THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINO TORRES AND PABLO PADILLA, Defendants-Appellants.

FACTS:

Walker testified that he had received information that on the night of January 20, 1914, Regino Torres
would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30 that evening they
stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short while afterwards saw
the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises; that Samson seized Torres, and
as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him and on passing by Samson and Torres saw
two tins of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to halt, and, as the latter continued to run,
witness fired a shot into the air, whereupon Padilla stopped, after he had thrown one tin over a fence;
that, after the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out with lights to search for the tins
and found the one thrown by Padilla inside the in closure, and the other two tins, about a meter from
the place where Samson had been holding Torres.

The other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however, when questioned by
the defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his pursuit of Padilla, that
Walker did say that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he was looking for them. He was
also asked by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the defendants that they pay a fine in the
form of a compromise, to which he replied that he had not, but that, on the contrary, it was the
defendants who made this offer.

That the defendant Regino Torres testified that Padilla told him that there was a large amount of opium,
and they agreed that at 6 o’clock in the evening they would go to the house above mentioned; that
Padilla went to Torres’ house at 6 o’clock in the evening and hurried him up, saying: "Eat in a hurry, for
the owner of the opium needs money" ; that when they arrived at the house of Franco’s widow, Padilla
entered the door of the place where the automobiles were kept, and five minutes afterwards called
witness to enter the garage and there Padilla showed Torres a tin of opium, at the same time saying that
it was first class and cost P60 without haggling; that witness replied that he would first show it to some
trustworthy friends to determine its class; that Padilla agreed and they both left for this purpose, but
that when they had gone about ten brazas from the door, he was seized by Samson and saw that Padilla
had run away and was being pursued by Walker. The court asked Torres whether he had wished to
investigate first and buy afterwards, to which he replied that he did, and that if he had been convinced
of the quality of the opium he would have bought about 20 or 25 tins. "But have you so much money?"
inquired the judge. The defendant replied: "Yes, sir."

ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise entered by Regino and Walker is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

No.

The witness, Walker, testified, among other things, that Regino Torres endeavored to compromise the
case and that he (Walker) was willing to accept the compromise through the payment of P1,500, but
subject to the approval of his superiors. The defense asked that this testimony be stricken out, alleging
that, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, the compromise in such cases must be made in
writing. "When made in civil cases, it is proper; but in criminal causes, it is not," the court said, and
accordingly overruled the objection. The defense excepted.

We have already seen above what Samson’s testimony was concerning this point and how thereby he
corroborated that given by Walker.

An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence (Code of Civ. Proc.,
sec. 346). In a criminal cause for theft (U. S. v. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this court said that the weight
both of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in
criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness
of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would
justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and
an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the
matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance and private
interests are concerned, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action,
however it may be with respect to the civil liability. But section 25 of Act No. 1761, under which this
cause was prosecuted, expressly authorizes the Collector of Internal Revenue to compromise a case
after action has been begun, "instead of commencing or prosecuting suit thereon." The words in
quotation marks are textual. A compromise necessarily implies two elements, one of which is the offer
and the other the acceptance, in order that the penal action may be extinguished and there remain only
the civil liability to deal with. Of course ordinarily it is the defendant who makes the offer, — a lawful act
sanctioned by law in this class of prosecutions, — and because it is made, no presumption of guilt must
be raised against the maker, as occurs in other criminal causes for public crimes in which the offer is not
lawful because it is a thing prohibited by law. The offer may have been prompted simply to avoid the
annoyance of a prosecution, as sometimes happens in a civil case where a person involved in the
litigation is perhaps entirely in the right but prefers to lose a sum of money rather than commence and
prosecute an action. This case is, therefore, on all fours with that of section 346 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, above cited. At all events, for the conviction of the defendants it is not necessary to consider
and weigh this evidence; it could only be considered as cumulative, and it was not taken into account by
the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

DANNY GODOY, * accused-appellant.

complainant Mia Taha, at around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is near the Palawan National School
(PNS), Pulot Branch, where she was studying. When she saw that the house was dark, she decided to
pass through the kitchen door at the back because she knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as
she opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the
hand and told her not to shout. She was then forced to lie down on the floor. Although it was dark,
complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by the light coming from the moon and through his
voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was her Physics teacher at PNS.

When she was already on the floor, appellant removed her panty with one hand while holding the knife
with the other hand, opened the zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private organ inside her
private parts against her will. She felt pain because it was her first experience and she cried. Throughout
her ordeal, she could not utter a word. She was very frightened because a knife was continually pointed
at her. She also could not fight back nor plead with appellant not to rape her because he was her
teacher and she was afraid of him. She was threatened not to report the incident to anyone or else she
and her family would be killed.

The following morning, January 22, 1994, complainant went home to her parents' house at Ipilan,
Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her parents about the incident for fear that appellant might
make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
parents and asked permission from the latter if complainant could accompany him to solicit funds
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot." When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go
with appellant because she did not want her parents to get into trouble.

Appellant and complainant then left the house and they walked in silence, with Mia following behind
appellant, towards the highway where appellant hailed a passenger jeep which was empty except for
the driver and the conductor. She was forced to ride the jeep because appellant threatened to kill her if
she would not board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's
Point where they alighted.

At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in and brought her to a room where they staye d for three
days. During the entire duration of their stay at the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to
leave the room which was always kept locked. She was continuously guarded and constantly raped by
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have sex with
appellant because the latter was always carrying a knife with him.

In the early morning of January 25, 1994, appellant brought her to the house of his friend at Edward's
Subdivision where she was raped by him three times. She was likewise detained and locked inside the
room and tightly guarded by appellant. After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the place
because appellant came to know that complainant had been reported and indicated as a missing person
in the police blotter. They went to see a certain Naem ** from whom appellant sought help. On that
same day, she was released but only after her parents agreed to settle the case with appellant.

Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant, went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the settlement of the
case. On their part, her husband insisted that they just settle, hence all three of them, Adjeril, Helen and
Mia Taha, went to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they met with the mother of appellant
who gave them P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance in
Criminal Case No. 7687 for kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office, which was sworn to before
Prosecutor II Chito S. Meregillano. Helen Taha testified that she agreed to the settlement because that
was what her husband wanted. Mia Taha was dropped from the school and was not allowed to
graduate. Her father died two months later, supposedly because of what happened.

Issue: Whether or not the settlement agreed by the parties is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

NO.

There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence presented
in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to
be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made,
hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;(2) that in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;18 and (3) that the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince this
Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was
the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.

I. Two principal facts indispensably to be proven beyond reasonable doubt for conviction of the
crime of rape under paragraph (1), Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code are, first, that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the complainant; and, second, that the same was accomplished through force or
intimidation.
1. The prosecution has palpably failed to prove beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had
sexual congress with complainant against her will. Complainant avers that on the night of January 21,
1994, she was sexually assaulted by appellant in the boarding house of her cousin, Merlelyn Casantosan.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied such a serious imputation and contends that on said date and
time, he merely talked with complainant outside that house. We find appellant's version more credible
and sustained by the evidence presented and of record.

According to complainant, when she entered the kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already
inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite perplexing how appellant could have known that she
was going there on that particular day and at that time, considering that she does not even live there,
unless of course it was appellant's intention to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who happened to
come along. But then this would be stretching the imagination too far, aside from the fact that such a
generic intent with an indeterminate victim was never established nor even intimated by the
prosecution.

On the basis of the laceration inflicted, which is superficial at 6 o'clock position, the aforesaid medico-
legal expert opined that it could not be categorically stated that there was force involved. On further
questioning, he gave a straightforward answer that force was not applied. He also added that when he
examined the patient bodily, he did not see any sign of bruises. The absence of any sign of physical
violence on the complainant's body is an indication of complainant's consent to the act. While the
absence in the medical certificate of external signs of physical injuries on the victim does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape, the instant case is clearly an exception to this rule since appellant has
successfully cast doubt on the veracity of that charge against him.

There is a rule that the rape victim's panty and blood-stained dress are not essential, and need not be
presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to prove rape.We incline to the view, however, that
this general rule holds true only if there exist other corroborative evidence sufficiently and convincingly
proving the rape charge beyond reasonable doubt. The rule should go the other way where, as in the
present case, the testimony of complainant is inherently weak and no other physical evidence has been
presented to bolster the charge of sexual abuse except for the medical report which, as earlier
discussed, even negated the existence of one of the essential elements of the crime. We cannot,
therefore, escape the irresistible conclusion that the deliberate non-presentation of complainant's
blood-stained skirt, if it did exist, should vigorously militate against the prosecution's cause.

The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be an admission of
guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is
generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly
affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It
has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in
truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.

A primary consideration here is that the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves appellant's
innocence of the offense charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from appellant
but was actually suggested by a certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and who likewise
informed appellant that he could be converted into a Muslim so he could marry complainant. As a
matter of fact, when said offer was first made to appellant, he declined because of the fact that he was
already married. On top of these, appellant did not know, not until the trial proper, that his mother
actually paid P30,000.00 for the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own mother, Helen Taha,
testified that present during the negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and appellant's mother.
Appellant himself was never present in any of said meetings.

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary
consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. In
another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a
settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the
effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices
and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties.

[G.R. No. 117217. December 2, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

On 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda
Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino Flores Ambray and a mother of two children, was at the gate of
Meadow Wood Subdivision, Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at about 8:45 p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride
toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When she noticed the accused, then wearing
army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some questions. He answered
in a stammering manner. The complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime
and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit.

After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to
which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. She
got scared but managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and tell her
that it was not in good condition.[11] When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an
unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the tricycle
and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she had taken about ten
steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to
shout but the accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away
from the unfinished house. She attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if she made
noise. She fought to free herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to
raise her T-shirt while holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt,
which she obligingly followed because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted
Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako, but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that she could
hardly breathe. He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her pants
and pulled it down her knees. She struggled to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused then tried to
insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she struggled and fought back, then slapped him
while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried to stand, he pushed her down and, in the
process, was able to completely pull down her pants and underwear. She pleaded to him to have mercy
on her and told him that she had two children. He warned her: Huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita. The
accused again tried to insert his penis into her, but she prevented him from doing so. The accused took
her hand and let her hold his penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle against the
accuseds sexual advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then
pulled out his penis and fingered her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not
to tell anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her family.He told her that she was his
third victim but the two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear
and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was
raped by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by
Gildas mother.

At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony Antonio,
the President of the Homeowners Association and President of the National Press Club. Antonio radioed
the Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator. PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt. Saguisame responded to
the alarm immediately. Upon their arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3 Bautista saw Gilda with her
mother. Gilda, who was crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she was raped and described to him her
assailant as a tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in army cut. Gilda also gave PO3 Bautista a
vivid description of the accuseds tricycle, viz., blue in color with the name Dimple at the back. The
policemen left and went to the house of the accused. PO3 Bautista invited the accused to go with him
because the Mayor wanted to talk to him. The accused, together with P03 Bautista, went to the
residence of Antonio. When the accused entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically
while pointing to the accused as her rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail.

Issue: Whether or not the act of the defendant’s parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the
house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

YES.

Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and
secluded places away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word of the
offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the Peoples single
witness of the actual occurrence.[33]

In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation
for rape can be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its on merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[34]

The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the accused
depend primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the accused
witnessed the incident when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would render the accuseds
conviction inevitable.

A meticulous assessment of Gildas testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her story,
which she narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further strengthening her
credibility in recounting her ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct immediately after the
sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, and upon her arrival she reported the rape to her
husband and her mother at once. Immediately thereafter, she reported it to Tony Antonio, the President
of the Homeowners Association and President of the National Press Club, who then sought police
assistance. When the policemen arrived at Antonios residence in response to the latters call, Gilda
narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them the description of the assailant. When the policemen
brought the accused to the residence of Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the person
who raped her. Gilda voluntarily submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Pias Hospital and
then to an examination of her private parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted
herself to an investigation[35] by the PNP of Bacoor, Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for
rape against the accused with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite.
Any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the
overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The
accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho,
and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal
pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife
and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise,
the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellants Brief is
conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for
forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed
and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be
considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by
the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease
to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution
upon (an offender).

[G.R. No. 117702. February 10, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-appellant.

Facts:

That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting knife, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
AAA, against her will."[1]

The prosecution established that AAA was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00
in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, AAA was cooking porridge for the
spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months old. Accused-appellant
arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He approached AAA and gave her a small white
envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. AAA was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and
stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of the children. AAA opened the envelope and
counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, AAA took all the tablets. A few minutes
later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the
spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at
her neck. He ordered AAA not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on
top of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. AAA cried out
in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched
AAA in the stomach. She lost consciousness.

A few minutes later, AAA woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood and changed
her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the incident to her
parents. Appellant then left the house.[2]

AAA did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month
before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY. Her mother found AAA in a state of
shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as dressing
herself. In short, AAA became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother
for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed
the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a physical examination and also
found that:

"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;

Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;

Internal examination -- admits one finger;

Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.

x x x."[3]

Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, AAA was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, AAA began to talk and revealed that she was
raped by appellant.[4]

Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged rape
he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and
worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after 8:00 in the evening
because of his many customers.

Issue: Whether or not an offer to compromise does require that a criminal complaint be first filed
before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror?

Ruling:

No.

The court find that the prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of AAA, is credible,
reliable and trustworthy. AAA testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never
wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which
tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.

The question of whether AAA contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not
important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave her
tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that AAA should have fallen asleep for hours
after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets.
They, however, weakened AAA and prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd
acts.[9] The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect AAA's credibility.[10] She was afraid
of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed three months after AAA told her mother of the
incident, and three months is not too long a period to file a complaint for rape.

AAA was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner of
the family.[11] It is hard to believe that AAA would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to
public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation
for no reason at all.[12] AAA suffered psychologically from the incident. Before the rape, she had been
working for the Yparraguirres for two months[13] and the spouses actually found her to be a good
worker.[14] When AAA returned to her family, however, she lost her speech and could not perform
ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric treatment. Indeed, AAA's psychological
condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication.
Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after AAA revealed the rape to her mother,
appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, BBB, fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When BBB refused, Mary Ann increased the offer
to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still BBB refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant,
no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the
rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that BBB told her about
it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money. An offer to compromise does
not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against
the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes
an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.

The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public market was
merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room[20] and during work breaks, appellant would
sometimes go home to bring food to his children.

77 F.2d 844 (1935)

HAWTHORNE

v.

ECKERSON CO.

No. 401.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 3, 1935.

Facts:

The plaintiff was driving her own Marquette automobile and was accompanied by one Addie O. Kellogg,
her partner in an antique furniture business, who was sitting in the driver's seat with her. As the car was
rounding a curve in the highway leading from Middlebury to Brandon, Vt., it collided with a Chevrolet
automobile belonging to the defendant Eckerson Company, and driven by A. J. Gassett, of Burlington,
Vt., one of its traveling salesmen. The plaintiff and Miss Kellogg were both injured and the Marquette
car was damaged to the extent of about $125. The plaintiff testified that when rounding the curve she
kept well to the inside of the road and was driving at a speed of only 18 miles per hour. She also showed
that Gassett came around the curve at a speed of 40 miles an hour, did not keep the Chevrolet on his
side of the road, but had come over to her side, and that because of this the collision occurred. After the
plaintiff had put in her case the defendant rested without introducing any proof.

Issue: Whether or not the court unlawfully permitted the plaintiff to prove a settlement by the
defendant with Miss Kellogg of her claim for injuries arising out of the accident in the present case.

Ruling:

The defendant complains because the court permitted the plaintiff to prove the settlement with Miss
Kellogg, both in order to show that Gassett was its agent and also to show liability. We think the rulings
in this respect were erroneous. Compromises are not in themselves evidence as admissions of liability,
and the same rule applies when they are offered as proof of agency. It is a quite different matter to
allow in evidence independent statements contained in offers of settlement as admission of liability.
Since, irrespective of any inference arising from the agreement of settlement, there was uncontroverted
proof that Gassett was the agent of the defendant, it may be argued that the error in admitting evidence
of the compromise was not prejudicial, for the judge charged the jury that the plaintiff could only
recover compensatory damages for her personal loss and injuries. But in the course of the testimony as
to the settlement, proof was elicited at the suggestion of the court itself, that Miss Kellogg had received
$4,750 in payment of her claim. Such evidence might have led the jury to allow the plaintiff a recovery
equivalent to that of Miss Kellogg, the other occupant of the car. It is true that the testimony was only
admitted on the theory that such a substantial payment as $4,750 would not have been made merely to
buy peace and that the making of it, therefore, justified the inference that Gassett was the agent of
defendant and that the latter was responsible for his acts. But the evidence was legally inadmissible to
prove agency, and we cannot say that knowledge by the jury of the amount paid to Miss Kellogg might
not have caused them to take her recovery into account in estimating the plaintiff's damages. Tennant v.
Dudley, 144 N.Y. 504, 507, 39 N.E. 644; Mischner v. Thalheim, 184 App. Div. 883, 170 N.Y.S. 758.

"The rule against allowing evidence of compromise is founded upon recognition of the fact that such
testimony is inherently harmful, for the jury will draw conclusions therefrom * * * in spite of anything
which may be said by the judge in instructing them as to the weight to be given such evidence."

That the jury may have been prejudiced by proof of the settlement seems especially likely because the
verdict for the plaintiff was for about the same sum as that paid Miss Kellogg, though the latter's injuries
seem to have been the more serious.

Settlements have always been looked on with favor, and courts have deemed it against public policy to
subject a person who has compromised a claim to the hazard of having a settlement proved in a
subsequent lawsuit by another person asserting a cause of action arising out of the same transaction.

As proof of the settlement was erroneously received and may have prejudiced the result of the trial, the
judgment cannot stand.

[G.R. Nos. 133066-67. October 1, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROMEO H. LAMBID, appellant.

Facts:

October 31, 1997, 14-year old Lyzel was sleeping in their house located at Inayawan, Cebu City together
with her father, herein appellant, and two sisters. Around 5:00 in the morning, she woke up and noticed
her father lying beside her. Then, her father started removing her panty at the same time warning her
not to tell her mother what he was doing. After her father succeeded in removing her panty, he went on
top of her and started inserting his penis into her vagina. She initially tried to resist the sexual advances
of her father by kicking him and by moving her body from left to right and vice versa. She stopped
resisting when her father stared hard at her and threatened to kill her (Lyzel). Her father succeeded in
inserting his penis into her vagina. The following day, November 1, 1997, she was again roused from her
sleep and noticed her father lying beside her. Repeating what he did the previous day, her father
removed her panty. Thereafter, he successfully inserted his penis into her vagina. Lyzel did nothing out
of fear. She did not tell anybody about these two incidents.

However, her sister, Mary Ann, aged 13, witnessed both incidents. She was awakened around 5:00 in
the morning of October 31, 1997 when she heard their father say to her sister Lyzel: Dont tell this to
your mother or else I will kill you. Their father was then lying beside Lyzel. Afterwards, she saw him
stand up and go to urinate. About 5:00 in the morning of the succeeding day, November 1, 1997, she
was sleeping beside her sister Lyzel. She was awakened while their father was pulling her blanket.
Suspicious of their fathers actuation, she kicked him. After kicking him, she laid near the foot of her
sister Lyzel. Their father then covered her with a blanket but she peeped through the blanket. She saw
their father who was only wearing an underwear place himself on top of Lyzel. Her father covered
himself and Lyzel with a blanket, after which Mary Ann saw their fathers whole body shake and heard
him breathing hard. She again heard their father warn Lyzel not to relate the incident to their mother,
otherwise he will kill her (Lyzel).

On November 2, 1997, Mary Ann informed three of their neighbors about the incidents she witnessed.
Their neighbors brought her to the president of their local association for assistance and on that same
day their father was arrested.

Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi conducted a physical examination of Lyzel on November 3, 1997 and found
that Lyzels vagina had new hymenal lacerations with raw edges at 5 oclock position. The doctor asserted
that Lyzel might have sustained the lacerations within six days prior to her examination. The test for the
presence of spermatozoa yielded negative results.

Issue: Whether or not the compromise offered by the father is admissible as evidence?

The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. On the witness stand, when asked about the truth
of her daughters complaint, appellant simply stated that if he had committed the crimes of rape against
his daughter, he asks for forgiveness because during that time he was drunk. He asked the court to
impose upon him a lesser penalty considering that his children are still under his care.

Appellant raised no defense whatsoever. He virtually admitted his guilt. A review of the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during his direct and cross examinations shows that he never disowned the
acts imputed against him.[28] Appellant merely claimed that he was drunk and he asked for forgiveness
from Lyzel, if he had really raped her and for compassion from the trial court. In People vs. Alvero, we
held that a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise and an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[29]
Thus, by asking for forgiveness, appellant has admitted his guilt.

G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and
JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.

Facts:

This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found
in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early
morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual
strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before
12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.

Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several
cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No
witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in
one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police
headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack
of any evidence implicating him in the crime.

During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act
of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came
into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of
Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City on
July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in the English language,
Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa,
Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of
Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, " another Leyteno. When brought to
Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again
executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to
before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in
detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and
"Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario
Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the
basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery
with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus
Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas,
and one John Doe."

Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial
court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as
evidence?

Ruling: NO.

The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-2"),
on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime
in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre
and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" 1 there being no
independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused,
although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused.
It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. 3 While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within
the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would
be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by
Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay
City jail.

[G.R. No. 119005. December 2, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO
PONCE, accused, SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.

Facts:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr.
Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their
kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired
their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN, January 25, 1988)

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husbands lifeless (sic) while a man took
her husbands gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)

She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other
men ran away. (p. 9, ibid.)

George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police
came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the
victims house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7, TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, March
21, 1988)

Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to
find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)

Appellants were later on apprehended on different occasions.

Issue: Whether or not the res inter alios rule is binding to all the accused?

Ruling:
NO.

A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation
of herein appellants in, the crime charged.

The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband.

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that
a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be
bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential exceptions, those exceptions do not
however apply to the present case.

Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce, there exists no evidence
whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that
appellant Sabas Raquel was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name
Dante Clementewas negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no person by the name
of Danny Clemente.

Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in
violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the
testimony of the same Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation
section of their police station
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be
waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. These rights, both constitutional and
statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.

[G.R. Nos. 98494-98692. July 17, 2003]

ROGELIO ALVIZO, FLORITO MONTECILLO, POMPEYO ALMAGRO and CATALINO MAGNO, JR., petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99006-20. July 17, 2003]

JOSELITO J. GENSON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99059-99259. July 17, 2003]

EFREN COYOCA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99309-18. July 17, 2003]

OSCAR BELCINA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 99412-16 & 99436-99636. July 17, 2003]

Facts:

Sometime in 1978, a team from the Commission on Audit (COA) was organized by Sofronio Flores, Jr.,
the COA Region VII Director, to verify the alleged issuances of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs)
and Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (SACDCs) during the period of 1976-1978 in various
Highway Engineering Districts (HEDs) of Region VII. The special audit team was composed of auditors
Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth Paredes. Then President Marcos also created a Special Cabinet Committee
composed of the heads of the COA, Ministry of Justice, Office of the Budget and Management, Bureau
of Treasury and the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate the fund anomalies in Region VII. This
Special Cabinet Committee created a Special Task Force made up of various teams, among others, Team
II, headed by Supervising Agent Amado de Coco to cover the Cebu 2nd HED. The task force worked with
the Audit team and retrieved documents and records from the Regional Office and the Cebu 2nd HED.
The Audit team found out that fake LAAs and SACDCs were issued in the year 1977 leading to irregular
disbursements of public funds for the payment of ghost projects.

The investigations resulted in the filing of 397 criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan charging certain
officials and employees of the government as well as private contractors with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.

In the 198 cases docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 5585-5782, the accused were officials and employees
of Central Office of the then Ministry of Public Highways, Manila (MPH for brevity), now Department of
Public Works and Highways. They were all acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for failure of the prosecution
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: whether or not the rule on res inter alios acta is applicable?
Ruling:

No.

Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are binding upon the Court. However, this general
rule is subject to some exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a
grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of facts
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based and 6) the findings of fact
of the Sandiganayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record.

Petitioners claim that these cases are exceptions to the general rule because the findings of
Sandiganbayan are contrary to the established facts and based on speculations, surmises or conjectures
and the inferences made by it are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible.

The scheme to defraud the government started with the issuance of 18 fake LAAs and 8 SACDCs to Cebu
2nd HED which were admittedly signed by Regional Accountant Rolando Mangubat.

The evidence for the prosecution had clearly established the existence of these fake LAAs and SACDCs
which became the bases of the subject 199 general vouchers and checks issued to contractors/suppliers
in payment for the alleged deliveries of materials in the different project sites. Prosecution witnesses
Ruth Paredes and Felicitas Ona, both COA Auditors who were tasked to investigate the issuances of
these fake LAAs and SACDCs, had clearly identified the badges of fraud in the issuances of these fake
LAAs which were released to Cebu 2nd HED. It was established among others that while the regular
LAAs were recorded in the logbook maintained by the Regional Office, the fake LAAs and SACDCs
following their issuances were not entered in the logbook. The entry in the logbook is an important
safeguard against fraud; thus, the failure to enter the LAAs and SACDCs in the logbook necessarily
indicates irregularity and fraud.

The COA findings were corroborated by no less than prosecution witness Delia Preagido, an accused-
turned-state witness, who had a first hand knowledge of how such falsification was done.

The hearsay rule being put up by petitioners apply only if Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez admission of
guilt was testified to by another person or by means of affidavit. In this case the three co-accused
personally confessed their guilt during arraignment where petitioners were likewise present. If
petitioners wanted to dispute the circumstances surrounding the confession of guilt of Gabison,
Mangubat and Echavez, petitioners had the right to present the three as hostile witnesses during the
trial or petitioners could even have presented the three as their own witnesses. And this fault should not
be translated in terms of absence of opportunity to cross-examine the three.

Petitioners invoke the rule on res inter alios acta alleging that the pleas of guilty of the three should
have not been given weight because they were made after the conspiracy had terminated.This is
erroneous because the Sandiganbayan did not convict petitioners on the basis of the pleas of guilty. The
Sandiganbayan merely said that the prosecutions case had been amply supported and strengthened by
the pleas of guilty entered by the three. The pleas of guilty are in themselves evidence that the pleaders
committed the acts mentioned in the Informations. The pleas certainly have corroborative effect on the
evidence-in-chief of the prosecution. There is no rule violated by the Sandiganbayan when it considered
the pleas of guilty.

The motive of the three in pleading not guilty is both speculative and insignificant. Petitioners could
imagine the motives of the three for pleading guilty, but the fact remains that the consequence of their
pleas is that they admitted the commission of the crimes charged. Petitioners cannot escape the effects
of this admission.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the portion of the Decision referring to the pleas of guilty of
Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez is not the basis for the conviction of petitioners. Even if said portion is
disregarded, the decision is still supported by evidence which proved petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In other words, even if there were no pleas of guilty by Mangubat, Gabison and
Echavez, the prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLENDO GAUDIA @ LENDOY or DODO, appellant.

That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and
prejudice.

The prosecution presented Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia testified that
on 24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)[3]and Kimberly (1 year old)[4] at
their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs food at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband
was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and
could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the
whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she shouted
and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am
here, from a grove of ipil-ipil trees.[5] Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the
mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their house.[6] She found Remelyn crying, naked,
nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil
leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home
and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from
Remelyns private organ.[7]

The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack
doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the
appellant.[8] The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and
told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped.[9] At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a
neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take
Remelyn.[10] At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we
will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son
committed.[11] Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials
(kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for investigation. Amalias statement was taken.[12]

On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. Amalia stated therein that Remelyn had
told her Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos. (Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan dialect.)
Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is
crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees.

The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area.
Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after
registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw
appellant carrying a small girl in his arms.[19] He identified the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of
Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.
Issues: Whether or not the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet can be used as
evidence?

Ruling:

Appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to
Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the
trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made
by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only
Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly
transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his
personal knowledge or perception. The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to
Amalia may have been the subject of testimony[48] of Amalia. However, following the principle of res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet,[49] the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant,
since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of
compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against
appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.

G.R. No. L-17011 August 30, 1963

EMMA S. ACENAS and ALBERTO E. ACENAS, spouses, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs. ANGELA SISON and TEOFILO SISON, spouses, defendants-appellants.

Facts:

In September, 1956, Angela Sison executed a promissory note, promising to pay Emma S. Acenas the
sum of P8,160 in 26 installments, the first falling due on November 30, 1956 and the last on November
30, 1960. The note provided that failure to pay two consecutive installments would make the balance
due and demandable.

Mrs. Sison was able to pay up to August 31, 1957 only. Upon her failure to pay the balance of the note,
alleged to be in the sum of P8,391.60, she was sued. Her husband, Teofilo Sison, was joined as a
defendant pursuant to Article 113 of the Civil Code.

In their answer, Mr. Sison denied liability on the ground that he had not signed the promissory note.

Issue: Whether or not a Lawyer must be given a full authority to compromise his clients?

Ruling:

Yes.

As the trial court found, that Atty. Nicanor S. Sison, counsel for Teofilo and Angela Sison, agreed to a
judgment on confession against his clients, provided no writ of execution was issued until June 30, 1960.
But, the records do not show that Atty. Sison had authority to confess judgment. On the contrary, the
decision of March 7, 1960 states that Atty. Sison "moved for the postponement of the hearing hereof in
view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time within which to confer with them for the
purpose of amicably settling this case." This indicates that Atty. Sison lacked authority to confess
judgment, otherwise, there would have been no need for him to confer with his clients. This
circumstance should have put the trial court on an inquiry as to counsel's authority.
In the present case the attorney of the defendant was not endeavoring to collect or enforce his client's
claim, but was resisting a suit or claim against his client and consented to the credit in favor of his client.
...

In contrast, Section 21 of Rule 127 expressly requires that attorneys have special authority not only to
receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash but also to compromise their
client's litigation.

Although an attorney at law, merely as such has strictly speaking no right to make a compromise, yet a
court would be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be exclaimed
against by all, and to create an impression that the judgment of the attorney has been imposed on, or
not fairly exercised in the case. But where the sacrifice is such as to leave it scarcely possible that, with a
full knowledge of every circumstance, such a compromise could be fairly made, there can be no
hesitation in saying that the compromise, being unauthorized and being therefore itself void, ought not
to bind the injured party. Though it may assume the form of an award or of a judgment at law, the
injured party, if his own conduct has been perfectly blameless, ought to be relieved against it. . . .

The court hold therefore that it was error for the trial court to accept the confession made by counsel
without ascertaining his authority to do so, at least with respect to Teofilo Sison. With respect to Angela
Sison, however, the judgment will be maintained, there being no claim in this appeal that the confession
of judgment made in her behalf was unauthorized. In fact her liability is admitted here.

[G.R. No. L-37398. June 28, 1974.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA,
Defendants, CONRADO VILLANUEVA, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1972, in the municipality of Valenzuela, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Rosario Cabrera y
Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc, with John Doe alias Ben and Peter Doe
alias Abay, who are still at large, armed with knives or ice picks, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, holdup, take, rob and carry away with them a jeep with
plate number 84-26 S’71, Bulacan, being driven by Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and owned by one Reynaldo
Santos, Jr., with a value of P8,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said amount
of P8,000.00; that during the commission of this crime, and on the occasion thereof, the said accused in
furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie and stab
several times with the said knives or ice picks the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and thereafter was
abandoned, thereby inflicting upon the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus stabbed wounds which caused his
death after a few days of confinement in the hospital.

"At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to proceed
immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who was
found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds (pp. 12-13, tsn., May 11, 1972).
This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz . He gave an ante mortem
statement. In the ante-mortem statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the
person who hired his jeep but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his
money and jeep . In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the
police. On January 20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial confession. In the said extra-judicial
confession she pointed to appellant Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She merely
hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the robbery and the killing of the deceased were done
by appellant and his two unidentified companions.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the co –conspirator is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and
perpetrator, together with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased
Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the jeep he was driving. But said statement is obviously inadmissible
against appellant, who made timely objection thereto.

There is no question that Cabrera’s inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation
conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in
question. For this reason alone, that is, that said statement was not made during the existence of the
alleged conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased
and when she was already in the hands of the authorities, Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of.
Said provision reads:

"Admission by conspirator — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration."

There being no other evidence against appellant, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment
appealed from and to acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well as counsel for the People.

G.R. No. L-9181 November 28, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and
JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN, respondents.

Facts:

on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown,
were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos. Trial of the case started
on May 3, 1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had been presenting its evidence. During the
progress of the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty.
Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of a certain extra-
judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for
the other defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban. The Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether
different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of
defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior
proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial testimony of one of the accused is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:

The lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the
prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial
when the ruling was made.

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of
an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him.

SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to
the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent
as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between
them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was,
nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt and should have been admitted as
such.

The rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule
123, providing that:

The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession made, as in
this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end

The confessions are not before the court and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any
purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in
evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish
conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at
its disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case,
the trial Court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under
the rules of evidence, should be excluded.

G.R. No. L-19590 April 25, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA, VICTORIO ALVAREZ, DIONISIO CARASIG, and JOHN DOES,
accused, CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA and VICTOR ALVAREZ, appellants.

Facts:

At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of July 15, 1959, the lifeless body of Hector Crisostomo, then an
officer of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of dollar smugglers,
was found in his Borgward sedan car at Lias Road, Marilao, Bulacan.
Upon the advice of the NBI medico-legal officer, the cadaver was brought to Funeraria Quiogue, Manila,
for autopsy. Examination of the corpse revealed that the deceased suffered three gunshot wounds on
the head: One, at the right temple, at a point above the external auditory meatus right, the entrance
wound directed from right to left; another, at the pre-auricular region left, above the external auditory
meatus left, directed from left to right; and the last, at the temporal region, scalp, left, at a point on the
above left external auditory meatus, directed from left to right. The cause of death was shock, severe,
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds on the head.

In the course of the investigation to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime, Capt. Dionisio Carasig,
also a member of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee working with the deceased, intimated to the
PC authorities that the recent car deal of Crisostomo with Victorio Alvarez may possibly have some
connection with the killing. With that clue, an intensive investigation was pursued by the police
agencies, the Bulacan PC, the Marilao police, and the NBI agents joining hands together. Fingerprint
experts and photographers of the NBI examined the car where the body of the victim was found, but no
clear fingerprints could be detected. Upon an inspection of the car, some specimen evidence were
found, such as, one (1) cartridge case caliber .25; one (1) unfired bullet, caliber .25; one (1) slug, caliber
.25; two (2) metal jacketed bullets retrieved from the head of the victim, caliber .25; and a bag.

Upon an examination of the bag, the investigators found a Philippine Trust Co.'s check in the amount of
P1,000.00, drawn by Victoria Alvarez in favor of Crisostomo, together with a receipt signed by the
deceased acknowledging payment by Alvarez in the amount stated in the check, with a further
statement of an unpaid balance of P24,500.00.

Suspecting that Alvarez may have something to do with the killing, the authorities picked him up for
questioning. Alvarez was taken to the Criminal Investigation Section of the PC for fingerprinting and
paraffin test for gun powder residue. The result of the test, as contained in the report of Crispin Garcia,
chief chemistry section of the PC, showed the presence of gun powder residue on both hands of Alvarez.

On August 4, 1959, a complaint for murder was filed by Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Victorio Alvarez and two John Does. The victim
named in the complaint was Hector Crisostomo.

Victoria Alvarez was arrested on August 19, 1959. Immediately after his arrest, Alvarez was investigated.
He made a tape-recorded statement before Lt. Bautista and Major Santiago of the CIS at Camp Crame,
admitting that he alone shot and killed Crisostomo near Manga Avenue, Manila. (Vide question 68,
Exhibit L, statement of Alvarez, August 21, 1959.)

On August 20, 1959, Alvarez executed a handwritten statement in narrative form before the CIS in the
office of the PC Alabang headquarters (Exhibit G). In this statement, he affirmed that a certain Johnny
was the one who shot and killed Crisostomo in Marilao, Bulacan. On the same day, Alvarez made
another statement in the form of questions and answers repeating substantially the facts contained in
his handwritten statement. (Exhibit F.)

Still on the next day, August 21, 1959, Alvarez executed another statement before Capt. Rafael
Yapdiangco of the PC (Exhibit L), wherein Alvarez again admitted that he was the only one who shot and
killed Crisostomo at barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan. In this statement, Alvarez gave a detailed narration of
the participation of George Chua in the commission of the crime, as follows: "At around 8:00 o'clock
P.M. (July 14), the Borgward sedan car driven by Capt. Crisostomo was approaching our car within a
distance enough to call his attention. Johnny extended his arm and called Capt. Crisostomo. Capt.
Crisostomo's attention was attracted and he cut in and parked his car in front of the Olds mobile where
we were riding. When his car was properly parked, Capt. Carasig and George Chua approached Capt.
Crisostomo, and finally they got in; Capt. Carasig first then followed by George Chua. After a few
minutes conversation, the car driven by Capt. Crisostomo with Capt. Carasig and George in it, left and
we followed. They passed Taft Avenue towards Isaac Peral to Otis, turned left towards Nagtahan bridge,
turned right to Santa Mesa Boulevard, turned left to Santol, turned left to Pararle St., turned left to
Benito St." . . . and then we proceeded "towards Bulacan."

Alvarez further declared that he was trusted by George Chua and was chosen to be the trigger-man; that
Chua promised to pay him P35,000.00 plus P400.00 a month for killing Crisostomo; that Chua was
engaged in the business of dollar smuggling.

On September 1, 1959, the complaint was amended by including Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and
Lim Bun Ping @ Johnny Yao, together with Victorio Alvarez and two John Does.

On the basis of Alvarez' confessions, and with him as guide, the CIS agents proceeded to Chua's
residence at 1834 M.H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila. Upon arrival at the house, they were received by
Chua's wife. Inquiring for Chua, the CIS agents were told by the wife that her husband was not at home.

In the evening of August 24, 1959, George Chua, accompanied by his lawyer, Jose Uy, surrendered to
General Isagani Campo of the PC at the D & E restaurant in Quezon City, in the presence of newspaper
reporters and photographers. Immediately thereafter, George Chua was taken to Camp Crame and was
investigated by Capt. Yapdiangco and other CIS agents for three hours, after which he was allowed to
sleep. The next day, August 25, 1959, Chua was again investigated by the CIS agents. The investigation
was reduced to writing. Believing that Chua was not telling the truth, because he would not admit
participation in the crime, the investigator destroyed the statements.

On August 28, 1959, while George Chua was detained in the provincial jail of Bulacan, he asked the
warden to summon the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, because he wanted to give a statement. The
assistant provincial fiscal, Pascual K. Kiliathko, interviewed George Chua in the provincial jail on August
29, 1959. The interview was reduced to writing in the form of questions and answers (Exhibit VVV) the
pertinent portions of which are the following:

Q. — I understand from you that you sent for me?

A. — Yes, sir.

Q. — Are you ready to give the statement voluntarily and willingly?

A. — Yes, sir.

Q. — Now, Mr. George Chua, will you please state your name and other personal circumstances?

A. — (Witness does so, and said) because I am accused of murder.

Q. — What is this murder charge that you have just stated?

A. — I was implicated by Alvarez to be one of those responsible for the killing of Crisostomo.

Q. — Now Mr. Chua, what is it that you would like to state, you stated that you sent for me to give a
statement, what is that statement you would like to give?

A. — Because I want to report to you that I was maltreated by the CIS agents and forced to sign a
statement.

Q. — You stated that you were maltreated before, how were you maltreated?

A. — First I was taken to the 5th PC Co. at 12:00 o'clock midnight at Alabang, Rizal, on August 25, 1959,
and there I was handcuffed, but before I was handcuffed, I was ordered to take off my clothes and then I
was handcuffed again and blindfolded me by wrapping a towel all around my face and my head and
some of the agents turned my head seven or eight times.

. — Now, is there something more that you still like to disclose before I ask you to sign this statement?

A. — Yes, sir, I want to inform you that they also applied electric shock to my body and while doing so,
they forced me to answer the way they designed, two hours later they forced me to lie down on the
ground, then a stout agent sat on my stomach and another agent sat on my legs, and then I almost lost
consciousness.

On March 24, 1960, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for murder against Victorio
Alvarez, Dionisio Carasig, Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and two John Does, alleging that said accused,
acting in conspiracy, with the attendant qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances of treachery,
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, use of motor vehicle, nocturnity and by a band, killed
Hector Crisostomo.

There is no evidence, oral or documentary, adduced by the prosecution, other than the several
confessions of Alvarez, the confession of Chua, and the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, that would tend
to prove any overt act of Chua indicating some connection between him and the other accused
establishing a common criminal design to commit the crime.

At the trial, George Chua repudiated his confession and denied any participation in the commission of
the crime. With reference to his confession, he declared thus: "When he was investigated by the CIS
agents at Alabang PC headquarters on August 26, 1959, his eyes were 'tied' (blindfolded) with a wet
towel for about six (6) hours and the bandage was removed only at around 6:30 to 7:00 o'clock in the
morning of said date, but he cannot remember who tied his eyes; that some agents used electric shock
on his body for two (2) hours simultaneously on his left upper back, left ear and knees; that the wire
connected to his body is cranked; that he was forced to lie down after which an agent sat on his
stomach and another sat on his leg; that he was ordered to undress, and remove his shoes and socks,
then they applied the electric shock; that he signed his confession under threat, the agents telling him
that if he did not sign the statement, he will be killed and his body will be thrown away; that nobody
read to him the written statement; that he was not allowed to read his confession, and to save his life,
he just signed it.

Corroborating appellant's claim of maltreatment, Dr. Jose Eustaquio, a private physician, declared that
when he examined Chua on August 26, 1959, at the instance of the latter's lawyer, he noticed some
contusion on his left upper back, at the nape of the neck, and in the middle term called linear abrasions
also in the left upper back. His finding, however, was not put in writing. Dr. Eustaquio examined Chua for
the second time on August 27, 1959, and this time he put his findings in writing (Exh. 19-Chua, Vol. 1).
Being asked about the meaning of "multiple scratches likeline" mentioned in his medical certificate, he
said, it means linear abrasions, the cause of which he could not determine. When he was pressed to
explain the contents of his certificate, he said these scratches could have been cause by wires, rough
stones, pointed objects or similar instruments applied by other persons; that the "reddish discoloration
of the nape of the neck" which is a "contusion" may have been caused by so called trauma or in
common parlance, a blow that may cause injury either by fist or objects; that the "reddish discoloration
at the left upper back which is medial of shoulder blade" is the same as the injury on the neck which
may have been caused by any kind of object, such as fist or hand blow; that the "pinhead spot on the
left leg and multiple scratches likeline", could have been caused by a pointed object applied to the skin,
but he does not know whether electrical shocking apparatus introduced in the body could have
produced the same.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-
conspirator?

Ruling:

These findings of the three doctors, yielded one significant indication, the existence of "reddish marks
and scratch abrasions on appellant's body. True, that Dr. Arsenio Anastacio made a remark in his
medical certificate (Exh. 3-Chua) that there is "no sign of physical injury externally which can be
appreciated at the time of his examination," and Major Miguel Zarraga declared that "the abdomen
revealed no external manifestation of any injury, nor is there any area of tenderness in the whole body"
of the appellant, these remarks, however, do not detract from the fact, physically and scientifically
recognized, that some forms of torture do not usually manifest external injury on the body of the person
maltreated. For instance, sitting on the stomach and the use of electric shock, which incidentally are
among appellant's complaints, do not necessarily produce external physical injury.

The finding of the court that there was conspiracy among the accused, notwithstanding the fact that on
the same evidence, the court found one defendant not guilty, but sufficient to convict the two others,
on the court's finding and conclusion "As regards the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, the court is inclined
to give a margin of error in his identifying Carasig on the night in question . . .," is indeed, somewhat
illogical —

Since in the instant case, the widow appears also to be a star witness of the prosecution whose
testimony was given much weight in pinning liability on appellants, we wonder whether this could be
consistent and would be true to logic and fairness if it would hold that on the strength of the same
testimony which was discredited by the court, insofar as one of the appellants' co-accused in the same
case is concerned, would reach a verdict of conviction against said appellants.

Aside from the foregoing consideration, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than
the confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case,
must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or
during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must
be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court
admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not binding on the appellant for being hearsay,
aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore, no inter-
locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of
appellant Chua connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.
G.R. No. L-7973 April 27, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. CENON SERRANO alias PIPING, ET AL., defendants.

Facts:

In the evening of 16 October 1950, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano
alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes then gathered at
the sala of the house of the first in the barrio of Potrero, Bacolor, Pampanga, that Pablo Navarro had
been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu
massacre, and for that reason he manifested to them his desire and plan to do away with Navarro.
Eulogio Serrano instructed them to wait for Navarro in the town of Bacolor, lure him to go with them to
barrio Dolores and there kill him. After disclosing to them his plan, Eulogio Serrano told them to go to
sleep at the post of the civilian guards near his house. In pursuance of the plan, the next day (17
October), Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio
Reyes waited for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where
he used to hang around. Navarro did not show up that day. The following day (18 October), the group
waited for him at the same places. This time Navarro showed up at the gambling casino and Cenon
Serrano alias Piping promptly invited him to a drink but Navarro declined saying that he was going
somewhere. On 19 October, the group again waited for their quarry at the same places but failed to
make contact with him as he did not show up. At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 20 October, the
group waited for Navarro in the same places. Navarro arrived at the gambling casino between 1:00 and
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Cenon Serrano alias Piping asked him for some drinks. Navarro ordered
some drinks and all in the group except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank. After drinking the contents of
six bottles of Black Dog gin, Orange Wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine, Navarro asked Cenon Serrano alias
Piping whether what they had drunk was enough, and the latter answered "No, look for some more."
Navarro left the gambling casino, went to the market place about 20 meters away and came back
accompanied by Simplicio Manguerra bringing four bottles of Orange wine and Sy Hoc Tong wine.
Simplicio Manguerra joined the party and all except Cenon Serrano alias Piping drank the four bottles of
wine. While the spree was going on, Cenon Serrano alias Piping suggested to Pablo Navarro that they
should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which suggestion Navarro agreed. Cenon Serrano alias
Piping sent out Domingo Cadiang to look for a jeep, and Cading returned with an auto calesa jeep driven
by Marcelino Sicate. After drinking the four bottles of wine, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo
Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon, Pablo Navarro, Simplicio Manguerra and Anastacio Reyes
boarded the jeep, the first and the last sitting at the front with the driver and the rest inside. From the
gambling casino the party repaired to Don Q gasoline station to refuel and proceeded to San Fernando.
But before reaching San Fernando, Cenon Serrano alias Piping remarked that "there is no use having a
good time" in San Fernando and suggested that they should proceed to Angeles for the "good time"
which suggestion Navarro approved. On the way to Angeles Cenon Serrano alias Piping ordered the
driver to stop at Tony's Place in San Fernando to buy some more wine. After buying another jar of San
Miguel gin, part of which Navarro who was already drunk was made to drink, the party resumed their
trip; but upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon Serrano alias
Piping told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores, Bacolor, where they arrived at about 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon. There Cenon Serrano alias Piping dismissed the driver of the jeep. At barrio Dolores, the
group passed by the house of Simeon Dizon, the barrio lieutenant, told him to come down and ordered
him to call for some temporary policemen. Upon seeing Benjamin Tolentino at the house of Dizon,
Cenon Serrano alias Piping beckoned and ordered Tolentino to tie Navarro's hands with rope. Upon
Cenon Serrano's order Felipe Garcia, a civilian guard who came with Simeon Dizon, pointed a gun at
Navarro. The latter asked Cenon Serrano alias Piping why he was being tied and Cenon Serrano alias
Piping answered "You deserve to be tied up because you are against us." Navarro was brought to the
stockade of the civilian guards where he was questioned and accused Cenon Serrano alias Piping of
bringing witnesses to the house of Senator Pablo Angeles David to testify on the Maliwalu massacre. As
Navarro denied the charge, Cenon Serrano alias Piping hit Navarro with his fist, struck him with the butt
of his .45 caliber pistol and ordered Domingo Cadiang to beat up Navarro. Cadiang did as he was
ordered by beating up Navarro with a piece of bamboo about 4 inches in diameter and less than a meter
long. As a result of the beating Navarro fell down. Cenon Serrano alias Piping kicked him and ordered
him to rise, and as Navarro was rising Cadiang hit him on the back, so Navarro again fell down. Cenon
Serrano alias Piping then told Filemon Cenzon to beat up Navarro and Cenzon with the same piece of
bamboo struck Navarro on his back about the waistline as he made an effort to stand up. Cenon Serrano
alias Piping returned to where the jeep was parked and ordered Felipe Garcia to tie the hands of
Simplicio Manguerra. Upon hearing the order of Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Simplicio Manguerra asked
whether he was to be killed. Cenon Serrano answered "I will also have you killed, you son of a whole."
Manguerra clung to Anastacio Reyes begging for mercy but the latter disengaged himself from him.
Cenon Serrano alias Piping pushed Manguerra and ordered Santiago Yumul to beat him up. Santiago
Yumul hit Manguerra with a pestle on the back. Manguerra fell to the ground. Then Cenon Serrano alias
Piping ordered Domingo Cadian and Felipe Garcia to bring Manguerra to the post behind the stockade.
At this juncture Basilio de Guzman arrived and was ordered by Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill
Manguerra. De Guzman and Garcia brought Manguerra to a field in Dolores where De Guzman dug a pit
while Garcia stood guard; and after digging the pit De Guzman shot Manguerra twice and shoved
Manguerra's body in the pit and covered it with earth. Afterwards, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Domingo
Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes repaired to the house of Eulogio Serrano
in barrio Potrero to report to him that the two victims were already in barrio Dolores, arriving at barrio
Potrero at past 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As Eulogio Serrano was not in his house when Cenon
Serrano alias Piping arrived, the latter boarded the jeep of the late Maximino Serrano and drove on it to
the town of Bacolor together with Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio
Reyes. Upon reaching the second bridge at barrio San Antonio on the way to Bacolor, Santiago Yumul
alighted. The rest resumed driving to town and met Eulogio Serrano that the two men were already in
barrio Dolores. Eulogio told Cenon that he would go to Dolores. Domingo Cadiang was left in the barrio
of San Antonio while Filemon Cenzon, Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes proceeded to the
town of Bacolor.

In the afternoon of 20 October 1950, while Emiliano Manalo known also as Isaias, a civilian guard, was in
his house at barrio Dolores, Bacolor, Pampanga, Benjamin Tolentino came and asked him to help him dig
a pit at Sitio Castilang Malati, barrio Dolores, to bury a dead horse of Atilano Gopez. He acceded to his
request and helped Tolentino did it. After digging the pit he went home and then proceeded to his post
in Sitio Pigulut Mauli, barrio Dolores. Upon reaching his post he was called by Eulogio Serrano who was
outside the stockade together with Atilano Gopez, Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino talking
with another person inside the stockade who he later on learned was Pablo Navarro. He heard Eulogio
Serrano ask "Ambo, are you the one bringing those people from Maliwalu to Don Pablo? Navarro
answered that he was not the one. Eulogio Serrano then told Atilano Gopez to take Pablo Navarro out of
the stockade and to bring him along with them (Eulogio Serrano, Atilano Gopez, Benjamin Tolentino,
Melchor Esguerra and Emiliano Manalo) to barrio Potrero. When they reached sitio Castilang Malati
Eulogio Serrano ordered Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino to shoot Pablo Navarro from behind.
Melchor Esguerra and Benjamin Tolentino fired one shot each simultaneously. Navarro fell down dead.
Eulogio Serrano ordered them to bring the dead body of Pablo Navarro to the pit that Benjamin
Tolentino and Emiliano Manalo had dug and to cover it with earth. Afterwards, they walked back to
barrio Dolores. Sometime after the elections in November 1951, Atilano Gopez ordered Emiliano
Manalo and Benjamin Tolentino to exhume the bones of the late Pablo Navarro, put them in a sack and
threw them into a creek. On 6 December 1951 the chief of police of Bacolor, Benjamin Tolentino,
Melchor Esguerra, Eulogio Serrano and Emiliano Manalo, accompanied by Constabulary soldiers,
exhumed the bones of the late Pablo Navarro.

On 17 December 1951, Cenon Serrano alias Piping, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo
Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were charged with illegal detention with
murder for the death of Pablo Navarro in an information filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga. On
12 February 1952, upon motion of the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of
Anastacio Reyes from the information to testify as witness for the prosecution. Eulogio Serrano was
charged with the same crime in criminal case No. 1819 but has not yet been apprehended. Cenon
Serrano alias Piping charged with the same crime was also at large but later on arrested and brought to
trial with his co-defendants in both criminal cases for the death of Pablo Navarro (case No. 1262) and for
the death of Simplicio Manguerra (case No. 1263). The evidence for the prosecution heard against his
co-defendants before his arrest and arraignment was again presented to afford him the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-
conspirator?

Ruling:

The weak defense of alibi put up by the appellants to disprove complicity in the murder of Pablo
Navarro cannot overcome the clear and positive testimony of Anastacio Reyes that they were at the
house of Eulogio Serrano in the evening of 16 October 1950 when the latter told them to lure Pablo
Navarro to barrio Dolores and there kill him; and that they were together on 17, 18 and 19 October
waiting for Pablo Navarro in the town of Bacolor to lure him to barrio Dolores, and on 20 October when
they finally succeeded in luring him to barrio Dolores where they killed him. It is difficult to believe that
a man who had made up his mind to kill another would bring along with him other persons who know
nothing about the plan just to witness the commission of the crime. If they were not in the know, as
they contend, they also would have been done away with right then and there, in the same way
Simplicio Manguerra, who was not to be killed, had been done away with, to prevent him from reporting
to the authorities or from testifying against them in Court; or they also would have been sent away upon
arriving at barrio Dolores, in the same way that Marcelino Sicat, the driver of the jeep on which they
rode in going to the said barrio, was sent away. The way the appellants were seated in the jeep in going
to barrio Dolores-Anastacio Reyes and Cenon Serrano alias Piping at the front seat with the driver and
the three appellants on the two parallel seats inside the jeep-belies the assertion that they were
prevented by Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes from running away upon learning that
criminal act was to be committed. The assertion that Cenon Serrano alias Piping pointed his gun at them
at the gasoline station, where they stopped to refuel, to prevent them from deserting, is unbelievable,
because the gasoline station is located in the heart of the town of Bacolor, in a busy street where the
slightest commotion or any sign of distress would easily draw the attention of the nearby traffic officer
directing the traffic.

The fact that in the evening of 16 October 1950, the three appellants and their co-defendants were
gathered at the house of Eulogio Serrano, over-all commander of the civilian guard and temporary
police organizations, who ordered them to lure Pablo Navarro to barrio Dolores and to kill him there,
because he had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David to inform
him about and to testify on the Maliwalu massacre; that pursuant to the plan laid out by Eulogio
Serrano, from 17 to 20 October 1950 the appellants joined Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio
Reyes in waiting for Pablo Navarro at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor
where he used to frequent; that they were actually with Cenon Serrano alias Piping and Anastacio Reyes
when Pablo Navarro was lured to go to Dolores on the pretext of going to San Fernando and then to
Angeles for a "good time" after a drinking spree in bacolor; that they took turns in manhandling the
victim as he was hogtied and rendered helpless; and the fact that the appellants went into hiding after
the incident together with Cenon Serrano alias Piping in the barrio of Escribania, show that they were in
league with Eulogio Serrano and Cenon Serrano alias Piping to kill Pablo Navarro. Each of them is,
therefore, guilty as co-principal.

The appellants contend further that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in
evidence against his co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission
itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a
privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio
Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been established and in
convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention does
not merit serious consideration, because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,"1 applies only to extra-judicial acts
or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial,2 where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in
crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be
received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.

G.R. No. L-48185 August 18, 1941

FELICIANO B. GARDINER, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, petitioner,

vs. HONORABLE PEDRO MAGSALIN, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, ET AL., respondents.

Facts:

It appears that on October 30, 1940, the herein petitioner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, filed
an information against the said Catalino Fernandez and the herein respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio
Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired
together to kill, and that they did kill, one Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premiditation.

Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five coaccused, not guilty. At the trial of
the latter, the former was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy.
Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent judge did no permit the witness Catalino
Fernandez to testify against his coaccused, on the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or
declaration is not admissible against his coconspirators until the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration, under section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of Court. A written motion for
reconsideration, supported with lenthy argument, was filed by the fiscal to no avail. Hence the present
petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-
conspirator?

Ruling:

SEC. 12. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
That is not a new rule of evidence. It is a re-enactment of paragraph 6, section 298 of the old Code of
Civil Procedure, which provided that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence. This rule has a well-settled meaning in
jurisprudence, but apparently the respondents completely missed it. It is one of the exceptions to the
"res inter alios" rule. It refers to an extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator — not to his testimony by
way of direct evidence. For illustration, let us suppose that after the formation but before the
consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez and his five coaccused, the former
borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that he and his coaccused were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar.
Such act and declaration of Fernandez's friend to the effect that Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told
him that he (Fernandez) and his coaccused were going to kill Gaudencion Viviar would be admissible
against Fernandez, but not against his coaccused unless the conspiracy between them be proven first. It
is admissible against Fernandez because the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him (section 7, rule 123). But, without proof of conspiracy, it is not
admissible against Fernandez's coaccused because the act and declaration of Fernandez are res inter
alios as to his coaccused and, therefore, cannot affect them. But if there is conspiracy, each conspirator
is privy to the acts of the others; the act of one conspirator is the act of all the coconspirators.

To further explain the rule in the language of the jurisprudence on the subject, we add:

... The evidence adduced in court by the coconspirators as witnesses are not declarations of
conspirators, but directly testimony to the facts to which they testify. Aside from the discredit which
attaches to them as accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to establish the facts to which
they testify. The rule for which counsel contends is applicable only when it sought to introduce
extrajudicial declarations and statements of coconspirators.

There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish a conspiracy in order to permit a witness to testify
what one or all of several accused persons did; and evidence adduced by coconspirators as witnesses,
which is direct evidence of the facts to which they testify, is not within the rule requiring a conspiracy to
be shown as a prerequisite to its admissibility. ...

[G.R. No. 112262. April 2, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and WILFREDO
TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellants.

Facts: About 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 1, 1985, Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver, both
members of the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, were walking
along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila. They had just come from Camp Claudio where they
attended a birthday party. They were in civilian clothes.

While walking along Quirino Avenue, they noticed two persons trailing them closely, about ten meters
away. The place was well-lighted. Gonzalo Penalver was carrying a clutch bag, containing a Sanwa
electric tester (Exhibit 1). They crossed the street ostensibly to avoid the two men following them.

On(e) of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy and kicked the latter. Armando Camat
followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat
who in turn stabbed the former, hitting him at the right rib. When Penalver kicked Camat he became
outbalanced. Wilfredo del Rosario then grabbed the clutch bag from him (Penalver).
Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid of somebody who
identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San Juan de Dios Hospital.

Nelson Sinoy died at the San Juan de Dios Hospital despite the efforts of Dr. Vittorio Pantig to save him.
Dr. Pantig conducted an exploratory lapar(o)tomy on the abdomen of Nelson Sinoy and found massive
bleeding in the abdominal cavity, and partial damage to the kidney, pancreas and the diaphragm. He
tried to control the bleeding but despite blood transfusion, the blood pressure of the patient went down
to zero.

Gonzalo Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2, 1985 after his wound was
already sutured at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. At the AFP Medical Center, Dr. Benedicto Mina took
care of the patient. He gave blood transfusion to the patient. The patient was discharged from the
hospital only on March 15, 1986.4

In traversing the criminal charge, appellants interposed the defense of alibi and denied any participation
in the commission of the felony.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-
conspirator?

Ruling:

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that, prior to questioning, the confessant
was warned of his constitutionally protected rights because the presumption of regularity of official acts
does not apply during in-custody investigation. Trial courts should further keep in mind that even if the
confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.

As to the implication of Del Rosario in the extrajudicial confession of Camat, no reliance can be placed
on the imputation therein because it violates the rule on res inter alios acta and does not fall under the
exceptions thereto, especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.
As against the latter, the confession is hearsay.

However, even disregarding the extrajudicial confessions of appellants, the judgment of conviction
rendered by the lower court stands and can be sustained. Worthy of consideration is the trial courts
conclusion that (a)lthough there is only one (1) eyewitness presented by the prosecution in the person
of Gonzalo Penalver, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the prosecution has satisfactorily
proved the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable doubt.22

It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing and trustworthy by the
trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23 We also see no reason
to deviate from the trial courts observation that Penalver s testimony bore the attributes of truth,
having been delivered in a candid and straightforward manner.

We have scrupulously examined the testimony of Penalver and we find the same to be categorical and
candid, untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It creditably chronicles the material
details in the commission of the crimes in question, and should accordingly be given full credence.

G.R. No. 123545. October 18, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ MADELO, JIM
MERCENE y BUSAR @ EMI, CARLITO DECENA y PARDELA, and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, and JOHN DOES,
accused,

RODELO PALIJON y URHINA @ MADELO and MYRA PRIA y BAGSIC, accused-appellants.

Facts:

At around two oclock in the morning of August 27, 1993, Rodelo Palijon,[1] Carlos Decena,[2] and Jim
Mercene entered the yard of the residence in San Pablo City of the spouses Gonzalo and Mellorequina
Reyes. Both were elderly returnees (balikbayans), recently arrived from the United States.

Decena entered the house by climbing a post and removing some glass panes from the jalousy windows.
Once inside, Decena and Mercene positioned themselves near the couples bedroom door and waited
for someone to open it so they could take cash and jewelry from the bedroom. Palijon remained outside
the house, as look-out.

Around four oclock A.M., Mrs. Reyes came out the bedroom to go to the bathroom. She did not notice
the intruders. Decena then followed her to the toilet where he kicked and boxed her. Mrs. Reyes
managed to shout for help before she fainted. Mr. Reyes rushed to assist his wife. Decena met him, with
a steel-edged stool and struck him hard several times. Mr. Reyes fell prostrate on the floor. The robbers
ransacked the house then escaped.

Prosecution witness Merly Reyes Alvero, a daughter of the Reyes couple, who lived some distance away,
was roused from her sleep by a phone call from her cousin, Edith Bicomong. A hysterical Bicomong told
Alvero that the latters parents were hospitalized and in critical condition. Alvero dashed off to the
hospital and was able to talk to her mother. Alvero then proceeded to the house of her parents. An
inspection of the bedroom of the spouses Reyes revealed that cash amounting to P17,000.00 and
various pieces of jewelry belonging to her mother, worth P100,000.00 were missing.

At 10:55 A.M., Mr. Gonzales died from his injuries. The immediate cause of death was cardio-respiratory
failure caused by severe contusion hematoma of head (right side, liver, and chest wall due to severe
beatings, with suspicious multiple fractures, ribs, 5th and 7th, right.)[3]

In an Information dated October 14, 1993, the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City charged
Rodelo Palijon, Jim Mercene, Carlos Decena, Myra Pria, and several John Does, with robbery and
homicide, allegedly committed.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-
conspirator?

Ruling:

The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property and not
against persons, the homicide being a mere incident of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery
with homicide, it is essential that the robbery itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The onus
probandi is, thus, upon the prosecution to prove the following: (1) the taking of personal property with
violence or intimidation against persons or by using force upon things; (2) that the property taken
belongs to another; (3) that the taking was characterized by animus lucrandi; and (4) that on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide was committed.

The prosecution presented both object and testimonial evidence that personal property of the victims
were taken. Alvero testified that she was familiar with her mothers jewelry having borrowed some of
the items on past occasions. After she inspected her parents house she discovered cash and valuable
pieces of jewelry missing. Alvero also identified, in open court, the broken jewelry box, some pieces of
fancy jewelry and other items of her mother recovered at the crime scene.[Under cross-examination,
Alvero was categorical in her account that the more expensive pieces of jewelry of her mother were
missing. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of Alvero is entitled to great respect. It is binding
on this court in the absence of any showing that the trial courts finding was not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.We also note that the
physical evidence of the prosecution corroborated Alveros account that her parents had been robbed.
Physical evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates highly in the hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.

It is appellant Prias contention that the prosecutions evidence implicating her is weak and shaky. She
points out that when her co-accused planned the robbery in appellant Palijons house, she was some
distance from them and could not have heard their scheme. She also avers that she was sleeping at the
time of the incident, and did not participate in the robbery.

In the instant case, both prosecution witness Mercene and defense witness Decena admitted the
existence of a conspiracy to rob the victims. However, their versions as to the participation of appellant
Pria differ. Mercene testified that he and his co-accused agreed to enter and rob the house of the Reyes
couple during the wee hours of the morning of August 27, 1993. According to Mercene it was appellant
Pria who: (1) informed them of the arrival of the Reyes spouses from abroad; (2) told them that the
balikbayans had a lot of money being; and (3) told them how to enter the house. Decena, admits that
Pria was present when they plotted the robbery,but vehemently insists that she had no participation in
its planning. Decena claims that Pria was there only to attend to their child, and she was sleeping when
he and Mercene broke into the house of the victims.To buttress Decenas testimony, the defense
presented three of his letters to Pria, written in prison, clearing her of any knowledge or participation in
the crime.

After reviewing the transcripts and circumstances extant to the case, we find that the trial court did not
err in giving credence to the testimony of Mercene. The latter testified that Pria was only 1-1/2 meters
away from them when they were plotting the robbery.The house of Palijon where they hatched their
plan is a small, one-room house with an area of approximately twenty (20) meters only.Both facts
clearly show that Pria could easily participate in the discussion of the conspirators. Mercenes
declarations are positive testimonial evidence. They outweigh Decenas unsubstantiated denial of Prias
participation in the criminal conspiracy. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a
credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.

In our view, notwithstanding her absence from the actual crime scene, Pria, as a conspirator, is as liable
for robbery with homicide just as if she had participated in the actual robbing and killing. At the instant
that the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and pursue it, each and every
member of the conspiracy is criminally liable for the felony committed by anyone of them.

Appellant Palijon denies he conspired with the others. He says the trial court erred in convicting him on
the basis of the testimonies of his alleged conspirators. Their testimonies could not be taken against him
under the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet as formulated in Sections 28[38] and
30,[39] Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.

There is conspiracy to commit a crime, where at the time the malefactors of the crime, their actions
impliedly showed a unity of purpose to attain their illicit ends. One who joins a criminal conspiracy
adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy
once it has materialized.
[G.R. No. 123070. April 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CASIANO BUNTAG alias CIANO and DIEGO BONGO, appellants.

Facts:

Before February 8, 1992, Berno Georg Otte,[3] a German national and a tourist, checked in at the Alona
Ville Beach Resort located in Panglao, Bohol. The resort manager, Herma Clarabal Bonga,[4] assigned
Otte to Room No. 9[5] and gave the latter his room key.

On February 8, 1992, Otte took his dinner at the resorts restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the
disco which was about to unfold that night in lower Tawala near the Catibo Chapel.[6]

At about 10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of the tables.[7]
She noticed that he had some companions whom she failed to recognize.[8]

Isidro A. Mihangos, a 19-year-old student, and Benigno Ninoy Guigue were also at the disco. At around
2:00 a.m. of February 9, 1992, Mihangos and Guigue decided to call it a night and walked home, with
their respective bicycles at their sides.[9] At the crossing to the Alona Beach, they saw a man lying on
the road but did not recognize him. They walked past the prostrate man. When they were about twenty-
five meters[10] away from the body by the road, they met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their
barriomates.[11] Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo jointly and simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for
their lives, Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigues uncle, Aquilino
Bongo.[12] In the process, they left their bicycles behind. Aquilino Bongo then accompanied Mihangos
and Guigue to where they left their bicycles. Mihangos and Guigue retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag
and Bongo were no longer there.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his co-
conspirator?

Ruling:

We agree with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that they conspired
to kill Otte and that they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However, we find and so hold, after an
incisive review of the records, that the prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove
the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may
be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime.[36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the
said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.[37] It is not
necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the
conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction
if the following requisites are established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been established; and, (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused. The same rule applies if the
extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the
declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible
against both accused.The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission when repeated during the trial
is transposed into judicial admissions.

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of facts by the
accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his
criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or
truths charged. It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.A confession, on the
other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.

In this case, appellant Buntag made extrajudicial admissions against his interest in his sworn statement,
and not a confession. So did appellant Bongo in his counter-affidavit. Such admissions in the form of
affidavits, made in the Municipal Trial Court in the course of its preliminary investigation, are high
quality evidence. MCTC Judge Antonio Sarce testified on the said sworn statement and counter-affidavit
and was cross-examined. Moreover, some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of one appellant
are identical with some of the extrajudicial inculpatory admissions of the other, and vice versa. This
corroborates and confirms their veracity. Such admissions, made without collusion, are akin to
interlocking extrajudicial confessions. They are admissible as circumstantial evidence against the other
appellant implicated therein to show the probability of his participation in the commission of the crime
and as corroborative evidence against him. The Court rejects the appellants contention that they were
deprived of their right to cross-examine the other on the latters admissions against the other. Through
their common counsel, they opted not to testify and be cross-examined on their respective statements
by the prosecution. They opted to file a motion to acquit. Besides, they had opportunity to cross-
examine Judge Sarce before whom they swore to the truthfulness of their statements.

Facts:

In the regional level, the requisition of funds for public works purposes, especially in the matter of road
and bridge repairs, involves a graduated series of steps. As found by the respondent Sandiganbayan, it
begins with the Sub-Allotment Advices (SAAs), as well as the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings
(ACDCs), issued by the Ministry of Public Highways in favor of its Highways Regional Offices. These serve
as the Regional Offices' authority to obligate and disburse funds. In turn, these become the sources of
funds of the various Engineering Districts apportioned throughout each region.

The Engineering District then requests for the release of these funds from the Regional Director through
a Program of Work. The Regional Finance Officer issues a Letter of Advice of Allotment (LAA), certified as
to availability of funds by the Regional Accountant countersigned by the Regional Director, and
addressed to the District (or City, as the case may be) Engineer. At the same time, he (the Regional
Finance Officer) prepares a Sub-Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDC) for the Regional Director.

The LAA and SACDC are subsequently entered in a logbook. The funds requested are then released.

On the strength of such LAA and SACDC, the District then prepares a Requisition for Supplies or
Equipment (RSE) as well as a Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA), pursuant to the Program of
Work. Both are likewise certified as to availability of funds by the Regional Accountant and approved by
the Regional Director.

Thereafter, the Property Custodian or the Purchasing Officer, as the case may be, addresses Requests
for Sealed Quotations to various suppliers, usually through newspaper advertisements or notices posted
in conspicuous places in the District concerned. After ten days, the Sealed Quotations are submitted to
the Price Verification Committee which determines the lowest bid in the presence of representatives of
the District Engineer and the Auditor. An Abstract of Sealed Quotations is then signed by the members
of the Committee as well as the said local representatives. Thereafter, and subject to the approval of the
District Engineer, the proper award is made in favor of the lowest bidder. On the basis thereof, the
Property Custodian issues a Purchase Order (PO) in favor of the winning bidder, again subject to the
approval of the District Engineer and certified as to availability of funds by the Regional Accountant.

The supplies thus to be delivered are thereafter inspected (through Request for Inspection) by the
Property Custodian. The deliveries themselves are recorded in a Tally Sheet after which a Record of
Inspection, certified by the Property Custodian, is prepared by the representative of the Auditor and the
Property Custodian.

Payment to the supplier is evidenced by a General Voucher (GV). Among others, the GV contains five
parts; (1) a certification of receipt of supplies to be accomplished by the Property Custodian; (2) a
certification of correctness, that is, that the expenses are necessary and lawful, and that the prices are
not in excess of the current rates in the locality, to be accomplished by the Project Engineer; (3)
approval by the District Engineer; (4) a certification, to be accomplished by the Auditor, that the GV has
been properly approved, its account codes proper, and that it is supported by the proper documents;
and (5) a certification that the GV has undergone pre-audit, to be accomplished by the Auditor.

The GV itself must carry with it the following: the RSE, ROA, Program of Work, Detailed Estimates,
Request for Sealed Quotations, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, PO, Delivery Receipts, Request for
Inspection, Record of Inspection, Test Reports, and Tax Clearance of the supplier.

The process winds up with the issuance of the check by the Cashier in the name of the supplier. Like the
GV, the check is pre-audited and then released.

The District Accountant thereafter prepares a Report of Obligation Incurred (ROI) and a Report of
Checks Issued (RCI) to be submitted to the Regional Office and entered in the journals and the General
Ledger thereof. On the basis thereof, the Regional Accountant prepares a trial balance to be
recommended by the Finance Officer and approved by the Regional Director. The same is then
submitted to the Ministry of Public Highways.

It appears that from May through June, 1978, the Tagbilaran City Engineering Office (CEO) embarked on
certain projects involving the restoration of various roads and bridges in Tagbilaran City. Pursuant to five
LAAs addressed to the Ministry of Public Highways purportedly issued by the Seventh Regional Highways
Office on behalf of the Tagbilaran CEO, more specifically described as follows:

LAA No.
Date
Amount

107-780-05-78

April 29, 1978

P 150,000.00

107-0780-07-78

No date

26,000.00
107-780-012-78

April 24, 1978

48,100.00

107-780-014-78

April 24, 1978

150,000.00

107-780-011-78

No date

100,000.00

TOTAL

P 474,100.00

as well as six SACDCs, as follows:

SACDC No.

Amount

022-78

P 26,000.00

167-78

48,100.00

180-78

48,100.00

193-78

150,000.00
222-78

150,000.00

086-78

225,830.00

TOTAL

P 699,930.00

the Tagbilaran CEO prepared RSEs and ROAs for the procurement of materials and supplies, specifically,
anapog binder, for the projects aforementioned. All five LAAs were certified as to availability of funds by
Rolando Mangubat, allegedly on behalf of Angelina Escao, Finance Officer of the Seventh Regional
Highways Office (Mangubat signed over her typewritten name) and countersigned by Jose Bagasao. The
six SACDs were likewise signed by Mangubat for the Regional Director. The materials requisitioned were
supplied by JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, a private contractorship owned by James Tiu. Six
GVs were prepared therefor, as follows:

GV No.

Program of Work

Amount

01-780601

Restoration of Shoulders, Tagbiliaran North Road (TNR), Junction TNR-Airport Road, Junction TNR-Wharf
Road and TCSR

P 49,980.00

01-780606

Restoration of Shoulders, Tagbilaran North Road (TNR), Junction TNR-Wharf Road

49,980.00

01-780641

Restoration of Shourders, Tagbilaran Corella-Sikatuna Road

49,980.00

01-780682

Restoration, Totulan-Ubos-Dauis Bridge Approaches

49,980.00

01-780684

Restoration, Totulan, Ubos-Dauis Bridge Approaches

49,980.00

01-780694

Restoration, Junction, Tagbilaran East Road-Dauis Paulao Central Road Shoulders and Bridge Approaches

49,980.00

TOTAL

P 299,880.00

representing partial payments in favor of JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, which has been
named as a creditor therein. The GVs themselves were accompanied by various supporting papers,
among them, the RSEs and ROAs earlier referred to.

Eventually, the matter reached the Commission on Audit which constituted two teams to mount an
inquiry.

The investigation disclosed that the above mentioned LAAs as well as SACDCs were spurious documents,
and that the six GVs were in fact based on only two LAAs, Nos. 107-780-05-78 and 107-780-014-78. It
was further established that the total sum requested under the said LAAs P474,100.00 supposedly to
cover the Tagbilaran CEO's unliquidated obligations were not in fact supported by its statement of
accounts, under which its total obligations totalled but P160,639.55. Moreover, the payee, JV Sand &
Gravel & Construction Supply, was not listed in the City's books as a creditor, for which it could have
been entitled to the sums released.

The Audit Commission likewise observed certain discrepancies in the GVs in question, notably, that the
Programs of Work had been "split"; that they were dated after the dates of the RSEs; that while the POs
called for 9,369 to 9,375 cubic meters of anapog binder, the GVs specified but 3,123 to 3,125 cubic
meters thereof apiece; that the Delivery Receipts had been issued "in lump quantities," did not bear
acknowledgment signatures or were not initialled by the auditor or dated after the dates of the pre-
audit; that the biddings were irregular; and that anapog had been short-delivered.

The Commission on Audit moreover found that the Highways Regional Office, as of this period, had in
fact released "doubtful" allotments to ten districts, the Tagbilaran CEO among them, in the total sum of
P24,052,750.00 supposedly to cover unliquidated obligations, although the statements of account
thereof showed a total of only P2,735,181.98 as and for unliquidated obligations.

The very books of the Regional Office appeared furthermore to have been doctored. For while the total
unliquidated obligations totalled only P2,586,306.78, the entry in the Regional Office's general ledger
was P35,509,002.99. And in payment of such doubtful obligations, the checks issued exceeded the cash
disbursement ceiling by P6,837,971.35. Apparently, it was Rolando Mangubat who recorded these
entries by way of seven Journal Vouchers (JVs).

It likewise turned out that James Tiu subsequently opened certain savings accounts at the Allied Bank in
favor of Nio Pilayre, Praxedes Lopena, and Miguel Bulac, although Lopena insists that as far as she was
concerned, she knew nothing about it.[9]
The Tanodbayan filed six Informations for estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents against nine public officials[10] and two private individuals[11] on the basis of conspiracy.
Later, additional public officials[12] were included in some of these Informations. It is only in Criminal
Case Nos. 195, 198 and 199 that petitioner Bolotaulo is a co-accused. Except for the amounts involved,
the quantities of anapog binder allegedly requisitioned and delivered, the six Informations were
uniformly worded as follows:

That, in or about and during the period from the months of April to June, 1978, in the City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the public officials, who by reason of the
duties of their office, are accountable officers, and conspiring and conniving among themselves, as well
as with their private party co-accused, after having falsified or caused to have falsified Letters of Advice
of Allotment No. 107-780-05-78 and No. 107-780-014-78, both dated April 24, 1978 and Sub-Advices of
Cash Disbursement Ceiling No. 193-78 dated April 28, 1978 and No. 222-78 dated May 2, 1978, which
are all public documents, whereby said accused made it appear that an amount of Three Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) had been lawfully allocated for the City of Tagbilaran from the MPH Regional
Highway Office No. VII, Cebu City, and made available For the maintenance of existing and unabandoned
roads and bridges in the City of Tagbilaran, which falsifications had been committed in connection with
the functions of their respective offices, then taking advantage of their official positions and committing
in relation to the functions of their respective offices, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify or cause to have falsified General Voucher,[13] covering the sum of Forty-Nine
Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Pesos (P49,980.00) for the payment of road shouldering materials
(anapog binder), with the use of the aforesaid falsified Letters of Advice of Allotment and Sub-advices of
Cash Disbursement Ceiling to support thereof and other documents, such as the Program of
Work/Budget Cost for Roads and Bridges dated May 8, 1978, Request for Obligation of Allotment dated
May 16, 1978, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, Purchase Orders dated June 9, 1978, Record of Inspection
dated June 9, 1978, and other papers in support thereof, by making it appear that the request for
obligation of allotment was regularly prepared and approved, that the bidding of materials was properly
conducted, that the corresponding purchase order was prepared in favor of the lowest bidder, and that
the materials purchased were duly and fully delivered in accordance with specifications and duly
inspected, when in truth and in fact, as the accused fully knew well, the foregoing transactions were
false and simulated, except that, with the amount of 3,123 cubic meters of anapog binder having been
purchased for the sum of P49,980.00 at the rate of P16.00 per cubic meter, accused Jimmy Tiu and his
representative accused Engracio Quiroz, by previous understanding with the accused officials, had
caused the delivery only of (quantity) cubic meters of anapog binders, hence causing the Government to
lose (quantity) cubic meters and worth (amount) at the rate of P16.00 per cubic meter; thus, the said
accused having in said manner in a narration of facts; and that, by means of the aforesaid falsifications,
the said accused were able to demand, collect and receive from the government thru the Tagbilaran City
Engineers Office, MPH Regional office No. VII, the value of the vouchers in question although the
amount due should have been only the value of the actual quantities delivered, and that, after the
accused after having demanded, collected and received, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit, and/or consent
or, through negligence, permit other persons to take, misapply, misappropriate, and convert to their
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in convicting petitioners and the other accused on
the basis of conspiracy?

Ruling:

The prosecution had clearly established that because of the fake LAAs, SACDCs and the general vouchers
with all its supporting documents, the government through the Tagbilaran CEO had disbursed funds for
projects which were short delivered. Since there were short deliveries of anapog binder to the alleged
projects sites, it resulted to the government suffering losses. We quote with approval the findings of the
Sandiganbayan on this matter, thus:

It is only logical that, if funds are disbursed without any appropriation, there is actually a payment of
money out of the Treasury without any sanction in law. In such case, the Government suffers a loss of so
much as is disbursed. Of course, in the cases at bar, the People adopted a more realistic approach to the
situation. It opted to hold the perpetrators of the fraudulent transactions liable only up to the amount
of the actual loss sustained, evidently because it concedes that there had been some deliveries, albeit
minimal. And, there can be no question that, if a contract is entered into with the Government for a
given quantity of materials and the entire contract price is paid but only a quantity less than that
contracted for is actually delivered, the Government would naturally be prejudiced to the extent of the
value of the materials not delivered. This is precisely what happened here. Therefore, it is altogether off-
tangent for the accused to contend that, because no statement of loss consequent to the transactions
here involved had been presented from the National Treasury or from the Philippine National Bank, no
justifiable finding of damage to the Government can be made. This would be closing ones eyes to reality.
For, the stark reality is that certain amounts have in fact been paid by the Government for materials that
were short-delivered. Accordingly, we hold that damage to the extent of the value of said short-delivery
was sustained. Considering that it is undeniable that the damage came about thru the deceitful medium
of the multiple falsifications here found to have been perpetrated, it is ineluctably clear that said
falsifications were the means to the perpetration of a crime of estafa. As correctly formulated in the
Informations herein, the crime committed in each of the cases at bar is estafa thru falsification of public
documents.

This ushers the Court to the determination of the extent of the damage caused to the Government. On
this score, the evidence bears looking into. Restituto Castro, testifying for the People, detailed the
volume of deliveries made to various sections of the roads and bridge approaches covered by the
projects here involved based on his counting of truckloads of anapog extracted from the Belderol Co and
Picmao quarries and brought to the restoration sites. On the other hand, Assistant Provincial Engineer
Sarmiento also made documented estimates of the volume of anapog delivered and significantly,
enough, even after reckoning with pertinent factors bearing on the matter-including the time lapse
between the date of spreading and the date of inspection, the effect of erosion, and a shrinkage factor
of 20% and 30% as the case may be- came up with figures higher than those arrived at by Castro. So
much so that, giving the defense the benefit of the doubt, the Court elects to go by the figures furnished
by Engineer Sarmiento as bases for reckoning the damage caused. For this purpose, the amount to be
considered as starting point should be the face value of the respective checks actually paid to accused
Tiu, that is to say, deducting the amount paid to the City Treasurer for Mining Fees. And, the value of
anapog delivered should be taken at the price it was supposed to have been sold to the Government,
that is P16.00 per cubic meter.

It bears stressing that the fraudulent issuances of the LAAs, SACDCs, GVs and its supporting documents
and the journal vouchers and short deliveries are now settled issues. As we have earlier stated, we
upheld the findings of the Sandiganbayan in four petitions brought to us by the four co-accused of
herein petitioners which involved the same decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 195 to
200 covering the same transactions.[26]

Thus, the only issue now is whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in finding petitioner Bolotaulo guilty
of conspiracy in committing the crime charged.

Petitioner Bolotaulo was convicted for his signature in the RSEs, in the abstract of sealed quotations and
for signing the general voucher certifying that the expenses are necessary, lawful and incurred under his
direct supervision, and that the price is just and reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the
locality. He, however, contends that he merely performed his duties and responsibilities in affixing his
signatures on those documents.

Petitioner, as the Senior Civil Engineer of the Tagbilaran CEO, was the one who prepared the three
Request for Supplies or Equipment (RSEs)which were all dated April 11, 1978 allegedly on the basis of
three programs of work he recommended for approval which were all dated May 8, 1978. Notably,
however, the RSEs antedated the programs of work which is an anomalous circumstance since the RSEs
needed for the prosecution of the projects are only based on the programs of work. In fact, petitioner, in
his cross-examination, admitted that he cannot prepare a RSE without an approved program of work
and that it is the normal and regular procedure; that if the program of work is prepared later than the
RSE, there must be something irregular about it.

No satisfactory explanation was advanced by petitioner on why the RSEs antedated the programs of
work as all he could say was that it was not his concern which of these two came ahead as long as that
at the time he was signing the general voucher, the program of work was there. As the Sandiganbayan
found, it unmasks the RSEs and/or Programs of Work as falsificiations since the former cannot be said to
be O.K. as to program of work, as therein stated since at the time of their preparation, no program of
work was yet in existence and that the latter can only be said to have been subsequently prepared to
plug a veritable loophole.

In fact, the RSEs are not even in accord with the program of work. While petitioner recommended the
approval of the three programs of work each calling for the use of 3,123 cubic meters of selected
borrow (Item 108) as well as the detailed estimates which also called for the use of selected borrow, the
three RSEs which petitioner prepared called for the use of anapog binder. No explanation was offered as
to why there was such a discrepancy.

Notably, petitioner Bolotaulo recommended for approval three programs of work which all cost not
more than P50,000.00 each. As established by the testimony of prosecution witness, Miguel V. Bulac,
this was so since petitioner Bolotaulos co-accused City Engineer Castillo could not approve program of
work exceeding P50,000.00 because in excess of that amount, the program of work has to be approved
by the Regional Director.[33] In fact, Engr. Castillo admitted that program of work in excess of
P50,000.00 needs the approval of the region.[34] As we earlier stated, we affirmed the conviction of City
Engineer Castillo.

Petitioner Bolotaulo signed three GVs certifying that the expenses are necessary, lawful and incurred
under his direct supervision, and that the price is just and reasonable and not in excess of the current
rates in the locality. Attached to these GVs as supporting documents are the programs of work, the
RSEs, the requests for sealed quotations and the purchase orders among others. He signed the GVs
despite the fact that the RSEs antedated the programs of work. He could not have failed to notice that
there was only one set of request for sealed quotation for the total of 9,369 cubic meters of anapog
binders and one purchase order which supported the three GVs all for amounts less than P50,000.00
each to the same contractor/ supplier James Tiu. The issuance of three GVs for amounts less than
P50,000.00 each was resorted to since a higher amount would have required the vouchers to be
forwarded to the Regional Auditor for action and review. The RSEs and the GVs had been split into
uniform amounts of not more than P50,000.00 each which is a clear case of splitting of requisitions and
general vouchers prohibited by the Commission on Audit Circular No. 76- 41 dated July 30, 1976.

As defined by the Circular, splitting in its literal sense means dividing or breaking up into separate parts
or portions, or an act resulting in a fissure, rupture, breach. Within the sphere of government
procurement, splitting is associated with requisitions, purchase orders, deliveries and payments.

Splitting may be in the form of (1) Splitting of Requisi3tions which consists in the non-consolidation of
requisitions for one or more items needed at about the same time by the requisitioner; (2) Splitting of
Purchase orders which consists in the issuance of two or more purchase orders based on two or more
requisitions for the same or at about the same time by the different requisitioners; and (3) Splitting of
payments which consists in making two or more payments for one or more items involving one purchase
order. These forms of splitting are resorted to in order to avoid (a) inspection of deliveries, (b) action,
review or approval by higher authorities; or (c) public bidding.

There is also no truth to petitioner Bolotaulos certification in the general voucher that the price of the
materials requisitioned is just and reasonable and not in excess of the current rates in the locality
considering that it was established that there was irregularity in the bidding held on May 24, 1978.
Finally, petitioner argues that assuming that there were admissions from the other co-accused, the
alleged conspiracy must first be proven by evidence other than the declaration of a co-conspirator citing
Section 27 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 27. Admission by conspirator- The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.

The argument is devoid of merit.

Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to
testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.

G.R. No. L-12794 October 14, 1918

ELADIO ALPUERTO, plaintiff-appelle,

vs. JOSE PEREZ PASTOR and MANUEL ROA, provincial sheriff of Cebu, defendants-appellants.

Facts:

The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the contention in this case
formerly belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested parties in this action claim titled under, the
plaintiff as party in possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the defendant as
purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against Llenos. the plaintiff, Eladio Alpuerto, asks
the court to make a declaration against the defendant, Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff
is the owner thereof in full and absolute dominion.

The defendant Pastor denies the right of the plaintiff to the relief sought, and asserts that the
transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired titled was simulated or fictitious and that the
supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Juan
Llenos. This defendant therefore in turn prays the court to declare that he himself is the true owner of
the property and that a judgment be entered condemning the plaintiff to surrender possession to him.

The plaintiff claims by virtue of the document (Exhibit A), which purports to be a contract of sale with
the privilege of repurchase. It recites a consideration of P2,500 the payment of which is acknowledged;
and the stipulated period within which is acknowledge; and the stipulated period within which the
vendor may repurchase the property is fixed at two years. This documents is signed by the two
contracting parties (Juan Llenos and Eladio Alpuerto) and is attested by two subscribing witnesses. It
purports on its face to have been executed on July 3, 1912; just it was not acknowledged before a notary
until December 3, 1914.

Issue: Was the transfer in question made after a judgment had been entered against Juan Llenos in
either instance?

Ruling:
Concerning the meaning of the expression "privies" (causabientes), in this article, the following passage
is found in the Commentary of Manresa:

The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only be right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but
also that of succession by singular title, derived form acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an
assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, etc., will be privies; in short, he, who by succession is
placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private
document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and obligations, is a privy.

Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term "privies", it is clear that Jose Perez
Pastor, the purchaser at the public sale under an execution directed against Juan Llenos, must be
considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound
by the instrument which conveyed the property to Eladio Alpuerto — and this from the date of the
execution of that instrument as a private document-unless this result is prohibited by article 1227 of the
Civil Code, which reads as follows:

The date of a private instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the date on
which it may have been filed or entered in a public registry, from the date on which it may have been
delivered to a public official by virtue of his office.

In considering this article it is important to bear in mind that it has reference merely to the probative
value of the document with respect to the date of its execution, and is not intended to lay down any rule
concerning the efficacy of the act or acts evidenced by the document. (The importance of the rule here
declared is therefore most conspicuously revealed in the situation where the document itself contains
the only competent evidence before the court bearing upon the date upon which the instrument in
question was executed as a private document.

[G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905. ]

THE CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACINTO DEL ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant.

Facts:

This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the complaint, located in Calles
Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant.

Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony of John
R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The first witness testified that he did not
know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city .The next witness testified that
the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to
the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs .
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran
Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his testimony is at
variance with that of the preceding witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central
Government. Villega’s testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of
the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently
for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land, drawing from
this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the
section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation.
The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.

Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between the
municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central Government (not
the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the
property abuts .

The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified merely that Lorenzo del Rosario had paid 100 pesos to her
brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory information as to the property
abutting on Calle Clavel. It appears that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and
sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario, the defendant in this case. Notwithstanding this, and assuming
that the hearsay testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we do not see how it can be inferred from her
testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the property.

The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership of the land. They
simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff.
Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the
"mayor of the city of manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the letter written by him on the 9th
of October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila. Lorenzo del Rosario in his testimony, admitted the
authenticity of both documents which contain an offer to the municipality of Manila to purchase the
land on Calle Clavel. Lorenzo del Rosario admitted also that he signed the first document under the
misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been subsequently informed by
some of the city officials that the land did not belong to the municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera.
He stated that he signed the second document because the President of the Municipal Board, Señor
Herrera, advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was
not contradicted. We accordingly hold that the provisions of section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure
are applicable to the case at bar in so far as they declare that an offer of compromise is not admissible in
evidence.

Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the
ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had transferred
the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered, as
the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is so, whatever
statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the documents mentioned, they are not binding
upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title
to real property from another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation to the property,
is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title."

the two public instruments executed on March 7, 1900, between the defendant and Telesfora Apostol y
Perea, also introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, show that the defendant was in possession of the
land under a good title and with the status of owner of the land. In the first instrument if is stated so
many words that the defendant is the owner in fee simple of the land, he having repurchased it from
Liberio de Aurteneche y Menchacatorre, whose title had been recorded in the property register.

From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not prove its claim of
title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the plaintiff nor the
documentary evidence introduced show that the city of Manila is the owner of the land, or that it has a
right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the documents introduced, as well as the
two public instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions
of the defendant rather than those of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the
complaint that the defendant’s possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March,
1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that the defendant had
been in the adverse possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be
presumed to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown.

[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),
FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA
[IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.

Facts:
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in relation to
Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now
estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-
gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various
foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:

(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;

(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;

(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;

(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and

(5) Maler Foundation accounts.

In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which
exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired
property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.

On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.

Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements[6] dated
December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the
enforcement thereof.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of
and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained
therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of its premises or whereas clauses the
fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that
the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of
the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x. The said decision of the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioners
request for legal assistance.[7] Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated
foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in
favor of the parties entitled to restitution.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s claim of lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding
the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts is sufficient as
evidence?

Ruling:
The general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were
not privy to the transactions cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs
and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father
vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.

PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993

The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos
stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and
substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single
document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides:

The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs
which shall contain, among others:

(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;

(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.[49]

It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to
state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence
each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a
description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the
documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and
law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a trial.
Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues
and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified
period for the prompt disposition of the action.[50]

The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely
stated:

WITNESSES

4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present additional
witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be
necessary in the course of the trial.

Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the
names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the
testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And
even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such
cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine
issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment.

G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE. PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.

Facts:
, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ Furnitures located along Tomas Mapua
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary
Jay. The intruders made their way into the furniture shop through the window grills they detached on
the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded
the two (2) maids of the owners into the bathroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood
Furniture, along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their
bedroom. Sensing however that something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door to
peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around her neck while another poked a balisong at her nape. She
was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered to open the drawers where she kept money. A third
man ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back, stuffed her mouth with a towel,
and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth P30,000.00.

Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the
bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the two
(2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho, dashed out of the
bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing Mary, the two (2) maids
untied her hands and took out the towel from her mouth. They then rushed to the ground floor where
they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of furniture which were in disarray. He
succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.

In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives
of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, while with his girlfriend
Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw his co-workers Marlo
Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda then confirmed the
information of Bartolome to the police investigators who also learned that the trio who were all from
Samar failed to report for work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go
to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather of his sister's child.

Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and Jenelyn
Valle went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his companions.
From the records of the parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar Mabini stood as
godfather in the baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez. Immediately they proceeded
to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and his companions already left the day
before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning to leave.

After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses, accused Marlo
Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to
Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However after regaining his
composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted his guilt and pointed to the arresting
officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil
was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated. On their way back to
Manila, he was again questioned. He confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was
with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were
and his participation as a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture
shop since he would be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside.
Compil said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they
all met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio Pakit,
where they shared the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all left for Quezon
and agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.

On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo Compil.
Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After the prosecution
had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing evidence filed a demurrer
to evidence.

On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49,1 denied the demurrer, found the accused
guilty of robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his constitutional
rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police officers started
interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at the Tayabas Police
Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and declare statements that
can be used against him in any proceeding."2 And, the belated arrival of counsel from the CLAO prior to
the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did not cure the constitutional infirmity since
the police investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from him the day before, which
extracted statements formed part of his alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the
admission of (his) oral . . . and . . . written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of other
witnesses"3 which are replete with "serious and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions."

Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:
In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation
upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas
Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents
again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the
crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.

The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract
incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed
extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.

What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained to the
accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the records, the
latter's constitutional rights and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial confession.

While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details which
could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence uncovered by the
investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit constitutional infirmity.
Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his behalf,
the Court is left with no other recourse but to consider only the evidence of the prosecution which
shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during and after the commission of the
crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. Thus circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. And where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all,
and each is to be held in the same degree of liability as the others.

[G.R. Nos. 112801-11. April 12, 1996]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WONG CHUEN MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN
SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN KOK WEE, CHIN KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG, CHIN KIN
FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM NYUK SUN, accused. WONG CHUEN MING and AU WING CHEUNG,
accused-appellants.

Facts:

Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, both British (Hongkong) nationals, together with
Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yang, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah,
Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun, all Malaysian nationals, were charged with unlawfully transporting
into the country Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Eleven (11) separate criminal informations
were filed against all of the accused individually, setting forth similar allegations:

That on or about the 7th day of September, 1991, about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon in Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport without lawful authority [3.40 kilograms in Criminal
Case No. 91-1524 filed against Wong Chuen Ming; 3.45 kilograms in Criminal Case No.91-1525 to 91-
1534 filed against all other accused individually], more or less of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, as
(sic) regulated drug commonly known as SHABU.

On 7 September 1991, at about 1:000 clock in the afternoon, Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR No. 301
from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila.
Among the many passengers who arrived on board said flight were the eleven (11) accused, namely,
Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing Cheung ,Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon
Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun. Their respective passports showed
that Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are the only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group
while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. Their passports also revealed that all the accused Malaysians
(except Lim Chan Fatt) originally came from Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and Hongkong before
proceeding to Manila. Upon the other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, as well as Lim
Chan Fatt, directly came from Hongkong to Manila. All accused arrived in Manila as a tour group
arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung, an employee of
Select Tours International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide.

After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group
went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same
in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at that time was manned by customs examiner
Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed to Gomez the tour groups passengers manifest, their baggage
declarations and their passports.

Gomez testified that he instructed the tour group to place their baggages on the examiners table for
inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective baggages while they wait for their turn to
be examined. Chin Kong Songs baggage was first to be examined by Gomez. Gomez put his hand inside
the baggage and in the course of the inspection, he found three (3) brown colored boxes similar in size
to powdered milk boxes underneath the clothes. The boxes were marked Alpen Cereals and as he found
nothing wrong with them, Gomez returned them inside the baggage and allowed Chin Kong Song to go.
Following the same procedure, Gomez next examined the baggage of Wong Chuen Ming. Gomez again
found and pulled out two (2) boxes of Alpen Cereals from said baggage and like in the previous
inspection, he found nothing wrong with them and allowed Wong Chuen Ming to go. The third baggage
to be examined belonged to Lim Nyuk Sun. When Gomez pulled out another three (3) boxes of Alpen
Cereals from said baggage, he became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter.
Inside the box was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez immediately
called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to his
discovery.[2]

Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes containing the white crystalline substance, she
immediately ordered the tour group to get their baggages and proceed to the district collectors office.
Chin Kong Song and Wong Chuen Ming, who were previously cleared by Gomez, were also brought
inside together with the rest of the group. Inside the collectors office, Gomez continued to examine the
baggages of the other members of the tour group. He allegedly found that each baggage contained one
(1), two (2) or three (3) boxes similar to those previously found in the baggages of Chin Kong Song,
Wong Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of thirty (30) boxes of Alpen Cereals containing white
crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the eleven (11) accused. As Gomez
pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by putting masking tape
around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio called
out the names of accused as listed in the passengers manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking
tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also present at this time
were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of Customs and several news reporters.
A few minutes later, District Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and then NBI
Deputy Director Mariano Mison.[3]

Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, he conducted a
field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was indeed
shabu. Capt. Francisco immediately informed the eleven (11) accused that they were under arrest.
Thereafter, all accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, were
brought to Camp Crame.[4]

At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified
them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside the
boxes bearing their signatures. The examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white crystalline
substance recovered from accused was shabu.[5] The total weight of shabu recovered was placed at
34.45 kilograms.

Issue: Whether or not the accused were deprived of their right to counsel and due process when their
previous counsels also represented the other accused despite conflicting interests is not well-taken?

Ruling:
Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing shabu,
are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records reveal that accused were never informed of
their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused
were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and
any statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix their
signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags
when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame.

By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made
a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These
signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not
sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore,
inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional
rights is inadmissible against them.[18] The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude
application of the exclusionary rule because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights
are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA @
PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.

Facts:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita
Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main doors
of their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.

At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who
shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the
garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door
of the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well
because he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta
Villanueva had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores.

Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and
she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she
identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage
and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.

Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the
door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand brandishing a
lead pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused Maqueda as the man
she saw then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if
someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help.

The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room,
leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the dining
room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly the two
rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to
hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to accused
Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.

Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the·back of her right hand. She fell to
the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After a few
seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta.
Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw that the
door knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering.
While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's
enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of
water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.

At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting
shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba·, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of
the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed,
he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a
missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder

Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would
lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound
for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men bearded
it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his
right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he bearded it. In the
Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the shorter man as
Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.

At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where they
had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In
the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the
house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they
returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier. They just
stayed near the road.

Issue: whether or not we can still secure a conviction based on the confession and the proof of corpus
delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence?

Ruling:

The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that
Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not
able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession
and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his
attention and arguments on these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession — the
Sinumpaang Salaysay — and an extrajudicial admission — the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate
and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the former and the latter
as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as follows:

Sec. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.

Sec. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt
or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a
confession from an admission as follows:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt. 14

And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without
the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already benefited
in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the
Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence, Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a
person under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial
court went on to state:

At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the
right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any
prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case
had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. 17

The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under
the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution.
Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do
and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.

As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court
admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the
truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of the
statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay .

While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had
been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no
longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then there would be
a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very
restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights under Section
14(2) Article III of the Constitution,

The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph
of Section 20, Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .

The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be

upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,
i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
33 We do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are
present in this case.

G.R. Nos. 97437-39 February 5, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSUE MOLAS, accused-appellant.

Facts: The evidence for the prosecution established that Molas and Dulcesima Resonable, the victim in
Criminal Case No. 5811, were sweethearts. They were engaged to be married in May, 1983. Dulcesima
was the daughter of Bernardo Resonable and Soledad Resonable, the victim in Criminal Case No. 5813.
The couple had two (2) sons namely Nicolas and Abelardo, the victim in Criminal Case No. 5812.

At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 2, 1983, Bernardo Resonable arrived at his house in
Inas, Dobdob, Valencia, Negros Oriental, tired from work on his farm. He was surprised to find his eight-
year-old son, Abelardo, at the doorway of his house, bathed in his own blood. He carried his son into the
house and placed him on top of a table. Abelardo asked for hot water, which his father quickly fetched,
after which Abelardo informed his father that appellant, Josue Molas, was the person who not only
inflicted his injuries but also stabbed his sister Dulcesima and his mother Soledad (TSN of August 7, 1984
of Bernardo Resonable, pp. 7-15). Having been informed of the stabbing, Bernardo looked for his
daughter and wife. He found the lifeless body of his daughter Dulce in a dried carabao mud pool some
three (3) arms-lengths from his house. He carried her into the house and looked for his wife whose
corpse he found near the bench by the door of the house. He ran to report the matter to the barangay
captain (Labe) and sought help from the authorities in the municipal building of Valencia. Meanwhile,
Abelardo was brought to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital by his brother Nicolas, who lived in a
house on higher ground. Abelardo expired the next day.

At dawn of February 3, 1983, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to Patrolman
Geronimo Vallega in the municipal hall of Pamplona, Negros Oriental. He also surrendered "the hunting
knife I used in killing the mother, the daughter and the boy" (p. 14 TSN, June 18, 1985; p. 160, Records in
G.R. Nos. 97437-39). The guard forthwith lodged him in jail. Afterwards, he was transferred to the
Valencia Police Station, which had jurisdiction over the crime that was committed in Sitio Inas, Dobdob,
Valencia, Negros Oriental.

The next morning, after he was informed of his Constitutional rights, Molas refused to give any
statement to the police. However, on March 10, 1983, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, the station
investigator at the Valencia Police Station, took down the sworn statement which Molas freely and
voluntarily gave with the assistance or presence of counsel. When he was asked to "relate the whole
story" (pp. 36-38, TSN, October 16, 1984), he answered as follows:

A — In our arrival to their house at sitio Inas, Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad
Resonable lighted a gas lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na ta walay makaboot nako ug
patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own
daughter] at the same time went near Dulcesima, her daughter and grabbed her hair and boxed her to
the different parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy, I stopped Solidad by holding her hands
to prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my intervention, Soledad boxed me hitting my head and arms.
Due to blocks I made she was tired and again went back to Dulcesima and again boxed her to the
different parts of her body. Because I was hurt on the part of Dulcisima, my wife-to-be and no other
means to prevent Solidad, I was able to grab the weapon on my waist and stabbed Solidad hitting her
first on the breast, then on the back after which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's younger brother at my back
holding and boxing my buttock. I stabbed him on the breast and followed again at the back causing him
to fall down on the ground, leaving therein the weapon I used causing incised wound on my right little
finger and ran away but Dulcisima stopped me by holding my left hand and said, "puslang nabuhat sa
akong ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag onong ta sa kamatayon." [How could you do this to
my parent, kill me also so we'll all die together]. Hearing such words, I responded, "papatay ka diay
kanako," [You'll kill me after all?] I went back where Abelardo was and pulled the penetrated weapon
and stabbed Dulcisima who at that time was following me hitting her breast and caused her life to end.
When I saw Solidad her mother walking towards the seat of their store and sat down, I followed her and
slashed her neck and stabbed her stomach and immediately ran home.

Molas signed his confession before Judge Celso P. Tayrosa of the Municipal Trial Court of Valencia after
the latter and Sgt. Rito Patron, had translated the contents of his affidavit into the Cebuano dialect.
Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as translated. He signed the document
willingly, after which the judge affixed his own signature thereon.

Issue: Whether or not that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and
assistance of counsel is admissible as evidence?

Ruling:
Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his mother and
sister was given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his
colon and spinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a dying
declaration.

To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) that he was a competent witness; and (d) that his declaration is offered in evidence
in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule
130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427). All of these circumstances were present when
Abelardo made his dying declaration.
While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and assistance
of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused
established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of
the accused

The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on
October 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment
on the witness stand, found him credible.

Rage appeared to have triggered Molas' killing rampage, rage on seeing Soledad maul his sweetheart,
Dulcesima, rage when Dulcesima chided him instead of appreciating his effort to stop her mother's
attack against her, and rage at Abelardo for attacking him also. But even if that motive may seem
insufficient to persons not as easily provoked to violence, the absence of motive only assumes
determinative significance when the perpetrator of the crimes had not been positively identified. In this
case, however, both the crimes and Molas' participation therein were definitely established.

At any rate, the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. Even if that
confession were disregard, there was more that enough evidence to support his conviction. His act of
giving himself up to the police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, his blood-stained clothing at the
time of the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the testimonies of
the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute
an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima
and Soledad Resonable.