LCP v COMELEC and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.
The Constitution
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities
into component cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However,
Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12thCongress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective
revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income
requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to
P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each
of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular
municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote,
denied the respondent municipalities’ first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April
2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent
municipalities’ second motion for reconsideration. The 18 November 2008 Decision
became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments
on 21 May 2009. However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc
reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the
Cityhood Laws.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
Nov. 18, 2008 Decision
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.
The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is
unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such
exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. “The Cityhood
Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.” “The criteria, as
prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria
prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just share” of local government
units (LGUs) in national taxes.”
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear – the creation of local
government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code
requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a
city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The
clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other
political units follows the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in
the Local Government Code. From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June
2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the P100million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for
municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The
uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA
9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing
Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the
increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law.
Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create
one.
Feb 15, 2011
For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:
1. Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24, 2010 dated and
filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.; and
2. Opposition [To the “Motion for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August
24, 2010”].
Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set “Motion
for Reconsideration of the ‘Resolution’ dated August 24, 2010” for Hearing. This
motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the “mad
rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities” and the apprehension that
before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It
should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income
requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure,
there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the
choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100
million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities.
 The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an
arbitrary amount, cannot be conclusively said to be the only amount “sufficient,
based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and
services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population,” per
Section 713 of the LGC. It was imposed merely because it is difficult to comply with.
While it could be argued that P100 million, being more than P20 million, could, of
course, provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions
vis-à-vis the population of a municipality wanting to become a component city, it
cannot be said that the minimum amount ofP20 million would be insufficient. The
existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No.
9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2.
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of
the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been
considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably give
the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and
application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great
deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution
and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its
invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in
pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution
to be in contravention of the Constitution, the case must be so clear to be free from
doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable,
because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of
the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until
the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will
the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution. To doubt
the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated
August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September 14, 2010 by respondents
Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
April 12, 2011
Yes, it’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
“We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the
Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but
have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC
prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these
cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court
should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable
legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,”
the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of
RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the
creation of cities. “The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated
upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several
municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA
9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason
of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion
bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities
Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of
Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint
Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate,
which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were
individually filed in the Lower House and were all unanimously and favorably voted
upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The
acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately
incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage
of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by
repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption
clauses.
* Re: the split or tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration of the 18
November 2008 Decision.
The dissenting opinion stated that “a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a
non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.” However, Section
7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in appealed cases, the court en
banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the
second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second
motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no
reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court
order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn
the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution denying
reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Hence, the 18 November 2008 judgment and the 31 March 2009 resolution stand in
full force. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by
a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior
affirmative action. The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional, was reinstated.
AD HOC SUPREME COURT MEMBERSHIP
FISCAL AUTONOMY – Section 3
CEZAR BENGZON et al V HON. FRANKLIN DRILON et al
FACTS:
The Petitioners of this case were retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals currently receiving monthly pensions under RA 910 as amended by
RA 1797. They filed this case against respondents involved in the release of funds
appropriated in the annual appropriations.. President Marcos issued a PD 644
repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of
retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. Subsequently, PD 1638
was issued by Marcos providing for the automatic readjustment of the pension of
officers and enlisted men while that of the retired justices was not restored.
Prior to this petition, Justices Barcelona et al filed a case alleging that PD
644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law due to the lack of required
publication. RA 1797 was still in effect. Thus the Congress included certain
appropriations for the Judiciary intended to pay for said pension.
President Aquino vetoed HB 16297 on the ground that it would be against
the policy on standardization of compensation (RA 6758 Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989). The President vetoed parts of the special provisions for
the Supreme Court and the lower courts on the ground that the resolution of the
court has been enacted nullifying the veto on HB 16297.
It was alleged that the said veto impairs the fiscal autonomy guaranteed by
the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON the veto by the President of provisions in the GAA 1992 infringes
upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
HELD:
The Constitution grants the Supreme Court fiscal autonomy to strengthen
its independence. As provided in section 3 of Article VIII, The Judiciary shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy and appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released. It guarantees full flexibility to allocate
and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the
government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Like the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman, the Judiciary
must have the independence and flexibility needed to discharge their duties. To
impose restrictions and constraints on its allocation and utilization of funds
appropriated for their operation is violative of the Constitution as well as the
independence of the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar, the veto of specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should
be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to the
Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the
funds allocated to it in the appropriations law
The petition was GRANTED and the questioned veto was held as
unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared
valid . The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release the funds
appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the
Judiciary, pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy.
JORGE VARGAS V EMILIO RILLORAZA
FACTS:
Section 14 of the People’s Court Act or Commonwealth Act No. 682 was
assailed in this motion on the grounds, inter alia that it provides for additional
qualifications other than those provided in Section 6 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do
not possess such qualifications, creates two Supreme Courts and destroys the
independence of the Judiciary.
Section 14 of the People’s Court Act provides that any Supreme Court
Justice who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or
the Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in cases in which the accused also held
any office under the said Commission or Occupation government. On account of
such disqualification or any of the disqualifications provided in Section 1 of the Rules
of Court (such as illness, absence or temporary disability), the President may
designate Judges of First Instance and Cadastral Judges to sit temporarily as Justice
of the Supreme Court, to constitute the necessary quorum or until a judgment is
rendered.
ISSUE: WON the temporary membership of the designees to the Supreme Court is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that section 14 of the People’s Court Act is
unconstitutional because it contravenes Section 1 of Article VIII which states that the
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law. The arrangement provided by the assailed provision creates two
Supreme Courts, the regular body and the temporary court for collaboration cases.
According to section 4 of said Article VIII, "the Supreme Court shall be
composed" of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices referred to in the provision
and its jurisdiction can only be exercised by it as thus composed. To disqualify any of
these constitutional component members of the Court is depriving the Court itself of
its jurisdiction as established by the Constitution. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power.
It also contravenes the provisions on the qualifications set forth in Section 6
(now section 7 paragraph 1) which stipulates that no person may be appointed
member of the Supreme Court unless he has been five years a citizen of the
Philippines, is at least 40 years of age, and has for 10 years or more been a judge of a
court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. A Judge of First
Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judge, under section 149 of the
Revised Administrative Code, need not be at least forty years of age, nor have more
than ten years or more been a judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines. Under said section he need only have practiced law for a
period of not less than five years or have held during a like period within the
Philippines an office requiring a lawyer's diploma. Thus, a "designee" under section
14 of the People's Court Act, sitting as a substitute Justice of the Supreme Court in
particular collaboration cases, and participating therein in the deliberations and
functions of the Supreme Court, like any regular Justice thereof, does not possess
the required constitutional qualifications of a regular member of said Court. A point
of repugnancy between the challenged section and the constitution.
The courts will continue to hold, invalid any attempt on the part of the
legislature to deprive them by statute of any power the exercise of which they deem
essential to the proper performance of their judicial function. The legislature may
regulate the exercise of, but cannot abridge, the express or necessarily implied
powers granted to this court by the Constitution. The Judiciary with condemns any
legislation which impinges or might impinge upon the fundamental independent
powers of the judicature.
IBP v. Zamora
FACTS:
President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join
the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem
the tide of rising violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through
Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated
02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This
was confirmed by a memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On
January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the
deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military on
the civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI,
Sec. 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?
RULING
Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged
act.
In this case, IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold
the constitution. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of
law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothed it w/
standing. That is too general, an interests that is shared by other groups & the whole
citizenry. IBP’s fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law
profession & improve the administration of justice, cannot be affected by the
deployment of the Marines.
Petition is dismissed.
SANLAKAS VS. EX. SEC. 2/3/04 (otherwise moot but capable of repetition)
Facts:
In the middle of the night of July 27, 2003, some three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives,
stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the
corruption in the AFP, the soldiers declared their withdrawal of support for the
government and demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President,
the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). These
actions constitute the crime of rebellion thus, under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution whenever it becomes necessary, the president may call out such Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. In the wake of the Oakwood incident, the President
Proclamation 427 and General Order 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion”
and calling out/directing the Armed Forces to suppress and quell the rebellion with
due regard to constitutional rights. By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood
occupation had ended and the soldiers returned to their barracks. On Aug. 1 2003,
the President then lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion through Proclamation
435. In the interim (in between/ meantime), several petitions were filed before the
Supreme Court challenging the validity of Proclamation 427 and General Order 4.
Specifically: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)- party list
organizations VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contend that Sec. 18 Article VII
of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
the AFP, and that because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there is no
sufficient factual basis for such proclamation by the president. Solicitor General
argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.
ISSUE: 1. W/N the issuance of Proc. No. 435 rendered the case moot?
2. W/N the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
3. W/N Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. are constitutional?
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation
435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case
moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to
the determination of “actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will decide a
question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.” The
present case is one such case.
‘Once before, the President on 1 May 2001 declared a state of rebellion and
called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38
and General Order 1. On that occasion, “‘an angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons’
assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before the
Supreme Court assailing the validity of the President’s declaration. Five days after
such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the
petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases precluded the Court from
addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.’
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, the Supreme Court seized
the opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of
rebellion in the exercise of the President’s calling out power, the mootness of the
petitions notwithstanding.
Courts may exercise the power of judicial review only when the following requisites
are present:
First, there must be an actual case or controversy;
Second, petitioners have to raise a question of unconstitutionality;
Third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
Fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
When may the courts still validly decide moot and academic cases?
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
ground of mootness. The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved
Third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary)
2. No. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM have no legal standing to sue. Petitioner has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the
Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be
threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime
of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal
rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of
invasion or infringement. Even assuming that petitioners are “peoples
organizations”, this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to
question the validity of the presidential issuances. That petitioner SJS
officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with
standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. No such illegal
disbursement is alleged. On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again, no such injury is alleged in this
case. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory
relief, petitioner claiming that it’s right to freedom of expression and freedom of
assembly is affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion and that said
proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial
power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions,
is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement
lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking
in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government
and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive
which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Thus, The Supreme Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of
Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the President’s declaration of a
state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus
impairing their legislative powers.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
*Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Accordingly, the “real-party-in interest” is “the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.” Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to
the relief sought.
3. Yes. The Court rendered that both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring
state or rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-
Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article
VI. Thus, the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main
from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers making it clear that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of
the petitioners have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual basis. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion
amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the
report requirement, is a leap of logic. Declaration of State of Rebellion is not
Declaration of Martial Law. There was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil
government. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may
be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers.
In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has
exercised martial law powers. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the
declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise
depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as
Commander-in-Chief.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution
does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion.
However, Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. The President's Commander-in-Chief
Powers: (1) the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter 2
powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an
actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such
power. While the only criterion in the calling out of power is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary’
SEAPARATE OPINION OF PANGANIBAN, J.:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the state of rebellion declared by the
President through Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 in the wake of the
so-called Oakwood Incident. The questioned issuances, however, were subsequently
lifted by her on August 1, 2003, when she issued Proclamation No. 435. Hence, as of
today, there is no more extant proclamation or order that can be declared valid or
void. For this reason, I believe that the Petitions should be dismissed on the ground
of mootness.
The judicial power to declare a law or an executive order unconstitutional, according
to Justice Jose P. Laurel, is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Following this long-
held principle, the Court has thus always been guided by these fourfold requisites in
deciding constitutional law issues: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; 2) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; 3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and 4) adjudication of the
constitutional question must be indispensable to the resolution of the case.
Unquestionably, the first and the forth requirements are absent in the present case.
Absence of Case and Controversy:
The first requirement, the existence of a live case or controversy, means that an
existing litigation is ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination; as
opposed to one that is conjectural or anticipatory, hypothetical or feigned. A
justiciable controversy involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. Hence, it admits of specific relief
through a decree that is conclusive in character, in contrast to an opinion which only
advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
As a rule, courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or
friendly suits between parties without real adverse interests. Neither do courts sit to
adjudicate academic questions no matter how intellectually challenging[8] because
without a justiciable controversy, an adjudication would be of no practical use or
value.
While the Petitions herein have previously embodied a live case or controversy, they
now have been rendered extinct by the lifting of the questioned issuances. Thus,
nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue.
Moreover, without a justiciable controversy, the Petitions have become pleas for
declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. Be it
remembered that they were filed directly with this Court and thus invoked its
original jurisdiction.
On the theory that the state of rebellion issue is capable of repetition yet evading
review, I respectfully submit that the question may indeed still be resolved even
after the lifting of the Proclamation and Order, provided the party raising it in a
proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result
of their issuance.
In the present case, petitioners have not shown that they have been or continue to
be directly and pecuniarily prejudiced or damaged by the Proclamation and Order.
Neither have they shown that this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief. I would venture to say that, perhaps, if this controversy had
emanated from an appealed judgment from a lower tribunal, then this Court may
still pass upon the issue on the theory that it is capable of repetition yet evading
review, and the case would not be an original action for declaratory relief.
In short, the theory of capable of repetition yet evading review may be invoked only
when this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. It cannot be used in the
present controversy for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.
The Resolution of the Case on Other Grounds:
The fourth requisite, which relates to the absolute necessity of deciding the
constitutional issue, means that the Court has no other way of resolving the case
except by tackling an unavoidable constitutional question. It is a well-settled doctrine
that courts will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the
case, or if the case can be disposed on some other grounds.
With due respect, I submit that the mootness of the Petitions has swept aside the
necessity of ruling on the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General order No. 4.
In the wake of its mootness, the constitutionality issue has ceased to be the lis mota
of the case or to be an unavoidable question in the resolution thereof. Hence, the
dismissal of the Petitions for mootness is justified.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions. On the constitutionality of a state of
rebellion, I reserve my judgment at the proper time and in the proper case.
Lis Mota —cause of action or means that the Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The
petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA vs. SIXTO DE LA COSTA
On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise
known as the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from
the President of the Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first
instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in accordance with said Act. As
the National Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937, without its Commission on
Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad
interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant
to which he took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties
thereof.
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly
disapproved the aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised
thereof by the Secretary of Justice on the 20th of said month and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent,
Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly. By virtue of said
appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and assumed office.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the appointment alleging that C.A. No. 145 is
unconstitutional
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the
law by virtue of which the new ad interim appointment of judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and
Palawan, was issued in his favor.
Ruling
NO. He cannot question the constitutionality of the law by which he was last
appointed.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily
accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, — which new
office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him — , qualifies for the
discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the
performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized
office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned
the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947,
sec. 55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he
was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is
excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may
affect public interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies.
If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145
is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at
least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of
obedience to the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power
entrusted with the final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional
or not.
Lacson v. Perez
G.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001)
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there
was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General
Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of rebellion,”
which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were
filed before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President
and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis
both in fact and in law.
1. On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a “state Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the
of rebellion” in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.
moot and academic.
PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required
2. As to petitioners’ claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is being judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1,
used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, there are actually general 2001 siege).
instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement
Proclamation No. 38 and obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This
means that preliminary investigations will be conducted.

3. Moreover, petitioners’ contention that they are under imminent danger of

being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary
remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless
arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

4. Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the
informations against the petitioners are filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding
with the trial of the case. Such relief is clearly premature considering that as of this
date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any
crime.

5. Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and
void since petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold
departure orders in their petition.

6. Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of

being arrested without a warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued
since such right to relief must be clear at the time of the award.

7. Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty (PMAP),

argues that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary to
interpret what took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

8. As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-

in-interest. LDP has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to
the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to
be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime
of rebellion.