E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find
ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together
with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general
damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed
in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely
disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in
his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur;
(b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true
that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in
rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are
as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff,
riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles
an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance,
upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after
passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue,
as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned
suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle
or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that,
according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he
was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in
the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his
head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that
the grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of
the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation,
his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little
hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the
fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded
as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of
the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby
noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and
a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the
functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf,
had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter
weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult
mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for
mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's
mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that
after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical
condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the
agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the
accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could
not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work
because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could
no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to
reach the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his
work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed
with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making
mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his
mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction
of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the
effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance
of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent
injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during
nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the
first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court,
however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the
plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated
for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only
two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was
spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We,
therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without
any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent
or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the
Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to
appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine
Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on
March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it
possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr.
E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that
said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between
his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial
on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said
Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former,
then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of
the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously
recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one
against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the
terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision,
. . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination.
The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have
"decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur,
who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed
the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision.
Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that
amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the
Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the
decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose
and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed
by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by
legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story,
"does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in
endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive
of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U.
S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How.,
527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the
negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by
the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries;
to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial
classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state,
being objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing
upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or
agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by
reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers
by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter
vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104
Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs.
Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state
where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated
in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16,
1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town
of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or
courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose
of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with
the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and agents, relative
to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the
State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan
Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of
the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of
Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted
liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit
now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to
see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the
state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for
the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere
in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the
disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law,
or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act
opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence
of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change
the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the
part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere
inference, but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co.
vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied
upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for
negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of examiners,
are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to
bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of
competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The
rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except as herein
otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases,
arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did
not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none
existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such
liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted.
(Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs.
State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court
"jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in
equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing
this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass.,
28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the
state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an
intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing
liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had,
by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages for
injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made
liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by
force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now
examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent
acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the
Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions
of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes
to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same
Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused
the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions
of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the
contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private
persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state,
therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise
except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of
acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations
which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof.
No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who
by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is
made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause
the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an
identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and
superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that
in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or
negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof,
however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903,
responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned
in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to
answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the
mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of
an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it
acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in
this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of
objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general
principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is
occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or
negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the
name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of
its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not
applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the
petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in
proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by
the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he
is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
 concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May
18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904,
in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose
which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or
technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner
laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in
not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of
damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ.,
146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra,
and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself
legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called
upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with
the courts.
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner
of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and
unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for
about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop.
As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps,
he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his
eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As
blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his
assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to
the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which
he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid,
Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg
and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These
injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections
administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a
private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended
— for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial
court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a
businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held
responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine
Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing
Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with
several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of
Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal.
As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his
customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about
P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was
subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends.
During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety
for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages:
the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2)
of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to
prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila,
received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of
P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same
was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron cover of the same
catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was
replaced the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never
received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in question was not
covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of
the said office, which is charged with the duty of installation, repair and care
of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received from
whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately
attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the
catchbasin with steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business
then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office
of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said
iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing
them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the
side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city
from time to time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered
the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the defendants and
dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was
sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this
appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other
city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter,
because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City
of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think,
correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned,
Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation;
but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4
of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City
of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure
of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the
other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription
making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the
death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers
to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a
road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact
not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint,
as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective
condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In
its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and
regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and
zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed
upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos
Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway
was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact,
which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the
first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the
appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong
to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control
or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers:
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out,
construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places;
to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . .
. to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the
openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the
building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and
under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to
provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate
traffic and sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the
abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners thereof;
to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of
bridges, viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying,
hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the
streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the
speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles, cars, and
locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all
vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location,
grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower
its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable
protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and repair
ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the
natural drainage of the streets and adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No.
917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the City
relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds
and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the
construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries, and
Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic
Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway
funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance and
improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District
Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in
annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under
the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty
of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were
decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the
findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the City of Manila. It is so ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner, vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and
ROSALITA CARDAÑA, Respondents.
Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision1 dated October 18,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaring petitioner
liable for negligence that resulted in the death of Jasmin Cardaña, a school
child aged 12, enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque Elementary School, where
petitioner is the principal. Likewise assailed is the Resolution2 dated March 20,
2003 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence
of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimito tree located
within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus,
her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaña - filed a case for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15,
1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the possible
danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the
tree that stood near the principal’s office. The Cardañas averred that
petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their
daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only
offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and
rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had
brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on
December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
In a Decision3 dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint
for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the
petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The
appellate court found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmin’s death,
as follows:
Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Appellee
Joaquinita Capili is hereby declared liable for negligence resulting to the death
of Jasmin D. Cardaña. She is hereby ordered to indemnify appellants, parents
of Jasmin, the following amounts:
1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaña P50,000.00;
2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;
3. For moral damages 50,000.00;
4. For attorney’s fees and litigation 10,000.00.
expenses
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now comes
before us submitting the following issues for our resolution:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS-À-VIS THE SET
OF FACTS STATED IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED IN
FINDING THE PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN
ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO THE
RESPONDENTS; AND
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.5
On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue:
Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Twelfth
Division, in CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002 …
should be affirmed and respected, thus remain undisturbed.6
Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death
of Jasmin Cardaña.
Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree
since she had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaña, to see to its disposal; that
despite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe any
indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15 teachers inform
her that the tree was already rotten;7 and that moral damages should not be
granted against her since there was no fraud nor bad faith on her part.
On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was
dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and caution which
an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.
To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or not is
a question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition for review, and
when this determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes
conclusive and binding on this Court.8 However, there is an exception, that is,
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of
the lower court.9 In our view, the exception finds application in the present
case.
The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no
knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios merely
informed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that
petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
require and that there was an absence of evidence that would require her to
use a higher standard of care more than that required by the attendant
circumstances.10 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner
should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no
matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed
and not merely delegated the task to Palaña. The appellate court ruled that
the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that should have been removed soon
after petitioner had chanced upon it.11
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a
lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving
an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other,
a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from
which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar
circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to
cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.12
The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm
someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal,
petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and
safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was
unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the
death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to
prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.13
The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the
dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree was
indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of
the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the
person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.14
The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or
inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which
caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s
negligence, being in charge of the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court held:
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference
or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks
for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as
to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and
that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course
of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used
proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose
from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s
negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the
doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all
requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or
inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care
or innocence, may outweigh the inference.16
Was petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed
immediately sufficient to exculpate her?
As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the
school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises.
That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation
on her part as to why she failed to be vigilant.
Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree
because Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its
condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was an
imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see the immediate
danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other
teachers conducted ground inspections. She further argues that, even if she
should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty by assigning
the disposition of the tree to another teacher.
We find petitioner’s explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner is
expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises.1âwphi1 The fact that
she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree
shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.
Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another
teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee.17 The record shows that
more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her
assistant Palaña on December 15, 1992, to the time the incident occurred on
February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed
by the rotting tree had been removed. Thus, we cannot accept her defense of
lack of negligence.
Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages are
awarded if the following elements exist in the case: (1) an injury clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established;
(3) a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on
any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.18 However, the person
claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough
that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety
as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably, such action must
be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.19 Under the
circumstances, we have to concede that petitioner was not motivated by bad
faith or ill motive vis-à-vis respondents’ daughter’s death. The award of moral
damages is therefore not proper.
In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court of
Appeals of ₱50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin,20 and ₱15,010 as
reimbursement of her burial expenses.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2002
and the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the award of
moral damages is hereby deleted.
JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents.
On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai
Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,[1] two parcels of land located at
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent
Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat.
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered
into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over
three parcels of land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning
1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up
commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The
rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private
respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In
1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial
buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to
the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator
advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new
owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus
filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of
Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold
rights over it.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of
Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire
need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied
interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease
contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject
lots.
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty.
Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract
between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties indeed
renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty.
Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal but these were all
unsigned. To refute the existence of a lease contract, petitioner presented in
court a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no
record of any lease contract notarized by Atty. Fajardo had been entered into
their files. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease contract
when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the
tenants of the building.
Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner
filed his counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and moral
damages.
On July 29, 1986, the court a quo found for private respondent (plaintiff below):
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff:
1. Declaring the Contract of Lease executed by Bai Tonina Sepi
Mangelen Guiabar in favor of the plaintiff on November 6, 1974 (Exh. A
and A-1) over Lot No. 6395, Pls-73. Lot No 6396. Pls.-73. Lot No. 6399.
3ls-73, and Lot no.9777-A. CSD-11-000076-D (Lot No. 3-A. 40124), all
situated along Ledesma St., Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, which document
was notarized by Atty. Benjamin S. Fajardo, Sr. and entered into his
notarial register as Doc. No. 619. Page No. 24. Book No. II. Series of
1974, to be authentic and genuine and as such valid and binding for a
period of ten (10) years specified thereon from November 1, 1974 up to
October 31, 1984;
2. Declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner of the commercial buildings
found on the aforesaid lots and he is entitled to their possession and the
collection (of rentals) of the said commercial buildings within the period
covered by this Contract of Lease in his favor;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the following:
a) Rentals of the commercial buildings on the lots covered by the
Contract of Lease in favor of the plaintiff for the period from October
1, 1978 up to October 31, 1984, including accrued interests in the
total amount of Five Hundred Six Thousand Eight Hundred Five
Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos (P506, 850.56), the same to continue
to bear interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum until the whole
amount is fully paid by the defendant to the plaintiff;
b) Moral damages in the amount of One Million Sixty Two Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P1,062,500.00);
c) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Three Hundred
Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P312, 500.00);
d) Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of One Hundred
Eighty Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P187,500.00)
e) Temperate or moderate damages in the amount of Sixty Two
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00);
f) Nominal damages in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00);
g) Attorneys fees in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00);
h) Expenses of litigation in the amount of Sixty Two Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P62,500.00);
i) Interest on the moral damages, actual or compensatory damages
temperate or moderate damages, nominal damages, attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation in the amounts as specified hereinabove
from May 24, 1982 up to June 27, 1986, in the total amount of Nine
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P900,000.00); all of which will continue
to bear interests at a legal rate of 12% per annum until the whole
amounts are fully paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs;
4. For failure of the defendant to deposit with this Court all the rentals
he had collected from the thirteen (13) tenants or occupants of the
commercial buildings in question, the plaintiff is hereby restored to
the possession of his commercial buildings for a period of seventy-
three (73) months which is the equivalent of the total period for which
he was prevented from collecting the rentals from the tenants or
occupants of his commercial buildings from October 1, 1978 up to
October 31, 1984, and for this purpose a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is hereby issued, but the plaintiff is likewise ordered to pay
to the defendant the monthly rental of Seven Hundred Pesos
(P700.00) every end of the month for the entire period of seventy
three (73) months. This portion of the judgment should be
considered as a mere alternative should the defendant fail to pay
the amount of Five Hundred Five Pesos and Fifty Six Centavos
(P506,805.56) hereinabove specified;
5. Dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendant for lack of merit;
6. With costs against the defendant.[2]
Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.[3] In a decision
dated January 31, 1995,[4] the appellate court modified the assailed judgment
of the trial court as follows:
a) The award for moral damages, compensatory damages, exemplary
damages, temperate or moderate damages, and nominal damages as well
as expenses of litigation in the amount of P62,500.00 and interests under
paragraph 3-a(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) are deleted;
b) The award for attorneys fees is reduced to P30,000.00;
c) Paragraphs 1,2,5 and 6 are AFFIRMED;
d) Additionally, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff by
way of actual damages the sum of P178,425.00 representing the amount of
rentals he collected from the period of October 1978 to August 1983, and
minus the amount of P42,700.00 representing rentals due the defendant
computed at P700.00 per month for the period from August 1978 to August
1983, with interest thereon at the rate until the same is fully paid;
e) Paragraph 4 is deleted.[5]
Before the appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any lease
contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and private respondent. On the
other hand, private respondent insisted that it was impossible for petitioner not
to know about the contract since the latter was aware that he was collecting
rentals from the tenants of the building. While the appellate court disbelieved
the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held that, for petitioner to
become liable for damages, he must have known of the lease contract and
must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject
parcels of land.
Via this petition for review, petitioner cites the following reasons why the Court
should rule in his favor:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that petitioner is
liable for interference of contractual relation under Article 1314 of the New Civil
Code;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that private respondent
is precluded from recovering, if at all, because of laches;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable for actual
damages and attorneys fees, and;
4. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners
counterclaims.[6]
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as
interference with contractual relations.[7] The interference is penalized
because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the
benefits that should result therefrom.[8]
The core issue here is whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject
property, during the supposed existence of private respondents lease contract
with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
petitioner should be held liable for damages.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals,[9] laid down the
elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a
valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence
of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification
or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the premises which
the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without
the knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation, prevented
from using the premises for its business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous
interference.
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly
established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized
copy of the purported lease renewal.[10] While the contract appeared as duly
notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and
delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the
rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after the trial court declared it to be
valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in
court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late
Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that
until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized
document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to
its execution and delivery.[11]
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on
the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence
of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous
interference.[12] A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for
interfering with a contract he is unaware of.[13] While it is not necessary to
prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if
followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the
contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.[14]
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract.
His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him
of any existing lease contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner
meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and
unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man
probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An
examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold
interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of
the same.[15]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such
knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in
So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal
justification or excuse for his action[16] or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant
must have acted with malice[17] or must have been driven by purely impious
reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be
justified.[18]
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent
that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him.
The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose
one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.[19] The records show
that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property
was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing
to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any
evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent
was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the
fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous
interference was never established.
In So Ping Bun, the Court discussed whether interference can be justified at
all if the interferer acts for the sole purpose of furthering a personal financial
interest, but without malice or bad faith. As the Court explained it:
x x x, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations
of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such
justification does not exist where the actors motive is to cause harm to the
other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the
interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and
that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived,
for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones
financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of the others. It is sufficient if
the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives.[20]
The foregoing disquisition applies squarely to the case at bar. In our view,
petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of
his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by
improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy,[21] the Court
declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled
by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation
will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages
as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable
for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for
private respondents losses.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is
the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which
results from the injury.[22] In BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,,[23] the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder
whose credit card had been cancelled by petitioner corporation after several
defaults in payment. We held there that there can be damage without injury
where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In that
instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to legal injury or wrong.[24] Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct
complained of precludes recovery of damages.[25]
With respect to the attorneys fees awarded by the appellate court to private
respondent, we rule that it cannot be recovered under the circumstances.
According to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be awarded
only when it has been stipulated upon or under the instances provided
therein.[26] Likewise, being in the concept of actual damages, the award for
attorneys fees must have clear, factual and legal bases[27] which, in this case,
do not exist.
Regarding the dismissal of petitioners counterclaim for actual and moral
damages, the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the trial court
because it found no basis to grant the amount of damages prayed for by
petitioner. We find no reason to reverse the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty.[28] Petitioner was unable to prove that he suffered loss or injury,
hence, his claim for actual damages must fail. Moreover, petitioners prayer for
moral damages was not warranted as moral damages should result from the
wrongful act of a person. The worries and anxieties suffered by a party hailed
to court litigation are not compensable.[29]
With the foregoing discussion, we no longer deem it necessary to delve into
the issue of laches.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
C. S. GILCHRIST, plaintiff-appellee, vs. E. A. CUDDY, ET AL., defendants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA, appellants.
An appeal by the defendants, Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano
Zaldarriaga, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, dismissing
their cross-complaint upon the merits for damages against the plaintiff for the
alleged wrongful issuance of a mandatory and a preliminary injunction.
Upon the application of the appellee an ex parte mandatory injunction was
issued on the 22d of May, 1913, directing the defendant, E. A. Cuddy, to send
to the appellee a certain cinematograph film called "Zigomar" in compliance
with an alleged contract which had been entered into between these two
parties, and at the time an ex parte preliminary injunction was issued
restraining the appellants from receiving and exhibiting in their theater the
Zigomar until further orders of the court. On the 26th of that month the
appellants appeared and moved the court to dissolve the preliminary
injunction. When the case was called for trial on August 6, the appellee moved
for the dismissal of the complaint "for the reason that there is no further
necessity for the maintenance of the injunction." The motion was granted
without objection as to Cuddy and denied as to the appellants in order to give
them an opportunity to prove that the injunction were wrongfully issued and
the amount of damages suffered by reason thereof.
The pertinent part of the trial court's findings of fact in this case is as follows:
It appears in this case that Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar and
that on the 24th of April he rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125,
and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May, the week beginning that day.
A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he
had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had made other
arrangements with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these
defendants Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the injunction
was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for the week
beginning the 26th of May.
It appears from the testimony in this case, conclusively, that Cuddy willfully
violated his contract, he being the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist
because the defendants had offered him more for the same period. Mr.
Espejo at the trial on the permanent injunction on the 26th of May admitted
that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He was trying to get it
through his agents Pathe Brothers in Manila. He is the agent of the same
concern in Iloilo. There is in evidence in this case on the trial today as well
as on the 26th of May, letters showing that the Pathe Brothers in Manila
advised this man on two different occasions not to contend for this film
Zigomar because the rental price was prohibitive and assured him also that
he could not get the film for about six weeks. The last of these letters was
written on the 26th of April, which showed conclusively that he knew they
had to get this film from Cuddy and from this letter that the agent in Manila
could not get it, but he made Cuddy an offer himself and Cuddy accepted it
because he was paying about three times as much as he had contracted
with Gilchrist for. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the defendants failed
signally to show the injunction against the defendant was wrongfully
procured.
The appellants duly excepted to the order of the court denying their motion for
new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision
rendered. There is lacking from the record before us the deposition of the
defendant Cuddy, which apparently throws light upon a contract entered into
between him and the plaintiff Gilchrist. The contents of this deposition are
discussed at length in the brief of the appellants and an endeavor is made to
show that no such contract was entered into. The trial court, which had this
deposition before it, found that there was a contract between Cuddy and
Gilchrist. Not having the deposition in question before us, it is impossible to
say how strongly it militates against this findings of fact. By a series of
decisions we have construed section 143 and 497 (2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure to require the production of all the evidence in this court. This is the
duty of the appellant and, upon his failure to perform it, we decline to proceed
with a review of the evidence. In such cases we rely entirely upon the
pleadings and the findings of fact of the trial court and examine only such
assigned errors as raise questions of law. (Ferrer vs. Neri Abejuela, 9 Phil.
Rep., 324; Valle vs. Galera, 10 Phil. Rep., 619; Salvacion vs. Salvacion, 13
Phil. Rep., 366; Breta vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 15 Phil. Rep., 446; Arroyo vs. Yulo,
18 Phil. Rep., 236; Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., 19 Phil. Rep.,
102; Blum vs. Barretto, 19 Phil. Rep., 161; Cuyugan vs. Aguas, 19 Phil. Rep.,
379; Mapa vs. Chaves, 20 Phil. Rep., 147; Mans vs. Garry, 20 Phil. Rep., 134.)
It is true that some of the more recent of these cases make exceptions to the
general rule. Thus, in Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., (19 Phil.
Rep., 102), that portion of the evidence before us tended to show that grave
injustice might result from a strict reliance upon the findings of fact contained
in the judgment appealed from. We, therefore, gave the appellant an
opportunity to explain the omission. But we required that such explanation
must show a satisfactory reason for the omission, and that the missing portion
of the evidence must be submitted within sixty days or cause shown for failing
to do so. The other cases making exceptions to the rule are based upon
peculiar circumstances which will seldom arise in practice and need not here
be set forth, for the reason that they are wholly inapplicable to the present
case. The appellants would be entitled to indulgence only under the doctrine
of the Olsen case. But from that portion of the record before us, we are not
inclined to believe that the missing deposition would be sufficient to justify us
in reversing the findings of fact of the trial court that the contract in question
had been made. There is in the record not only the positive and detailed
testimony of Gilchrist to this effect, but there is also a letter of apology from
Cuddy to Gilchrist in which the former enters into a lengthy explanation of his
reasons for leasing the film to another party. The latter could only have been
called forth by a broken contract with Gilchrist to lease the film to him. We,
therefore, fail to find any reason for overlooking the omission of the defendants
to bring up the missing portion of the evidence and, adhering to the general
rule above referred to, proceed to examine the questions of law raised by the
appellants.
From the above-quoted findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a resident of
Manila, was the owner of the "Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the owner of a
cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in accordance with the terms of the
contract entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former leased to the
latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater for the week
beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violate his contract in order
that he might accept the appellant's offer of P350 for the film for the same
period. Did the appellants know that they were inducing Cuddy to violate his
contract with a third party when they induced him to accept the P350? Espejo
admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner of the film. He received a
letter from his agents in Manila dated April 26, assuring him that he could not
get the film for about six weeks. The arrangement between Cuddy and the
appellants for the exhibition of the film by the latter on the 26th of May were
perfected after April 26, so that the six weeks would include and extend
beyond May 26. The appellants must necessarily have known at the time they
made their offer to Cuddy that the latter had booked or contracted the film for
six weeks from April 26. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the
appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to violate his contract with another
person. But there is no specific finding that the appellants knew the identity of
the other party. So we must assume that they did not know that Gilchrist was
the person who had contracted for the film.
The appellants take the position that if the preliminary injunction had not been
issued against them they could have exhibited the film in their theater for a
number of days beginning May 26, and could have also subleased it to other
theater owners in the nearby towns and, by so doing, could have cleared,
during the life of their contract with Cuddy, the amount claimed as damages.
Taking this view of the case, it will be unnecessary for us to inquire whether
the mandatory injunction against Cuddy was properly issued or not. No
question is raised with reference to the issuance of that injunction.
The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for the
lease of the film must be fully recognized and admitted by all. That Cuddy was
liable in an action for damages for the breach of that contract, there can be no
doubt. Were the appellants likewise liable for interfering with the contract
between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of one
of the contracting parties? The appellants claim that they had a right to do
what they did. The ground upon which the appellants base this contention is,
that there was no valid and binding contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist and
that, therefore, they had a right to compete with Gilchrist for the lease of the
film, the right to compete being a justification for their acts. If there had been
no contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist this defense would be tenable, but
the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally
inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights.
Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass., 555), said: "Everyone
has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry,
skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton
interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result
of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque
injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with."
In Read vs. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons ([1902] 2 K. B., 88),
Darling, J., said: "I think the plaintiff has a cause of action against the
defendants, unless the court is satisfied that, when they interfered with the
contractual rights of plaintiff, the defendants had a sufficient justification for
their interference; . . . for it is not a justification that `they acted bona fide in the
best interests of the society of masons,' i. e., in their own interests. Nor is it
enough that `they were not actuated by improper motives.' I think their
sufficient justification for interference with plaintiff's right must be an equal or
superior right in themselves, and that no one can legally excuse himself to a
man, of whose contract he has procured the breach, on the ground that he
acted on a wrong understanding of his own rights, or without malice, or bona
fide, or in the best interests of himself, or even that he acted as an altruist,
seeking only good of another and careless of his own advantage." (Quoted
with approval in Beekman vs. Marsters, 195 Mass., 205.)
It is said that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering with
a contract between others rests, is that the interference was malicious. The
contrary view, however, is taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Angle vs. Railway Co. (151 U. S., 1). The only motive for
interference by the third party in that case was the desire to make a profit to
the injury of one of the parties of the contract. There was no malice in the case
beyond the desire to make an unlawful gain to the detriment of one of the
contracting parties.
In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist —
Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by
exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but
this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that
contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear, under the above
authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their
acts, unless they are relieved from such liability by reason of the fact that they
did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.
The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual
obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate
his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for
damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission,
causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged
to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires
as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the
identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein
this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order
that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
But the fact that the appellants' interference with the Gilchrist contract was
actionable did not of itself entitle Gilchrist to sue out an injunction against them.
The allowance of this remedy must be justified under section 164 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which specifies the circumstance under which an injunction
may issue. Upon the general doctrine of injunction we said in Devesa vs. Arbes
(13 Phil. Rep., 273):
An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that code (Act No. 190) from
American practice, and originally borrowed from English legal procedure,
which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of
equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to
cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,"
which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are
undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable
injury will be done," which cannot be compensated in damages, and where
there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted,
to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of
another whose title has not been established by law.
We subsequently affirmed the doctrine of the Devesa case in Palafox vs.
Madamba (19 Phil., Rep., 444), and we take this occasion of again affirming
it, believing, as we do, that the indiscriminate use of injunctions should be
discouraged.
Does the fact that the appellants did not know at the time the identity of the
original lessee of the film militate against Gilchrist's right to a preliminary
injunction, although the appellant's incurred civil liability for damages for such
interference? In the examination of the adjudicated cases, where in injunctions
have been issued to restrain wrongful interference with contracts by strangers
to such contracts, we have been unable to find any case where this precise
question was involved, as in all of those cases which we have examined, the
identity of both of the contracting parties was known to the tort-feasors. We
might say, however, that this fact does not seem to have a controlling feature
in those cases. There is nothing in section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which indicates, even remotely, that before an injunction may issue restraining
the wrongful interference with contrast by strangers, the strangers must know
the identity of both parties. It would seem that this is not essential, as
injunctions frequently issue against municipal corporations, public service
corporations, public officers, and others to restrain the commission of acts
which would tend to injuriously affect the rights of person whose identity the
respondents could not possibly have known beforehand. This court has held
that in a proper case injunction will issue at the instance of a private citizen to
restrain ultra vires acts of public officials. (Severino vs. Governor-General, 16
Phil. Rep., 366.) So we proceed to the determination of the main question of
whether or not the preliminary injunction ought to have been issued in this
case.
As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have an adequate remedy at
law. Where the choice is between the ordinary and the extraordinary
processes of law, and the former are sufficient, the rule will not permit the use
of the latter. (In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564.) If the injury is irreparable, the ordinary
process is inadequate. In Wahle vs. Reinbach (76 Ill., 322), the supreme court
of Illinois approved a definition of the term "irreparable injury" in the following
language: "By `irreparable injury' is not meant such injury as is beyond the
possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, nor
necessarily great injury or great damage, but that species of injury, whether
great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted
on the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the
other, is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable
redress can be had therefor in a court of law." (Quoted with approval in
Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell, 82 Fed., 65.)
The case at bar is somewhat novel, as the only contract which was broken
was that between Cuddy and Gilchrist, and the profits of the appellee
depended upon the patronage of the public, for which it is conceded the
appellants were at liberty to complete by all fair does not deter the application
of remarked in the case of the "ticket scalpers" (82 Fed., 65), the novelty of
the facts does not deter the application of equitable principles. This court takes
judicial notice of the general character of a cinematograph or motion-picture
theater. It is a quite modern form of the play house, wherein, by means of an
apparatus known as a cinematograph or cinematograph, a series of views
representing closely successive phases of a moving object, are exhibited in
rapid sequence, giving a picture which, owing to the persistence of vision,
appears to the observer to be in continuous motion. (The Encyclopedia
Britanica, vol. 6, p. 374.) The subjects which have lent themselves to the art
of the photographer in this manner have increased enormously in recent
years, as well as have the places where such exhibition are given. The
attendance, and, consequently, the receipts, at one of these cinematograph
or motion-picture theaters depends in no small degree upon the excellence of
the photographs, and it is quite common for the proprietor of the theater to
secure an especially attractive exhibit as his "feature film" and advertise it as
such in order to attract the public. This feature film is depended upon to secure
a larger attendance that if its place on the program were filled by other films of
mediocre quality. It is evident that the failure to exhibit the feature film will
reduce the receipts of the theater.
Hence, Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by
reason of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the
film Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film. It is quite apparent that to
estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely
suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible. If he allowed
the appellants to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would be useless for him to exhibit
it again, as the desire of the public to witness the production would have been
already satisfied. In this extremity, the appellee applied for and was granted,
as we have indicated, a mandatory injunction against Cuddy requiring him to
deliver the Zigomar to Gilchrist, and a preliminary injunction against the
appellants restraining them from exhibiting that film in their theater during the
weeks he (Gilchrist) had a right to exhibit it. These injunction saved the plaintiff
harmless from damages due to the unwarranted interference of the
defendants, as well as the difficult task which would have been set for the court
of estimating them in case the appellants had been allowed to carry out their
illegal plans. As to whether or not the mandatory injunction should have been
issued, we are not, as we have said, called upon to determine. So far as the
preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which
prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist
desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the
issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court.
We are not lacking in authority to support our conclusion that the court was
justified in issuing the preliminary injunction against the appellants. Upon the
precise question as to whether injunction will issue to restrain wrongful
interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts, it may be said that
courts in the United States have usually granted such relief where the profits
of the injured person are derived from his contractual relations with a large and
indefinite number of individuals, thus reducing him to the necessity of proving
in an action against the tort-feasor that the latter was responsible in each case
for the broken contract, or else obliging him to institute individual suits against
each contracting party and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. vs. Mechanics' Clothing Co. (128 Fed., 800); Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. vs. Louis Weber & Co. (161 Fed., 219); Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. vs. Pommer (199 Fed., 309); were all cases wherein the respondents were
inducing retail merchants to break their contracts with the company for the sale
of the latters' trading stamps. Injunction issued in each case restraining the
respondents from interfering with such contracts.
In the case of the Nashville R. R. Co. vs. McConnell (82 Fed., 65), the court,
among other things, said: "One who wrongfully interferes in a contract between
others, and, for the purpose of gain to himself induces one of the parties to
break it, is liable to the party injured thereby; and his continued interference
may be ground for an injunction where the injuries resulting will be irreparable."
In Hamby & Toomer vs. Georgia Iron & Coal Co. (127 Ga., 792), it appears
that the respondents were interfering in a contract for prison labor, and the
result would be, if they were successful, the shutting down of the petitioner's
plant for an indefinite time. The court held that although there was no
contention that the respondents were insolvent, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting a preliminary injunction against the respondents.
In Beekman vs. Marsters (195 Mass., 205), the plaintiff had obtained from the
Jamestown Hotel Corporation, conducting a hotel within the grounds of the
Jamestown Exposition, a contract whereby he was made their exclusive agent
for the New England States to solicit patronage for the hotel. The defendant
induced the hotel corporation to break their contract with the plaintiff in order
to allow him to act also as their agent in the New England States. The court
held that an action for damages would not have afforded the plaintiff adequate
relief, and that an injunction was proper compelling the defendant to desist
from further interference with the plaintiff's exclusive contract with the hotel
company.
In Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. vs. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co.
(171 Fed., 553), the court, while admitting that there are some authorities to
the contrary, held that the current authority in the United States and England
is that:
The violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and
that it is a violation of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations
recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.
(Quinn vs. Leatham, supra, 510; Angle vs. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 151 U.
S., 1; 14 Sup. Ct., 240; 38 L. Ed., 55; Martens vs. Reilly, 109 Wis., 464, 84
N. W., 840; Rice vs. Manley, 66 N. Y., 82; 23 Am. Rep., 30; Bitterman vs.
L. & N. R. R. Co., 207 U. S., 205; 28 Sup. Ct., 91; 52 L. Ed., 171; Beekman
vs. Marsters, 195 Mass., 205; 80 N. E., 817; 11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 201; 122
Am. St. Rep., 232; South Wales Miners' Fed. vs. Glamorgan Coal Co.,
Appeal Cases, 1905, p. 239.)
See also Nims on Unfair Business Competition, pp. 351- 371.
In 3 Elliot on Contracts, section 2511, it is said: "Injunction is the proper remedy
to prevent a wrongful interference with contract by strangers to such contracts
where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable.
And where there is a malicious interference with lawful and valid contracts a
permanent injunction will ordinarily issue without proof of express malice. So,
an injunction may be issued where the complainant to break their contracts
with him by agreeing to indemnify who breaks his contracts of employment
may be adjoined from including other employees to break their contracts and
enter into new contracts with a new employer of the servant who first broke
his contract. But the remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a
legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of
a contract. Nor will equity ordinarily enjoin employees who have quit the
service of their employer from attempting by proper argument to persuade
others from taking their places so long as they do not resort to force or
intimidations on obstruct the public thoroughfares."
Beekman vs. Marster, supra, is practically on all fours with the case at bar in
that there was only one contract in question and the profits of the injured
person depended upon the patronage of the public. Hamby & Toomer vs.
Georgia Iron & Coal Co., supra, is also similar to the case at bar in that there
was only one contract, the interference of which was stopped by injunction.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed, with costs, against the
appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.