TC- 015

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2018

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

IN THE MATTER OF-

MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI AND ORS.

v.

UNION OF INDICA

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE RESPONDENT

MMMEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ......................................................................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................................... 7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................................................... 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................................... 10
ARGUMENT ADVANCED ................................................................................................................. 12
I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER THE ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE
THE HON‘BLE SUPREME COURT? ................................................................................................... 12

1. THE PETITIONERS DOES NOT HAVE A LOCUS STANDI .......................................................... 12

II. WHETHER LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT AND
THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY? .................................................................................................................................... 13
1. THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT IS NOT
ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY. ................................................... 13
2. THE AMENDMENT MADE TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS NOT ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONCEPT OF EQUALITY? ........................................................................................................... 16
III. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN
PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS
MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN THEY BE CHALLENGED
ON THIS GROUND? .......................................................................................................................... 17

1. THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT DOES NOT
SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES? ................................................................... 17

2. THE AMENDMENT MADE TO ARTICLE 19(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA DOES NOT
SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES....................................................................... 18

IV. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION? .............................................................................................. 19

1. BASIC STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION. ................................................................................ 19

2. THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION? ......................................................................................................................... 20
V. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014 EXTENDS
TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI? ........................................................................................................ 21

1. WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014 ....................................................................... 21

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2. MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR GETTING PROTECTION UNDER THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT, 2014 ................................................................................ 22
VI. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES THE MOTIVE OF
ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS? ...................................... 23

1. THE GROUNDS FOR STRIKING DOWN A LAW......................................................................... 23

2. THE GROUNDS OF LAW SERVING FOREIGN POWER AND COMMUNAL POLITICS IS NOT
VALID GROUND TO STRIKE DOWN ANY LAW. .............................................................................. 25

VII. WHETHER 33% RESERVATION IS VIOLATIVE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO

CHOOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE AND THE RIGHT TO CONTESTS ELECTIONS? ............................... 26

PRAYER.......................................................................................................................................... 27

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR………………………………………………………… All India Reporter

Art. …………………………………………………………………….Article
&………………………………………………………………………… And
Anr…………………………………………………………………… Another
Bom………………………………………………………………….. Bombay
Del. ……………………………………………………………………...Delhi
Ed…………………………………………………………………….. Edition
Govt…………………………………………………………….. Government
Jt………………………………………………………………………..Joint
Ltd. ………………………………………………………………….Limited
Ors…………………………………………………………………… Others
¶…………………………………………………………………. Paragraph
Sec……………………………………………………,……………. Section
SC……………………………………………………,……. Supreme Court
SCC ………………………………………………….Supreme Court Cases
i.e.…………………………………………………………………….. that is
U.P…………………………………………………………….Uttar Pradesh
v……………………………………………………………………... versus
vol…………………………………………………………………. Volume

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Sr. No. Title Citation Appears on

Pg(s).
1. A.K. Roy v. Union of India &Ors AIR 1980 SC 710 25
2. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi AIR 1981 SC 487 13
3. Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh AIR 1981 SC 298 26
v. Union of India
4. Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India Civil Writ Petition No. 20
and Ors. 265 of 2006 (Supreme
Court 10/04/2008)
5. D.A.V College Etc v. State Of Punjab and AIR 1971 SC 1737 12
Ors.
6. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643 19 19
7. I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N AIR 2007 SC 861 21, 24
8. Independent Thought v. Union Of India Civil Writ Petition No. 15
382 of 2013 (Supreme
Court 11/10/2017)
9. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477 16
10. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 20, 24
11. Lok Prahari Through Its General Civil Writ Petition 12
Secretary v. Union Of India No..864 OF 2016
(Supreme Court
07/05/2018)
12. Narender Singh Ahlawat v. Arvind Application No. 22
Kaushal 060/00177/2015
(Central Administrative
Tribunal 31/05/2016)
13. P.M.A Metropolitan v. Moran Mar AIR 1995 SC 2001 18
Marthoma and anr.
14. Rajbala and others v. State of Haryana (2016) 1 SCC 463 13
15. Rajesh Kagra & Ors. v. State Of M.P. Special Leave 12
Petition(C) No. 3009 of
2009 (Supreme Court
17/09/2010)
16. Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13
274 OF 2016 (Supreme
Court 08/02/2016)
17. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918 18
18. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845 19
19. Samrat Sharma Roorkie v. PIO Hemwati 21
Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University CIC/RM/A/2014/00244

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Srinagar 8-SA
20. Shankari Prasad Singh v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 458 19
21. Shrikrishna Eknath Godbole v. The Public Interest 15
Union of India and Ors Litigation No. 166 OF
2016 (High Court of
Judicature at Bombay
21/10/2016)
22. State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh AIR 2012 SC 1040 23
23. Supreme Court Advocates-on-record (2016) 5 SCC 1 20
Association. v. Union of India
24. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan Civil Appeal No. 8161- 25
8164 of 2003 (Supreme
Court 07/10/2003)

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

It is most humbly submitted that the Respondent has appeared before this Hon’ble Court in
response to the notice sent to the Respondent with regard to writ petition filed by the
Petitioners under Article 321of the Constitution of Indica.

1
Article 32 in The Constitution Of India, 1950-
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may
by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 ).
(4) The right guaranteed by this Article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Indica is a multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-cultural and secular country which

exhibits to the world the principle of "Unity in Diversity." Modern Indica took
inspiration from the west and inducted democratic setup in its governance through
its Constitution. Fundamental ideology of its Constitution is "equality among all" in
general, and "equality among equals" in particular and the country also believes in the
principle of “equality of gender”.
2. Indica has been a male-dominated State since ancient times and patriarchy is an age-old
practice. It is a system of society and government in which men hold the power and
women are largely excluded from it. However, with the passage of time, women of
Indica have become aware of their rights and liberties, and sporadically, voices
are raised by the women bodies and organizations laying emphasis on equal and
greater participation of women in the governance of the country, both at federal and
provincial levels. According to the statistics the representation of women was very low in
the parliament as compared to men.
3. Following this low representation a demand was made to reserve seats for women in the
parliament to increase representation and for empowering the women. Prior to the year
1996 one major party namely “Wrongrace Party” was in power and the demand for
reserving seats for women in the parliament was presented before them but the party
showed no interest in the matter. Back in the year 1992 a Constitutional amendment was
introduced in the parliament which reserved seats for women in the Municipalities and
Panchayats in all the states of Indica, this further strengthened the demand for reservation
in the parliament.
4. The demand for 33% reservation to women was strongly opposed by the members of the
minority community because according to them men and women can never be equal. And
it shall be against their religious beliefs to make women equal to men, people belonging to
the majority community too agreed with them.
5. In the year 2005, the “Rashtriya Janta Party”, came to power and formed government. The
demand for 33% reservation for women was also laid before them and after giving due
consideration to various facts, in the year 2006, they decided to pass it, and hence, the law
prescribing 33% reservation for women in both Houses of the Parliament was passed
which received the assent of the President on 1st July 2006.

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6. By the year 2015, as a result of such law, women representation in both Houses of the
Parliament got tremendously increased, further in 2015,the Parliament, by a constitutional
amendment, to empower the women to express themselves and their opinions freely,
inserted a proviso to Article 19(2) of the Constitution which reads “Provided that in case
of women, reasonable restrictions can only be imposed on the grounds of immorality,
public order and friendly relations with foreign states.”
7. Some male members could not bear this interference in politics by women which used to
be dominated by men, and they regarded it anti-religious and violation of the concept of
equality enshrined under the Constitution and as a result of this one Mr. R.M Swain filed a
P.I.L in the Dehri High Court to declare the reservation unconstitutional.
8. In the winter session of the Parliament in the year 2017 a member of the lower house Mrs.
Fatima Ghansari brought a motion in the lower house for repealing the law providing
reservation to women contending that it was used for ulterior motives of the party but the
motion was refused. So, in the summer session of the Parliament in the year 2018 she
again presented the motion but was again refused. Later on she received an anonymous
call which threatened her against continuing with her demands about which she informed
the speaker of the lower house who immediately provided her with security, but
dissatisfied with the fact that her motion was rejected Mrs. Fatima filed a petition in the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica asking for the reservation law to be declared
unconstitutional and she also prayed that she shall be awarded protection under the
“Whistleblower Protection Act, 2014”.
9. On 28th February 2018, Mrs. Garima Dhall, Mrs. Yamini Paul and Mrs. Mannat Raichandani
who belonged to the class of women who were in favour of reservation and worked for it were
arrested by the intelligence agency allegedly on the grounds of spying for enemy country.
Following this the MP’s of “Wrongrace Party” presented a motion in parliament for repealing
the law for reservation, claiming that it serves a foreign power but their motion was refused so
aggrieved by it they filed PIL in the Supreme Court alleging the same and asked the Court to
declare the law unconstitutional.
10. The “Rashtriya Janta Party” has opposed all the allegations and has emphasized on the fact
that the law providing reservation is Constitutional and that the Petitioners want to drag Indica
backward by filing frivolous petitions.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER THE ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE

BEFORE THE HON‘BLE SUPREME COURT?
II. WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE
PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?
III. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN
PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR
RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN
THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?
IV. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?
V. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014
EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?
VI. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES THE
MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF COMMUNAL
POLITICS?
VII. WHETHER 33% RESERVATION TO THE WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT IS VIOLATIVE OF
DEMOCRATIC RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER THE ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE
BEFORE THE HON‘BLE SUPREME COURT?
The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that the petition filed
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not maintainable on the grounds that there has been no
breach of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Indica and further no
alternate remedy has been opted by the Petitioners and hence the present petition is just an
attempt to tarnish the image of government and stop the government from enacting laws
which empower women of the country.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE
PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE
OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that the law providing
33% reservation to women and the amendment to Article 19(2) is in not arbitrary and
violative of the concept of Equality. In the present case it is the need of the hour to empower
women which can only be achieved when the women are included in the policy making of the
country actively, and this active involvement can only be achieved by way of enforcing a law
providing reservation and reservation helps bring unequal on equal ground as is not
violative of the concept of equality.

ISSUE 3. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN

IN PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR
RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN
THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THE GROUNDS?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that the law providing
33% reservation to women and the amendment to Art. 19(2) do not smack of some ulterior
religious motive. The main intention of the legislature for framing the law was to give just
and equitable rights to women and bring women to an equal stage as men by giving them
some liberty. There was no religious motives involved behind passing of the legislation.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES THE

BASIC STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION?

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The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that the amendment to Art.
19(2) are not violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. The basic structure of the
constitution means the basic fundamental rights which are guaranteed under the Constitution
which must not be revoked or damaged under any circumstance. The Constitution
empowered the legislature to make special provision for the upliftment of the backward and
the dominated class. The amendment to Art. 19(2) just widen the scope of freedom that
women can exercise and does not encroach upon the fundamental rights of others. .

ISSUE 5: WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE “WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION ACT,

2014” EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that Mrs. Fatima
Ghansari cannot be regarded as a whistle blower and be granted immunity and protection
under the “Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2014”, as her allegation do not have a credible
ground and was just intend to humiliate the government on grounds of religious affiliation.

ISSUE 6: WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON THE GROUND THAT IT SERVES
THE MOTIVE OF ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF COMMUNAL
POLITICS?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most humbly submits that a law cannot be struck
down on the ground that it serves the motive of any foreign power because in order to
maintain peaceful international relation certain provisions need to be made in favor of a
foreign power so as to help develop international trade and also secure international borders
from any kind of hindrance and interference

ISSUE 7: WHETHER 33% RESERVATION IS VIOLATIVE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHT OF PEOPLE

TO CHOOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most humbly submits that the right to choose
representative is guaranteed under the Constitution and any kind of reservation aimed at
uplifting a Section of society in the elections is in no way violative of the same, as it ensures
that more and more participation from all the spheres of society is achieved and as a result a
harmonious society and nation can be built whereby every individual is represented fairly
and equitable demands are made.

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ARGUMENT ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER THE ARTICLE 32 IS MAINTAINABLE

BEFORE THE HON‘BLE SUPREME COURT?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that the present
petition is not maintainable under Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indica, as there has been
no violation of any of the Fundamental Rights of the Petitioners.

1. THE PETITIONERS DOES NOT HAVE A LOCUS STANDI

The Counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, The
Respondent’s sole motive behind passing the legislation and the purpose of the law was
simply to help the downtrodden section of the society and give them the appropriate
position that they deserve. In the case of D.A.V College Etc v. State Of Punjab and Ors.
AIR 19712 the Court has held that “in a petition under Article 32 this Court cannot go into
the question of legislative competence if the law that is impugned does not in any way
affect the fundamental rights of the Petitioners.”

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most humbly submits that the literal
interpretation of the term “Locus Standi” refers to the right to bring an action or to be
heard in a given forum. An essential character of a writ under Art. 32 are that the
Petitioner must have a locus standi. It has been held in the case of Rajesh Kagra & Ors v.
State Of M.P (2010)3 that if the rights of the petitioner are not affected they do not have a
locus standi in the court. In the present petition the Petitioners are the members of the
opposition party and have initiated the proceedings just to malign the ruling party and gain
political advantage and have not filed the petition with actual genuine consent with no
personal motive4 and hence cannot be allowed to proceed with the following petition.

2
D.A.V College Etc v. State Of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1737
3
Rajesh Kagra & Ors. v. State Of M.P., Special Leave Petition(C) No. 3009 of 2009 (Supreme Court,
17/09/2010)
4
Lok Prahari, Through Its General Secretary v. Union Of India, Civil Writ Petition No..864 OF 2016 (Supreme
Court, 07/05/2018)

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II. WHETHER LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN THE PARLIAMENT
AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) ARE ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE

CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, the law providing
for 33% reservation for women in Parliament and the Amendment to Article 19(2) of the
constitution is not arbitrary and violative of the concept of equality. A two Judge Bench of
the Supreme Court in Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2016 5 observed that
“Women in this world, and particularly in India, face various kinds of gender disabilities
and discrimination, and Women empowerment is the need of the hour” therefore the
present law was made for this very purpose.

1. THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT IS NOT

ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY.

The Counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, the law
providing for 33% reservation for women in the Parliament is made for the purpose of
promoting equality among the citizens of the state Indica and hence is not at all violative
of the concept of equality or arbitrary in nature.

The Counsel on behalf of Respondent submits that Article 14 essentially embodied a

guarantee against ‘arbitrariness’ and therefore, the test of ‘reasonable classification’ was
itself informed by the doctrine of ‘arbitrariness’. In this sense, ‘arbitrariness’ was not a
new test at all but in fact the principle underlying the evolution of doctrinal tools and
judicial standards for determination of the negation of the right to equality guaranteed
under article 14 of the Constitution.6Further being arbitrary is not a ground for a law to
be held as unconstitutional.

In the case of Rajbala & others v. State of Haryana (2016)7 it was held that “the courts in
this country do not undertake the task of declaring a piece of legislation unconstitutional
on the ground that the legislation is “arbitrary” since such an exercise implies a value

5
Richa Mishra v. State of Chhattisgarh, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 274 OF 2016 (Supreme Court, 08/02/2016)
6
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487
7
Rajbala and others v. State of Haryana, (2016) 1 SCC 463

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judgment and courts do not examine the wisdom of legislative choices unless the
legislation is otherwise violative of some specific provision of the Constitution.”

The Respondent submits that, the present law providing for 33% reservation for women in
parliament and amendment to article 19(2) of the Constitution is not arbitrary on the
grounds that it is reasonable and was in question since very long time and after the
Respondent came into power they passed this act with the intention to promote women
empowerment.

1.1. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14

The Respondent humbly submits that, Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which reads as
follows that "the State shall not deny to any person equality before law or the Equal
Protection of the Law within the territory of India ". However, this is not an absolute rule
and there are a number of exceptions to it. Though there it declares it constitutionally
absolute, there arises certain immunity to certain individuals. For example, foreign
Diplomats enjoy immunity from the Countries Judicial process. Even Article 3618 of the
Constitution extends immunity to the President of India and Governors of the States,
Public Officers and Judges. Some special groups and interests like Trade Unions have
been accorded special privileges by law.

In the case of Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B Vijayakumar, A.I.R. 19959. The court
while addressing the difficulties in the backward section stated that "Reservation,
therefore, is one of the constitutionally recognized methods of overcoming this type of
backwardness. Such reservation is permissible under Article 15(3)."

The Respondent submits that, the equal participation of women and men in public life is
one of the cornerstones of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly in 1979, and in force since 1981. Indica is a signatory to the Convention.
Despite that, discrimination in matters of representation of women in decision-making
bodies continues. The Respondent submits that in the present case the Law providing for

8
Art. 361, the Constitution of Indica: Protection of President and Governors and Rajpramukhs.
9
Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B Vijayakumar, AIR 1995 SC 1648

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33% reservation is a step towards making the women equal to women and altogether
developing the State of Indica. Hence the present law is not violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.

1.2. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 15

The Counsel on behalf of the Respondent most humbly submits that, Article 1510 of the
Constitution which speaks about prohibition of discrimination and under Article 15 (3) of
the Constitution, any special provision may be made for women and children belonging to
all social groups transcending caste, religion etc., for their advancement and welfare in all
fields. In the present case the same has been done due to which tremendous growth of
women in the Parliament has been observed.

In the case of Shrikrishna Eknath Godbole v. The Union of India and Ors. AIR 201611,
the bench noted, “According to us, Section which makes special provision for women, is
clearly a provision relatable to Article 15 (3) of the Constitution that reads, “Nothing in
this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and
children’ and there is no reason to declare the same as unconstitutional.”

In the case of Independent Thought v. Union Of India (2017) it was held that “Article
15(3) was intended to discriminate in favour of women and children – a form of
affirmative action to their advantage”12. In the present case the present law was made in
favor of women so that they can also become equal to men and be a part of all the policy
decisions made by the legislature.

10
Art. 15: the Constitution of Indica: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or
place of birth
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of
birth or any of them
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to
any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of
State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause ( 2 ) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
11
Shrikrishna Eknath Godbole v. The Union of India and Ors, Public Interest Litigation No. 166 OF 2016 (High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, 21/10/2016)
12
Independent Thought v. Union Of India, Civil Writ Petition No. 382 of 2013 (Supreme Court, 11/10/2017)

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1.3. VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 16

The Respondent submits that, Right to Equality is one of the basic fundamental rights that
the constitution of India guarantees to all the citizens of the country. Article 16 deals with
the equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and 16(4)13, give privileges to
the backward group.

In the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 199314 (the Mandal case)it was
held that, clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to the rest of that article, but rather it
is a facet of equality of opportunity guaranteed in clause (1) of that article and an effective
method of realizing and implementing it. In the present case no such violation of Article
16 has been done.

The Respondent further submits that, the combined effort of Article 14 and 15 is not that
the state cannot pass unequal laws but if it does pass unequal laws, the inequality must be
based on some reasonable ground and that due to Art. 15(1), i.e., religion, race, caste, sex
or place of birth cannot be grounds for justice but only the actual economic position of the
family or the individual if no one is there to support oneself, shall be the correct and just
for the reservation system. Hence in the present case the reservation which is being
provided to women is beneficiary and helpful to the society at large and hence should not
be out in question.

2. THE AMENDMENT MADE TO ARTICLE 19(2) IS NOT ARBITRARY AND VIOLATIVE OF

THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY?

The Counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, the amendment
made to Article 19(2) of the Constitution of Indica which reads as “Provided in case of
women, reasonable restrictions can only be imposed on the grounds of immorality, public
order, and friendly relations with foreign states” is not arbitrary and violative of the
concept of equality.

13
Art 16(4), the Constitution of Indica: “Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment” Nothing in
this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in
favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the
services under the State.
14
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India , AIR 1993 SC 477

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The Respondent submits that, in 1992 parliament amended and reserved 33% seats
exclusively for women in Municipalities and Panchayats in all state of Indica. And further
the same was demanded in the parliament but due to lack of the majority seats it was not
passed. But in 2005 the Respondent through absolute majority passed this present law and
further made the amendment only and only for the benefit of the women of the state of
Indica hence not arbitrary in nature.

Under Article 15 (3), the State is thereby empowered to make “special provisions”,
legislative or otherwise, to secure women's socio-political advancement. In the present
case the Legislation have exercised their power under Article 15(3) of the Constitution and
made law for the upliftment of the women in the socio-political society. The Respondent
further submits that, women in our country totally lack political awareness and
experiences. Even educated and elite women from political background do not know
anything about running administration. They need training and experience. They have
always been used as rubber stamps from generations. At least taking this as an
opportunity they will get some experience and the next generation will be better equipped
with the necessary skills.

III. WHETHER LEGISLATING THE LAW PROVIDING 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN

PARLIAMENT AND THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR

RELIGIOUS MOTIVES, AND IF SO, DO THEY VIOLATE SECULAR PRINCIPLES AND CAN

THEY BE CHALLENGED ON THIS GROUND?

The counsel on behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that the law providing
33% reservation to women in Parliament and the amendment to Article 19(2) neither
smacks of some ulterior religious motives nor violate the secular principles of the country.

1. THE LAW PROVIDING FOR 33% RESERVATION TO WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT DOES

NOT SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES?

The counsel on behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that Indica is a pluralistic
society and a country of religions. Religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious
groups are essential parts of secularism. Secularism in Indica does not mean irreligion.

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In the landmark case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 15, it was observed that,
“religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups and protection of their life
and property and of the places of their worship are an essential part of secularism
enshrined in our constitution”. The basic principle of Secularism deals with the different
religions in the country and the present law providing for 33% reservation and the
amendment to Article 19(2) is in no way related to religion.

The counsel further submits that the Supreme Court in the case of P.M.A Metropolitan v.
Moran Mar Marthoma AIR 199516 observed that, “religion is the belief which binds
spiritual nature of men to super-natural being. It includes worship, belief, faith, devotion,
etc. and extends to rituals. Religious right is the right of a person believing in a particular
faith to practice it, preach it and profess it.”

Hence, the law providing 33% reservation to women in parliament is not touching the
concept of secularism and religious beliefs by any angle. The reservation law is passed by
the Respondent only with the sole motive of development and upliftment of the
downtrodden women in the society.

2. THE AMENDMENT MADE TO ARTICLE 19(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA DOES

NOT SMACKS OF SOME ULTERIOR RELIGIOUS MOTIVES.

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that freedom of speech
is the bulwark of democratic government. The freedom of speech and expression17 is
regarded as the first condition of liberty. In a democracy, the freedom of speech and
expression opens up channels of free discussion of issues. Article 19(2)18 of the
Constitution of Indica allows the state to make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression.

The counsel further submits that the amendment to Article 19(2) of the Constitution of
Indica which is passed by the Respondent is for empowering the female section of the

15
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918
16
P.M.A Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma and anr., AIR 1995 SC 2001
17
Art. 19, the Constitution of Indica
18
Art. 19(2), the Constitution of Indica: Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause ( 1 ) shall affect the operation of any
existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence

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society and not any religious section of the society. The Constitution of Indica also
provides for making of special provisions for women under Article 15(3) of the
Constitution. The Article 15(3) relieves the state from the bondage of Article 15(1) and
enables it to make special provision accord socio-economic equality to women.

Hence, there is no ulterior religious motive of Respondent in Amending the Article 19(2)
of the Constitution. The amendment is done with the sole purpose of development of the
status of women in the society and empowering them. So the amendment cannot be
challenged on this very ground.

IV. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) VIOLATES THE BASIC
STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION?

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that the Constitutional
Amendment to Article 19(2) does not violates the basic structure of the constitution.

1. BASIC STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTION.

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that the Constitution of
Indica permits the Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article 36819. The clause 1
of the article 368 reads, “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in
exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any
provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article”.

The Respondent submits that, the question whether the Parliament has the power to amend
the fundamental rights or not came up for the first time in the case of Shankari Prasad v.
Union of India AIR 195120, The Supreme Court held that, the parliament had the power to
amend including the fundamental rights also.

The same decision prevailed in the Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 196521. Then
in the Golaknath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967case22, the court overruled the decisions of
Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh case and ruled that the Parliament had no power to
amend the Part III of the Constitution.

19
The Constitution of Indica
20
Shankari Prasad Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458
21
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845
22
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643

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Further in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala23, the court recognized the
basic structure concept for the first time. In this case the Supreme Court declared that
Article 368 did not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the
Constitution and parliament could not use its amending powers under Article368 to
'damage', 'emasculate', 'destroy', 'abrogate', 'change' or 'alter' the 'basic structure' or
framework of the constitution.

In the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-record Association. v. Union of India AIR

201624, the Court explained that “An amendment to the Constitution can be challenged
only if it alters the basic structure of the Constitution and a law can be challenged if:

a. It is beyond the competence of the Legislature

b. It violates Article 13 of the Constitution
c. It is enacted contrary to a prohibition in the Constitution; and
d. It is enacted without following the procedure laid down in the Constitution.

2. THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 19(2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION?

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that the amendment to
Article 19(2) does not violate the basic structure of the constitution as it is neither beyond
the competence of the Legislative nor violating Article 13 of the Constitution.

The counsel further submits that in the case of Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India
and Ors (2008)25 it was held that, “Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005 does
not violate the "basic structure" of the Constitution so far as it relates to the state
maintained institutions and aided educational institutions - 27% of seats for other
backward classes is not illegal and the Parliament must be deemed to have taken into
consideration all relevant circumstances when fixing the 27% reservation.”

The counsel submits that the amendment to Article 19(2) of the Constitution of Indica
does not violate the basic structure of the constitution as it is not damaging, emasculating
or destroying any of the Fundamental Rights or essential elements of the basic structure.

23
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973SC 1461
24
Supreme Court Advocates-on-record Association. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1
25
Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and Ors., Civil Writ Petition No. 265 of 2006 (Supreme Court,
10/04/2008)

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The amendment to Article 19(2) can also be reviewed under Judicial Review. So, it is also
not excluding the Judicial Review under Article 32 and Article 136 of the constitution.

In the case of I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. AIR 200726, it was observed by the Supreme
Court that the Supreme Court has to scrutinize the Ninth Schedule Law and the terms of
statute, the nature of rights involved. For doing so, it has to first find whether the Ninth
Schedule Law is violative of part III. If yes, then the further examination is whether the
violation is destroying the basic structure doctrine. If the answer is again yes, then the
result would be invalidation of the Ninth Schedule Law.

The counsel further submits that in the present case the amendment to Article 19(2) is
neither violative of Part III nor there is any violation which is destructive for the Basic
Structure of the Constitution as the amendment is made to lift up the female section of the
society and not for jeopardizing the rights of other citizens in the nation. Hence, the
amendment to Article 19(2) is not violating the Basic Structure of the constitution of
Indica. The amendment is paving way for the women to exercise their rights and raise
their voices against any injustice to them.

V. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF THE WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014

EXTENDS TO MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, the protection of
the Whistle blowers Protection Act, 2014 does not extends to Mrs. Fatima Ghansari
because the Act does not provide protection to someone who is just making allegations
against other party.

1. WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2014

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, in the case of
Samrat Sharma, Roorkie v. PIO Hemwati Nandan Bahguna Garhwal University,
Srinagar AIR 2014, 27 it was held that “The whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 enables
any person to make a public interest disclosure against a public servant or against an act

26
I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N, AIR 2007 SC 861
27
Samrat Sharma, Roorkie v. PIO Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University Srinagar,
CIC/RM/A/2014/002448-SA

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of corruption and willful misuse of power or discretion by a public servant, including
Ministers, Members of Parliament, the lower judiciary, regulatory authorities, Central
and State Government employees, etc. Such disclosers are made to competent authority
that must conduct a discrete enquiry and conceal the identity of the complainant and the
Public Servant.”

The Respondent further submits that, a person who raises his or her voice against any
illegal act done by another person or the one who reports an act of corruption is known as
“whistleblower.” In the present case Mrs. Fatima Ghansari who is a member of the Lower
House is just putting mere allegation against the Respondent of which she has no proof of.
Hence she cannot be regarded and provided protection as a Whistle Blower under this Act.

2. MRS. FATIMA GHANSARI IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR GETTING PROTECTION UNDER THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ACT, 2014.

The Counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, Mrs. Fatima
Ghansari is not eligible for getting protection under the Whistleblower Protection Act;
2014. It has been proved that she is not a whistleblower and that further she is already
getting protection by the Police department for the anonymous calls and threats, hence
protection under this Act just for putting up some allegation does not call for.

The Respondent further submits that, the name of the Act itself makes it very clear that the
purpose of this act is the protection of the persons who make public interest disclosure or
have assisted in such matters from possible victimization or harassment and the Central
Government has to ensure such protection. The Act, under section 3,28 provides that any
public servant or any other person including a non-governmental organization may make a
public interest disclosure to a Competent Authority. In the present case the allegation
passed by Mrs. Fatima Ghansari does not fulfill the criteria of the Public Interest
disclosure and hence does not fall within the ambit of this Act.

In the case of Narender Singh Ahlawat v. Arvind Kaushal (2016)29the applicant has
claimed himself to be whistleblower for exposing alleged corruption in CSSRI. The court
observed that the applicant has made wild allegations against one and all. He has used

28
The Whistleblower Protection Act, (2014) act no. 17 of 2014
29
Narender Singh Ahlawat v. Arvind Kaushal, Application No. 060/00177/2015 (Central Administrative
Tribunal, 31/05/2016)

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very foul, distasteful and unparliamentarily language and stated that, misconduct and
language of the applicant deserve strong action against him and further not regarded as a
Whistle Blower.

The counsel further submits that in the present case Mrs. Fatima Ghansari who has
demanded protection under The Whistleblower protection Act 2014 has made vague and
wild allegation against the Respondent without furnishing any proof or evidence for
supporting her allegations. Hence Fatima Ghansari should not be titled as a whistleblower.

VI. WHETHER A LAW CAN BE STRUCK DOWN ON GROUNDS THAT IT SERVES THE MOTIVE OF
ANY FOREIGN POWER OR HAS BECOME A TOOL OF COMMUNAL POLITICS?

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that there are several
grounds for striking down the laws. For a law to be struck down, the dispute has to fall
under the purview of those grounds.

1. THE GROUNDS FOR STRIKING DOWN A LAW.

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that, the Constitution
of Indica is the supreme law. Furthermore, Parliament of Indica has the power to pass or
amend a law. At state level, this power is with the state legislature. The laws can be struck
down on following basis:

1.1. IF THE LAW IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION

The counsel further submits that in the case of State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh AIR
201230 , it was observed that, “Article 13(2) clearly prohibits the making of any law by the
State which takes or abridges rights, conferred by Part III of the Constitution. In the event
of such a law being made the same shall be void to the extent of contravention.” In this
case, the Supreme Court made it clear that any law which is in contravention of Article 13
shall be void.

The Respondent humbly submits that, a law which is inconsistent with Article 13 shall be
declared void by the constitution. In the present case neither the law providing for 33%

30
State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, AIR 2012 SC 1040

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reservation, nor the amendment made to Article 19(2) is in violation of Article 13 of the
Constitution of Indica.

1.2. IF THE LAW VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that the doctrine of
Basic Structure was first recognized by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 197331. The Supreme Court in the
abovementioned case declared that “Article 368 did not enable Parliament to alter the
basic structure or framework of the Constitution and parliament could not use its
amending powers under Article368 to 'damage', 'emasculate', 'destroy', 'abrogate',
'change' or 'alter' the 'basic structure' or framework of the constitution”. Supreme Court
mentioned the following as the “basic foundation and structure” of the Constitution:

1. Supremacy of the Constitution;

2. Separation of Powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary;
3. Republican and democratic form of Government;
4. Secular character of the Constitution;
5. Federal character of the constitution.

The counsel further submits that any law made in contravention of abovementioned
features will be held unconstitutional and void to the extent of such contravention.

In the case of I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 200732, it was held that, “the Basic
Structure is the fundamental aspects of the Constitution which cannot be abridged or
destroyed. Some of the phenomenon of the Basic Structure is Judicial Review; Arts.32 and
226; Federalism; Secularism; The sovereign, democratic, republican structure; Freedom
and dignity of the individual; Unity and integrity of the Nation”.

The counsel further submits that the reference of the foreign power given in the present
case is very vague and uncertain. It is very difficult to interpret that which foreign power
is discussed about in the present case. There is no proper definition of the said aforesaid
foreign power is given in the present case, that’s why a law cannot be struck down on the
basis of a definition which is uncertain and vague.

31
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
32
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861

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The counsel submits that in the case of A.K. Roy v. Union of India &Ors. AIR 198133 it
was held by the court that, “We see that the concepts aforesaid, namely, 'defence of India",
'security of India', 'security of the State' and 'relations of India with foreign powers', which
are mentioned in Section 3 of the Act, are not of any great certainty or definiteness. But in
the very nature of things they are difficult to define. We cannot therefore strike down these
provisions of Section 3 of the Act on the ground of their vagueness and uncertainty. We
must, however, utter a word of caution that since the concepts are not defined,
undoubtedly because they are not capable of a precise definition, courts must strive to give
to those concept a narrower construction than what the literal words suggest.”

Hence, the law to be passed has to pass the test of abovementioned grounds. If the law is
violating any of the abovementioned features, then it shall be held void and
unconstitutional and will lose to have a binding force but the present law does not fall
under the ambit of these inconsistencies.

2. THE GROUNDS OF LAW SERVING FOREIGN POWER AND COMMUNAL POLITICS IS

NOT VALID GROUND TO STRIKE DOWN ANY LAW.

The counsel on the behalf of Respondent most respectfully submits that in the present case
the involvement of foreign powers in the passing of reservation law is just an allegation
which is not supported by any credible evidence. Moreover, the legislative makes many
laws for promotion of healthy relationship with the foreign powers. Entries 10 to 21 of the
Union List given in the Constitution of Indica confer extensive powers on the Centre to
conduct the foreign affairs of the country, to enter into treaties with foreign countries and
to enact legislation to implement them.

The counsel further submits that in the case of Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan,
(2004)34 it was held that, “Power of entering into a treaty is an inherent part of the
sovereign power of the State. Moreover, the Constitution makes no provision making
legislation a condition for entry into a treaty in times either of war or peace.”

The counsel submits that the laws are made with the alertness of keeping the sovereignty
of the nation intact and independent, so in the first place there is no need of striking down

33
A.K. Roy v. Union of India &Ors, AIR 1980 SC 710
34
Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, Civil Appeal No. 8161-8164 of 2003 (Supreme Court, 07/10/2003)

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a law and there are different laws which are made for promotion of healthy relationship
with foreign countries not for serving the foreign powers.

The counsel further submits that the legislative does not make any law which promotes the
communal politics. The laws are manipulated that way but the intention to pass such law is
totally different. Hence, to strike down a law it has to violate the basic structure of the
constitution or has to be inconsistent with the Article 13 of the Constitution. The grounds
of law serving the foreign powers and communal politics are not the valid ground to strike
down any law.

VII. WHETHER 33% RESERVATION IS VIOLATIVE OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO

CHOOSE THEIR REPRESENTATIVE AND THE RIGHT TO CONTESTS ELECTIONS?

The counsel on behalf of the Respondent most respectfully submits that, the present law
providing for 33% reservation is not violative of democratic right of people to choose their
representative. The Citizens of Indica has the right to choose their representative through
Adult Suffrage35 and any law which is made for the minorities or uplifting a particular
section of society to promote equality does not violate it.
In the case of Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh v. Union of India AIR 1980 36 it
was held that “ reservation to socially and economically backward classes, is not a
concession or privilege extended to them, it is in recognition of their undoubted
Fundamental Right to Equality of Opportunity and in discharge of the Constitutional
obligation imposed upon the state to secure to all its citizens 'Justice, social, economic
and political and to ensure their equal participation in administration of affairs of the
country”.
The Respondent submits that the present law is for ensuring active political participation
of women. And further increased political participation of women in Parliament and
legislatures will help them fight the alleged abuse, discrimination, and inequality prevalent
against women. Unless reservation is provided, it would not be possible for more women
to join politics in our supposedly “male dominated society”. Hence the Present law
providing for 33% reservation to women stand correct and constitutionally valid.

35
Art. 326, the Constitution of Indica
36
Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298

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PRAYER

Wherefore in light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Supreme Court, that it may graciously be pleased
to -

1. Dismiss the writ petition.

2. In the alternative declare and adjudge:

a) The petitions filed by Mrs. Fatima Ghansari, Dr. R.M Swain and the M.P’s of
Wrongrace Party are not maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution.
b) The law providing 33% reservation to women in the parliament is not arbitrary and
violative of the Constitution.
c) The amendment to Article 19(2) is not against the basic structure of the Constitution
and Constitutional.
d) The allegations put forward by Mrs. Fatima Ghansari are false and no additional
security should be provided to her.

AND/OR

Pass any other order, direction or relief that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience.

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE RESPONDENT SHALL DUTY BOUND FOREVER PRAY.

Sd/-

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

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