Digests For Crim Pro-Finals

10/17/2018 DIGESTED CASES
FOR CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE-
FINALS
Submitted to Prof. Jedrek Ng
Iane Gem Mula

JD 2-2
DIGESTED CASES FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FINALS
Tickler: The present case is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel
and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing an order on the ground that the DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. The court resolves by ruling otherwise.
Doctrine:
Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. – The following may conduct preliminary
investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court
in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Case Title:
GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner,
vs.
THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F.
DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO
MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
G.R. No. 159747
April 13, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by respondent
CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano alleging that after a thorough investigation, he found that certain
military personnel and Senator Gregorio Honasan II have committed the crime of coup d’etat on July 27,
2003.
The complaint was based on the sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil wherein he stated in his
affidavit that he is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and was invited to the National
Recovery Program (NRP) with a certain Captain Alejano. In the said meeting, Sen. Gringo Honasan presided
the gathering wherein a plan on overthrowing the government through force, violence and armed struggle
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in order to achieve the goals of NRP. Ragil opposed the proposition but due to threats on his person, he
was forced to pursue it and even join their blood compact.
This prompted the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ to send a subpoena to Honasan for
preliminary investigation.
On August 27, 2003, Honasan and his counsel appeared at the DOJ and filed a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ’s jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the since the imputed facts were
committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. They further alleged that it is the Sandiganbayan and
not the regular courts that should take cognizance of the case since they are public officials with Salary
Grade 31.
On September 10, 2003, DOJ thereafter issued an order deferring the resolution of Honasan’s motion to
clarify jurisdiction.
Hence, Senator Honasan II filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing an order on the ground
that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Court then heard the parties
in oral arguments on the following issues:
1. Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;
2. Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 or
Ombudsman Act of 1989; and
3. Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the
resolution of the petitioner's motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim of the petitioner that the
DOJ Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
Petitioner’s Contentions:
1. The Office of Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
2. DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-DOJ Joint Ciruclar No. 95-001 to conduct the
preliminary investigation of Honasan.
3. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular NO. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative of the Constitution.
4. Since Honasan is charged with coup d’etat in relation to his office, it is the Ombudsman which has the
jurisdiction, not the DOJ Panel.
DOJ Panel’s Arguments:
1. DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation pursuant to Sec. 3, Chapter 1, Title III, Book
IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to PD No. 1275, as amended by PD No. 1513.
2. Honasan Is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately related to his public office as a Senator.
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3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint circular is misplaced.
Issue:
Whether or not the DOJ Panel has the authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over
the case of Honasan.
Ruling:
YES. The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but
on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ.
Under the said provision, the DOJ, as the government’s legal counsel and prosecution arm, has the power
to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction
system.
With regard to the issue of the Ombudsman jurisdiction over the case, Par. 1 of Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officials. Under R.A 6770 or “The Ombudsman Act of 1989,” the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent
with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include
the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges
of the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court. In other words the provision of the law has
opened up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
to all investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation
under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the
Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction
(when the case is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan).
Therefore, the fact that Honasan holds a Salary Grade 31 position (and that his case may be cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan) does not remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the charge of coup
d'etat against him.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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Tickler: This case discusses the authority of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolution of the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party and whether the letter narrating
the events as regards the alleged crime sent by the mother of the victim to the Secretary of Justice may be
considered as a petiton for review.
Doctrine:
Rule 112 Section 4 par. 5: If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice
may prescribe or motu propio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting anther preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Case Title:
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. TEODULO NANO ALAON, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 189596
April 23, 2014
PEREZ, J.
Facts:
Teodulo was charged before the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte for alleged rape on three
occasion by AAA, a minor. After the requisite preliminary investigation where Teodulo was charged with
rape, he filed a motion for reconsideration where the provincial prosecutor charged Teodulo with acts of
lasciviousness instead of rape.
The corresponding Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court presided by Judge Leo. Unknown
to Teodulo, BBB, the mother of AAA sent a letter to the Secretary of Justice narrating what happened to
AAA, who allegedly suffers from an intellectual disability. Thus, the Secretary of Justice ordered the
Provincial Prosecutor to forward the entire records of the case and to defer the filing of the Information
against Teodulo.
Thus, the assistant provincial prosecutor, on a mistaken belief that Teodulo filed a petition for review with
the DOJ, requested the withdrawal of the information against him. While the judge found probable cause
with the Information filed, he took into consideration Prosecutor Estrellado’s letter and suspended the
proceedings. He also ordered Estrellado to submit a copy of Teodulo’s petition for review. When Prosecutor
Estrellado realised his mistake, he filed a Manifestation before the RTC that Teodulo did not in fact file a
Petition for Review but was merely informed by BBB that they sought the assistance of the DOJ Secretary
by way of the letter.
Alarmed at this development, Teodulo moved to lift the suspension of proceedings and his arraignment on
the charge for acts of lasciviousness set, invoking his right to speedy trial. The RTC granted the motion.
Prosecutor Estrellado, confused, withdrew his appearance before the case, in view of the directive by the
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DOJ. The RTC denied this order, citing the withdrawal of appearance is not a proper remedy. The prosecutor
then filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings which the RTC also denied and set the case for pre-trial.
Meantime, at the Department of Justice, the review process ended in the DOJ reversing the earlier finding
of acts of lasciviousness and directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file a case for rape against
Teodulo. Teodulo thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the review of the resolution by the Secretary of Justice did not go through
the appeals process mandated by the DOJ, thus it should not have been treated as a petition for review.
The review therefore was made with grave abuse of discretion.
The Secretary of Justice elevated the case to the Supreme Court, invoking its power of review over the
orders and resolutions of the provincial and city prosecutors.
Issue:
May the DOJ Secretary review the resolution of its prosecutors even without a petition for review filed by
any of the parties?
Ruling:
The Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion when he acted on the letter request of BBB, the mother
of the victim, AAA. There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justice’s power of review over the actions of
his subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is encompassed in the Secretary of
Justice’s authority of supervision and control over the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him, subject
only to specified guidelines.
Chapter 7, section 38, paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 292 or The Administrative Code of 1987, defines
the administrative relationship that is supervision and control:
SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. —Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or
in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be
categorized and defined as follows:
(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines,
plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies, the word “control” shall encompass supervision and control as defined
in this paragraph.
In Noblejas v. Judge Salas, we defined control as the power (of the department head) to alter, modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The power of control implies the right of the President
(and, naturally, of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in
the officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.
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Founded on the power of supervision and control over his subordinates, we do not find abuse of discretion,
much more grave abuse of discretion, by the Secretary of Justice when he took cognizance of BBB’s letter
and treated it as a petition for review from the provincial prosecutor’s resolution. It cannot be said that in
this case, there was an “absence of a petition for review.” There was in fact an appeal from the prosecutor’s
resolution, although not as described in the National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal. There was,
tersely put, an appeal that the Secretary of Justice had ample power to act upon. In fact, the Secretary of
Justice acted on the letter request of BBB. What was done was not a motu propio review.”
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Tickler: The court shed light in this issue when a complaint filed was not acted on within the prescribed
period by the Rules and worse, acted on exceedingly out of time.
Doctrine: Rule 112 Sec. 3(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer
shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the
respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
Case Title:
FRANCISCO S. TATAD v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR Nos. 72335-39
Mar 21, 1988
YAP, J.
Facts:
Antonio de los Reyes filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC),
charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Information, with
alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Apparently, no action was taken on said report. Five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner
had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, which was subsequently accepted by
President Marcos. Antonio de los Reyes again filed a complaint with the same charges.
An investigation took place and a report was submitted, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming
immunity, but was denied.
Five criminal information were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Tatad. A motion to quash
the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the
right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived
petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against
him.
Ruling:
YES. Long delay in termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case found
to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process; Undue delay in the conduct of
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent
and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for
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finding investigation and report. The long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot
be justified on the basis of the facts on record.
The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary
investigation by him from its termination. Though the period fixed by law is merely "directory," it cannot
be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot
be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
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Tickler: This case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case dismissing the same for lack of probable cause for
the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against respondents.
Doctrine:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.
Executive determination of probable cause ascertains whether a criminal case must be filed in court.
It is a function that... properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and should be held for trial.
Judicial determination of probable cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. It is one made by a judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence presented, there
is necessity in placing the accused under custody so that the ends... of justice will not be frustrated.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. MAXIMO A. BORJE
GR No. 170046
Dec 10, 2014
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
On January 9, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Simeon
Datumanong, issued Department Order No. 15, Series of 2002, creating a committee for the purpose of
investigating alleged anomalies and illegal disbursements in connection with the... repair of DPWH-owned
motor vehicles and equipment. As a result of the investigation, it was discovered that during the period of
March 2001 to December 2001, the emergency repairs conducted on hundreds of DPWH vehicles,
approved and paid for by the government, did not actually take place, resulting in the loss of about One
Hundred Thirty-Nine Million Pesos
Atty. Irene D. Ofilada, of the Internal Audit Service of the DPWH and member of the committee, filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for violation of
General Appropriations Act against the several officials/employees of the DPWH, including respondents
herein.
Thereafter, respondents filed their responsive pleadings essentially assailing the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause.
Sandiganbayan issued an Order giving respondents a period within which to submit their memoranda of...
authority.
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petitioner questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to act on respondents' motions, arguing that the
same had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents and, hence, it... had no
authority to hear and decide their motions. Petitioner also alleged that it successfully established probable
cause justifying the issuance by the respondent court of a warrant of arrest.
Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution[9] upholding its authority to act on respondents' motions for
their filing of the same may be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court and
dismissing the... case for lack of probable cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate charges against the accused-respondents. It ruled that as the records reveal, not all elements
of the crime are present for the accused Borje had not amassed ill-gotten wealth... of at least P50 million.
It further denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution... for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition
Issue:
THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE FILING OF AN
INFORMATION IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE PROSECUTION.
Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman is an
executive, not a judicial function. As such, it asserts that respondent Sandiganbayan should have given
deference to the finding and determination of probable cause in... their preliminary investigation.
Moreover, petitioner faulted the respondent court for taking into consideration the findings of Atty. Irene
Ofilada of the Investigating Committee that it was not respondent Borje who encashed the checks but the
respondent-suppliers,... by virtue of a blanket authority given by the former to the latter. It posits that said
findings cannot bind the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of the existence of probable cause.
Respondents counter that the respondent court correctly dismissed the case for the evidence clearly shows
the absence of certain elements of the crime. They maintain that while investigating officers have a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause, which deserves respect from the courts, the
acts of the Ombudsman in disregarding essential pieces of evidence are tantamount to an abuse of
discretion authorizing the dismissal by the court of the case.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
there are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.
executive determination of probable cause ascertains whether a criminal case must be filed in court.
It is a function that... properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and should be held for trial.
judicial determination of probable cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. It is one made by a judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence presented,
there is necessity in placing the accused under custody so that the ends... of justice will not be frustrated.
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the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that
matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is empowered to determine, in...
the exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have
committed the crime as defined by law.
It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the
presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the corresponding... information with the appropriate
courts.
This rule is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the
functions of... the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases
Thus, unless it is shown that the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause was done in a... capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the same.
Also, it would be unfair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the
conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is found in the
nature and objective of a preliminary investigation. Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether
there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that respondent is probably... guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It has consistently been... held that there is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at... all in
contemplation of law.
The Ombudsman in this case, however, was merely performing his duty as mandated by the Constitution
and by law.
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Tickler:
This case settles the controversy based on the contention of petitioner that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion when they already ‘found petitioners liable for the criminal offense’.
Doctrine:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no objective except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is
guilty thereof. In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not decide whether there is
evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely determines the existence
of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so.
Case Title:
ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
GR NOS. 168830-31
Feb 06, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
Administrative complaints in connection with "CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES" were filed against BSU President Ernesto De Chavez, together with other
employees of said campus. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for violation of "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT," was also filed against them. The Ombudsman issued a Resolution charging the petitioner
for the said violations, employing the word “liable for..” in which case contending that the former already
ruled on their guilt.
Issue:
RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN FINDING PETITIONERS ALREADY LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
Ruling:
We reject the foregoing asseverations. Petitioners make mountain on the use of the words "liable for
violation x x x" employed by the Ombudsman. A review of the specific powers of the Ombudsman under
the Constitution, the laws and jurisprudential pronouncements is in order. By virtue of this power,[23] it
may conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
objective except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
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cause to believe that the respondent is guilty thereof.[25] In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent.
A prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information
if he finds it to be so.[26]
the presumption that the Ombudsman knows whereof he speaks forcefully applies. We must then presume
that he is well aware of the extent and limitations of his powers. Thus, when Ombudsman Marcelo used
the words "liable for" in his Supplemental Resolution of 12 July 2005, he is presumed to have used these
within the sense of the limited power vested in him by our laws and jurisprudence - the finding of probable
cause.
We, then, conclude that the words "liable for" employed by the Ombudsman in the challenged resolution
really alluded only to the probability of guilt. They simply imply that the Ombudsman had found probable
cause to hold petitioners liable for the crimes imputed and, thus, should be held liable for trial in the courts
of law. It is not a declaration of guilt.
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Tickler: These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the orders and resolutions
of public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
for the crime of multiple murder.
Doctrine: It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents
showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's
resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence. Delos Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101
Case Title:
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO v. EPHREM S. ABANDO
GR No. 176830
Feb 11, 2014
SERENO, C.J
Facts:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave contained skeletal
remains of 67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched
by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain
Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).The letters requested
appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B.
Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the
Central Committee.
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by members
of the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to Operation VD.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among
others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses. Petitioner Ocampo
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submitted his counter-affidavit. Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits because they
were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of
petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not
served a subpoena.
In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple
murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein.
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and
Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital
to the success of the prosecution.
The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by
Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando).
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with
no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo
from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners Echanis
and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati). Putting forward
the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this case,
are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with
and in furtherance of rebellion.
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest
issued by Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative
Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.
Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the
records of Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.
Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post
Bail respectively. The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to them. The Court
granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount ofP100,000,
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subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual
participation in the peace negotiations
Issue:
Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest?
Ruling:
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's
defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance
to present one's own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found
in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur,
Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente
Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance
by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent
were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid.
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named
respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority
of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation.
Instead, he refused to participate.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him
to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit.
The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of
several other witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in
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finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested." Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994.Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under
oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary
for the determination thereof. In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents showing
the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and
require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. Delos
Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed
to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.
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Tickler: This case is about the Ombudsman's authority to conduct preliminary investigation in a forfeiture
case where the petitioner allegedly amassed ill-gotten wealth before February 25, 1986.
Doctrine:
As the Court held in a case:
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the
proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him
were made, and an opportunity to controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious
purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses
by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics."
Case Title:
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 161602
Jul 13, 2010
ABAD, J.
Facts:
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of
alleged unlawfully acquired property with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez and
his wife Agnes Sison Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity
Management, Inc., and Dio Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes) pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) 1379.
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend
proceedings. They claim that since the case was a forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the
Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases" before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2 of the law.
Republic pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary investigation
in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820[5] and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the
endorsement of the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, denying the Romualdezes' motion. It also denied by resolution on
December 3, 2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Romualdezes filed the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan's rulings and prevent it from
further proceeding with the case until another preliminary investigation is conducted in their case.
Issue:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-0820 in 1991
satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases.
Ruling:
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The Ombudsman has also under its general investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture
cases where the alleged ill-gotten wealth had been amassed before February 25, 1986.
Although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that
instituted the action in the case in line with the Court's ruling in the above-cited Republic and other cases
that followed.
The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes' claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary
investigation since they had no opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They
admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent to their last known residence at the time it
was conducted. The Republic categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the
Romualdezes.
Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left the Philippines because of danger to their lives after
the EDSA revolution of February 1986 and so could not take part in the proceedings against them. While it
is true that the Court characterized the departure of the Romualdezes as forced upon them by the
uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also said that such was the case only until things shall have stabilized.
The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the people's ratification of the 1987 Constitution on
February 2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political situation in the Philippines. Consequently,
the Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not responding to the subpoena served on them at their last
known address in 1991, which they do not deny having received.
The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes' cases
when they did not show up despite notice being sent to them at their last known residence.
In sum, no reason exists for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.
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Tickler: This case is a petition for review of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals reversing the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Resolutions which nullified the provincial prosecutor's Resolution finding
probable cause to indict petitioners for illegal possession of prohibited drugs and the Regional Trial Court's
(RTC) Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the Information.
Doctrine:
While the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive function, the Court would not hesitate
to interfere if there is a clear showing that Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached.
Case Title:
BARRY LANIER v. PEOPLE
GR No. 189176
Mar 19, 2014
PEREZ, J.
Facts:
The police operatives conducted a test-buy at petitioners’ residence in Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island
where they were able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from
petitioners. On the basis of the test-buy operation, they were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC
of Aklan.
A Receipt for Property Seized was prepared by SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan, but petitioners refused to sign the
same. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under arrest. The assistant prosecutor of Kalibo filed an
Information charging the petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information before the
RTC of Kalibo but the RTC denied the motion and remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor for
preliminary investigation. The prosecutor upheld the Information and directed the return of the records to
the RTC for disposition.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the DOJ. The Sec. of Justice favored the petitioner on the belief
that the evidences seized were planted. The secretary, in a Resolution, directed the prosecutor to withdraw
the Information before the RTC. RTC then granted the Motion to Withdraw Information by the prosecutor.
OSG filed to the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the Resolution of the DOJ. The CA found
probable cause to sustain the petitioners’ indictment and reinstated the Information against the
petitioners. CA nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolution and the Order of the RTC.
Issue:
WoN the CA erred in reversing the DOJ resolution which nullified the prosecutor’s resolution finding
probable cause to indict petitioners for illegal possession of prohibited drugs and the RTC Order granting
the Motion to Withdraw the Information.
Ruling:
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No. The CA did not commit any reversible error.
In Crespo v Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal Complaint or Information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, dismissal, acquittal or conviction rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence,
and discretion of the trial court. The rule applies to a Motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case
even before or after the arraignment of the accused.
When the Secretary of Justice made a determination and concluded that the evidences were planted, he
went into the merits of the defense and exceeded his jurisdiction.
On the part of the RTC, it having acquired jurisdiction over the case, is not bound by the Resolution of the
DOJ but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the Secretary’s ruling is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
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Tickler: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which dismissed respondent Leila F. Giron's complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against
petitioner Masayuki Hasegawa.
Doctrine: The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal
complaint for kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of probable cause.
Case Title:
MASAYUKI HASEGAWA VS. LEILA F. GIRON
G.R. No. 184536
August 14, 2013
PEREZ, J.
Facts:
Respondent (Giron ) filed a Complaint- Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against
petitioner and several John Does. Respondent alleged that she and her officemate, Leonarda Marcos
(Marcos) filed a complaint against their employer Pacific Consultants International, J.F. Cancio & Associates,
Jaime F. Cancio, Tesa Tagalo and petitioner for illegal salary deductions, nonpayment of 13th month pay,
and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Respondent averred that since the filing of said complaint, they
have been subjected to threats and verbal abuse by petitioner to pressure them to withdraw the complaint.
Respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust
vexation against petitioner. Said cases are pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay
City.
Respondent recalled that she received a call from an alleged messenger of her counsel who requested for
a meeting at Harrison Plaza Mall in Manila. She asked Marcos to accompany her. While respondent and
Marcos were on their way to Harrison Plaza Mall, they noticed a black Pajero car parked in the place where
both of them work. When they reached the mall, they went inside and they noticed two men following
them. Respondent suddenly felt a man’s gun being pushed against the right side of her body. She panicked
and her mind went blank. Respondent and Marcos were taken at gunpoint and pushed inside a black Pajero.
While inside the vehicle, they were blindfolded and gagged. They were taunted and repeatedly threatened
by their abductors into withdrawing the case against petitioner. When her blindfold was loosened,
respondent was able to take a good look at her surroundings. She noticed that the car was parked in a
warehouse with concrete walls and high roof. She also saw four vehicles parked outside. She finally saw
three men wearing bonnets over their faces: the first one, seated beside her; the second one, seated in
front; and the third one, was standing near the parked vehicles.
Before respondent and Marcos were released, they were once again threatened by a man who said: “pag
tinuloy nyo pa kaso kay Hasegawa, may paglalagyan na kayo, walang magsusumbong sa pulis, pag nalaman
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namin na lumapit kayo, babalikan namin kayo.” They were released at around 11:00 p.m. on 18 July 2006
and dropped off in Susana Heights in Muntinlupa. In a separate Affidavit, Marcos corroborated
respondent’s account of the alleged kidnapping.
Petitioner, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied the accusation of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
against him.
In a Resolution, Senior State Prosecutor Emilie Fe M. De Los Santos dismissed the complaint for lack of
probable cause. Respondent filed an appeal before the DOJ. Finding no basis to overturn the findings of the
Investigating Prosecutor, then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales dismissed the petition.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the DOJ, she filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed and set aside the
Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing of an Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
Issue:
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT’S PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
Ruling:
No.
The elementary rule is that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the DOJ
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The grant by the Court of Appeals of the certiorari petition is a determination that the DOJ committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for lack of probable cause.
The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound
discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or
reinvestigations, or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the
corresponding information against an offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own
judgment for that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or not
is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the corresponding
information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of
an action in court.
In sum, the prosecutor’s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts,
unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. We find such reason
for judicial review here present. We sustain the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of
the DOJ.
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Tickler: This case is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution and
the Order of the deputy ombudsman for Luzon. The challenged Resolution dismissed the present case
against respondents for lack of probable cause and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Doctrine:
The Court's review powers over resolutions and orders of the Office of the Ombudsman is restricted only to
determining whether grave abuse of discretion, that is, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, has
been committed. The Court is not authorized to correct every error or mistake allegedly committed by that
constitutionally independent government agency. Thus, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion,
we have consistently sustained its determination of the existence or the nonexistence of probable cause.
Case Title:
CESAR T. VILLANUEVA v. MAYOR FELIX V. OPLE
GR No. 165125
Nov 18, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts:
Petitioners Cesar T. Villanueva, Pedro S. Santos, and Roy C. Soriano filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman charging incumbent Mayor Felix V. Ople and Vice-Mayor Josefina R.
Contreras of Hagonoy, Bulacan, for violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the the Local
Government Code (LGC).
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (OMB-Luzon) found no probable cause against
respondents.
It noted that the charge was premised on allegedly illegal disbursements that had caused undue injury to
the government. Yet, petitioners failed to specify which disbursements had been made illegally. Besides,
there was no proof that the expenditures unduly benefited certain individuals or were made pursuant to
the regular operations of the municipality.
In denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the OMB-Luzon pointed out that the alleged undue
injury should have been specified, quantified, and proven to the point of moral certainty. It found no reason
to set the case for clarificatory hearings or to issue subpoenas.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the remedy sought by petitioners was proper.
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Ruling:
The proper remedies in questioning decisions and resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) have
already been settled in a catena of cases.
Thus, petitioners committed a procedural error in resorting to a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. To challenge the dismissal of their Complaint and to require the OMB to file an information,
petitioners should have resorted to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The only
ground upon which this Court may entertain a review of the OMB's resolution is grave abuse of discretion,
not reversible errors.
A special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy when a government officer has acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. But even assuming that the present Petition may be treated as one
for certiorari, the case must nevertheless be dismissed.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the present case, petitioners do not even allege that the OMB gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
questioned Resolution.
In any event, the Court finds no grave abuse in the manner in which the deputy ombudsman exercised his
discretion. Evidently, he had sufficient bases for his finding that there was no probable cause.
A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. The complainant
must adduce sufficient proof of guilt as basis for a criminal charge in court. As discussed earlier, the present
petitioners did not submit any proof in... support of their accusations against respondents.
Hence, the Court is bound to respect the deputy ombudsman's professional judgment in finding the case
dismissible, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Government resources and the time and effort
of public officials would be needlessly wasted if the courts allow unmeritorious cases to be filed and given
due course. It would be better to dismiss a case, like the present one in which the circumstances blatantly
show that the act complained of does not constitute the offense charged.
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Tickler: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the denial of petitioner Girlie M. Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to Quash before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144 (RTC).
Doctrine:
SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause
to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath
in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10)
days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
Case Title:
GIRLIE M. QUISAY v. PEOPLE
GR No. 216920
Jan 13, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts:
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya or Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner for violation of "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11,
2013 charging petitioner of such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the
person who filed the same before the RTC.
In this regard, petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that
ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file
or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such, the Information must be quashed for being
tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.
26 |Page
The RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It found the Certification attached to the
Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires
the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order. Aggrieved, petitioner
elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid Sakdal
clearly indicated that the same was filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with the prior
written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor. In this regard, the CA opined that such Certification
enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's performance of official functions, in the
absence of convincing evidence to the contrary.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
petitioner's motion to quash.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or
information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint
or information may be filed before the courts.
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore,
subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:
SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:... x x x x
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
In this relation, People v. Garfin firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the
requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or... even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City Prosecutor
the power to "[investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused," he may indeed delegate
his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution service.
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was
validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP
Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
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Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as
there was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-
Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz
which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na angpaghahain ng sakdal na ito
ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" - which translates to
"and that... the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor."
In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v. Paqueo the Court had already rejected
similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations were
defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or
failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated
in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was
authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself.
In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid
Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the
RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the
Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
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Tickler: These cases are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen.
Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis
(De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others,
for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended.
Doctrine: Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. – Preliminary investigation is an

inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Case Title:
RICHARD A. CAMBE v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
GR Nos. 212014-15
Dec 06, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Facts:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of
public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen. Revilla for the years
2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.
As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen. Revilla
-with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or
"kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the conditions of the
PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding Implementing
Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from
40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the
legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his
PDAF, who in turn, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO.
By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator.
Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy),
Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the
preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the
project proposals of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or
his staff, all for the approval of the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the
"commission" of the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.
Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the
preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and
the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA
concerned, the head/official of which, in turn, would expedite the transaction and release of the
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corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in
the project cost.
Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO
concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO,
Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds
by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting.
Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her
residence in Taguig City.
De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence. Finally,
to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries,
liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would make it
appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were
actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the
help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to
the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least
P224,512,500.00.
In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and
Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been
regular and above-board."; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no
credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all
the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.
Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-
Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all
forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged
co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.
In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one
(1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts
of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and
Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; (
b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed,
accumulated, or acquired HI-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and
( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold amount of
P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder..
Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion
to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent
to the filing of the criminal complaints against him.
Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the
Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults
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the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence
of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies who
purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alias acta rule.
Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint
Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly
committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to
prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the
criminal complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners are correct
Ruling:
1. No. The Court disagrees. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation
to the COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder
and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have
no effect on the filing of the latter.
2. Yes, there is probable cause against the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were
charged.
Probable Cause against Revilla.
The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the
forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself
requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that
made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the
chosen NGO.
All these documents -even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla -directly implicate him for the crimes
charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines.
In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation. At its core, legislators -may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program
menus -have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to
be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations." It is through this mechanism that
individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the
PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.
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Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must
be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery) should be ventilated in a
full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot
be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine
signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an
independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity. Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported
handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui,
(Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.
It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's
signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all
events, the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned
signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their
respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish,
were written by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.
The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -are, in
fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner
workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all
the Senators, only the Offices ' of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy: Estrada
(Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with in the plunder of their PDAF.
Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since
they were employees of JLN Corporation -the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation -and in their
respective capacities, were individually tasked by to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the
financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of
PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.
In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply during preliminary
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on
independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless
of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does
not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are
independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present
controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.
Probable Cause against Cambe.
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The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. is no dispute that Cambe was Sen. Revilla's trusted
aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen.
Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures explicitly appear on several
PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for
certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to
have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.
In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. For the same reasons
above-discussed, there should be 'no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF documents and
whistle blowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cambe at this stage of the
proceedings. He also has no right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits .of his co-respondents.
Probable Cause against Napoles.
Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind
of the PDAF scam.
Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the
accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman,
this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it
has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities,
was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting
to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for
violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to,illegally divert PDAF Funds
to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government. That a private individual, such as Napoles,
could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those
crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary
offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same
if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the
fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. In this case, since it appears
that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman
correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The findings of probable cause against all
petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to
commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.
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Tickler: This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of the Department of Justice, which dismissed the criminal
complaint for tax evasion filed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue against GMCC United Development
Corporation's corporate officers on the ground that the period to assess the tax had already prescribed.
Doctrine:
To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must
clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to
establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary
prosecutorial action may be obtained.
Case Title:
REPUBLIC v. GMCC UNITED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
GR No. 191856
Dec 07, 2016
LEONEN, J.
Facts:
The Bureau of Internal Revenue National Investigation Division issued a Letter of Authority, authorizing its
revenue officers to examine the books of accounts and other accounting records of GMCC United
Development Corporation (GMCC) covering taxable years 1998 and 1999.
GMCC was served a copy of said Letter of Authority and was requested to present its books of accounts
and other accounting records. GMCC failed to respond to the Letter of Authority as well as the subsequent
letters requesting that its records and documents be produced.
Due to GMCC's failure to act on the requests, the Assistant Commissioner of the Enforcement Service of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum on GMCC president, Jose C. Go (Go). When
GMCC still failed to comply with the Subpoena Duces Tecum, the revenue officers were constrained to
investigate GMCC through Third Party Information.
The investigation revealed that in 1998, GMCC, through Go, executed two dacion en pago agreements to
pay for the obligations of GMCC's sister companies, Ever Emporium, Inc., Gotesco Properties, Inc. and Ever
Price Club, Inc., to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. GMCC allegedly failed to declare the income it
earned from these agreements for taxation purposes in 1998.[12] Moreover, these transactions
constituted a donation in favor of GMCC's sister companies for which GMCC failed to pay the corresponding
donor's tax. The BIR also assessed the value added tax over the said transactions.
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It was also discovered that in 1999, GMCC sold condominium units and parking slots for a total amount of
P5,350,000.00 to a Valencia K. Wong. However, GMCC did not declare the income it earned from these
transactions in its 1999 Audited Financial Statements.
Thus, on November 17, 2003, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued a Notice to Taxpayer to GMCC, which
GMCC ignored.
It was only when the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued the Final Assessment Notice that GMCC responded.
In a Letter dated November 23, 2004, GMCC protested the issuance of the Final Assessment Notice citing
that the period to assess and collect the tax had already prescribed. The Bureau of Internal Revenue denied
the protest in a Final Decision.
In light of the discovered tax deficiencies, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, on October 7, 2005, filed with
the Department of Justice a criminal complaint for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code against
GMCC, its president, Jose C. Go, and its treasurer, Xu Xian Chun.
Department of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, issued a Resolution dismissing the criminal
complaint against the GMCC officers. The State Prosecutor ruled that there was no proof that GMCC
defrauded the government. The Bureau went beyond its authority when it assessed and issued the Letter
of Authority knowing that the period to assess had already lapsed. Moreover, the prosecutor ruled that
since GMCC did not gain from the assailed transactions, the imposition of income, VAT, and donor's taxes
were improper.
Bureau of Internal Revenue filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Department of Justice denied
Bureau of Internal Revenue filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari arguing that the
Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against GMCC's
officers.
Court of Appeals denied the Petition and affirmed in toto the Department of Justice's Resolution.
Bureau of Internal Revenue moved for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when he found no probable cause and dismissed the tax evasion case against the respondent
officers of GMCC.
Ruling:
The Petition must be denied.
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the ruling of the Secretary of Justice that there
was no probable cause to file a tax evasion case against the respondent officers. Since the assessment for
the tax had already prescribed, no proceeding in court on the basis of such return can be filed.
In ruling that there was no probable cause to indict the respondent officers for the acts charged, the Court
of Appeals said there was no clear showing that there was deliberate intent on the part of the respondents
to evade payment of the taxes. Both the State Prosecutor and the Court of Appeals emphasized that if
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respondents really intended to evade payment, they would have omitted the assailed transactions
completely in all their financial statements. We agree.
As it stands, while the dacion en pago transactions were missing in the GMCC 1998 Financial Statement,
they had been listed in the GMCC 2000 Financial Statement. Respondents' act of filing and recording said
transactions in their 2000 Financial Statement belie the allegation that they intended to evade paying their
tax liability. Petitioner's contention that the belated filing is a mere afterthought designed to make it appear
that the non--reporting was not deliberate, does not persuade considering that the filing of the 2000
Financial Statement was done prior to the issuance of the March 2003 Letter of Authority, which authorized
the investigation of GMCC's books.
In any case, this Court has a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations.
Moreover, a prosecutor's grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a case must be clearly shown before the
Courts can intervene.
The necessary component of the Executive's power to faithfully execute the laws of the land is the State's
self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws. This responsibility is primarily lodged with
the DOJ, as the principal law agency of the government. The prosecutor has the discretionary authority to
determine whether facts and circumstances exist meriting reasonable belief that a person has committed
a crime. The question of whether or not to dismiss a criminal complaint is necessarily dependent on the
sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary (or Undersecretary acting
for the Secretary) of Justice. Who to charge with what crime or none at all is basically the prosecutor's call.
The Court has consistently adopted the policy of non- interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts cannot order the
prosecution of one against whom the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case; as a rule, courts, too,
cannot substitute their own judgment for that of the Executive.
To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must
clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to
establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary
prosecutorial action may be obtained.
Based on the foregoing, absent any indication that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
not finding probable cause for the complaint against respondent officers to prosper, the dismissal stands.
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Tickler: This case tackles the question: May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal
determination and relying solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable
cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
Doctrine:
Case Title:
VICENTE LIM v. NEMESIO S. FELIX
GR Nos. 94054-57
Feb 19, 1991
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts:
Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr., together with his security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone
assassin at the airport vicinity in Masbate.
Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
Herein petitioners were alleged to be behind the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest of herein petitioners.
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the amount of
P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case containing 261 pages.
Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but
differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be
charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of
the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante."
MR’s of the petitioner’s Lim was also denied.
Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate information of murder against
the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue and was
granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (from Masbate to Makati RTC)
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest because it was not personally determined by
the judge as he relied solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause
exists.
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RTC dismissed their petition upholding the validity of the arrest warrants.
Issue:
WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
Ruling:
NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination
is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge
commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed
by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had
nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever
necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing
questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
Petition granted.
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Tickler: This case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, Digos, Davao
del Sur convicting defendant-appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in
Furtherance of Subversion.
Doctrine:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. RUBEN BURGOS Y TITO
GR No. 68955
Sep 04, 1986
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Facts:
Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting
members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of
Digos, Davao del Sur.
From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a
man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrested defendant and had his house
searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one
Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, were confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities
and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged
extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his
family.
He avers that his arrest was unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding
the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.
Issue:
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WON defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several
NPA-related documents were lawful.
Ruling:
Records disclosed that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the information given
by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in wanton violation of Art. IV, Sec 3
(now Art III, sec 2) of the Constitution. As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however
powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself
in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a
man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the
government.
The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit
an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest was under the ambit of
aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in
a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or actually have been
committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no
compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to
see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There was no showing that
there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no
showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
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In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were
really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus
the admissions obtained were in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec
20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.
Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents
are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive
documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.
The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating
Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action
is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.”
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Tickler: The accused-appellant in this case claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it
was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Doctrine:
arrest a person:
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. IDEL AMINNUDIN Y AHNI
GR No. 74869
Jul 06, 1988
CRUZ, J.
Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this
tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to
contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the
basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is violated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules ofCourt was not
justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been
committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be
secured.
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In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least
two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming
to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was
certain. And from the information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determined on
his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.
ACQUITTED.
43 |Page
Tickler: This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police
officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.
Doctrine:
arrest a person:
Case Title:
GEORGE ANTIQUERA Y CODES v. PEOPLE
GR No. 180661
Dec 11, 2013
ABAD, J.
Facts:
Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified men
rush out of a house and boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police officers approached
the house.
When they peeked through the partially opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz engaged in a pot
session. The police officers entered the house, introduced themselves and arrested Antiquera and Cruz.
While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewellery box which contained shabu and unused
paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The
court affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was invalid.
Ruling:
Yes, there was unlawful arrest because the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in
flagrante delicto. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from
the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no
activity that warranted their entering it.
44 |Page
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of
accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal,
the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
45 |Page
Tickler: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David
(petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro
denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.
Doctrine:
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
Case Title:
RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY
GR No. 199113
Mar 18, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Facts:
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-
square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application[3] (MLA) over the subject land with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,[4]
(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07[5] issued by the Consulate General of
the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
46 |Page
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner's motion for re-
determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
(petitioner).
Issue:
WON petitioner is correct.
Ruling:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into
law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:..
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall
be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the
conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both
categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology
used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is
one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63
by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship,[21] and also
provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
47 |Page
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph 1.
48 |Page
Tickler: This is an appeal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)which affirmed the Joint Decision of the
(RTC), finding accused-appellant Glen Piad (Piad) guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, as amended and accused-appellants Renato Villarosa (Villarosa), Agustin Carbo (Carbo)
and Nilo Davis (Davis) all guilty of violation of Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Doctrine:
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, When Discretionary. - Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the... trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
xxx
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during
the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman, xxx
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. GLEN PIAD Y BORI
GR No. 213607
Jan 25, 2016
MENDOZA, J.
Facts:
Piad was charged in two (2) informations with the crimes of illegal sale of dangerous drugs while accused-
appellant Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were charged in two (2) informations with the crimes of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs during a party.
Piad, Villarosa and Carbo were arraigned and they pleaded "Not Guilty." Davis, however, was not arraigned
because he had jumped bail.
Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. On May 15, 2008, after Davis was arrested, he was arraigned and,
with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges against him.
In its Joint Decision, dated September 24, 2009, the RTC found Piad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, while Villarosa, Carbo and Davis were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during parties and
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during parties.
The RTC held that all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs were established because PO1 Arevalo
handed the marked money to Piad, who, in turn, handed the plastic sachet, which was confirmed to contain
0.05 gram of shabu. The elements of the crime of illegal possession of drugs were also established because
two (2) more sachets of shabu weighing 0.06 gram were found in the metal container inside the pocket of
Piad immediately after his arrest.
49 |Page
As to Villarosa, Carbo and Davis, the RTC found that they committed the crime of illegal possession of drugs
and paraphernalia during a party because they were surrounded by plastic sachets containing 0.03 gram of
shabu and different drug paraphernalia when the team found them. The elements of such crimes were
clearly proven because they were in a proximate company of at least two persons and without any legal
authority to possess such illicit items.
The RTC did not give credence to the defense of denial and frame up put up by the accused because their
testimonies were inconsistent and self-serving.
Piad, Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis filed their notices of appeal. Subsequently, Carbo withdrew his appeal,
which was granted by the CA in its Resolution, dated October 21, 2011.
Piad, Villarosa and Davis argued that the chain of custody rule was not complied with because PSI Ebuen
did not testify on the condition of the confiscated items; that it was not shown how the said items were
brought before the court; and that no photograph was taken or an inventory of the seized items was
conducted.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 required only substantial compliance as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the items were preserved; and that the testimony of the police officers showed that the items were
properly handled.
CA affirmed the conviction of Piad, Villarosa and Davis. The CA held that all the elements of the crimes
charged were indeed proven. As to the chain of custody, the appellate court enumerated in detail how the
prosecution was able to establish its compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. As the chain of custody
of the seized items was sufficiently established not to have been broken, then the admissibility and
credibility of the said items were appreciated.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
WON the appeal deserves merit.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit and Davis has lost his right to appeal.
Elements of the crimes charged were duly established by the prosecution.
After a review of the records of the case, the Court holds that Piad was properly convicted of the crime of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It was proven that, on April 23, 2005, the police went to his house to conduct
a buy-bust operation; that PO1 Arevalo acted as the poseur-buyer; and that when PO1 Arevalo gave the
marked money to Piad, the latter handed to him a small plastic sachet. A laboratory examination confirmed
that the plastic sachet contained 0.05 gram of shabu. Clearly, all the elements of the said crime were
established.
Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If the
offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
50 |Page
discretion. In case bail is granted, the accused must appear whenever the court requires his presence;
otherwise, his bail shall be forfeited.
When a person is finally convicted by the trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, When Discretionary. - Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the... trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has
not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
xxx
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during
the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman, xxx
Here, Davis was charged with the crimes of illegal possession of dangerous drugs during a party and illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia during a party. Both offenses did not have a prescribed penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, thus, bail was a... matter of right. Accordingly, Davis secured a
surety bond with Summit Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc. on May 6, 2005.
Davis failed to appear before the RTC which considered him to have jumped bail. At that point, the RTC
should have cancelled the bailbond of Davis with Summit Guaranty & Insurance Company, Inc. Although he
was subsequently arrested and arraigned on May 15, 2008, it is alarming that no record of Davis'
confinement in any detention facility was ever found.
When the RTC promulgated its decision for conviction, Davis and his counsel were present in the
courtroom. Yet, they did not file any motion for bail pending appeal before the RTC or the CA. Nonetheless,
any motion for bail pending appeal should have been denied because Davis... violated the conditions of his
previous bail. Necessarily, as he previously jumped bail and no bail pending appeal was secured, the RTC
should have immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him.
In the same manner, the CA should not have entertained the appeal of Davis. Once an accused escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail (as in this case), or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing
in court. Unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the... court, he is deemed to have waived
any right to seek relief from the court. As no such surrender was made in this case, in the eyes of the law,
Davis is a fugitive from justice and, therefore, not entitled to seek relief from the courts.
51 |Page
Tickler: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied the petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Regional Trial
Court, (RTC) in for granting the petition for bail of respondent PO1 Cyril A. De Gracia (De Gracia).
Doctrine:
Under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, are not entitled to bail before conviction. A reading of the
provision reveals that bail shall only be denied when... the evidence of guilt for the offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua is strong. Necessarily, in all other instances, bail must be granted before the conviction
of the accused. The right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should... not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Evidently, despite being charged with a non-bailable offense, an
accused can still possibly acquire bail.
Conversely, if the evidence of guilt is strong, then the accused cannot enjoy provisional liberty before his
conviction. There is nothing unreasonable in denying the right to bail to one charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is... strong, as it is likely that the accused, rather
than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a penalty demanding a lifetime of incarceration,
would be tempted to flee the jurisdiction.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. PO1 CYRIL A. DE GRACIA
GR No. 213104
Jul 29, 2015
MENDOZA, J.
Facts:
De Gracia was charged with the crime of Murder, with a prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua. On
February 22, 2012, while detained in the Manila City Jail, accused filed a petition for bail.
During the hearing on the petition for bail, the prosecution presented Robert Bryan Villanueva (Robert),
Joshua Mendoza (Joshua) and Merwin Irison (Merwin), as their witnesses, to prove that the evidence of
guilt against the accused for the crime of murder... was strong.
In its August 31, 2012 Order, the RTC granted the petition for bail. The trial court ruled that treachery, the
essential qualifying element of murder, was not sufficiently established. It found that based on the
testimonies of the witnesses, nothing would show that De Gracia... made preparations to kill David in a
treacherous manner to ensure the execution of the felony. Rather, the killing was perpetrated on the spur
of the moment. The RTC concluded that the evidence of guilt for murder was not strong. T
The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration,[7] but it was denied by the RTC
In the same order, the RTC set the bail in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for...
his provisional liberty.
52 |Page
Not in conformity, the public prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari against the assailed order of the RTC
before the CA.
The appellate court issued a resolution[9] requiring the rectification of certain defects in the petition.
Subsequently, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an amended petition for certiorari with the CA. The OSG argued
that treachery was proven because De Gracia decided to shoot any of the friends of Bless in an instant.
the CA rendered the assailed decision, dismissing the petition of the OSG.
The CA stated that, while the act of shooting was sudden, there was no evidence showing that De Gracia
consciously adopted this method of attack. The... prosecution had not shown that he attended the party
with the nursed intention to kill anyone there.
The CA also considered the events that transpired before and after the shooting. Merwin testified that De
Gracia did not know David and had no reason to be angry with him. De Gracia even tried to bring David to
the hospital after being shot. Thus, the CA agreed with the RTC that... the prosecution failed to establish
that the evidence for murder against the accused was strong.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in the assailed resolution.
Hence, this present petition.
Issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RTC WAS
CORRECT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWING
RESPONDENT PO1 CYRIL DE GRACIA GUILTY OF MURDER IS STRONG AND, THUS, AGREEING WITH THE RTC'S
ORDER ADMITTING
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
An accused charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua may still be granted bail
The accused was charged with the crime of murder, which carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
hence, a non-bailable offense. From the standpoint of a layman, an accused indicted for a "non-bailable
offense" cannot be granted bail prior to his conviction. Such... interpretation, however, is technically
inaccurate.
Under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, are not entitled to bail before conviction. A reading of the
provision reveals that bail shall only be denied when... the evidence of guilt for the offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua is strong. Necessarily, in all other instances, bail must be granted before the conviction
of the accused. The right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should... not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Evidently, despite being charged with a non-bailable offense, an
accused can still possibly acquire bail.
53 |Page
Conversely, if the evidence of guilt is strong, then the accused cannot enjoy provisional liberty before his
conviction. There is nothing unreasonable in denying the right to bail to one charged with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is... strong, as it is likely that the accused, rather
than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a penalty demanding a lifetime of incarceration,
would be tempted to flee the jurisdiction.
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption
of guilt is strong. "Proof evident" or "Evident proof in... this connection has been held to make clear, strong
evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been
committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if
the law is... administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the
inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment
and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.
Guided by these judicial pronouncements, the prosecution must establish before the trial court, after
proper notice and hearing, that the evidence against an accused for the crime charged is strong so as to
deny him of his provisional liberty.
De Gracia is charged with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The
elements of this crime are: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances... mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that
the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, both the CA and the RTC were one in finding that although the shooting of David was sudden,
there was no evidence showing that De Gracia deliberately and consciously adopted such mode of attack
to ensure the commission of the crime.
Insofar as the evidence presented during the hearing on the petition for bail is concerned, the Court agrees
with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused deliberately or consciously
adopted the means of execution. Without the crucial element of... treachery being established, the
evidence of guilt for the crime of murder against the accused is deemed not strong. Accordingly, the
accused is entitled to bail. The present ruling, however, shall not in any way affect the merits of the case
before the RTC.
54 |Page
Tickler: There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novelty in the plea made by counsel de oficio in this
appeal of the accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, who were sentenced to life imprison-ment for
the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed that because the information alleged
conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with only the two appellants being convicted, two having been
utilized as state witnesses and the other three having been acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence as to their culpa-bility, the judgment of conviction against the appellants cannot stand, there being
a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. To bolster such a contention, certain alleged deficiencies in the proof
offered by the prosecution were noted. A careful study of the evidence of record would leave no other
rational conclusion but that the deceased met his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as
found by the lower court. Hence the appeal cannot prosper.
Doctrine: It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be,
according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to
the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that
culpability lies.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. PABLEO DRAMAYO
GR No. L-25325
Oct 29, 1971
FERNANDO, J.
Facts:
Dramayo and Ecubin accompanied the deceased to the chief of police to be witnesses on a robbery which
took place on the house of the deceased but they were then included as prime suspects. To prevent the
deceased on testifying for the robbery case, Dramayo with Ecubin invited 5 of their friends to a drinking
session where they brought up the plan of killing the deceased. The killing took place where only Dramayo
and Ecubin actually contributed to the killing. However, all 7 of them were accused of murder, but 2 were
utilized as state witnesses, 3 were acquitted for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and only Dramayo
and Ecubin were convicted, though the offense was charged to have been committed with conspiracy. It
was the contention of the defense that since the crime charged involves conspiracy and the other accused
were acquitted beyond reasonable doubt, Dramayo and Ecubin should also be acquitted for lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: WON the appellants’ prayer need be heard.
Ruling:
Even if the other defendants in a crime charged with conspiracy were acquitted, if moral certainty arisen
in some of them as to their culpability, the PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE cannot come to their rescue as
it was sufficiently overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt establishing moral certainty that they are
guilty of the offense charged.
55 |Page
Tickler: This case talks about one of the primary rights of the accused: the right to counsel. The court stressed
its importance when the accused was not represented by a member of the bar who claimed to be so.
Doctrine: Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution further mandates that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Case Title:
GARRY V. INACAY, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 223506
November 28, 2016
REYES, J.
Facts:
Garry V. Inacay was a former sales agent of Mega Star Commercial (MSC), a business enterprise engaged
in the wholesale of electrical and construction materials. As part of his duties, Inacay was tasked to find
clients in Pangasinan, solicit orders, collect payments, and issue receipts.
Inacay was able to collect a check payment from Gamboa Lumber and Hardware (GLH), one of MSC's
clients, in the amount of P53,170.00. However, Fernando Tan (Tan), the proprietor of MSC, claimed that
he demanded Inacay to remit the said amount paid by GLH, but he failed to do so. Tan then filed a criminal
complaint for estafa with the Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon City against Inacay. Consequently, an
Information for the crime of estafa was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against
Inacay.
In the proceedings before the RTC, Inacay was represented by a certain Eulogia B. Manila (Manila), who
represented herself as a lawyer. During arraignment, Inacay pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. RTC
of Quezon City rendered a Decision finding Inacay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa.
Unperturbed, Inacay appealed the RTC decision to the CA; he was still represented by Manila in the
proceedings before the appellate court. the CA rendered a Decision, affirming the RTC's disposition in toto.
When Inacay learned of the CA's decision, he requested Manila to file the appropriate petition with this
Court, but the latter refused and told him to find another lawyer.
Subsequently, Inacay found out, after talking to a lawyer, that Manila is not a member of the Bar. Hence,
this petiton claiming that he was denied due process since he was not represented by a lawyer. He, likewise,
avers that the lower courts erred in convicting him of the offense charged since there was no evidence
presented showing that he actually encashed the check paid by GLH and misappropriated the proceeds
thereof.
Issue:
Whether Inacay's guilt of the crime charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The petition is granted.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
56 |Page
without due process of law. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution further mandates that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be
a grave denial of due process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned.15 "Thus, even if the judgment
had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be
heard by himself and counsel."
"The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going
litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his
client company." Unless the accused is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense
presented in his behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.
Considering that there was a denial of due process, there is a need to set aside the judgment of conviction
against Inacay and remand the case to the trial court for new, trial. Further, Manila, for representing herself
as a lawyer, should be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
57 |Page
Tickler: On complaint of Samir and Rowena Muhsen, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for
Grave Coercion before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information. On October 28, 2002,
petitioner posted bail and was released.
Doctrine: Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116
and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September
15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall
be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred
twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
Case Title:
FEDERICO MIGUEL OLBES v. DANILO A. BUEMIO
GR No. 173319
Dec 04, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Facts:
On June 28, 2002, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave Coercion before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information. Petitioner posted bail and was released.
His motion for review before the DOJ to defer or suspend his arraignment was denied and so he was
arraigned where he pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was set but due to a typhhon, it was reset without objection
from petitoner. At the resched pre-trial, petitioner failed to appear prompting the trial court to issue a
warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery that neither petitioner nor
his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was again reset.
Before the scheduled pre-trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on the ground of
violation of his right to a speedy trial under Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and a Supreme Court Circular, arguing
that he was not brought to trial within 80 days from date he was arraigned and such was not his fault.
Therefore, the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 in relation to Rule 119, Section 6
of the Rules.
Trial court denied his motion to dismiss as well as his petition for review on certiorari and prohibition
holding that Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case
just because trial has not commenced within 80 days from arraignment; that the proceedings before the
MeTC were not attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; and that the concept of a speedy
trial is not a mere question of numbers that could be computed in terms of years, months or days but is
understood according to the peculiar circumstances of each case.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s right to speedy trial was violated.
Ruling:
The petition does not impress.
58 |Page
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate
certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide
that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar
to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution."
Thus, in spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of
"speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Such right to a speedy trial and
a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and
to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
Applying these, the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the
"delay" in the proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
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Tickler: In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner assails the Order of Judge Genaro Gines of the RTC
of San Fernando, La Union which dismissed Criminal Case entitled "People vs. Ramon Labo, Jr. and Francis
Floresca" and the Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
Doctrine:
The right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. GENARO GINES
GR No. 83463
May 27, 1991
PARAS, J.
Facts:
3 persons were charged for libel, but 1 was excluded having no participation therein, and another accused
is to be added in the then filed information in lieu of the excluded person. There were postponements filed
by the complainant for medical reasons, i.e. separate days for operation of both eyes for cataract and one
for check-up abroad. Pending preliminary investigation for the third accused who was supposed to be
added in the information, Hon. Gines dismissed the case for the denial of speedy trial for the accused.
(NOTE: Dismissal of the charge for the third accused was proper as crime already prescribed for not being
filed for more than a year.)
Issue:
Whether or not the right of the accused to a speedy trial had been violated.
Ruling:
The dismissal of the case for the 2 other accused due to speedy trial was premature and erroneous. As
settled, right to SPEEDY TRIAL is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements. As in this case,
postponements by the prosecution were not capricious, oppressive nor vexatious as they were done in
good faith with justifiable and meritorious reason satisfactorily proven by the prosecution to be true. The
case was dismissed 8 and a half months after the filing of the charges which is not a lengthy duration to
cause unnecessary delay denying speedy trial. Hence, their invocation of speedy trial as a ground for
dismissal which, if given merit would be tantamount to acquittal, cannot be appreciated. Due that, it would
not fall under double jeopardy should the case be ordered reopened.
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Tickler: The case is a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the annulment of
Sandiganbayan Resolutions with prayer for the issuance of a status quo order or a temporary restraining
order against the Sandiganbayan.
Doctrine: “In the present case, petitioner has undoubtedly been prejudiced by virtue of the delay in the
resolution of the cases filed against him. Even though he was not initially included as a respondent in the
investigation conducted from 1996 to 2006 pertaining to the “overpricing of medicines” procured through
emergency purchase, he has already been deprived of the ability to adequately prepare his case considering
that he may no longer have any access to records or contact with any witness in support of his defense. This
is even aggravated by the fact that petitioner had been retired for fifteen ( 15) years. Even if he was never
imprisoned and subjected to trial, it cannot be denied that he has lived under a cloud of anxiety by virtue of
the delay in the resolution of his case.”
Case Title:
COMMO. LAMBERTO R. TORRES v. SANDIGANBAYAN & PEOPLE
GR Nos. 221562-69
Oct 05, 2016
VELASCO JR., J.
Facts:
From 1991 to 1993, petitioner Commo. Lamberto R. Torres was the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff for
Logistics under the Flag Officer In Command of the Philippine Navy. Sometime in July 1991 until June 1992,
the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit at the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN)
pertaining to the procurement of drugs and medicine by emergency mode purchase, among others.
On December 11, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman commenced a preliminary investigation against
petitioner and several others for Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of Sec. 3 ( e) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
It was alleged that the purchase of additional drugs and medicines worth P5.56 million was not properly
supported and accounted for, in which petitioner was included as a respondent for being a signatory of the
checks involved.
In another case, it was also alleged that supplies and materials amounting to P6,663,440. Petitioner was
included as a respondent in the case because he allegedly recommended the approval of the purchase
orders and signed the certificates of emergency purchases.
These cases, however, were dismissed against petitioner for lack of probable cause. A few years after
petitioner's retirement from the service in 2001, Tanodbayan Simeon V. Marcelo issued an Internal
Memorandum, recommending a new fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation relative to
other transactions in other units and offices of the Philippine Navy.
Pursuant to this Internal Memorandum, a new Affidavit Complaint dated February 22, 2006 was filed by
the Ombudsman against petitioner and several others, this time, for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of
RA 3019. Notices of the new preliminary investigation were, however, sent to petitioner's old address in
Kawit, Cavite, which he had already vacated in 1980.
61 |Page
Thus, petitioner was not informed of the proceedings in the new preliminary investigation. Unknown to
petitioner, eight (8) Information were filed by the Ombudsman against him and the other accused before
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner was thereafter allowed to file a Counter-Affidavit before the Office of the
Ombudsman, where he prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that his constitutional rights to
due process and speedy trial were violated by the inordinate delay of the case.
In its Resolution, the Ombudsman resolved to maintain the Information filed against petitioner due the fact
that it was based on a new investigation. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Informations
before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to
Quash, anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner's right to speedy disposition of cases.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. There is grave abuse of discretion when an act of a court or tribunal is whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious as to amount to an "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."
Grave abuse of discretion was found in cases where a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence. In his Motion to Quash, petitioner invoked Section 3,
paragraph (d) of Rule 117, asserting that the Ombudsman had lost its authority to file the Information
against him for having conducted the fact-finding and preliminary investigations too long. He raised a
similar argument in the present petition-that the Ombudsman had no more authority to file the Information
since petitioner's rights to speedy disposition of cases and to due process were violated.
In the present case, the lapse of time in the conduct of the proceedings is tantamount to a vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay, which We find to be in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases.
In the present case, petitioner has undoubtedly been prejudiced by virtue of the delay in the resolution of
the cases filed against him. Even though he was not initially included as a respondent in the investigation
conducted from 1996 to 2006 pertaining to the "overpricing of medicines" procured through emergency
purchase, he has already been deprived of the ability to adequately prepare his case considering that he
may no longer have any access to records or contact with any witness in support of his defense. This is even
aggravated by the fact that petitioner had been retired for fifteen (15) years. Even if he was never
imprisoned and subjected to trial, it cannot be denied that he has lived under a cloud of anxiety by virtue
of the delay in the resolution of his case.
62 |Page
Tickler: The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far has remained
unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. More specifically, did
respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the
holding of the trial of the other respondents inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named
as petitioner.
Doctrine:
Case Title:
GREGORIO N. GARCIA v. FELIX DOMINGO
GR No. L-30104
Jul 25, 1973
FERNANDO, J.
Facts:
In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon
Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana.
The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial even on Saturday on the
chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted the request. (as police officers under suspension
because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases
scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday).
On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the petitioner judge order should be
reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.
Ruling:
Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts
the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger
to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties’ need be shown.
There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence
may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted.
63 |Page
Tickler: Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a Criminal Case Order denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, and her Motion for Reconsideration.
Doctrine:
The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the
prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.
As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside
peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial
court.
Case Title:
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY AND LOVERIE PALACAY
G.R. No. 164258
August 22, 2012
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling filed by private
respondent against herein petitioner with the (MCTC) of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur
Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public Prosecutor assigned to handle the case filed an
Information against her. Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Pre-trial conference was set. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City since the
respondent was a minor, where petitioner was brought to trial.
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the final witness for the
prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contended
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because the MCTC erroneously transferred the case
to the RTC instead of dismissing it. Petitioner also argued that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction was further
aggravated when she was not arraigned before the RTC.
RTC issued its assailed Order ruling that it acquired jurisdiction over the case when it received the records
of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by the MCTC; that the transfer of the case from the
MCTC is authorized under Administrative Matter, that there is no doubt that the offended party is a minor
and, thus, the case falls within the original jurisdiction of Family Courts pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8369.
The RTC also held that even granting that there was defect or irregularity in the procedure because
petitioner was not arraigned before the RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner's counsel entered
64 |Page
into trial without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC... noted that
petitioner's counsel has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution. Consequently, the RTC denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON petitioner should have been arraigned anew before the RTC and that her arraignment before the
MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein were void.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The Court agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that she should have been
arraigned by the RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction,
including its decision, are null and void.
Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner's
arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid
Information filed with the RTC.
It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC without
objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC to rely on the case of
People v. Cabale, because the accused therein was in fact arraigned, although the same was made only
after the case was submitted for decision.
There is no arraignment at all before the RTC. On the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC
is null and void. Thus, there is nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC
the fact that her client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the
prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.
As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed

aside peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the
trial court.
65 |Page
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Digos City are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the Information in Criminal Case without
prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court.
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Tickler:
Two main issues are raised by defendant-appellant in his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City: (1) Whether or not the defendant-appellant entered a valid plea of guilty to the offense as
charged in the information; and (2) Assuming that there was a valid plea of guilty, whether the accused may
waive the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
Doctrine:
An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt, provided that a
certain penalty be imposed upon him. In such cases, the information should first be amended or modified
with the consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant, or the accused must be considered as having entered
a plea of not guilty.
When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. PATRICK DE LUNA
GR No. 77969
Jun 22, 1989
GANCAYCO, J.
Facts:
Defendant-appellant Patrick de Luna, assisted by Counsel de-Oficio Atty. David Ompoc, when arraigned on
December 23, 1986, entered a PLEA OF GUILTY for the crime of Murder with the qualification that "hindi
ko sinasadya."
"Being informed of the charge and having understood the said accusation, the accused waived his right
that the prosecution present its evidence in order to determine for this court the degree of culpability of
the accused under the present charge.
Finding accused Patrick de Luna Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and appreciating
in his favor the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty plus his manifestation to this court that he did not
intentionally want it to happen that way, the court hereby sentences accused Patrick de Luna to Reclusion
Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of P30,000.00.
Issue/s:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FOR MURDER WHICH WAS NOT PLEADED OR
ADMITTED BY THE ACCUSED, BECAUSE OF HIS QUALIFICATION TO HIS PLEA, THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT
THE CRIME INTENTIONALLY.
67 |Page
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO
DETERMINE THE PROPER PENALTY FOR THE CRIME INVOLVED.
Ruling:
I.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full
knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the precise
nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information.
While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information including the aggravating
and qualifying circumstances, the repeated and emphatic qualification stated by the defendant-appellant
as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the attention of the trial court that the plea was made
without a full knowledge of its consequences. Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning
and effect of the technical language used in the information qualifying the acts constituting the offense.
In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to
foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative
but to impose the penalty fixed by law. Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant's qualified plea
of guilty is not a valid plea of guilty.
Thus, this Court has ruled that:
"An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt, provided that a
certain penalty be imposed upon him. In such cases, the information should first be amended or modified
with the consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant, or the accused must be considered as having entered
a plea of not guilty."
II.
After a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of
culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.
Thus, notwithstanding the waiver made by the appellant as to the presentation of evidence by the
prosecution, the presentation of evidence should be required in order to preclude any room for reasonable
doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might
have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the nature of the charge to which he
pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify
or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.
68 |Page
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to said court for a
new arraignment and further proceeding.
69 |Page
Tickler:
The mandatory procedure laid down by jurisprudence and the Rules of Court should be meticulously
observed by trial courts in accepting a plea of guilty in a case involving a capital offense. There should be no
doubt that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charges and the consequences thereof.
Otherwise, the plea would be set aside for having been improvidently made.
Doctrine:
In People v. Aranzado, the Court, citing Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, set the following guidelines
for receiving a plea of guilty in a case involving a capital offense:
(1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the

voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea;
(2) The court must require the prosecution to present

evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to

present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do
so if he desires."
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. BENJAMIN GALVEZ
GR No. 135053
Mar 06, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts:
In an Information dated February 20, 1998, appellant was charged with multiple rape of his own daughter
who was 16 years old when the first instance of rape happened.
During the arraignment, read and explained to appellant in Ilocano -- a dialect he spoke and understood --
were the charges for ten counts of rape. Assisted by Atty. Renato Mercado, he pleaded not guilty to the
charges. However, on May 14, 1998, appellant, this time with the assistance of Atty. Ruby Rosa Espino,
changed his plea to that of guilt. In accordance with the RTC's Order, an inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of his plea was conducted. After hearing evidence for the prosecution, the lower court
rendered the assailed Decision.
Appellant did not present any evidence on his behalf. Neither did his counsel present in his Brief any
counter-statement of the facts.
70 |Page
The automatically appealed Decision states that the trial was conducted pursuant to People v. Alicando,
which held that "a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt -- after a free and
intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and
the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt." As appellant absolutely refused to offer any
evidence in his own favor, the trial court decided the case solely on the basis of the evidence presented by
the prosecution.
However, the RTC convicted him of only one count of rape perpetrated in the third week of April, 1997,
because the Information had alleged only one incident of the crime. The allegation that the victim was
raped several times after the third week of April 1997 was deemed "too indefinite to give the accused the
opportunity to prepare his defense."
Hence, this automatic appeal.
Issue:
WON appellant's plea was improvident.
Ruling:
Yes. We agree with appellant -- his plea of guilt was improvident. The stringent procedure governing the
reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge
in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge did not conduct a "searching inquiry" into the voluntariness
of appellant's plea of guilt and full comprehension thereof. Moreover, there is no showing that the lawyer
explained to appellant the consequences of the latter's plea -- probable conviction and death sentence.
Equally important, the trial judge should have asked why the plea of appellant was changed. The former
obtained none of the information required in Aranzado. Hence, there is no basis to conclude that the latter
voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty to the charges against him.
In the instant case, the Court also notes that "guilty" was not the original plea of appellant; hence, careful
effort should have been exerted by the court below to inquire into why he changed his plea. In addition,
he refused to present evidence in his defense.
WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Case is REMANDED to the court of origin
for re-arraignment and further proceedings to be conducted with all deliberate speed, in accordance with
this Decision.
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Tickler:
The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court. During
custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given the option to be
represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option during
arraignment and trial, the court shall appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel is
absolute, the accused's option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to sanction
reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the state
and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
Doctrine:
The right covers the period beginning from custodial investigation, well into the rendition of judgment, and
even on appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right to an accused not only during trial but
even before an information is filed.
It provides:
"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he... must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
"SEC. 14 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x."
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. MARIO SERZO
GR No. 118435
Jun 20, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts:
Appellant was charged with murder in an Information dated September 4, 1990 filed by Rizal Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor. Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits. After
arraignment and trial, appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced.
In view of appellant's allegation that he was denied his right to counsel, a narration of the proceedings
before the trial court is now in order. Arraignment was set by the trial court on January 8, 1991, during
which appellant appeared without counsel. Consequently, the trial... court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-
ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that the arraignment be reset
and that he be given time to engage a counsel of his own choice, which the trial court granted.
72 |Page
Appellant appeared without a counsel de parte. He was nonetheless arraigned with the assistance of
Counsel de oficio Wilfredo Lina-ac. He pleaded "not guilty." Pre-trial was waived and trial was set.
Thereafter, the assailed Decision convicting appellant of murder was promulgated on August 23, 1994.
In its Decision, the trial court noted that appellant simply refused to secure the services of a counsel de
parte and to present evidence in his defense despite ample opportunity accorded to him.
Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. Appellant was positively identified as the assailant by the widow, Adelaida Alcantara, who
survived his attack. In her distinct and vivid narration of the sequence of... events leading to the murder,
she showed that the attack was treacherous as the victim was stabbed at the back and without warning.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Decision, appellant through Counsel Carmelo L. Arcilla appealed to this
Court.
Issue/s:
The lower court erred in not giving the defendant-appellant time to engage counsel of his own choice.
II
The lower court erred in not affording the defendant-appellant the chance to present evidence for his
defense.
Ruling:
The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. This
right is granted to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutory machinery of the state.
The right covers the period beginning from custodial investigation, well into the rendition of judgment, and
even on appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right to an accused not only during trial
but even before an information is filed.
It provides:
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he... must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
"SEC. 14 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x."
73 |Page
A deprivation of the right to counsel divests the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a
level playing field, so to speak.
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a court-
appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel is immutable,
his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute.
The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the states' and the
offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict the
accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the
chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid
reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so long as (1) the waiver is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law and (2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.
In the present case, appellant claims that he was not given sufficient time to engage a counsel de parte,
thereby preventing him from presenting evidence in his defense. In his Brief he adds, but without giving
particulars or proof, that allegedly his counsels de oficio did not exert their "utmost efforts" in representing
him. The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel
because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano
and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused
as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the
trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were
not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.
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Tickler:
This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, in a Criminal Case
finding accused-appellant guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him
accordingly.
Doctrine:
The right to counsel covers the period beginning from custodial investigation, well into the rendition of
judgment, and even on appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right to an accused not only
during trial but even before an information is filed.
It provides:
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he... must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. RENE LAMSING Y JABON
GR No. 105316
Sep 21, 1995
MENDOZA, J.
Facts:
The case arose from the killing in the early hours of November 1, 1989 of Winnie Cabunilas, a security
guard, while on duty at the construction site of a Synergy building on Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon
City.
Four days after the killing, accused-appellant was arrested by policemen, while in a drinking spree with
friends at a basketball court near the scene of the crime. He was detained and, in a police lineup, was
identified by witnesses as one of those responsible for the death of Winnie Cabunilas.
An information was filed against him and a John Doe for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. As the other accused was at large, trial
proceeded against accused-appellant alone.
Issue:
WON accused-appellant was correct in complaining that he was made to join a police lineup where he was
identified by three persons, without the assistance of counsel.
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Ruling:
No.
It was settled in Gamboa v. Cruz, however, that the right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the
Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The
reason for this is that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory.
The accused's right to counsel attaches only from the time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken
against him.
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Tickler:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the approximate time of the commission of the offense.
A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a ground
for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The remedy against an indictment that fails to
allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of
particulars.
Doctrine:
Rule 116, Section 9. Bill of particulars. — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars
to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or information and the details desired.
Case Title:
FELICISIMO ROCABERTE v. PEOPLE
GR No. 72994
Jan 23, 1991
NARVASA, J.
Facts:
Rocaberte and two others were charged with the crime of theft. The Information states:
That on or about the period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of West Canayaon,
municipal of Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties...
Rocaberte moved to quash the information, alleging that the statement of the time of commission of the
felony charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, a period of 7 years," or "about 2,551 days," was fatally
defective; there was "so great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same
offense"; "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional right to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to
defend themselves. The trial court denied the motion. Hence, the appeal.
Issues:
1. Is the statement of the time of the commission of the offense "between October, 1910 to August, 1912,"
defective?
2. Is a defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged a ground for a motion
to quash?
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3. What then is the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the
offense with sufficient definiteness?
Ruling:
1. The rules of criminal procedure declare that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
approximate time of the commission of the offense. Where, however, the statement of the time of the
commission of the offense is so general as to span a number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to
August, 1912," it has been held to be fatally defective because it deprives the accused an opportunity to
prepare his defense.
2. A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a ground
for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that
account will be denied since the defect is one that can be cured by amendment.
3. The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with
sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars.
The information against Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused the
unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span of more than 2,500 days. It
is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make more definite and particular
the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he
cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case must be dismissed.
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Tickler:
In this case, the court resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner spouses Alexander Trinidad
and Cecilia Trinidad to challenge the Resolution of September 29, 2010. The Resolution denied the petition
for review on certiorari for its failure to state the material dates of receipt of the order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 44, Masbate City, and of filing the motion for reconsideration, in violation of Sections
4(b) and 5, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(d), Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
Doctrine:
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended
in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court
shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice,
or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Case Title:
SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD, VS. VICTOR ANG
G.R. No. 192898
January 31, 2011
BRION, J.
Facts:
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners. Petitioners
the filed with the DOJ a motion for review.
On March 3, 2009 the prosecutor then filed the information with the MTcC who later on ordered the
petitioners to file their counter affidavit.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest praying, among others, for the deferment of their arraignment
in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ. The MTCC granted the motion subject
to par c, section 11 rule 116 and set their arraignment on September 10, 2009.
A petition for certiorari was then made to the RTC who held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the
arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ.
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The petitioners then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the 60-day
limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule.
Issue: WON the motion for review is a ground for suspension of arraignment.
Ruling:
Yes. SC granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstate the petition for review on certiorari.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court
shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice,
or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period
of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after
the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007. When
the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already
lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.
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Tickler:
In this case, the trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were
rendered incomplete after respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the court believed would
negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid marriage. The evidence presented
showed that respondent later obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first union following the
celebration of a subsequent marriage.
Doctrine:
The granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense is "not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
Case Title:
MYRNA P. ANTONE VS. LEO R. BERONILLA
G.R. No. 183824
December 08, 2010
PEREZ, J.
Facts:
Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla, alleging that her marriage with respondent had
not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with Maguillo. Beronilla moved
to quash the information because his marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC. Absent
a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The court quashed the information. MR denied. CA
dismissed the case as well.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sustained the motion to quash
on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information
Ruling:
Yes.
A motion to quash an information is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
or information against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in
the face of the information.
The court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted, or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage.
The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
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defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established
rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised
only during the presentation of evidence.
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the information. It considered an evidence
introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information, and that facts not alleged thereat may be
appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.
Case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
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Tickler:
This case talks about the sufficiency of the information filed by petitioner against the accused.
Doctrine:
Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the
designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA
GR L-42050-66
Nov 20, 1978
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.
Facts:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined
by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of
deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the
three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will
be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that
the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Issue:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of
"illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
Ruling:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state
the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly.
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3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to penalize
the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and
the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The
preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
The petition is DISMISSED.
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Tickler:
As respondents themselves admit, in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by
what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be
presented during the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal
obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information constitutive of the offense
charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is there retained
regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information.
Doctrine:
Since the crime of seduction carries with it a liability, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, to
acknowledge and give support to the offspring resulting from the crime - matters beyond the jurisdiction of
the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts - it follows that the instant case falls within the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance (U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. JUDGE DIMALANES BUISSAN
GR No. 54419
Jul 15, 1981
DE CASTRO, J.
Facts:
On June 26, 1979, Paterno Santiago, private respondent herein, on previous complaint of the offended
party, Araceli C. Medel, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte with the crime
of simple... seduction
Upon arraignment on September 3, 1979, respondent Santiago pleaded not guilty, and on the day set for
the trial of the case on October 22, 1979, said respondent moved to quash the information for "failure to
allege lewd design." He filed a formal Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss the Information on the same ground
An opposition was filed by the People of the Philippines, herein petitioner, on November 13, 1979; and on
November 16, 1979, Judge Dimalanes Buissan, one of the public respondents herein, denied the motion,
but remanded the case to the City Court of Dapitan on the "ground of lack of jurisdiction since the penalty
for Simple Seduction is only Arresto Mayor.
People of the Philippines filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the City Court has no jurisdiction
over the case, but respondent Judge Buissan denied the motion.
City Judge Wilfredo C. Martinez, the other public respondent, assuming jurisdiction of the case, set the
hearing thereof on May 28, 1980, on the merits.
Alleging that CFI Judge Buissan, in denying the petitioner's motion to quash and/or to dismiss Criminal Case
No. 2258 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte and remanding said case to the City Court
of Dapitan for trial on... the merits on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI and that City Judge
Martinez, in assuming jurisdiction of the case and setting it for trial on the merits as above narrated, both
acted with grave abuse of discretion and that their respective orders likewise referred... to above are illegal
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and void, petitioner People of the Philippines came to this Court on the present petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether a criminal case charging simple seduction which is penalized by law by not more than arresto
mayor or not more than six months, comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of a municipal or city court.
Ruling:
The penalty imposed by Article 338 of simple seduction is arresto mayor, the duration of which is from one
month or one day to six months. Apparently, the crime of simple seduction falls under the original...
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts. However, it should not be overlooked that
persons guilty of seduction shall also be sentenced to indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the
offspring unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and to give support to such offspring. (Article
345, Revised Penal Code). These are inherent accessory civil liabilities when a child is born as a result of
the crime.
The acknowledgment of and the giving of support to, the offspring are matters beyond the jurisdiction of
the Justice of the Peace or Municipal Courts. They pertain to the Courts of First Instance. Since the crime
of seduction carries with it a liability, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, to acknowledge and give
support to the offspring resulting from the crime - matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Justice of the
Peace or Municipal Courts - it follows that the instant case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance (U.S. vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265). It would be absurd to have the principal case of seduction tried
and decided by the Municipal Court and the resulting acknowledgment and support of the offspring by the
Court of First Instance. The duplication would entail unnecessary waste of time and effort for the parties
and for the courts, to the detriment of an orderly administration of justice."
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Tickler:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo
Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder)
against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Doctrine:
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information and once it is shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
Hence, it’s elementary rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
Case Title:
PANFILO M. LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No. 128096
Jan 20, 1999
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate
involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group
(ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command,
that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng
gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate
the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board
modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged
as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases
where one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or
PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the
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Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A.
7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that
the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed
in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the
case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection
of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented
to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party
who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under
the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal
laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office
if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
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of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal
accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed
in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
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Tickler:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition against the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, presided over by respondent, Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, Judge.
Petitioner Caridad Cabarroguis is accused of estafa in Criminal Case No. 5355-P of said court. At the hearing
thereof on February 28, 1962, complainant therein, Ernerita C. Orpilla, was the sole witness for the
prosecution.
Doctrine:
Section 2 o£ Rule 116 of the Rules of Court "the judgment" and the order... of dismissal in question had, if
completed, such effect "must be written * * * personally and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by
him * * *."
Case Title:
CARIDAD CABARROGUIS v. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO
GR No. L-19517
Nov 30, 1962
CONCEPCION, J.
Facts:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition against the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, presided over by respondent, Hon. Lourdes P. San Diego, Judge.
Petitioner Caridad Cabarroguis is accused of estafa in Criminal Case No. 5355-P of said court. At the hearing
thereof on February 28, 1962, complainant therein, Ernerita C. Orpilla, was the sole witness for the
prosecution.
Respondent Judge dictated in open court an order dismissing the case against the accused on the ground
that the crime of estafa did not obtain in the said case.
When the hearing was resumed on March 7, 1962, petitioner moved to set aside the order of respondent
withdrawing her aforementioned order, of dismissal, alleging; that otherwise petitioner would be again "in
danger of being placed in jeopardy."
This motion was immediately denied, whereupon the present case was instituted, upon the theory that
said verbal order of dismissal of February 28, 1962, without the consent of the accused (petitioner herein),
amounted to her acquittal, and that the withdrawal of said order, followed by the continuation of the
examination of the complainant and the presentation of the other evidence for the prosecution, placed the
petitioner in double, jeopardy. Hence, petitioner prayed that said order withdrawing the verbal order of
dismissal be set aside and that respondent be commanded to desist from further proceeding with the trial
of said Criminal Case.
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Issue:
WON the verbal order of dismissal was valid.
Ruling:
Petitioner's pretense is untenable. The verbal order of dismissal of said case was withdrawn or set aside, as
soon as it was dictated by respondent and before it could be reduced to writing and signed by her. As a
matter of fact, it was never put in writing. Much less was it... ever signed by respondent. For this reason,
respondent contends that said order of dismissal was incomplete and did not have the effect of acquitting
the accused before it was withdrawn.
Indeed, pursuant to section 2 o£ Rule 116 of the Rules of Court "the judgment" and the order... of dismissal
in question had, if completed, such effect "must be written * * * personally and directly prepared by the
judge, and signed by him * * *." The cases cited by herein petitioner involved written orders of dismissal,
which were signed by the corresponding judges. Hence, said cases are not controlling in the one at bar.
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Tickler:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) dated April 15, 1983, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) at Bacolod City, dismissing the petition for certiorari which sought to annul and set
aside the order of the City Court at Bacolod City, dated July 1, 1977, in Criminal Case No. 29688.
Doctrine:
Section 2 o£ Rule 116 of the Rules of Court "the judgment" and the order... of dismissal in question had, if
completed, such effect "must be written * * * personally and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by
him * * *."
Case Title:
DR. FELIX ABAY, SR. AND FELIX ABAY, JR. Vs. The HON. FELINO A. GARCIA, Acting City Judge, City of Bacolod
(now Municipal Trial Court); PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the City Fiscal, Bacolod City,
RAMIRO GARQUE and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66132 June 27, 1988
MEDIALDEA, J.
Facts:
A criminal case for direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority was filed against Felix Abay, Sr.,
Felix Abay, Jr., and two other accused. Accused Felix Abay, Sr. and Felix Abay, Jr. were duly arraigned and
both pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced with Ramiro Garque testifying on direct examination and partly
on cross examination.
The trial was transferred but again the cross-examination was not terminated so the case was reset. At the
continuation of the trial, both accused appeared without their counsel. The trial fiscal, was present, but the
complainant, Garque who was still to be cross-examined, failed to appear despite due notice. The private
prosecutor also failed to appear. Whereupon, City Judge Felino Garcia verbally ordered, motu proprio, the
dismissal of the case. Fiscal Lobaton did not object to the dismissal. Both accused remained silent and later
left the courtroom after the judge dictated the order of dismissal.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, Atty. Trocino, together with Garque arrived in court
and upon learning that Criminal Case was ordered dismissed, verbally moved to have the order of dismissal
set aside. In the presence of special counsel Navarro, Atty. Trocino was allowed to present evidence in
support of the verbal motion for reconsideration and to explain the failure of Garque to appear on time. In
his written order Judge Garcia granted the verbal motion for reconsideration and set aside the verbal order
of dismissal. He further ordered the resetting of the case for hearing on another date.
Subsequently, the accused, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order invoking
double jeopardy, claiming that the verbal order of dismissal, even if provisional, was rendered without the
express consent of the accused. The motion for reconsideration was denied, after which the accused filed
a petition for certiorari, which sought to annul and set aside the order of the City Court. The judge dismissed
the petition. The CA affirmed the decision.
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Issue:
Whether there was a valid dismissal.
Ruling:
We fully agree with the findings of the respondent court. Where there is valid information and the accused
has been arraigned, an order of dismissal issued by the court, motu proprio, in the course of a trial of a
criminal case, whether based on the merits or for failure of prosecution witnesses to appear, has the effect
of a judgment of acquittal and double jeopardy attaches.
The order is also immediately executory. However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions
of Rule 120, section 2 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 120, section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure).
In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely dictated in open court by the trial judge. There
is no showing that this verbal order of dismissal was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus,
it did not yet attain the effect of a judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge
to set it aside and enter another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.
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Tickler:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rules) are the April 27, 2004 Decision and August 10, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People
of the Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga which acquitted respondent Consuelo C. Aliga (Aliga) from the
offense charged and, in effect, reversed and set aside the July 12, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 147, Makati City.
Doctrine:
If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court
a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense."
Case Title:
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL VS. CONSUELO C. ALIGA
G.R. No. 166995
January 13, 2014
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
On October 31, 1996, an Information was filed against respondent Aliga for the crime of Qualified Theft
thru Falsification of Commercial Document.
During her arraignment on December 6, 1996, respondent Aliga pleaded not guilty. After the RTC resolved
to deny petitioner's motion for issuance of a hold departure order against respondent Aliga and the latter's
motion to suspend proceedings, trial on the merits ensued. Both the prosecution and the defense were
able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their respective documentary exhibits.
The RTC succinctly opined that the evidence of the prosecution is very clear that respondent Aliga must
have been the one who made the intercalation in the subject check, and that even without her written
admission, the evidence presented constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt.It appearing that the
amount of P60,000.00 subject of the offense was already returned by the accused, the Court absolved the
accused of civil liability in this case.
Respondent Aliga appealed to the CA, which, on April 27, 2004, reversed and set aside the judgment of the
RTC. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on August 10, 2004; hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.
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Ruling:
The petition is unmeritorious.

A judgment of acquittal may be assailed only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the
court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review
errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable
ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Under
Section 1 of the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan may file a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court, or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be
placed in double jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the
Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from
appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." The rule is that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and
immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review
without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed
from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened
to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a
court simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based
on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in
the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
The case does not fall within the exception to rule on double jeopardy the rule against double jeopardy is
not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there
is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.[31] Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case.
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First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial. In fact, petitioner did not make any allegation to
that effect. What the records show is that during the trial, both parties had more than enough occasions
to be heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during the appeal before the CA. The State,
represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair opportunity to prove its case.
second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It could not be said that its judgment
was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this reason, void. Again, petitioner did not even allege that the CA
gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he... asserted was that the CA "gravely erred" in the evaluation
and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, what he questioned was the purported
errors of judgment or those involving wrong appreciation of evidence or errors of law, which, as aforesaid,
cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65 petition. To repeat, a writ of certiorari can only correct errors
of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion, not those which call for the
evaluation of evidence and factual findings.
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Tickler:
This case discusses that failure of the accused to move for the quashal of the information against him before
he enters his plea is deemed a waiver to question the regularity of his arrest.
Doctrine:
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over
the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. CESAR GIVERA Y GAROTE
GR No. 132159
Jan 18, 2001
MENDOZA, J.
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City finding accused-
appellant Cesar Givera y Garote guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon y Arrivas and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs of the suit.
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on April 10, 1996, whereupon he was tried.
He questioned the validity of his arrest long after he was arraigned.
Issue:
WON petition has merit.
Ruling:
Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996 was made
without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by a warrant issued by the court on April 27, 1995.
However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest was returned unserved by the arresting officer on June
7, 1995 as accused-appellant could not be found.
He was finally found only on May 4, 1996. Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest.
Unless specifically provided in the warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled or
quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, §4 is only a directive to the officer executing the warrant
to make a return to the court.
At any rate, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto because he failed
to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court, entered a plea of not guilty and
participated in the trial. As this Court has held, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
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Tickler:
This case talks about the mandatory nature of the Rules and how they are applied as strictly against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.
Doctrine:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him
and his counsel. (Rule 118)
Case Title:
MANOLO P. FULE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 79094
June 22, 1988
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting petitioner (the accused-appellant)
of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) based on the Stipulation of Facts entered
between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court.
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subsequent hearing
on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof,
submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-
appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment of
conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable Respondent
Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense
charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts
made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. In
Sec.4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him
and his counsel. (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
Having been effective since January 01, 1985, the above rule is applicable.
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Issue:
Whether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by
the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
YES. Judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and
REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of
evidence.
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and
phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs.
Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]).
The use of the term “shall”, further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84
SCRA 176). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People
vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
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Tickler:
The Supreme Court ruled in the afore-cited case that where the stipulation of facts was made during trial
and therefore automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings
had in court, the conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary.
Doctrine:
Rule 118 provides the following:

"Section 1. Pre-trial; when proper -- To expedite trial, where the accused and counsel agree, the court shall
conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters enunciated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights
of the accused.
Sec. 2 Pre-trial conference; subjects -- The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ
GR No. 108028
Jul 30, 1996
FRANCISCO, J.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale in violation of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code. Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
After careful calibration of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, the court a quo
rendered a decision holding that the defense of "denial" interposed by the accused could not prevail over
the positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which had established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an admission by the appellant of
the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or license from the POEA, but was merely an admission
that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA, if presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2) the
stipulation of facts is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. Appellant posits the foregoing
arguments to bolster her contention that the stipulation of facts did not relieve the prosecution of its duty
to present evidence to prove all the elements of the crime charged to the end that the guilt of the accused
may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant further contends that granting arguendo that defense counsel had in fact agreed to the above
stipulation of facts, the same is null and void for being contrary to the well-established rule that a stipulation
of facts is not allowed in criminal cases.
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Issue:
WON stipulation of facts is not slowed in criminal cases.
Ruling:
The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the fundamental right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the corollary duty of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefore advanced that the prosecution being duty-
bound to prove all the elements of the crime, may not be relieved of this obligation by the mere expedient
of stipulating with defense counsel on a matter constitutive of an essential element of the crime charged.
However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure, particularly the pre-trial
provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation of facts in criminal cases no longer holds
true. Rule 118 provides the following:
"Section 1. Pre-trial; when proper -- To expedite trial, where the accused and counsel agree, the court
shall conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters enunciated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the
rights of the accused.
Sec. 2 Pre-trial conference; subjects -- The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
By the foregoing rule, a stipulation of facts in criminal cases is now expressly sanctioned by law. In further
pursuit of the objective of expediting trial by dispensing with the presentation of evidence on matters that
the accused is willing to admit, a stipulation of facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial but also
and with more reason, during trial proper itself.
Thus, although the requirement is for an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference to be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be
used in evidence against the accused, the Supreme Court ruled in the afore-cited case that where the
stipulation of facts was made during trial and therefore automatically reduced into writing and contained
in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court, the conformity of the accused in the form of his
signature affixed thereto is unnecessary.
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Tickler: On complaint of Samir and Rowena Muhsen, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for
Grave Coercion before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information. On October 28, 2002,
petitioner posted bail and was released.
Doctrine: Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116
and the preceding section 1, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September
15, 1998, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall
be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred
twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
Case Title:
FEDERICO MIGUEL OLBES v. DANILO A. BUEMIO
GR No. 173319
Dec 04, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Facts:
On June 28, 2002, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave Coercion before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information. Petitioner posted bail and was released.
His motion for review before the DOJ to defer or suspend his arraignment was denied and so he was
arraigned where he pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was set but due to a typhhon, it was reset without objection
from petitoner. At the resched pre-trial, petitioner failed to appear prompting the trial court to issue a
warrant for his arrest, which warrant was, however, later recalled on discovery that neither petitioner nor
his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial was again reset.
Before the scheduled pre-trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on the ground of
violation of his right to a speedy trial under Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and a Supreme Court Circular, arguing
that he was not brought to trial within 80 days from date he was arraigned and such was not his fault.
Therefore, the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 119, Section 9 in relation to Rule 119, Section 6
of the Rules.
Trial court denied his motion to dismiss as well as his petition for review on certiorari and prohibition
holding that Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case
just because trial has not commenced within 80 days from arraignment; that the proceedings before the
MeTC were not attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; and that the concept of a speedy
trial is not a mere question of numbers that could be computed in terms of years, months or days but is
understood according to the peculiar circumstances of each case.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s right to speedy trial was violated.
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Ruling:
The petition does not impress.
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate
certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide
that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar
to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution."
Thus, despite the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept of
"speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Such right to a speedy trial and
a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.
Applying these, the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the
"delay" in the proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.
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Tickler:
"Everything that happens in this world happens at the time God chooses. He sets the time for birth and the
time for death, . . ." (Ecclesiastes 3:1-8).
Though God has certainly set the time of Arthur Tanhueco's birth, the three men accused in this case
unblinkingly usurped God's power to set the time of his death. In one virtual motion, they deprived him of
his liberty; and demanded a considerable sum from his loved ones for his freedom, and yet, took his life
despite achieving their purpose. For their acts, they shall have to answer to God and to society.
Doctrine:
THE REQUISITES IN ORDER FOR A PERSON TO BE DISCHARGED AS A STATE WITNESS
1. The discharge must be WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED sought to be a state witness
2. There is ABSOLUTE NECESSITY for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
3. There is NO OTHER DIRECT EVIDENCE AVAILABLE for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
4. The testimony of said accused can be SUBSTANTIALLY CORROBORATED in its material points;
5. Said accused DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE MOSTGUILTY; and
6. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving MORAL TURPITUDE.
Case Title:
PEOPLE v. ROMMEL DEANG
GR No. 128045
Aug 24, 2000
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
On 31 January 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision in a Criminal
Case finding accused Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu, and Nicson Catli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
death. The case is now before this Court on automatic review.
During the trial, a motion to discharge Benito to become a state witness was filed which was opposed by
DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI. The trial court, however, granted the motion in an order.
After a meticulous review of the voluminous records and the evidence adduced by the parties, this Court
agrees with the findings of the trial court and, consequently, affirms the conviction of accused-appellants
DEANG, ESPIRITU and CATLI.
State witness Benito Catli's testimony is crucial to the determination of the guilt or innocence of accused-
appellants. He maintained that it was DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI who conceptualized, planned and
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executed the abduction. Thereafter, the three mapped out how to get the ransom from JAY-JAY's parents.
Benito also declared that the boy was held against his will.
All the foregoing, especially the pivotal testimony of state witness Benito Catli, established beyond any
shadow of a doubt that DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI committed, and are guilty of, the crime for which they
were charged, namely, kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
Issue:
WON the discharge as a state witness is proper.
Ruling:
Yes.
The requisites for an accused to be discharged as a state witness were complied with by Benito Catli as
follows:
First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Benito Catli, for despite the presentation of witnesses
by the prosecution, none of them testified on the exact manner the crime was committed. The question as
to who masterminded the commission of the offense, the manner it was committed and the actual
participation of the four accused. The existence of the alleged conspiracy can be gleaned from the sworn
statement of Benito Catli.
Second, the crime charged against the four accused is kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution was limited to the fact of kidnapping and the fact of the victim's death.
The circumstances leading to the death of the victim and the manner he was killed was not yet established.
Without accused Benito Catli's testimony, no other direct evidence is available for the prosecution to prove
the elements of the crime charged against the four accused.
Third, his testimony was and could be corroborated by the prosecution's witnesses. Fourth, he does not
appear to be the most guilty. In his sworn statement, he was merely asked by the three other accused to
join them in their already perceived plan of kidnapping a certain person. Fifth, there is no evidence that he
has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
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Tickler:
This case talks about how criminal cases should be consolidated so as not to defeat the purpose of promoting
a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business
transaction.
Doctrine:
Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating: Sec. 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses. – Charges
for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be
tried jointly at the discretion of the court.
Case Title:
ROMULO L. NERI v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR No. 202243
Aug 07, 2013 VELASCO JR., J.
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In connection
with the botched Philippine-ZTE National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Ombudsman filed two
criminal information, the first against Abalos, and the second against Neri. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor then moved for the two cases’ consolidation, to promote a more expeditious and less expensive
resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business transaction.
Issue:
WON Consolidation of the two cases is proper.
Ruling:
NO. Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket
are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to
the parties. Toward this end, consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court's docket or
consolidation of issues within those cases are permitted by the rules. The term "consolidation" is used in
three (3) different senses or concepts, thus: a (1)Where all except one of several actions are stayed until
one is tried, in which case the judgment [in one] trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi consolidation) (2)Where several actions are combined into
one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is
illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which
might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation) (3)Where several actions are
ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate
judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to
one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial).
To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is
entitled "Consolidation or Severance." And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides: Section 1.Consolidation. – When
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actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
stating: Sec. 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses. – Charges for offenses founded on the same facts
or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court.
As complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which states: Section
2.Consolidation of Cases. – Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket
number is raffled. The prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22
of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.||| Joint trial is permissible "where the [actions] arise
from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially
on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that
a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the
parties."
More elaborately, joint trial is proper where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are
of the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts,
occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same
manner, or where there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the
same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their prosecution, and
if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on
each trial.
Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit
differently, it exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have
no relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying
the resolution of his case. Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies
against Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be
resolved – a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the criminal case against him.
107 |Page
Tickler:
This case stresses the fact that power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is
merely stalling the proceedings. Bernardo admits that the trial court denied her motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence during the hearing.
Doctrine:
Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court:
Under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after
the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer,
he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or
after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision
based on the evidence for the prosecution.
Case Title:
PAZ T. BERNARDO v. CA
GR No. 119010
Sep 05, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J.
Facts:
Paz T. Bernardo was originally charged with 4 counts of violation of B.P. 22. However, respondent Florlita
Ronquillo Concepcion, executed an Affidavit of Desistance which led to the dismissal of 2 cases thus leaving
only 2 to be disposed.
The prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, after presenting its last witness. After the
prosecution had formally offered its evidence, the accused thru his counsel ask for a resetting, for leave of
court to file demurrer to evidence which was denied by the court and asked him to present his evidence.
However, the counsel was persistent and asked for reconsideration. But the court reminded him that if he
won’t present his evidence, he will be considered to have waived his right to present evidence. The counsel
resorted to filing of demurrer to evidence without leave of court but as mentioned as she intended to make
a written demurrer after extensive research and with proper authorities to support the same, but the Trial
Court considered her to have waived her right to present her evidence.
Bernardo filed Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Trial Court as it committed grave
abuse of discretion in considering her to have waived her right to present evidence after the denial of her
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.
CA’s Decision: “the defense having been considered to have waived her right to present her evidence, this
case is deemed submitted for decision”
Issue:
W/N the denial of the filing of Petition of Demurrer to Evidence by the Trial Court is proper.
108 |Page
Ruling:
YES, because her move was merely “dilatory.” But the ruling of CA is wrong--- directing the trial court to
receive the evidence of the defense after its motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence was denied. It
is contrary to the letter and spirit of Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court.
Under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after
the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer,
he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court,
or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for
decision based on the evidence for the prosecution.
This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the
proceedings. Bernardo admits that the trial court denied her motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence
during the hearing.
In such case, her only right is to adduce evidence in her defense. However, petitioner insisted on filing a
demurrer instead of presenting evidence. Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is
discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior
leave to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied, and the accused still files his demurrer
to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present
evidence.
The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution. If there’s grave abuse (but not present in the instant case) = the trial court’s denial of prior
leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed but maybe elevated to the
appellate court for review.
109 |Page
Tickler:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion when it issued its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 denying his demurrer to
evidence and the subsequent Resolution dated December 17, 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration
in Criminal Case No. 23069.
Doctrine:
The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower
court's order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecution's
evidence and precipitately decide whether or not such evidence has established the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely
abused, thereby amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice.
Case Title:
EDUARDO A. ALARILLA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 136806
Aug 22, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
Facts:
On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting through the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
filed an information with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla with the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, a second information was
filed charging petitioner of having violated section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. These informations were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 23069 and 23070, respectively.
The trial of Criminal Case No. 23069 proceeded. On May 19, 1998, after the prosecution had completed
the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution
had failed to prove that he had committed the crime charged in the information and that the act
complained of took place while he was performing his official functions.
In a resolution dated July 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's demurrer to evidence.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the Sandiganbayan in its December 17, 1998
resolution.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
110 |Page
Ruling:
Petitioner claims that the elements constituting the crime of grave threats have not been proven. He insists
that the prosecution had not established that his act of pointing a gun at complainant Simeon Legaspi, if it
had actually occurred, constituted grave threats. However, quite to the contrary, the Sandiganbayan found
that the prosecution's evidence, standing unrebutted by any opposing evidence, sufficiently established
the crime charged.
The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower
court's order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecution's
evidence and precipitately decide whether or not such evidence has established the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely
abused, thereby amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not
suffice.
For the special civil action of certiorari to lie, it is crucial that there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both
civil law and common law traditions. To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the
alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the
abuse must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive... duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law.
When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy. Rather, the appropriate
recourse from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after
which the accused may file an... appeal from the judgment of the lower court rendered after such trial. In
the present case, we are not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its discretion
when it denied petitioner's demurrer to evidence. Public respondent found... that the prosecution's
evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged. Correspondingly, there is nothing in
the records of this case nor in the pleadings of petitioner that would show otherwise.
111 |Page
Tickler:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 9, 2010, December 14, 2010, and February
14, 2011 in CA-GR. CR No. 32066.
Doctrine:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
more to be adjudicated upon. The term final judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which
disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future
determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet
to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties'
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is
basically provisional in its application.
Case Title:
MA. CORAZON M. OLA v. PEOPLE
GR No. 195547
Dec 02, 2015
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
The instant petition traces its origin to an Information filed with the RTC of Las Pinas charging petitioner
and other 2 persons with the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC. After the trial, the RTC found
petitioner and her co-accused guilty of other forms of swindling under Art. 316 of the RPC. Petitioner and
the other accused appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court praying that she be granted a period of
20 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. She then filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file
Amended Appellant’s Brief. CA denied petitioner’s motion for having been filed out of time. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, but CA denied it. Undeterred, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for [Extension of Time] to File for Vacation for Resolution or Appropriate Pleading. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
112 |Page
Issues:
1. Whether or not the governing law or rule is Rule 10 on amendments of pleading, and not Section
6, both of Rule 6 and 11, in relation to Section 9 of Rule 44 and Section 4 of Rule 124 on matter of
reply, all of the Rules of Court; and
2. Whether or not the liberality rule for amendment of pleadings instead of the general rule on
liberality must be applied in favor of the petitioner
Ruling:
1. It is settled that the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA would depend on whether
the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order.14 If the Order or Resolution issued by the CA is
in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.15Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
more to be adjudicated upon. The term final judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which
disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future
determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet
to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the
parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is
basically provisional in its application.
In the present case, the Court agrees with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that
the assailed Resolutions of the CA are interlocutory orders, as they do not dispose of the case completely
but leave something to be decided upon.19 What has been denied by the CA was a mere motion to amend
petitioner's appeal brief and the appellate court has yet to finally dispose of petitioner's appeal by
determining the main issue of whether or not she is indeed guilty of estafa. As such, petitioner's resort to
the present petition for review on certiorari is erroneous.
Thus, on this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible as the Court finds no cogent reason not to
apply the rule on dismissal of appeals under Section 5,20 Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
2. The CA has correctly ruled that under Section 4, paragraph 2, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court, petitioner
had twenty (20) days from receipt of herein respondent's brief to file a reply brief to discuss matters raised
in respondent's brief which were not covered in her brief. However, as found by the CA, petitioner's
manifestation requesting an additional period to file an appropriate pleading as well as her motion for leave
of court to file an amended appellant's brief was filed seventy-nine (79) days late and, as such, was deemed
"not acceptable or too long to ignore."24
113 |Page
Even if the court were to apply the rule on amendment of pleadings, it is clear under Section 3, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court that after a responsive pleading has been filed, as in the present case, substantial
amendments may be made only by leave of court. Moreover, such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay. In the instant case, the Court finds that the CA did
not commit any error in refusing to grant petitioner's motion to amend her -brief on the ground that the
delay in filing such motion is unjustified.
Finally, it bears to point out that the premise that underlies all appeals is that they are merely rights which
arise from statute; therefore, they must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. 25 It is to this end
that rules governing pleadings and practice before appellate courts were imposed. 26These rules were
designed to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and overall, to enhance the orderly
administration of justice.27 Failing in this respect, the instant petition should be denied.
114 |Page
Tickler:
In this case, petitioner questions the validity of the judgement since the writer of the decision, Judge Lyliha
L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the testimonies; Thus, the court touched upon the requisites
of a valid judgement.
Doctrine:
RULE 120 - JUDGMENT
Section 1. Judgment; definition and form. – Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper
penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts and the law upon which it is based.
Case Title:
LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE
GR No. 174461
Sep 11, 2013
BRION, J.
Facts:
An information was filed against petitioner Leticia Kummer and her son, Johan, a minor, for homicide.
According to the prosecution's evidence, on June 19, 1988 Jesus Mallo, the victim, accompanied by Amiel
Malana went to the house of Kummer. When Kummer opened the door, her son Johan shot Mallo twice.
Kummer denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children were already asleep in
the evening of June 19, 1988.
The prosecution filed an information for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the petitioner and Johan.
Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and
the trial on the merits accordingly followed.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor made some amendment in the date of the complaint that was from July 19,
1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month.
Both RTC and Court of Appeals found both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. Petitioner questioned the sufficiency of prosecution’s evidence. She claimed that she was
not arraigned on the amended information for which she was convicted.
The petitioner also contended that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed to recognize that
the trial court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was not the same court that rendered
the decision.
115 |Page
Issue:
WON petitioner is correct questioning the validity of the judgement claiming the writer of the decision,
Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the testimonies.
Ruling:
It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who heard the case.
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed to recognize that the trial
court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was not the same court that rendered the
decision.
The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely because the judge who
heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity
of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he
can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision.
Thus, the contention - that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one who heard the evidence
and thereby did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses - must fail. It is enough
that the judge, in deciding the case, must base her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way
that appellate courts do when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. Thus, a judgment of
conviction penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records available to her.
116 |Page
Tickler:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which reversed and set aside the Decision dated February 23, 2009
and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in
turn, affirmed the Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
Doctrine:
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not
show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is
not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc.
Case Title:
ARMILYN MORILLO v. PEOPLE
GR No. 198270
Dec 09, 2015
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing
themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio
Construction, purchased construction materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from
petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties
agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery
and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of
which shall be via postdated checks.
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of

P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking their project.
After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn
from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity,
petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo,
Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and
demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured
petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI
Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored because the account from which they were
drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent
and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati
City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.
117 |Page
Issue:
WON there were procedural errors in the petition.
Ruling:
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain
procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides
that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. Thus, as a rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal,
the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the
State.
Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, not under Rule 65, and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic,
the same should be summarily dismissed. The unique and... special circumstances attendant in the instant
petition, however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits and not solely on technical grounds.
First, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent.
Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a
dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by... the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused
to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal. In the
oft-cited People v. Salico, the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal.
Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not
show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does tint decide the case on the
merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is
not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc.
The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for me
dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because
the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch
as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted... before the court of competent jurisdiction;
and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before
a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue
of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court
merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed
within the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show
respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an
118 |Page
acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion.
119 |Page

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(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

G.R. No. 159747

April 13, 2004

1. The Office of Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.

DOJ Panel’s Arguments:

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition

We rule in favor of petitioner.

As the Court held in a case:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.

No. The CA did not commit any reversible error.

Hence, this Petition.

Whether or not the remedy sought by petitioners was proper.

The petition is meritorious.

Doctrine: Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. – Preliminary investigation is an

Probable Cause against Revilla.

Probable Cause against Cambe.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Bureau of Internal Revenue moved for reconsideration, but it was denied.

The Petition must be denied.

MR’s of the petitioner’s Lim was also denied.

Whether or not the arrest was invalid.

WON petitioner is correct.

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Hence, this appeal.

WON the appeal deserves merit.

Elements of the crimes charged were duly established by the prosecution.

Hence, this present petition.

The petition lacks merit.

Issue: WON the appellants’ prayer need be heard.

The petition is granted.

Hence, this petition.

WON petitioner’s right to speedy trial was violated.

The petition does not impress.

Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

The petition is meritorious.

As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed

Thus, this Court has ruled that:

(1) The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the

(2) The court must require the prosecution to present

(3) The court must ask the accused if he desires to

Hence, this automatic appeal.

WON appellant's plea was improvident.

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

Case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The petition is DISMISSED.

WON the verbal order of dismissal was valid.

Whether there was a valid dismissal.

The petition is unmeritorious.

WON petition has merit.

Rule 118 provides the following:

WON stipulation of facts is not slowed in criminal cases.

Hence, this petition.

WON petitioner’s right to speedy trial was violated.

The petition does not impress.

THE REQUISITES IN ORDER FOR A PERSON TO BE DISCHARGED AS A STATE WITNESS

5. Said accused DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE MOSTGUILTY; and