Republic of the Philippines NLRC rendered a Decision[2] affirming the decision of the LA.

Respondent filed a Motion for

Supreme Court Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI),[3] pertinent portions of which read:
Manila
x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under consideration was merely copied from
FIRST DIVISION the pleadings of respondents-appellees with very slight modifications. But we cannot accept
the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable individuals, that the actual writer of the said
JOHNNY NG, Adm. Case No. 7252 decision is not at all connected with the NLRC First Division.
Complainant, [CBD 05-1434]
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in maintaining that the
Present: separation pay should be only one half month per year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not
clear enough, or is there another reason known only to them?
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, First Division, it is
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ignominious ignorance of the law on the part of the commissioners concerned.
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually resulted in prosperity and
not losses. xxx Respondents failed to prove their claim of losses. And the Honorable
ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR, Commissioners of the First Division lost their ability to see these glaring facts.
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 22, 2006 x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One month per year of service and all
x--------------------------------------------------x of it to the affected workers not to some people in the NLRC in part.
RESOLUTION
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent practices of employers xxx. If the
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. Honorable Commissioners, of the First Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to
real life.
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27, 2006 of the IBP Board of
Governors, to wit: x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division to see for themselves the
evidence before them and not merely rely on their reviewers and on the word of their ponente.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, If they do this honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty on the part of the
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence. Unfair labor practice stares them
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully in the face.
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents propensity to resort to undeserved language and disrespectful stance, Atty. If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the Honorable Commissioners of
Benjamin C. Alar is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that severe penalties will be the First Division are doubly so and with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an
imposed in case similar misconduct is again committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against illegal strike, how come their only penalty is removing their tent? It is obvious that the Labor
Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Arbiter and the Honorable Commissioners know deep in their small hearts that there was no
strike. This is the only reason for the finding of illegal strike. Without this finding, they have no
A verified complaint[1] dated February 15, 2005 was filed by Johnny Ng (complainant) against basis to remove the tent; they have to invent that basis.
Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment. x x x The union in its Union Reply To The Position Paper Of Management and its Annexes has
shown very clearly that the so called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to
Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor case with the National Labor believe the myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front of the wall and
Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and
the counsel for complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the

1
egress of the premises, are blocked by something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired
vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money claims. Whereas, before, the
established rule was, in cases of money claims the employer had the burden of proof of
payment. Now it is the other way around. x x x For lack of a better name we should call this
new rule the Special Dinopol Rule. But only retirable commissioners are authorized to apply
this rule and only when the money claims involved are substantial. When they are meager the
ordinary rules apply.
x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips proved that the sixteen (16)
claimants were already paid their service incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim
from the cross-eyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos
xxx
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking of the ingress and egress is a
myth seem invisible to the impaired sight of Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as ponente [of] the decision that
he signed and caused his co-commissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown great and
irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance of the law. He is a shame to
the NLRC and should not be allowed to have anything to do with the instant case any more.
Commissioner Go and Chairman Seeres, by negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but, since
the NLRC rules prohibit the inhibition of the entire division, Chairman Seeres should remain in
the instant case and appoint two (2) other commissioners from another division to sit with him
and pass final judgment in the instant case.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005, respondent Alar contends that the
instant complaint only intends to harass him and to influence the result of the cases between
complainant and the workers in the different fora where they are pending; that the Rules of
Court/Code of Professional Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC
Rules of Procedure has no provision on disciplinary matters for litigants and lawyers appearing
before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against
misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing in cases before it; that the Rules of Court/Code of
Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being
a court; that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial
Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary; and that the labor
lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously practicing before the NLRC and get paid on a
contingent basis are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get cheated in their
cases by reason of corruption and collusion by the cheats from the other sectors who make
their lives and the lives of their constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers for the
employers who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel aggrieved.[5]
Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union president Marilyn Batan wherein it
is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers
in several instances, such that while the labor case is pending before the NLRC, respondents
Paras and Cruz filed a new case against the laborers in the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon
City (QC) to demolish the tent of the workers, thus splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC
and the City Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC which violates Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that
although Ng signed the disbarment complaint against Alar, respondents Parass and Cruzs office
instigated the said complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's company did not pay income
tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation due to fire and respondents consented to this
act of the employer which violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when the case started, there
were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the acts of the employer and the respondents,
the number of complainants were reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01,
19-02 and 19-03.[6]
In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005,[7] respondents Paras and Cruz
alleged: At no time did they file multiple actions arising from the same cause of action or brook
interference in the normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs sought before the CEO has
nothing to do with the case pending before the NLRC; the demolition of the nuisance and illegal
structures is a cause of action completely irrelevant and unrelated to the labor cases of
complainant; the CEO was requested to investigate certain nuisance structures located outside
the employer's property, which consist of shanties, tents, banners and other paraphernalia
which hampered the free ingress to and egress out of the employer's property and present
clear and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer found the structures violative of
pertinent DPWH and MMDA ordinances; the pendency of a labor case with the NLRC is
completely irrelevant since the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not validate or justify the
construction of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO proceeded to abate the nuisance structures
pursuant to its power to protect life, property and legal order; it was not their idea to file the
disbarment complaint against respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client on how to
go about filing the case, after having been served a copy of the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8
should not be perceived as an excuse for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by
their brother lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only reason the number of
complainants were reduced is because of the amicable settlement they were able to reach with
most of them; their engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases; at no
time were they consulted regarding the tax concerns of their client and therefore were never
privy to the financial records of the latter; at no time did they give advice regarding their client's
tax concerns; respondent Alar's attempt at a disbarment case against them is unwarranted,
unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on his part.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Patrick
M. Velez for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation,
the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using improper and abusive
language and recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of not less than three
months with a stern warning that more severe penalty will be imposed in case similar
misconduct is again committed.
2
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find any actionable misconduct
against Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore recommended that the Counter-Complaint against
them be dismissed for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors issued the Resolution
hereinbefore quoted. While the Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that
respondent Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of
diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not
admit any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,[8] the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack
made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom's Resolution. On its face, the Resolution
presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and
jurisprudence. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary
language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,[9] the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[10] A
lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[11] Submitting pleadings
containing countless insults and diatribes against the NLRC and attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or
justices and therefore not part of the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial
Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla,[12] the Court held that
respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless
remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.[13]
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger
is unavailing. It does not deter the Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers
who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as members of the Bar.[14]
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,[15] thus:
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished
and punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or
irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. Resort by an attorney
in a motion for reconsideration to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is
frowned upon as neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the
attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and
to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion are sufficient, and such
words superfluous. It is in this context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio thought
best to focus the attention of this Court to the issue in the case does not give him unbridled
license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much
more effective, in calling the Courts attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does
not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect
of harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief. Stability of judicial institutions suggests that
the Bar stand firm on this precept.
3
The language here in question, respondents aver, was the result of overenthusiasm. It is but to
repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact,
the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be
circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts
in our system of government.[16]
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
actions erode the publics perception of the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP Board of Governors
is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz, the Court finds no reason to
disturb the following findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as
approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to substantiate its claims
despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office of the City Engineer really
partakes of a different cause of action, which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision
was made by the city engineer. Respondents remedy should be to question that decision, not
bring it to this Commission which has no jurisdiction over it. We can not substitute our
judgment for the proper courts who should determine the propriety or sagacity of the city
engineers action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves of remedies available in law
provided; these acts do not exceed the bounds of decency. In supporting the action against
respondents conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the attorneys duty as an
officer of the court to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack.
This requires of him not only to refrain from subjecting the judge to wild and groundless
accusation but also to discourage other people from so doing and to come to his defense when
he is so subjected. By the very nature of his position a judge lacks the power, outside of his
court, to defend himself against unfounded criticism and clamor and it is the attorney, and no
other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbents of the
judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152
(1957) Whether the disbarment complaint was filed by Ng or by his lawyers is therefore not of
great import, what is more apropos would be the contents of the complaint and whether the
same is sufficient to consider disciplinary sanctions.
Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the respondent lawyers have
already stated that they were not engaged as counsels to take care of their clients tax problems,
then they cannot be held accountable for the same. If any wrongdoing has been committed by
complainant Ng, he should answer for that and those lawyers who were responsible for such
acts be held liable jointly. There is no showing [that] attorneys Paras and Cruz were responsible
for that tax fiasco.
Finally, while it may be true that Batans group has been greatly diminished from about 100
claimants to less than half the number is not by itself an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are
duty bound to foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial proceedings while
a necessary part of the practice is not encouraged, because it will save expenses and help
unclogged [sic] the dockets. If the compromise is fair then there is no reason to prevent the
same. There is nothing in the counter-complaint which shows that the compromise agreement
and waivers executed appear to be unfair, hence no reason to hold lawyers liable for the same.
Besides, a compromise is as often the better part of justice as prudence the part of valor and a
lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the clients champion in settlement out of court
than he is the clients champion in the battle in court. (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court, 5
(1958); cited in Agpalos Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is therefore respondent Alar[]s beef
with the execution of these waivers if these were executed freely by his clients?
All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence
the dismissal of the counter-complaint against them is proper for absolute lack of merit.[17]
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-8.
[2] Penned by Commissioner Ernesto Dinopol, id. at 17.
[3] Id. at 11-17.
[4] Id. at 12-16.
[5] Id. at 22-30.
[6] Id. at 32-33.
[7] Id. at 114-119.
[8] Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, May 10, 2006.
4
[9] 455 Phil. 9 (2003).
[10] Id. at 20-21.
[11] Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 132, 136-137.
[12] 201 Phil. 47 (1982).
[13] Id. at 51.
[14] Id. at 52.
[15] G.R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441.
[16] Id. at 445-446.
[17] Report and Recommendation, pp. 13-14.

5
EN BANC The Facts

MARIA DIVINA CRUZ-VILLANUEVA, Sometime in January 2004, complainant engaged the services of respondent Rivera to prepare
Complainant, the documents, and to pay all the necessary expenses, relating to the sale of complainants
A.C. No. 7123 property to Samson B. Bautista (Bautista). As shown by an acknowledgment receipt,[1]
respondent Rivera received P80,000 from complainant to cover expenses payable to the
Present: Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Register of Deeds, the City Treasurers Office, and others.

PANGANIBAN, C.J., On Bautistas death in February 2004, complainant learned that the property had been
PUNO, transferred in Bautistas name based on a Deed of Reconveyance[2] executed by complainant.
QUISUMBING, Bautistas widow also informed complainant that final payment for the property would be
YNARES-SANTIAGO, withheld pending payment of all the necessary taxes.[3] The BIR also directed complainant to
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, explain why no tax evasion charges should be filed against her for non-payment of taxes on the
CARPIO, transfer.[4]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, Respondent Rivera then convinced complainant to file an adverse claim on the property and to
CARPIO MORALES, file cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 against Bautistas widow.
CALLEJO, SR., Respondent Rivera requested and received P13,000 as acceptance fee and representation
AZCUNA, expenses.[5]
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, After repeated verbal requests, complainant wrote a letter[6] to respondent Rivera to clarify
GARCIA, and the issue on the non-payment of taxes and the alleged Deed of Reconveyance, which
VELASCO, JR., JJ. complainant claimed she did not execute. Complainant likewise inquired about the adverse
claim supposedly filed by respondent Rivera on her behalf. Complainant also directed
- versus – respondent Rivera to pay immediately the necessary taxes to the BIR.

ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA and Promulgated: Complainant later learned that respondent Rivera had no notarial commission for the years
ATTY. ALEXANDER P. SIMEON, JR., 2003 and 2004.[7]
Respondents. November 20, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Complainant also charged respondent Simeon, Jr., Regional Director, Registry of Deeds,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, of conspiracy with respondent Rivera in registering the property
DECISION under Bautistas name based on the Deed of Reconveyance without payment of the proper
CARPIO, J.: taxes. Complainant alleged that respondent Simeon, Jr. allowed the registration despite
knowledge that there was a prior Deed of Sale[8] and that respondent Simeon, Jr. received part
The Case of the P80,000 to facilitate the transfer.

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Maria Divina Cruz-Villanueva (complainant) against
Atty. Carlos P. Rivera (respondent Rivera) and Atty. Alexander P. Simeon, Jr. (respondent
Simeon, Jr.) for grave misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).
In an Order dated 18 October 2004, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline directed respondents to answer the complaint. Respondent Rivera asked for an
extension of ten days to file his answer.[9] However, respondent Rivera did not file any answer.
In his Answer[10] dated 22 November 2004, respondent Simeon, Jr. denied complainants
allegations and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against him. On the registration in
Bautistas name without payment of the required taxes, respondent Simeon, Jr. claimed that he
relied on the genuineness and authenticity of the documents presented by respondent Rivera.

6
Respondent Simeon, Jr. denied that he received money from respondent Rivera to facilitate the
transfer. Respondent Simeon, Jr. also disavowed any knowledge of a prior Deed of Sale.
IBP Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco (Commissioner Pacheco) set the case for mandatory
conference on 11 March 2005. Only complainant and respondent Simeon, Jr. appeared in the
11 March 2005 hearing. The hearing was canceled and reset for 15 April 2005. Only complainant
appeared in the 15 April 2005 hearing. Despite receipt of notices of hearing, respondent Rivera
did not attend any of the hearings.
Commissioner Pacheco required all the parties to submit their position papers and
documentary evidence. Complainant and respondent Simeon, Jr. both filed position papers.
Respondent Simeon, Jr. submitted a reply to complainants position paper. Respondent Rivera
did not submit any position paper, thus waiving his right to comment and participate in the
investigation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-07 dated 28 January 2006 adopting
with modification[11] Commissioner Pachecos Report and Recommendation finding
respondent Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and serious violation of the Code. The IBP Board
of Governors recommended the imposition on respondent Rivera of a penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two years.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent
Simeon, Jr. for lack of merit.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to the Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B[12] of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent Rivera liable for violation of the lawyers oath and the Code.
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. should be
dismissed.
Complaint Must be Supported by Substantial Evidence
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving with substantial
evidence the allegations in the complaint.[13] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.[14]
Aside from complainants bare allegations, complainant did not present any evidence to prove
that respondent Simeon, Jr. conspired with respondent Rivera in registering the property in
Bautistas name based on the Deed of Reconveyance without payment of taxes. Likewise,
complainant did not present any evidence to prove that respondent Simeon, Jr. received part
of the P80,000 from respondent Rivera for the registration. Hence, the complaint against
respondent Simeon, Jr. should be dismissed.
Respondent Rivera Not Commissioned as Notary Public
A member of the Bar who notarizes a document when he has no authorization or commission
to do so may be subjected to disciplinary action. Notarization is not an empty act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.[15]
Respondent Rivera notarized the Deed of Sale and the Deed of Reconveyance sometime in
January 2004. However, the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, issued a certification that respondent Rivera had no notarial commission for the years
2003 and 2004.[16] Respondent Rivera did not present any evidence to the contrary. Therefore,
when respondent Rivera notarized the two deeds, he had no authority to do so.
In performing notarial work without a commission, respondent Rivera violated the lawyers oath
to obey the law, specifically the Notarial Law, and to do no falsehood. Respondent Rivera also
violated Rule 1.01[17] of the Code because he deceived complainant into believing that he was
authorized to act as notary public when he was not. Respondent Riveras conduct constitutes
malpractice and falsification of a public document.[18]
Respondent Rivera Failed to Account for the Money
He Received from Complainant
The Code mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all funds of his client that may come
into his possession.[19] The Code further states that a lawyer shall account for all money
received from the client.[20]
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer must render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.[21]
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.[22]
Respondent Rivera specifically received P80,000 from complainant for expenses to the BIR, the
Register of Deeds, the City Treasurers Office and other related purposes. Respondent Rivera
also received P13,000 from complainant as acceptance fee and representation expenses for the
7
filing of the adverse claim and criminal charges against Bautistas widow. However, respondent
Rivera did not pay the taxes to the BIR and did not file an adverse claim. Hence, respondent ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Rivera should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant. Associate Justice

Respondent Riveras failure to make an accounting or to return the money to complainant is a WE CONCUR:
violation of the trust reposed on him. As a lawyer, respondent Rivera should be scrupulously ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity because the Code exacts REYNATO S. PUNO
a high degree of fidelity and trust from members of the bar.[23] LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
The Court also notes respondent Riveras lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. After ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
filing the Motion for Extension of Time to File an Answer[24] and despite receipt of the IBPs MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
orders and notices, respondent Rivera did not participate in the investigation. Respondent RENATO C. CORONA
Riveras actuation shows a high degree of irresponsibility which stains the nobility of the legal CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
profession.[25] ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Rivera DANTE O. TINGA
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Notaries public who notarize documents without the requisite commission are penalized with CANCIO C. GARCIA
revocation of their notarial commission and are barred from being commissioned as notary PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
public.[26] Thus, respondent Rivera should be barred from being commissioned as notary
public for one year and his notarial commission, if any, revoked. [1] Rollo, p. 10.
[2] Id. at 8.
On the other hand, lawyers guilty of violation of Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code are [3] Id. at 13.
suspended from the practice of law for six months to one year.[27] Considering respondent [4] Id. at 12.
Riveras lack of prior administrative record, suspension from the practice of law for one year [5] Id. at 17.
and not disbarment, as prayed for by complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the interest [6] Id. at 14-15.
of the public and the legal profession. [7] Id. at 16.
[8] Id. at 32.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera GUILTY of violation of the lawyers oath, [9] Id. at 21.
Rule 1.01, Canon 16, and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we [10] Id. at 25-28.
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera from the practice of law for one year effective upon [11] Commissioner Pacheco recommended the disbarment of respondent Rivera.
finality of this decision. Further, respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is BARRED from being [12] Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
commissioned as notary public for one year and his present commission, if any, is REVOKED.
Furthermore, respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera is ORDERED TO ACCOUNT to complainant, SEC. 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.
within 20 days from notice of this decision, for the P80,000 and the P13,000. xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
We DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. Alexander P. Simeon, Jr. respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
respondents personal record as attorneys. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated [13] Adarne v. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, 27 June 1978, 83 SCRA 734.
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. [14] Navarro v. Cerezo, A.M. No. P-05-1962, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 626.
[15] Nunga v. Viray, 366 Phil. 155 (1999).
SO ORDERED. [16] Rollo, p. 16.
[17] Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

8
[18] Joson v. Baltazar, A.C. No. 575, 14 February 1991, 194 SCRA 114.
[19] Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 16.
[20] Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.01.
[21] Garcia v. Manuel, 443 Phil. 479 (2003).
[22] Barnachea v. Quiocho, 447 Phil. 67 (2003).
[23] Medina v. Bautista, 120 Phil. 787 (1964).
[24] Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[25] Sencio v. Calvadores, 443 Phil. 490 (2003).
[26] Zoreta v. Simpliciano, A.C. No. 6492, 18 November 2004, 443 SCRA 1; Nunga v. Viray, supra
note 15.
[27] Meneses v. Macalino, A.C. No. 6651, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA 212; Villanueva v.
Ishiwata, A.C. No. 5041, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 401; Emiliano Court Townhouses v.
Dioneda, 447 Phil. 408 (2003).

9
EN BANC Her complaint-affidavit narrated that sometime in February 2004, a certain SPO1 Lino Taytay
referred her to respondent as she was in need of legal aid concerning a string of complaints for
AILEEN A. FERANCULLO, A.C. No. 7214 estafa filed against her. They allegedly agreed to a monthly retainer fee of P10,000.00 in
Complainant, consideration for respondents legal services; the first payment thereof made in the same
month of February at her residence in Central Park Condominium, Pasay City. Respondent
Present: purportedly advised complainant to stay for the meantime at his office located at GF-7, Elenel
Apt., 2243 Luna corner Mabolo Sts., Pasay City, to avoid arrest and to keep her safe from the
PANGANIBAN, C.J., people suing and threatening her. He allegedly went to the extent of sending his cousin, Felix
PUNO, Reyes, to fetch complainant from her residence. At night, complainant and respondent,
- versus - QUISUMBING, together with the latters office staff, went out for dining and relaxation.[2]
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Complainant recounted further that respondent prodded her to move into a more secure
CARPIO, location, the Youth and Student Travel Association of the Philippines in Paraaque.[3] That
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, allegedly became the start of his courtship. Complainant averred that respondent would send
CORONA, her breakfast and flowers. When asked about his personal circumstances, respondent
CARPIO MORALES, supposedly told complainant that he was still single although he had a child out of wedlock.
ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO, CALLEJO, SR., Complainant also maintained that she saw no apparent indications suggesting that respondent
JR., AZCUNA, was married.[4]
Respondent. TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, As indicative of their romantic relationship, respondent and complainant allegedly traveled to
GARCIA, and different places. According to complainant, respondent took her to Antipolo to meet his
VELASCO, JR., JJ. relatives and to Mindoro to attend the birthday celebration of his mother. They also
purportedly went to Cebu City to meet complainants eldest child.[5]
Promulgated:
November 30, 2006 Complainant claimed that in the beginning, respondent diligently attended to her cases and
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x advised her not to appear at the hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor, assuring her that
DECISION he would attempt at a compromise agreement with the adverse parties. For this purpose,
between February and July 2004, complainant purportedly entrusted to respondent varying
Tinga, J. amounts of money totaling Four Hundred Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P431,000.00) based on
his assurance that her cases merely involved money claims which can be settled amicably.
Tell the truth and shame the Devil Complainant claimed that she had to ask this amount from her parents. Complainant did not
Shakespeare-Henry IV, Part I, III-1 ask from respondent for any receipt evidencing the transaction.[6]

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Aileen Ferancullo Complainant further alleged that she and respondent moved to a unit at Parrison Tower at F.B.
(petitioner) against Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. (respondent) grounded on his alleged Harrison, Pasay City sometime in April 2004, where they started living together as husband and
commission of estafa, bigamy and violation of the lawyers oath. Both parties have starkly wife. The unit was purportedly owned by a client of respondent who agreed to offset the
contrasting stories to tell. Hence, the necessity of presenting both versions. amount of rental with the legal fees due him.[7]

In a verified complaint dated December 17, 2004,[1] complainant narrated how respondent
allegedly took advantage of their attorney-client relationship to extort money from her in
consideration of the out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases and deceived her into
marrying him by concealing his previous marriage.
To corroborate her allegation that they lived together as husband and wife, complainant
annexed to her complaint-affidavit five (5) photographs, three of which show intimate poses of
complainant and respondent.[8] Complainant also recounted that during respondents birthday
celebration held on May 28, 2004 at the rooftop of the Parrison Tower, he supposedly
introduced complainant as his wife to his guests.[9] Complainant attached a VCD copy
documenting the event to her reply to respondents answer.[10] As averred, at the start of the

10
video, complainant can be seen entertaining the guests and overseeing the food preparation.
Early in the party, complainants three children arrived. While respondent was walking around
and entertaining the guests, complainant stood behind the buffet table supervising last minute
preparation before the food was served. As the guests started to get food from the buffet table,
complainant approached respondent. Respondent placed his hand on the hips of complainant
while the latter whispered at him. All throughout the video, complainant was either standing
behind the buffet table or conversing with respondent and the guests.
Complainant found out that she was pregnant sometime in June 2004. On August 4, 2004,
complainant and respondent allegedly wed in a rite solemnized in Kawit, Cavite.[11] In support
of this averment, complainant annexed to the complaint a photocopy of the marriage
certificate.[12]
Two (2) months thereafter, in a casual conversation with a certain Teresita Santos, another
client of respondent, Santos told complainant that respondent was already married to a certain
Marlin M. Maranan. Complainant then confronted respondent who allegedly admitted that he
was married but assured complainant that he was ready to leave his wife so that they can be
together. The relationship between complainant and respondent turned sour eventually
leading to their separation.[13]
Complainant sought assistance from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). In a letter dated
14 October 2006, Atty. Romarico Ayson sent a demand letter to respondent, urging the latter
to shoulder complainants hospitalization until her delivery and provide monthly support for the
child in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) thereafter.[14]
Complainant averred that since their separation, respondent and his agents had been
threatening her with arrest and lawsuits. She also discovered that the criminal complaints
remained pending filed against her with the Office of the Prosecutor. She claimed that
respondent himself had been exerting efforts so that the criminal complaints against her would
proceed.[15]
In compliance with the IBP Order dated 6 January 2005, respondent filed an answer,[16]
denying the allegations that he committed estafa, maintained an illicit relationship and
contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant. While admitting that complainant sought
his legal services in connection with the latters cases for estafa and illegal recruitment pending
before the Office of the Prosecutor, respondent insisted that his relationship with complainant
was purely professional. In particular, he claimed that the purpose of his visits to complainants
residence was to show her court orders issued in relation to her cases. He also averred that it
was complainant who sought refuge in his office and invited him and his legal staff for dinners
to discuss her cases.[17]
Respondent maintained that complainant insisted on skipping the scheduled hearings before
the Office of the Prosecutor. He also denied receiving P431,000.00 from complainant, arguing
that on the alleged dates of payments, he was out for court appearances.[18] He admitted
going to Cebu City upon the behest of complainant who shouldered all his expenses, but the
visit was only for the purpose of discussing the cases with complainants parents.[19]
Respondent denied meeting complainants eldest child in Cebu City and all the other alleged
trips they took together.[20]
Respondent likewise denied courting complainant asserting that the latter had already known
since February 2004 that he was married.[21] He claimed to be happily married to his legal wife.
He denied living in together with complainant or providing a residence for complainant.
According to him, complainant vacated her residence at Central Park Condominium, Pasay City
because her lease application was denied.[22] While he admitted that the unit at Parrison
Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City belonged to his client, respondent insisted that his relatives
had been occupying the same since March 2004, thus making it impossible for complainant to
have transferred to said unit in April 2004.[23]
Respondent described as contrary to human experience the allegation of complainant that he
introduced her as his wife during his birthday celebration on 28 May 2004, where his brothers
and sisters were also present. To support this claim, he submitted the affidavits of fifteen guests
in his party, stating that respondent did not introduce complainant as his wife.[24]
Respondent also denied that a marriage celebration between him and complainant took place
on 4 August 2004 or that he signed the marriage certificate and or that he got her pregnant. He
had already instituted corresponding criminal complaints against complainant for the alleged
falsification of his signature in the marriage certificate. Respondent claimed that complainant
was extorting money from him, hence the filing of the administrative complaint.[25]
Complainant submitted a Reply[26] to respondents answer to rebut his allegations. Annexed to
her reply were receipts of payments on utilities to prove that she actually lived at Parrison
Tower and a VCD copy showing the video clip of respondents birthday celebration held on 28
May 2004. Complainant and respondent also filed their respective position papers. In addition,
complainant filed a Manifestation and Reply with the following annexes: (1) a blue polo barong
and pants allegedly worn by respondent during his birthday celebration on 28 May 2004; (2)
the original bank statement reciting the deposits made by complainants parents of the amount
of P431,000.00;[27] (3) the original passbook in the names of complainant
and respondent;[28] and (4) the certified xerox copy from the original of their marriage
contract.[29]
In response thereto, respondent moved to expunge from the records the annexes to
complainants Manifestation and Reply[30] on the ground that he was not furnished a copy of
said annexes and that the Manifestation and Reply was an unsigned pleading. Complainant filed
an opposition thereto.[31]
On 20 January 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) issued its Report and Recommendation to dismiss the complaint against respondent for
lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report and
Recommendation in a Resolution[32] dated 20 March 2006, finding the recommendation to be
11
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
that the complaint lacked merit. The IBP believed that the complainant failed to present a clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof to warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. The
IBP also ruled that the pictures and VCD not having been duly authenticated could not be
received in evidence.
As is usual in cases of this nature, the adverse parties presented conflicting versions. The duty
to examine the claims and counterclaims and the evidence to support them ideally lies with the
IBP, but in the instant case, its evaluation leaves much to be desired.
Despite the numerous factual allegations presented by both parties and the affidavits and
documents to support them, the IBP made only a general conclusion that complainant must be
motivated by greed in filing the instant administrative complaint. Thus, the Court reviewed the
records.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[33]
For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.[34]
Contrary to the IBPs opinion, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent maintained
an illicit relationship with complainant who was not his legal wife. It also appears that
respondent contracted a second marriage with complainant as evidenced by their marriage
certificate.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract.[35] Section 7 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents.[36] The marriage certificate plainly indicates
that a marriage was celebrated between respondent and complainant on 4 August 2004, and
it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. The marriage
certificate should prevail over respondents claim that the marriage certificate or his signature
therein was falsified. The rule is that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a
notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity.[37]
Respondent contends that the certified true copy of the marriage contract should be expunged
from the records because he was not furnished a copy thereof and the Manifestation and Reply
to which it was annexed was an unsigned pleading. The records show otherwise. A copy of said
marriage certificate, denominated as Annex G, accompanied the initiatory complaint filed
before the IBP and furnished to respondent. In fact, respondent admitted in paragraph 61 of
his answer that he received a copy of the marriage contract.[38] A copy of complainants
Manifestation and Reply, to which a certified true copy of the questioned marriage certificate
was annexed, was also sent by registered mail to the IBP.
The proscription against unsigned pleadings laid down in Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
is not applicable in the instant case. In view of its nature, administrative proceedings against
lawyers are not strictly governed by the Rules of Court. As we held in In re Almacen, a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.[39] Hence, an administrative
proceeding continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.[40] Moreover, no defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the
proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of
Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result
in a miscarriage of justice.[41] That the copy of the Manifestation and Reply furnished to
respondent was not signed by either complainant or her counsel is merely an innocuous error.
In any case, the copy thereof forming part of the IBP records was signed by complainant.
All told, the Court finds that complainants version is more credible, with the caveat that the
Court is not accepting hook line and sinker every allegation of complainant. There is substantial
evidence suggesting that more than a business or professional relationship existed between
complainant and respondent. Complainant presented certain evidence either proving her claim
or demonstrating as incredible respondents defense that complainant was merely extorting
money from him. For instance, to prove her allegation that she and respondent lived together,
complainant presented the original of the retainer agreement between respondent and the
owner of the condominium building where they allegedly lived together. Complainant also
attached to her reply copies of receipts of payments on utilities and the original passbook of an
account in the names of both complainant and respondent. These pieces of evidence were
supposed to be under the control or custody of respondent, but the latter offered no
explanation as to how complainant was able to produce them. If respondents claim is to be
believed, complainant must have gone to great lengths just to fabricate or steal these pieces of
evidence, a theory that is not even suggested by respondent. Incidentally, vis--vis complainants
overwhelming allegations, respondent offered only denials which are effectively self-serving
and weak under the law on evidence. Other than his general claim that complainant only
wanted money from him, respondent did not even bother to create his own version of the
supposed extortion.
Moreover, the VCD documenting respondents birthday celebration on 28 May 2004 belied
respondents claim that he acted as complainants legal counsel only and the concomitant
12
assumption that she was there herself as a guest only. In said party, complainant entertained
the guests and supervised the food preparation. Obviously, these are not the usual actuations
of a client or a guest merely invited to a party.
Respondent would have this Court disregard the contents of the VCD and of the intimate photos
of respondent and complainant on the ground that under the rules of evidence, the person who
took the pictures or videotaped the birthday party should identify and authenticate the picture
and VCD.
Respondents objection will be sustained in civil or criminal litigation, but not in an
administrative proceeding as in the instant case. In administrative proceedings, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.[42]
The Court, however, finds no sufficient evidence indicating that respondent falsely promised
the settlement of complainants criminal cases in consideration of the amount of P431,000.00.
The bank statements showing the deposits made by complainants parents are not conclusive
of said claim because they do not prove that said amounts were received by respondent.
For what ethical breaches then may respondent be held liable?
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
On several occasions, the Court has held that an illicit relation is considered disgraceful and
immoral conduct which is subject to disciplinary action.[43] In Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,[44] it was
held:
x x x x indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly
immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to
cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional
career or in his private life. A lawyer at no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber
which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands
for his continued membership in, a great and noble profession.[45]
In Dantes v. Dantes,[46] the Court ordered the disbarment of a lawyer, describing as grossly
immoral his conduct of engaging in illicit relationships and abandoning his family. The Court
exhorted lawyers to refrain from scandalous behavior, thus:
In Barrientos vs. Daarol, we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives
in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member
of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain
an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.
The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes,
namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect
prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[47]
Respondents intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.[48] It is a
time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.[49] However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired.[50]
The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment,
depending on the circumstances of the case. In case of suspension, the period would range
from one year[51] to indefinite suspension, as in the case of Cordova v. Cordova,[52] where the
lawyer was found to have maintained an adulterous relationship for two years and refused to
support his family.
13
 [9]Id. at 4.
In Dantes v. Atty. Dantes,[53] disbarment was imposed as a penalty on the lawyer who [10]Rollo, Vol. II, p. 3.
maintained illicit relationships with at least two women during the subsistence of his marriage. [11]Id. at 4.
And so was the case in Toledo v. Toledo[54] and Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,[55] where the lawyers [12]Id. at 22.
subject of disciplinary actions were found to have abandoned their legal wives and cohabited [13]Id. at 5.
with other women. [14]Id. at 23.
[15]Id. at 6.
The exacerbating circumstances present in the cited cases are absent in this case. Moreover, [16]Id. at 40.
complainant failed to prove that respondent misappropriated her money. Thus, the Court finds [17]Id. at 43.
that suspension from the practice of law is adequate to penalize respondent for his grossly [18]Id. at 48.
immoral conduct. [19]Id. at 52.
[20]Id. at 53.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross immorality and is hereby [21]Id. at 46.
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, [22]Id.
with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the [23]Id. at 54.
same or a similar offense hereafter. [24]Id. at 133-148.
[25]Id. at 58-59.
SO ORDERED. [26]Id. at 179.
DANTE O. TINGA [27]Id. at 193-94.
WE CONCUR: [28]Id. at 192.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN [29]Id. at 195.
REYNATO S. PUNO [30]Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 189-191.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING [31]Id. at 206.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO [32]Rollo, Vol. I, p. 76.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ [33]Fr. Sinnott, v. Judge Barte, 423 Phil. 522, 536 (2001).
ANTONIO T. CARPIO [34]Concepcion v. Atty. Fandio, Jr., 389 Phil. 474, 481 (2000).
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [35]Villanueva, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, June 21, 1991, 198 SCRA 472; Vda. De
RENATO C. CORONA Chua v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 465 (1998); People v. Alejo, G.R. No. 149370, September 23,
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES 2003, 411 SCRA 563; Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. SCRA 272.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA [36]Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO [37]Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 171, 181 (2000).
CANCIO C. GARCIA [38]Rollo, p. 70.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. [39]Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, A. C. No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306.
[40]Rules of Court, Rule 139-B, Sec. 5.
[1]Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 1-8. [41]Rules of Court, Rule 139-B, Sec. 11.
[2]Id. at 1-2. [42]Ocampo v. Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21, 28 (2000).
[3]Id. at 3. [43]Dela Torre- Yadao v. Cabanatan, A.M. No. P-05-1953, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 332.
[4]Rollo, p. 3. [44]376 Phil. 336 (1999).
[5]Id. [45]Id. at 340.
[6]Id. at 2-3. [46]A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582.
[7]Id. at 3. [47]Id. at 588-589Supra.
8]Id. at 27. [48]Sinnott v.Barte, supra note 30, at 293.

14
Republic of the Philippines Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment instituted by the herein complainant Dahlia S.
Supreme Court Gacias against Atty. Alexander Bulauitan on grounds of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Manila
Herein respondent Atty. Alexander Bulauitan used to own a parcel of land with an area of
EN BANC 1,242 square meters located at Tuguegarao City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-79190. Sometime in February 1996, complainant and respondent entered into an
DAHLIA S. GACIAS, agreement for the purchase, on installment basis, of a 92-square meter portion of the 1,242-
Complainant, square meter lot at a unit price of P3,500.00 per square meter. Out of the total consideration
of P322,000.00, complainant initially paid respondent, as down payment, US$3,100.00, or its
- versus - equivalent of P82,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt dated February 28, 1996. Subsequent
installment payments were remitted, as mutually agreed upon, to the Bank of Philippine
ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN, Islands, Kamuning Branch, under the account of respondents daughter, Joan Christine. All
Respondent. told, complainant had, as of November 1996, paid the respondent, in cash and in kind, the
peso equivalent of US$6,950.00, which, per complainants computation, using the $1:P43
A.C. No. 7280 dollar-peso rate of exchange, amounted to P300,000.00.

Present: As complainant would also allege in her affidavit-complaint dated April 23, 2001,[1] as
amended,[2] she asked for the copy of the title over the 92-square meter portion upon
PANGANIBAN, C.J., learning about the mortgage the respondent constituted over his Tuguegarao property.
PUNO, According to complainant, respondents inability to produce the desired title impelled her not
QUISUMBING, to complete payment anymore and to request the return of the amount she had already paid
YNARES-SANTIAGO, the respondent. Complainant further alleged that the respondent agreed, but has not made
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, good his undertaking, to make reimbursement. Her request for assistance from the Integrated
CARPIO, Bar of the Philippines (IBP) proved futile, too. Meanwhile, the mortgagee bank, China Bank,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, foreclosed the mortgage constituted on the respondents property, then consolidated the title
CORONA, over it in its name.
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR., In his answer in compliance with an order from the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
AZCUNA, respondent admitted entering into a land purchase agreement with the complainant, but
TINGA, stressed the private nature of the transaction between them. He described as premature the
CHICO-NAZARIO, complainants demand for delivery of title inasmuch as the aforementioned agreement was
GARCIA, and not consummated for complainants failure to pay in full the purchase price of the 92-square
VELASCO, JR., JJ. meter portion. Respondent admitted, though, that he undertook to pay back the amount of
P300,000.00 as a measure to avoid scandal, given what to him was complainants penchant to
Promulgated: make a scene whenever the opportunity presented itself.

November 16, 2006 To the answer, complainant countered with a reply, to which respondent filed a rejoinder.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In the meantime, complainant, upon the facts above narrated, filed a criminal complaint for
DECISION estafa against the respondent before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan.

GARCIA, J.: Following several failed preliminary conferences and hearings, IBP Bar Discipline Hearing
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes issued, on July 22, 2005, an order[3] declaring the case as

15
submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and position papers submitted by the
parties, with their attachments.
In its report dated November 8, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommends that
respondent be adjudged guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
The recommendation to suspend and the findings holding it together commend themselves
for concurrence.
are thus put in serious doubt too. The private nature of the transaction or the fact that the
same was concluded without the respondent taking advantage of his legal profession is really
of little moment. For, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him wanting in honesty, probity or good
demeanor.[7]
While the Court agrees with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline respecting the guilt of
respondent and the propriety of a suspension, it is not, however, inclined to impose the
severe recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest WHEREFORE, herein respondent, ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN, is found guilty of gross
or deceitful conduct.[4] The complementing Rule 7.03 of the Code, on the other hand, misconduct and dishonesty and ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to one (1) year effective upon his receipt hereof. Let copies of this decision be spread on his
practice law. Another complementing provision is found in the Rules of Court providing that a record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the IBP and the Office of the Court
member of the bar may be suspended or even removed from office as an attorney for any Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts.
deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office.[5] And when the Code or the Rules speaks of
conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in SO ORDERED.
connection with the performance of the lawyers professional duties, but also covers any CANCIO C. GARCIA
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him WE CONCUR:
to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law invest ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
him with. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza.[6] [T]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, REYNATO S. PUNO
of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Like Atty. Adaza in Orbe, respondent Atty. Bulauitan also refused without justifiable reason to ANTONIO T. CARPIO
comply with his just obligation under a contract he entered into with the complainant. There MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
can be no quibbling as to the complainant having paid respondent the amount of P300,000.00 RENATO C. CORONA
out of the total contract cost of P322,000.00. In other words, there had been substantial CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
contract compliance on the part of the complainant. A reciprocal effort towards complying ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
with his part of the bargain would have been becoming of respondent, as a man of goodwill. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
It would appear, however, that this kind of gesture was alas too much to hope for from the DANTE O. TINGA
respondent. For, instead of going through the motion of delivering the portion of his property MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
to its buyer after his receipt of almost the entire purchase price therefor, the respondent PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
mortgaged the whole property without so much as informing the complainant about it. Like [1] Records, pp. 1 et seq.
the IBP investigating commissioner, the Court finds the respondents act of giving the property [2] Dated July 26, 2001; Records, pp. 61 et seq.
in question in mortgage bordering on the fraudulent and surely dishonest. The Court, to be [3] Id. at 207.
sure, takes stock of respondents attempt to make amends by promising to return the amount [4] Rule 1.01.
of P300,000.00. But this promise strikes the Court, as it did the IBP investigating [5] Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court.
commissioner, as a mere ploy by the respondent to evade criminal prosecution for estafa, [6] Adm. Case No. 5252, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 567, citing cases.
what with the fact that he has yet to make good his commitment to return. [7] Zaguirre v. Castillo, Adm. Case No. 4921, March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 658, citing Nakpil v.
Valdes, A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998, 286 SCRA 758.
Respondent had shown, through his dealing with the complainant involving a tiny parcel of
land, a want of professional honesty. Such misdeed reflects on the moral stuff which he is
made of. His fitness to continue in the advocacy of law and manage the legal affairs of others

16
THIRD DIVISION
ESTELA ANASTACIO-BRIONES,
Adm. Case No. 6266
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. ALFREDO A. ZAPANTA,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
November 16, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Estela Anastacio-Briones against respondent Atty.
Alfredo A. Zapanta for abandonment and neglect of duties.
In her Complaint[1] dated December 1, 2003, Estela Anastacio-Briones stated that she engaged
the services of respondent to file three civil cases involving a parcel of land located in Antipolo
City. The cases were then consolidated[2] before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 73.
Complainant averred that on October 25, 2002, she showed respondent a copy of Discharge
and Appearance of Counsels with Ex-parte Motion to Cancel the October 25, 2002 Hearing she
intended to file that day. She claimed that even prior to the hearing, she informed respondent
of her joint venture agreement with a real estate developer who offered the services of its own
counsel. Complainant added that respondent requested her not to file it and he would submit
a withdrawal of appearance instead. Complainant also informed respondent that she could not
attend the hearing on January 6, 2003 because of other commitments. Respondent allegedly
assured her that he would be present in the hearing.
On January 6, 2003, both respondent and complainant failed to appear in the hearing. As a
result, the trial court declared them to have waived their right to present further witnesses and
directed them to file their formal offer of evidence within ten days from notice. The trial court
noted that respondent received its Order on January 24, 2003, but respondent did not act on it
within the ten-day period. Instead of filing a formal offer of evidence, respondent filed a
withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003. On March 10, 2003, the trial court dismissed the
case with prejudice.[3]
On May 5, 2003, complainant learned that the cases were dismissed and that respondent did
not attend the January 6, 2003 hearing and did not file a formal offer of evidence.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for abandoning her case and withdrawing
his appearance as counsel without her knowledge.
In his Comment[4] dated June 10, 2004, respondent countered that he was discharged as
complainants counsel after the October 25, 2002 hearing. Respondent added that he prepared
a withdrawal of appearance on October 30, 2002 but complainant ignored his several requests
to sign it in his office. Nevertheless, he claimed he filed a withdrawal of appearance on March
5, 2003 without complainants conformity.
Respondent denied promising complainant that he would attend the January 6, 2003 hearing.
According to him, complainant informed his secretary that her new lawyer would attend.
Respondent claimed further that complainants new lawyer should be faulted for belatedly filing
an entry of appearance and a motion for reconsideration. Respondent claimed that he was
merely being used as a scapegoat for complainants own negligence in pursuing the cases.
In a Resolution[5] dated September 20, 2004, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005, Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for negligence in the performance of
his duties as counsel, and for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner
Funa recommended respondents suspension for three months from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-104 dated October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Funa. On November 15, 2005,
the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed with this Court a motion for reconsideration. In its
comment, the IBP, through Commissioner Funa, recommended the denial of the motion.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent was remiss in performing his duties as
counsel of complainant. The Court finds respondent liable for negligence and for violation of
Canon 18[6] specifically Rules 18.03[7] and 18.04[8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
17
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[9] provides the proper procedure for a lawyers Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
withdrawal as counsel in a case. Unless the procedure prescribed in the abovementioned respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
section is complied with, the attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who should be Department of Justice, and all courts in this country for their information and guidance.
served with copies of the judgments, orders and pleadings and who should be held
responsible for the case.[10] For its part, the court could recognize no other representation SO ORDERED.
on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
effected.[11]
Associate Justice
In Orcino v. Gaspar,[12] we held that until a lawyers withdrawal shall have been approved, he
remains counsel of record and is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the WE CONCUR:
interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-
client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of his appearance on ANTONIO T. CARPIO
record.
Associate Justice
In this case, respondent admitted that he did not attend the January 6, 2003 hearing despite
being notified by the court. His claim that he was already discharged as counsel as early as CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
October 25, 2002 is negated by the record that he withdrew his appearance only on March 5,
Associate Justice
2003. Until his dismissal or withdrawal was made of record, any judicial notice sent to him was
binding upon his client even though as between them the professional relationship may have DANTE O. TINGA
been terminated.[13] Thus, unless properly relieved, respondent is responsible for the conduct
of the cases and his failure to attend the hearing and comply with the trial courts directive to Associate Justice
file a formal offer of evidence constitute inexcusable negligence.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Moreover, respondents negligence is not excused by his claim that he had prepared his
withdrawal of appearance as early as October 30, 2002 but complainant refused to sign it. In Associate Justice
Macarilay v. Seria,[14] with similar facts, we rejected the counsels excuse for failing to file the
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-3.
complaints, although the complaints were finished, due to his clients refusal to sign them.
[2] Docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-4934, 98-4935 and 99-5218.
Certainly not to be overlooked is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of the
developments of the case.[15] We note that it was only on May 5, 2003 that complainant [3] Supra note 1 at 6.
learned that she defaulted in the case. As a lawyer mindful of the interest of his client,
respondent should have informed the complainant of the courts order addressed to him, [4] Id. at 30.
especially if he considered himself discharged in order for complainant and her new counsel to
be guided accordingly. [5] Id. at 55.

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief or
other pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in grave cases,
disbarment.[16] In this case, this Court sustains the recommendation of the IBP for respondents
suspension of three months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo A. Zapanta is hereby found GUILTY of negligence and is
meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for THREE MONTHS effective upon
finality of this Decision.
[6] Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
[7] Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
[8] Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
[9] SEC. 26. Change of attorneys.An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time
from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on

18
notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on
the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be
given to the adverse party.

xxxx

[10] Aquino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109493, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 578, 584.

[11] Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 106 Phil. 501, 505 (1959).

[12] Adm. Case No. 3773, September 24, 1997, 279 SCRA 379.

[13] Aromin v. Boncavil, A.C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999, 315 SCRA 1, 6.

[14] A.C. No. 6591, May 4, 2005, 458 SCRA 12.

[15] Dizon v. Laurente, A.C. No. 6597, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 595, 601.

[16] Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, A.C. No. 5760, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA
111, 127.

19