COMPLEX LAW?*
S.D. BALSARA**
♦This article was written by the author before the passing of the Companies (Amend
ment) Act, 1974. By the Amendment Act of 1974, no change has been made in sections
370 and 372—(Ed.)
**B.A., LL. M. (Bom.), LL, M. (Stanford), Professor of Law, Government Law
College, Churchgate, Bombay*
The facts mentioned above would convince any one that inter-corporate
loans and investments are operations which require to be watched and
controlled carefully and closely to prevent malpractices that may shatter
public confidence in corporations and thereby hamper the commercial pros
perity of the country. The question, however, is how much these operations
should be controlled by law and whether our law is needlessly becoming
more and more complex in the matter. In the humble opinion of the author
the Companies (Amendment) Bill, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Amend
ment Bill) complicates the law on the subject still further when it is quite
possible to make it more simple.
1. Government of India, The Second Annual Report on the Working and Administra*
Hon of the Companies Act, 1956, 23-24 (1959).
www.ili.ac.in © The Indian Law Institute
1915] INTER-CORPORATE LOANS AND INVESTMENTS 201
Besides penal liability there is joint and several liability for repayment of
the loan on all the persons who are parties to a lending transaction contrary
to the provisions of section 370 of the Companies Act (section 371).
Clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 370 of the
Companies Act requires the sanction of the central government where the
loans to "all such other bodies corporate...under the same management as
the lending company" exceed thirty per cent of the aggregate of the subscribed
capital of the lending company and its free reserves. Does the expression put
in quotes mean "where none of such other companies are under the same
management" or "where some of such other companies are under the same
management"? Again clause (b) of the second proviso to sub-section (1) of
section 370 lays down the limit of twenty per cent "where all such other
bodies corporate are under the same management as the lending company".
If clause (a) means that the thirty per cent limit applies only where all the
other companies are under the same management, then what is the limit
applicable to cases where some are under the same management and some are
not ? It is unfortunate that even in 1972 Amendment Bill no effort is made
to rectify this ambiguity.
The Second Annual Report on the Working and Administration of the
Companies Act 1956, points out the guideliness followed by the government
in sanctioning loans. It says:
With regard to the lending company, important points, e.g., whether (a)
it has surplus funds to lend, (b) the loan is secured or not, (c) the rate of
interest offered on the loan is reasonable, (d) the loan is for a definite
period and (e) the general financial position of the lending company is
satisfactory are considered. In regard to the borrowing company, points
such as whether the borrowing company is fully solevent and has a good
profit record are investigated before the sanction of the Government
is conveyed to the parties concerned.2
2. W. at 23,
www.ili.ac.in © The Indian Law Institute
202 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LA W INSTITUTE [Vol. 17: 2
Suggestion
It must be considered whether companies, other than purely investment
companies, should at all be allowed to give loans to other companies except
in the usual course of business. Today the banks give about seven per cent in
terest on monies deposited with them and charge about eleven per cent in
terest on monies lent by them on reasonable security. So if two companies
do borrowing and lending directly between themselves instead of through the
medium of a bank they do so for this difference of about four per cent
interest only. For this benefit of four per cent in interest rate, should com
panies be allowed to do direct borrowing and lending business, which more
often than not, leads to malpractices? If a company gets from another com
pany more than eleven per cent interest then the lending company is definitely
running some risk, because no company which is in a sound position would
borrow money at a rate higher than eleven per cent from another company
instead of from a bank from whom the loan is available at eleven per cent. A
company, other than a purely investment company, should not be allowed to
take such risk with shareholders' monies. Lending is a business which requires
expertise; ordinary companies cannot normally be expected to have on their
staff experts who can wisely decide what risk can be taken by the company
with advantage. Under the present law as stated above, the government in
sanctioning loans is required to consider whether the lending company has
sufficient surplus funds, whether the loan is for a definite period, whether the
rate of interest is reasonable, whether the borrowing company is fully solvent,
whether it has a good profit record, etc., etc. Why should the government
take all this trouble when the banks are there to consider all these points for
just a nominal charge?
It is a different matter if two companies are having business transactions
and in the course of business, one gives credit facilities to the other. Here a
reasonable limit may be laid down, say, the giving of credit to the other com
pany to the extent of fifty per cent of the business transaction.
Again, it is a different matter if the lending campany is an investment
company. Under the present law also, sections 370 and 372 of the Companies
Act do not apply to companies established with the object of financing indus
trial enterprise. Such a company can be expected to have the expertise to
decide what risk may be taken by the company with advantage. A distinc
tion, however, should be made between a purely investment company and a
company which has lending businees as one of its objectives, because the law
can otherwise be easily evaded by providing lending as one of the objects of
the company in the memorandum.
The present law may, therefore, be simplified by laying down that no
company, except a purely investment company, otherwise than in the usual
course of business, shall give a loan to other companies exceeding ten per cent
(the limit may be raised to fifteen per cent or so if considered proper) of the
aggregate of the subscribed captial plus free reserves of the lending com
pany*
purposes of this section, any per one-third of the shares (...) in the
son in accordance with whose other (4B I-v), or
directions or instructions the if the directors of the one are
Board of Directors of a com accustomed to act in accordance
pany is accustomed to act shall with the directions or instructions
be deemed to be a director of of the directors of the other or if
the company]. the directors of both the bodies
corporate are accustomed to act
in accordance with the directions
or instructions of any individual,
whether belonging to a group or
not (4B.l-/x).
The additional provisions of
clause 4-B of the Amendment Bill
are:
(vi) If one exercises control over the
other or both are under the con
trol of the same group or any of
the constituents of the same
group4 (4B. 1-i), or
(v/i) if one holds not less than one-
third of the shares (whether equity
or preference or partly equity and
partly preference) in the other or
controls the composition of not
less than one-third of the total
membership of the Board of Direc
tors of the other (4B. l-z/7), or
(viii) if the same body corporate or
bodies corporate belonging to a
group holding not less than one-
third of the shares (whether equity
or preference or partly equity and
partly preference) in one body
corporate also hold not less than
one-third of the shares .... in the
other (4B. 1-vi), or
The criteria laid down by the proposed clause 4B for determining whe
ther the two companies are under the same management can be conveniently
divided under the following three heads :
(A) Direct management.
(B) Control of the Board of Directors.
(C) Holding of shares.
Sub-clauses (1) and (2) of clause 4B of the proposed Amendment Bill
are couched in general terms and their application would be very wide. Again,
sub-clause (3) would mean that if two or more companies under the same
management hold in aggregate one-third share capital in another company,
such other company shall also be deemed under the same management. For
example, if A, B and C companies are under the same management and if
they hold in aggregate one-third share capital of D company, then D com
pany will also be deemed to be under the same management.
By the proposed clause 4B, the scope of inter-connection has been con
siderably enlarged and most companies wiU fall in its net. Its consequences
as regards application of sections 370 and 372 will be far-reaching and dras
tic.
If the holding of the financial institutions is counted with the holdings of
the other companies, for the purposes of considering one-third holding of
the voting power, then very soon almost all of the companies in India would
be under the same management!
Suggestions
(/') The biggest headache under this section is to determine which com
panies are under the same management 1 and which are not under the same
management. Just to enable companies to invest ten per cent more without
the sanction of the central government, a distinction is made between compa
nies under the same management and those not under the same management.
The author is sure that the companies would readily agree to an investment
up to a lower limit, say, twenty-five per cent instead of the present thirty per
cent, if thereby they are not required to decide whether the companies in
which they are investing are to be treated as under the same management.
Whatever may be the advantage of the definition of companies under the same
management in the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, the de
finition is unnecessarily introduced as regards inter-corporate investments.
Nothing would be lost if the distinction between the companies under the
same management and those not under the same management is abolished
and a flat limit of twenty-five per cent on inter-corporate investments is laid
down.
(ii) Further, except in the case of a purely investment company, a limit
of twenty-five per cent of the subscribed capital of the investment company is
quite on the high side and a company will be able to make trade investments,
i.e., investments which are likely to create conditions conducive to the interest
of the investing company as well as to the other company's more economic
working and betterment of production. For example, a sugar company would
like to invest in a company which runs a sugarcane-farm and supplies sugar
cane to it. So investments up to twenty-five per cent should be permitted.
However, a company should not be allowed to invest more than twenty-five
per cent of its subscribed capital in other companies except when the latter
are its subsidiary companies. This exception is there under the persent law
also [section 372, clause 14(d)]. Having regard to the evils of the inter corpo
rate investments, this absolute limit of twenty-five per cent would be
quite fair so that a company may not digress from its main business and frit
ter away shareholders' monies by investing in other companies when the
monies have been given by the shareholders not for the purpose of invest
ments in other companies but for some other purposes. Again, the practical
effect of such a prohibition is not likely to be far-reaching, because as stated
above, during 1956 to 1971, a period of fifteen years, such applications to the
government have been only to the tune of one hundred crores of rupees.
Companies exempted from sections 370 and 372
Sections 370 and 372 of the Companies Act do not apply —
(a) to a banking or an insurance company ;
(b) to a private company, unless it is a subsidiary of a public com
pany ;
(c) to investments and loans made, or guarantee given, by a holding
company, in, or in respect of, its subsidiary;
(d) to a company established with the object of financing industrial enter
prise (in case of investments under section 372, the enterprise must
be in India and the central government must have made to the com
pany a special advance for the purpose or must have guaranteed the
payment of monies borrowed by the company from any institution
outside India).
Suggestions
The way in which exemptions from sections 370 and 372 of the
Companies Act are given to banking and insurance companies gives rise to
some interesting questions. Can a bank or an insurance company give
a loan to company A with full knowledge that the company wishes
to utilise the loan for lending it to company B in violation of sec
tion 370? Or can a bank or an insurance company give guarantee in respect
of a loan given by company A to company B in violation of section 370?
Or can a bank or an insurance company give a loan to company A to
invest in shares of company B in violation of section 372? It seems that a
bank or an insurance company can do ali these things without invoking the
penal consequences. The danger of flouting the sections with impunity may
not be there with regard to insurance companies, because the insurance
business is now fully nationalised, but it is definitely there in the case of
banks many of which are still in the private sector. The desirability of
plugging the loop-holes in these cases so that banks may not assist in violation
of the intentions of legislature may be considered.
Every lending campany and every investing company shall keep regis
ters in which particulars of loans, guarantees and securities shall be entered
within three days and particulars of investments must be entered within seven
days. Such particulars should include the names of all the companies under
ing such intimation, the central government can issue directions regulating
the transfer of such shares. In respect of companies operating in the fields
covered by industries (covered by the Industrial Policy Resolution of the cen
tral febverriment an# enumerated in schedule 13, the central government may
direct the shares to be* transferred to it or a corporation owned or con
trolled by it,
The government alsb proposes to regulate the terms for acquiring the
shares so directed to be transferred. Anv disagreement shall be settled by
the court
The proposed new section 108D, will empower the cemral government
to direct companies not to give effect to any transfer of shares, if as a result
of such transfer, a change in the controlling interest of the concern, prejudicial
to the interests of the company or to public interest, is likely to take place.
The power will extend to a restoration of the status quo ante.
Though the object of the sections may be laudable, the wording of the
sections has generated a lot of criticism; for example from the wording of
section 108B it would appear that the restrictions will operate even in case
of a transfer of one share out of the total holding of ten per cent.
Suggestions
It may be of interest to ftote that this type $f provisions were
considered even when the Companies Act, 1956 was drafted. D.L. Mazum-
dat, Who was intimately connected With the drailirig and early working of
the Companies Act, writes in his interesting book, Towards a PhihSphy of We
Modern Corporation:
The proposal was,* however, dropped for several reasons. First of all,
it was doubted whether su^h proposals would be intra vires the Constitution
(as it then was), unless elaborate and complicated provisions relating to com
pensation were made. Further, action in individual crises would infringe a
citizen's fundamental rigljt to acquire, hold and dispose of property^ To
aypida* charge of discriminatioa in,, particular cases, the general principles
or tests which the administration $Jwd4 follow ir^ arriving at its assessment
in individual cases, would have had to be laid down with sufficient precision.