G.R. No.
113054 March 16, 1995 particularly since he has not been shown to be an
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant,
and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget
only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born
July 18, 1987.From the time the boy was
released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody
of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel
Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The boy's
mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United
States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged
that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his
efforts to locate her in the United States proved
futile. Private respondents claim that although
abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending
financial support to them for her son.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.the trial
court issued an order on the same day awarding
custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Issue: who should properly be awarded custody
of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
Held: The father and mother, being the natural
guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
and company. 14 The child's welfare is always
the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.
We find the aforementioned considerations
insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have
custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents'
demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents. 22 The latter's
wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present
time, petitioner is in no position to support the
boy.
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG,
petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and
TERESITA MASAUDING
MELO, J.:
FACTS:Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita
Masanding began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband while in US. Teresita
works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his
empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a
child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they
went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation
when they also got married. Subsequently, they
had a second child named Reginald.
In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo
pleaded for second chance but instead of
Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo
brought the children in the Philippines and left
them with his sister. When Teresita returned in
the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the
children.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should
be awarded to the mother.
HELD:In cases of care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
the paramount concern and that even a child
under 7 years of age may be ordered to be
separated from the mother for compelling
reasons. The presumption that the mother is the
best custodian for a child under seven years of
age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the
judgment was rendered, the 2 children were
both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child
to whom she preferred to stay must be
considered.
It is evident in the records submitted that
Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She
was found of suffering from emotional shock
caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore,
there was nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying
his best to give the children the kind of attention
and care which their mother is not in the
position to extend. On the other hand, the
mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and
her illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts
at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the
minors was reinstated to their father.
G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES,
et. Al. vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA et. Al.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Loran S.D. Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail
C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie
Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B.
Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws
problems, private respondent suggested to his
wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the
house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was
prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity
and as the representative of his son, filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody, before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. the
trial court issued that the child be returned.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the
court denied. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC and dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
filed by the petitioner.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the
trial court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 and
February 24, 2003?
Held: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases
where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto. 9 Under Article 211 of the
Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner
Marie Antonette have joint parental authority
over their son and consequently joint custody.
Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
parents are still entitled to the custody of their
child. In the present case, private respondent’s
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to
see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the
remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s
welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child
and Youth Welfare Code 12 unequivocally
provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In
sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the
orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24,
2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the
said orders of the trial court.
[G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002]
REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA.
LOURDES* D. LAXAMANA, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and
respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met
sometime in1983. Petitioner, who came from a
well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of
Laws, while respondent, a holder of a degree in
banking and finance, worked in a bank. They got
married and the union blesses with three
children. All went well until Petitioner became a
drug dependent. Despite several confinements,
respondent claimed Petitioner was not fully
rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened
and it became difficult for respondent and her
children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly
became violent and irritable, thus, respondent
and her 3 children abandoned Petitioner and
transferred to the house of her relatives.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a
Petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of
his three children. Respondent opposed the
Petitioner, citing the drug dependence of
Petitioner. RTC ordered to remain the custody
under the respondent and parties are enjoined to
comply with the terms and condition stated in
the visitation arrangement.
Issue: W/N the court a quo has resolved the
issue of custody in a manner not in accord with
law of the three (3) minor children.
Ruling: Petitioner is not stopped from
questioning the absence of a trial considering
that said psychiatric report, which was the
court’s primary basis in awarding custody to
respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision.
The fundamental policy of the State to promote
and protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.
While Petitioner may have a history of drug
dependence, the records are inadequate as to his
moral, financial and social well-being.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing
that he is not yet“ completely cured” may render
him unfit to take custody of the children, but
there is no evidence to show that respondent is
unfit to provide the children with adequate
support, education, as well as moral and
intellectual training and development. Moreover,
the children in this case were 14 and 15 years
old at the time of the promulgation of the
decision, yet the court did not ascertain their
choice as to which parent they want to live with.
G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner, vs. GLENN D.
VALLECERA
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition
with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary
protection order against Glenn Vallecera before
RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under
RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl
added a prayer for support for their supposed
child. She based such prayer on the latter’s
certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera ‘s
employer, to withhold from his pay such amount
of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that
Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against
woman and child abuses, that he was not the
child’s father and that the signature in the birth
certificate was not here. He also added that the
petition is a harassment suit intended to for him
to acknowledge the child as his and therefore
give financial support. RTC dismissed petition.
ISSUE:Did the RTC correctly dismiss Dolina’s
action for temporary protection and denied her
application for temporary support for her child?
HELD:Yes.Dolina evidently filed the wrong action
to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A.
9262 under which she filed the case is the
protection and safety of women and children
who are victims of abuse or violence. Although
the issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of
legal support for the wife and the child, this
assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support. In this case neither
her or her child lived with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must,
in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he
is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not
acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have
proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is
to file through her mother a judicial action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If
filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional
rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her
child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and
then demand support. Alternatively, she may
directly file an action for support, where the
issue of compulsory recognition may be
integrated and resolved.
G.R. No. L-14414 April 27, 1960
SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE BALCE
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos
Salen who died single from wounds caused by
Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant.
At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also Single, a
minor below 18 years of age, and was living with
defendant. As a result of Carlos Salen's death,
Gumersindo Balce accused and convicted of
homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment
and to pay the heirs of the deceased an
indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00.
Upon petition of plaintiff, the only heirs of the
deceased, a writ of execution was issued for the
payment of the indemnity but it was returned
unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was
insolvent and had no property in his name.
Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant,
father of Gumersindo, the payment of the
indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but
defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs to
institute the present action.
Issue: whether appellee can be held subsidiary
liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which
his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case
filed against him.
Held: It is true that under Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable
for the acts committed by his son only if the
latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of
age, over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act
without discernment, unless it appears that
there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is
because a son who commits the act under any of
those conditions is by law exempt from criminal
liability.
The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to
the person who has the deliquent minor under
his legal authority or control. But a minor over
15 who acts with discernment is not exempt
from criminal liability, for which reason the Code
is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his
parents should he stand convicted. In that case,
resort should be had to the general law which is
our Civil Code.
it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-
delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity
that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his
or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO vs.
REGINALD HILL and MARVIN HILL
BARREDO, J.:
Facts: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of
Agapito, the son of Elcano. Elcano filed a criminal
case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted
for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano
then filed a civil action against Reginald and his
dad, Marvin Hill, for damages based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil
action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the
criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as
a parent has been extinguished by the fact that
his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held
civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate
civil action. A separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if accused is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to
in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is
terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the
minor child”, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child’s person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though
he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He
can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian.”
Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin
Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of
the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s
liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter
of equity.
G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILoIPPINES vs.
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and
her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both
male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male
characteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in
court the medical certificate evidencing that she
is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who,
in addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally, thus has organs of both
male and female.”
The lower court decided in her favor but the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before
the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead
the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as
appearing in her birth certificate be changed.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered
“the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial.” The
Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence
presented in court including the fact that private
respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to
the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen), which is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being
male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give
respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects
the respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
added that a change of name is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons and the consequences
that will follow.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ET. aL.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving
properties worth P600,000. She executed a will
written in Spanish, affixed her signature and
acknowledged before Notary Public by her and
the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the
will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera.
The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the
ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her
grandchildren, the legitimate children of said
spouses.
Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed by will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of
the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan,
claiming that she was an adopted child of
Francisca and an acknowledged natural child of
Jose, that said will was not executed as required
by law and that Maria as physically and mentally
incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress,
threat, or influence of fear.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in
this proceeding.
HELD:It is a well-settled rule that in order that a
person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the
estate, will or in the property to be affected by
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
and be benefited by such as an heir or one who
has a claim against it as creditor. Under the
terms of the will, defendant has no right to
intervene because she has no such interest in the
estate either as heir, executor or administrator
because it did not appear therein any provision
designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of
the estate. She could have acquired such right if
she was a legal heir of the deceased but she is not
under the CIVIL CODE.
Even if her allegations were true, the law does
not give her any right to succeed the estate of the
deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca
because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited
solely to the adopter and adopted and does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
except only as expressly provided by law. As a
consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but
not of the relatives of the adopter.
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG et. Al. vs. THE
MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS
NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA
RAMOS-AGONOY
PADILLA, J.:
meaning in law and do not include
grandchildren. Well known is the rule of
statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be
interpreted.
The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous
or doubtful meaning may be subjects of
interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and
Rommel Daoang , the grandchildren of Antero
and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption
of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the
Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition
and affirmed the judgement of the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.

Facts: On 23 March 1971, the respondent

spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. On 22 April
1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang,
assisted by their father and guardian ad litem,
the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming
that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had
a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors’ mother, who died on 1 March 1971,
and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to
adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent spouses

Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art.
335 of the Civil Code.

Held: The words in the paragraph (1) of the

Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was
adopted, it changed the word “descendant”,
found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New
Civil Code was patterned, to “children”. The
children thus mentioned have a clearly defined