JBL VS BAGATSING

Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit
to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The
permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have
been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also
issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US
embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from
such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that
under our constitution we “adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the
rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless
element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of
international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine
Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the
same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof
would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.

II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that
subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the
police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the
ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the
500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally –
but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this case).

BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA [488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]

Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently
dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was
preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are
affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being
followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to
be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and
forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on
October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along
España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them
along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed,
causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto
and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept.
21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of
the message for which the expression is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment
of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for
the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and
penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of
publication.
KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No.
880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can
set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit
on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-
day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly,
otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is
preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that
no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum
tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise
by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave
public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is
content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to
Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the
permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a
content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the
right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
“lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be
struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, this was declared null and void.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General, National Economic Development

Facts: President Arroyo issued Executive Order 450 which requires all government agencies and
controlled corporations to have a uniform identification card; the director-general of the national
economic development authority was tasked to implement this order. The information required to be in
the said identification card would be: name, home address, sex, picture, signature, date of birth, place of
birth, marital status, names of parents, height, weight, two index fingers and two thumb marks, any
prominent distinguishing features like moles and others, tax identification number (TIN). The petitioners
argued that the said executive order usurped legislative functions and violates the right of privacy.
Petitioners alleged that EO 450 is contrary to law because it violated the principle handed down by the
Court in Ople v Torres and RA 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. The order according to the
petitioners was also going to use funds that are not appropriated by the Congress, it was also issued
without a public hearing. The order was also violating the constitutional provision of equal protection of
the laws because it discriminates and penalizes those who do not have an id. The petitioners also argue
that the order violates the right to privacy by allowing for the access of the personal data of the owner
without his or her consent. Issue:
Whether or not EO 450 usurped legislative functions and violated the citizen’s right to privacy.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the petition had no merit. The said order only applies to
government agencies who are already issuing identification cards even before the said order was
implemented. The purposes of the order were to: reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability,
convenience to the people served by the government entities and insure compatibility. Section 17
Article VII of the Constitution also provides for the President to have control to all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does
not need implementing legislation. This power of course is limited to executive branch of the
government and does not extend to other branches or independent constitutional commissions. EO 450
does not violate the right to privacy since no citizen particularly government employee have complained
upon the showing of information on their identification cards, even the petitioners have not made any
complaint about their own identification cards. EO 450 also issues identification cards that only have 14
data about the owner much less than what is issued upon Supreme Court employees.

EN BANCAM NO 90-5-2373JULY 12, 1990

IN RE: ATTY. EMILIANO P. JURADO, JR. a.k.a. EMIL JURADO
Gentlemen,Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of theCourt En Banc dated July 12,
1990.“Adm Matter No. 90-5-2373 (In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr. a.k.a. Emil Jurado). –

The front page of the Sunday, May 27, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, a national daily,
carried the banner headline: “Rebellioncomplex does not exist –SC.” And below it in smaller type,
“State back to Square One in cases vs. Enrile, et. al.” The lead article appeared in the following
page under the sub-head “High Tribunal reaffirms Hernandez Doctrine with 14-1 vote” and the by-line
of “Emil Jurado,Manila Standard Columnist” and reported, pertinently, that according to “well-placed
sources at the Supreme Court,” in a decision penned by Associate Justice Narvasa” ** to be announced
tomorrow for immediate promulgation ** the court had “** upheld a long standing precedent
known as the Hernandez Doctrine ** (and) reaffirmed that the crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and other common offenses does not exist ** (and) “* (b)y a vote of 14 to one ** denied the
government’s motion (sic) to repeal the doctrine.” It added that said majority included Chief Justice
Marcelo Fernan and that the lone opposition vote was Justice Leo Medialea’s.Mr. Jurado’s regular
column on page 10 of the same issue which was titled “SC decision knocks out gov’t lawyers.” And
began with the word “SCOOP” in bold, reiterated the above-quoted highlights of his page 2 report.
If those details and the photographs accompanying the report were not indication enough,
mention therein of the names of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, ex-Assemblyman Homobono Adaza
and lawyer Rafael Recto, among others, made clear what the main subject of those news items
was: a supposed decision awaiting immediate promulgation on one or another of the cases then
pending in this Court that challenged the validity of criminal informations charging various
persons with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder in connection with the failed
coup attempt of December, 1989. The Monday, May 28, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard was
headlined “High Cort ruling hailed.” The lead Article by Amante E. Bigornia on page 2 reported that the
ruling had been hailed by unnamed “legal luminaries” and added further supposed details about its
adoption which the writer attributed to the paper’s equally anonymous sources. In his column on page 9
of the same issue, Mr. Jurado elaborated in his earlier report as follows:“The Supreme Court is expected
to promulgate today or tomorrow its decision upholding the Hernandez doctrine that the
complex crime of rebellion with murder or frustrated murder does not exist. The decision will be
released as soon as it is signed by Justice Manuel (sic) Gancayco and
Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018Justice Irene Cortes, who were expected to arrive
from abroad over the weekend. The two had earlier signified their intention to uphold the
Hernandez doctrine.I must however, make certain clarifications about the Standard exclusive
yesterday on the Supreme Court decision. The High Court voted 14-0 (not 14-1, as reported
yesterday). As explained by my unimpeachable source, who is not connected in any way with the
Supreme Court, Associate Justice Leo Medialea, who was reported to have cast the dissenting vote,
had in fact inhibited himself from the process. Medialea’s son is a junior partner of the PECABAR Law
Office, the firm of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, who is charged with this complex crime.”“One Justice,
who concurred in the decision abstained in the case of the Panlilios because he is related to them
and was their lawyer at one time.”The decision was penned by Associate Justice Andres Narvasa, whose
father the late Judge Gregorio Narvasa, decided in the 50s that the complex crime of rebellion does not
exist.”While headlines and news about the matter continued to greet Manila Standard readers on
Tuesday, May 29, 1990, the tenor of these had materially changed. The headlines now proclaimed
that “Cory (referring to the President) awaits SC ruling” and “Tribunal still deliberating rebellion
complex issue.” The news inside was no longer about a decision already reached or a ruling made. It
reported a statement of the Chief Justice, made through Assistance Clerk of Court Luz Puno, that
there was no such decision and that the matter was still under deliberation. For the first time in three
days, Mr. Jurado’s subject was silent on the subject.The sequence of events is revealing. Having
stood by their news story of two days, Mr. Jurado and his newspaper had already began to
“backtrack,” as it were, by the third, confronted, no doubt, with the hard fact that it was not and could
not be, substantiated. On that same Tuesday, the Court en banc issued a Resolution branding as falsethe
news reports of May 27, 1990, declaring that as of that day, no decision or resolution on the subject of
said reports have been signed, either by the supposed ponente or any other member of the
Court, and requiring Mr. Emil Jurado (full name Emiliano P.Jurado, Jr: hereafter, “respondent”
only), a member of the bar as well as a journalist, to explain within five (5) days why he should not be
dealt with administratively” ** for publishing obviously false statements relative to the Court’s action
on a pending proceeding or otherwise indulging in speculation or conjecture, or airing illicit
information about the same.”By the fourth day, nothing was left but excuses. In his column in
the Wednesday, May 30, 1990 issue of the Manila Standard, respondent acknowledge having
received the show-cause Resolution and sought to justify the questioned news items as legitimate
reporting duly verified[4 LR 20]by both himself and his editor-in-chief and approved for publication of
the latter. The same issued featured an editorial which relevantly:
Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018a)Admitted that “breaking” the story of the alleged
decision before its promulgation went against the usual practice of awaiting the Court’s pronouncement
thereof; b)Admitted, also, awareness of the principle underlying such practice: ** that premature
disclosure and discussion may affect the Supreme Court’s deliberation on the matter”; c)Sought to
justify such action on the people’s right to know about decisions with “** momentous effect on
many prominent people ** (and) important implications for the political process o this
country”;d)Expressed the editor’s feeling that no violation of such principle against premature
disclosure of the Court’s decisions had been committed; ande)Clearly implied that the decision to
publish the report as a news story under respondent’s by-line, instead of as an item in his column,
had meant to evoke a reaction from the Court which would have ignored a column item as opinion or
gossip.It is now of public knowledge that respondent’s claimed reliance on “unimpeachable” sources
had been totally misplaced. At the time of publication of the reports in question, no ruling or decision on
any of what have become widely known by the misnomer “rebellion complex cases” had issued or was
about to issue. No action or pronouncement of the Court had given any intimation that a ruling on the
meritson any of them was in the offing. As a matter of fact, said cases were still under deliberation, and
the members of the Court had yet to reach that agreement or consensus upon which alone a
formal ruling or judgment could follow. Quite apart from the consideration that a decision or
resolution of the Court becomes such, for all legal intents and purposes, onlyfrom the moment of its
promulgation1–and none had to that time been promulgated, it was also a fact that no decision
or resolution of the tenor and character reported had been signed, either by the supposed writer
thereof, or by any other member of the Court. Only on July 5, 1990 did the Court promulgate its
Decision in G.R. Nos. 92163 (Enrile vs. Salazar, et. al.) and 92164 (Sps. Panlilio vs. De Leon, et.
al.) upholding the Hernandez ruling2in the rebellion cases filed against the petitioners herein.Its
contents, by showing up the many inaccuracies in Mr. Jurado’s earlier accounts, attest to the falsity of
his report of its existence on or before May 27, 1990. Thus, insofar as concerned the question of
wheter or not the Hernandez ruling remains binding precedent, it was not a 14-0 nor a 14-1, but a
12-1 decision, two members of the Court being on leave. The member first reported as having
dissented (Medialea, J.) did not in fact do so. He concurred with the majority in G.R.No. 92164 and
abstained from voting in G.R. 92163. It was the Chief Justice who filed a dissent on that principal
issue. No member abstained in G.R. No. 92164 by reason of either blood or past professional
relationship with the petitioners therein. Of the 12 member majority, six (6)issued or concurred in
separate opinions which, without affecting their concurrence on the main ruling upholding Hernandez,
expressed dissent on, or reservations about, some points raised and discussed in the majority
opinion. The fact 1Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Lopez Enage 152 SCRA 80 (1987); Ago vs. Court of
Appeals, 6 SCRA 530 (1962) 299 Phil. 515 (1956)
Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018that so many members of the court found need
to express their own views underscores, independently of any disavowals on the part of the Court or
its officers, the improbability of any consensus having been reached –much more, of a decision
having been written or signed –atthe time of the news reports in question.Under date of June 1, 1990,
respondent filed a “Compliance” with the show-cause Resolution which, while assuming responsibility
for the publication of the news reports of May 27, 1990 above referred to and offering his apologies
to the Court “** if ** (he had) in some way, actually hampered the administration of justice, or
obstructed the orderly workings of the Court, ** pleads in justification freedom of the press as well as
the right of the public to information on matters of public concern, both he avers, being guaranteed by
the Constitution. What said Compliance makes immediately apparent is the wide variance
between the plain import of the news reports in question and that the of the information upon which
respondent admittedly based the same. Said reports –which according to respondent were drafted, in
part at least and in for inclusion in his column, two days before they were actually published3-
invariably advert to the supposed ruling in the past tense, i.e., as a fait accompli, a decision already
reached, putting into writing and signed, thus” “(t)he Supreme Court has upheld a long standing legal
precedent known as the Hernandez doctrine **; (b)y a vote of 14 to one, the Tribunal already
denied the government’s motion to repeal the doctrine **; and (t)he ** decision was penned by
Associate Justice Andres Narvasa and concurred in by 13 other justices.: Bit, also by his own account,
the information upon which he based those reports was merely to the effect that ”** the Supreme
Court deliberationsclearly pointed to an overwhelming majority for upholding the Hernandez
doctrine ** and indicated ** the existence of a trend towards (such) a consensus among the members
of the Court.”4While such information might have inspired speculation about a possible ruling, it simply
did not warrant making, much less publishing as news, a conclusion that a decision on the matter had
already been written and signed. Thus, said reports, insofar as they assumed to chronicle an actual
state of facts, were not only objectively false, even in the context of what respondent claimed had
come to his knowledge, they were also grossly exaggerated and, at best, speculative. If all that
respondent had obtained from his unidentified sources was information had reached a consensus,
or that there was a trend towards a consensus, for upholding the Hernandez ruling –and it is
notable that even as he claims that his editors had checked out said information prior to
publication and obtained further details confirming its accuracy, he neglects to mention any of
those detains –its evolution into straight news that a ruling had in fact been written and signed [4 LR
21]and was about to be promulgated cannot be defended on the ground of either truth or honest
error. Neither does it merit belief that respondent’s editors had seriously applied themselves to
checking independently the capacity of information about a supposed ruling before proposing to
respondent and/or authorizing its publication. The implicit admission in 3Compliance, p. 2, par. 14Id.,
also pp. 4-5 par. 1
Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018the editorial of May 30, 1990 that the reports
were published as straight news, not as comment or gossip, in order to provoke a reaction from
the Court clearly suggests that it was the Court that was expected to confirm or verify the story,
that expectation itself providing the justification for its publication; there would otherwise be no
reason for such action had respondent’s editors attempted more than a desultory check or verification
of said story.It further suggests that the Court, ** jealous of its inner workings **, has to be prodded
into announcing or promulgating itsdecisions already made, however important, far-reaching or
urgent, the questions resolved and unmindfulof the right of the people to be informed thereof. The
notion must be speedily rejected and laid to rest, being wholly false and denigrative of the collective
sense of duty of the members of this Court. Nothing so far stated, however, should be taken as in
any manner implying that objective truth or good faith will exonerate respondent here. The
really relevant question being whether the report and comments in questions, regardless of their
truth and of the motives or purposes behind their publication, are protected by the
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.5There is no dispute of the existence and fundamental character of
these guarantees. But equally fundamental, needing no express statement or sanction in statute or
charter because inherent in the very nature of the judicial power and indispensable to the free
and untrammeled exercise by the courts of their traditional functions, is the principle of
confidentiality of all actuations of, or records or proceedings before, a Court in a pending action which
are not essentially public in character. Such principal the Court holds to be equally firmly established by
immemorial tradition and to inhere in the “judicial power” that is vested by the Constitution in this
Court and in the lower courts established by law.6Awareness of such principle is in fact acknowledge,
expressly by respondent’s editors in their May 30, 1990 editorial as already pointed out, and at
least implicitly by respondent himself,if indeed he is not chargeable with such knowledge as a lawyer’s.
As far as the proceedings in this Court are concerned, these confidential matters include, among
others, raffling of cases, deliberation and discussions of the en bancor the divisions, drafts of decisions
and resolutions embodying conclusions reached and dispositions agreed upon by the members in
consultation. Nor is the tension or confrontation resulting from the interplay of these adversarial
principles a new or recent development. It is as old as their common history, a long-standing
subject of judicial inquiry, and the weight of jurisprudence thereby developed clearly supports the
view that a publication relating to judicial action in a pending case which tends to impede,
embarrass orobstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom andis punishable as contempt. In
American Law, it is regarded as an interference with the work of the courts to publish any
matters which should be kept private, as, for example, the secrets of the jury room.5ART III, SECS.
4 and 7, Constitution6ART VIII, SEC. 1, Constitution
Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018A person charged with contempt of court in
making utterances or publishing writings which clearly constitute a contempt may not ordinarily
escape liability therefor by invoking the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press.
Liberty of speech and the press must not be confused with the abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by
means of the spoken or written word, the administration ofjustice by the courts has been
described as abuse of the liberty of the speech or the press such as will subject the abuse to punishment
for contempt of court7As a general rule, a publication tending to intimidate, influence, impede,
embarrass or obstruct the courts in the administration of justice in matters pending before them
constitutes contempt. This rule applies to any publication which has a tendency to prejudice or prevent
fair and impartial action in a cause under judicial investigation, whether by threats or other
forms of intimidation, or by reflections on the court, counsel, parties, or witnesses, with respect
to the cause. To constitute contempt, the publication need not be made in the place where the
court is held; circulation in or about such place is sufficient.Except as otherwise provided by statute,
it is not necessary to show that the publication actually obstructed, impeded, or embarrassed the
administration of justice, although it must appear that its tendency was of that character. However,
neither inherent tendency or reasonable tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of
justice in an action then before a court for consideration is enough to justify a restriction of free
expression; the publication must have been made under such circumstances as would be
calculated to imperil the fair and orderly functioning of the judicial process, not remotely or probably,
but immediately, and it must constitute a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice, which danger must be serious and substantial.* * *A cause is pending within the rule
relating to contempt from the moment an indictment is returned to the court, or from the
beginning of the action. A cause remains pending so long as there is still something for the court
to do therein, the doing of which may be embarrassed, impeded, or obstructed by the complained of
publication. This a cause is pending when it is still open to modification, appeal, or rehearing and until
the judgment is rendered and the remittur issued, and a cause is still pending within the meaning of the
rule, although an order has been made dismissing the action on the payment of the fees.[4 LR 22]* *
*Divulging judicial secrets constitutes an interference with the proper functioning of the courts and the
administration of justice.8In US vs. Sullens9where the editor of a newspaper published an article
commenting adversely to the prosecution upon certain criminal proceedings pending in court at the
time of publication, forecast an acquittal of the defendants, it was held:717 Am. Jur. 2dpp. 58-59817
CJS, pp. 81-87917 CJS, pp. 81-87
Encoded by Hezekiah D. Nicdao, Ateneo Law B2018“The administration of justice and the freedom of
the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other.
The press and the courts have corrective rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles
of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and taken care of at
all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial
business unhampered by publications which tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its
undoubted power to punish for contempt *** * *This court must be permitted to proceed with
the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of
its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court and, as
a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. But such a case as this has never before occurred in the
history of the state so far as I know, and it is hoped will never occur again.”And in Burns vs. State10:
“Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted in secret for the proper
administration of justice, should never be, while the case is on trial, given publicity by the press. It
is not infrequent that proceedings in courts of England in an important criminal case are highly
commended by the press of this country and comparison with procedure in the latter unjustly made
unfavorable thereto, without appreciating the very things which attract favorite mention are
promoted by restrictions upon personal liberty which do not exist here at all, or are sparingly
enforce. Such an occurrence during an important criminal trial after retirement of the jury to deliberate
upon their verdict, as publication in a newspaper of the secrets of the jury room would, in the mother
country, be visited by prompt and severe punishment as contempt of court. That incidents of like
treatment of offenders may be found in the decisions of courts in this country, is well illustrated
by State vs. Howell.11Here, the duty to abstain from such abuses is just as great as elsewhere. Here, the
sense of duty incident to good citizenship and public condemnation of such abuses ought to be
sufficient to prevent such occurrences. Moreover, trial courts should be alive to the importance
of protecting jurors from such interference during the course of a trial particularly after the
retirement to deliberate upon their verdict, in important criminal cases.” Closer to home, in In Re:
Lozano and Quevedo, which involved contempt proceedings against the editor and writer of a
newspaper which published an inaccurate account of a closed-door investigation of a Judge of
First Instance, this Court, after surveying earlier 10(1929) 36 Fed. (2nd) 230, 238-2391180 Conn. 668-
69 Atl 1057, 125 Am. St. Rep. 141.