MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No.

128448; 1 Feb 2001]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National
Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975
under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a
Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB.
The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and
to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine

Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and
authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever
profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that
the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked
PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their
accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties
by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency
claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said
proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB
remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to
account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained
to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance,
and damages against PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have
agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or
executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the
Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing
the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such
notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress
that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not
limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself
provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there
is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General
is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for
violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private
property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its
power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this
power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have
standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

By: Dennis D. San Diego

G.R. No. 115455

235 SCRA 630 (1994)

FACTS

RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base

of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the

Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of

local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate

may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings

on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days

before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a

public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
 ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

HELD

No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that

the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the

Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of

printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

235 SCRA 506

Philippine Constitution Association, petitioner
vs.
Enriquez, respondent
Facts:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the Philippines from January 1 to
December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the
Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the
Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art
XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer
and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the
GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against
the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l
Highway Authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?
Held:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o
vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct
relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the use of income &
creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State
Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely
acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of
roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the
entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road
maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress
required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking
an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate
law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension
funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such
power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the
compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an
amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot
be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.