 1941, since said act reappointment was expressly prohibited by the implemented and completed the organization of the Constitution. The next Chairman was respondent Commission that under the Constitution "shall be" Commissioner Domingo Imperial, whose term of established. nine years must be deemed to have begun on June 21, 1950, to expire on June 20, 1959. Therefore: The vacancy created by the legal expiration of Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, nine- Rovira's term on June 20, 1953 is unfilled up to the year term, from June 21, 1941 to June 20, promulgation of the decision of the case (1955). The 1950. time elapsed is counted against his successor, whose legal term is for nine years, from June 21, 1953 to Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, six year June 20, 1962. term, from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1947.
The first 3 year term, from June 21, 1941
to June 20, 1944, was not filled.
Thereafter, since the first three-year term had
already expired, the appointment (made on July 12, 1945) of the Honorable Vicente de Vera must be deemed for the full term of nine years, from June 21, 1944, to June 20, 1953.
The first vacancy occurred by expiration of the initial
6-year term of Commissioner Enage on June 21, 1947 (although he served as de facto Commissioner until 1949). His successor, respondent Rodrigo Perez, GAMINDE vs. COA the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her. G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000
Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the
Facts: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the CSC Commissioner, as appointed by President Fidel President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed she served as de-facto officer in good faith until office on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The February 2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman Commission on Appointments (COA) and the and members of the Civil Service Commission is Congress of the Philippines confirmed the prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX- appointment on September 7, 1993. Gaminde, on D, Section 1 (2): February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for clarification on the expiry date of her term of “The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be office. In response to her request, the Chief appointed by the President withthe consent of the Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term Commission on Appointments for a term of seven office will expire on February 2, 2000 instead of years without reappointment. Of those first February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999. seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon another Commissioner for three years, without Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the no case shall any Member be appointed expiration of their appointments on February 2, or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” 1999. The General Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 2, salary and other emoluments. Gaminde and her co- 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and the constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March other emoluments for actual service rendered. 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co- terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed, CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012 held that the issue of Gaminde’s office term may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date of FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of bereft of power to recognize an extension of her the COA. term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, Office of the President. Gaminde moved for 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA reconsideration, but was denied by COA. Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Commission on Appointments confirmed his Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, Commission, to which she was appointed on June as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. ISSUES: Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, case to court insists that his appointment as COA Chairman b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to sitting in that body and after having served for four lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts appointed to that position. tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, HELD:
via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his transcendental importance, since it obviously has intention to step down from office upon the “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to appointment of his replacement. True to his word, promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and Villar vacated his position when President Benigno the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development institute the instant petition. has rendered this petition and the main issue In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the tendered therein moot and academic. bare minimum norm before the so-called “non- traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly: Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal the requirements for review of a moot and academic disbursement of public funds or that the tax case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the measure is unconstitutional; mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious Arroyo namely: interest in the validity of the election law in question c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; importance which must be settled early; and b. The case involves a situation of exceptional d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the character and is of paramount public interest; official action complained of infringes their c. The constitutional issue raised requires the prerogatives as legislators. formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading On the substantive issue: review. Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides The procedural aspect comes down to the question that: of whether or not the following requisites for the (2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain be appointed by the President with the consent of in this petition, viz: the Commission on Appointments for a term of a. There must be an actual case or justiciable seven years without reappointment. Of those first controversy before the court appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven b. The question before it must be ripe for years, one commissioner for five years, and the adjudication; other commissioner for three years, without c. The person challenging the act must be a proper reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be party; and only for the unexpired portion of the term of the d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the predecessor. In no case shall any member be earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota appointed or designated in a temporary or acting of the case capacity. Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional reappointment of any kind within the commission, appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, the point being that a second appointment, be it for provided it is made under the aforestated the same position (commissioner to another position circumstances or conditions. of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio. The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. term––from February 2008 to February 2015––given The flaw lies in regarding the word “reappointment” his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner as, in context, embracing any and all species of devalues all the past pronouncements made by this appointment. The rule is that if a statute or Court. While there had been divergence of opinion constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case applied without attempted interpretation. can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a 7-year service limitation and would be term of seven years, and if he has served the full constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to term, then he can no longer be reappointed or the spirit of the rotational system of succession. extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could barred from being reappointed. In short, once the not have had, under any circumstance, validly Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year term of seven years, then he can no longer be appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not reappointed to either the position of Chairman or legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term to prevent the president from “dominating” the as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional comply with said rule would also be invalid as the or two more commissioners. corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of not prohibit a promotional appointment from office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a commissioner has not served the full term of seven period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. as chairman when such position became vacant as a 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee promotional appointment to the position of will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the under the constitutional ban. staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), he will be appointed to the position of Chairman Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz: must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). 1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of Modesto Agyao vs. CSCGR No. 182591January 18, commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of 2011FACTS: seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is Petitioner was re-appointed, following the expiration void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority of his previous temporary appointment, to cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) PEZADirector II by the PEZA Director-General de years in case of the expiration of the term as this will Lima. The appointment was submitted to the Civil result in the distortion of the rotational system ServiceCommission. The re-appointment was prescribed by the Constitution. invalidated by the CSC as petitioner lacked the prescribed CareerExecutive Service Office/Career Service Executive Examination (CESO/CSEE) 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain qualifications. The CSC ruledthat the position of causes (death, resignation, disability or PEZA Director II is above the Division Chief level, impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired which falls properly under level 3, orCareer portion of the term of the predecessor, but such Executive Service. Petitioner appealed to the Court appointments cannot be less than the unexpired of Appeals, which sustained the ruling of theCSC. portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of ISSUE: terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). Whether or not PEZA Director II falls under level 3 or Career Executive Service, of the AdministrativeCode. 3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC HELD: or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven Petition is impressed with merit.It has been held in a years and who served the entire period, are barred long line of Jurisprudence that for a position to fall from reappointment to any position in the under Career Executive Service,the appointing Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the authority must be the President of the Philippines. Commission under the Constitution are also covered The Administrative code makes thisclassification by the prohibition against reappointment. based on the Constitutional powers granted to the President. As such, any deviation ofinterpretation would not only be against the prevailing law (i.e. 4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Administrative Code), but also beunconstitutional. Commission for less than seven years is eligible for The position of PEZA Director II is appointed by the an appointment to the position of Chairman for the PEZA Director-General, not by thePresident of the unexpired portion of the term of the departing Philippines. Hence, the CESO/CSEE requirements are chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the not needed by the appointee. ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and DIMAANDAL V COA the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further Petitioner: Dimaandal that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by Respondent: COA impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means Ponente: Martinez a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to FACTS: Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or Dimaandal office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute Held position as Supply Officer III in a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict Batangas legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Designated Acting Assistant Provincial Constitution. Treasurer by Batangas Governor Mayo in 1993. Dimaandal filed a claim for the difference in 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be salary and Representation and Transportation appointed or designated in a temporary or acting Allowance (RATA) for the whole year of 1993. capacity. Provincial Auditor disallowed the claim. On appeal to COA, COA also disallowed the claim. a provincial office. Power resides with President Ratio: or Sec of Finance. (1) Dimaandal was merely designated, thus he Dimaandal’s designation is defective. Thus, it was not entitled to receive additional confers no right. No ground for violation of salary. constitutional right, nor impairment of the (2) The governor was not the “duly competent obligation of contracts. authority” who can designate him to such position under Sec 471 of LGC (note: in 1994 he was eventually appointed by Sec of (2) Mere designation, not appointment. Finance). Difference between designation and appointment: ISSUE: WON an Dimaandal is entitled to the Appointment: selection by the proper the difference between the regular position and higher selection by the proper authority of an position to which he was designated. individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office HELD: NO. Designation: merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by RATIO: law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment; Arguments of Dimaandal: simply the mere imposition of new or Jurisprudence laid down the rule that de additional duties on the officer or employee facto officers are entitled to salary for to be performed by him in a special manner; services actually rendered. it does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary (1) Defective Designation attached to the position. As such, there being no appointment issued, designation Law provides: does not entitle the officer designated to LGC Section 471: Assistant Treasurers. - receive the salary of the position. For the (a) An assistant treasurer may be legal basis of an employee’s right to claim appointed by the Secretary of Finance from the salary attached thereto is a duly issued a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible and approved appointment to the position. recommendees of the governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. (3) He cannot be considered a de facto officer. Section 2077 of the Revised Administrative Code: In case of the temporary absence or De Facto Officer: one who derives his disability of a provincial officer or in case of appointment from one having colorable a vacancy in a provincial office, the authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive President of the Philippines or officer having office, and whose appointment is valid on its the power to fill such position may, in his face; one who is in possession of an office, and is discretion, order the payment of discharging its duties under color of authority, by compensation, or additional compensation, which is meant authority derived from an to any Government officer or employee appointment, however irregular or informal, so designated or appointed temporarily to fill that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer; one the place, but the total compensation paid who is in possession of an office in the open shall not exceed the salary authorized by exercise of its functions under color of an law for the position filled. election or an appointment, even though such Law does not authorize Provincial Governor to election or appointment may be irregular. appoint, nor even designate one temporarily in Precedents are inapplicable. cases of temporary absence/disability/vacancy in Menzon v. Petilla: In Menzon, what was extended was an appointment to the vacant position of Vice-Governor, in petitioner’s case, he was designated. The appointment of Menzon had the color of validity. Cui v. Ortiz: “Petitioners’ appointments on December 1 and 12, 1955 by the then mayor of the municipality were legal and in order, the appointing mayor still in possession of his right to appoint. For such appointments to be complete, the approval of the President of the Philippines is required. The law provides that pending approval of said appointment by the President, the appointee may assume office and receive salary for services actually rendered. Accordingly, therefore, in that duration until the appointment is finally acted upon favorably or unfavorably, the appointees may be considered as ‘de facto’ officers and entitled to salaries for services actually rendered.”
Lastly, the 1999 appointment by Sec of Finance
does not confirm the claim of petitioner that his appointment is retroactive.