2000 Y L R 867

[Lahore]

Before Muhammad Naseem Chaudhri, J

AMEER BUX---Petitioner

versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1032-B of 1999, heard on 19th July, 1999.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302---Bail, grant of---Accused had no motive
to commit the murder of his wife, but on having seen her committing adultery with a
stranger in his house he killed both of them---If "Ghairat " was not prompted and given
due weight, the apprehension could not be ruled out that the close relations would
become "Be-Ghairat " due to the fear of heavy punishment---Accused even if convicted
could not be liable for the maximum punishment--Bail was allowed to accused in
circumstances.

Liaqat Ali v. State 1994 PCr.LJ 2012 ref.

Sardar Dost Muhammad Khan Chandia for Petitioner.

Sh. Gul Muhammad for the State.

Date of hearing: 19th July, 1999.

JUDGMENT

Page No. 1 of 3
Abdul Qadir complainant, a driver by profession, and brother of Mst. Khadija (deceased
of this case), married to Ameer Bakhsh petitioner, got recorded F.I.R., No.51, dated
29-1-1999 at Police Station Jampur, district Rajanpur under section 302, P. P. C.
According to him his sister Mst. Khadija was married to Ameer Bakhsh who were
blessed with two sons and two daughters. He had gone to the house of his Behnoi Ameer
Bakhsh along with Kareem Bakhsh on a routine visit where he had his dinner and started
watching television. In the contiguous room his sister Mst. Khadija was present. At about
8-30 p.m. he heard the alarm of his sister where he went and saw Ameer Bakhsh
petitioner present there while armed with a gun and a stranger whose name afterwards
was brought to his notice as Abrar Ahmad was lying with his sister Mst. Khadija on the
same cot. His Behnoi fired at Mst. Khadija and, second time, at Abrar Ahmad. He
repeated firing at Mst. Khadija and Abrar Ahmad. He restrained them from coming ahead
by issuing the threats who fled way. According to the complainant the dead bodies of
both Mst. Khadija and Abrar Ahmad were lying full of blood on the same cot. He prayed
for taking the legal action. The law was set in motion. The dead bodies were taken into
possession and autopsy of both the dead bodies was got conducted. The blood-stained
earth was taken into possession. The statements of the P.Ws. were recorded under section
161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ameer Bakhsh was arrested whose bail plea has
been rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. He has filed this petition before
this Court to try his luck to be admitted to bail.

2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned State counsel
and gone through the record before me. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the
petitioner took the law to his hands in furtherance of pure moral and ethical
considerations in the Islamic State of Pakistan as a stranger Abrar Ahmad was present in
the room of his house where his wife Mst. Khadija was lying with him on the same cot
who could not restrain himself as it was a matter of adultery. He added that the petitioner
is a person who can be termed to be "Ba-Ghairat" and he is not liable for capital
punishment. On the contrary learned State counsel laid the emphasis that the petitioner is
named in the F.I.R., who committed the double murder and, thus, is not entitled to be
admitted to bail

3. At this stage I would refer to the ruling printed as Liaqat Ali v. State (1994 PCr.LJ
2012) and I shall reproduce the following para. from the same:--

"Chapter IV (General Exceptions) of the Code is to be read in conjunction with

substituted Chapter XVI. Section 76 provides that nothing is an offence which is
done by a person in good faith believing himself to be bound by law to do it.
Extending the analogy to the facts of the case ill hand, one can prima facie say
that the act of the petitioner in finishing Abdul Hameed deceased was rather in
furtherance of the pure moral and ethical Islamic atmosphere in society when he
proceeded to do away with the life of a Zani. Section 79 ibid also lays down that
nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law to do it
or in good faith believe himself to be justified by law in doing it. A Muslim on
seeking a person committing Zina with a woman and that too of his own house,
under Islamic Law, is justified to do away both. "

4. The fact of the matter is that there, was no motive on the part of Ameer Bakhsh
petitioner-accused to have committed the intentional murder of his wife Mst. Khadija. I
am tempted to express that in the circumstances of such like cases when the accused is
none else than the husband of Mst. Khadija who was blessed with two sons and two
daughters and yet committed adultery with the stranger in his house, if the "Ghairat" is
not prompted and given the weight then apprehension cannot be ruled out that the close
Page No. 2 of 3
dears and. nears shall become "Be-Ghairat" due to - the fear of heavy punishment. In our
Islamic society the morals of the society have always been given the weight. Rather the
efforts are made to improve the moral values. Legally Ameer Bakhsh petitioner shall not
be liable for the maximum punishment even if he is convicted. Keeping in view the very
case of the prosecution, I hold that Ameer Bakhsh petitioner--accused is entitled to the
discretion of this Court in this Islamic State of Pakistan so that the male person(s) remain
"Ba-Ghairat" instead of becoming "Be-Ghairat". On the aforesaid reasoning it is a fit case
to admit Ameer Bakhsh petitioner to all than to detain him in jail.

5. For what has been said above, I accept this application and admit Ameer Bakhsh
petitioner-accused to bail in the sum of RS. 1,00,000 (Rupees One Lakh) with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jampur,
district Rajanpur with the direction to appear before the learned Trial Court on each and
every date of hearing failing which the learned Trial Court may cancel his bail.

N.H.Q./A-148/L

Bail allowed.

Page No. 3 of 3
1999 M L D 3011

[Karachi]

Before Rana Bhagwan Das. J

Mst. ZUBEDA through her Son and General Attorney---Appellant

versus

MUHAMMAD NADIR---Respondent

First Rent Appeal No. 20 of 1995, decided on 18th February, 1999.

(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15(2)(vii)---Bona fide personal need of landlady on the ground of her son being
jobless---Validity---Where one of the sons of 'landlady were rendered jobless, it was her
privilege and absolute right to eject the tenant and to rehabilitate her son being her moral
and parental obligation.

(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15(2)---Premises let for fixed tenure---Business disturbance of tenant as ground

against ejectment application of landlord---Relevance---Where the tenancy was for a
fixed period, tenant could not appropriately urge that he was not in a position to vacate
the premises on the plea that his business would be disturbed or interest prejudiced---
Condition incorporated in the tenancy agreement that landlord could get premises vacated
before the agreed period after giving tenant one month's notice---Effect---No such ground
having been recognised by law, ejectment application, on such ground, was not liable to
be dismissed.

Shahzada Sultan Humayoon v. Zainab Bai 1989 C L C 1338 and Tariq Shafi v. MRs.
Shamshad Begum 1990 C L C 698 ref.

(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

Page No. 1 of 7
----S. 15(2)(vii)---Bona fide personal need of landlord---Difficulties and inconveniences
to be faced by tenant---Effect---Such circumstance could not be permitted to be put in
juxtaposition to the personal requirement of the landlord as any amount of display of
emotion or sentiment was not desirable under law.

(d) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15(2)(vii)---Bona fide personal need of landlord---Resources and finances of

landlord for setting up business to the premises---Proof--Landlord need not establish his
resources and finances for setting up his business in the premises in respect of which he
sought an order of ejectment.

Majeed v. Imamuddin 1981 C L C 1091 and Abdul Hussain Khan Muhammad v.

Muhammad Younas Khan 1987 C L C 499 fol.

(e) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15(2)(vii)---Bona fide personal need of landlady---Landlady wanted the premises

for her jobless son and she did not have any other shop to accommodate her son suitable
for his needs---Period of tenancy had come to an end long before---Shop was situated in
the locality known for the kind of business, the son of the landlady intended to start---
Landlady had demonstrated her good faith and bona fides for the occupation of her own
property-- -Order of Rent Controller dismissing the ejectment application was set aside in
circumstances.

(f) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----Ss. 15(2)(vii) & 15-A---Bona fide personal need of landlord---Protection to tenant---S

Cope---Tenant had apprehension that the premises would be let out to some one else on
higher amount of rent---Validity---Sufficient protection was provided in S.15-A, Sindh
Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which, to the event of use of premises other than
personal use by landlord, not only postulated punishment for the landlord but also
provided an effective mechanism for restoration of possession to the evicted tenant---Law
having provided alternate and effective remedy to defuse the impression of the tenant,
such an apprehension was not well-founded.

(g) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15-A---Restoration of possession to evicted tenant---Delaying tactics by landlord---

Effect---Rent Controller, in appropriate cases, would be justified to order restoration of
possession even at interlocutory stage of proceedings by are interim order. where landlord
adopts delaying tactics.

Page No. 2 of 7
Hassan Mehmood Baig for Appellant.

Masood Ali Syed, for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 12th February, 1999.

JUDGMENT

This appeal arises out of an order dated 26-3-1995 passed by learned Controller
Hyderabad dismissing the prayer for ejectment of the respondent from the shop of the
appellant situated in Khokhar Moballa Hyderabad.

2. Facts leading to the litigation between the parties briefly are that tire appellant let out
the shop in question to the respondent vide agreement of rent, dated 1-10-1992 with
effect from 7-10-1992 for a fixed tenure of eleven months at monthly rental of Rs. 1,200
coupled with security deposit of Rs. 1,00,000 received by her in cash. As one of the terms
and conditions of the agreement was that the shop could be got vacated even prior to the
expiry of the tenancy subject to notice to the respondent, appellant served a legal notice,
dated 25-4-1993 requiring the respondent to vacate the shop for the use and occupation of
her son Muhammad Altaf. This notice was replied by the respondent through his counsel
stating that he had invested huge amount in the business undertaken by him. And that he
had supplied goods to his customers on credit basis which would be impossible to recover
within short period: It urged that appellant's son Muhammad Altaf was still employed
with his elder brother Muhammad Farooq, therefore, the shop was not at all required in
good faith for his use. Exchange of notice was followed by institution of the ejectment
application on 18-7- 1993 leading ultimately to the impugned order.

3. In his reply respondent urged that appellant's son was gainfully employed with his
brother Muhammad Farooq who is a builder; that the appellant in fact did not require the
shop for the use of her son and wanted to let out the same to someone else at higher
amount of rent and for inflated amount of security and that he having invested huge
amounts in his business it was difficult to vacate the shop within a short span of time.

4. In support of her case appellant examined her son and general attorney Muhammad
Haneef and other sons Muhammad Farooq and Muhammad Altaf while the respondent
examined himself besides examining Syed Zahid Hussain and Muhammad Ali.

5. On assessment of the relevant evidence on record learned Controller came to the

conclusion that the requirement of the appellant was not bona fide, therefore, he declined
the prayer for ejectment giving rise to his appeal.

Page No. 3 of 7
6. At the hearing Mr. Hassan Mehmood Baig, learned counsel for the appellant contended
that the tenancy being for a fixed tenure having expired and the appellant or her son
neither owning nor possessing any other shop was entitled to seek ejectment of the
respondent from the tenanted premise for the use and occupation of her son who had left
his job with his elder brother after his marriage which took place on 15-1-1993.

7. Conversely, Syed Masood Ali, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the
requirement of the appellant for the tenanted premises was neither good faith nor bona
fide; that Muhammad Altaf son of appellant was gainfully employed in the construction
business of his brother Muhammad Farooq; that the respondent having invested huge
amounts in the business set up by him and having advanced goods to his customers on
credit, it would be harsh and unjust to uproot him from the premises and lastly that the
appellant's son admitted in his evidence that he had no funds to commence the business
relating to sale and purchase of old and new motorcycles which requires considerable
investment.

8. There is no dispute between the parties that the tenancy in favour of the respondent
was for a fixed period of eleven months commencing from 7th October, 1992 on the
terms and conditions incorporated in the rent agreement Exh. 16. It is followed by an
stipulation that on expiry of the tenure, fresh agreement may be executed by consent on
fresh terms and conditions. Admittedly there is a clause in the agreement to the effect that
to case the landlady intends to get the said shop vacated before expiry of this agreement
or tenant intends to vacate the said premises before expiry of eleven months, they shall
have to serve one month's prior notice to other party and on expiry of notice period, the
tenant shall hand over vacant physical possession of the shop to the landlady who shall
return the security amount to the tenant after adjustment of electric and telephone charges
and damages to the shop if any. It is thus obvious that the respondent was fully aware of
the terms and conditions of the agreement between the parties and in law he bound
himself to abide by the stipulation contained in the mutual agreement. It was urged that
after about seven months of the commencement of the tenancy, appellant served a legal
notice on the respondent expressing her desire that she intended to have the shop vacated
as the same was required in good faith for the use of her son Muhammad Altaf who after
his marriage on 15-1-1993 wanted to establish his own independent business as dealer of
old and new motorcycles. In law there is nothing wrong with this notice as the landlady
acted within rights notifying her intention to the tenant that since the shop was required
for the use of her son, she needed its vacant possession. By this notice, she further
intimated the respondent that her son had left the service about a month hack because
after his marriage his relations became strained with his elder brother Muhammad
Farooq. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that as admitted by Muhammad
Altaf he was young when the shop was let out on rent to the respondent. There is a further
admission on the part of this witness that even at that time he could do his business in the
shop. This admission on the part of this witness is neither fatal to the case of the appellant
nor does it militate against her bona tides as her son was serving in the construction
business of his own brother and it was only soon after his marriage that relations between
the two brothers turned out to be strained which is not unusual in our society on account
of lack of equation and understanding between the two brothers. The circumstance that at
the time of letting out the shop on rent, Muhammad Altaf could start the business is
dependent on various factors namely his aptitude for the business, confidence of his
mother in his capabilities to start a business independently and the need for commencing
of such business. By letting out the shop on rent, I think appellant did not commit any
blunder nor does the demand of vacating the shop tantamount to mala fide or ulterior
intent. Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously submitted that the word "young"
incorporated in the deposition of the witness was a misnomer on the part of the Controller
and what was intended to be said by the witness was that he was not minor at the relevant
time, which circumstances by itself did not mean that he was capable enough for
commencing of an independent business or that the need for starting such business was
imminent. The submission of the respondent, therefore, is not of much substance and in
any event does not. detract from the fact that the requirement of the shop was asked for in
good faith.
Page No. 4 of 7
9. Adverting to the second limb of argument put forward by the learned counsel for the
appellant, it may be observed that there is consistent and reliable evidence in support of
the plea that appellant's son after his marriage continued to be associated with his brother
Muhammad Farooq which he left in March, 1993 due to lack of equation and
understanding between the two brothers. This fact stands established not only from the
sworn testimony of Muhammad Altaf but by the evidence of Muhammad Frooq with
whom he was employed as well as Muhammad Hanif who appeared in the witness-box as
attorney of the appellant. It was contended that in the event of strained relations between
the two brothers Muhammad Farooq would not have supported the case of the appellant
by filing his affidavit in evidence and stating that his relation with Muhammad Altaf had
become strained. The argument on the face of it is devoid of any material substance. This
witness categorically stated that Muhammad Altaf was employed with him for more than
three years; that after his marriage perhaps under the influence of his wife his work and
attitude in the office was not satisfactory and on his admonition, their relations became
somewhat strained and he left the job in March, 1993. Evidence of this witness as well as
other witness is not shattered during the course of cross-examination and all suggestions
to the contrary were expressly controverted with the natural consequence that there is no
apparent reason to discard the position taken by the appellant's son. The case set up by
the appellant in this regard is neither unusual nor cooked up. Even otherwise if one of the
grown up sons of landlady is rendered jobless, it is her privilege and absolute right to
eject a tenant and to A rehabilitate her son which is a moral and parental obligation of
every person. To my mind, no exception can be taken to the appearance of Muhammad
Farooq before the Controller without issuance of any summons or his support to the case
of the appellant which again is not at all unnatural and unrealistic. Even otherwise in law,
parties are entitled to produce their own witnesses without the summons from a Court and
this practice had not been disapproved by the Courts so far in civil disputes. There is,
thus, no warrant for the view that the requirement of the shop for occupation of the
appellant's son was not justified or that her desire was tainted with mala fides.

10. Adverting to the third contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the
latter has invested huge amounts in the business set up by him and, therefore, he is not in
a position to vacate the same, suffice it to say that establishment of a business naturally
would require financial investment and larger the business higher the amount of
investment is the natural phenomenon There may be no cavil with the factual aspect of
this plea, the tact remains that a landlord cannot be lawfully deprived of exercising his
right to use and occupy the property for his own use and occupation. Indeed this right is
guaranteed by the Constitutional provisions as well and is well-recognized in law.
Dislocation of a person is a natural consequence for establishment of a business of
another which alone may not be a strong ground to decline the relief which may be
otherwise available to a person. The respondent having agreed to occupy the premises for
a fixed tenure in law cannot appropriately urge that he is not in a position to vacate the
premises since his business would be disturbed or his interest prejudiced. Since the law
does not recognize this ground, I am of the view that the ejectment plea is not liable to be
dismissed on this account as misunderstood by the counsel. This question arose before
this Court in Shahzada Sultan Humayoon v. Zainab Bai (1989 C L C 1338) and Tariq
Shafi, v. Mrs. Shamshad Begum (1990 C L C 698) which fully support the view taken by
me in the case in hand because the landlady has quite satisfactorily established her bona
fide need for-the tenanted shop in order to enable her son to start his business as
aforesaid. The plea taken by the tenant cannot be appropriately entertained for difficulties
and inconveniences to be faced by the tenant is quite natural. This circumstance cannot be
permitted in juxtaposition to the personal requirement of the landlady and any amount of
display of emotion of sentiment is not desirable under the law. Truly speaking in every
case of seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide personal requirement,
some amount of inconvenience and discomfort would be certainly caused to him which
cannot be imported while deciding an eviction plea because law does not recognize
compassionate approach by the Controller or the appellate authority. I have already
expressed this view in F. R. A. No. 481 of 1988, decided on 29-1-1995.

Page No. 5 of 7
11. Taking up last contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant's
son has no finance as to establish the huge business of dealing in old and used
motorcycles it may be observed that no such plea was taken in the written reply before
the Rent Controller. It was only at the spur of moment and during the cross-examination
that a question was posed to appellant's witness Muhammad Farooq who innocently
admitted that Muhammad Altaf has no money to start the business in the shop in
question. No such question was, however, directed to Muhammad Altaf who would be
the best judge to take up a definite stand and make a proper reply. Even the attorney of
the landlady was not questioned on this point with the result that there was no occasion
for him to explain the factual position. It may not be impertinent to point out that
appellant's witness Muhammad Farooq in his re-examination clarified the position by
stating that his mother will finance the, business of his brother Muhammad Altaf in the
shop in dispute. In my view the controversy is set at rest by this explanation which is a
complete answer to the argument advanced at the Bar. Even otherwise, it is not the
requirement of law that a landlord must establish his resources and finances for setting up
his business in the premises in respect of which he seeks an order of ejectment. more
particularly when no such plea has been raised by the tenant in his written statement. This
view was affirmed in Majeed v. Imamuddin (1981 C L C 1091) authored by Sajjad Ali
Shah, J. sitting as a Judge in this Court. An identical issue was raised in Abdul Hussain
Khan Muhammad v. Muhammad Younas Khan (1987 C L C 499) before Zahoorul Haq, J.
(as he then was) in which it was held that where landlord has sufficiently established that
he wanted premises bona fide to start business of his own, he would not be forced to
prove that he had made necessary preparation for the purposes of starting his business or
that he obtained licence for that business or that he had sufficient experience of that
business.

12. Before parting with this judgment, I find it necessary to observe that the landlady
having no other shop to accommodate her son suitable for the needs, the period of
tenancy having come to an end long back and the tenanted shop situated in a locality
known for the business of old and new motorcycles has demonstrated her good faith and
bona fide for the occupation of her own property. Learned counsel for the respondent,
however, persistently expressed his apprehension that entire exercise was with a view to
let out the shop to someone else on higher amount of rent and for collection larger
amount of security. Indeed in the entire evidence it has not been hinted as to who could
be the prospective tenant to whom the appellant would like to induct in order to charge
higher amount of rent as well as security deposit. Sufficient protection has been
postulated in section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which in the
event of use of premises other than personal rise not only postulates punishment for the
landlord but also provide an effective mechanism for restoration of the possession to the
evicted tenant before the Controller who would be entitled to exercise such authority on
due consideration of the facts. Since the law provides an alternate and effective remedy to
defuse the impression of the respondent, I think the apprehension is not well founded in
the present state of circumstances. Perhaps in appropriate cases, Controller would be
justified to order restoration of possession even at interlocutory stage of the proceedings
by an interim order should the landlord adopted delaying tactics.

13. In view of what has been stated above, the order of the Controller cannot be sustained
at law and must be recalled. Accordingly this appeal is allowed and ejectment application
granted. In view of the business activities of the respondent in the demised premises, he
is allowed six months' time to vacate the premises subject, however, to regular payment
of rent to the appellant as before. Parties shall bear their own costs.

Q.M.H./Z-43/K Appeal allowed.

Page No. 6 of 7
Page No. 7 of 7
1998 M L D 892

[Peshawar]

Before Jawaid Nawaz Khan Gandapur, J

SHARAFAT and others---Petitioners

versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 1420 of 1997, decided on 4 th February,

1998.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 324/337-F [(as substituted by Criminal Law
(Second-Amendment) Ordinance (XII of 1993)]---Bail, grant of--Injury sustained by
complainant on his foot was declared simple in nature by Medical Officer---Case of
accused, in circumstances, would fall within mischief of S. 337-F, P.P.C. and punishment
for various hurts under S. 337-F, P.P.C. ranged from one year to 7 years' R.I. as Tazir---
Grant of bail in offences punishable with imprisonment for less than 10 years was a rule
and refusal an exception---Accused being not previous convicts, no danger existed of
their repeating the offence in question and there was no apprehension of their
abscondence or tampering with prosecution evidence---Accused, were admitted ,~ bail. in
circumstances.- [Evidence.

Tariq Bashir and others v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 ref.

Salahuddin Khan assisted by Khaliquz Zaman for Petitioners.

Abdul Qayum Sarwar for the State.

Date of hearing: 4th February, 1998.

Page No. 1 of 1
JUDGMENT

Taj Mulk S/o Gulandar respondent No. 2 has charged the petitioners, namely, Sharafat
and Baharuddin, (petitioners Nos. 1 and 2) for having committed an offence punishable
under section 324/34, P.P.C. Vide: F.I.R. No. 219 registered in Police Station, Mathra,
District Peshawar on 4-8-1997. He alleged that he was fired upon by the petitioners with
lethal weapons with which he was hit on his left foot. He further stated that the
occurrence was witnessed by his son namely, Niaz Ali.

2. After their arrest the petitioners Sharafat and Baharuddin were admitted u bail by Mr.
Roohullah Khan, Judicial Magistrate Peshawar, Vide his Order dated 20-11-1997
However, the same was recalled by the Additional Sessions Judge-V, Peshawar (Mr.
Muhammad Ayub Khan) Vide: his order recorded on 10-12-1997, mainly on the grounds
that the petitioners were directly charged in the F.I.R. for having attempted at the life of
the complainant by ring at him effectively with lethal weapons with which he was hit on
his left 10t. The Addl: Sessions Judge was of the view that the medical evidence,
available on the record, duly supported the version of the complainant as well as P.W.
Niaz Ali (complainant's son) who had witnessed the occurrence. He, therefore, held that
reasonable grounds did exist for believing that the petitioners lave committed a non-
bailable offence and that the lower forum was not justified in allowing them bail.
According to him the order of the lower Court was not only perverse but was also
arbitrary which was accordingly recalled.

3. Mr. Salahuddin Advocate learned counsel for the petitioners assisted by Mr. Khaliquz
Zaman, Advocate and Mr. Abdul Qayum Sarwar Advocate learned counsel for the State
present and heard.

4. The learned counsel for the parties have admitted and rightly so that the injury
sustained by the complainant/respdt. No. 2 on his foot, simple in nature, as declared by
the Medical Officer. In the circumstances, therefore, the petitioners' case would
apparently fall within the mischief of section 337-F, P.P.C. The punishment for various
hurts under section 337-F, ranges from one Year to 7 years R.I. as Tazir.

5. I agree with the Additional Sessions Judge, Peshawar that a person who is charged for
having committed a non-bailable offence is not entitled to be released on bail as a matter
of right but it has escaped the notice of the Additional Sessions Judge that grant of bail in
offences punishable with imprisonment for less that 10 years is a rule and refusal an
exception. The exceptional and extraordinary cases where bail is declined are:--

(a) Where there is likelihood of abscondence of the accused;

(b) Where there is. apprehension of the accused tampering with the Prosecution evidence;

Page No. 2 of 1
(c) Where there is danger of the offence being repeated if the accused is released on bail:
and

(d) Where the accused is a previous convict.

6. In holding the above view I am fully supported by a case supported by a case decided
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan i.e., Tariq Bashar and others v. The State,
reported in PLD 1995 Supreme Court 34.

7. Since the petitioners are not previous convicts, there is no danger of their repeating the
offence in question and there is no apprehension of their absconsion or tampering with
the Prosecution evidence, I would, therefore, admit them all to bail. They shall be
released forthwith, if not required in any other case, provided each one of them deposit
Rs. 10,000 (Rs. ten thousand), as bail amount, in this Court.

H.B.T./17/Pesh Bail granted.

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