1 Cruz Civillaw

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HUMAN RELATIONS
• ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
• Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law,

wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
• Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or

injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
DIAZ vs. ENCANTO, et. al., GR 171303,

January 20, 2016
5/10/88 – Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast
Dept., recommended that Diaz be
granted any LOA she may be qualified
for; In her 5/2/88 letter, Diaz indicated
her unwillingness to teach, hence,
Diaz has been in the service of Lazaro deleted Diaz’s name in the final
UP since 1963 & Asso. Prof. in schedule of classes for the 1st sem., AY
the College of Mass 1988-89; Diaz’s request for sabbatical
Communications (CMC) in 1987; leave was denied due to shortage of
May 3,1988, she applied w/ the teaching staff & exigencies of the
Office of the UP President for service. While Diaz was able to teach
sabbatical leave w/ pay for 1 during the 2nd semester, AY 1988-89,
year effective July’88 to May’89. she was not able to claim her salaries
for her refusal to submit the Report
for Duty Form.
Q. Was there abuse of right done by the UP officials

in denying Diaz’ request for sabbatical leave?
Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil

Code. Good faith consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. It is presumed. Malice connotes ill will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive. He who alleges bad faith has the burden to prove the
same.
A sabbatical leave is not a right but a privilege and Diaz

cannot demand its grant. Diaz failed to prove bad faith on
respondents’ part. Nothing in the records show that respondents
purposely delayed the resolution of her application to prejudice
and injure her. Any delay that occurred was due to the fact that her
application for sabbatical leave did not follow the usual procedure,
hence, the processing of said application took time.
California Clothing, Inc., et. al. vs

Quinones, G.R. 175822, October 23, 2013
Shirley did
NOT pay
the black
Shirley – Reservation jeans worth
Ticketing Agent of
P2,098.00
Cebu Pacific in Lapu-
Lapu City
Wrote to Cebu Pacific and Robinson’s

Dept. Store informing the 2 offices of
Shirley’s non-payment of the black jeans.
Q: Was there abuse of right on the part of California

Clothing and its employees warranting damages in favor
of Quinones?
A. YES. The exercise of a right is not without

limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right
and in the performance of a duty causing
damage to another is actionable under the
New Civil Code.
While it is true that they had the right to verify from

Quinones whether she has paid or not, and collect from her
if she did not, they however, went overboard, thus they
abused their right. When they sent letters to the
employer, on the guise of asking assistance, they
imputed bad acts on the part of Quinones. They
accused her that she was not completely honest.
Clearly, these statements were accusatory which were
intended to tarnish her reputation in the eyes of her
employer.
Quinones is entitled to moral damages.

Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of plaintiff’s physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury as provided for under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Moral damages are
not a bonanza. They should reasonably
approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
gravity of the wrong done. They are awarded not
to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to
obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering she has
undergone.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs.

REYES, GR 154259, FEB. 28, 2005
Nikko Hotel Mr. Tsuruoka’s

birthday party Reyes
Mla. Garden
Ms. Ruby
Lim
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a

person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”)
refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to
injury – which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.
SPS. HING vs. CHOACHUY, et. al., G.R.

179736, June 26, 2013
Art.26 NCC. Every person shall respect the dignity,

personality and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1). Prying into the privacy of

another’s residence; xxxx
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle,

where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted
by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another without
the consent of the latter.” However, it does not mean that
only the residence is entitled to privacy.
THE FAMILY CODE
MARRIAGE
ACEBEDO vs. ARQUERO, A.M. P-94-1054, 3/11/2013

(Process server, MTC
Brooke’s Pt. Palawan)
Edwin
Ed i AAcebedo
b d Dedje Irader Eddie Arquero
7/10/79
“KASUNDUAN” Desiree
ree
born 5/21/89
“consenting & giving freedom to either of them
to seek any partner and live with him or her”
The KASUNDUAN had absolutely no force and effect on the

validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife.
Article 1 FC provides that “marriage is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and NOT subject to stipulation ”. It is an
institution of public order or policy governed by rules
established by law which CAN NOT be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.
ESPINOSA et.al. vs. Atty. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011
Rodolfo Espinosa
Atty. Julieta Omaña
E
Elena Marantal
(11/17/1997)
((7/23/1983)
19
983)
“Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay ”
The extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal

partnership without judicial approval is VOID.
A notary public should NOT facilitate the disintegration
of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extra-judicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership.
VDA. DE AVENIDO vs. AVENIDO, GR 173540,

January 22, 2014
Tecla Eustaquio Peregrina

9/30/42 3/30/79
Talibon, Bohol +9/22/89
Davao City
Climaco, Apolinario, Editha,

& Eustaquio, Jr.
While a marriage certificate is considered

the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence
of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches us that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate.
REPUBLIC vs. ALBIOS, GR 198780,

October 16, 2013
Never lived together as
H & W; left for USA; did not
Liberty Daniel Lee Fringer process Liberty’s citizenship
10-22-04 ; Mand. MTC
Agreed to pay Fringer $2K Q: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose
to acquire US citizenship of acquiring US citizenship in consideration of $2K,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
A: Consent was not lacking between Albios & Fringer.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring US citizenship through
marriage. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them since it was that
precise legal tie w/c was necessary to accomplish their goal.
SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE, GR 200233, 7/15/15

believed Nicanor was
testified she
single; NO ML, VOID
informed Leonila
2nd marriage.
she was Santos’
4 mos. after their
wife in Mar ’97.
marriage, bigamy
Estela Nicanor Leonila
6/2/74 7/29/97
filed vs. H & W ;
Leonila was
convicted of
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE bigamy.
“marriage was celebrated W/O
a ML based on Art. 34 FC”,
Nicanor and Leonila’s Marriage Certificate contained the

misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to
contract marriage without a ML under Art. 34 FC. Our penal
laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s
deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct
character of this special bond between spouses.
RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

GR 182438, JULY 2, 2014
No ML
Joey Claire
3/29/2003 Fr. Mario Ragaza
refused to solemnize
Sta Rosa Catholic Parish the marriage
Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos
Fr. Ronulo
Solemnized
Aglipayan Church the marriage
W/O a ML
Q: Was the alleged “blessing” by petitioner

tantamount to an “illegal marriage ceremony”
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC?
NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG, GR 133778, 3/14/00
(+2/19/97)
Teodulfa Pepito Norma
9/26/74 12/11/86
(+4/24/85)
5 children AOC dated

12/11/86
The 5-year cohabitation period w/c is counted

back from the date of the celebration of the marriage
should be characterized by exclusivity – that is, no
3rd party was involved at any time within the 5
years AND continuity – that is, unbroken.
REPUBLIC vs. JOSE DAYOT, GR 175581,

March 28, 2008
Felisa Jose Rufina

Tecson Dayot Pascual
11/24/86 8/31/90
Pasay City Hall
7/7/93 – Declaration of nullity of

marriage w/Felisa NO ML
AOC
The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to

the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation CANNOT be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is a mere scrap of paper, WITHOUT
force and effect. It is as if there was NO AFFIDAVIT at all.
LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC and TAMANO,

GR 169766, March 30, 2011
(+1994)
Zorayda Sen. Mamintal Estrellita

Tamano Llave
5/31/1958 - civil rites;
(DIVORCED) 5/27/93 - Islamic laws
- Muslim rites 6/2/93 - civil rites
PD 1083
Adib 8 other legitimate
children Code of Muslim
Personal Laws
11/23/94 - Declaration of nullity of Q: Was the marriage of Sen.

marriage of Estrellita and Sen. Tamano and Estrellita valid?
Tamano for being bigamous
A: NO. The marriage between Sen. Tamano

and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriages between Muslims and non-
Muslims was the Civil Code of 1950 where only ONE
marriage can exist at any given time and divorce is
NOT recognized.
PD 1083 or the Muslim Code took effect on

Feb. 4,1977 and this law CANNOT retroactively
override the Civil Code. A new law ought to affect the
future, NOT what is past. In the case of subsequent
marriage laws, NO vested rights shall be impaired that
pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
UY vs. SPS . LACSAMANA, GR 20622, AUG. 19, 2015

Contended she was never
married to Uy; marriage
ceremony was not consummated
due to bombings during WW II;
she lawfully acquired the
Luis Uy Petra Rosca
(+2/18/81) 1944-1973 (+5/10/96) properties & constructed the
house using her own paraphernal
8 children funds.
1/29/64 - DOS of 484 sq. m. lot; 4/18/79-- DOS in favor of Spouses
TCT issued in the name Lacsamana.
of“P
Petra Rosca married to
Luis Uy”; Rosca
constructed a split-level
house on said lot. Q: Was there a valid marriage
6/15/64 - DOS of a 215 sq.m. lot between Rosca and Uy which
adjacent to the 484 sq. m. warranted Uy’s written consent
to the DOS to Sps. Lacsamana?
lot.
A: NONE. Uy was NOT able to present any copy of

their marriage certificate. NO MARRIAGE TOOK
PLACE BETWEEN UY AND ROSCA AS THERE
WAS NO MARRIAGE CEREMONY THAT
ACTUALLY HAPPENED.
Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able

to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any
property acquired while living together shall be owned by
the couple in equal shares. The words “married to” do
not always mean that the property is conjugal. The house
and lot were clearly Rosca’s paraphernal properties
and she had every right to sell the same even
WITHOUT Uy’s consent.
MORIGO vs. PEOPLE, GR 145226, 2/6/04
Lucia Lucio Morigo Maria Lumbago

8/30/90 10/4/92
obtained a divorce decree 10/19/93 -- charged of bigamy;
in Canada on 1/17/92. 8/5/96 -- convicted by RTC;
10/21/99 -- conviction affirmed by CA.
NO MARRIAGE CEREMONY was performed by an authorized

solemnizing officer.” Morigo and Lucia merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears NO semblance to a valid marriage and thus needs
NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY. Such act alone cannot
be deemed an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
FOREIGN DIVORCE OBTAINED

BY ONE SPOUSE
General Rule: Article 15 NCC
Exception: Article 26(2) FC
LAVADIA vs. HEIRS of LUNA, GR 171914,

Separated JULY 23, 2014
de facto
after 20
years;
11/12/75 --
(+7/12/97)
Executed Soledad
Eugenia Atty. Luna
Agreement 1/12/76, Sto. Domingo,
9/10/47; 9/12/48
For Separation
Dominican Republic
and Property
Settlement 7 children
Condo unit w/ CCT - “Juan
1/12/76 - - Divorce decree from CFI, Luna married to Soledad
Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic Luna”; law books
“Divorce between Filipinos is ineffectual

and VOID under the nationality rule adopted
by Philippine law. xxx The phrase “married
to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of
ATTY. LUNA at the time of registration of title.
REPUBLIC vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

GR 154380, October 5, 2005
Lady Myros Innocent

Cipriano
Orbecido III Villanueva Stanley
5/24/1981
Son
Kristoffer Lady
Kimberly
Kim
petition for
authority to left for the US in 1986 &
re-marry became a US citizen;
obtained a divorce
decree in 2000 & married
a US citizen
Q: Is Article 26 (2) applicable in the case at bar?

The twin elements for the application of

Article 26 (2) FC are:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated

between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of

the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
MEDINA vs. KOIKE, LCR of QC & NSO

GR 215723, JULY 27, 2016
6/14/12 – Spouses filed for
divorce before the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City, Aichi
Doreen Michiyuki Prefecture, Japan; divorce
6/14/05, QC decree was granted on the
Fuka same date & duly recorded in
Masato
(1/23/06) (4/14/07) the official Family Register of
2/7/2013 - filed a PJRFD & Michiyuki Koike.
declaration of capacity to remarry
based on Art. 26 (2) FC before the
QC RTC; NO ONE appeared to Q: Did the RTC err in
oppose the petition; RTC denied denying the PJRFD?
the petition .
A: YES. Doreen presented the ff.: "Certificate of

Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce "and
"Family Register of Michiyuki Koike“, both issued by the
Mayor of Ichinomiya City and authenticated by the
Philippine Consul for Osaka, Japan; a certified machine
copy of a "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for
the Ambassador of Japan in Manila and authenticated by
the DFA, with a Certification by the LCR of Manila that
the original divorce certificate was filed and recorded in
the said Office; photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan
and their English translation; two (2) books entitled “The
Civil Code of Japan 2000” and the “Civil Code of
Japan 2009”, not authenticated by the Phil. consul in
Japan, as proof of Japan’s law on divorce.
Philippine Law does not provide for absolute

divorce, hence, our courts cannot grant it. However,
Art. 26(2) FC- which addresses foreign marriages or
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner-
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained
abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign

judgments and laws. The foreign judgment & its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
MATUDAN vs. REPUBLIC & MARILYN B. MATUDAN,

GR 203284, NOVEMBER 14, 2016
Q: Is abandonment by the wife of her family tantamount to PI to
warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC?
1985 – Marilyn left to work

Nicolas Marilyn abroad; Nicolas & the children
10/26/76; Samar lost contact w/her; she had not
been seen nor heard from
4 children again.
6/20/08 - filed PDNM based on Art. 36 Marilyn is “not ready for a lasting &
FC; Marilyn consistently neglected & permanent commitment like
failed to provide the H & their children marriage”; she cannot properly &
w/the necessary emotional & financial morally take on the responsibility of a
care, support & sustenance; loving and caring wife.”
A: NO. Psychological incapacity should refer to no

less than a mental--not merely physical incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. Psychological incapacity must be confined
to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ,

GR 166357, January 14, 2015
The guidelines have turned- out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the
petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.
Article 36 of the FC must not be so strictly and too literally
read and applied. XXX
In the task of ascertaining the presence of PI as a ground

for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of
necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive
at an intelligent and judicious judgment. The conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable
demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
The fact that respondent brought her children with her to

her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of
parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose
them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her
children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of
her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act
of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
Xxx In Article 36 , there is no marriage to speak

of, as the same is VOID from the very beginning. To
indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under
Article 36 FC will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
MALLILIN vs. JAMESOLAMIN & REPUBLIC,

GR 192718, FEB. 18, 2015
US citizen
Robert Luz
9/6/72
3 children 5/8/00 → PAM with the

Metropolitan Tribunal
3/16/94 – PDNM under of First Instance for
Art. 36 FC 5. Luz dated diff. men; the Archdiocese of
1. he did the cleaning loitered w/ male Manila.;
of their house; students; received
2. his mother cooked male visitors at 10/10/02 → MT declared
their meals; home; allowed marriage void due to
3. his sister washed another man to “grave lack of due
their clothes; sleep at home; discretion”; decision
4. his sister took care contracted loans affirmed by NAMT
of the children; w/o his knowledge.
Psychological incapacity as required

by Article 36 must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It
must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may only emerge
after the marriage. It must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party
involved.
ARTICLE 40. FAMILY CODE
CAPILI vs. PEOPLE et. al.,

GR 183850, JULY 3, 2013
Karla James Walter Shirley

9/3/1999 12/8/1999
charged w/ bigamy before

PDN of 2nd marriage
Pasay City RTC on
before Antipolo City
6/28/2004.
RTC
MTD bigamy case
declared the 2nd
marriage void on
12/1/04 due to MTD granted by Pasay City RTC
bigamy.
Q: Is the declaration of nullity of the 2nd

marriage a ground for the dismissal of the
bigamy case?
A: NO. The subsequent judicial declaration

of the nullity of the 2nd marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. The outcome of the civil
case had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper
is that the 1st marriage be subsisting at the
time the 2nd marriage is contracted.
JARILLO vs. PEOPLE, GR 164435,

JUNE 29, 2010
Rafael Victoria Emmanuel

Alocillo Jarillo Uy
5/24/74 11/26/79
charged 1. convicted by RTC
w/bigamy Pasay, 7/9/2001
5/3/2000 2. conviction affirmed
by CA, 7/21/2003
1. Oct. 5, 2000 – Filed case for declaration of nullity of 1 st marriage
due to psychological incapacity;
2. Mar. 28, 2003 – Makati RTC declared 1st marriage null & void due
to psychological incapacity;
3. July 9, 2003 – Makati RTC decision became final;
4. Jarillo appealed for reversal of her conviction for bigamy.
Under the law, a marriage, even

one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. Even if the accused eventually
obtained a declaration that her 1st
marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the 1st and 2nd marriage were
subsisting before the 1st marriage was
declared null and void. The subsequent
declaration of nullity of the 1st marriage is
immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated.
ABSENCE OF ONE SPOUSE

UNDER ARTICLE 41 of the FC
(Declaration of Presumptive
Death)
REPUBLIC vs. SAREÑOGON, JR., GR 199194,

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 left to work as a
seaman; for 3 mos. did not
went to Hongkong receive any news from
as a domestic Netchie; no idea about her
helper; never heard whereabouts; while abroad
or seen thereafter. Netchie Jose tried to contact Netchi’s
8/10/96, City Hall Mla parents but they left Clarin
Misamis Occ; inquired from
Lived together as H Netchie’s relatives &
& W only for 1 month friends w/c proved futile.
RTC declared Netchiee

presumptively dead in filed PJDPD of Netchie
its decision dated
1/31/11
Q: Is the RTC decision declaring Netchie

presumptively dead correct?
A. NO. The law did not define “well-founded belief.” To be

able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that
based on these efforts and inquiries, he believes that the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).
Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate Netchie are

notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence. Jose did not call to the
witness stand specific persons whom he allegedly met in his
search for Netchie. He did not prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent gov’t. agencies and the media. Nor
did he show that he undertook a thorough, determined and
unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least 2 years, (and
what those years were) and the places he went to.
SANTOS vs. SANTOS, GR 187061, Oct.8, 2014
Celerina Ricardo 2nd wife

6/18/80 9/17/08
10/2008 – learned of Ricardo’s petition; 6/15/07- filed petition for

on 11/17/08; filed a Petition for Annulment declaration of Celerina’s
of Judgment w/ the CA due to extrinsic presumptive death.
fraud & lack of jurisdiction; 11/28/08 - CA 7/27/07- Tarlac City RTC
dismissed her petition contending that declared Celerina
the proper remedy is Article 42 of the FC. presumptively dead.
SC HELD: “The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of

presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to
annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not
the proper remedy when the person declared
presumptively dead has never been absent.”
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She

also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its
effects. She contends that reappearance is not a
sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage.
Celerina is correct. If the subsequent marriage is

terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before its termination
shall still be considered legitimate and the property
regime will be the same as in a valid marriage.
Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is
a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
PROPERTY RELATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE
PROPERTY REGIMES OF
UNIONS W/O VALID
MARRIAGES
DOMINGO vs. SPS. MOLINA, GR 200274, APR. 20, 2016

borrowed money
frm Sps, Molina;
9/10/78 – sold
his interest over
the lot to Sps. Spouses
Molina to answer Molina
Flora Anastacio
(+1986) for his debts; took
(+1968)
5/19/95 – sale possession
of Anastacio’s of the lot &
Melecio share registered paid taxes.
6/15/51– Sps. on TCT # 22967
Domingo bought a
lot in Tarlac 5/17/99 – complaint for Annulment of Title
consisting of ½ and Recovery of Ownership contending
undivided portion Anastacio could not have sold his interest over
over an 18,164 sq. the lot W/O Flora’s consent as Flora was
m. lot. already dead at the time of the sale.
Q: Was the sale of the conjugal property to Spouses

Molina W/O Flora’s consent valid and legal?
A: YES. The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and
Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to

freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not
the interest of his co-owners. Anastacio’s sale to Spouses
Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was
not totally VOID, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion
thereof, were thereby effectively transferred making
Spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the
extent of Anastacio’s interest.
PNB vs. GARCIA et. al., GR 182839, 6/2/14

Lot w/ TCT Accomodation Rogelio &
No. 44422 Mortgagor; Celedonia
acquired REM of lot Garcia
during Ligaya Jose, Sr.
marriage; (+1/21/87) PNB
Jose Sr. as
”widower” 4 children
Q: Is the lot covered by TCT No. 44422 conjugal

or exclusive property of Jose, Sr.?
A: It is conjugal property. Registration of a property alone in

the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.
What is material is the time when the property was acquired.
Although the property appears to be registered in the name
of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during
the marriage. It retains its conjugal nature.
PNB vs. VENANCIO C. REYES, GR 212483, OCT. 5, 2016

ts
Three (3) lots
in Malolos, s,
Bulacan weree Venancio Lilia
acquired 1973 PNB
during their ir
P3M loan w/REM on Foreclosed
marriage.
the 3 lots; forged the REM; was
3 lots are conjugal properties; Lilia’s Venancio’s signature the highest
loan & REM were W/O his consent on the loan, REM & PN; bidder in the
as his signature was falsified on the she failed to pay the foreclosure
PN & REM. loan. sale.
Q.1: Did the CA err in declaring the REM void?

Q.2: Can the conjugal partnership of Spouses Reyes be held liable
for the loan contracted unilaterally by Lilia?
A.1: NO. The REM over the conjugal properties is VOID for
want of Venancio’s consent. Under Art. 124 FC: any
disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one
spouse must be consented by the other spouse; otherwise, it is
VOID.
A.2: YES. The REM is void but the loan remains VALID
and can be recovered from the CPG. In Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. vs. CA, 349 Phil. 942 (1998), the SC
HELD: where the husband or the wife, contracts a loan but acts
as a surety or a guarantor, evidence that the family benefited
from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal
partnership can be held liable. If the loan was taken out to be
used for the family business, there is no need to prove actual
benefit. The law presumes the family benefited from the
loan and the conjugal partnership is held liable.
CARIÑO vs. CARIÑO, GR 132529,

Feb. 2, 2001
Susan SPO4 Santiago

SP Susan
Nicdao S. Cariño Yee
6/20/1969 (+11/23/1992) 11/10/1992
Sahlee Sandee
P146,000.00 P21,000.00 burial

death benefits benefits
NO ML VOID NO JDNM VOID

Art. 147 FC Art. 148 FC
FAMILY HOME
EULOGIO, et.al. vs. BELL, SR., et.al., GR 186322, 7/8/15
Contract of Sale for P1M Spouses Eulogio

Spouses Bell of a 329 sq. m. H & L
which was their FH.
Complaint for annulment of
Bell Siblings document, reconveyance,
quieting of title and damages
Q: Can this FH be the subject of a Writ of

Execution under Article 160 of the FC?
A: NO. Under ARTICLE 155 FC, the family home

shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment EXCEPT:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to
the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for
the construction of the building.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home

under Article 160 FC, petitioners needed to establish these facts:
(1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase
resulted from voluntary improvements on the property
introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its
owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased
actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article
157 of the Family Code.
The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering

the execution sale of the property under Article 160 FC. The
RTC had already determined with finality that the
property was a FH, and there was no proof that its value
had increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary
improvements by respondents.
PATRICIO vs. DARIO III, GR 170829, 11/20/06

8/10/87 –
Extrajudicially Perla Marcelino
settled (+ 7/5/87)
Marcelino‘s
estate; 755 sq.
m. H & L in Marcelino Marc Marcelino III
Cubao, QC
Marcelino IV
Art. 159 FC shields the FH from immediate partition

despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary still residing therein.
To avail of the benefits of Art. 159, the minor
beneficiary must ACTUALLY be living in the FH
AND fully dependent on the head of the family for
legal support.
EQUITABLE PCIB, INC. vs. OJ-MARK TRADING G

INC., et. al., GR 165950, AUG. 8, 2010
P4,048,800.00 signed REM as
Equitable Loan principal debtor
PCIB, Inc. & Pres. Of OJ-
Oscar Mark Trading
& Evangeline
initiated EJF of Martinez
the REM reg. owner
condo unit REM over condo & 3rd party
is their FH unit where they mortgagor
reside annotated
on CCT of the
Pasig City RD
Xxx Article 155 (3) FC allows the

execution or forced sale of a FH “for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution”.
SPS. DE MESA vs. SPS. ACERO, et al,

GR 185064, Jan. 16, 2012
The exemption of the FH from attachment, levy

or forced sale must be invoked as soon as possible,
otherwise, it is considered as waived. The FH’s
exemption from execution must be set-up and proved
to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. The right of exemption is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor &
must be claimed by him, NOT by the Sheriff, at
the time of the levy or before the sale at public
auction.
PATERNITY,
FILIATION,
CUSTODY,
AND SUPPORT OF
CHILDREN
Aguilar vs. Siasat, GR 200169, Jan. 28, 2015

Alfredo Candelaria (+2/8/94)
(+8/26/83)
Rodolfo
(3/5/45) Edna
1. his elementary school records stating Alfredo In June 1996, filed w/ the RTC
Aguilar as his parent; of Bacolod City for
2. his ITR indicating Candelaria is his mother; mandatory injunction plus
3. his Certificate of Marriage reflecting the Aguilar Damages against Edna to
Spouses as his parents; recover 2 TCTs covering 2 lots
4. Alfredo’s SSS E-1 Form dated 10/10/57 stating owned by Spouses Aguilar.
Rodolfo is his legitimate son and dependent;
5. Certification issued by the Bacolod LCR dated
1/27/96 that all records of births for the Rodolfo was NOT the son of
periods 1945 -1946 were “all destroyed by Spouses Aguilar.
nature“, hence, no copies could be issued.
Q: Based on the documents he presented, was Rodolfo

able to prove he is the legitimate son of Spouses
Aguilar?
A: YES. Rodolfo – who was born during the

marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of
the Aguilar spouses. Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form
E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of
filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses
under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself,
said document constitutes an “admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.”
CONCEPCION vs. CA & ALMONTE,

GR 123450, Aug. 31, 2005
Mario
Gopiao Ma. Theresa Gerardo
12/10/80 12/29/89
12/19/91- annulment
Jose Gerardo
of marriage due to
born 12/8/90
bigamy
The LAW and only the LAW determines who

are legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s
legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. IT SHOULD BE WHAT THE LAW
SAYS AND NOT WHAT THE PARENT SAYS IT IS.
BECKETT vs. JUDGE SARMIENTO, JR.,

A.M. RTJ-12-2326, 1/30/30/13
did not return Geoffrey
after holidays in 2011.
Geoffrey Eltesa
HC filed by Beckett
Compromise agreement
approved by the court Court granted
that he shall have full Geoffrey, Jr. provisional custody to
custody over their son. Eltesa.
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If

the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change &
becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and
adjusted. Xxx To be sure, the welfare, the best interest, the benefit,
and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either
parent is chosen to be the custodian. A judgment involving the
custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect
of res judicata.
Arado Heirs, et.al. vs. Alcoran, et.al., GR 163362,

July 8, 2015
(2 lots) (8 lots)
4 siblings Joaquina Raymundo
(+1981) (+1939)
nephews/
nieces
Florencia 3 siblings
Francisca Nicolas
(+1954) (+1960)
(1). Anacleto’s BC and Page 53, Book 4,

Register No. 214 of the Register of Births of
the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Occ.;
(2). His baptismal certificate; (3). Pictures
Filed suit in 1992
taken during Nicolas’ wake showing
Anacleto Elenette
e Anacleto being carried by Joaquina and
(Born 7/13/51) 1972 Florencia; (4). his school records; (5) his
Marriage Certificate; and (6). Joaquina’s
will.
Issues:
1. Whether Anacleto is the illegitimate son of Nicolas;
2. Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.
The father has duly acknowledged the child

as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of the
child appearing in the Register of Births showed
that the father had himself caused the registration
of his birth, he being the informant of the birth to
be registered. Considering that the father had
a direct hand in the preparation of the birth
certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of
Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully
warranted.
Arado Heirs, et.al. vs. Alcoran, et.al., GR 163362,

July 8, 2015
(2 lots) (8 lots)
4 siblings Joaquina Raymundo
(+1981) (+1939)
nephews/
nieces
Florencia 3 siblings
Francisca Nicolas
(+1954) (+1960)
(1). Anacleto’s BC and Page 53, Book
4, Register No. 214 of the Register of
Births of the Municipality of Bacong ,
Negros Occ. ; (2). His baptismal
Filed suit in 1992 certificate ; (3). Pictures taken during
Anacleto Elenette Nicolas’ wake showing Anacleto being
(Born 7/13/51) carried by Joaquina and Florencia ;
1972
(4). his school records (5) his MC ;
(6). Joaquina’s will.
GRANDE vs. ANTONIO, GR 206248,

FEB. 18, 2014
Left
Legal Patricio Grace for the
Wife USA in
May,
2007
Andre Lewis Jerard Patrick

(2/8/98) (10/13/99)
Q: Can the father compel his illegitimate

children to use his surname upon his
recognition of their filiation?
A: NO. Art. 176 FC (as amended by

R.A. 9255 (3/19/2004) now reads:
Illegitimate children SHALL use the surname

and SHALL be under the parental authority of their
mother, and SHALL be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children MAY use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. XXX
Art. 176 FC gives illegitimate children the right

to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate child.
DELA CRUZ et.al. vs. GRACIA, GR 177728,

July 31, 2009
Christian Dominique
Jenie Aquino
(+ 9/4/05)
Antipolo LCR
“Aquino” Autobiography
1. Birth Certificate; “Jenie dela Cruz” is
Christian “my wife” as “We fell
2. AUSF she executed (born 11/2/05) in love w/each other”
& signed ; and “Now she is
3. Affidavit of pregnant” and “for
Acknowledgment that we live together”
signed by
Dominique’s father;
HELD: Dominique’s Autobiography, though

unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the
requirement of the law.
1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the

LONE piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent;
2. Where the private handwritten instrument is

ACCOMPANIED by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative
of such other evidence.
IN THE EYES OF SOCIETY, A CHILD WITH AN

UNKNOWN FATHER BEARS THE STIGMA OF DISHONOR.
DEL SOCORRO vs. VAN WILSEM,

GR 193707, DEC. 10, 2014
Divorce
Decree - City
Ernst
Court of Norma Johan Filipina
Holland 9/25/90 - Holland
(monthly
support)
Roderigo Q.1: Can a foreign national be

obliged to support his minor
8/28/09 – Complaint child under Philippine Law?
for support under
Art. 195 FC;
Information filed Q.2: Can a foreign national be
under RA 9262 but held criminally liable under RA
dismissed by Cebu 9262 for his unjustified failure
City RTC.
to support his minor child?
A.1: NO. The obligation to give support to a child is a

matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland, he is subject to the
laws of his country, NOT to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
However, he alleged but was not able to prove his foreign
national law, hence, the doctrine of processual
presumption comes into play.
A.2: YES. Respondent may be made liable under

Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly
refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.
SPS. LIM vs. LIM et. al., GR 163209,

Oct. 30, 2009
Chua Giak Mariano III
P34K support
Prudencio Filomena
in-house Edward
midwife of
Cheryl
Support
Chua Giak 1979
P40K
P6K TOTAL
monthly
income Lester Candice Mariano III
6/11/81 10/23/85 8/31/86
Q: Are Edward’s parents concurrently liable with

Edward to provide support to respondents?
A: YES. The obligation to

provide legal support passes on
to ascendants not only upon
default of the parents but also
for the latter’s inability to
provide sufficient support. Art.
199 FC is applicable.
VERCELES vs. POSADA, GR 159785, 4/27/07
Wife Teofisto Verceles Ma. Clarissa Posada

12/22/1986
Mayor of Pandan, Support
Catanduanes Verna Aiza 1) 4 handwritten letters
9/23/87 2) Pictures of Verceles w/
handwritten notations
Petitioner’s private handwritten instruments

establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Art. 172 (2) FC. The
dates, letters, pictures, and testimonies presented by
respondents are irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is
petitioner’s illegitimate child. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required.
PROPERTY
HIDDEN TREASURE: any hidden and unknown deposit of money,

jewelry, or other precious objects the lawful ownership of which
does not appear. (Art. 439 NCC)
RIGHT TO HIDDEN TREASURE:
FINDER IS:
1. owner of land, building or property All the treasure belongs to him
where treasure was found
2. not the owner thereof ½ to him; ½ to owner
3. merely employed by owner no share in the treasure, but should be
paid his wages, unless there is an
agreement to the contrary
4. trespasser no share in the treasure
Treasure is of interest to science or the State acquires them at their just price;
arts division in conformity with above rules
Art. 448. RULES WHEN LANDOWNER IS IN GOOD

FAITH AND BUILDER, PLANTER, SOWER
IS ALSO IN GOOD FAITH
Rights and Obligations of Rights and Obligations of B/P/S in
Landowner in Good Faith Good Faith
1. right of appropriation after 1. right of reimbursement of
payment of indemnity provided necessary and useful expenses;
in Arts. 546 and 548; OR 2. right of retention until paid;
2. right to compel B/P to pay the 3. right to buy the land upon which
price of the land and S, the the building has been built or
proper rent. trees have been planted.
EXCEPTION: value of the
EXCEPTION: value of land is
land is considerably more
considerably more than value of
than value of the building or
the building or trees; hence,
trees, hence: forced lease
forced lease shall result.
is the remedy, the terms of
which is as per agreement
of the parties. In case of
disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
Art. 449 to 452. RIGHTS OF BUILDER IN BAD FAITH

AND LANDOWNER IN GOOD FAITH
Landowner in Good Faith Builder in Bad Faith

1. right of appropriation without No right except reimbursement
payment of indemnity, + of necessary expenses for
damages; OR preservation of land.
2. right to demand removal or
demolition, at builder’s
expense, + damages; OR
3. right to demand price of land or
rent, regardless if value of land
is considerably more than value
of building or trees + damages.
SPOUSES BENITEZ vs. CA

266 SCRA 242, January 16, 1997
The OPTION IS TO SELL AND NOT TO

BUY the land and the CHOICE BELONGS
TO THE LANDOWNER; There is NO pre-
emptive right to buy even as a
compromise and NO compulsion to sell on
the part of the landowner.
SPOUSES ALVIOLA vs. CA

GR 117642, April 24, 1998
For Article 448 NCC to apply “the
CONSTRUCTION MUST BE OF PERMANENT
CHARACTER, ATTACHED TO THE SOIL,
WITH AN IDEA OF PERPETUITY. But if it is
of a transitory character or is transferable,
there is NO ACCESSION and the builder
must remove the construction.”
VERONA PADA – KILARIO vs.

CA, GR 134329, Jan. 19, 2000
MERE PROMISE TO DONATE THE LAND

CANNOT CONVERT THE BUILDER INTO ONE
IN GF. At the time the improvement was built
on the land, there was mere expectancy of
ownership which may or may not be realized.
Occupancy by petitioner of the property
was merely TOLERATED, HENCE, THEIR
POSSESSION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN
GF.
NO PRESCRIPTION will lie against the real
owners who have title/TCT over the land.
JOSEFA vs. SAN BUENAVENTURA,

GR 163429, March 3, 2006
LESSEES ARE NOT BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH.
They came into the possession of the lot by virtue of
a contract entered into with the lessor. They are
estopped to deny their landlord’s title, or to assert a better
title not only in themselves, but also in some 3rd person
while they remain in possession of the leased premises and
until they surrender possession to the landlord.
Although they cannot claim any right under

Article 448 NCC, their right is given under Article
1678 NCC.
ALLUVIUM (Art. 457 NCC)
REQUISITES:
1. deposit of soil is gradual and
imperceptible;
2. cause is the current of the river;
3. river must continue to exist;
4. increase must be comparatively little;
5. lands where accretion takes place must
be adjacent to the banks of the river.
EFFECT: soil deposited belongs to the

owner of the land adjoining the river
bank where accretion took place.
AVULSION (Art. 459 NCC)
REQUISITES:
1. segregation or transfer caused by the
current of a river, creek, or torrent;
2. segregation or transfer must be sudden
or abrupt;
3. portion of the land transported known or
identified.
EFFECT: the owner of the land to which the

segregated portion belongs retains ownership
thereof, provided he removes (not merely claims)
the same within 2 years from such segregation.
ABANDONED RIVER BED (Art. 461 NCC)

REQUISITES:
1. change in the course of river must be sudden
so the old river bed may be identified;
2. change in the course must be more or less
permanent;
3. change of the river bed must be a natural
one;
4. definite abandonment by the government;
5. river must continue to exist.
EFFECT: abandoned river beds belong to the owners whose

lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost; however, the owners of the lands adjoining the
old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying
the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value
of the area occupied by the new bed.
CO-OWNERSHIP
ROSARIO VICTORIA
CTO
ORIA
R A & ELMA PIDLAO
PIDLAOAN vs.
NORMITA PIDLAOAN, et.al., GR 196470, 4/20/16
Lived together since
1978 until Rosario
left for Saudi Arabia
borrowed money from Normita to
Rosario Elma redeem H & L; executed DOS of lot
in Normita’s favor; per advise of NP,
Constructed house on 1984 –bought 201 executed DOD in favor of Normita;
Elma’s lot; left for sq.m. lot; TCT was TCT was issued to Normita who has
Saudi Arabia after the in her name; been paying taxes; Normita allowed
house was built. mortgaged H & L Elma to continue occupying the
In 1989. house.
Q.1: Is Rosario a co-owner of the lot?
Q.2: Was the Deed of Donation simulated?
Q.3: Was the transaction between Elma and Normita a sale,
a donation or an equitable mortgage?
A.1: NO co-ownership exists. Elma ALONE bought the lot

in 1984 from its previous owners. Title was issued SOLELY
in her name. Normita bought the lot relying on the face of
the TCT that Elma and NO other person owned it.
Mere construction of a house on another’s land

does NOT create a co-ownership, regardless of the value of
the house. Art. 484 NCC provides that co-ownership exists
when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons. A house and a lot are separately
identifiable properties and can pertain to different owners: the
house belongs to Rosario and the lot belongs to Elma. The
remedies of Rosario in recovering the house or its value are
based on Article 448 NCC.
A.2: Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that

would transfer the ownership of the subject matter of their
contract but disguised it as a donation due to the ill-advise of the
notary public. The Deed of Donation they executed was only
relatively simulated.
A.3: A review of the sale contract shows that the parties

intended NO equitable mortgage. The contract even contains
Elma's undertaking to remove Rosario's house on the property.
This undertaking supports the conclusion that the parties
executed the contract with the end view of
transferring full ownership over the lot to Normita.
In sum, Elma and Normita entered in a sale contract, not

a donation. Elma sold the entire property to Normita.
Title was validly issued in Normita’s name.
RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNER:

1. full ownership of his part, i.e. his undivided
interest or share in the common property;
2. full ownership of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto;
3. may alienate, assign, or mortgage his ideal
interest or share;
4. may even substitute another person in the
enjoyment of his part, except when personal
rights are involved;
5. right of redemption in case the shares of all the
other co-owners or any of them are sold to a third
person;
6. to renounce so much of his interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes
to exempt himself from said obligation;
7. to demand partition.
TABASONDRA, et.al. vs. SPS. CONSTANTINO, et.al. ,

GR 196403, DECEMBER 7, 2016
Co-owners of 3
lots w/ a total
area of 100,352
square meters Cornelio Valentina Valeriana
(+3/15/91) (+8/19/90) (+8/4/98)
q
33,450.66 square meters each.
Tarcila & Sebastian Tabasondras 8/18/82 - DO
DOSOS to SSebastian
b i &
Tarcila of their ideal shares.
Q: Did the CA correctly order the partition & accounting

with respect to Cornelio’s share only?
A: YES. Valentina and Valeriana can alienate their pro-

indiviso shares to Sebastian and Tarcila even without the
knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because
the alienation covered only the disposition of their
respective interests in the common property.
CONSENT OF CO-OWNERS REQUIRED

1. ACTION IN EJECTMENT ONE CO-OWNER
(Art. 487) - not only against a stranger
- includes forcible entry, but even against a
unlawful detainer, accion co-owner
publiciana, accion
reinvidicatoria, quieting of
title and replevin
2. ACTS OF PRESERVATION ONE CO-OWNER, but he must,
(Ar t. 488) if practicable, first notify his
- include expenses for co-owners of the necessity of
preservation, maintenance repairs
or necessary repairs and - Co-owner may not contribute
taxes by RENOUNCING so much of
- compel contribution of his undivided interest = to his
other co-owners, even if share of the expenses (and
incurred w/o prior notice or taxes) but no such renunciation
knowledge if it is prejudicial to the
co-ownership
3. ACTS OF ADMINISTRATION FINANCIAL MAJORITY,

(Art. 492) i.e., approval by those
a) include those that:
who represent the
(1) do not involve an alteration
(2) improve or embellish the thing
CONTROLLING
(3) may be renewed from time to INTEREST in the co-
time ownership;
(4) have transitory effects
(5) do not give rise to a real right
over the co-owned property
(6) do not affect the substance
or nature of the thing
4. ACTS OF ALTERATION ALL CO-OWNERS i.e.,

(Art. 491) UNANIMOUS CONSENT,
a) more or less permanent express or implied, to
b) changes the use of the make alteration valid;
thing
but to recover
c) prejudices the condition of
the thing or its enjoyment
expenses, express
by the others consent is required.
RURAL BANK of CABADBARAN, INC. (RBCI)

vs. MELECIO-YAP, GR 178451, JULY 30, 2014
3,044sq.m. lot
w/ancestral Isaac Trinidad
house & 2
other (+) (+)
structures
adm. & Erna Melecio heirs Extrajudicially

mgt. foreclosed the
RBCI REM; highest
SPA P200K loan secured by bidder; NO
REM over the house & redemption; intend
lot registered w/the RD to take possession
and annotated on TD # of the property.
425-R.
Q: If the entire property subject of co-ownership

was mortgaged by a co-owner using a forged SPA,
is the mortgage valid, voidable or void ?
A: The mortgage is valid with respect to

Erna’s share but with respect to the
shares of the other co-owners, the
mortgage is void. While Erna, herself a co-
owner, by virtue of Article 493 of the NCC,
had the right to mortgage or even sell her
undivided interest in the said properties, she
could not dispose of or mortgage the
subject properties in their entirety
WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER
CO-OWNERS.
ARAMBULO, et. al. vs. NOLASCO, et. al.,

GR 189420, MAR. 26, 2014
co-owners of Rosita Vda. de Arambulo

2 lots in
Tondo, Mla.
w/ a total 7 children Iraida Genaro withholding
area of 233 (+) consent to
sq. meters the sale of
their 1/9
3 children
share
Q: May a co-owner be compelled to give

consent to a sale of his share by the
other co-owners?
A: NO. Under Art. 493. NCC, each co-owner shall

have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved.
The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not

affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part
that belongs to them. XXX With the full ownership of
the respondents remaining unaffected by
petitioners’ sale of their parts, the nature of the
property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the
petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with
the respondents.
Art. 494. PARTITION

1. A co-owner can demand partition at any time, in so far as his share is
concerned.
2. Action is imprescriptible; it cannot be barred by laches, absent a
repudiation of the co-ownership by a co-owner.
3. NO PARTITION if:
a. prohibited by agreement for a period not exceeding 10 years; may
be extended after original period has prescribed provided each
does not exceed 10 years.
b. prohibited by testator/donor for a period not exceeding 20 years.
c. prohibited by law.
d. legal nature of the common property does not allow partition.
e. physical partition would render the property unserviceable for its
intended use.
Art. 498. LEGAL PARTITION

1. Resorted when the thing is essentially indivisible.
2. Procedure :
a. Give the whole to one co-owner who will be required to indemnify
the rest.
b. If not agreed upon, public or private sale and its proceeds divided
among the co-owners.
Art. 494. ACQUISITION BY

PRESCRIPTION
1. GEN. RULE: NO CO-OWNER can acquire the whole
property by prescription.
EXCEPTION: Repudiation of the co-ownership.
a. he must make known to the other co-owners that

he is definitely repudiating the co-ownership and
claiming complete ownership over the entire
property;
b. evidence of repudiation and knowledge on the par t
of the others must be clear and convincing;
c. open, continuous, public, peaceful, adverse
possession for the period of time required under
the law;
d. period of prescription starts from such repudiation.
QUINTOS, et. al. vs. NICOLAS, et. al.,

GR 210252, JUNE 25, 2014
Q: May partition be barred by res judicata

since the first case for partition was
dismissed for failure to prosecute?
A: NO. Under Article 494 NCC, NO CO-OWNER is

obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and his
proper remedy is an action for PARTITION which he
may bring at anytime in so far as his share is
concerned. Xxx A substantive law CANNOT be
amended by a procedural rule.
SPOUSES MARCOS vs. Heirs of BANGI et.al.

GR 185745, OCT. 15, 2014
Q: Is an oral partition of land valid?
A: YES. Partition is the separation, division

and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. Every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition.
Oral partition is effective when the

parties have consummated it by the taking
of possession and the exercise of ownership
of the respective portions set off to each.
Art. 523. POSSESSION

1. it is the holding of a thing or
2. the enjoyment of a right
CLASSES OF POSSESSION:
1. in one’s own name or in
the name of another.
2. in the concept of the
owner, or in the
concept of a holder, or
in the concept of both
the owner and the
holder.
3. in good faith, or in bad
faith.
Art. 538. RULES REGARDING

POSSESSION AS A FACT
1. GEN. RULE: cannot be recognized at the same time
in two different personalities.
2. EXCEPTION: a) co-possessors;
b) possession in different concepts
or degrees.
3. In case of conflict/dispute regarding possession
a. present possessor shall be preferred;
b. if both are present, the one longer in possession;
c. if both began to possess at the same time, the one
who presents or has a title;
d. if both present a title, the court will determine.
POSSESSION OF MOVABLE ACQUIRED IN GOOD FAITH POSSESSION OF

(Art. 559) MOVABLE
ACQUIRED IN BF
1. Equivalent to title 1. NOT equivalent
to title
2. Owner may RECOVER
a. if he lost the same OR
b. he has been unlawfully deprived*
EXCEPTION:
a. possessor acquired the movable in GF at a
public sale, hence, owner must REIMBURSE
the price paid by the possessor
* Unlawful
deprivation –
includes all
cases of taking
which
constitute
a criminal
offense
Subic Bay Legend Resorts & Casinos, Inc.

vs. Bernard Fernandez, G.R. 193426,
Sept. 29, 2014
Subic Bay Legenda’s

Legend Resorts security
& Casinos, Inc. Ludwin &
Deoven officers
played at the
casino and
operates the had their interrogated the
Legenda Hotel chips brothers; turned
& Casino encashed by them over to the
the cashier IIOSBMA; ordered
the return of the
chips and the
cash
Applying Article 559 of the NCC, respondent

had the legal presumption of title to or
ownership of the casino chips. This conclusion
springs from respondent’s admission during trial
that the chips represented payment by a Chinese
customer for services he rendered to the latter in
his car shop. Since respondent became the
owner of the chips, he could very well have given
them to Ludwin and Deoven, who likewise held
them as “possessors in good faith and for
value” and with “presumptive title” derived
from the respondent.
EASEMENT OR SERVITUDE
- is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner
or for the benefit of a community or one or
more persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong by virtue of which
the owner is obliged to abstain from doing
or to permit a certain thing to be done on
his estate. (Arts. 613/614 NCC).
MODES OF ACQUIRING EASEMENTS (Arts. 620 – 623)

A. CONTINUOUS AND 1. By TITLE
APPARENT a) does not necessarily mean
document
b) it means a juridical act or law
sufficient to create the
encumbrance. Ex: Law,
EXAMPLES: donation, will, contract
1. Easement of aquaduct
2. Easement of light and view 2. By PRESCRIPTION - TEN YEARS
a) positive, when made: a) positive – computed from the day
(1) on one’s own wall the dominant owner commenced
extending over to exercise the easement upon
another’s property OR servient estate.
(2) on a party wall
b) negative, when made: b) negative – computed from the day
(1) on one’s own wall notarial prohibition was made on
w/c does not extend the servient estate.
over another’s
property.
MODES OF ACQUIRING EASEMENTS (Arts. 620 – 623)

B. DISCONTINUOUS AND
APPARENT
C. CONTINUOUS AND
By TITLE ONLY
NON-APPARENT
D. DISCONTINUOUS AND
NON-APPARENT
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY (Arts. 649 -

657): by which one person or a particular
class of persons is allowed to pass over
another’s land, usually thru one particular path
or line.
A. REQUISITES: (Art. 649)
1. property (dominant) is surrounded by other
estates;
2. no adequate outlet to a public highway;
3. absolutely necessary for use or cultivation of
the enclosed estate of the claimant;
4. isolation not due to claimant’s own act;
5. established at the point least prejudicial to
servient estate;
6. claimant must be the owner or one with a real
right thereto;
7. payment of the proper indemnity.
B. AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY (Art. 649)

1. If passage is permanent – value of
the land + amount of damage
caused to servient estate
2. If passage is temporary – amount of
damage caused to servient estate
C. EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE LEGAL
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
(Art. 655 NCC)
1. opening of a new road;
2. joining the dominant estate to another
which abuts, and therefore, has
access to the public highway;
3. such new access is adequate and
convenient to the dominant estate.
CRISTOBAL vs. CA,

GR No. 125339, June 22, 1998
Q: Who has the burden of proving

entitlement to a legal easement of right of
way?
A: It is incumbent upon the dominant estate

owner to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the presence of all the requisites
before his claim for the legal easement of
ROW may be granted. IF IT CANNOT BE
PROVEN, IT CANNOT BE GRANTED.
ALICIA REYES vs. SPS. RAMOS, GR 194488, 2/11/15

Proposed LEROW is not
the least onerous to the
servient estate as it would
pass through the Ramos’
garage, garden and grotto.
Spouses Ramos
Alicia
demanded the LEROW
contending her 450 sq. m. lot OCULAR INSPECTION REPORT:
was surrounded by Sps. “Petitioner’s property had another
Ramos’ 1,500 sq. m. lot, w/o outlet to the highway…. xxx an
her fault & the only adequate irrigation canal w/c can be traversed
outlet from her property to by constructing a bridge as
the highway was through Sps. passageway just like what others have
Ramos’ property. done”.XXX
The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be

longer and more inconvenient to petitioner because she will have
to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the
irrigation canal before she can reach the road. These reasons will
not justify the imposition of an easement on respondents' property
because CONVENIENCE IS NOT THE GAUGE IN
DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE A LEOROW
OVER ANOTHER'S PROPERTY.
Petitioner would have permanent structures — such as the

garage, garden, and grotto already installed on respondent's
property — destroyed to accommodate her preferred location for
the right of way. This negates the claim that Ramos’ property is
the least prejudicial to the servient estate.
DICHOSO, JR. et.al. vs. PATROCINIO MARCOS, GR

180282, April 11, 2011
Q: May petitioners who were already granted a

ROW by another landowner still compel
respondent to grant them a legal EOROW
contending that the alternative route given to
them was longer and circuitous?
A: NO. Convenience of the dominant estate has
never been the gauge for the grant of a
compulsory ROW. The true standard for the
grant of the legal EOROW is “adequacy”.
CHAN vs. CA, GR No. 105294

Feb. 26, 1997
The owner of a lot who built a concrete

fence on the southern portion of her property
to separate it from her neighbors and
closed the 28-inch clearance which was
her means to reach the national highway
is NOT entitled to the legal easement of
right of way. She was the one who
caused her own isolation.
Unisource Commercial and Dev. Corp.

vs. Chung, GR 173252, July 17, 2009
Encarnacion Francisco
Sandico Hidalgo
OCT w/ Vol. EOROW
Several transfers
of lots
Unisource Commercial Chung Brothers

TCT # 176253 TCT # 121488
w/vol. EOROW
The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway

can extinguish ONLY legal or compulsory easements,
NOT voluntary easements. A voluntary easement of
right of way, like any other contract, could be
EXTINGUISHED ONLY BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF
THE PARTIES OR BY RENUNCIATION OF THE OWNER
OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE.
SPS. SALIMBAGON vs. SPS. TAN,

GR 185240, Jan. 21, 2010
Q: What is the effect if the servient

estate owners in an easement of
right of way later become the
dominant estate owners?
A: The easement is extinguished by

operation of law. The existence of a
dominant estate and a servient estate
is incompatible with the idea that
BOTH estates belong to the same
person.
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND

VIEW (Art. 667 – 673 NCC)
GEN. RULE: no part owner may, WITHOUT
THE CONSENT OF THE
OTHERS, open through the
party wall any window or
aperture of any kind .
PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION FOR

ACQUISITION THEREOF: (Art. 668 NCC)
1. If thru a party wall – 10 yrs. from
the time of opening of the window.
2. If thru a wall on the dominant
estate – 10 yrs. from the time of
notarial prohibition.
CLASSIFICATION OF
NUISANCE: (Art. 695)
I. ACCORDING TO SCOPE/EXTENT
OF ITS INJURIOUS EFFECTS
A. PUBLIC – one which affects a

community or neighborhood or
any considerable number of
persons although the extent of
annoyance, danger or damage
upon individuals may be
unequal.
1. REMEDIES
1). Prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance;
2). Civil action;
a). Gen. Rule: must be commenced by the city or municipal
mayor.
b). EXCEPTION: private person may file the action if the nuisance
is specially injurious to himself.
3). extrajudicial abatement.
a). district health officer determines whether or not it is the best
remedy.
b). by private person himself, provided: (Art. 703/705)
(1). nuisance specially injurious to himself;
(2). demand is first made upon the owner or possessor of the
property to abate the nuisance;
(3). such demand has been rejected;
(4). abatement be approved by the district health officer and
executed with the assistance of the local police;
(5). removing or if necessary, by destroying the thing which
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of
the peace or doing unnecessary injury;
(6). Value of the destruction does not exceed P3000.00.
2. Remedies are cumulative NOT exclusive.
3. All remedies may be availed of by public officers but a
private person may avail of the last two (2) remedies only.
B. PRIVATE – one which affects

only private rights or produces
damage to one or a few
persons.
1. Remedies:
1). Civil action;
2). extrajudicial abatement.
II. ACCORDING TO ITS NATURE

A. Nuisance per se
B. Nuisance per accidens
PER SE PER ACCIDENS
1. nuisance at all times and 1. becomes a nuisance by
under any circumstances, reason of circumstances,
regardless of location or location or surroundings;
surroundings; 2. proof of the manner of
2. proof of its existence is its conduct, or the act,
sufficient; its consequences and
3. may be summarily abated other like circumstances,
under the undefined law is necessary;
of necessity. 3. reasonable notice and
hearing on whether or
not, in law, it constitutes
a nuisance.
CRUZ et. al. vs. PANDACAN HIKER’S

CLUB INC., GR 188213, 1/11/16
Q: Is the basketball ring a nuisance

per se that may be summarily abated?
A: NO. The basketball ring is not a nuisance per se that
is susceptible to a summary abatement. It can be
considered as a mere nuisance per accidens, for it does
not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of persons
and property. It is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses
to the safety and lives of the people; nor is it like
pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs which are inherently pernicious and which may be
summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy restaurant
which may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the
public health.
Perez, both in his personal & official capacity as

Chief, Marikina Demolition Office vs. Sps. Madrona,
GR 184478, March 21, 2012
Q: May the owners of a H & L who
constructed a concrete fence with a steel gate on their
property be ordered by the Chief of the Demolition Office
to demolish said fence on the contention it was
encroaching on the sidewalk?
A: Respondent’s fence is NOT a nuisance per se.
By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of
the community. It was built primarily to secure
respondent’s property and to prevent intruders
from entering it. The sidewalk still exists. If petitioner
believes that respondent’s fence indeed encroaches on the
sidewalk, it may be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose.
DONATION
DONATION includes:
1. an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts
it. (Art. 725 NCC).
2. giving to another a thing or right on
account of the latter’s merits or of the
services rendered by him to the donor,
provided they do not constitute a
demandable debt (Art. 726 NCC).
3. giving to another a thing or right and
imposes upon the donee a burden
which is less than the value of the
thing given (Art. 726 NCC).
REYES vs. ASUNCION, GR 196083, 11/11/15
Milagros Felix Asuncion

Reyes
10/21/01 – owner of 3.5 Transfer of Right over Lot
hec. lot; filed complaint 15 June 1993
for declaration of nullity
of contract alleging it “my H & I voluntarily transfer
was absolutely simulated our lot to Felix Asuncion for his 10
since she never intended years of honest services to us; we
to transfer her rights to R shall take care of the finances in
but only to prevent the the processing of the sugar cane
BCDA from taking her under my name, for as long as I
property. like. xxx”
Q: What is the nature of the contract executed

by the parties?
?
It is a remuneratory donation. Reyes gave the

subject land to Asuncion to remunerate his ten (10) years
of faithful and honest service to her. She also stated that
"napagkasunduan namin na kami ang bahala sa finances,
sa kasunduan na kami ang magpapakabyaw ng tubo sa
pangalan ko, hanggang gusto ko.” This is a profit sharing
agreement where Reyes finances the planting, harvesting
and milling of sugarcane on the land donated to Asuncion
under the former’s name. Unmistakably, it is a charge or
burden on the donation.
The rules on contracts should govern the

subject contract because the donation is onerous
as the burden is imposed upon the donee of a thing
with an undetermined value.
VOID DON
NATIONS (Art. 739 NCC):
1. between persons who are guilty of

adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation;
2. between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
3. made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants and ascendants, by reason
of his office;
4. between spouses, during their marriage,
except moderate gifts during times of
family rejoicing. (Art. 87 FC).
GROUNDS FOR REVOCATION OF

DONATION (Art. 760 NCC)
1. birth, adoption, re-appearance of the 1st
child of donor (within 4 years from BAR);
2. non-compliance with any of the

conditions imposed by the donor
(within 4 years from non-compliance);
3. ingratitude of donee (within 1 year

from knowledge of donee’s ingratitude).
GROUNDS FOR REDUCTION OF

DONATION
1. failure of the donor to reserve sufficient means to
support himself or dependent
p relatives (anytime
during lifetime of donor).
onor)).
2. failure of the donor

to reserve sufficientt
property to pay-off
his existing debts
(within 4 years from
m
perfection of
donation).
debtor creditor
3. Inofficiousness (within 5 years after death of

donor).
4. birth, adoption, re-appearance of 1st child of

donor (within 4 years).
ACTS OF INGRATITUDE AS GROUND

FOR REVOCATION: (Art. 765)
1. if the donee should commit some
offense against the person, the
honor or the property of the
donor or of his wife or children
under his parental care.
2. if donee imputes to the donor any y
criminal offense or any act
ct
involving moral turpitude, even n
though he should prove it, unless ss
the crime or the act has been n
committed against the donee
e
himself, his wife or children underer
his authority.
3. if he unduly refuses him support
when the donee is legally or morally
bound to give support to the donor.
CALANASAN vs. DOLORITO, G.R. 171937,

Nov. 25, 2013
The donor has no factual and legal basis for
the revocation of the donation. 1st, the
ungrateful acts were committed NOT by
the donee; it was her husband who
committed them. 2nd, the ungrateful acts
were perpetrated NOT against the donor;
it was the petitioner’s sister who received
the alleged ill treatments.

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