Lichauco vs Apostol

Facts:

Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under the Phil. laws, engaged for several years in the
business of importing carabao and other draft animals, and was desirous of importing, from
Pnom-Pehn, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However,
respondent Director of Agriculture refused to admit said cattle except upon condition that drafts
be immunized. Petitioner however contends that the respondent has no authority over the
matter, invoking section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052. On the
other hand, relying upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code, Admin. Order No. 21 of the
Bureau of Agriculture, and Dept. Order No. 6 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, respondent maintained its decision. Hence, the issue.

Issue:
Whether or not section 1770 (and other similar acts) has been repealed by implication by Act
3052 and hence cannot be applied with the case at bar?

Held and Reasoning:

No. The Court ruled that the contention of the petitioner is untenable for the reason that the
invoked section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature while 1770 is a particular
one. Section 1770 is therefore not inconsistent with section 1762 and instead be considered a
special qualification of the latter provision. Moreover, the court emphasized that “specific
legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon a same subject unless
it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so repugnant..xxx…The special act and
the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular subject and the other
as the general law of the land.” Therefore, Section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in
effect and serves as a supplementary provision to section 1762, as amended.

People vs. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)

FACTS:
1983. Tujan charged with subversions under RA 1700 with warrant of arrest issued. On June 5,
1990, Tujan was arrested and caught with .38 caliber revolver. On June 14, 1990, he was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion (PD
1866) Tujan filed motion to quash invoking protection versus double jeopardy (Art. III,
Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v. Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in
subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the court of appeals.
ISSUE:
WON charge under PD 1866 be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view of the previous
charge under RA 1700.

Ratio: No.
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117 Revised Rules of Court state that for double
jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal in previous cases must have occurred. In
this case, first case was not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700 punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes illegal
possession of firearms.

However, since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to
the accused, we can no longer charge accused with RA 1700 even if they didn’t raise this issue.
PD 1866 should be amended to mere illegal possession of firearms without furtherance of
subversion

Held:
RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA 1700 charge dismissed. PD 1866 change amended.
Release Tujan.

PEOPLE vs. CONCEPCION

FACTS:
Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion, a co-partnership.
Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of
violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not, directly or
indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents
of the branch banks.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938
approved on January 30, 1921.

ISSUE:
W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were
repealed by Act No. 2938.

HELD:
In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a
punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends that
the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal
prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense
repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the
effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders
charged with violations of the old law.

BUSCAYNO VS MILITARY COMMISSION

Facts:
In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed
under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus which was denied by the SC. Aquino then questioned the validity of such denial and the
declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No.
2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for
illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court.
Aquino argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational and
that being a civilian, his trial by a military commission deprives him of his right to due process.

Issue:
Whether or not Aquino was afforded due process in a military court.

Held:
YES. According to Schwartz, “The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however,
give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety,
legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction
normally vested in court.”
Neither are We impressed with petitioner’s argument that only thru a judicial proceeding before
the regular courts can his right to due process be preserved. The guarantee of due process is
not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of
competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before
an impartial tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does
not necessarily means a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. 14 The guarantee of due
process, viewed in its procedural aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It implies due
notice to the individual of the proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and “the problem of
the propriety of the deprivations, under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a
manner consistent with essential fairness.” It means essentially a fair and impartial trial and
reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential Decree No.
39, assures observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an
essentially fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense
Section 11 of the Manual for Courts-Martial specifically provides that the “rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the courts of the Philippines shall be applied
by courts-martial.” This is applicable to trials in the military commission . There is, therefore, no
justification for petitioner’s contention that such military tribunals are concerned primarily with
the conviction of an accused and that proceedings therein involve the complete destruction and
abolition of petitioner’s constitutional rights.