WEEK 4: L A N D VALUATION

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their
agricultural lands, which were acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. The RTC ordered Land Bank and DAR
to pay respondents' land for P30 per square meters. Land Bank was not able to file its motion for reconsideration on
time because the motion filed by its counsel lacked a notice of hearing. Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel
is due to intense work-pressure and constitutes excusable negligence, so the trial court should have heard the relief in
accordance with Sec 1 of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Land Bank also argues that respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the
determination of just compensation directly with the trial court because they should have first sought reconsideration
of the DAR's valuation of their properties.

Issues:

1. Whether or not counsel's failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank
to a relief from judgment.

2. WON respondents should have sought reconsideration from DAR.

Answer: The petition is unmeritorious.

Reasoning: Land Bank's argument that its counsel committed an excusable negligence when he was not able to file
the motion on time is untenable. Primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the
just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge
before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function
addressed to the courts of justice.
JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170220. November 20, 2006.
FACTS:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee2 of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located
at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT). In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land
reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)4 and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).5 The land was
thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP
fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
Nenita Suntay-Tañedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land
consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571
hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares
was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05. Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties,
hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative
proceedings for determination of just compensation.

ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at
the time of payment.

HELD: Yes.
Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a
prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners.27 The transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit
by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.

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The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.

Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just
compensation. Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and
not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines et. al., versus Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR. No.
79310, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343) [pertinent portions on just compensation]
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A.
No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption
by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D.
No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among
tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued
E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of
still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
(PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings
do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced
to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own
land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different
class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that
these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent
domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process
for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

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HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled
to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter.
In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian
reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law
which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation
can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as
both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then
judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however that, the just compensation determined by
an administrative body is is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation
by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination.
This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain.
The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos
in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

Land Bank vs. CA and Pedro Yap (GR No. 118712, Oct. 6, 1995)
Facts:
Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR, subjecting it for transfer to qualified
CARP beneficiaries. Aggrieved by the compensation valuation of DAR and LBP, respondents filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with a preliminary mandatory injunction. The case was referred to CA for proper
determination and disposition. Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
without jurisdiction when they opened trusts accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or bonds, before the lands was
taken and the titles are cancelled. Respondents claim that before the taking of the property, the compensation must be
deposited in cash or bonds. DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial compliance with the rule
on taking and compensation. LBP confirms that the certificate of deposit expresses "reserved/deposited". CA ruled in
favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition. DAR, maintain that the word "deposit" referred merely to the act of
depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as form of deposit.

Issue: Whether the opening of trust account tantamount to deposit.

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Ruling: Contention of DAR is untenable. Section 16 of RA 6657 provides: (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied) It is very explicit
that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds, there is no ambiguity.

WEEK 5: LAND REDISTRIBUTION

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, et. al, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and
HACIENDA MARIA, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. 159674. June 30, 2006.]
Indefeasibility of Titles as discussed in this case:
CHAPTER VII
Land Redistribution
Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to
landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, that the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given
preference in the distribution of the land of their parents: and provided, further, that actual tenant-tillers in the
landholdings shall not be ejected or removed therefrom. Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have
culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under this Program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land as
productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary,
so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right
to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the
PARC. If, due to the landowner’s retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on the land, there is
not enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for
distribution under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries. Farmers already in place and those not accommodated
in the distribution of privately-owned lands will be given preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public
domain.

Section 23. Distribution Limit. — No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3) hectares of agricultural land.

Section 24. Award to Beneficiaries. — The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the
time the DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180)
days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by
a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act,
and shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title.

Section 25. Award Ceilings for Beneficiaries. — Beneficiaries shall be awarded an area not exceeding three (3)
hectares which may cover a contiguous tract of land or several parcels of land cumulated up to the prescribed award
limits. For purposes of this Act, a landless beneficiary is one who owns less than three (3) hectares of agricultural
land. The beneficiaries may opt for collective ownership, such as co-ownership or farmers cooperative or some other
form of collective organization: provided, that the total area that may be awarded shall not exceed the total number of
co-owners or member of the cooperative or collective organization multiplied by the award limit above prescribed,

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except in meritorious cases as determined by the PARC. Title to the property shall be issued in the name of the co-
owners or the cooperative or collective organization as the case may be.

Section 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. — Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to
the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The payments for the first three
(3) years after the award may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC: provided, that the first five (5)
annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross production as established
by the DAR. Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten percent (10%) of the annual gross
production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiary’s fault, the LBP may reduce the interest
rate or reduce the principal obligations to make the repayment affordable. The LBP shall have a lien by way of
mortgage on the land awarded to the beneficiary; and this mortgage may be foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment
of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations. The LBP shall advise the DAR of such proceedings and the latter
shall subsequently award the forfeited landholdings to other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land, as
provided herein, has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under
this Act.

Section 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. — Lands acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or the LBP, or to other qualified
beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: provided, however, that the children or the spouse of the transferor shall
have a right to repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the
availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the
barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) as herein
provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC. If the land has not yet been fully paid by the
beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the
beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land
himself. Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the
availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph. In the event of such transfer
to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter has already paid,
together with the value of improvements he has made on the land.

WEEK 6: LAND TENURE IMPROVEMENT

Caballes vs. DAR, GR No. 78214, December 5, 1988 (168 SCRA 247)
Facts:
Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale, Abajon constructed his house on
a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental to the owner. Abajon was also allowed to plant on a portion of the
land and that the produce thereof would be shared by them on a 50-50 basis. When the new owners took over, they
told Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the southern portion of the property because they would be building a poultry
near Abajon's house. Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they needed the property. Abajon refused.
During the trial the former landowner testified that Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land
under his cultivation.

Held:
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The circumstances of this case indicate
that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or
compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of
the said portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the
private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as
amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.

Personal cultivation
Cultivation

Under DAR AO 5 (1993), cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but also the
husbanding of the ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry, the taking care of the land and fruits

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growing thereon, fencing of certain areas, and the clearing thereof by gathering dried leaves and cutting of grasses. In
coconut lands, cultivation includes the clearing of the landholding, the gathering of the coconuts, their piling, husking
and handling as well as the processing thereof into copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers.

Meaning of "Personal Cultivation" "Personal cultivation" exists when a person cultivates the land by himself and
with the aid available from his immediate farm household.

In Oarde vs. CA, et al., supra, the Court held that the element of personal cultivation is essential for an agricultural
leasehold. There should be personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the
family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities
(Evangelista vs. CA, 158 SCRA 41). The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many persons to help him cultivate the land
(De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559). In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, supra, the Court held that the tenancy relation was
severed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm household ceased from personally working the fishpond when he
became ill and incapacitated.

Compensation in money and/or produce

In Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981), the Supreme Court held that: A tenant is defined under section 5(a)
of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household,
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing
the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the above definition of a
tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy relationship had ever existed between the parties. What
transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was to supervise applications for loans
from those residing therein; he was allowed to build his house thereon and to plant specified plants without being
compensated; he was free to clear and plant the land as long as he wished; he had no sharing arrangement between
him and defendant; and he was not obligated to pay any price certain to nor share the produce, with the latter.

Security of Tenure
Under Sec. 7 of RA 1199, "the agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee
the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the
Court for causes herein provided."

The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has been established, the agricultural lessee
is entitled to security of tenure. The tenant has a right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected
therefrom for cause as provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 [1989]).

Transfer of ownership or legal possession does not affect security of tenure.

In Tanpingco vs. IAC, 207 SCRA 653 (1992), the Court upheld the validity of donation but the donee must respect
the rights of the tenant and ordered the donee to pay the tenant disturbance compensation.

Gelos vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA 608, 1992)

Facts:
Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their laborer on a 25,000-sq. m farmland. They
executed a written contract which stipulated that as hired laborer Gelos would receive a daily wage of P5.00. Three
(3) years later, Gelos was informed of the termination of his services and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos
refused and continued working on the land. Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer. The lower court found Gelos
as tenant of the property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?

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Held: The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy agreement. The agreement is a lease of services,
not of the land in dispute. . . . The petitioner would disavow the agreement, but his protestations are less than
convincing. His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another
proceeding. Her claim that they were tricked into signing the agreement does not stand up against the testimony of
Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and officer of the court) that he
explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even read it himself before signing it. . . . Gelos points to the
specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired
laborer. Not so. The work specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired
laborer working under the direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved
but the intention of the parties that determines the relationship between them. As this Court has stressed in a number
of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is
also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case,
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."

Classes of agricultural tenancy

Agricultural tenancy is classified into share tenancy and leasehold tenancy (M. A. GERMAN, SHARE AND
LEASEHOLD TENANCY, 13 [1995]).

Share tenancy means "the relationship which exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or
several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with aid of labor available from members
of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant." (Rep.
Act No. 3844 [1963]. Sec. 166 [25]).

With the passage of RA 3844, share tenancy has been declared to be contrary to public policy and abolished (Rep. Act
No. 3844[1963], sec. 4) except in the case of fishponds, saltbeds, and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts,
cacao, coffee, durian and other similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of said Act (Rep. Act No.
3844 [1963], sec. 35). When RA 6389 (1971) was enacted, agricultural share tenancy has been automatically
converted to leasehold but the exemptions remained. It was only under RA 6657 when the exemptions were expressly
repealed.

Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single
person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by, another in
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 4).

Under RA 6657, the only agricultural tenancy relation that is recognized is leasehold tenancy. Said law expressly
repealed Sec. 35 of RA 3844, making all tenanted agricultural lands throughout the country subject to leasehold.

Leasehold tenancy may be established by operation of law, that is, through the abolition of share tenancy under Sec.
4 of RA 3844; through the exercise by the tenant of his right to elect leasehold; or by agreement of the parties either
orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly, which was the condition before 1972 (M.A. German,supra, at 27).

Leasehold relation is instituted in retained areas with tenant(s) under RA 6657 or PD 27 who opts to choose to remain
therein instead of becoming a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.
The tenant must exercise his option within one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area
for retention (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 6). Leasehold relation also exists in all tenanted agricultural lands that
are not yet covered under CARP (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).

The institution of leasehold in these areas ensure the protection and improvement of the tenurial and economic status
of tenant-tillers therein. (Rep. Act No. 6657 [1988], sec. 6).

Leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease

In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974), the Supreme Court distinguished leasehold tenancy from civil law
lease.

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There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas
the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold
tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to
the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by
special laws (at 596).

Elements of Agricultural Tenancy

The following are the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relation:
a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b) The subject is agricultural land;
c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land, given either orally or in writing, expressly
or impliedly;
d) The purpose is agricultural production;
e) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate farm household; and
f) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in money and/or produce. (Carag vs. CA, 151
SCRA 44 [1987]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 [1974]; Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Qua vs. CA,
198 SCRA 236 [1991])

The Supreme Court emphasized in numerous cases that "(a)ll these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws." (Caballes v. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988])

In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969), the Court found all the elements of an agricultural leasehold
relation contained in the contract of lease executed by the parties.

Gabriel vs. Pangilinan (58 SCRA 590, 1974)

Facts:
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula,
Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was notified that the
contract would be terminated, but upon request was extended for another year. Defendant moved for the dismissal of
the complaint claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian
Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff,
the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally leased to him by the
plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the condition that he would convert the
major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be
reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could
continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid
of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter,
Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his
instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the fishpond, defendant’s other children are all
professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the
fishpond.

Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199,
as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

8
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm
household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished
(Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists between
the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide
this case. Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a
civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction,
the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.

HELD:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law
requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee
need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted
to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs,
the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.

The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or
in produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact
that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec
4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.

The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and
incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the members
of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him
for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm
household". Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. A
person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household
cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who
hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned
the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status,
rights, and privileges of one. We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between
the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No.
1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

9
 WEEK 7: CONVERSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
Jose Luis Ros, et. al. Petitioners, vs. Department Of Agrarian Reform Respondents. [G.R. No. 132477.
August 31, 2005.]
Facts:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal
Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial
lands. As part of their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured
all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications. Despite these permits and certifications,... the
DAR was disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for... industrial use and directed... him to cease and desist
from further developments on the land Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the RTC... a Complaint... for
Injunction... with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction... the RTC, ruling
that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues:
Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands... has the effect of taking such... lands out of the coverage of
the CARL and beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR

Ruling:
if... the agricultural land sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which has already been brought under
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and/or which has been distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries, then such reclassification must be... confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under
Section 6522 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective. After the passage of Republic Act
No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which
is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already... reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657
are exempted from conversion. Agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion despite having undergone
reclassification... a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its
use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is... permitted
to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), petitioner, vs. THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. [G.R. No. 183409. June 18, 2010.]
FACTS: Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by
LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the following: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another
type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use
other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses. The 2 earlier
AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers
all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.

The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies
and calamities. To address the conversion to lands to non agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and approval
of land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that there is a slowdown of housing projects because of
such stoppage.

ISSUE: Is DAR’s AO unconstitutional?

HELD: RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the soil,

10
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations
done by a person whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land. However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands reclassified from
agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to
be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because
there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the
jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority.

Also, it violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein that reclassification by
LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be
secured to effect reclassification.The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the
constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under DAR AO No. 01-
02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or
restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased
in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society. DISMISSED.

The Hon. Carlos Fortich et. al. vs. The Hon. Renato Corona GR. No. 131457, April 24, 1998 (Decision,
Opinion and Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration)
Facts:
Respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to SC En Banc. A careful reading however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, "decided" referring to cases and "resolved" referring to
matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. (referring each to each)

The issue presented by the respondents is whether the power of the LGU to reclassify lands is subject to the approval
of the CAR is no longer novel, this having decided in Camarines Sur vs CA case that the LGU need not obtain the
approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

Intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land
ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farm workers at the plantation, they have been identified
by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property.

Ruling:
Intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farm workers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest
over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share
of the fruits of the land.

WEEK 8: MECHANISMS FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

WEEK 9: AGRARIAN JUSTICE OR THE RESOLUTION OF AGRARIAN DISPUTES
Rufina Vda de Tangub vs. Court of Appeals, UDK 9864, December 3, 1990 (191 SCRA 885)
FACTS:
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders
Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is at issue in the proceeding at bar.

Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988,
"an agrarian case for damages by reason of unlawful dispossession . . .were tenants from the landholding" owned by
the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil.

11
 Respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint as then jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over
agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for Certiorari with this Court, this Court referred the same to the Court of
Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act thereon. and

The Court of Appeals, dismissed the petition, finding that the jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved
by the Trial Court. Emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board.

Basis:
-Below E.Os were issued by President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her revolutionary powers in
accordance with Section 6, Article 17 of the 1986 Consti.
Section 6, Article 17 of 1986 Consti provided that the "incumbent President shall continue to exercise
legislative powers until the first Congress is convened."

E.O No. 229 approved on July 22, 1987 (Section 17)

Vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters,"
Granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform.
EXCEPT:
Those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture [DA]
Powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs
to enforce its orders or decisions."

E.O No. 129-A (Section 5), issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act No. 6657, effective on June 15,
1988
Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose
Punish for contempt and issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writ of execution of its decision, and
other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious program implementation;
***The decisions of the Department may in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall
be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal;
Provide free legal service to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian conflicts and land tenure
related problems as may be provided for by laws;
Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided . . ."
The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform is evidently quite as extensive as that
theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946.

The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition
stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders
just quoted

The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this Court, contending that the Trial
Court's "order of dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are
patently illegal and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A.
6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129."

ISSUE: WON agrarian cases fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

HELD: Not all.

Regional Trial Court has a limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases:
SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all

12
 matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters.
Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are
Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as
such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original
and exclusive jurisdiction over:

All petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners, and

The prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act
***In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by . . . (the) Act."

It is relevant to mention in this connection that —

Appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, . ."

Appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining
to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian
reform may be brought to the Court of
Appeals by Certiorari except as otherwise provided . . . within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the
DAR [being] final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence."

The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case
concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said
Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.

the law strives to make resolution of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not only
that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence," supra, but also that, as explicitly
stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section 50 of the Act:

"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations
in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided, however, That when there are two or more representatives for any
individual or group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent such party or group
before any DAR proceedings."

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation versus Juan Amante et.al. (G.R. No. 112526, March 16, 2005)
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area
of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to
the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying
the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court seeking an
easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the
ejectment of private respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the Department of
Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The landholding of
SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the property
contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of
18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.
The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

13
Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed
part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657

Held: Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that
the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection
of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to
be answered now.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO J. CUENCA et. al, respondents.
[G.R. No. 154112. September 23, 2004.]
FACTS:
Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City and devoted
principally to the planting of sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE
to private respondent Cuenca placing the landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF
COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the subject land
pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of
Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405. Cuenca alleged that the implementation of CARP
in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have
commenced and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that Executive Order No. 405 amends,
modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that then President Corazon Aquino
no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.

Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio. The respondent
Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing
Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the
LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA
a petition for certiorari assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of
the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the
power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the jurisdiction of the
DAR, not with the trial court

RULING: Yes. A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs prayed for
refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the annulment
of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage,
as may be gleaned from the following averments. The main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial
court was not the issue of compensation. Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the
DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the courts function of determining just compensation. To be sure, the
issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary step towards the acquisition of private land under
the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the
quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency
of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.

Phil. Veterans Bank vs. CA et. al, (GR No. 132767, Jan. 18, 2000)
Facts:
PVB owned 4 parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, and these lands were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless
farmers pursuant to CARP. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by LBP and DARAB, PVB filed a petition
for a determination of just compensation for the properties. The petition was dismissed on the ground that it was filed
beyond the reglementary period. CA affirmed this decision. CA added that the jurisdiction over the land valuation is
lodged in the DARAB. PVB filed for reconsideration but was denied too.

14
Issue: Whether the jurisdiction over the fixing of just compensation is under DARAB.

Ruling: There is nothing contradictory between the "agrarian reform matters" under the jurisdiction of DAR and the
"all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" [which includes just compensation] under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. The first is an administrative proceeding while the second is judicial. CA is affirmed.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ, respondent. [G.R. No.
169008. August 14, 2007.]
Facts:
The land owned by Martinez was compulsory acquired by DAR for the purpose of CARP, of which the LBP offered
P1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the amount was just and confiscatory, Martinez rejected it. Thus,
PARAD conducted a summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of the just compensation.

PARAD marked some inconsistencies in the figures and factors used by LBP in its computation, so they rendered an
amount of P12,179,492.50 as just compensation.

LBP however, filed at the RTC-Romblon that the ruling of the DARAB on the just compensation has become final
after the lapse of 15 days. Martinez opposed the motion. Later on, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari against
PARAD, assailing that PARAD gravely abuse its discretion when it issued the order for the 12m just compensation
despite the pending petition in the RTC. CA, finding LBP guilty of forum-shopping dismissed the petition, Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
(1) whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department; (2) whether or not petitioner
committed forum shopping; and (3) whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely
abused his discretion when he issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just
compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Ruling:
The Court went on to rule that the petition for review on certiorari could not be filed without the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) entering its appearance as the principal legal counsel of the bank or without
the OGCC giving its conformity to the LBP Legal Department’s filing of the petition. The Court also found petitioner
to have forum-shopped when it moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their
annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. Most importantly, the Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision on land valuation. The said adjudicator’s
decision attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules of Procedure.

On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in this case that
the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated
in the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled
jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period. Following settled doctrine, we ruled in this case that the
PARAD’s decision had already attained finality because of LBP’s failure to file the petition for the fixing of just
compensation within the 15-day period.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO CRUZ G.R. No. 175175, September
29, 2008
Facts:
Respondents are registered owners of an unirrigated riceland situated in Cagayan, which was placed by the government
under the coverage of the operation land transfer under PD 27. LBP pegged the value of the land but was rejected the
valuation.

15
Because of such rejection, SAC held that the value of the land different from that of the valuation made by the LBP,
following the valuation made by the PARAD. On petition, the CA ruled that the area covered by the agrarian reform
program was duly established before PARAD, however, CA affirmed the land valuation made by the SAC. Hence,
this instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the SAC has the jurisdiction to determine the valuation of the land.

Ruling:
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 states:
SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land,
the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by government to the property as well as the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.

A perusal of the PARADs Decision dated 23 November 1999, which mandated payment of just compensation in the
amount of P80,000.00 per hectare, reveals that the PARAD did not adhere to the formula prescribed in any of the
aforementioned regulations issued by the DAR or was at least silent on the applicability of the aforementioned DAR
regulations to the question of just compensation. The PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in support
of its finding.

The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended, as the controlling guideline in fixing
just compensation. Pertinently, to obtain the land value, the formula under said regulation requires that the values for
the Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value based on the tax declaration must be shown.
Moreover, said formula has been superseded by DAR A.O. No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires values for
Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value, the same parameters laid down in the prior regulation.

Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the aforementioned parameters, the SAC ruled that it was
constrained to adopt the finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal,
the CA adopted the same finding. The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are binding and conclusive on the Court. However, the rule admits of exceptions, as when the factual
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures or when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based.

A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was adopted by both the SAC and the CA, shows that its valuation of
P80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking in any evidentiary or legal basis. While the Court wants to fix just
compensation due to respondents if only to write finis to the controversy, the evidence on record is not sufficient for
the Court to do so in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998. Decision of CA was reversed and set aside,
the case was remanded to RTC to determine the just compensation.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONILA P. CELADA G.R. No. 164876. January 23, 2006
Fact: Respondent owner agricultural land was identified by the DAR as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the
CARP. The matter was then indorsed to petitioner LBP for field investigation and land valuation. In due course, LBP
valued respondent’s land at P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same amount to respondent as just compensation, but
it was rejected. Nonetheless, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in the name of respondent. Pursuant to
the CARL, the matter was referred to the DARAB for summary administrative hearing on determination of just
compensation. While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation against LBP, the DAR and the MARO before the RTC which was the designated SAC.

Respondent alleged that the current market value of her land is at least P150,000.00 per hectare based a number of
factors. LBP filed its Answer7 raising non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as forum-shopping as
affirmative defense. According to petitioner, respondent must first await the outcome of the DARAB case before
taking any judicial recourse; that its valuation was arrived at by applying the formula prescribed by law whereas

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respondent’s was based only on the “current value of like properties”. the SAC fixes the compensation of the land of
petitioner at P354,847.50 and which shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of its
taking by the DAR and to indemnify petitioner for attorney’s fee and incidental expenses. LBP elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed the appeal outright. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration,
LBP filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the SAC erred in setting aside petitioner’s valuation of respondent’s land on the sole basis of the higher
valuation given for neighbouring properties.

Held: Yes, the SAC cannot ignore administrative issuances in the determination of the Just Compensation of the
expropriated land especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. The petitioner arrived at its valuation
by using available factors culled from the Department of Agriculture and Philippine Coconut Authority, and by
computing the same in accordance with the formula provided in the said administrative order. Under the
circumstances, the court find the explanation and computation of petitioner to be sufficient and in accordance with
applicable laws. Petitioner’s valuation must thus be upheld.

Land Bank vs. CA and Jose Pascual (GR No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999)
Facts:
Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of land located in Gattaran, Cagayan. Pursuant to the Land
Reform Program of the Government under PD 27 and EO 228, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed
these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT). In compliance with EO 228, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of the DAR in an Accomplished OLT Valuation Form recommended Average Gross Productivity
(AGP) should be 25 cavans per hectare for unirrigated lowland rice. Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (SAR) also conducted its own valuation proceedings apart from the PARO. Private respondent Jose
Pascual, opposing the recommended AGP of the PARO. PARAD ruled in favor of private respondent nullifying the
AGP recommended by the PARO. Instead, the PARAD applied the 1976 AGP and the AGP stated in private
respondent's Tax Declarations to determine the correct compensation and "Government Support Price" (GSP) of P300
for each cavan of palay and P250 for each cavan of corn.

PARAD ordered petitioner LBP to pay private respondent P1,961,950.00. After receiving notice of the decision of the
PARAD, private respondent accepted the valuation. However, when the judgment became final and executory,
petitioner LBP as the financing arm in the operation of PD 27 and EO 228 refused to pay thus forcing private
respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution with the PARAD which the latter issued on 24 December 1992. Still,
petitioner LBP declined to comply with the order. Secretary Ernesto Garilao Jr. of the DAR wrote a letter to petitioner
LBP requiring the latter to pay the amount stated in the judgment of the PARAD. Again, petitioner LBP rejected the
directive of Secretary Garilao. Petitioner LBP Executive Vice President, Jesus Diaz, then sent a letter to Secretary
Garilao arguing that (a) the valuation of just compensation should be determined by the courts; (b) PARAD could not
reverse a previous order of the Secretary of the DAR; and, (c) the valuation of lands under EO 228 falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR and not of the DARAB. Petitioner LBP having consistently refused
to comply with its obligation despite the directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand letters of
private respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel
petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD. The appellate court also required petitioner LBP to pay a
compounded interest of 6% per annum in compliance with DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.
Petitioner's MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether DARAB of the DAR has jurisdiction to determine the value of lands covered by OLT under PD 27?
Whether private respondent Pascual should file a case in the Special Agrarian Court to compel Petitioner Landbank
to pay just compensation?

Held:
FIRST ISSUE
Yes. It is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform
although such valuation may only be considered preliminary as the final determination of just compensation is vested

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in the courts. Thus, petitioner's contention that Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946 is still in effect cannot be sustained. It
seems that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform erred in issuing Memorandum Circular No. I, Series of 1995, directing
the DARAB to refrain from hearing valuation cases involving PD 27 lands.

SECOND ISSUE
No. Although it is true that Sec. 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian
Courts shall have jurisdiction over the final determination of just compensation cases, it must be noted that petitioner
Landbank never contested the valuation of the PARAD. Thus, the land valuation stated in its decision became final
and executory. There was therefore no need for private respondent Pascual to file a case in the Special Agrarian Court.
Although the case at bar pertains to an involuntary sale of land, the same principle should apply. Once the Land Bank
agrees with the appraisal of the DAR, which bears the approval of the landowner, it becomes its legal duty to finance
the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner participated in the valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD
through its counsel, Atty. Eduard Javier. It did not appeal the decision of PARAD which became final and executory.
As a matter of fact, petitioner even stated in its Petition that "it is willing to pay the value determined by the PARAD
PROVIDED that the farmer beneficiaries concur thereto." These facts sufficiently prove that petitioner LBP agreed
with the valuation of the land. The only thing that hindered it from paying the amount was the nonconcurrence of the
farmer-beneficiary. But as we have already stated, there is no need for such concurrence. Without such obstacle,
petitioner can now be compelled to perform its legal duty through the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Decision is
AFFIRMED.

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