82.PAGCOR VS. BIR, GR No.

172087, March 15, 2011

FACTS:

PAGCOR was created pursuant to PD 1067-A on January 1, 1977. Simultaneous to its creation, PD 1067-B was issued
exempting PAGCOR from the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of five percent of the gross revenue.
Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, PD 1399 was issued expanding the scope of PAGCOR exemption. Obviously, it is a government
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC).

In 1998, R.A. 8424 or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) became effective. Section 27 thereof provides
that GOCC’s are NOT EXEMPT from paying income taxation but it exempted the following GOCCs:
1. GSIS
2. SSS
3. PHILHEALTH
4. PCSO
5. PAGCOR
But in May 2005, R.A. 9337, a law amending certain provisions of R.A. 8424, was passed. Section 1
thereof excluded PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR was subjected to pay income taxation. In September 2005,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) for R.A. 9337. In the said IRR, it identified
PAGCOR as subject to a 10% value added tax (VAT) upon items covered by Section 108 of the NIRC (Sale of Services and Use or
Lease of Properties).
PAGCOR questions the constitutionality of Section 1 of R.A. 9337 as well as the IRR. PAGCOR avers that the said
provision violates the equal protection clause. PAGCOR argues that it is similarly situated with SSS, GSIS, PCSO, and PHILHEALTH,
hence it should not be excluded from the exemption.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PAGCOR should be subjected to income taxation.

HELD:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional. It was the express intent of Congress to exclude PAGCOR from the exempt
GOCCs hence PAGCOR is now subject to income taxation.
PAGCOR’s contention that the law violated the constitution is not tenable. The equal protection clause provides that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
The general rule is, ALL GOCC’s are subject to income taxation. However, certain classes of GOCC’s may be exempt from
income taxation based on the following requisites for a valid classification under the principle of equal protection:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
When the Supreme Court looked into the records of the deliberations of the lawmakers when R.A. 8424 was being
drafted, the SC found out that PAGCOR’s exemption was not really based on substantial distinctions. In fact, the lawmakers merely
exempted PAGCOR from income taxation upon the request of PAGCOR itself. This was changed however when R.A. 9337 was
passed and now PAGCOR is already subject to income taxation.
Anent the issue of the imposition of the 10% VAT against PAGCOR, the BIR had overstepped its authority. Nowhere in
R.A. 9337 does it state that PAGCOR is subject to VAT. Therefore, that portion of the IRR issued by the BIR is void. In fact, Section
109 of R.A. 9337 expressly exempts PAGCOR from VAT. Further, PAGCOR’s charter exempts it from VAT.
To recapitulate, PAGCOR is subject to income taxation but not to VAT.

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 83.ROMA DRUG VS. RTC OF GUAGUA, April 16, 2009;

In 2000, Roma Drug, owned by Romeo Rodriguez, was raided by the NBI upon request of Smithkline – a
pharmaceutical company (now Glaxo Smithkline). RD is apparently one of 6 pharmacies who were directly importing
5 medicine brands produced by Smithkline from abroad. RD is not purchasing those medicines via local Smithkline –
the authorized distributor of Smithkline in the Philippines. Smithkline Phil. avers that because the medicines were
not purchased from a Philippine registered counterpart of Smithkline then the products imported by RD are
considered as counterfeit or “unregistered imported drug product” – as defined by R.A. No. 8203 or the “Special
Law on Counterfeit Drugs.” Notwithstanding RD’s motion for reconsideration, the provincial prosecutor
recommended that Rodriguez be tried. Rodriguez assails the constitutionality of RA 8203 averring, among other
things, that it has violated his right to equal protection as it banned him access from such medicines.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 8203 violates equal protection.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court denounced R.A. No. 8203 for it violated equal protection. It does not allow private
3rd parties to import such medicines abroad even in cases of life and death nor does it allow the importation by
3rd parties in cases wherein the stocks of such medicine would run out. It discriminates at the expense of Filipinos
who cannot travel abroad to purchase such medicines yet need them badly. Nevertheless, the flawed intention of
Congress had been abrogated by the passage of RA 9502 “Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act
of 2008” and its IRR. This law does not expressly repeal SLCD but it emphasized that any medicine introduced into
the Philippines by its patent holder be accessible to anyone. It provides that the right to import drugs and medicines
shall be available to any government agency OR ANY PRIVATE 3rd PARTY. The SC noted that this law provided and
recognized the constitutionally-guaranteed right of the public to health.

84. PEOPLE VS. VERA

FACTS: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court. He filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial, but they were denied. He elevated to the Supreme Court and the Court
remanded the appeal for new trial. While waiting for new trial, he appealed for probation alleging
that he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The judge of the CFI of Manila directed the
appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera,
upon another request by the petitioner, allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City
Prosecutor countered, saying that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Section 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting the provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to a convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is indicated
that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law, it is unconstitutional
because Section 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Act denies the equal protection of the laws
HELD: The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

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 85.IMELDA MARCOS VS. CA, 278 SCRA 843
FACTS: Imelda Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 960 which banned residents, firms,
associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without permission from the
Central Bank. Several informations were filed against her. During the pendency of the cases, C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B.
Circ. 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically allowed residents, firms,
associations and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving clause
excepting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of C.B. Circ. 960. Marcos filed a Motion to
Quash the informations filed against her based on the new circulars. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA
hence the appeal. Marcos averred that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new
circular was purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her.

She also averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central Bank Act (which allowed the Central Bank to issue
circulars) is an undue delegation of legislative power because the said law allowed the Central Bank to legislate
(define crimes) penal laws and determine penalties therefor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Marcos are correct.

HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The Central Bank Act is the penal law which defined the crimes which
allegedly were committed by Imelda Marcos. The C.B. Circulars concerned merely spelled out the details of the
offense. These circulars are mere administrative regulations and not the penal laws itself alleged to have been
violated by Marcos.

Anent the issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court said “[Marcos’s] lamentations that the aforementioned
provisions are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal
argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as
respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioner’s claim that her
constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such
objection, she may always adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage
therefor, and not at their present posture.”

86.HIMAGAN VS. PEOPLE, October 7, 1994

Facts:

Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar,
Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act
No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for
grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous
trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of
over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives
no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense

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where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension
cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the
trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The
two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the
time from within which the trial should be finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally
or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for
over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be
lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated
within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused
will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case
within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases
where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal
by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

87.PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO, November 11, 1993

section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege
granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge. In 1992,
a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal
service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes).
Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the
judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege. The
Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section
35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.

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HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need
is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be
sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order
to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by
removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking
privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The equal protection clause
does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies
of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the
mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as
where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would
benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is
meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars. In lumping the Judiciary with the other
offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it
should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege.

88.GUMABON VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 37 SCRA 420

Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS:

Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares
and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on
Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954.
Each of the petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a
ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. In People v.
Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with murder,
arson and robbery was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense.
This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served

5
more than the maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom,
and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this
case (WON judicial decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same crime can be applied
retroactively)

RULING:

Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art.
22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the
accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional
right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by
the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

89.PANFILO LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999

On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident
was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at the time of the
“rub out” was then the PNP Chief, among others, as the ones responsible. They were accused of
multiple murder. The case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They aver that the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (par a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975 also known
as “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan,
Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended”.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or
more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking
principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has
the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as
it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in
which Lacson’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby
violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law
may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the
exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage
of RA 8249.

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HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No
concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as
unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law
that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four
elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial
has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started
as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the
power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases,
which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al
cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated
as them.
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public officials and,
under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and
intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”
It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of
the new law (R.A. 8249).

90.BASCO VS. PAGCOR, May 14, 1991

Facts: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it
constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the
Manila Cit government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same
reason, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees.
This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:

1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot
assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been
passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”

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The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and abolish municipal
corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it
can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771
and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be
and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere Local Government.

4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No.
1869.

Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:

“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government.”

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is
always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

91.TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, 281 SCRA 330

Facts:
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding
ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry.
One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that “any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use
the same for his own requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates
on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad
contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries (Petron, Shell and Caltex)

8
and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own
refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude
products and 7% on refined crude products.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 of RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution;

Section 5. Liberalization of Downstream Oil Industry and Tariff Treatment.

b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff shall be imposed and
collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the
rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude
oil Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum
products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.

HELD: The assailed tariff differential is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It is germane
to the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8180 which is to achieve (1) fair prices; and (2) adequate and continuous
supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products. Said adequate and continuous supply of
petroleum products will be achieved if new investors or players are enticed to engage in the business of refining
crude oil in the country. Existing refining companies, are similarly encouraged to put up additional refining
companies. All of this can be made possible in view of the lower tariff duty on imported crude oil than that levied
on imported refined petroleum products. In effect, the lower tariff rates will enable the refiners to recoup their
investments considering that they will be investing billions of pesos in putting up their refineries in the Philippines.
That incidentally the existing refineries will be benefited by the tariff differential does not negate the fact that the
intended effect of the law is really to encourage the construction of new refineries, whether by existing players or
by new players.

Republic Act No. 8180 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade, and unfair competition. The three provisions relied upon by petitioners (Section 5 [b] on tariff
differential; Section 6 on the 40-day minimum inventory requirement; and Section 9 [b] on the prohibited act of
predatory pricing) actually promote, rather than restrain, free trade and competition.

The existence of a tariff differential with regard to imported crude oil and imported finished products is nothing
new or novel. In fact, prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 8180, there existed a 10% tariff differential resulting
from the imposition of a 20% tariff rate on imported finished petroleum products and 10% on imported crude oil
(based on Executive Order No. 115). Significantly, Section 5 (b) of the assailed law effectively lowered the tariff
rates from 20% to 7% for imported refined petroleum products, and 10% to 3% for imported crude oil, or a
reduction of the differential from 10% to 4%. This provision is certainly favorable to all in the downstream oil
industry, whether they be existing or new players. It thus follows that the 4% tariff differential aims to ensure the
stable supply of petroleum products by encouraging new entrants to put up oil refineries in the Philippines and to
discourage fly-by-night importers.

92.TAXICAB OPERATORS vs. BOT, September 30,1982

FACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that
the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation
(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxi units which are over six
yeard old. Pursuant to OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted
for registration as public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao
and Ace Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary

9
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT
and Memorandum Circular of the BLT.

ISSUES: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process;
and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.

HELD: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were
deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not
availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide
range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or
program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position
papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the
options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it
is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it
can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption.
A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The
span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time
taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also
generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering
that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift.
With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has
been met.

On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely
towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the traffic conditions
are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It
can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights.
In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to
other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does
not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or
similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform
operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded
the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars
satisfy the foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and
undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed.

10
93.BAUTISTA VS. JUINI0,127 SCRA 329
FACTS:
Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles
into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and
holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down
petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be
discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum
consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption.
Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars
may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed
on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them
fall within such category.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.

HELD:
The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification
on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for
the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage.
Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given
things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . .
To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental
act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by
the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It
suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
on the rest.

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 94.DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
Facts:
Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner
Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution
which provides that “Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment
of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired.”

Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, paragraph 2,
which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of
the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of
conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact.

Issue:
Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be
declared null and void

Held:
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class
can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified
differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in
the workplace.
In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional
provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified
from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil
or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom
charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is
virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto,
which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the
sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).”

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable
portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 which can stand by itself.

12
Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid and that
portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and
void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused

95.VILLEGAS VS. HIU, 86 SCRA 270

FACTS:
The case is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of Judge Francisco Arca which declared
a city ordinance of Manila null and void. The ordinance made it unlawful for any person not a citizen of
the Philippines to be employed in Manila without getting first the employment permit from the mayor.
Violating the ordinance imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than 3 months to 6 months or a
fine not less than 100 but not more than 200 pesos. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho claimd that the ordinance is
null and void because it is discriminatory and violative of the rule of taxation and it violates due process
and equal protection clauses of the constitution. The judge declared the ordinance as null and void.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the ordinance violate the equal protection clauses of the constitution

HELD:
The ordinance violates due process and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a
person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse to give it is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in
a means of livelihood. The Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory once an
alien is admitted however he cannot be deprived of life without due process. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all person both aliens and citizens.

96.CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

FACTS:

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which
effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized
(those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in
provincial elections. Cities not entitled to participate in the election of pro- provincial officials

1. Baguio 11. Mandaue

2. Bais 12. Manila

3. Canlaon 13. Naga

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 4. Caloocan 14. Ormoc

5. Cebu 15. Oroquieta

6. Cotabato 16. Ozamis

7. Dagupan 17. Pasay

8. Davao 18. Quezon

9. General Santo 19. San Carlos (Pangasinan)

10. Iloilo 20. Zamboanga

. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city not a chartered one or a highly urbanized
one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections,
Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed)
questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners
claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96
of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically
known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-
third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the
province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza
likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized
as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and
palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause
HELD:
None, The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that "The state shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities." 4 To this end, the Constitution directs the National Assembly to "enact a local
government code which may not thereafter be amended except by the majority vote of all its members,
defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall,
allocating among the different local governments their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of local government
units," 5 and empowered local government units "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
subject to limitations as may be provided by law." 6 Art. XI, Section 4(1) of the said Constitution places
highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory power of the province where they are geographically
located. This is as it should be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly urbanized city due
to a bigger population and greater economic activity which require greater autonomy.

14
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular
annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is
capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It
would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its
independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the
continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in
the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since
the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without
merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying
the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges
granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the
statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while
granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the same city.

Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage since the Constitution
confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province where the city is
located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the
questioned statues neither withdraw nor restrict.

97.United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 38

FACTS: In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments
were to be placed to a plebiscite for the people’s approval. The YES vote was being advanced
by KBL – Marcos’ Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity
and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be
equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides.
On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to
11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations
nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same
opportunity as Marcos has pursuant to Res’ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand.
UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial
of their request.
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded
equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-
pulong’ or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as
President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under
the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program
of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the
head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does
not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed.
The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the
SC cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not

15
party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at
their own expense.
98.NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433(Read also the dissenting
opinion of Justice Makasiar
Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD
1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of
the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims
that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to equal protection, because –
appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and
trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal
as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the
CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of
a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged
with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a
special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973,
when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive
to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth
met the standard requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions
in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices – a showing that
decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.
99. SISON VS. ANCHETA, 130 SCRA 654
A suit for Declaratory relief or prohibition proceeding of the batas pambansa 132 section 1, the assailed provision
further amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on
citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other
winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and
from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable
partnership, (f) adjusted gross income. Petitioner as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, "he would be unduly
discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his
profession vis-a-visthose which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He allege that
secion 21 created a class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. Sison allege that it denies due process,
equal protection clause, and violatition of the uniformity rule in taxation.

Issue: won violation of eqaul protection clause

16
Ruling:

No, the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumtances which if
not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest." That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures. The equal protection clause is, of course,
inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal of the laws benefits being available to all and the affairs
of men being governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law.

"Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be
taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation, ... . As clarified by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained of "conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is
therefore uniform." There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is
that the tax "applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.".

100. CITIZENS SURETY VS. PUNO, 119 SCRA 216

FACTS: In 1956, Resolution 542 was passed by the Register of Deeds Manila which provided that
only Filipino laborers whose wages do not exceed P180.00/month or P6.00/day and at the same
time residents of Manila may be allowed to purchase lands in Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila. On 10
Oct 1966, Maria Barcelon mortgaged her 180 sq. m. land located in Barrio Obrero to (CSICI) Citizen’s
Surety and Insurance CO., Inc. CSICI foreclosed the property due to nonpayment and later bought
the land. CSICI later sought to register and consolidate the land before the Register of Deeds but
then Justice Puno denied the request pursuant to Resolution 542 as CSICI does not meet the
qualification.

CSICI averred that Resolution 542 is null and void. It averred: “As may be seen from Sec. 4 of
Res. 542, only laborers earning not more than P180.00 a month, or P5.00 a day are qualified to buy
Lands in Barrio Obrero. Employees working in offices or establishments and earning as much but who
are not laborers cannot buy lands in that area. Also persons who are engaged in some calling or
occupation earning as much are not also qualified. It should not be overlooked that the intention of
the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila contained in Sections 97, 98 and 100 of
said Charter is to help the poor people of Manila to acquire residential lands on easy terms.” CSICI
points out that there is no substantial difference between these laborers to those mentioned in the
Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution 542 violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled against CSICI. CSICI, which is a corporation and not a lowly paid worker, is not
competent to raise this claim. For even if the SC sustain it, no benefit can accrue to CSICI who will
nonetheless be disqualified to acquire the lot. Moreover, in the absence of manifest abuse of power,
the SC not vent to substitute their judgment for that of the City of Manila which is tasked by its Charter
“to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms
to residents, giving first priority to the bona-fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second
priority to laborers and low-salaried employees.” Obviously, the questioned resolution merely seeks
to implement the Charter provision.

17
 101. PERALTA VS. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30
FACTS: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections.
He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and
155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for
individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to
elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the
space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block
ballot). Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this
provision of the Constitution: “Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.” He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other
independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is
not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection
question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in the
Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his
ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an
advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate
who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article
IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.

HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will
be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether
he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for
the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel
him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly,
before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing
to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an
official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other
words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully
weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the
application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his
discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.

102. ORMOC SUGAR CO. VS. ORMOC CITY, 22 SCRA 603

FACTS:

In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: “There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States
of America and other foreign countries.” Though referred to as a “production tax”, the imposition

18
actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar
produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is
violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: “It shall not be in the
power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise
carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export
tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or
otherwise, shall be void.” And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out
Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC
had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs
to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative
of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax.
As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
103. FLORES vs. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484
Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest
number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra,
and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his
election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one
vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and
installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from
the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The
judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or
initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the
petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner
was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.

The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no
power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the
RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions

19
of fact shall be final and non-appealable”. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted
for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election
contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section
9 of R.A. No. 6679?

Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant
ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall
“Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or
Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election
contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-
quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have
been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act
No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a
barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.

CHAPTER IV : THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

Read:

Sections 18, 19 and 26 of RA No. 9372, the Human Security Act or the Anti-Terrorism Law

Requisites of a valid search warrant

104. UY VS. BIR, 344 SCRA 36
Facts:

On September 30, 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of Unifish Packaging Corporation (UPC)
reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy, manager of
UPC, were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). On
October 1, 1993, the BIR requested and successfully secured, before the RTC of Cebu, a search warrant.
On the same day, a second warrant was issued with contents almost identical to that of the first warrant
but consisted of only one page. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Section 253.
A third warrant, however, was issued on that same day for Uy’s alleged violation of Section 238 in relation
to Section 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the
PNP searched the premises of the UPC on October 2, 1993. They seized the items as listed on the said
warrant. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. Uy and UPC filed a motion
to quash the warrants before the RTC. Said motion was denied. A petition for certiorari filed before the
Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed as it is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:

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Whether the search warrant issued was valid.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It sustained the validity of the search warrant and
comprehensively discussed each and every defect alleged by petitioners. A search warrant must conform
strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions. One of which is that, the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
Although it noted inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated on said
warrants, the Court ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officers
enforcing the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. It was not established that the enforcing officers had
any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation, hence, inconsistency in identifying the
city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this
case. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched—one warrant was directed only
against Uy while the other was against Uy and UPC. The Court, however, ruled that where the warrant
was issued not for search of the persons occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises
occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of
the owner or occupants of the premises, because of the inconsistencies in stating their name.
Furthermore, the Court said that where the apparent intent in issuing another warrant was to supersede
an earlier warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former. Also the thing to be seized was
not clearly defined by the judge as she used generic terms. As a rule, the use of a generic term or a generic
description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is
unavailable. But where, however, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must rather
be general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean no warrant could
issue. As regards the terms “unregistered delivery receipts” and unregistered purchase and sales
invoices”, the Solicitor General correctly argued that these documents need not be specified as it is not
possible to do so precisely because they are unregistered. Lastly, general description of most of the
documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant void— the search warrant is
severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant. Hence, insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of“ unregistered delivery
receipts” and “unregistered purchase and sales invoices”, the warrants remain valid.

To be issued by a "judge". May an MTC Judge issue a search warrant in connection with crimes within
the jurisdiction of the RTC?

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 b. Read:

105. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE EDMAR CASTILLO. JR. G.R. No. 204419, November 7,
2016

FACTS:
This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court dated November
12, 2012 of petitioner People of the Philippines as represented by Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to reverse and set aside the Regional Trial Court's
(RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint Resolution1 dated May 14, 2012 quashing Search
Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually
dismissing Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.
a search was conducted by elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing residue of
suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent Rabino
located in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, the test gave
positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.3chanrobleslaw

Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent Rabino for
violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which reads as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri, [P]rovince of Cagayan, and
within, the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal
authority thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession
and under his control and custody one (1) big zip-lock transparent plastic sachet containing two
(2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, one sachet with
traces of said substance gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, commonly known as Shabu, a dangerous drag, while the other sachet gave negative
results to said tests, the said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any
person to possess or use any dangerous drug regardless of the quality of the purity thereof, unless
authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri,
Cagayan, presided by respondent Judge Castillo.
Arguments raised by petitioner are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by respondent Judge
Castillo with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or is patently

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erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the
authority to issue Search Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned to search and seize the shabu stated
therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within the same second judicial region in violation of
R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the fact that the power to hear and try the offense is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched; No
compelling reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant
HELD:
Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search
warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the
affirmative.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oatn or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.22 Necessarily,
a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant,
such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the
search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant.23chanrobleslaw

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search wan-ant and eventually dismissed
the case based merely on the fact that the seerch warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran,
Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an
offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. It is therefore safe to presume that the
other grounds raised by the private respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By
that alone, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on
a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for
as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when
any of its elements are found to be wanting.

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It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search
warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any
court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in
another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search
warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may
issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed,
provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present

a. The place to be searched in the warrant is controlling

106. PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400
FACTS:
On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before
RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and
explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte Bulacan.
The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr.
Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail
Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their
personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-
shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which
private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular
apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

RULING:
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds
as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the
same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the
warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been
done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in
the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the
warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated
in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

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 The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support
of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires
inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place
to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to
abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description
of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself;
it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
b. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informer's tip.

107. PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626

In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant
named “Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be
back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the
evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the
informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling
bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta
was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

Issue: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.

Resolution:

The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to
technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor
had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as
the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the
evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor
tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and
warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless
search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully
arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent
search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles
seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree”
and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

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*note: Warrantless search is not valid because the police have no personal knowledge that accused was
committing a crime

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