Zablocki vs.

REdhail

Facts of the case

Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support.
Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was
denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state
statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.. Redhail filed a class
action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled
in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Question

Did the Wisconsin statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Wisconsin's statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. In the majority opinion authored
by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy
found in the Fourteenth Amendment as identified in Griswold v. Connecticut. While the state has
an interest in ensuring that child support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated
those who wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to marriage as
found in Loving v. Virginia.

Loving vs. Virginia

Facts of the case

In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white
man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly
thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute,
which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in
jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not
return for 25 years).

Question

Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Conclusion

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were
generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of
invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was
legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial
classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the
State."
Skinner vs. Oklahoma

Facts of the case

Oklahoma's Criminal Sterilization Act allowed the state to sterilize a person who had been
convicted three or more times of crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude."

Question

Did the Act violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

A unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since some crimes such as embezzlement, punishable as felonies in Oklahoma,
were excluded from the Act's jurisdiction, Justice Douglas reasoned that the law had laid "an
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense." Moreover,
Douglas viewed procreation as one of the fundamental rights requiring the judiciary's strict
scrutiny.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any
act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Human Rights Law Case Digest: Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization
v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is superior to
property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free assembly and rights of
petition

FACTS:
• March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid exercise of
their constitutional right of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the
Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of Pasig at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers in the first, second and third shifts (6am-
2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon
where PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. That Management, thru Atty.
C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that
any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation thus
whoever fails to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed for violation of the
existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company: REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
MARCH 4, 1969
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation
since they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against the
company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers
directly responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration – dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the
rights of free expression, free assembly and petition

HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the petitioners.
• In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in
his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people
• The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary
terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike
• The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea
for the preservation merely of their property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting
the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against
the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence
from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary
hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But
management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from
work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these
lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act,
the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their
right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
moral, social and economic well-being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1)
in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert
activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor
practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal
conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas
corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the
exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one
speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors
to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these
guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he
is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services
• enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights. It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power
to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require."
SIMON JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Facts:

 A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North
EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period of 3 days within which to vacate the questioned premises of
North EDSA to give way to the construction of the"People's Park".
 On 12 July 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a
letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking for a letter to be
addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents'stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.
 Petitioners started the demolition despite CHR’s order to desist. Respondents
consequently asked that petitioner’s be cited in contempt.
 Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondents.
They alleged that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it
involved respondents’ privilege to engage in business, not their civil and political
rights.
 In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt
for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the
"order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March
1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss. The CHR
opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights,
but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines "
 Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petioners Simon Jr. et al filed
a petition for prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing private respondents’
complaint.

Issue/s:

WON CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed for by
respondents.
WON the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents’ complaint.

Held:

No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate.

No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights.

Rationale:

 Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to
investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights.
 In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres
Narvasa observed that:

(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law
to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much
less take over the functions of the latter.
 The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have

CHR’s investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights.

 The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong to
every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition
and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.
 Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent
that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its
attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4)
cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious."
 In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed
into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis
the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.