23

ancient education.99

Such a situation should, I propose, be understood to also characterise the ancient evaluation of
philosophical identity.

IV. Philosophical Outsiders

It can be observed that the lengthy process of study that philosophy required, and the change in
attitudes/worldview that it could provoke in its adherents would often instil a sense of affinity
between respective schools’ pupils.100 Lucian, for example, portrays a philosopher (of seemingly
Stoic allegiance) promising a prospective student that philosophy could make him one citizen
(πολίτης) of many who lived in a different and higher state.101 Appealing to an equally strong
concept, Plutarch meanwhile asserts that because of their similar training in philosophy, even
people who live centuries apart can display a similarity in outlook and behaviour that bespeaks of
their shared kinship, while expressing a similar outlook, Apuleius can refer to the “Platonica
familia”.102 Further, although it has not been widely deliberated in scholarly discussions, there is
evidence that some schools’ students, including the Stoics, might have adopted some sort of shared
dress code.103
The feeling of connection to fellow adherents, and the exacting scholastic demands of
philosophical study naturally created a divide between individuals who were, and who were not
familiar with deep philosophical thought. A common way in antiquity to refer to people who were
not philosophers was to use the word ἰδιώτης. Iδιώτης has two primary meanings, firstly a private,
as opposed to a political person, and, secondly, an individual who lacks familiarity or skill in a
certain activity or field of expertise.
Regarding the first use, ἰδιώτης is frequently employed in ancient literature to designate
someone who does not hold political office. When used in the sense of a non-political individual,
ἰδιώτης is obviously being employed in a way that places it outside of the concerns of this book. It
should, however, be noted that while ἰδιώτης might be used to signal a person’s inferior status in
comparison with someone who holds political office, it does not seem to often carry derogatory

99
Cribiore (2007) 198.
100
On this see also the reflections of Haake (2015) 76, 78.
101
Herm. 21. On the Stoic idea of belonging to a city consider Schofield (1991).
102
Dion 1.1. On this passage see also Trapp (2007) 15, cf. Apul. Apol. 64, 536.
103
On this practice with regards to Bion’s school see the comments at Dorandi (1999) 62. At Herm.
82, 86, Lucian implies that students of Stoic philosophy might grow their beards to mark
themselves out as being philosophers. On the importance of uniforms and shared symbols for social
identity theory see Jenkins (1994) 145.
 24

connotations.104
With regards to its second meaning, the ignorance or inabilities of ἰδιῶται in relation to, for
example, the skills of military officers, physicians, orators, craftsmen, sophists, and philosophers, is
also frequently described in classical literature.105 When used in this way ἰδιώτης can again
sometimes seem to lack a derogatory meaning, for example when it was employed to refer to
people who were not part of early Christian circles.106 More often than not, however, when ἰδιώτης
is used in ancient literature to negate someone’s skill, experience, or knowledge, then demeaning
descriptions of their capabilities or intelligence are frequently attendant,107 or ἰδιῶταί are
purposefully referenced in order to set up a contrast with, and so amplify the virtues of the skilled
or cultured.108 Aside from ἰδιῶται, words that relate to crowds, the masses, or humanity in general
(such as δήμῳ, the people of a country/the general masses; ὄχλος, crowd/throng; οἱ πολλοί ,the
many) are also frequently used by classical authors as a way to describe people who lack
philosophical education or awareness.109
Regarding Latin, the Greek word ἰδιώτης was transliterated into the language as idiota, and was
commonly used to designate an individual who was ignorant of a particular area of study, whether
that be in science, philosophy rhetoric etc.110 The language of crowds or the commonality of
humanity could also be appealed to by Latin writers to designate generally (and especially
philosophically so) uneducated people.111
Turning now to explore Epictetus’ portrayal of laymen, where we will see many of the Greek
words and concepts we have looked at above are utilised, we can note that it is immediately clear
from his discussions that he holds a marked difference exists between the lay majority and the few
philosophically-minded members of society. So he clearly opines at one stage:

104
E.g. see Plut. Demetr. 45, Jos. BJ 1.209, Ath. 6.78, and Dio Or. 1.43.
105
Respectively Polyb 1.69.11, Thuc 2.48.3, Isocr 4.11, Plato Theag. 124c, Xenophon Hiero 6, Plu.
Symp IV.2.3, and Sextus adv Theag. 124c.
106
E.g. see 1 Cor. 14.16,23,24, and the useful discussion at Thiselton (2000) 1115. For further uses
of διώτης that are not derogatory see also Galen Affect. 1, and the discussion in Kraus (1999).
107
E.g. see De Anima 81.27, and Plut. Cic. 26.6.
108
Luc. Dom. 2, Plut. Compar. 1, and Ath. 9.20.
109
E.g., respectively, Ps.-Xenophon Const. Ath. 1.5, Rep. 6.494, 489, Med. 11.23. As Maxwell
(2006) 16, notes: “aristocratic condescension toward ordinary people is often cited as an indication
of the gulf separating elite and mass culture… Remarks about ‘masses’ usually indicate an
unquestioned sense of superiority over ordinary people.”
110
Stock (1983) 28-29.
111
For example at Parat. Orat 90 Cicero contrasts the indocti (uneducated) and agrestes multi
(uncultured/ rustic majority), with the humani (well-educated) and politi boni (good/refined men).
 25

only some few [incline] to the divine and blessed one. And since of necessity every man
must deal with each thing according to the opinion that he holds about it, those few who
think they are born to fidelity, and honour, and a securely grounded use of their
impressions, will harbour no abject or ignoble thought about themselves, whilst the
multitude will think the opposite.112

ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως
ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι, ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν
οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν,
οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία.

Here the few (ὀλίγοι), namely the philosophers, are openly contrasted against the multitude
(πολλοὶ) – the non-philosophers. Utilising the same language, Epictetus elsewhere compares
philosophers to be like a small (ὀλίγοι) number of people who attend a cattle market to observe and
consider the procedures that govern its operation, and who are laughed at by the bemused multitude
(πολλοὶ); stating:

but there are a few who come only to look at the fair, and inquire how it is carried on,
and why, and who set it up, and for what purpose... Few are the men who attend the fair
because they are fond of looking on considering... and what is the consequence? They
are laughed at by the multitude.113

ὀλίγοι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ θέαν ἐρχόμενοι τῆς πανηγύρεως, πῶς τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ
διὰ τί καὶ τίνες οἱ τιθέντες τὴν πανήγυριν καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι… ὀλίγοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ
πανηγυρίζοντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοθεάμονες… τί οὖν; καταγελῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν.

Often though Epictetus’ estimation of the narrow constitution of philosophically observant/aware

members of humanity is relayed through his employment of analogies, such as his appeal for his
listeners to consider philosophers to be like the narrow line of purple that is in a senatorial toga (the
latus clavus) in comparison to the white colour that predominantly constitutes the garment, and
which he depicts as representing the non-philosophically-minded commonality of society.114

112
Diss. I.3.3-4.
113
Diss. II.14.23, 25, 39. This analogy appears to have been first used by Pythagoras (Diog. Laert.
8.8, Iamblichis, V.P. 12.58-59), from which Fitzgerald (2013) 136, argues that Pythagoras must
have: “believed that ‘philosopher’ was sufficient to distinguish the minority who devoted
themselves to the contemplation and discovery of nature from the majority who gave themselves to
other pursuits.”
114
Diss. I.2.22. Stephens (2007) 120, 121, significantly comments: “this quotation is essential for
establishing that Epictetus believes Stoicism is for the few, not the many… His judgment, which
probably derives from empirical observations, is that the multitude judge themselves wretched
because they judge their physical condition to be wretched... only a rare few, as it turns out, have
the prowess to stand out from the crowd like this.”
 26

Through his remarks Epictetus continually presents laymen as being the antithesis of the
philosopher.115 For example, he claims to his pupils: “you must assume either the attitude of a
philosopher or that of a layman” τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι φιλοσόφου στάσιν ἔχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου.116 An important
point to highlight here is that his advocacy for his students to assume the same attitude (στάσις,
standing state) as either a philosopher or a layman is framed around moral, rather than intellectual
attributes; specifically whether his students’ ruling faculties (ἡγεμονικόι) and desires are for the
things that are inside of them/concerning them (περί), rather than outside (ἔξω) of them (i.e. to be
focused upon internal attributes rather than external circumstances or appearances). Here we clearly
see that in Epictetus’ estimation being a layman is not solely based upon whether a person is
ignorant of philosophy’s doctrines, but also if they neglect to let these principles impact their life.117
Similarly, we can observe that he considers the status of being educated (παιδευομένοις) to include
a person’s successful implementation of philosophical teachings into their daily life. So Epictetus
defines “to be properly educated” (ὄντι παιδευομένοις) as being the possession of “tranquility,
fearlessness, freedom.” (ἀταραξία, ἀφοβία, ἐλευθερία).118 If we miss this point we might, however,
conclude that Epictetus is making perplexing, even contradictory statements, such as that a person
who has learned about syllogisms and eythmemes, but who is conceited/puffed up (χαυνόω) is, in
actuality, uneducated (ἀπαίδευτος).119
We should highlight that Epictetus’ position can sometimes unfortunately be obscured in
commonly utilised translations. For example, in Diss. II.1.2 there is no contextual reason for

115
Diss. I.27.5; 29.22-23; II.14.2; 17.4; III.16.6-7, Ench 51, and consider especially Diss. III.19, a
discourse that is entitled “What is the Position of the Layman, and What That of the Philosopher?”
Τίς στάσις διώτου κα φιλοσόφου.
116
Diss. III.15.13. See also Eshleman (2012) 73-74, comments in this regard, are worth quoting at
length: “Echoing Socrates, he [Epictetus] repeatedly cautions against chasing after the meaningless
approval of lay people, which no specialist heeds when it comes to his own art (2.13.3; 14.2;
4.1.117, 5.22, 12.14). Why would a philosopher care if he is admired by non-philosophers (1.21.3-
4; cf. 2.7.4-7, 13.16-19, 2.9.50-4) or despised by the ignorant (4.5.22), whose behavior betrays their
incomprehension of true moral value?... [For Epictetus] exclusion of lay voices serves to
marginalize inappropriate (sophistic, crowd-pleasing) modes of philosophy.” See also the
discussion in Hock (1993) 139, and Boter (2010) 327-331, and similar comments to Epictetus’ from
Seneca at Ep. 5.6, 7.1-8, 10.5, 20.3, 23.8, 25.7, as well as Muson. 18b. Okell (2005) 193, also notes
that in Seneca’s play Hercules: “Hercules is struggling to save mankind from the restriction of fear
and tyranny, but mankind (in the form of the chorus) is clearly not interested in being saved or in
being heroic.”
117
See also Ench. 51.
118
Diss. II.1.21.
119
Diss. I.8.8-7, and I.19.1-2. That Stoics could even characterise philosophers as being ignorant
(or γνοια), but due to their lack of consistently upheld correct behaviour/mindset, and not because
of any epistemic failings, see Cuany (2015).
 27

rendering ἰδιώτης as “illiterate” as Hard does,120 especially since ἰδιώτης is not synonymous with
the word αγράμματος that normally carries this meaning.121 When we are sensitive to Epictetus’
perspective that philosophical education incorporates both intellectual and moral dimensions, we in
fact realise that the ἰδιώτης in this passage might just as easily be a highly schooled individual, but
one who does not understand how, or who refuses, to let their actions accord with the philosophical
principles they have learned.
Returning to consider our broader point about Epictetus’ portrayal of laymen, we can note that in
another passage he can present a firm distinction as existing between them and philosophers, for
instance by averring that:

It is proper that we laymen should inquire of you philosophers what is the best thing in
the world, just as those who come to a strange city do of the citizens, who know the
area; so that, when we have heard what it is we may seek it out, as visitors to cities, and
have a look at it.122

ἄξιον, ἔφη, τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἡμᾶς παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πυνθάνεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς
εἰς ξένην πόλιν ἐλθόντας παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ εἰδότων, τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν ἐν κόσμῳ,
ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἱστορήσαντες μετίωμεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ θεώμεθα.

In the above passage, philosophers are again pictured as being individuals who look and evaluate
the world in a way that differentiates them from the non-philosopher (ἰδιώτης), a theme that
Epictetus reprises in another discourse where he labels the masses as being deluded (τὸ δ᾽
ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν.)123 For this reason we can understand why Epictetus advises
his students (as Seneca similarly recommends to his readers124) if they recognise that a person
cannot understand, or cannot accept philosophical truths, then they should hold their silence rather
than enunciating their views and prompting animus to occur, or, similarly, that they should just clap
along with laymen as they enjoy their religious festivals instead of attempting to prompt a shift in
their perception of the world.125 In this regard, Epictetus elsewhere reflects upon the mutual
confusion (φύρω) that can arise between philosophers and laymen (ἰδιῶται) if they enter into
dialogue with each other, with, he suggests, the layman finding philosophical concepts to be
obscure (δυσπαρακολούθητος) and vulgar/repulsive (φορτικός), while the philosopher is apt to
revile (λοιδορέω) and openly laugh (καταγελάω) at their conversation partner, and exclaim: “he is a

120
Gill and Hard (1995) 101.
121
See Kraus (1999).
122
Diss. III.7.1. See also Diss. III.15.8-13 along with the discussion in Hoof (2010) 103.
123
Diss. II.17.5.
124
Ira 2.10.6-7, 10.
125
Diss. I.29.31; 26.30-31.
 28

layman; there is no making anything of him” (‘ἰδιώτης ἐστίν: οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι).126 For
this reason, we have evidence that Epictetus repeatedly cautioned his students against entering into
discussions on philosophical themes with laymen127 (something we can note that Plutarch also
advises128).
Notably, one of Epictetus’ students is also depicted as admitting that he is reluctant to conform
to the behavior that Epictetus expects from him because of the opposition that this could arouse
from members of the public, arguing:

Yes, but if I should place the good here, amongst things that are within the sphere of
choice, everyone will laugh at me. Some grey-headed old fellow will come with his
fingers covered with gold rings, and shake his head, and say: ‘Listen to me, child, it is
right that you should learn philosophy, but it is right too that you should keep your
head. This is nonsense. You learn syllogisms from the philosophers, but when it comes
to how you should act, you know better than they do.’129

ναί: ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐνταῦθά που θῶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, πάντες μου

καταγελάσονται.ἥξει τις γέρων πολιὸς χρυσοῦς δακτυλίους ἔχων πολλούς, εἶτα
ἐπισείσας τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐρεῖ "ἄκουσόν μου, τέκνον: δεῖ μὲν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, δεῖ δὲ καὶ
ἐγκέφαλον ἔχειν: ταῦτα μωρά ἐστιν. σὺ παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων μανθάνεις συλλογισμόν,
τί δέ σοι ποιητέον ἐστίν, σὺ κάλλιον οἶδας ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι.

Finally, when his students raise their concern that people who lack a background in philosophy
might judge them to be impious, Epictetus responds (as other philosophical voices do,130 including
a philosopher a few decades later who was on trial and under this very scenario131) by again
contrasting the value of philosophical and lay thought, and arguing for the latter’s redundancy:

So who on earth is this man to pass such judgement on you? Does he know what piety
or impiety is? Has he made a study of it, or learned it? Where? From Whom?... So shall
the truly educated man pay any heed to an uneducated one, when he passes judgement
on what is holy and unholy, just and unjust?132

126
Diss. II.12.2.
127
Consider especially Diss. IV.8.17-24, and Ench. 46, cf. Diss. II.1.36-39 and 13.22-23. For
comments on some of these passages see Oakes (1993) 53.
128
From Sym. 613F, and remarks from Dillon (2002) 32.
129
Diss. I.22.18-19.
130
E.g. see Ep. 91.19, where Seneca approvingly notes that the Cynic Demetrius compares the
speech of laymen to be like the grumbling of the digestive tract. See also Apuleius Apol. 39.1.
131
Apuleius Apol. 3.6, 27.1.
132
Diss. I.29.52, 54. Eshleman (2012) 36 n.63, also draws attention to this passage. See also a
similar statement from Epictetus at Diss. IV.5.22. Meanwhile, Wildberger (2014b) 309-310, argues
from Ep. 95.56, that: “Like Socrates and like his fellow Stoics, Seneca is clearly an intellectualist.
For him this means that one must not only practice ethical behavior but seriously study philosophy
 29

οὗτος οὖν τίς ποτε ὁ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἀποφήνασθαί τι περὶ σοῦ; οἶδεν τί ἐστι τὸ
εὐσεβὲς ἢ τὸ ἀσεβές; μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό; μεμάθηκεν; ποῦ; παρὰ τίνι;… ὁ δὲ ταῖς
ἀληθείαις πεπαιδευμένος ἀνθρώπου ἀπαιδεύτου ἐπιστραφήσεται ἐπικρίνοντός τι περὶ
ὁσίου καὶ ἀνοσίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου

That the sense of division we have argued existed between philosophers and laymen could be
apprehended and even reinforced by laymen themselves. As for Epictetus, as we have seen in
his analogy of the cattle-market, he frequently portrays people who lack philosophical
education as laughing (καταγελάω) at philosophers, being repelled if they hear that they are
ignorant (ἀγνοέω) of what the good (ἀγαθός) is, openly reviling (λοιδορέω) philosophers, and
even having the propensity to become violent if they are confronted with philosophical
exposition.133 As he warns one of his students:

If you set your desire on philosophy, prepare from the very first to be ridiculed and
laughed at, to be jeered at by many people, and to hear them say, ‘Look, he has come
back to us, a philosopher all of a sudden’

ε φιλοσοφίας πιθυμε ς, παρασκευάζου α τόθεν ς καταγελασθησόμενος, ς

καταμωκησομένων σου πολλ ν, ς ρούντων τι ‘ φνω φιλόσοφος μ ν
πανελήλυθε’.

Less threateningly, Epictetus also notes that laymen can conclude that philosophy’s scholars
know nothing and speak gibberish (βαρβαρίζω), nonsense (φλυαρέω), or accuse them of
adopting a supercilious (ὀφρύς) look.134 This topic is also frequently reflected upon by a
range of classical thinkers, such as the Epicurean scholar Philodemus, Persius (the satirist and
one-time pupil of the Stoic philosopher Cornutus), the rhetorician Quintillian, and numerous
other authors, who record that people might consider philosophers to be objectionable,
miserable, and fixated upon boring and pointless speculations;135 to be appropriate objects of
mockery and even violence;136 and to be of less use than a slave or horse.137

in order to become a good person.” See also Herm.1.

133
Regarding laymen laughing at philosophers see Diss. I.11.39, III.15.11, III.20.18; on them being
repelled III.23.28-30, II.14.21, cf. Diss. II.13.4 and IV.8.34-36; and regarding the thread of violence
from non-philosophers see II.12.24-25, and IV.1.7.
134
Respectively Diss. III.9.14, 20.19; Diss. II.21.11, III.20.19; Ench 22.
135
E.g. Philodemus Rhet. Fr.3, Pers. 5.86, Quintillian Inst. 12.3.11, Constant. 3.1, Ep. 73.1, 76.4,
Aristoxenus Harm. 2.102, Dio Or. 66.25, 72.8, Vit. Auct. 7.10, Symp. 34, Fug. 14-15, Pisc. 12, 37,
Merc. Cond 25, Juv. 2.8-9, 14-15, and Diod. Sic. 2.29.5-6.
136
Regarding derision see Ep. 76.4, on violence Dio Or. 72.2, and remarks from Tacitus cited
below.
137
Diod. Sic. fr. 508.
 30

Because of such derision from certain portions of society, Seneca reflects that people are
often hesitant to start imitating philosophers in some areas of their life, in case they will feel
compelled to follow them in everything and become a philosopher.138 This attitude seems to
also be documented from Epictetus, and to regard an individual who apparently did have
philosophical pretensions:

If you want to know what the Romans think of philosophers, listen to this, Italicus, who
had the greatest reputation amongst them as a philosopher, once grew angry with his
friends in my presence, claiming that his situation was desperate. ‘I cannot bear it!’ he
exclaimed. ‘You are the death of me, you will make me just like him’– and he pointed
to me!

Πῶς ἔχουσι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἂν θέλῃς γνῶναι, ἄκουσον. Ἰταλικὸς ὁ

μάλιστα δοκῶν αὐτῶν φιλόσοφος εἶναι παρόντος ποτέ μου χαλεπήνας τοῖς ἰδίοις, ὡς
ἀνήκεστα πάσχων, "Οὐ δύναμαι", ἔφη, "φέρειν: ἀπόλλυτέ με, ποιήσετέ με τοιοῦτον
γενέσθαι", δείξας ἐμέ.

Such an attitude is also apparent in the noted phenomenon in antiquity of Roman fathers who
attempted to prevent their children from studying, or at least becoming overly preoccupied with
philosophy.139
Describing a more combative approach, and in one particularly extended portrayal of a
layman’s views, Seneca describes an individual directly challenging the austere moralizing of
philosophers by staunchly advocating sensual pleasure by means of eating, drinking, and adopting a
lax attitude towards the disposal of money, i.e. the opposite of usual philosophical convictions.140
Meanwhile, in a depiction of lay opinion, Persius notes that the schools’ students were widely
believed to be fixated upon arcane and useless theories; with him imagining one layman’s withering
response after the details of Epicurean cosmology had just been detailed as being:

‘What I know is enough for me. Personally, I have no desire to be like Arcesilas or
those troubled Solons with their heads bent, eyes fixed on the ground, while they gnaw
their mumbles and rabid silences to themselves and weigh words on their stuck-out lips,
repeating the fantasies of some aged invalid: that nothing can come from nothing, that
nothing can return to nothing. Is this why you’re so pale? Is this the reason for missing
lunch?’ These jibes make the rabble laugh, and with wrinkled nose the muscular youths
redouble their quivering cackles.141

138
Ep. 5.3.
139
Horace Sat. 1.4.109, Seneca Ep. 108.22, Muson. Rufus Fr. 16.10.
140
Ep. 123.10-11.
141
Pers. 3.80-89.
 31

quod sapio, satis est mihi. non ego curo esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones
obstipo capite et Agentes lumine terram, murmura cum secum et rabiosa silentia rodunt
atque exporrecto trutinantur verba labello, aegroti veteris meditantes somnia, gigni de
nihilo nihilum, in nihilum nil posse reverti, hoc est quod palles? cur quis non prandeat
hoc est?’ his populus ridet, multumque torosa iuventus ingeminat tremulos naso
crispante cachinnos.

A similar reaction to the one above, but with the added threat of violence to ensure that the speaker
would refrain from continuing to enunciate philosophical thought, is also described by Tacitus when
a philosopher tried to introduce ideas of cosmopolitanism to Roman soldiers.142 Worthy of note is
also Dio Chrysostom’s comments that the crowds: “seize the initiative and abuse and jeer at them
[philosophers] as being wretched and foolish, knowing that if they establish them as senseless and
mad, they will prove themselves to be self-controlled as intelligent/of sound mind”, οὐκοῦν
προκαταλαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὶ λοιδοροῦντες καὶ τωθάζοντες ὡς ἀθλίους καὶ ἀνοήτους, εἰδότες ὅτι, εἰ
μὲν τούτους ἀποφανοῦσιν ἄφρονας καὶ μαινομένους, ἅμα καὶ αὑτοὺς ἀποδείξουσι σωφρονοῦντας
καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντας.143 The verb προκαταλαμβάνω holds the sense of seizing, or occupying
beforehand, and is usually employed in a military context. The sense in this passage is, therefore, of
laymen who are attempting to stake out the ground of critiquing philosophers, before the
philosophers have a chance to critique laymen. This two way derision between philosophers and
laymen is a dynamic that classical authors could directly reflect upon, such as Sextus Empiricus
who states that: “Just as the scholar (ὁ φιλολόγος) is ridiculed by laymen (οι ιδιώται), so is the
layman (ή ἰδιωτική) ridiculed by scholars (οἱ φιλολόγοι)”.144 The discussion in the opening chapter
regarding how outsiders who are looked down upon by certain groups can respond in turn by
negatively evaluating their accusers’ attributes is, therefore, particularly relevant at this point. In
this case we see evidence that laymen could apparently portray philosophers as being the ones who
are without their minds (ἀνόητοι) and who are wretched/pathetic (ἄθλιοι). People who conceived of
philosophy and those with an interest in it in the manner that the above sources portray, would
doubtless find it a matter of little concern if they found themselves prohibited from claiming the
identity of philosophers.
Of final interest for us in this section is Lucian’s portrayal of someone asking a student of
Stoicism to relay philosophical truths to him, but to request that he do so simply, and by adopting
the character of a layman (ὁποῖος τότε ἦσθα ἰδιώτης, “now do so as a layman”), for he is an
outsider (οὕτως ἀπόκριναι) and so cannot easily comprehend the ideas that the student has been

142
Tacitus Hist. 3.81.1.
143
Dio Or. 72.7-8
144
See also the discussion in Hilton (2018) 27.
 32

coached in. With the use of the verb ἀποκρίνω (to be set apart), we notably have an example of an
ancient source which characterises the philosopher/layman divide explicitly in the frame of the
insider/outsider.

V. Identifying Laymen in Epictetus’ Discussions

Before we continue in forthcoming chapters to consider how Epictetus views laymen, it would be
remiss of us were we not to elaborate on how we intend to identify them within the records of his
discussions.
Firstly, and most simply, laymen are explicitly mentioned through the use of words such as
ἰδιῶται etc., with regularity in his discussions.145 With Epictetan dialogue supplying us with a large
number of direct references to laymen, this provides a unique opportunity for us to move the
discussion of ancient philosophers’ perceptions of laymen from the abstract to the particular, and to
see the above criteria being used to evaluate potential incomers to a philosophical school on a first-
hand basis. Secondly, Epictetus’ habit of referencing groups of people, some of whom it might be
plausibly thought had some familiarity with philosophy, but when mentioned as a class are surely
not, e.g. athletes, thieves, judges, musicians, comics, nurses, shoemakers and vegetable dealers,
likewise provides us with an opportunity to clarify his stance regarding laymen.146 Thirdly, and
finally, the records of Epictetus’ conversations do not restrict themselves to only document the
interactions he had with his pupils, but also ones he held with numerous visitors to the school.
Thanks to Arrian’s careful efforts in documenting information about these visitors’, some seven of
them can be concluded with reasonable certainty would have been viewed by Epictetus as being
laymen. These visitor passages, which have been also helpfully listed by Hock,147 will be frequently
appealed to throughout the course of this study, but their existence presents us with a remarkably
valuable resource from which we can explore a philosopher’s perception of laymen during the time
of the Roman Empire. It is, therefore, worthwhile to examine them here as a whole in order to see
what broad themes and insights might emerge from them. By their order in the Discourses they are:

1. Diss. I.11: A lengthy and profitable exchange is portrayed as taking place between
Epictetus and a government official (whose reason for being at the school is not delineated),
regarding what is right (ὀρθός) (1-37). Epictetus then cautions, and claims that he believes his
dialogue partner already comprehends that such issues can only be understood if he is prepared to

145
Diss. I.27.4, 29.64, II.12.2, 13.4, 14.2,6, III.15.13, 16.6-8, 22.87, 19.1.
146
E.g. see Diss. I.4.13; 18.13; II.2.10; 5.10, 13.2; III.4.1, 16.4, 24.44. On this, consider also the
discussion in Nock (1992) 134.
147
Hock (1991) 129-132.
 33

lay aside all other concerns and commit himself to an extended period of study, and to become that
creature everyone laughs at — a student/scholar (σχολαστικός) (38-40).
2. Diss. I.15: An unnamed person visits Epictetus and claims that he wants to know how he
can follow nature (φύσις) (1, 6). Evidently apprehending that this man expects that such advice can
be promptly dispensed, Epictetus challenges the validity of this request by noting that a significant
amount of study needs to be undertaken before the answer to this question can be known (2-5).
Seeking to further press this point, Epictetus enquires whether his visitor anticipates that he could
harvest the fruit of a fig in a single hour and, if not, how he expects that he might be able to obtain
the fruit of a person’s mind in so short a space of time (7-8). At this point no further discussion is
recorded as having taken place and this discourse closes.
3. Diss. II.14: A father and son are visiting the school and Epictetus begins to explain the
manner of his teaching to them, but then falls silent (1). When prompted by the father to continue to
explain his pedagogical approach, Epictetus instead informs them that numerous professions or
interests, such as shoemaking or learning to play a musical instrument at first offer no pleasure, or
are tedious/troublesome (ἀνιαρός) to people who lack a familiarity with them, and that in this
regard philosophy is similar (2-6). Epictetus then argues that laymen (ἰδιῶται) need to learn certain
things before they can benefit from philosophy (7-9), and bluntly states: “it is not sufficient to wish
to be wise and good but necessary to learn certain things” (μή ποτ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἀπαρκεῖ τὸ
βούλεσθαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, χρεία δὲ καὶ μαθεῖν τινα) (10). We can note that here
Epictetus uses language that this man might be familiar with, with the phrase καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν
notably coming to be used outside of the philosophical tradition as a way to refer to moral queries
over right and wrong.148 In any case, Epictetus proceeds to attempt to relieve the father of his
mistaken belief that he is not ignorant, by arguing that he is referencing moral concepts as an
illiterate person would appeal to the practice of writing (14-15), and that his demeanour indicates he
is impervious to reason and will likely feel affronted if he is exposed to detailed philosophical
discussion (16-21). The chapter concludes with Epictetus asserting that only a few people have an
interest in, and the time that allows them to consider, philosophical issues, and when they do so
they will be laughed at by the multitude (22-9).
4. Diss. II.24: In this passage we are told that an individual has been frequenting Epictetus’
school with the intention of engaging the philosopher in conversation, but so far he has not been
able to realise this aim (1). After pleading to speak with him, Epictetus explains that their lack of
interaction has not been due to an oversight on his part— he has been evading him on purpose. The

148
See Weaver (2008).
 34

man is then informed that listening to a philosopher requires skill/experience (ἐμπειρία) which
Epictetus judges that he does not possess (2-11), and with him lacking the ability to discern what
truth or error is, attempting to hold a discussion with him on topics of philosophical debate would,
Epictetus states, be a waste of time (13-15). At this point the record of their interaction,
unsurprisingly, ceases.
5. Diss. III.1: A student of rhetoric is conversing with Epictetus about what should be
considered beautiful (καλός) or not (1-10). It is, however, then relayed to him that, were they to
explore this subject any further, Epictetus fears that he will cause his finely dressed interlocutor to
be offended. After manoeuvring to bring their discussion to a close, Epictetus then (and apparently
vocally) remonstrates with himself that what if this youth should later in life come to his senses and
wonder why a philosopher had not shown more concern to come to his aid when his errors had been
so visibly displayed (11-24). A long, and seemingly largely effective, dialogue then takes places
between them over whether beauty can be found in ascetic qualities or in the substance of a
person’s character (25-45), wherein Epictetus again reflects that he is not in the habit of speaking
with anyone (36). The ultimate reaction of the guest to Epictetus’ attempts to reason with him are
not documented.
6. Diss. III.4: The Procurator of Epirus approaches Epictetus and explains that he has been
mocked by a theatre audience because of the partiality that he displayed for a certain comic actor.
Instead of offering sympathy or advice regarding this public act of shaming, Epictetus asserts that
the crowd was merely mirroring the official’s own vices back to him. Beyond this no direct
interaction is recorded as taking place and this passage’s importance for our concerns, at least for
now, is minimal.
7. Diss. III.9: A rhetorician who is in Nicopolis before travelling onto Rome to attend a
lawsuit visits Epictetus’ school in the hopes of gleaning some advice from the renowned
philosopher regarding his impending trial (1). Again pivoting the discussion to speak on a subject
that he has not been directly asked to address, Epictetus enquires whether his guest has ever
reflected on how he forms judgements (δόγματα) (2-6) and if he has ever set aside time to reflect
upon, or has ever approached someone, to help him with this endeavour (7-10). With the implied
answer being never, the man is chastised by Epictetus for presuming that philosophers are like
greengrocers or shoesmiths who sell a commodity that can be quickly consumed, when the benefits
from philosophy require a prolonged period of contemplation to have been undertaken (11). At the
end of their conversation, Epictetus reflects that this man must think that meeting him has been like
visiting a stone (12).
Several themes and concerns that we have seen in our discussion of philosophical identity are,
 35

I suggest, importantly present in these accounts. Firstly, Epictetus criticism of the actions and
attitudes of several of his visitors (#5, 6, as well as perhaps 3149) indicates that he believes
philosophy has a mandate to challenge errant behaviour and ethical principles, and that it is one he
would seek to enforce were these individuals under his supervision. Secondly, with the exception of
#6, each person has it relayed to them that they lack knowledge, and for them to profit from
philosophical advice a significant period of study will have to be completed (#1, 2, 3, 4, 7). Thirdly,
and finally, while individuals are evidently free to visit the school, if they appear to want to make
their association more regular, or to engage Epictetus in conversation, then their behaviour,
deportment, and capacity for learning is often critiqued in a way that would seem to purposefully
dissuade them from desiring future contact (#2, 3, 4, 6, 7) – a phenomenon that Hock has also
drawn attention to.150 Only in one example (#1) is a positive exchange portrayed as occurring
throughout and Epictetus intimates that the person might want to return to the school for further
studies, and once (#5) his willingness to dialogue in-depth about philosophical matters is stated
part-way through a conversation that he had otherwise been expressing a desire to cease. Epictetus’
understanding of what will likely occur when laymen engage with philosophy in fact seems to be
summarised in a passage where he reflects that: “but the mass of men, rashly entering upon these
[philosophical] debates, get confused and confuse others, and at last, after an exchange of abuse,
walk off.” οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ εἰκαῖοι συγκαθέντες εἴς τι τοιοῦτον φύρονται καὶ φύρουσι καὶ τὰ
τελευταῖα λοιδορήσαντες καὶ λοιδορηθέντες ἀπέρχονται.151
This last theme of purposefully seeking to dissuade potential students is perhaps worthy of
some deliberation. We have already seen the rhetorician Dionysius’ and the Platonist Polemo’s
concern to prevent people who are uninformed from associating with, or expressing their opinions
in their respective schools. More importantly, we can (at least start to152) assemble evidence that
reveals the custom of being selective, even combative, with visitors is not uncharacteristic for an
individual who is associated with the Stoic tradition. For instance, Diogenes Laertius portrays Zeno
would bluntly asking people to leave the vicinity when he was conversing with his pupils, and that
he would request money not for his pecuniary benefit, but in order to prevent “the people” (οἱ

149
See Diss. II.14.18.
150
See also the conclusion of Nock (1992), 135-136, 139, who proceeds, 139, to argue that
Epictetus’ usual approach is to “drive away”, “discourage” and issue “warnings” to visitors.
151
Diss. II.12.13.
152
On the lack of evidence of an overt sense of mission or outreach in the Stoic school, see the
useful remarks from Goodman (1994), 33-37, Annas (2007) 151, Eshleman (2012) 49, Setaioli
(2014b) 244, and especially Bartsch (2015) 125-128. Consider also the comments from Seneca at
Ep. 16.3, 20.2, 29.1-5, 41.5, 52.15.
 36

πολλοί) from gathering around him.153 Zeno’s more subtle attempts at dissuasion, such as arranging
circumstances so that an unpromising pupil would dirty his clothes and come into close contact
with beggars, are also narrated by Diogenes.154
More importantly, we cannot conclude that this selective approach was only a feature of the
school during its infancy. Note, for example, Epictetus approvingly recalling: “Rufus for the most
part, tried to turn them [potential students] away, using that as a test to distinguish the gifted from
the ungifted...” διὸ καὶ ὁ Ῥοῦφος τὰ πολλὰ ἀπέτρεπεν τούτῳ δοκιμαστηρίῳ χρώμενος τῶν
εὐφυῶν καὶ ἀφυῶν.155 This passage might, I suggest, imply that we should interpret Epictetus’
generally discouraging stance to visitors (which we have seen in #7 he compares to being like a
stone) is a deliberate strategy, and one that he adopted from his own teacher’s practise.156 Although
no thought process is articulated that fully explains why this approach is taken, the above passage
suggests that Musonius and Epictetus are doing their best to repel potential recruits to the school so
that the small number of individuals who they believe can cope with having their behaviour and
principles challenged, and who have the resolve to commit themselves to philosophical study can
be identified.157 In any case, such interactions continue to highlight that Epictetus conceives of the
inclusion into philosophy, and the ethical and intellectual demands it makes of pupils to be
challenging.

VI. Philosophers From Other Schools

One topic we have not touched upon, but which should be mentioned in a discussion of
philosophical identity in antiquity, is philosophers’ opinions towards others whose philosophical
allegiances belong to rival schools of thought, such as Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, or Epicurean
ones (etc.), and whether they consider such individuals to be genuine philosophers or not.
Understanding cross-school opinions of each other is, however, complex for it is rarely a directly
addressed topic in ancient texts, and our understanding of respective philosophers attitudes towards
other philosophies and their members is largely an inferred one.158 Of potential help for this

153
Diog Laert. 7.14.
154
Diog Laert. 7.19, 22. We can also note that Diogenes records Zeno led a youth (μειράκιον), who
was asking a question that he thought was beyond his years, to a mirror and inquires of him whether
someone who looked like him should be asking such a question.
155
Diss. III.6.10.
156
In this regard, see the comments at M. Aur. Med 9.41.
157
On Epictetus' belief that some people are appointed and intended by god/nature to be laymen
see, e.g. Ench 17.
158
See though our comments here at p.134 n.84, regarding the debate over classifying the Cynic
school, as a philosophical school or not.