Project Report on

Criminal Conspiracy

Submitted to: Mr. Manoj Kumar

(Faculty of Indian Penal Code)

Submitted by: NIKHIL PARTHSARTHI

Roll No: 91
Semester: V

Date of Submission 30/11/2018

Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur

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 Contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ 2
Introduction:........................................................................................................................................... 3
CHAPTER-I............................................................................................................................................... 4
CHAPTER-II ............................................................................................................................................. 6
CHAPTER-III........................................................................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER-IV .......................................................................................................................................... 13
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 25
Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................... 26

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 Acknowledgements
First & foremost, I take this opportunity to thank Mr. Manoj Kumar, Faculty, Indian Penal Code,
HNLU, for allotting me this interesting topic to work on. He has been very kind in providing
inputs for this work, by way of suggestions.

I would also like to thank my dear colleagues and friends in the University, who have helped me
with ideas about this work. Last, but not the least I thank the University Administration for
equipping the University with such good library and I.T. facilities, without which, no doubt this
work would not have taken this shape in correct time.

Nikhil Paerhsarthi

Semester-V, Batch-XIV

Roll no-91

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 Introduction:
An agreement between two or more persons to engage jointly in an unlawful or criminal act,
or an act that is innocent in itself but becomes unlawful when done by the combination of actors.
conspiracy is governed by statute in federal courts and most state courts. Before its codification
in state and federal statutes, the crime of conspiracy was simply an agreement to engage in an
unlawful act with the intent to carry out the act. Federal statutes and many statutes now require
not only agreement and intent but also the commission of an over act in furtherance of the
agreement. Conspiracy is a crime separate from the criminal act for which it is developed.
For example: One who conspires with another to commit burglary and in fact commits the
burglary can be charged with both conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary.
Conspiracy is an inchoate, or preparatory, crime. It is similar to solicitation in that both
crimes are committed by manifesting an intent to engage in a criminal act.

Scope and Limitation:

The scope of the project is to deal with the criminal conspiracy and the and the judgement of
the other countries.
Objective:
The objective of the study is to deal with the criminal conspiracy and independent people in
the project.

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 CHAPTER-I
Introduction:-
Criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons formed for the purpose of
committing a crime. The application and to the evidence necessary to prove the existence of the
agreement. Criminalization of conspiracy performs two functions. The first function is that
performed by any inchoate offense-the interruption of criminal activity prior to its completion.
At least in theory, conspiracy subjects the defendant to criminal sanctions at a stage earlier than
any other offense, even attempt. "[Every criminal conspiracy is not an attempt. One may become
guilty of conspiracy long before his act has come so dangerously near to completion as to make
him criminally liable for the attempted crime." The courts rarely have stated the rationale for this
early sanction, although a few commentators have offered justifications for it, arguing that
individuals who band together have expressed, immediately upon their agreement, a clear intent
to violate society's laws. Also, it is argued that when more than one person agrees to engage in
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the criminal activity, the likelihood of the accomplishment of the crime is increased.
The effort of an individual to disturb this equilibrium can never be perceptible, nor carry the
operation of his interest on that of any other individual, beyond the limits of fair competition; but
the increase of power by combination of means, being in geometrical proportion to the number
concerned, an association may be able to give an impulse, not only oppressive to individuals, but
mischievous to the public at large; and it is the employment of an engine so powerful and
dangerous, that gives criminality to an act that would be perfectly innocent, at least in a legal
view, when done by an individual.'
Conspiracy is a crime at the moment the agreement is formed, or at the moment some minor
act is taken in furtherance of that agreement. This is an earlier stage of criminal activity than is
required for attempt, which usually involves either a substantial step toward the commission of
the contemplated crime, or else "conduct that, in fact, amounts to more than mere preparation
for, and indicates intent to complete, the commission of the crime. Regardless of whether
attempt could handle the inchoate conspiracy activities in theory, or whether it would be
desirable, attempt would seem to be able to handle those situations in which prosecutors actually
charge conspiracy. Conversations with prosecutors confirmed this. One stated that "[no one will

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scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1636&context..

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prosecute a case without an overt act; generally there is at least an attempt unless you have an
informant which is the rare situation, for you find out about the conspiratorial relationship from
the overt act."
A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two
or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design
rests in intention only it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is
an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum,
capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable of for a criminal object or for the use of criminal
means.
Ingredients of criminal conspiracy:
Unlawful agreement :

It is an element of a criminal conspiracy. Generally, the crime of conspiracy is complete

when parties enter into a conspiratorial agreement. Moreover, if there is an agreement between
two or more persons for an unlawful purpose, it is considered a criminal conspiracy even where
there is no agreement regarding the details of the criminal scheme or the means by which the
unlawful purpose will be accomplished. The agreement will determine whether single or
multiple conspiracies exist between the parties. A single conspiratorial agreement will constitute
a single criminal conspiracy and multiple agreements to commit separate crimes will constitute
multiple conspiracies.

Similarly, conspiracy is considered a specific intent crime. A specific intent crime is one in
which a person acts with knowledge of what he/she is doing and also with the objective of
completing some unlawful act. The intent can be determined from words, acts, and conduct. If
the conspirators agree or conspire with specific intent to kill and commit an overt act in
furtherance of such agreement, then they are guilty of conspiracy to commit express malice
murder.2

2
Ajeet Singh Chauhan and others v State of U.P. and others

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 knowledge:-
To be more specific, to make a person liable for criminal conspiracy as a co conspirator,
he/she must have knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy and knowledge of the illegal
object of the conspiracy. At the same time, a person having no knowledge of a conspiracy
cannot be considered a conspirator.
Similarly, in order to satisfy the statute, the government must prove that a conspirator
committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. A conspiracy conviction requires proof
of the commission of at least one overt act by one of the conspirators within the five-year
statutory period in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement.3

CHAPTER-II
Section 120-A of the I.P.C. defines ‘conspiracy’ to mean that when two or more persons agree to
do, or cause to be done an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an
agreement is designated as “criminal conspiracy.

No agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy,

unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in
furtherance thereof.

The main thing on which criminality lies under this section is the “agreement”, which requires at
least two persons. Here ‘Agreement’ is not merely the stage of intention which is not culpable,
but is much more than that.

It is a plan or a design to bring in action. The plot is an act in itself. It is not necessary that all the
members of the conspiracy must be aware of each detail of the conspiracy, but it is essential and

3
State of Delhi v Bashir Ahmed Ponnu and others

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required that there has to be a common design among them and every conspirator from his end
of the design must carry out into effect or execute the plan.

However, every conspirator will be aware of the major and important details of the conspiracy if
not the minutest details.

For example- If there is a conspiracy of committing a murder amongst some persons, each of
the conspirator will have to be aware of the major detail of the conspiracy in order to execute
the plan properly. Major details here would be, who is to be murdered and how, when he is to
be murdered and by whom, even though the other minute details might not be known to each
of them.

In determining criminal conspiracy it is immaterial whether the ultimate object of the agreement
is such illegal act or not. A conspirator to commit an offence punishable with death
imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upward and no
specific provision is made for such conspiracy then the offender will be punished in the same
manner as he has abetted the offence. If the conspiracy is not to commit an offence then the
provided punishment shall be term not exceeding six months or fine or both.

It is important that the culpability of an offence is inconsonance with the degree or grade of the
act of perpetrator, while determining the guilt of the accused persons, the degree and the act of
the participants in the offence has to be carefully and cautiously assessed.

ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME:

The Act of Agreement. -
Although every other common-law crime includes both a criminal act and a criminal intent,
it has been contended that the law of conspiracy punishes intent alone. Such a view seems
unjustified. In its early development the crime might have been explained by considering its
criminal act to be the physical act of communicating, by words or otherwise, mutual adherence
to a common enterprise; for originally the statute of limitations began to run on a conspiracy as
soon as this communication was made. Today, however, it is established that conspiracy is a
continuing crime, extending beyond the initial communication of agreement. It seems, therefore,
that the criminal act of the modern crime is not the communication of agreement, but the act of

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agreement itself, that is, the continuous and conscious union of wills upon a common
undertaking.
While this act is not physical, it still goes beyond the completely internal and subjective act
of intending. It requires on the part of each conspirator communion with a mind and will outside
himself, and it must be initiated by a communication of common intention and assent through
physical means. If some principle of law demands that the line of criminal responsibility never
be drawn short of a physical act, the act of agreeing should go unnoticed. But the line the
common law has chosen does not seem irrational. "Indeed, it seems a reduction to absurdity, that
procuring a single stand of arms should be a sufficient overt act to make the disloyal design
indictable, and that conspiring with a thousand men to enlist should not."

The Criminal Intent:-

In actuality, conspiracy defies division into the classic elements of criminal act and criminal
intent, since the act, being volitional, includes within itself the intent. For purposes of analysis,
however, the division remains meaningful. Therefore, this section is devoted to a second
consideration of intent, this time apart from its function as an element necessary to the
commission of the criminal act, and in its role as the mens rea required for criminal guilt under
the common law' Specific Intent. - It has been said that conspiracy requires "specific intent."
This phrase is properly used to denote something more than merely a corrupt or wrongful
purpose; it indicates a particular kind of purpose characteristic of the particular "species" of
crime. Larceny, for example, requires the specific intent to deprive someone of his property
permanently. The intent to deprive him of it only temporarily, while it may be corrupt and
wrongful, will not support a conviction4. It has been observed that there are really two intents
required for the crime of conspiracy: an intent to agree and an intent to achieve the object of the
agreement. As applied to the former, the statement that conspiracy requires a specific intent is
clearly correct, for the intent to agree is indispensable to, and characteristic of, this species of
crime. But if the statement is meant to apply to the second intent, as appears to be the case, it

4
N. Ratnakumari v State of Odisha and others

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seems inaccurate. It is difficult, in fact, to conceive of any crime in which the intent is less
specific.

Wrongful Intent. -
A question of more practical significance than whether the intent in the crime of conspiracy
is specific is whether it need be wrongful, that is, whether any mens rea need be shown at all.
The view which has won general acceptance in this country was first proposed in People v.
Powell and was later well expressed by Justice Qua in Commonwealth v. Benesch: "In the case
of conspiracy, as with other common law crimes, it is necessary that criminal intent be shown.
Speaking in general terms, there must be an intent to do wrong." If the act that is conspired to is
malum in se, this intent merely requires knowledge of the relevant facts, so that the parties know
what they are planning; but if it is an act not wrongful in itself and merely made unlawful by
statute, the requisite intent to do wrong does not exist without knowledge that the contemplated
acts violate the law. Therefore, even when the commission of a particular substantive offense
does not require scienter, conspiracy to commit that offense does. Such a view seems consistent
with the general-danger rationale of conspiracy, since it is difficult to say that a grouping is
inherently antisocial and poses a continuing threat merely because a contemplated act which it
thinks to be lawful is in fact unlawful. It may be argued that if the group plans such an act once,
it may do so again, and so does constitute a continuing danger. But merely informing the group
of the illegality of its object, rather than invoking the severe sanction of criminal punishment,
may be all that is necessary to end such danger. If this is not effective, then the group in its
subsequent activity will possess the requisite scienter, and so will be antisocial and punishable as
a conspiracy.
Objects:-
General Nature.-
A famous maxim states that an indictment "ought to charge a conspiracy, either to do an
unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means." In practice no real distinction has been drawn
between ends and means. Whether or not this clause is a "magic jingle" which obviates "the
necessity of correctly analyzing the doctrine of conspiracy" seems open to question. 'The precise
limits of the word "unlawful" are unclear. There seems to be general agreement that an indictable
conspiracy exists whenever the object to be attained is felonious. Conspiracy convictions may be

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sustained when the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanour, even when the penalty for
conspiring is much more severe than the penalty for the substantive offense.' Furthermore, when
the object of the conspiracy is itself unlawful only in the sense that liability for civil damages
may result, and even when attainment of the object intended involves no civil or criminal
sanctions, conspiracy convictions are allowed.

Requisite Plurality:-
Husband and Wife:-
Criminal conspiracy requires a plurality of conspirators. At common law husband and wife
were one. Thus the rule was early established that husband and wife cannot be counted as the
minimum two parties necessary to make up a criminal conspiracy.' The rule, accepted initially by
American courts as the common law, was first questioned early in this century.' However, it was
not expressly repudiated by a state court until and not by a federal court until Some earlier
courts may have applied the common-law rule on the basis of the ancient doctrine that the wife
was not liable for substantive offenses committed jointly with her husband because she was
presumed to be under his control. Any presumption of control sufficient to defeat a finding of
plurality has been much weakened. In the other cases in which the rule has been accepted, it
seems to have been mechanically applied; similarly, when rejected, it has been mechanically
rejected. The courts in the latter cases simply note that in no other field of modern law are
husband and wife considered one.
At one time it was held that corporations could not be indicted for offenses requiring
criminal intent. However, a corporation is now indictable as a conspirator, arguably for the
reason that the intent of agents who conspire is imputed to the corporation. However, as in
situations involving husband and wife, problems in determining the existence of the plurality
necessary for indictment arise. When two corporations and an officer of each are indicted, the
necessary plurality is evident. It is also apparent when a corporation, one of its officers, and a
third person combine for unlawful ends. When, however, the corporate entity and a single agent
are the only two parties to a conspiracy, plurality seems lacking; and there appears to be no
conspiracy for which intent is imputable to the corporation.

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 The Wharton Rule. -
A defendant can be convicted of conspiracy although his co-conspirators are immune from
prosecution both for the conspiracy and for the substantive offense, but not when his co-
conspirators are without legal capacity. Moreover, a defendant can be convicted of conspiring to
commit a substantive offense for which he himself is not indictable. The latter rule is upheld
against the charge that it is contrary to legislative intent on the ground that the conspiracy is
"distinct" from the substantive offense. 5Although this merely states the conclusion, the rule
appears to be sound in view of the rationales underlying conspiracy. The substantive offense
seems more likely to be accomplished once the agreement is made, and in any event, a
combination dangerous in itself, no matter who is liable for the substantive offense, introduces
the normal general dangers of conspiracy. The argument that the legislature intended to punish
only the party who can actually commit the substantive offense has force only when the party
indicted for conspiring is a member of a legislatively protected class. However, even in such a
case, a conspiracy conviction was sustained when the protected person was extraordinarily active
in pursuing the criminal object.

CHAPTER-III
Evidence :-
The problems of the conspiracy trial are complicated by the special evidentiary rules which
apply to this crime. The existence of conspiracy is usually proved in one or more of three ways:
by circumstantial evidence, by the testimony of a co-conspirator who has turned state's evidence,
or by evidence of the out-of-court declarations or acts of a co-conspirator or of the defendant
himself.

5
N. Ratnakumari v State of Odisha and others

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 1)Circumstantial Evidence:-
The gist of the conspiracy is the agreement, although many jurisdictions require an overt act
in addition. Since conspiracy is a crime which by its nature tends to be secret, the agreement is
seldom susceptible of direct proof. Most conspiracy convictions therefore rest on inferences from
circumstantial evidence. Further, there can be a conspiracy even if there is no express
communication of agreement. 6As a result, the courts have established less stringent standards of
relevance for the admission of circumstantial evidence in conspiracy trials than for other crimes.
"Wide latitude is allowed [the prosecution] in presenting evidence, and it is within the discretion
of the trial court to admit evidence which even remotely tends to establish the conspiracy
charged." Evidence of criminal offenses less related to the crime charged is allowed in
conspiracy prosecutions"' than in the prosecution of crimes other than conspiracy. Finally, once
the jury has found an agreement, only slight additional evidence is necessary to connect the
defendant with the conspiracy. In these respects the courts seem to be overcompensating for the
difficulties faced by the prosecution.
2) Testimony of a Co-conspirator. -
The testimony of a co-conspirator as to facts within his knowledge involves no hearsay
problem, since the statements are given on the stand and are open to cross-examination. Some
states, however, have statutory provisions that this testimony must be corroborated, although
there is no such federal statute. This requirement is sometimes relaxed by imposing a less rigid
standard for corroborative evidence in a conspiracy trial than would usually be the case.
3) Co-conspirator Hearsay Exception:-
The general rule regarding the admission of hearsay evidence as to the statements of a co
conspirator, although complex in application and often misunderstood, may nevertheless be
simply stated: any act or declaration by one co conspirator, committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy and during its pendency, is admissible against each co-conspirator provided that a
foundation for its admission is laid by independent proof of the conspiracy
.

6
Pawan Kumar Mittal and others v State of Uttar Pradesh and another

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 CHAPTER-IV
Case Law:
State Of Tamil Nadu Through Superintendent Of Police CBI /SIT Vs Nalini AIR
(1999) 5 SCC 253
 Under section 120A IPC offence of criminal conspiracy is committed when two or more
persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal means. When
it is legal act by illegal means overact is necessary. Offence of criminal conspiracy is
exception to the general law where the intent alone does not constitute crime. It is
intention to commit and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not one
intention but there has to be agreement to carry out the object intention which is an
offence. The question for consideration in a case all the accused had the intention and did
they agree that the crime committed. It would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy
where the accused merely entertained a wish, howsoever, horrendous it that offence be
committed.
 Acts subsequent to the achieving of object of conspiracy may tend to that a particular
accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the conspiracy has been achieved any
subsequent act which may be would not make the accused a part of the conspiracy like
giving should absconder.
 Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely establish a conspiracy by direct
evidence. Usually both the existence conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from
the circumstance conduct of the accused.
 Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a
conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually both the existence of the conspiracy and its
objects have to be infered from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused.
 conspirators may for example be enrolled in chain A and enrolling B, B enrolling in C,
and so on and all will be members of the single conspiracy if they so intend and agree,
even though each members knows only the person who enrolled him and the person
whom he enrols. there may be a kind of umbrella - spoke enrollement, where a single
person at the centre doing the enrolling and all the other members being unknown to each
other though they know that there are to be other members.

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  These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell whether the conspiracy in a
particular case falls into which category. it may however even overlap. but then there has
to be present mutual interest. persons may be members of single conspiracy even though
each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse role to play. It is
not a part of the crime of conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the
same or an active role.
 It is not necessary that all the conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the
same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the consummation
of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible.
 What part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to
when a conspirator is to play may not be known to every one or the fact as to when a
conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left.
 A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it is forced them into a joint
trial and the court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every accused.
Prosecution has to procedure evidence not only shown that each of the accused has
knowledge of object of conspiracy but also of the agreement.
 In the charge of the conspiracy court has to guard itself against the danger of unfairness
to the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the conviction of all,
which is to be avoided.

Case Analysis:-

 On the night of 21.5.1991 a diabolical crime was committed. It stunned the whole nation.
Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India, was assassinated by a human bomb. With
him 15 persons including 9 policemen perished and 43 suffered grievous or simple
injuries. Assassin Dhanu an LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam) activist, who
detonated the belt bomb concealed under her waist and Haribabu, a photographer (and
also a conspirator) engaged to take photographs of the horrific sight, also died in the
blast.
 As in any crime, criminals leave some footprints. In this case it was a camera which was
found intact on the body of Haribabu at the scene of the crime. Film in the camera when
developed led to unfolding of the dastardly act committed by the accused and others. A

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 charge of conspiracy for offences under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), Indian Penal Code (IPC), Explosive Substances Act,
1908, Arms Act, 1959, Passport Act, 1967, Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Indian Wireless
Telegraphy Act, 1933 was laid against 41 persons, 12 of whom were already dead having
committed suicide and three absconded. Out of these, 26 faced the trial before the
Designated Court. Prosecution examined 288 witnesses and produced numerous
documents and material objects.
 Statements of all the accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Code). They denied their involvement. The Designated Court found them
guilty of the offences charged against them. Thereafter all the accused were heard on the
question of sentence. Designated Court awarded death sentence to all of them on the
charge of conspiracy to murder. "A judicial massacre", bemoaned Mr. Natarajan, learned
senior counsel for the accused, and rightly so in our opinion. Designated Court also
sentenced each of the accused individually for various offences for which they had been
separately charged.
 In view of the provisions of Section 20 of TADA, Designated Court submitted the
sentence of death to this Court for confirmation. The accused also filed appeals under
Section 19 of TADA challenging their conviction and sentence.
 The accused have different alias and while mentioning the accused name it may not be
necessary to refer to them with all their respective alias and alias of an accused will be
indicated wherever necessary. There is no dispute about these alias. For proper
comprehension of the facts it will be appropriate to refer to the appellants as accused.
 Three absconding accused are (1) Prabhakaran, (2) Pottu Amman @ Shanmuganathan
Sivasankaran and (3) Akila @ Akilakka. Prabhakaran is alleged to be the supreme leader
of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) - a Sri Lankan Tamil organization, who
along with Pottu Amman, Chief of Intelligence Wing of LTTE, Akila, Deputy Chief of
Women Wing of LTTE, and others designed criminal conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv
Gandhi and commit other offences in pursuance thereof.

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Punishment for terrorist acts.-

(1) Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in
people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect
the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs,
dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or fire-arms or other lethal
weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether
biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to
cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of,
property or disruption or any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or
detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government
or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.

(2) Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall,-

(i) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment
for life and shall be liable to fine;

(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

(3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or

knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist act,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

(4) Whoever harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any terrorist shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may
extent to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

(5) Any person who is a member of a terrorists gang or a terrorists organisation, which is
involved in terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

16
(6) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act or has
been acquired through the terrorist funds shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than five years but which may extent to imprisonment for life and shall also be
liable to fine.

Section 4.Punishment for disruptive activities.-

(1) Whoever commits or conspired or attempts to commit or abets, advocates, advises, or

knowingly facilitates the commission of, any disruptive activity or any act preparatory to a
disruptive activity shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), "disruptive activity" means any action taken, whether by
act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever,

(i) which questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; or

(ii) which is intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly or indirectly, for the
cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union.

Enhanced penalties.-

(1) If any person with intent to aid any terrorist or disruptionist, contravenes any provision of, or
any rule made under, the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), the Explosives Act, 1884 (4 of 1884),
the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), or the inflammable Substances Act, 1952 (20 of
1952), he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any of the aforesaid Acts or the rules
made there under be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) For the purposes of this section, any person who attempts to contravene or abets, or attempts
to abet, or does any act preparatory to the contravention of any provision of any law, rule or
order, shall be deemed to have contravened that provision, and the provisions of sub-section (1)

17
shall, in relation to such person, have effect subject to the modification that the reference to
"imprisonment for life" shall be construed as a reference to "imprisonment for ten years".

1 Certain confessions made to police officers to be taken into consideration.-(1) Notwithstanding

anything in the Code or in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), but subject to the
provisions of this section, a confession made by a person before a police officer not lower in rank
than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer either in writing or on any
mechanical device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which sounds or images can
be reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person or co-accused, abettor or
conspirator for an offence under this Act or rules made there under.

Over-riding effect.- The provisions of this Act or any rule made there under or any order made
under any such rule shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained
in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any
enactment other than this Act.

Power to make rules.-

Without prejudice to the powers of the Supreme Court to make rules under Section 27, the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the
provisions of this Act.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may
provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:

(a) regulating the conduct of persons in respect of areas the control of which is considered
necessary or expedient and the removal of such persons from such areas;

(b) the entry into, and search of,

(i) any vehicle, vessel or aircraft; or

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(ii) any place, whatsoever, reasonably suspected of being used for committing the offences
referred to in section 3 or section 4 or for manufacturing or storing anything for the commission
of any such offence;

TADA RULES:

Recording of confession made to police officers.-

(1) A confession made by a person before a police officer and recorded by such police officer
under Section 15 of the Act shall invariably be recorded in the language in which such
confession is made and if that is not practicable, in the language used by such police officer for
official purposes or in the language of the Designated Court and it shall form part of the record.

(2) The confession so recorded shall be shown, read or played back to the person concerned and
if he does not understand the language in which it is recorded, it shall be interpreted to him in a
language which he understands and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his confession.

(3) The confession shall, if it is in writing, be-

(a) signed by the person who makes the confession; and

(b) by the police officer who shall also certify under his own hand that such confession was
taken in his presence and recorded by him and that the record contains a full and true account of
the confession made by the person and such police officer shall make a memorandum at the end
of the confession to the following effect:-

(4) Where the confession is recorded on any mechanical device, the memorandum referred to in
sub-rule (3) in so far as it is applicable and a declaration made by the person making the
confession that the said confession recorded on the mechanical device has been correctly
recorded in his presence shall also be recorded in the mechanical device at the end of the
confession.

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(5) Every confession recorded under the said section 15 shall be sent forthwith to the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in
which such confession has been recorded and such Magistrate shall forward the recorded
confession so received to the Designated Court which may take cognizance of the offence.

Bimbadhar Pradhan vs The State Of Orissa on 13 March,

The appellant and four others were placed on their trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge of
Sambalpur for offences under sections 120-B, 409,477-A and 109, Indian Penal Code with
having committed the offences of criminal conspiracy, criminal breach of trust in respect of
Government property, and falsification of accounts with a view to defraud the Government. The
appellant was the District Food Production Officer in Sambalpur and the other four accused
persons were agricultural sub-overseers in charge of their respective areas under the appellant.
Another such agricultural sub-overseer was Pitabas Sahu at Bargarh centre. He was examined at
the trial as P.W. 25 and (1) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 881

The prosecution case is that in furtherance of the Grow More Food Scheme initiated by
Government it was decided to subsidize the supply of oil cake to agriculturists with a view to
augmenting the production of food crops. Cultivators were to be supplied this variety of manure
at Rs. 440 per maund, though the Government had to spend per maund. The appellant entered
into a conspiracy with his subordinate staff including the agricultural sub- overseers aforesaid to
misappropriate the funds thus placed at their disposal for the procurement and supply of oil cake
to cultivators. To bolster up the quantity of oil cakes to be procured, they showed false
transactions of purchase and distribution thereof and falsified accounts, vouchers, etc. Thus they
were alleged to have misappropriated of Government money.

A large volume of oral and documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the prosecution. The
three assessors who assisted at the trial were of the opinion that none of the accused was guilty.
The learned Assistant Sessions Judge in agreement with the assessors acquitted the four
agricultural sub-overseers aforesaid of all charges, giving them the benefit of the doubt. But in
disagreement with the assessors he convicted the appellant under all the charges and sentenced

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him to rigorous imprisonment for four and a half years and a fine of Rs. 2,000 under section
409,Indian Penal Code, and to rigorous imprisonment for two years each under sections 120-
B and477-A of the Code, the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently. The learned trial
Judge observed in the course of his judgment as follows:- "Hence on a consideration of all the
evidence as discussed above, I find that the prosecution have fully proved their case that the
accused Bimbadhar Pradhan, the D.F.P.O. has conspired to embezzle the Government money.
They have also proved that he has got an active hand and in assistance of Pitabas Sahu has
embezzled Government money amounting to Rs. 4,943-4-0 and in that act he has also actively
helped Pitabas Sahu in falsifying the Government records by making false entries

The appellant went up in appeal to the High Court of Orissa. A Division Bench of that Court
allowed his appeal and set aside his convictions and sentences under sections 409 and 477-
A,Indian Penal Code, but upheld his conviction and sentence in respect of the charge of
conspiracy under section 120-B of the Code. We need not enter into the correctness of the
findings of the trial court in respect of the acquittal of the other four accused, or of the High
Court with regard to the acquittal of the appellant in respect of the charges under sections
409 and 477-A, Indian Penal Code. The High Court held that though the appellant had
withdrawn the sum of Rs. 27,000 from the Government treasury with a view to subsidizing the
procurement of oil cake, it had not been proved that there was an entrustment to the appellant.
Hence the charge against him undersection 409 failed.

As regards the charge under section 477-A, the High Court acquitted him on the ground that the
documents said to have been falsified, which were large in number, had not been mentioned in
the charge and a vague statement that "accounts, cash books, stock books, petty cash sale
register, cash memos, applications from cultivators, receipts, bills, vouchers, papers, documents,
letters, correspondence, etc. had been falsified" was made. As regards the charge of conspiracy
under section 120-B, the High Court observed that the most important witness to prove the
charge was the approver aforesaid (P.W. 25) who had given a full description of the conspiracy
on the 23rd or 25th September 1947 between the appellant and other sub- overseers including
himself for the purpose of showing bogus purchases and bogus distribution of large quantities of
oil cake. It also observed that "Most of the witnesses examined by the prosecution to corroborate
the evidence of Pitabas are themselves accomplices in the conspiracy". The High Court found

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that in respect of that conspiracy the evidence given by the approver got adequate corroboration
from other independent witnesses. After setting out the evidence the High Court recorded the
following finding:- "This would be strongest corroboration of the evidence of the approver about
the appellant being the prime mover and the brain behind the entire fraud. It was he who wanted
to misuse his official position and persuade his subordinates to join with him in showing false
procurement and distribution figures of oilcakes".

120-B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy -

(1) whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where
no express provision is made in the Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished
in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an
offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.

Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.-- When a criminal act is done
by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable
for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

302. Punishment for murder -- Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.-- Whoever, except in the
case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument
for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely
to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any
corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance

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which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by
means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be punished.

Ram Narain Popli vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 14 January, 2003

Bench: M.B. Shah, B.N. Agrawal, Arijit Pasayat

 It is the case of A-5 that except for first transaction he borrowed money from the MUL
because MUL had surplus funds which MUL were to invest and make substantial profits
out of investment. A-5 returned the borrowed amount on due date with interest in each
transaction. All the said four transactions were backed by BRs as collateral security and
the BRs were backed by requisite number of units. Loan was for a short period e.g. 2nd
transaction was for 12 days, 3rd was for five days, 4th was for two days and 5th for five
days. Interest rate was also high i.e. 16.75%, 21%, 26.25% and 25% respectively.
 It is his submission that it is absurd to suggest that A-5 committed any offence or
offences, but the prosecution is a piece of political revenge against A-5 for disclosing
certain facts to the press against the political leaders. He contends that transactions were
loan transactions because in all these transactions the rate of interest and number ;f days
for which the loan was being advanced was settled before die money and the units
changed hands. This is consistent only with the transaction being a loan transaction. He
also submitted that mainly the prosecution case in the FIR dated 15.4.1993 which was
lodged after preliminary enquiry which started from 15.9.1992 as well as in the charge-
sheet submitted by the CBE on 15.12.1994 was that MUL gave loan to A-5 at a lower
rate of interest and suffered toss.
 The learned senior counsel submitted that FIR was lodged after investigation for seven
months and charge-sheet was submitted after more than one year and eight months,
which itself indicates mat CBI knew that there was no case to be put up before a Court
and the investigation was kept alive for sordid and dishonest motive. He pointed out that-
(I) the CBI itself understood that the FIR was based upon the one single allegation that
MUL should have received more interest than it actually received. The charge-sheet

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nowhere states that at the time of the FIR the nature of these five transactions was
misunderstood or that they changed their mind after investigation; descriptions of the
remaining transactions.

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 Conclusion
The very heart of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement. To reach an agreement that
constitutes criminal behaviour, the parties must intend to agree and intend to achieve the same
object. This article has explored the problems, both practical and theoretical, that result when
applying this seemingly simple truism of criminal law. Proving intent is not easy, particularly if:
(1) the defendant denies he had the intent; (2) the defendant is an otherwise honest business
person; or (3) the courts require a different sort of intent than that required for the substantive
offense. The intent issue of conspiracy law is so very crucial that even this brief treatment of the
subject may aid those who study the crime, and more importantly, assist those who prosecute or
defend persons charged with criminal conspiracy is applicable to this case as well.

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 Bibliography

 EMILE DURKHEIM: RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1950) PG.65

 CRIME IN INDIA 1993 GOVT. OF INDIA BUREAU OF POLICE RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT, NEW DELHI.
 STUDY CONDUCTED BY INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION, NEW
DELHI PARA 15.9 OF SECOND REPORT OF NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION.
 INVESTIGATION AND ROLE OF POLICE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS BY
MALLICK AT PG.29.

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