NO.
CASE TITLE KEY FACTS (PHRASES ONLY)
* Minibus took a detour; unfamiliar with the
area
Fabre v. CA * Reached a sharp curve; hit traffic signs
1 259 SCRA 426 * Passenger was pinned down; paralyzed
* Contract bet. Calvo (customs broker) and
SMC for transfer of semi-chemical fluting
Calvo vs UCPB paper and kraft liner board
GR 148496 * Reels of semi-chemical fluting paper were
2 3/19/02 wet/stained/torn and kraft liner board torn
* Junk dealer; side line = delivery
* Contract to deliver milk
Guzman vs. CA * 600 boxes not delivered; said truck was
3 168 SCRA 612 hijacked
* Contract between Bascos (carrier) and
Bascos vs. CA Cipriano to transport soya bean meal
4 221 SCRA 318 * Truck was hijacked
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT
* Driver could not have seen the curve despite the
care he took in driving the bus, because it was dark
and there was no sign on the road. He allegedly
slowed down but it was too late.
Other Arguments:
* An earlier departure could have prevented the
mishap (SC: Delay not the direct cause of accident) that the trip was Cabil's first one outside of
* The passengers were directly responsible for the Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a
conduct of the trip (SC: Passengers not
responsible to injuries caused by negligence of
driver)
* Calvo contends that she is not a common carrier
but a private carrier because, as a customs broker
and warehouseman, she does not indiscriminately
hold her services out to the public but only offers
the same to select parties.
* Calvo claims that the damage took place while
the goods were in the custody of wither the
carrying vessel or the arraastre operator, as she
immediately delivered the containers in SMC's
compound
* He was not a common carrier hence he could
not be held responsible for the value of the lost
goods;
* Loss was due to force majeure
* BASCOS’ DEFENSES:
a. No contract of carriage since Ciptrade
merely leased the cargo truck to load the cargo
from Manila to Laguna;
b. Ciptrade was liable to Bascos amounting to
Php11k for the loading of the cargo;
c. The truck was hijacked along Paco, Manila;
d. Said hijacking was immediately reported to
Ciptrade and that Bascos and the police exerted all
efforts to locate the hijacked properties;
e. After P.I., an information for robbery and
carnapping were filed against the suspects;
f. Hijacking, being a force majeure, exculpated
Bascos from any liability to Ciptrade.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
* Given the condition of the road and considering * In Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, in case of injury to a passenger due to
moderate speed.
* The negligence of Cabil gave rise to presumption
that Fabres, as employers, were negligent.
* Calvo accepted the cargo without exception
despite the alleged defects in some of the
container vans. Thus she was negligent.
* Cendana as common carrier and having failed to
exercise the extraordinary diligence required of
him by law should be held liable for the value of
undelivered goods;
* Pedro argues that in the circumstances of this
case, Cendeno should have hired a security guard
presumably to ride with the truck (SC: The
standard of extraordinary diligence does not
require this)
* Bascos was a common carrier, as evidenced by
the following:
- The truck driver received the cargo as evidenced burden to overcome it.
by cargo receipt;
- The truck helper was also an employee of Bascos; must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or
- The control of cargo was placed in Bascos's care irresistible threat, violence, or force. The affidavits presented by
SC RULING
1.Sps. Fabre and Cabil were negligent.
a.The arrangement was a contract of carriage (Art. 1732)
- As common carriers, Sps. Fabre were bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the passengers
to their destination. That of a good father of a family is insufficient
for common carriers.
- It was shown that the only screening of Cabil was a 2-week
apprenticeship, and finding out if Cabil could remember the names
of the children.
b.Considering that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it
was dark, Cabil drove the bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even
on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour,
and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, thus he was grossly
negligent.
2.Sps. Fabre and Cabil are jointly and severally liable.
the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and
of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners
of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
* Calvo is a common carrier, thus liable for the damages incurred
by the shipment – Art. 1732 does not distinguish whether or not
carrying of persons/goods/both is a principal activity, and here
Calvo’s transportation of goods is an integral part of her business. *
Calvo is liable for damages because of her failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier. To prove the
exercise of extraordinary diligence, Calvo must do more than
merely show the possibility that some other party could be
responsible for the damage. Calvo accepted the cargo without
exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container
vans, thus the exemption of liability under Art. 1734 (4) cannot
apply.
* Cendana was properly characterized as a common carrier even
though he merely “back-hauled” goods for other merchants from
Manila to Pangasinan, although such back-hauling was done on a
periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and
even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the
carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that he charged
his customers a fee for hauling their goods
* But the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as
quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly
regarded as a fortuitous event. Common carriers are not held liable
for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable,
provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard
of extraordinary diligence.
* Therefore, Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered
merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond
his control.
1. Bascos is a common carrier – The test to determine a
common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a part of the
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the
general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent
of the business transacted."
2. The hijacking is NOT a force majeure – The presumption
of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's
To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from hijacking, he
Bascos were not enough to overcome said presumption.
DOCTRINE NOTES FROM SIR
•
The degree of diligence to be exercised by common carriers is
extraordinary diligence, not merely that of a good father of a family.
•
In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver * Fabres did not have to be engaged in the
of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another business of public transportation for Art 1732
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are to apply (could be principal business activity
jointly and severally liable for damages. OR ancillary activity/sideline)
* No notes huhu but I highlighted this part --
the transportation of goods is an integral part
of Calvo's business, thus there's greater reason
to hold her as common carrier
* Also: extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods:
Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides: - render service with greatest skill and foresight
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for - use all reasonable means to ascertain the
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary nature and characteristic of goods tendered for
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the shipment
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances - exercise due care in the handling and
of each case. stowage, including such methods as their
nature requires.
* The Civil Code’s definition of common carrier makes no
distinction between one whose principal business is the carrying of
persons or things, and one who does such only as an ancillary
activity. A certificate of public convenience is likewise not required,
as the liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a
common carrier.
* Art. 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are
responsible for the loss of goods, unless the same is due to five (5)
enumerated causes therein.
* A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the
incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing
common carriers. * Common carriers are not made absolute
Under Article 1745 (6), a common carrier is held responsible — insurers against all risks of travel and of
and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility transport of goods
— even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where * Sir emphasized that carrier was not made
such thieves or robbers in fact acted “with grave or irresistible liable because cause of injury was beyond its
threat, violence or force.” control
* Art. 1732 did not distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population. * No notes again sorry :(

* EDSA LRT III construction;
* Project awarded to EDSA LRT Corp.
Tatad vs. * Assailed due to citizenship requirement of
Garcia GR granting franchise under the Constitution
5 114222 4/6/95
* PETITIONERS ARGUE:
a.The new agreements insofar as it grants EDSA
LRT Corp, a foreign corporation, the ownership
of the EDSA LRT III, a public utility, violates the
Constitution.
b.The BLT scheme provided in the agreement is
not defined or recognized under the BOT Law or
its IRR. Hence it is illegal.
c.The award of the contract on a negotiated basis
violates RA 6957
d.The award violatres the requirements provided
in the IRR
e.The agremeents violate EO No 380 for their
failure to bear presidential approval and hence,
illegal and ineffective
f.The agreements are groslly disadvantageous to
the government
* RESPONDENTS ARGUE:
a.Petitioners are not real parties in interest and
w/o legal standing
b.The writ of prohibition is not the proper
remedy and petition requires ascertainment of facts
c.Scheme adopted in the agremeents is actually a
build-transfer scheme allowed by the BOT law
d.Nationality requirement for public utilities
does not apply
e.The agremeents have been approved by Pres.
Ramos & are not disadvantageous to the
government
f.The award of the contract to private
respondent through negotiation and not public
bidding is allowed under the BOT law
g.Granting that the BOT law requires public
bidding, this has been amended by RA 7718 which
provides for direct negotitation
* The award of project was Constitutional
- What EDSA LRT Corp. owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks
like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a
public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities
to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public
utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but
their use to serve the public.
- The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for
the operation of a public utility. But, it does not require a franchise
before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility
so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
- The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and * Two types of franchise:
separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can - for ownership (putting up the business)
own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or - for operation
conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the * The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for
facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to the operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a What the Constitution prohibits is the grant of
serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a franchise to foreign corporation to operate
control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof. public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public. public utility.

* GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion

Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other
individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier.
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation,
offering their services to the public whether to the public in
general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an
exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of
passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail
themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."

* GPS cannot escape liability

- In culpa contractual, upon which the action of FGU Insurance
rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the
mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
- GPS trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract
of carriage between it and FGU Insurance’s assured, and admits * Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation,
failure of compliance with, the obligation — in this case, the offering their services to the public whether to the public in
FGU Insurance * Contract between GPS (carrier) and * GPS was the exclusive hauler of Concepcion and delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination — general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an * Res ipsa loquitur does not apply when an
vs. Sarmiento Concepcion for the delivery of refrigerators thus it was not engaged in business as a common gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of unexplained accident may be attributabe to
GR 141910 * GPS ruck collided with another truck; * GPS can still be considered as a common carrier carrier liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail causes which the defendant could not be
6 8/6/02 Cargoes damaged despite its limited clientele * The cause of damage was purely accidental him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so. themselves of its transportation service for a fee. responsible.
* FPIC is a common carrier
i. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying
goods (petroleum products)
ii. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to
all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the * Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a “common carrier” as
goods by land and for compensation “any person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the
iii. The fact that FPIC has a limited clientele does not exclude business of carrying or trnapsorting passengers or goods or both,
1.The imposition and collection of the business it from the definition of a common carrier by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to
tax on its gross receipts violates Sec. 133 of the the public.”
LGC; * Under the Petroleum Act, RA 387, FPIC is considered a
2.The authority of cities to impose and collect a “common carrier”: The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of
tax on the gross receipts of “contractors and Art. 86. Pipe line concessionair as a common carrier. – A pipe line goods is:
independent contractors” under Sec. 141 (e) and 1.FPIC cannot be exempt from taxes under Sec. shall have the preferential right to utilize installations for the • He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for
151 does not include the authority to collect such 133 (j) of the LGC as said exemption applies only transportation of petroleum owned by him, but is obligated to others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready
taxes on transportation contractors for, as defined to “transportation contractors and persons utilize the remaining trnasporation capacity pro rata for the to engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a
* Pipeline concession assessed local business under Sec. 131 (h), the term “contractors” engaged in the transportation by hire and common transportation of such other petroleum as may be offered by others business and not as a casual occupation
tax excludes transporation contractors; and carriers by air, land and water.” for transport, and to charge without discrimination such rates as • He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his
First Phil * Exemption given to common carrier under 3.The City Treasurer illegally and erroneously 2.
Pipelines are not included in the term “common may have been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and business is confined * Pipeline operators are common carriers as
Industrial vs. LGC imposed and collected the said tax, thus meriting carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers Natural Resources • He must undertake to carry by the method by which his held by jurisprudence
CA 300 SCRA * Local government said pipeline operator not the immediate refund of the tax paid such as trucks, trains, ships and the like business is conducted and over his established roads; and * Having limited clientele does not exclude
7 661 a common carrier • The transportation must be for hire one from the definition of a common carrier.

* Shipmnent of steel sheets
* Black Sea - owner of vessel
* Schmitz - customs broker
Schmitz vs. * TVI - owner of barge and tugboat for towing
Transport * Barge not pulled back to the shore
Venture 456 * Storm caused barge to capsize; Sheets sank
8 SCRA 557
* Jewels of Europe tour
Crisostomo va * Wrong info given by niece; missed flight
CA GR 138334 * Another tour taken; paid for the new tour;
9 8/25/03 claimed for reimbursement
* Schmitz was arguing that its act of chartering
(aka hiring) the barge and tugboat of TVI, it was
acting only as an agent of Little Giant, (consignee)
therefore the transportation contract was actually
between Little Giant and TVI.
* In her complaint, she alleged that her failure to
join "Jewels of Europe" was due to Caravan
Travelt’s fault since it did not clearly indicate the that she made a mistake in missing her flight for
departure date on the plane ticket. Caravan Travel "Jewels of Europe". Petitioner was allowed to
was also negligent in informing her of the wrong
flight schedule through its employee Menor. She
insisted that the "British Pageant" was merely a
substitute for the "Jewels of Europe" tour, such
that the cost of the former should be properly set- balance for the "British Pageant" package tour.
off against the sum paid for the latter.
* Black Sea argued that the cargoes were received - Black Sea’s duty as a common carrier extended only from the
by Little Giant through Schmitz in good order,
therefore, it has no liability because it had no
control nor supervision after.
* TVI argued that it was only a passive party and it Giant, it had no liability here.
merely received the cargoes and transferred them
unto the barge upon Schmitz’s instruction.
* For its part, Caravan Travel, through its
Operations Manager, Concepcion Chipeco, denied
responsibility for Estela’s failure to join the first
tour. Chipeco insisted that Estela was informed of
the correct departure date, which was clearly and
legibly printed on the plane ticket. The travel
documents were given to her two days ahead of
the scheduled trip.
* Caravan Travel explained that it can no longer
reimburse the amount paid for "Jewels of Europe",
considering that the same had already been
remitted to its principal in Singapore, Lotus Travel
Ltd., which had already billed the same even if
Estela did not join the tour. Lotus’ European tour
organizer, Insight International Tours Ltd.,
determines the cost of a package tour based on a
minimum number of projected participants. For
this reason, it is accepted industry practice to
disallow refund for individuals who failed to take a
booked tour.3
* Lastly, Caravan Travel maintained that the
"British Pageant" was not a substitute for the
package tour that Estela missed. This tour was
independently procured by Estela after realizing
make a partial payment for the second tour
because her niece was then an employee of the
travel agency. Consequently, Caravan Travel
prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the
* The Act of God doctrine does not apply.
- If only the barge was towed back right away to the pier, the loss
could have been avoided. However, the barge was left to float in
open sea until the big waves came in and this resulted to the
sinking of both the barge and the coils.
* Schmitz is a common carrier because it undertook to transport
the cargoes from the shipside of M/V Alexander Saveliev to Little
Giant’s warehouse at Cainta.
As long as a person or corporation holds itself to the public for the
purpose of transporting goods as a business, it is already
considered a common carrier regardless if it owns the vehicle to be
used or has to hire one .
* TVI WAS NEGLIGENT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
- TVI’s failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase
the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the
operation, but it was the proximate cause of the loss.
* SCHMITZ WAS ALSO NEGLIGENT
- Schmitz sent checkers and a supervisor to check TVI’s
operations, but it didn’t take all precautions to avoid the loss. It
already noted that TVI did not arrange for the towing of the barge
back to the shore, but it still did not do anything about it. This is
aggravated by the fact that Schmitz also knew that the weather
conditions were getting worse.
BLACK SEA WAS NOT NEGLIGENT
time the goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its
possession and received for transportation, until they were actually * Art. 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal
or constructively delivered to Little Giant. business activity is the carrying of goods and one who only does it
Since Black Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little as an ancillary activity. It is enough that the party undertakes to
deliver the goods for pecuniary estimation. To rule otherwise,
would deprive protection from those parties who have the
obligation to carry goods for its customers even if it’s only a part of
its business.
* Caravan Travel is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a
private nor a common carrier. Caravan Travel did not undertake to
transport Estela from one place to another since its covenant with
its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf.
Caravan Travel’s services as a travel agency include procuring
tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking
customers for tours.
* While Estela concededly bought her plane ticket through the
efforts of the company, this does not mean that the latter ipso
facto is a common carrier. At most, Caravan Travel acted merely as
an agent of the airline, with whom Estela ultimately contracted for
her carriage to Europe. Caravan Travel’s obligation to Estela in this
regard was simply to see to it that Estela was properly booked with
the airline for the appointed date and time. Her transport to the
place of destination, meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline.
* The object of Estela’s contractual relation with Caravan Travel is
the latter’s service of arranging and facilitating Estela’s booking,
ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the
object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers
or goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in
this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage.
* No contractual breach. * By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one
- The evidence on record shows that Caravan Travel exercised due whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate * One cannot transform an agreement as
diligence in performing its obligations under the contract and themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to contract of carriage merely by stipulation if one
followed standard procedure in rendering its services to Estela. As another for a fixed price.9 Such person or association of persons does not hold himself out as such
correctly observed by the lower court, the plane ticket issued to are regarded as carriers and are classified as private or special
Estela clearly reflected the departure date and time, contrary to carriers and common or public carriers. A common carrier is * 3 parts of contract of carriage:
Estela’s contention. The travel documents, consisting of the tour defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons, 1) meeting of the minds
itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were likewise delivered to corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of 2) consideration
Estela two days prior to the trip. Caravan Travel also properly carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, 3) offering of services to the public
booked Estelar for the tour, prepared the necessary documents and water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.
 * It should not have been ordered to respond for
the damage since paragraph 5 of the complaint
would indicate that BA was not the employer of
the negligent driver who was under the control
and supervision of Lino Castro at the time of the
accident, apart from the fact that the Isuzu truck
was in the physical possession of Rock by virtue of
the lease agreement.
* BA assumes, given the so-called hiatus on the
basis for the award of damages as decreed by the
* Truck owned byand registered under the lower and appellate courts, that Article 2180 of the
name of BA Finance met an accident which new Civil Code on vicarious liability will divest
BA Finance vs. resulted to death and injuries. petitioner of any responsibility absent any
CA 215 SCRA * Truck was leased by BA Finance to Rock employer-employee relationship between
10 715 Component Philippines petitioner and the driver.
* Collision bet. a Ford Fiera and a bus
Occidental * Bus did not stop to help * Occidental claims that the Fiera did not belong
Transport vs * Ford driver died to Trencio but to its registered owner, Sevilla Line,
CA 220 SCRA * Ford registered under the name of Sevilla and therefore, the grant of damages for its repair
11 167 Line but Trencio was the real owner was improperly awarded to Trencio.
* No argument stated in the case
* No argument stated in the case
* The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is
liable to the public for the injuries or damages suffered by
passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle,
even though the same had been transferred to a third person. The *Sir also asked:
principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with * There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the 1) Can the registered owner be allowed at the
vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the defendant-appellant as he is the registered owner in the Motor trial to prove who the actual and real owner is?
right to assume or presumed that the registered owner is the actual Vehicle Office. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to - Answer: No. The law does not relieve him
owner thereof, for it would be difficult with the public to enforce identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any directly of the responsibility as an incident or
the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, consequence of registration,
vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the 2) What is the recourse?
to prove who actual the owner is. registered owner. - Third-party complaint in the same action
* . The party who stands to benefit or suffer from the decision is
admittedly private respondent Trencio and not Sevilla Lines.
William Sevilla admitted that the real owner of the vehicle was
Trencio, in the case for damages by Occidental Land
Transportation against Sevilla Lines and/or William Sevilla. Having
thus been settled in the lower court, Occidental is now no longer
in any position to question the ownership of the Fiera or the award * The real owner of the vehicle should be the one to suffer or
of damages to private respondent Trencio. benefit. *No notes

* The prevailing doctrine on common carriers makes the registered

owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of the
carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already have
been transferred to another person.

* Benedicto retained registered ownership of the freight truck for

* Contract to deliver sawn lumber
* Goods did not arrive so owner of the truck
Benedicto va (Benedicto) was sued
IAC 220 SCRA * Benedicto previously sold the truck to
12 167 another person
* Benedicto denied liability alleging that she was a
complete stranger to the contract of carriage, the
subject truck having been earlier sold by her to
Benjamin Tee. She averred that Tee had been
operating the said truck in Central Luzon from
that date (28 February 1980) onwards, and that,
therefore, Licuden was Tee's employee and not
hers
* She urges that she could not be held answerable
for the loss of the cargo, because the doctrine
which makes the registered owner of a common
carrier vehicle answerable to the public for the
negligence of the driver despite the sale of the
vehicle to another person, applies only to cases
involving death of or injury to passengers.
* Because of petitioner's delay, the consignee was
constrained to look for other suppliers
her own benefit and convenience, that is, to secure the payment of
the balance of the selling price of the truck. Considerations both
of public policy and of equity require that she bear the
consequences flowing from registered ownership of the subject * A common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
vehicle insistent reasons of public policy, is burdened by the law with the
duty of exercising extraordinary diligence not only in ensuring the
* A common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for safety of passengers but also in caring for goods transported by it.
insistent reasons of public policy, is burdened by the law with the The loss or destruction or deterioration of goods turned over to
duty of exercising extraordinary diligence not only in ensuring the the common carrier for conveyance to a designated destination,
safety of passengers but also in caring for goods transported by it. raises instantly a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of
the carrier, save only where such loss, destruction or damage arises
* A contract of carriage of goods was shown; the sawn lumber was from extreme circumstances such as a natural disaster or calamity
loaded on board the freight truck; loss or non-delivery of the or act of the public enemy in time of war, or from an act or
lumber at Blue Star's premises in Valenzuela, Bulacan was also omission of the shipper himself or from the character of the goods
proven; and petitioner has not proven either that she had exercised or their packaging or container.
extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss or non-delivery or that
the loss or non-delivery was due to some casualty or force majeure This presumption may be overcome only by proof of extraordinary *Consideration in a contract of carriage =
inconsistent with her liability. diligence on the part of the carrier. must be for profit

* In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a

*Tractor rammed into a house, resulting to
Equitable vs. death and injury
Suyon GR * According to certificate of registration,
13 143360 7/05/02 owner's name is Equitable leased to Edwin Lim
* Equitable is liable for the deaths and the injuries, because it was
the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident.
* Equitable’s defenses: * Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner
a.The vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
and concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for
b.It was no longer in possession and control the consequences of its operation.
thereof at the time of the incident * Failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine to register the sale with the
c.Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but LTO should not prejudice the injured parties, who have the legal
of Ecatine. right to rely on the legal principle that the registered vehicle owner
* No argument stated in the case is liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the driver.
motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the
vehicle may have already been the subject of an unregistered Deed
of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the LTO,
the sale -- while valid and binding between the parties -- does not
affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents involving the
said transport equipment. Thus, in the present case, petitioner, * Leasing company can escape liability if the
which is the registered owner, is liable for the acts of the driver lease is registered
employed by its former lessee who has become the owner of that * In this case, the lease was superseded by the
vehicle by virtue of an unregistered Deed of Sale sale
 The school bus service is a common carrier and is therefore liable
for breach of contract of carriage. True test for a common carrier -
whether the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the
carrier that he has held out to the general public as his business or
School bus operator argues that they exercised the occupation. Given the nature of the business and for reasons of
diligence of a good father of the family in the public policy, the common carrier is bound "to observe
selection and supervision of the van driver, by extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
seeing to it that he had a driver’s license and that safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
he had not been involved in any vehicular accident. circumstances of each case."

PNR argues that the proximate cause of the PNR is also guilty. PNR faield to ensure the safety of others
collision had been the reckless crossing of the van through the placing of crossbars, signal lights, warning signs, and
Teodoro vs Parents are suing based on BREACH OF whose driver had not first stopped, looked and other permanent safety barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians Take note that the source of liability of the
Spouses - Parents suing school bus operator CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE against the school listened; and that the narrow path traversed by the from crossing there. A common carrier is bound to observe extraordinary diligence in school bus operator is for BREACH OF
Nicolas, GR - Traversed railroad crossing bus operator. Against PNR, they are suing for van had not been intended to be a railroad the conduct of his business. He is presumed to be negligent when CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE. While that of
14 157917 8/29/12 - Hit by PNR train QUASI-DELICT crossing for motorists PNR and the school bus are joint tortfeasors. death or injury occurs to a passenger. PNR is because of QUASI-DELICT.

Note in this case that the arrastre and customs

broker are solidarily liable ONLY because they
did not appeal the decision. It was the RTC
which held them liable, but they no longer
appealed it. Ruling on solidary liability might
differ if they appealed the case and they
produced evidence which would exculpate
them from liability

Sir also asked what was mentioned by the cited

The insurance company paid for the damaged
goods. It was subrogated to the rights of the buyer
of the goods. The drum was received in bad order
Eastern - Shipment of riboflavin by the buyer, the damage was caused by the carrier
Shipping vs CA - One drum arrived in bad order of the goods, the arrastre operator and the
15 196 SCRA 570 - Insurer was subrogated to rights customs broker.
Carrier alleges that the shipment was discharged in
good order from the vessel unto the custody of
the arrastre operator so any damage incurred after
shipment is no longer its liability
The arrastre and customs broker allege that they
received the drums in bad condition.
The common carrier, arrastre operator, and customs broker are
solidarily liable for the damage caused on the goods.
case (Fireman's Fund): The relationship
The common carrier’s duty to observe the requisite diligence in the between the consignee and the common
shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered carrier is similar to that of the consignee and
to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the arrastre operator. Since it is the duty of the
the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of Arrastre to take good care of the goods that
a reasonable time for their acceptance by, the person entitled to are in its custody and to deliver them in good
receive them. condition to the consignee, such responsibility
also devolves upon the Carrier. Both the
When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged Arrastre and the Carrier are therefore charged
condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to with the obligation to deliver the goods in
observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of good condition to the consignee.
negligence to hold it liable

Payment of the insurer cannot be validly interpreted as an

automatic admission of the sea vessels seaworthiness as to
foreclose recourse for any obligation as a common carrier. The fact
of payment by American Home grants it the subrogatory right
which enables it to exercise legal remedies that would be available
to Caltex as owner of the lost cargo against the common carrier. From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers
Delsan (operator of the vessel) argues that transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
American Home’s (insurer) payment of insurance The defense of force majuere cannot be accepted, PAGASA report case. In the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of the Subrogation receipt is sufficient, no need to
Delsan policy is an implied admission of MT Maysun’s shows that the weather at the time was not perilous. There was no insured goods, common carriers shall be responsible unless the present insurance policy.
Transport vs. seaworthiness. The insurer therefore recognizes squall or bad weather or extremely poor sea condition in the same is brought about, among others, by flood, storm, earthquake,
CA 369 SCRA - Vessel containing fuel oil sank the ill-fate of the vessel. Delsan also argues that vicinity when the said vessel sank. The sinking was solely because lightning or other natural disaster or calamity.
16 24 - Insurer was subrogatted to rights the sinking was caused by force majuere of the vessels unseaworthiness Squal - strong winds with high waves

The operator for unloading the goods claim that it

is merely a depository and not a common carrier,
Petitioner asserts that mere proof of receipt of the hence, not obliged to exercise extraordinary
shipment by the common carrier in good order, diligence. Reiterates that the loss/damage was The case falls under one of the exceptions mentioned in Article The common carrier’s duty to observe the requisite diligence in the
and their arrival at the place of designation in bad caused by the failure of the shipper to place a sign 1734, particularly the character of the goods or defects in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the articles are surrendered
Phil. Charter vs. order makes out a prima facie case against it; in on the crate that it should be handled with care. packing or in the containers. The Court found that the breakage to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, There was a valid defense for the carrier,
Chemoil GR such case, it is liable for the loss or damage to the was not due to the fault or negligence of the operator nor the the carrier for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of therefore it has rebutted the presumption of
161833, - While unloading the cargo the slings snapped cargo absent satisfactory explanation given by the The shipper alleges that its obligation has ended carrier, but to the inherent defect and weakness of the materials a reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person entitled to negligence. It is incumbent upon the petitioner
17 7/08/05 and the contents fell carrier as to the exercise of extraordinary diligence. when it left the dutiy of unloading to the operator used in the fabrication of the crate. receive them. to prove his claim.
Much of the distinction between a "common or public carrier" and
a "private or special carrier" lies in the character of the business,
such that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of
PKS (the shipping company) should be considered the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out
Philmagen vs. a common carrier and be held liable for the lost to carry the goods for the general public or to a limited clientele, Carrier need not be open to entire public to be
PKS Shipping cargo. Fortuitous event cannot be a defense PKS is a common carrier, but is not liable for the loss of the goods although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or considered a common carrier. Must look at the
GR 149038 - shipment of cement because at the time the typhoon has not entered because there was no way the crew could have prevented the corporation providing such service could very well be just a private facts if the carrier performs business of
18 4/9/03 - vessel sank because of stormy seas the Philippine Area of Responsibility sinking of vessel, it being a fortuitous event. carrier. carriage.

They fault the lower courts for not finding that
TWA and PAL failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence required by law which resulted in the
switching and/or misdelivery of the remains of
Crispina Saludo to Mexico causing gross delay in
its shipment to the Philippines, and consequently,
Saludo vs CA damages.
19 207 SCRA 4798 - body of deceased was lost in transit
TWA argues: Having duly delivered or transferred
the cargo to its co-respondent PAL, as supported
by the TWA Transfer Manifest, TWA faithfully
complied with its obligation under the airway bill.
Said faithful compliance was not affected by the
fact that the remains were shipped on an earlier
flight as there was no fixed time for completion of
carriage stipulated on. Moreover, the carrier did
not undertake to carry the cargo aboard any
specified aircraft, in view of the condition on the
back of the airway bill.
PAL and TWA were NOT responsible for the misdelivery. First, as
to the PAL Airway Bill issued, such was not as evidence of receipt
of delivery of the cargo, but merely as a confirmation of the
booking made for the San Francisco-Manila flight. Article 1736 of
the Civil Code states that the extraordinary responsibility of the
common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to
the carrier. However, for such duty to commence there must in
fact have been delivery of the cargo subject of the contract of
carriage.
Article 1736 of the Civil Code states that the extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the
goods are delivered to the carrier. However, for such duty to
commence there must in fact have been delivery of the cargo
subject of the contract of carriage. Only when such fact of delivery
has been unequivocally established can the liability for loss,
destruction or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier,
absent the excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the
presumption of fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked.

Lorenzo No delay could have been incurred because there was no judicial or
Shipping vs. BJ extrajudicial demand. The contract also did not manifest that time
Mathel GR - late shipping Shipping company alleges that it is not liable for Purchaser doesnt want to pay shipping fees was of the essence. The buyer despite the late delivery accepted the
20 14583 11/19/04 - did not want to pay delay because the delivery was delayed goods and is estopped from non-payment.
The SC held that Sealoader was negligent in its operations. It did The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
not have a radio device in its barge, their crew were lax in their negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that
Sealoader Sealoader contends that there was contributory duties and failed to inform themselves of the approaching storm. of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
Shipping vs. negligence on the part of Grand Cement as they Grand Central timely informed the crew of the weather conditions, negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
Grand Cement did not inform Sealoder of the weather and but the crew refused to acknowledge the same. opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with
21 638 SCRA 488 - barge rammed the wharf because of their late loading of cargo. the loss. The vessel did not have radio equipment.
The kind of loss referred to is a situation where no delivery at all
was made by the shipper of the goods because the same had Based on the Civil Code and in Sec. 3(6), par. 4 of COGSA, loss
perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared in such a way that contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all was made
Mitsui Lines vs their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered. In this by the shipper of the goods because the same had perished, gone
CA 287 SCRA Mitsui alleges that the claims against it had case, there is neither deterioration, disappearance, or destruction of out of commerce, or disappeared in such a way that their existence
22 366 - goods were not shipped immediately prescribed under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act goods caused by the carriers breach of contract. is unknown or they cannot be recovered.
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
It cannot be denied that the shipment sustained damage while in tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to
the custody of petitioner-carrier. It is not disputed that one of the follow the required precaution for avoiding the damage to, or
three crates did fall from the cargo hatch to the pier apron while destruction of, the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and
Sulpicio was unloading the cargo from its vessel. The falling of the delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the
Sulpicio vs crate during the unloading is evidence of their negligence in greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to
First Lepanto Delbros alleges that assuming the contents were handling the cargo. As a common carrier, it is expected to observe ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for
GR 140349 - during unloading of cargo, one crate was truly in bad order, fault is with Supicio, which was Sulpicio asserted that it observed extraordinary extraordinary diligence in the handling of goods placed in its shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage,
23 6/29/05 dropped responsible for the unloading. diligence. possession for transport. including such methods as their nature requires.

The law and jurisprudence on common carriers both hold that the
Coastwise mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier and the
lighterage vs - transport of molasses SC held that in allowing an unlicensed person whose navigational subsequent arrival of the same goods at the place of destination in
CA 245 SCRA - struck an unknown sunken oobject skills are questionable, at the helm of the vessel was considered a bad order makes for a prima facie case against the carrier.
24 796 - water gushed and damaged the cargo negligent act.

While it is established that damage or losses were incurred by the

shipment during the unloading, it is disputed who should be liable
for the damage incurred at that point of transport.

Phil First The goods arrived in bad order which led to filing It has been held that it is ordinarily the duty of the master of a
Insurance vs case for damages. When loaded on board the vessel to unload the cargo and place it in readiness for delivery to
Wallem First vessel they were in good order, but upon receipt SC held that it is because the duty of care of the cargo is non- the consignee, and there is an implied obligation that this shall be
Shipping 582 of arrastre it was already declared that there were delegable, and the carrier is accordingly responsible for the acts of accomplished with sound machinery, competent hands, and in
25 SCRA 457 spillages and losses the master, the crew, the stevedore, and his other agents. such manner that no unnecessary injury shall be done thereto.

The Supreme Court ruled that jeepney driver and owners are
negligent and such negligence is the proximate cause of the
The heirs of the deceased filed three complaints accident. With regard to the last clear chance doctrine and the
for recovery of damages against the jeepney driver, presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another is guilty,
jeepney owners, Rabbit Bus Lines, and the bus the SC held that both are not applicable in the instant case. For the
driver. For the jeepney driver and owners, suit is former, the SC held that the “last clear chance” would call for
Phil Rabbit vs - jeepney accident, right rear wheel was anchored on breach of contract of carriage while application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
CA 189 SCRA detached for the other two parties, suit is anchored on quasi- colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
26 158 - passengers died delict. responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.

The CA committed reversible error in not
exculpating it from liability for the loss of the
subject cargo and in not applying the rule on
contributory negligence against Caltex, the shipper-
owner of the cargo, and in not taking into
consideration the fact that the loss due to
backflow occurred when the diesel oil was already
completely delivered to Caltex.
Delsan First, the loss through spillage was partly due to
Transport va the contributory negligence of Caltex; and Second,
American the loss through backflow should not be borne by
Home GR - Oil discharge Delsan because it was already delivered to Caltex’s
27 149019 8/1506 - Hose severed, oil leak to ocean shore tank.
Delsan’s argument that it should not be held liable for the loss of
diesel oil due to backflow because the same had already been
actually and legally delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the
shore tank holds no water. It had been settled that the subject
cargo was still in the custody of Delsan because the discharging
thereof has not yet been finished when the backflow occurred.
Since the discharging of the cargo into the depot has not yet been
completed at the time of the spillage, it thus means that there was
no actual delivery of the cargo to the consignee.
The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from
the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee,
or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice
None Petition denied. Delsan liable. to the provisions of Article 1738.

Since there is no contractual obligation, PPL is obliged to give only

the diligence required of a good father of a family. PPL exercised
diligence of a good father of a family when the vessel sailed only
after the "main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were
checked and found to be in good running condition; when the
master left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge
with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River;
- Iron ore loading when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel's double
Wildvalley - Vessel center of the channel bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.
Shipping vs CA - Blocked the river
GR 119602 - Compulsory pilotage service -- PPL engaged a There was negligence on the part of PPL to If there is no contractual obligation, only diligence required of a Grounding of the vessel attributable to the
28 10/06/00 qualified pilot warrant the award of damages. No negligence Petition denied. PPL Not liable. good father of a family is required. pilot.

- Shipment of empty gelatin capsules
- Misshiped to virginia for unknown reasons
- Bill of lading states: Carrier does not
Maerks Lines undertake that the goods shall arrive at the port
va CA 222 of discharge or the place of delivery at any
29 SCRA 108 particular time...
MAERSK’S DEFENSE: Maersk denied that it
committed breach of contract. It alleged in its
answer that the subject shipment was transported
in accordance with the provisions of the covering
bill of lading, and that its liability under the law on
transportation of goods attaches only in case of
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
under Art. 1734 of the Civil Code.
MAERSK’S DEFENSE: It maintains that it
cannot be held for damages for damages for the
alleged delay in the delivery in the capsules since it
acted in good faith and there was no special
contract under which it undertook to deliver the
shipment on or before a specific date.
Although generally contracts of adhesion are valid, the questioned
provision in the subject bill of lading has the effect of practically
EFREN'S CLAIM: There was gross negligence leaving the date of arrival of the subject shipment on the sole
and undue delay in the delivery of the goods. He determination and will of the carrier.
filed an action before the court for rescission of
contract with damages against Maersk and Eli Lilly While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to
as defendants. carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with
the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers
EFREN’S CLAIM: Efren claims that during the previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time,
period before the specified date of arrival of the delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a
goods, he had made several commitments and bill reasonable time.
of lading is a contract of adhesion. Therefore,
Maersk can be held liable for the damages suffered WHEREFORE, with the modification regarding the deletion of A delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two (2)
by Efren for the cancellation of the contracts he item 4 of respondent court`s decision, the appealed decision is is months and seven (7) days falls was beyond the realm of
entered into. hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. (MAERSK LIABLE) reasonableness.

ANCO: It admitted that cases of beer were indeed

loaded on D/B Lucio but it claimed that it had an
agreement with SMC that it would not be liable
for any losses or damages resulting to the cargoes
by reason of forfuitous event. Since the cases of
beer were lost by reason of a storm, forfuitous
event, which battered and sunk the vessel, it While the loss of cargoes was admittedly caused by typhoon, a To be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster should
should not be held liable. natural disaster, ANCO is still liable since its representatives failed have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. There must
- Tugboat + Barge to exercise the extraordinary degree of diligence mandated by law. have been no contributory negligence on the part of the common
- Shipment of san miguel beer ANCO and SMC failed to exercise ordinary ANCO’s arguments boil down to the claim that carrier.
FGU Insurance - MT ANCO left barge on island even though diligence (or diligence of the good father of the the loss of the cargoes was caused by the typhoon The decision of the CA is affirmed with modification dismissing
vs CA 454 barge had no engine of its own, and waves family) in the care and supervision of the cargoes Sisang, a forfuitous event (casa forfuito) and there the 3rd-party complaint against FGU Insurance. In this case, the calamity which caused the loss of the cargoes was
30 SCRA 337 were getting bigger insured to prevent its loss and/or destruction. was no fault or negligence on their part not unforeseen nor was it unavoidable
 Responsibility of the carrier: Until goods are
delivered to the consignee

Constructive delivery: Acceptable (e.g.

warehouse of arrastre)
Lapse of reasonable time for acceptance by
person entitled to receive them; case to case
basis

Defense of carrier:
1. Extraordinary diligence
2. Art. 1734

Elements of Art. 1734:

1. Fact of fortuitous event
2. Such was the proximate cause
When goods shipped are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a 3. Exercise of extraordinary diligence to
presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that minimize damage caused
diligence; there need not be an express finding of negligence to
hold it liable Should there be a PAGASA declaration that
DSR vs Federal - Artificial trees C.F. Sharp denied any liability on the ground that Since fire is not one of those enumerated under the above there is a storm?
GR 135377 - Feeder vessel such liability was extinguished when the vessel provision which exempts a carrier from liability for loss or - No. Not the ultimate factor, as long as one
31 10/07/03 - Transporting, caught FIRE carrying the cargo was gutted by fire. None Petition denied. DSR liable. destruction of the cargo, liability was not extinguished. can prove wind factor, height of waves, etc.

If a common carrier fails to exercise due diligence to prevent or

minimize the loss before, during, and after the occurrence of a
natural disaster, the carrier shall be deemed to have been negligent.
The loss or injury is not, in a legal sense, due to natural disaster
under Art. 1734

Central shipping while admitting the sinking of the
vessel, interposed the defense that the vessel was
fully manned, fully equipped and in all respects
seaworthy; that all the logs were properly loaded
and secured; that the vessels master exercised due
diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before,
during and after the occurrence of the storm.
It raised as its main defense that the proximate and
Central only cause of the sinking of its vessel and the loss
Shipping vs of its cargo was a natural disaster, a tropical storm
Insurance GR - Logs which neither Central shipping nor the captain of
32 150751 9/20/04 - Vessel sank due to shifting of logs its vessel could have foreseen
- Dunhill cigarettes Citadel Lines, in its reply letter dated May 23,
Citadel Lines vs - Lack of space in pier (arrastre's) 1979, admitted the loss but alleged that the same
CA 184 SCRA - Placed in containers under Citadel's custody occurred at Pier 13, an area absolutely under the
33 544 - Stolen cigarettes control of the ARRASTRE.
None Petition denied. Central Shipping liable.
The duty of the consignee is to prove merely that
the goods were lost. Thereafter, the burden is
shifted to the carrier to prove that it has exercised
the extraordinary diligence required by law. And,
its extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time
the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually
or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or Citadel liable to pay Manila wine, modified: only amount stated in
to the person who has the right to receive them.
In all other cases not specified under Article 1734 of the Civil
Code, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence.
The defense of fortuitous event or natural disaster cannot be Doctrine of limited liability (Art. 587 Code of
successfully made when the injury could have been avoided by Commerce)
human precaution. Hence, if a common carrier fails to exercise due - The liability of a captain and the carrier may
diligence -- or that ordinary care that the circumstances of the be limited if you abandon the vessel and
particular case demand -- to prevent or minimize the loss before, equipment, giving the shipper what carrier may
during and after the occurrence of the natural disaster, the carrier claim from insurance
shall be deemed to have been negligent. The loss or injury is not, in - Cannot be used if carrier is negligent
a legal sense, due to a natural disaster under Article 1734(1) - If vessel sinks, nothing more to abandon
The duty of the consignee is to prove merely that the goods were
lost. Thereafter, the burden is shifted to the carrier to prove that it
has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. And, its
extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the
carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who
has the right to receive them.
Basic is the rule, long since enshrined as a statutory provision, that
a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the Bill of lading terms:
goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner - Must be reasonable, just, entered into
the bill of lading declares a greater value, is binding. voluntarily by the parties

The consignee is bound to the contract of carriage between the

shipper and the carrier
The right [of the consignee] springs from either a relation of
agency that may exist between the consignee and the shipper or
Hernandez Co. contends that Everett should be consignor, where he becomes a party thereto when he demands
held liable for the whole value for the loss of the fulfillment of that stipulation, in this case the delivery of the goods
goods in the amount of Y1,552,500.00 because the or cargo shipped.
terms appearing at the back of the bill of lading
was so written in fine prints and that the same was ART. 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers liability is
Everett Everett merely admitted that it lost the shipment, not signed by Hernandez Co., or the shipper limited to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading,
Steamship vs and thus it should be liable only up to the amount (Maruman Trading Company), thus, they are not unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.
CA 297 SCRA - Bus spare parts of Y100,000.00, in accordance with the bill of bound by the clause stated in paragraph 18 of the CA decision reversed, limited liability clause in bill of lading
34 496 - One missing crate upon arrival in manila lading’s provisions. bill of lading. VALID
 Sun Holidays denied being a common carrier, Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
alleging that its boats are not available to the services to the general public, i.e., the general community or
general public as they only ferry Resort guests and population, and one who offers services or solicits business only
crew members. Nonetheless, it claimed that it from a narrow segment of the general population.
exercised the utmost diligence in ensuring the Private carrier: No presumption of negligence
Sun Holidays is a common carrier since by its tour safety of its passengers; contrary to Sps. Cruz To fully free a common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous
package, the transporting of its guests is an integral allegation, there was no storm on September 11, event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. GR: A squall is a fortuitous event
Cruz vs. Sun - Honeymoon part of its resort business. Thus, it must exercise 2000 as the Coast Guard in fact cleared the voyage; And it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize However, when it's epected under the weather
Holidays 622 - Couple died because boat sank extraordinary diligence. In this case, they failed to and M/B Coco Beach III was not filled to capacity the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous condition (foreseen), no longer counted as
35 SCRA 389 - Strong waves do so. and had sufficient life jackets for its passengers Petition granted. Sun Holidays is a common carrier, and is liable event. fortuitous
PAL contends that under the Warsaw The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or
- Lost 9th luggage Convention, its deterioration of goods transported from a foreign country to the
- Warsaw convention stipulation limiting liability, if any, cannot exceed US $20.00 based on Philippines is governed primarily by the New Civil Code. In all
liability of carrier of loss, delay or damage to weight as Co did not declare the contents of his matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of
PAL vs CA 207 checked-in baggage to US$20.00 based on baggage nor pay PAL is liable. Warsaw convention can't apply as what governs is common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and
36 SCRA 100 weight traditional charges before the flight NCC by Special Laws.
None of the employees exerted the least effort to
assist Ongsiako in his predicament, despite his
appeal for help; that not one of them even deigned
to look at his baggage tag, listen to his problem, or Art. 2220 of the Civil Code says that moral damages may be
give assurances that something would be done, or awarded in “breaches of contract where the defendant acted
otherwise show sympathy. fraudulently or in bad faith.” There must be competent evidence of
fraud or bad faith by the party who breached the contract. If the
PanAm assails the moral damages as without Ongsiako testified that the PanAm employee in complaining party fails to to take the witness stand and testify as to
PANAM vs - Waitlisted passenger evidentiary foundation or at the least excessive. It Honolulu arrogantly threatened to bump him off his social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., moral
IAC 186 SCRA - Luggage was left in Manila argues that no arrogance or boorishness was in Honolulu should he persist in looking for his Damages awarded in favor of Ongsiako, PANAM found guilty of damages cannot be recovered. This rule applies to common carriers
37 687 - Rude PANAM employees displayed by PanAm at the Honolulu Airport. bag. bad faith as well.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is
not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for
damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the
The award of P20,000.00 for exemplary damages is maintained as breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonable together with the attorney's fees of P25,000.00. The reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include
- Flight to indonesia, luggage missing moral and exemplary damages shall earn interest at the legal rate moral and exemplary damages.
- Contents of luggage needed for conference from 1 March 1976 when the complaint was filed until full
Cathay Pacific - Offered $20 as inconvenience money payment. Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted
va CA 219 - Luggage not delivered, was required to be fraudulently or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary
38 SCRA 520 picked up in philippine embassy Employees rude CATHAY GROSSLY NEGLIGENT damages is proper.
Atty. Arroyo’s ARGUMENTS:
1. The engines of M/V Asia Thailand conked out
in the open sea, and for more than an hour it was
stalled and at the mercy of the waves, thus causing
fear in the passengers.
2. It sailed back to Cebu City after it regained In a contract of carriage, the laws of primary application are the
power, but for unexplained reasons, the passengers provisions on common carriers under the Civil Code, while for all
were arrogantly told to disembark without the other matters not regulated thereby, the Code of Commerce and
necessary precautions against possible injury to special laws.
them.
3. They were unceremoniously dumped, which Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are bound
only exacerbated his mental distress. to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of
4. By reason of Trans-Asia’s wanton, reckless, and passengers. That means that a common carrier is bound, under
willful acts, he was unnecessarily exposed to Article 1755 to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
danger, and having been stranded in Cebu City for foresight can provide.
a day, incurred additional expenses and loss of
Transasia - Lawyer income. Art. 698 must be read together with Articles 2199, 2200, 2201, and
Shipping vs CA - Ship ride from Cebu to CDO The safety of the vessel or passengers was never at 5. He prayed that he be awarded P1,100.00, 2208 in relation to Art. 21 of the Civil Code. It means that Trans-
GR 118126 - Repair works on vessel stake because the sea was ‘calm’ in the vicinity P50,000.00, and P25,000.00 as compensatory, Asia is liable for any pecuniary loss or loss of profits which Arroyo
39 3/04/96 - Vessel stopped mid voyage where it stopped. moral, and exemplary damages, respectively. Petition denied. may have suffered by reason thereof.

* PAL theorizes that the hotel accommodations or

cash assistance given in case a flight is cancelled is
in the nature of an amenity and is merely a
privilege that may be extended at its own
discretion, but never a right that may be demanded
by its passengers. Thus, when respondent Pantejo
was offered cash assistance and he refused it,
* Fiscal boarded PAL for hearing in Surigao petitioner cannot be held liable for whatever befell
* Flight cancelled due to typhoon respondent Pantejo on that fateful day, because it
PAL vs CA 275 * PAL primarily refused to reimburse payment was merely exercising its discretion when it opted
40 SCRA 621 made for accommodation to just give cash assistance to its passengers.
* Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no vested
right to accommodation in case a flight is cancelled due to force
majeure, what makes petitioner liable for damages in this particular
case and under the facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to
* PAL acted in bad faith when it failed and refused accord the so-called amenities equally to all its stranded passengers
to provide hotel accommodations for Pantejo or who were bound for Surigao City. No compelling or justifying
to reimburse him for hotel expenses by reason of reason was advanced for such discriminatory and prejudicial
the cancellation of flight due to the typhoon conduct.
* COURT RULED IN FAVOR OF PANTEJO - The
discriminatory act of a common carrier against its passenger
ineludibly makes the former liable for moral damages under Article
21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code.
* Passenger can demand, as a matter of right,
for accommodation in case of delays (even if
due to FE)
* Extraordinary diligence includes care of
passengers (to attend to their needs)
 The decision in another civil case between Salva
and Calalas (jeep owner), finding Salva (truck Calalas liable: Res judicata does not apply - The issue in the other
owner) liable should bind Sunga (victim) / Sunga's case was liability for quasi-delict for the damage caused to jeepney.
taking of extension seat amounted to an implied The issue in this case is liability on the contract of carriage between
assumption of risk / A common carrier is not an Calalas and the victim. / Doctrine of proximate cause does not * Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
Calalas vs CA Freshman major in PE rode jeepney on an insurer of the safety of its passengers / The apply in this case. It applies only in actions for quasi-delict / But negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to
GR 122039 extension seat / Jeep unloaded passenger but accident constitutes casa fortuito / Moral damages Calalas failed to exercise the diligence required of moral damages deleted as there was no bad faith or fraud nor death prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of * Doctrine of proximate cause applies only to
41 5/13/00 not properly parked / hit by truck not supported by evidence him as a common carrier occured his passengers. quasi-delict and not for breaches of contract

* Q: How long must the airline shoulder

* Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of passenger's accommodation for reasons of
JAL LIABLE ONLY FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES - Where a travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme delay (due to FE)?
party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the A: It is case to case basis (not sure but Sir said
general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages / Airline consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After in this case it's not a matter of right)
passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.
Common carriers are not insurer of all risks / JAL still reneged on Q: What if delay is due to technical reasons?
JAL was obligated to shoulder expenses as long as its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, A: You can still demand (even for one week);
JAL vs. CA Flight from California to Manila / Stopover at Airline passengers have no vested rights to the passengers were still stranded / Airlines have the passengers when it failed to make necessary arrangements to which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be Airline should fly you out at first instance;
GR 18664 Japan as incentive / Mt. Pinatubo eruption / amenities (hotel and meal expenses) in case a flight obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience transport private respondents on the first available connecting vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying Extraordinary diligence entails that planes
42 8/07/98 JAL paid only for overnight stay is cancelled due to force majeure of their passengers flight to Manila. any loss suffered by him. should have been regularly maintained.

COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF CATAPANG - Respondent was

not informed by FUT and the ticket did not reflect that it was a
restricted type / Petitioner's breach was aggravated by the rude
treatment received by respondent. Passengers have the right to be
treated with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. * Passengers have the right to be treated by a carrier's employees * Moral damages may be awarded not only due
Northwest vs Asst VP of UCPB went to Paris on business The ticket was a discounted one / Rebooking was There was willful breach of the terms and They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. Any to bad faith but also due to FAULT.
Catapang 594 trip / Requested for rerouting/rebooking but subject to the rules of applicability / No breach of conditions of the contract of carriage / Personnel injurious language, indignities and abuses. Thus the award of moral discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a * This is exemplified in the manner that
43 SCRA 401 ticket was of restricted type contracr humiliated and embarassed him and exemplary damages is justified. passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier passenger was treated

* COURT RULED IN FAVOR OF CUDIAMAT - It is the duty

of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by
railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a
reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an
opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries
suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting
up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

* It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt

* Petitioners alleged that they had observed and
continued to observe the extraordinary diligence
required in the operation of the transportation
company and the supervision of the employees,
even as they add that they are not absolute insurers
of the safety of the public at large.
* The driver and the conductor had no knowledge
Dangwa vs CA * Passenger boarded bus while moving that the victim would ride the bus as the latter had
44 202 SCRA 564 * Passenger fell; Bus ran over the passenger not manifested its intention to do so.
* Even assuming that the bus was moving, the act
of the victim in boarding the same cannot be
considered negligent under the circumstances. As
clearly explained in the testimony of the witness
for petitioners, the bus had "just started" and "was
still in slow motion" at the point where the victim
had boarded and was on its platform.
to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily
prudent person would have made the attempt board the moving
conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that
passengers board and alight from slowly moving vehicle is a matter
of common experience both the driver and conductor in this case
could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
* The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of
the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the
rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation.
Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier owes to its
patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom.
* Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the
conductor failed to bring the gravely injured victim immediately to
the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and incontrovertible
proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be
stigmatized as callous indifference.
* It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including
common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop
their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford
passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable
for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the
sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are
doing so.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the
bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights
and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation. Hence, it
has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers owes to its
patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom.
Judicial Notice: The fact that passengers board and alight from * By overloading the bus, it was already
slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the negligence on the part of the Dangwa.
driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of Contributory negligence will not exculpate
such an ordinary practice. them

* Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at imprudence filed against the CRANE
the time of the accident, the vessel was completely OPERATOR, Alejo Figueroa.
under the control of PIONEER as the exclusive
stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, (handled the
unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz)
a* It is also averred that since the CRANE
* Passenger of a vessel already disembarked but OPERATOR was not an employee of Aboitiz, the more than ample opportunity to unload his
went back as he left some of his baggages latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-
Aboitiz vs CA * Crane used to unload luggage hit him, which servant rule
45 179 SCRA 95 caused his death
Diaz vs CA GR * Tamaraw FX rammed into a truck * No argument from both sides
46 149749 7/25/06 * 9 passengers of FX died
* Pestaño blamed Sumayang for the accident. He
testified that when he first blew the horn the
motorcycle which was about 15 or 20 meters
ahead went to the right side of the highway that he
again blew the horn and accelerated in order to
overtake the motorcycle; that when he was just
one meter behind, the motorcycle suddenly turned
left towards the Tabagon Road and was bumped
by his bus.
* Metro Cebu also alleged that Pestaño was an
experienced driver and that he was tested before
he was hired. Management also gave regular
* Motorcycle and bus mishap in a junction; lectures to drivers on topics like speeding, etc.
Motorcycle passengers died (Sumayang and Lastly, Metro Cebu also said that before the bus
Pestano vs. Rumagos) left for that day and before it went back, they
Sumayang GR * Driver (Pestano), along with the owner of the checked for defects and did not find any.
47 139875 12/4/00 bus, were sued for damages
Ludo vs CA Ludo alleges that the damage was due to the
GR 125483 vessel's ramming into the pile cluster during
48 2/01/01 - while docking, vessel rammed into fender pile docking.
* PIONEERraised the following defenses
a. that ABOITIZ had no cause of action
against PIONEER considering that ABOITIZ is
being sued by the PARENTS and WIFE of
ANACLETO for breach of contract of carriage to
which PIONEER is not a party;
b. that PIONEER had observed the diligence
of a good father of a family both in the selection
and supervision of its employees as well as in the
prevention of damage or injury to anyone
including the victim;
c. that ANACLETO’s gross negligence was
the direct and proximate cause of his death;
d. that the filing of the third-party complaint
was premature by reason of the pendency of the
criminal case for homicide through reckless
* ABOITIZ also contends that since one (1) hour
had already elapsed from the time ANACLETO
disembarked from the vessel and that he was given
cargoes prior to the operation of the crane, his
presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable
and he consequently ceased to be a passenger.
* No argument from both sides
* The bus was overspeeding; The speedometer of
the bus was defective
Gabisan argues that the damage could have been
caused by prior and subsequent vesses which
likewise docked in Ludo’s private wharf
* The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the vessel owner's dock or premises.
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until
the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted
from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier's premises.
All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after
leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable
time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure
Reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the
attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common
carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so
forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element
per se without taking into account such other factors.
* It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident,
the victim had already disembarked from the vessel. ABOITIZ
failed to prove this.
* Where a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.
ABOITIZ failed to rebut the presumption against it.
* DIAZ IS LIABLE
- In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier
is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In
fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the
carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.
- In the case at bar, Diaz, as common carrier, failed to establish
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence. The
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
showed that the accident which led to the death of Sherly Moneo
was caused by the reckless speed and gross negligence of Diaz’
driver who demonstrated no regard for the safety of his
passengers. It was thus correct to hold Diaz guilty of breach of the
contract of carriage.
* Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and
managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an
employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent
either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that
the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
* Allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a defective speedometer
showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its
business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence
alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that
which directly caused the accident.
It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
required by law
Gabisan did not show persuasively other possible causes of the
damage. Gabisan’s negligence constits likewise in allowing
incompetent crew to man its vessel – the captain was merely an
elementary school graduate, and the chief mate was a high school
graduate – their experiences in navigation were merely as
watchman and quartermaster, respectively.
* It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and
passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from passengers.
the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of * But if a passenger is waiting at the lounge for
destination, BUT continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.
* Level of care for the safety of passengers: A common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
When presumption of negligence attaches: In a contract of carriage,
it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent
when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need
for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on
the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may
only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence.
* Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and
managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an
employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent
either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that
the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
Common Carrier: Extraordinary Diligence
Owner: Diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
the supervision of its employee.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where the thing which
causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from the
want of care.
* If you have given reasonable opportunity for
passengers to leave and he does not leave,
extraordinary diligence not required from
common carrier anymore in relation to such
his boarding, he is already considered a
passenger. He is under the control of the bus
company.
* If injury can be traced to other causes (not
attributable to common carrier), the
presumption would still arise, but it could be
rebutted by evidence showing that carrier is
not the proximate cause of the injury.
* It does not matter what kind of injury or
how slight or grave the injury is
* Sir Q: Is there a presumption of negligence
here?
A: Yes. Under the principle of vicarious
liability, when an employee or servant causes
injury due to his negligence, the
employer/master is presumed to be negligent.
Sir Q: What is the defense?
A: That the employer exericed the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee/s.
*Sir: Presumption under breach of contract
does not apply here because the motorcycle
passengers do not have a contract of carriage
with the bus owner.
 according to the stipulation at the back of the ticket, its liability is
limited to P100.00 per baggage because Yiu did not declare a
greater value or call the attention of the airline to the true value
thereof. This stipulation could be seen as it is printed in reasonably
big letters and easily readable. Yiu, as a lawyer, businessman and
frequent flier of PAL must be fully aware of this. Yiu did not
declare a higher value and did not pay any additional transportation
charge.

A contract of adhesion, wherein one party imposes a ready made As a lawyer he should never have left pieces of
form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, evidence in his luggage
- PAL flight Yiu alleges that PAL failed to deliver his luggage are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
Ong Tiu vs CA - lost luggage which contained his papers for on time and when it did, his possessions were PAL is only liable to the amount of P100.00 as stipulated in the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives Contract of adhesion was not construed in his
49 91 SCRA 223 trial missing. back of the ticket. his consent. favor because of his profession
Widower instituted a claim for damages, relying
heavily on the presumption of negligence Corazon (operator) and Lucio (Driver), alleged Generally, the issue as to whether a carrier used such reasonable
Estrada vs attributed to common carriers. There is failure to defense of force majeure. That it was the other precautions to avoid the accident as would ordinarily be used by
Consolacion 71 - jeepney collided with truck which caused safely conduct the passenger to the place of vehicle which caused the accident and it could not Corazon and Lucio's evidence of force majuere was not careful, prudent persons under like circumstances is a question of
50 SCRA 523 death destitation. have prevented the collision. controverted by Gregorio. fact and therefore must be decided at the trial.
The ambiguities in the contract, being one of adhesion, should be
Northeast is liable because there is lack of consent from the construed against the party that caused its preparation -- in this
passengers and there is no proof for the necessity of the alteration. case, NW. Since the conditions enumerated on the ticket do not
- family (mayor, business woman, vice mayor) After an examination of the conditions printed on the airline ticket, specifically allow it to change stopping places or to fly the
Savellano vs travelled to US we find nothing there authorizing Northwest to decide unilaterally, passengers to alternate connecting cities without consulting them,
Northeast GR - while bound for manila they made an Although the airline provided them with lodging, after the distressed flight landed in Seattle, what other stopping then it must be construed to mean that such unilateral change was The family was given a longer flight schedule
51 151783 7/08/03 emergency landing in seattle they rerouted their flight without their consent. places Savellano should take and when they should fly. not permitted. than others

SC held that the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous Argument of Yobido should have been more
fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact specific. Say that they do routine checks on the
The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from bus before it leaves the terminal and that it
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the constantly requires its employees to undergo
Yobido vs CA vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the training. State that they have proper licenses
GR 113003 - left front tire exploaded Yobido claims that the accident was due to vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the and know how to troubleshoot in case of
52 10/17/97 - caused death of father fortuitous event, that the tire was new and branded conclusion that it could not explode within five days' use. conclusion that it could not explode within five days' use. emergencies.

SC held that Air France is not liable. Mere refusal to accede to the
passenger's wishes does not necessarily translate into damages in
the absence of bad faith. Of importance is the fact that Morales is a
lawyer, and the restriction box clearly indicated the non-endorsable
Air France vs character of the ticket. Omissions by ordinary passengers may be
CA 171 SCRA Air France argues that it cannot alter the itinerary condoned but more is expected of members of the bar who cannot Mere refusal to accede to the passenger’s wishes does not
53 399. - wanted to shorten his flight itenerary because of restricted markings on the ticket. feign ignorance of such limitations and restrictions. necessarily translate into damages in the absence of bad faith.

It is a well known physical fact that cars may skid on

- Baysen alleges that the proximate cause of death SC held that Bayasen’s negligence was not proved by the evidence greasy/slippery road, as in this case, without fault on the manner of
of his companion was not his negligence in driving on record and that the particular circumstances of this case i.e. handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of
Bayasen vs. CA at an unreasonable speed. He claims that the skidding of the vehicle (particularly the rear wheels) is considered control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying
54 103 SCRA 197 - homicide case evidence presented did not prove the allegations as a unforeseen event. negligence. Skidding may occur without fault.

For waiver to be valid and effective it must be:

1. couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as
to the intention of a person to give up a right
SC held that there was no valid waiver. It cannot be said that the 2. not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do
terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case can be regarded as a not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right
waiver in clear and unequivocal terms. vested in such person.
3. not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs.
Common carrier contends that the vehicular Force majeure defense also fails. The continued failure of
mishap was due to force majeure, Gatchalian had respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, To be considered a force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not
already been paid and had waived any right to coupled with the driver’s refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely
institute any action against Delim and his driver, after he had heard once again the “snapping sound” and the cry of independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to
Gatchalian vs. - hit a flower pot and turned turtle causing when Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit on 14 alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of avoid.
Delfin 203 injuries to parties July 1973. the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence
55 SCRA 126 - made to sign a waiver on the part of respondent and his driver
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common
carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of
1. Case was force majeure a good father of a family.
Fortune 2. Apply doctrines from past cases (Robbery with
Express vs CA - Bus accident guns + throwing rocks at buses) Fortune express liable. Force majeure cannot apply because the in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,[6] a common carrier can be
GR 119756 - Plot of revenge 3. Atty. Caorong contributory negligence because element of unforeseeability is wanting. They were already warned held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers
56 3/18/99 - Burned bus with atty caorong inside he went back to get the bags that the Maranaos would attack the bus and inspecting their baggages

Claiming that they “suffered mental anguish,
sleepless nights and great damage” because of
Northwest’s failure to inform them in advance that
Tan vs. their baggages would not be loaded on the same
Northwest flight they boarded and because of their delayed
Airlines 327 - Baggages left in tokyo arrival, they demanded from Northwest Airlines
57 SCRA 263 - returned with contents soiled and destroyed compensation for the damages they suffered.
CALs argument that it had to cancel Salvador and
Lao’s reservations because of the advice of
Morelia, the booking agent, and that Amexco had
no right to use the booking and record locator
- Distribution of Filipino films in Los Angeles number of Morelia.
China Airlines - First travel agency cancelled flight with CAL
vs CA GR because repondents switched travel agencies Morelia = first travel agent
58 129988 7/14/03 - Not allowed to fly with CAL AMEXCO = second
He remonstrated that it was the airlines
agent/representative who must have committed
the mistake of tearing off the wrong flight coupon; CATHAY firmly maintains that it did not breach Cathay’s agents been diligent in double checking the coupons they
that he did not have enough money to buy new
tickets; and, CATHAY could conclude the
investigation in a matter of minutes because of its particular flight and on a particular date specifically booking.
facilities. CATHAY, allegedly in scornful
insolence, simply dismissed him like an
impertinent "brown pest." Thus he and his cousin even assuming that there was breach of contract,
Tiongson, who deferred his own flight to
accompany him, were forced to leave for San
Singson vs CA - Ticket booklet, ticket coupons Francisco on the night of 1 July 1988 to verify the exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees in favor of departure from the extraordinary standard of care required of
59 282 SCRA 149 missing ticket.
Manila Railroad
vs. Ballesteros - Auditor took the wheel from bus driver
60 16 SCRA 641 - Accident
Northwest, in its answer, did not deny that the
baggages were not loaded on the Northwest Flight
29. They claim that it couldn't be loaded on the
same flight because of weight and balance
restrictions. However, the baggages were loaded in
another Northwest flight which arrived on the
evening on June 2, the night after Priscilla and
Connie arrived.
Salvador and Lao claimed that CAL just wanted
them bumped off to accommodate other
passengers.However, they failed to substantiate
this particular allegation. Circumstances are
inadequate to prove CALs bad faith in cancelling
the reservations.
CATHAY denied these allegations and averred
that since Singson was holding an "open-dated"
ticket, which meant that he was not booked on a
specific flight on a particular date, there was no
contract of carriage yet existing such that
CATHAYs refusal to immediately book him could
not be construed as breach of contract of carriage. There was already a complete written contract by and between
its contract of carriage with Singson. It argues that were supposed to detach from the passenger’s tickets, there would
it is only when a passenger is confirmed on a
stated in his ticket that its refusal to board the
passenger will result in a breach of contract. And
there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of
CATHAY as to justify the award of moral and
Singson.
Northwest not liable.
It is admitted that Northwest failed to deliver the luggages on time
but there was no showing of bad faith or malice. In fact, it was for
safety that the baggages had to be shipped in another flight with
the same date of arrival.
CAL liable to pay, but there is no bad faith--only for negligence
resulting to breach of contract. Nominal damages awarded, no
moral or exemplary.
Based on the testimonies, industry practice prohibits a travel
agency to use the record locator number of another travel agency,
as this will usurp the booking of another travel agency.
But When CAL confirmed the reservations, a contract of carriage
arose between CAL and Salvador and Lao, even if Amexco, not
Morelia, confirmed the reservations.
Absent fraud or bad faith on defendant’s part in breaching his
contract, his liability for damages is limited to the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, which the
parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a
case, the liability would not include moral damages.
Cathay liable.
Cathay and Singson when the round trip ticket was issue. Had
have been no reason for CATHAY not to confirm Singson’s
Liable also for moral damages. Cathay’s mistake in removing the
wrong coupon was compounded by several other independent acts
of negligence. Taken together, they indubitably signify more than
ordinary inadvertence or inattention and thus constitute a radical
common carriers.
MRC liable. After analyzing the facts and the law applicable, he
reached the conclusion that the acts of the bus personnel,
particularly "in allowing Mr. Abello to drive despite two occasions
when the bus stopped and the regular driver could have taken over,
constitute reckless imprudence and wanton injurious conduct on
the part of the MRR employees."
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is
not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for
damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen. In that case, such liability does not include
moral and exemplary damages.
In an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the
aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier
was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the
existence of the contract and the fact of its non- performance by
the carrier. CAL does not deny its confirmation of the reservations
made by Amexco. The confirmed tickets are undeniable proof of
the contract of carriage between CAL and private respondents.
Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach
of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where
the mishap results in the death of a passenger, or where the carrier
is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the
negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually
amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewise becomes
entitled to recover moral damages.
A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. (Art. 1763)
No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to
drive the motor vehicle under his control, or permit a person,
sitting beside him or in any other part of the car, to interfere with
him in the operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person
to take hold of the steering wheel, or in any other manner take part
in the manipulation or control of the car. Sec. 48(b)2 of the Motor
Vehicle Law
 a. BACHELOR argues that the proximate cause of
the death of BETER and RAUTRAUT was the act
of the passenger who ran auck and stabbed
another passenger of the bus
b. That the stabbing incident triggered off the
commotion and panic among the passengers who
pushed on another and that presumably out of fear
and moved by that human instinct of self-
preservation BETER and RAUTRAUT jumped
off the bus while the bus was still running
resulting in their untimely death
c. Under these circumstances, BACHELOR
asseverate that they wer not negligent in the
performance of their duties and that the incident
was completely and absolutely attributable to a
third person, the passenger who ran amuck, for
without his criminal act, BETER and
RAUTRAUT could not have been subjected to
fear and shock which compelled them to jump off
the running bus
d. Thus, should not be liable for damages arising
from acts of third persons over whom they have
no control or supervision
Bachelor e. That the driver of the bus, before, during and
Express vs CA - Stampede due to stabbing of a PC soldier by a after the incident was driving cautiously giving due
61 188 SCRA 261 passenger of the bus regard to traffic rules, laws and regulations
Nocum vs
BLTB 30
62 SCRA 69 - Injury to firecrackers loaded in the bus
- Vessel caught fire while cargo was being
Smith Bell vs unloaded
Borja GR - Inspector jumped but water had fire due to Smith Bell claims that the explosion that caused
63 143006 6/10/02 chemicals hence permanently disabled the fire originated from International’s barge.
Mendoza (bus driver): was told box contained
miscellaneous items and clothes
Dispatcher: He added that they were not
authorized to open the baggages of passengers
because instruction from the management was to
call the police if there were packages containing
articles which were against regulations.
Bachelor liable. the testimony and evidence showed that
BACHELOR was negligent when it belatedly stopped, and opened
the door at an appreciably fast speed, as well as being equipped
with a solitary door in contravention of the Land Transportion and
Traffic Code
Considering the factual findings of the CA – the bus driver did not
immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus
was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door
when it was opened or gae way while the bus was still running; the
conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already
falled off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with
doors in accordance with law – it is clear that BACHELOR has
failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found
in the law governing common carriers
BLTB not liable because It is to be presumed that a passenger will
not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his
co-passengers.
Not to be lightly considered be the right to privacy to which each
passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual
search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and
nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In
other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a
passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but
beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed.
Smith bell liable because it was the chemical cargo of its vessel and
the fact that its crew failed to take the necessary precautions to
prevent the accident.
Smith Bell’s vessel was carrying chemical cargo -- alkyl benzene and
methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel
was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and
crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an
accident. Smith Bell was, therefore, negligent.
The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order
that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of
force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by
force majeurer. The common carrier must still prove that it was not
negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
"Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7,
while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is
further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
A carrier is ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers from
fires or explosions caused by articles brought into its conveyances
by other passengers, in the absence of any evidence that the carrier,
through its employees, was aware of the nature of the article or had
any reason to anticipate danger therefrom.
As a result of the fire and explosion, Borja had suffered damages.
Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of a
vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage
caused to persons and property by reason of negligent management
or navigation.