Giovanni Gentile and the Philosophy of the Young Karl Marx

Author(s): A. James Gregor

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1963), pp. 213-230
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 GIOVANNI GENTILE AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE YOUNG KARL MARX

A. JAMESGREGOR

The relationship of GiovanniGentileto Marxismdatesback to

1897 when,at the age of twenty-two, he publishedhis essay "Una
criticadel materialismo storico"in thecollection Studistorici.While
it establishesthefactthatGentilehad earlyconcerned himselfwith
Marxism,the essayis in itselfratherpedestrianand does not par-
ticularlyrecommend itselfto thereader.It is a competent but some-
whatnarrowdiscussion ofthematerialist conception ofhistory.Much
moreimportant is Gentile'sessay,"La filosofiadi Marx,"published
bySpoerriin 1899,whenGentilewas twenty-four. The essay,written
somesixty-odd yearsago, beforethe substantialpartsof the early
Marxmanuscripts werepublishedin 1932,1reflects Gentile'skeenin-
sight,orat leasttheinsightafforded byhisrichHegelianbackground,
intothephilosophical speculations oftheyoungKarl Marx.
Gentile'sessaylendsweightto a considerable bodyof opinion2
whichholdsthattheyoungMarxwasnota materialist in theordinary
senseofthewordandthat,as such,he wassomething quiteotherthan
EngelsorLenin,whosematerialist "metaphysics" havecausedprofes-
sionalepistemologists no littlepuzzlementforhalfa century. Gentile's
essaymade considerable impactin Italy and philosophic tractsde-
votedto analysesofMarxhave,in thepast,madereadyand constant
reference to it.' AlthoughLeninhimself 4 made the existence of the
essayknownto a wideaudience,it has unfortunately passedall but
unnoticedoutsideof Italy. This is unfortunate because the essay
seemsto shedconsiderable lighton a particularly obscureperiodof
Marx'sintellectualdevelopment. As such it constitutes an original
and important contribution to Marxscholarship.
We can give some indicationof its generalimportance in the
1 Cf.Landshut's
foreword
to K. Marx,Die Friihschriften
(Stuttgart,
1953),v.
2 Cf. A. Labriola,Studiosu Marx (Naples,1926),34f.; R. Mondolfo, R mate-
rialismostoricoin FedericoEngels (Genoa,1912), 9, 11; cf. G. Kline'sreviewof
Mondolfo's neweditionin JournalofPhilosophy, LI, 13 (June24, 1954),389; cf.
S. Hook,Towardsthe Understanding ofKarl Marx (New York,1933),29; cf.also
M. Adler,Marx als Denker(Berlin,1925), 126-41,Lehrbuchdermaterialistischen
Geschichtsauffassung (Berlin,1930).
3 Cf.,forexample, F. Oligiati,CarloMarx (Milan,1918),146,n. 1, andC. Scalia,
R materialismo storicoe il socialismo(Milan,1920),12 and passim,Mondolfo, op.
cit.,9 and passim.
4N. Lenin,The Teachingof Karl Marx (New York,1930),45, cf.G. Gentile,
Fondamenti dellafilosofiadel dirittocon aggiuntidue studisulla filosofia
di Marx
(Florence,1955) [hereafter referred
to as FD], vi.
213

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214 A. JAMES GREGOR

courseof our rathercarefulinquiry.Of specificimportance forour

specialconcernis the factthatGentile'sdiscussionturnsessentially
on thefirstglossofthe"Theseson Feuerbach," whichMarxhad writ-
tenin 1845 (whenhe was twenty-seven) and whichEngelspublished
in 1888as an appendixto LudwigFeuerbach.5 That gloss,withwhich
Gentileis primarily concerned,is a consideration
of "sensuousactiv-
ity" (sinnlicheTatigkeit).Althoughthe "Theses"are nowgenerally
recognized as markinga transition fromliberalismand idealismto
socialismand materialism,6 Marxistorthodoxy insistson interpreting
themin a strictly materialistfashion,7as thoughtherehad beenno
development at all in thethought ofKarl Marx.
Gentile'scontention is substantially
that the "Theses"reveala
metaphysics, whichdevelopsoutofan analysisofsensation, anything
but materialist in any formalsense.The "Theses,"particularly the
first,giveevidenceof a curiousphilosophical position,neverclearly
defined, but whichis of fundamental importance in any attemptto
reconstructthedevelopment ofMarx'sthought. The firstthesisreads
in itsentirety:
The chiefdefectof all hitherto
existing
materialism-that of Feuerbach
included-isthattheobject,reality,
sensuousness,
is conceivedonlyin the
formoftheobjectordatumofcontemplation butnotas humansensuous
activity, notsubjectively.
practice, Thusit happened thattheactiveside,
in opposition
to materialism,was developedby idealism-butonlyab-
since,ofcourse,
stractly, idealismdoesnotknowrealsensuous activityas
such.Feuerbach wantssensuousobjects,reallydifferentiatedfromthe
thoughtobjects,buthe doesnotconceivehumanactivity itselfas activity
throughobjects.Consequently,
in theEssenceof Christianity,he regards
thetheoretical
attitude
as,theonlygenuinely
human attitude,
whilepractice
is conceived
andfixedonlyin itsdirty-Jewish
form ofappearance. Hence
he doesnotgraspthesignificanceof"revolutionary,"
or practical-critical,
activity.8
5 F. Engels,LudwigFeuerbach(New York,1941),82-84.
6 Cf. A. Cornu,Karl Marx,Die okonomisch-philosophischen (Ber-
Manuskripte
lin,1955),3.
7 Cf.T. Jackson,
Dialectics,theLogicofMarxismanditsCritics(London,1936),
ch. ii.
8 "Der Hauptmangel alles bisherigen
Materialismus (den Feuerbachschen mit
eingerechnet) ist,dass derGegenstand, die Wirklichkeit,
Sinnlichkeit
nurunterder
Form des Objektsoder der Anschauung gefasstwird; nichtaber als sinnlich-
menschliche Tdtigkeit, Praxis,nichtsubjektiv.Daher die tatigeSeite abstraktim
Gegensatzzu demMaterialismus von demIdealismus-dernaturlich die wirkliche,
sinnlicheTiitigkeitals solchenichtkennt-entwickelt. Feuerbachwillsinnliche-von
den Gedankenobjekten wirklichunterschiedeneObjekte: aber er fasstdie men-
schlicheTiitigkeitselbstnichtals gegenstdndlicheTitigkeit.Er betrachtetdaherim
Wesendes Christentums Verhaltenals das echtmenschliche,
nur das theoretische
wiihrend die Praxisnurin ihrerschmutzig-jUdischen Erscheinungsform gefasstund
fixiert
wird.Er begreift dahernichtdie Bedeutungder 'revolutionliren,'der prak-
tisch-kritischen
Tatigkeit."

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX' S PHILOSOPHY 215

Marx'schoiceof wordshereis singular, to say the least.Gentile

contendsthatthepointof Marx'sobjectionto "all hitherto existing
materialism" thatadvancedby Idealism,i.e.,thatma-
is essentially
terialismconceivestheobject,theexternalworldas a datum,some-
thing"given"to sensation, something simplycontemplated.9
One oftheprincipalcontentions of Idealism,in general, had been
thatiftheobjectwas conceived as extrinsicto thesubject,something
simplycontemplated, therewouldbe no creditableway to certify
truth.That is to say,ifwe entertainonly"images"in themind,"im-
pressions" receivedfroman externalworld,therecouldbe no wayto
certifythe accuracy,the truth,of such an impression, forwe can
never stand outsidethe presumedrelationshipand comparethe
"image,"the "impression" withthe "thing-in-itself" conceivedto be
itscause.
Idealismhad longcontended thatknowledge couldonlyariseout
ofan intrinsic betweensubjectand object.As Fichteex-
relationship
pressedit: "In vain shall we look fora linkof connection between
subject and if
object, theyare notfirstand simplyapprehended as a
unity."10This "unity"in whichsubjectand objectare connected is
"consciousness" or "mind."
According to the generalorientation of GermanIdealismthe ob-
ject firstcomesbeforeus as abstractobject,the mereemptyim-
mediacyofthenot-self. Opposedto theabstractobjectis theabstract
subject.The synthesis ofbothin consciousness constitutesknowledge.
"Consciousness," Marxstates,outlining theIdealistposition,"knows
the . . . object . . . because it knowsthe object as its self-alienation
(Selbstentausserung)."11Knowledgeconsistsof the realizationthat
everyobjectis no morethan an "externalization" of ourselves(as
MindorEgo) anda consequent re-absorptionofsuch"otherness" into
ourconcrete subjective life.'2
In accordancewiththemorespecific principles
ofHegelianIdeal-
ismtheconcrete subjectgoesoutofitselfintoitsopposite,theobject,
and thenreturns intoitselfin thecognitive synthesis.The object,in
orderto be known,mustsomehowbe conceivedas intrinsic to the
knowingsubject,i.e.,subjectively. The "object"is to be understood
not as something simplysensed,but mustratherbe conceivedas a
"self-alienation,"
or, as Marx explainsthe thesis: "knowingknows
thatin relating
itselfto an objectit is onlyoutsideitself-thatit only
externalizes
itself;thatit itselfappearsto itselfonlyas an object-
9 "In verita,qual era,in fondo, il rimproveroda lui mossoal materialismo,
nella
teoriadellaconoscenza? Questo:di crederel'oggetto, la intuizione
sensible,
la realta
esternaun dato,invececheun prodotto. ... " FD, 214.
10 J. Fichte,"Versuch einerneuenDarstellung," Werke,I, 528.
11K. Marx,"National6konomie und Philosophie,"Friihschriften,
277,Economic
and PhilosophicManuscriptsof 1844 (Moscow,n.d.) [hereafter referredto as
EPM], 160. 12 Cf. SectionDD of Hegel'sPhenomenology of Mind.

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216 A. JAMES GREGOR

or thatthatwhichappearsto it as an objectis onlyit itself."13

As Gentileinterprets thefirst thesis,Marxremainsfaithful to this
Hegelianconception ofthenatureofknowledge, in a qualifiedsense,
emptying it of its idealisticcontent.'4Gentilecontendsthat what
Marxis suggesting is that"nature"doesnotbecomeknownthrough
thatwhichis simply"given,"thatwhichis "contemplated," as ma-
terialism had longpretended; it becomesknownthrough a dialectical
process.It is a "product" havinga history. But in placeofthedialec-
tic of the abstractSpiritof Hegel,Marx substitutes the dialecticof
sensuouspractice.'5 The "object"is to be understood notas something
whichcomesto be knownthroughsimplesensationconceivedas a
kindofcontemplation, butratheras theconsequence ofsomehow hav-
ingbeen"made"by theconcrete subject,as the "product"ofhuman
sensuousactivity.'8
Gentilecontendsthattheexpression "gegenstdndliche Tdtigkeit,"
"activitythrough objects,"17 iS to be understood as implying a "sen-
suous activity"whichsomehow"fashions,posits,createsthe ob-
ject."'8 This,of course,constitutes a radicalre-interpretation of the
philosophic positionof the youngMarx. It arisesessentially out of
Gentile'sfamiliarity with GermanIdealism; Gentileunderstands
Marx to meanthathumansensuousactivitysomehow"constitutes"
objectsin muchthesameway as Hegel understood Spiritto be the
creatorof the "objectiveworld."The criticaldifference, of course,is
thefactthatMarxunderstood themotiveenergyofthiscreativeac-
tivitytoemanatenotfromthe"abstract" needsoftheSpirit,butfrom
theessentialnaturalneedsof thehumanagent.'9Needs arisein the
agent;20 in meetingthoseneedsthe agentembarksupon sensuous
activity.2'In thatactivity theagentdefines himself as subjectagainst
the objectsmeetinghis needs.22Sensuousactivityis the process
I3 Marx,"Nationalokonomie .. . , " Friihschriften,277 (EPM, 160).
14 " 'IJ puntodi partenzaperlui era il fare,al quale tiendietroil conoscere; e la
conoscenzanon e altroche lo sviluppogeneticodel faremedesimo.' . . . Cotesto
principio vuoleMarxdall'astratto idealismotrasportare nel concretomaterialismo."
FD, 213f.;cf.Olgiati,op. cit.,152.
'6 Cf. Labriola,op. cit.,36ff.;Scalia,op. cit.,12f."La radiceintanto, la causa
permanente di questosviluppoe nell'attivith nel faredel soggetto...." FD, 215.
18 "La realtadunque,secondolui, e una produzione soggettiva dell'uomo;pro-
duzioneperodell'attivita sensitiva.... " FD, 216.
17Gentile translatesthis as "L'attivita. . . umana comeattivitaoggettiva."
FD, 207. 18Ibid., n. 1.
19"Marx non fa altroche sostituire allo spiritoil corpo,all'ideail senso: e ai
prodotti in cui consisteva
dellospirito, perHegella verarealt'a. .. i fattieconomici,
che sonoi prodottidell'attivita sensitivaumana,nellaricercadellasoddisfazione di
... bisognimateriali.... " Ibid.,294f.,cf.216; cf.J. Calvez,La penseede Karl
Marx (Paris,1956),383ff.
20Cf.Scalia, op. cit.,27. 21FD, 256; cf. Calvez,op. cit.,390. 22FD, 298.

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX' S PHILOSOPHY 217
through whichsubjectand objectare distinguished.
The subjectdoes not passivelyreflect the objectin sensation;it
developsa consciousness ofitsintrinsic relationship withit. For what
is the subjectwithoutthe object?And the objectwithoutthe sub-
ject?23 Subjectand objectare correlative terms,the one inevitably
carriesthe otherin its train.24 The one is intrinsic to the other,in
whichit findsitsnecessary complement, an essentialrelationship out-
sideof whicheach component is but an abstraction.25 They must be
conceivedin theirmutualrelationship.26 The objectwhicharisesout
ofhumansensuousactivity canbe saidtohavebeen"created"bythat
activity;the"object"is the"product" ofthatactivity, andsincethere
canbe no objectwithout a corresponding subjectit is necessary to add
thatin "creating"the objectthe subject"creates"itself.27 The mo-
mentsoftheprogressive development ofthesubjectcorrespond to the
diversemoments oftheprogressive formation oftheobject.This de-
velopment articulatesitselfin sensuousactivity, practice;28 its ulti-
mategroundis theunityofBeing.
Gentileunderstands Marx'saccountas an attemptto analyzethe
conditions whichmakeknowledge possible.29The unityofsubjectand
object,defined in sensuousactivity, affords therealand theoretic pos-
sibility ofknowledge. Knowledgeis theconsequence ofsensuousprac-
ticeundertaken to meettheexigencies of feltneeds.30 Onlyin meet-
ing needsare "objects"defined.Being definedas a consequenceof
meeting humanneeds,"objects"succeedin tellingus something about
the essenceof man.Each object,then,tellsus something aboutthe
subject.The objectis a "self-projection" of thesubject,a Selbstent-
23 "Ma questosoggetto, di chea soggetto?
senzail suo oggetto, E questooggetto
senzail rispettivo soggetto,
di chee oggetto?"Ibid.,214.
24 "Marx,insomma, rimproverava ai materialisti . . . di concepire il soggettoe
l'oggetto dellaconoscenza in una posizioneastrattae perofalsa."Ibid. "Soggetto ed
oggettosonopuredue termini correlativi, l'uno dei quali si trae dietronecessaria-
mentel'altro."Ibid.
25 "E se il soggettoe l'oggettoesistono, senza questeimmagini, prodottodella
relazionein cui essipossonoentrare, se esistonoquindiindipendenti l'unodall'altro,
che e soggetto, comepurosoggetto, e che e oggettocomepurooggetto?. . . astra-
zioni."Ibid.,216.
26 "Soggetto ed oggettosonopure due terminicorrelativi . . . Bisognadunque
concepirli nellaloromutuarelazione." Ibid.,214.
27 "Quandosi conosce, si costruisce,si fa l'oggetto,e quandosi fa o si costruisce
un oggetto, lo si conosce;dunquel'oggettoe un prodottodel soggetto;e, poiche
soggetto nonc'e senzaoggetto, bisognasoggiungere cheil soggetto, a manoa mano
che vienfacendoo costruendo l'oggetto,vienfacendoo costruendo se stesso. ..
Ibid.,215. 28Ibid.
29 "Scindete questarelazione;e nonavretepi'ula vita.... Non piu due termini
realidel fattodel conoscere, ma due termini astratti."Ibid.; cf.240f. 30FD, 246,
294f.

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218 A. JAMES GREGOR

fremdung, an alienationofselfin other.3'

We havereconstructed here,in summary form, Gentile'sinterpre-
tationofthemetaphysics oftheyoungMarx-a metaphysics in which
the subjectand objectarticulatethemselves in the dialecticof sen-
suouspractice.Gentile'saccountrecommends itselfprimarily because
it relates,intelligibly,
thephilosophy oftheyoungMarxto hisHegel-
ian and Left-Hegelian heritage. As suchhisaccountis to be preferred
to thatof SidneyHook whoattemptsto readintothefirsttheseson
Feuerbacha sophisticated foreshadowing of scientific
pragmatism,32
an elaboratemethodological programwhichwould make of the
twenty-seven-year-old Marxnotonlya philosophical geniusbutsome-
thingofa prophet. Professor Hook'sinterpretation findslittlesupport
in the manuscripts of 1844writtenin the monthsimmediately pre-
cedingthewriting of the "Theseson Feuerbach."It is interesting to
note,in thisrelation, thatProfessor Hookmakesbut one casualref-
erence33 to thesedocuments in hismostdetailedstudyofMarx'searly
philosophy, fornowhere in theearlydocuments do wefindsupportfor
the notionthatMarx was concerned witha "philosophy of science"
in any formalsense.Furthermore, even thoughthe manuscripts of
1844wereavailableto Professor Hook,theentireconceptof "aliena-
tion"is completely neglected, althoughthatconcept,as Gentileindi-
cated,is thecriticallinkbetweenHegel,Feuerbach,and Marx.
That Gentile'saccounthas notbeenappreciated in ourowncoun-
tryseemsto be the consequence of the generalneglectof Hegelian
philosophy as wellas ofits "revision"at thehandsofLudwigFeuer-
bach.Professor Marcuse'saccount,34 forexample,seemsto suffer from
a generalmisinterpretation of Feuerbach'sbasic position,or at any
rate,the positionheld by Feuerbachduringthe periodin whichhe
exercisedan influence on the youngKarl Marx. Professor Marcuse
contendsthatFeuerbach, was essentially a "materialist"in the "tra-
ditionof materialistphilosophers. .. ," 35 that he held the subjectto
be essentiallypassive, "primarilyreceptive. . . determined. . . the
passivesubjectofperception."
3 As we shallattempt to indicate,Pro-
fessorMarcuse'saccountis incorrecton bothcounts.He missesthe
importanceof Feuerbach'sinterpretationof sensoryexperience. He
subsequentlyfailsto appreciateMarx'sanalysisin its entirety,
over-
lookingther8leofalienationin Marx'saccountofthecognitive proc-
31 "La prassie attivitacreatrice,per cui verumet factumconvertuntur. t
svilupponecessario,
percheprocededellanaturadell'attivita....Ma questooggetto
chesi vienfacendoper virtiudel soggetto,none se nonuna duplicazione
di questo,
una sua proiezione
di se stesso,una sua Selbstentfremdung."
Ibid.,225.
32Cf.Hook,FromHegel to Marx,281-5; The Meaningof Marx (New York,
1934),49. 33Hook,FromHegel to Marx,272,n. 1.
34H. Marcuse,Reason and Revolution:Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory
(New York,1954), 267-73. 35Ibid.,270. 3Ibid., 270f.

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX' S PHILOSOPHY 219

ess. He restricts his discussionto whatCalvez calls "profanealiena-

tion,"37i.e., theEntfremdung ofmanin economics and politics.
Whatis necessary fora correct interpretationofthephilosophy of
theyoungMarx,particularly his understanding ofthenatureof sen-
suousactivity, is a ratherdetailedaccountofthephilosophy ofFeuer-
bach as Karl Marxknewit in 1844.This,coupledwiththematerial
in theEconomicand PhilosophicManuscripts of 1844,establishthe
essentialcorrectness ofGentile'sinterpretationandsupplythemissing
links in the chain of Marxism'sphilosophicaldevelopment from
HegelianIdealismto DialecticalMaterialism.
Onlywhenthephilosophy ofFeuerbachis understood (to theex-
tentto whichit lendsitselfto understanding) doesMarx'spositionin
the manuscripts of 1844becomecomprehensible. Such an apprecia-
tion,in turn,makespossiblean interpretation of the firstthesison
Feuerbachwhichis historically credible.This interpretation reveals
itselfto be,substantially, theinterpretationoffered by Gentilein his
analysisof"La filosofia dellaprassi."
Feuerbachhad begunhisphilosophic laborsas a studentofHegel.
But by 1839Feuerbachdrewtogether therestivecriticism, tracesof
whichcanbe foundin hisearlierwork,38 and announced hisdefinitive
break with Hegelianismwith the writingof "Zur Kritik der
Hegel'schenPhilosophie.""tVber den 'Anfangder Philosophie"'fol-
lowed(in 1841),in whichhe defined hisrevolutionary position. Hegel,
according to Feuerbachwas to be turned"rightside up." Feuerbach
conceived Hegelas havingbeencontentto commence withabstractor
ideal "Being."Feuerbachcontendedthat he wouldcommencewith
real or naturalbeing.39 "Being"signified forhim concrete, limited
being in a worldofhumansensuousexperience. Philosophy was to
begin,in thefirstinstance,withthatwhichwas notphilosophical at
all.41Philosophywas to findits commencement in its antithesis,in
simplesenseperception 42 outofwhich wereto arisetheever-changing
distinctions betweensubjectand object.43
37 Cf. Calvez,op. cit., partII.
38 Cf. Jodl,LudwigFeuerbach(Stuttgart,
1904),10.
39 Cf. Feuerbach,"Zur Kritikder Hegel'schen Phiosophie,"SamtlicheWerke
(Leipzig,1846ff.)[hereafterreferredto as SW], II, 192,207,231; C. Chamberlain,
HeavenWasn'tHis Destination:The Philosophy ofLudwigFeuerbach(New York,
1940),30.
40 "Der Anfang der Philosophieist nichtGott,nichtdas Absolute,nichtdas
Sein als Pradicatdes AbsolutenoderderIdee-der AnfangderPhilosophie ist das
Endliche,das Bestimmte, das Wirkliche." SW, II, 252f. 41 Ibid.,236,258.
42 "Feuerbach erkliirt
die HegelscheDialektik. . . vomPositiven, vomSinnlich-
Gewissen. . " Marx,"National6konomie ...," 251 (EPM, 145; cf.
Friihschriften,
111).
and objectsdo not cometogether
43 "{Subjects to createhumanactivity:they
are everchanging distinctionswithinit." Hook,FromHegelto Marx,259. (Having

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220 A. JAMES GREGOR

In thisfashionFeuerbachfanciedhimselfinstituting a profound
revisionofGermanIdealism.He contended thatonemustbeginwith
the realityof human sensoryexperience 44 ratherthan abstract

"Being."Sucha beginning, he held,obviatesthenecessity ofderiving

"otherness" outof"oneself." Forthenaturalconceptofselfarisesout
of something otherthanself.Withoutsucha beginning one is con-
demnedto remainforeverwithinthe confines of the ego.45For the
relationship, Feuerbachheld,betweentheegoandits"objects"is not,
as Idealismconceivedit, asymmetrical; it is reciprocal.
The ego is
limited, determined bytheobject,justas theobjectis determined by
theego.46 Bothariseout ofprimary sensory experience.
SinceKant,according to Feuerbach,Idealismhadpersistently con-
cerneditselfwiththe ego as activein the cognitiveprocess,as the
agent,real or virtual,prescribing intelligibleFormsor Categories
whichmakeknowledge possible.Feuerbachimaginedhimselfrestor-
ing,somehow, a "naturalequilibrium" betweenthe "objective"and
"subjective"elementsof experience.Feuerbachheld that Idealist
epistemology advancedthe ego as an activeagent(at the costof a
considerableamountof plausibility)even whenits passivitywas
plain.Hegel,forexample,playedwiththeconcept"here"in typically
Idealistfashion.47 "Here,"forexample,is a tree,an objectofsensory
experience. The subjectturnshimselfabout and this "truth"has
vanished!The treeis no longer"here."But it has vanishedonlyfor
Hegelin his Phenomenology whereits dispatchcostsbut a word.In
realitythe treecontinuesto standbehindone; to assureoneselfof
thefactoneneedbutstepback!48 The treelimitsmyfreeactivity-
it acts as a kindof activeagentagainstwhichI am,in at least one
sense,passive.In sensuousactivityone can no moredenythereality
ofthetreethanonecan denytherealityofoneself.Senseexperience,
whichdoesnotfollowthedictatesofourcaprice,49 cannotbe denied.
We cannotdeny the fact that we findourselvescast in a world
whereinwe are constrained to laborwiththe materialsat hand.50
said thismuchProfessor Hook nowhere relatesthisinsightto thepositionassumed
by Marxin themanuscripts of 1844.)
44 "Vorlaufige ThesenzurReformderPhilosophie," SW, II, 252f.;Chamberlain,
op. cit.,184.
45 'tPberden 'Anfang derPhilosophie,"' SW, II, 235ff.
46 "Ist denndas Objectweiter garnichtsals Object?Sicherlich ist es das Andere
des Ich, aber kannich nichtauch umgekehrt sagen; das Ich ist das Andere,das
Objectdes Objectsundfolglich auchdas ObjecteinIch?" "Anfang. . ," SW, II,
237.
47Cf. Hegel,Phenomenology of Mind (Baillie),154f.
48 "Kritik. . .," SW, II, 214. 4i "Anfang . . .," SW, II, 239. 50 Jodl,
op. cit.,40.

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX S PHILOSOPHY 221

realsensuousexperience,
Hence,it is practice, whichrestores phi-
losophyto health.The perplexities whichabstractspeculation creates
are onlyresolvedby practice51 in thereal world.To restorevitality
to philosophy onemustmakeit "unphilosophical." 52 One mustcarry

it downintothe arenaof everydayaffairs, intopracticallife.53 Phi-

losophymustbe no longersimply"theory," but mustalso be "prac-
tice."Philosophy mustbecometheintimateconcernofmankind. For
it is mankind's whichis eloquenttestimony
suffering to hisparticipa-
tionin a worldofrealbeing.54 Thatmansuffers, recognizesthe"objec-
tiveworld"as a limittobe overcome, indicatesthatrealandnecessary
relationscan be established betweenthe"subjective"and "objective"
elements ofexperience. That suchrelationscan existindicatesa sub-
stantialcommunity in anterior"being."Man can operatein nature
becausehe is essentiallya naturalbeing.55Thisis theextentofFeuer-
bach's "realism,"his carefully defined"materialism."56
Outoftheworldofsensory experiencethought distinguishesitself;
thoughtis a predicateof being.57 One might,however,withequal
warrantsay thatmattertoo,is a predicateofbeing.For theabstract
concept"matter"(liketheconcept"thought")arisesonlyas distinct
fromthatwhichis otherthanitself.58 For Feuerbachwas equallyfar
removedfrom materialism as from subjectiveidealism.59Truthliesin
neithermaterialism norsubjectiveidealism,butin Man, in whomall
contrariesare resolvedand contained.60 For manis thesecretofphi-
losophy-notMan as individual-butMan as species,61 as universal.
For the criterion forall thingslies in the essentialnatureof the
Man, forFeuerbach,is the measure.63
species.62 In avoidingthe ex-
die dieTheorienichtl6st,l6stDir die Praxis."SW, II, 411.
51"Die Zweifel,
52 Cf. Hook,FromHegelto Marx,229.
B3 "Der tUbergangvom Idealenzum Realenhat seinenPlatz nur in der prac-
tischenPhilosophie.""Vorlaufige Thesen... ," SW, II, 254.
54 "Nur da, wo ich aus einemIch in em Du umgewandelt werde,wo ich leide,
enstehtdie Vorstellung einer ausser mir seiendenActivitat,d.i., Objectivitat."
"Grundsatze derPhilosophie der Zukunft,"para. 32. SW, II, 322.
". . . desObjectsaufdas Wesenund
aus demWesenunddenEigenschaften
die Eigenschaften des Subjectsschliessen." Ibid.,para. 7, 275.
56 Hook,FromHegelto Marx,237. 57 "Vorlaufige Thesen... ," SW, II, 263.
58 "Die Materiewirdnurim Gegensatze zumGeistebekanntund erkannt. Nur
furein von der Materieunterschiedenes, richtiger:sich unterscheidendes Wesen
existirteine Materie,wie die Finsterniss nur furein sehendes,aber kein blindes
Wesen." "Kritikdes Idealismus,"SW, II, 147. r9 Cf.Adler,Lehrbuch ... ,I, 96ff.
60 Cf. "VorlaufigeThesen ... ,)" SW, II, 264.
B1 "The measureof the speciesis the absolutemeasure, law, and criterion of
man."Feuerbach, Essenceof Christianity (New York,Harper,1957),16.
82 "Man .. . is to himselfthemeasureof all things, of all reality."Ibid.,22.
63"I have regarded manas the criterion of truth.... ." Ibid.,xlii.

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222 A. JAMES GREGOR

idealismonemustbe equallycharyoftheextreme
tremeofsubjective
ofuncritical
"objectivism,"conceiving
sensoryexperienceas a simple
ofa materialworld.Man provides
"contemplation" themeasureofthe
naturalworld;the measureof naturalphilosophyis the humanes-
sence.64
In orderto act in natureman mustsharewithit a commones-
sence.Fromthisit followsthat"objects"cannotmanifest themselves
to the"subject"unlessbothareconceivedas somehow sharinga com-
monunity.Thuseveryexperience withtherealworld,firstconceived
as a comingtogether of mutuallyindependent subjectand objectin
sensation,revealsitselfas a processof correlativedifferentiation
through whichobjectandsubjectdistinguish themselves.The "objec-
tiveworld"is "nothingelse but the subject'sown,but objectivena-
ture."65 Thus everysensoryexperience withthe naturalworldis an
essentialexpression of self,68
a "self-alienation.'?
In theobjectwhichhecontemplates therefore,
manbecomes acquainted
with
himself; consciousness
oftheobjective is theself-consciousness
ofman.We
knowmanbytheobject,byhisconception ofwhatis externalto himself;
in it hisnaturebecomes evident;thisobjectis hismanifestednature,
his
trueobjective ego; and thisis truenotmerely of spiritual
butalso of
sensuousobjects.67
All thepredicatesone assignsto natureare ultimately
determina-
tionsof qualitiesdrawnfromone's own nature-qualitiesin which
one,in truth,
onlyimagesandprojectsoneself."8 Thustheproposition
may be applied, "withoutany limitation... the object of any subject
is nothingelse thanthesubject'sownnaturetakenobjectively." 69
Each speciesis foritselfa standard,a criterion.The lifespan of
an ephemerais, to us, brief;to the ephemerait is as longas lifeof
yearsto others.The leafon whichthecaterpillar livesis forit a uni-
verse,an infinity.70
We are consciousof the limitations of thelower
orderofbeingsbecausewe are beingsof a higherorder.71 We cannot
be similarlyawareof our limitations sincesuchan awarenesswould
requirethatwe transcend experience.To speculateupon a "reality"
outside,or behind,experience is a vainpreoccupation;
72 it is a scho-
lasticresidual.For the "world-in-itself," the world"independent of
sensory experience"is a nonsense world,withoutsubstanceandmean-
ing.73The worldis as it is forman.Man is themeasureofitstruthand
84 "Kritik . . ." SW, II, 230. '65Essence . .. , 4.
68' . .. selbstnichtsanderesist,als das gegenstandliche
der Gegenstand Ich."
"Anfang . . ., " SW, II, 238.
87 Essence... , 5. 68 Ibid., 1.69 Ibid., 12. 70 Ibid.,8. 71 Cf. ibid.,7.
ist daheralle Speculation,
72 "Eitelkeit die fiberdie Naturund den Menschen
hinaus will." "Anfang.
..,." SW, II, 231.
theworldis, it at leastis whatit looksliketo manand hisbody.
73 "Whatever
It is no lessrealnormorerealthanwhatit appearsto thosecreatures
whosee with
'hands' . . . save that the whole comparisonis
eyes, touch with different
different

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX'S PHILOSOPHY 223

substance.In thehistory ofthespeciesthistruthand thissubstance

will alteras the complexity of real sensoryrelationsfostersa more
complexandintricate world.Foran objectrevealsitselfonlywhenone
entersintoa realrelationship whicharises
withit; 74 it is a distinction
in beingas a consequence oftherealsensuousactivityofthesubject.
A feltneed76 generatesa passion'I whichmotivates activity in the
searchforsatisfaction.Objectsaredefined in thecourseofthissensory
activity.Theyare "real"becausetheyansweran essentialneed.Ob-
jectsconfirm theessence(Wesen) and characteristics of thesubject;
manestablishes a realconnection withtherealworldwhenhe satisfies
a needthrough hisactivity.The objectworld,then,is a "product"of
that activity;natureis provideddeterminate qualities.Realitybe-
comeshumanreality, a Selbstenfremdung, foronlythatis realwhich
is the "product"ofman'ssensoryactivity.77 That activityis thecon-
sequenceof his need78 and interest.79 As man becomesmoreculti-
vatedhis needsand interests increaseand as a consequence the "real
world"becomescorrespondingly moreinvolvedand intricate.80 To
men of limitedneeds,hencelimitedsensibilities, the worldis cor-
respondingly limited.8'
The entireprocessof comingto knowtheworldis a "self-aliena-
tion,"a "self-projection" (Selfstentdusserung), a processwithwhich
GermanIdealismhad familiarized philosophy. But forFeuerbachit
is not the Spiritwhichobjectifies itselfas nature;it is the essence
(Wesen) ofman as a sensuousbeing.Problemsare posedby thees-
sentialneedsofman,solutionsare soughtin passionand resolvedin
activity.Objectswhichsatisfythoseessentialneedsare real objects.
Clearlydiscerniblein theearlyphilosophy ofFeuerbachareall the
elements, not ofmaterialism or idealism, of a radicalhumanism;
but
Man is thesecretoftheworld;hisessenceis itstruthanditsreality.82
fantastic, forwe can neverknowhow thingsappear to otherorganisms." Hook,
FromHegelto Marx,258.
74 "Jeder Gegenstand wirdallerdings nurnachseinenBeziehungen aufdenMen-
schenvon dem Menschengewusstund erkannt-auchin der Wissenschaft...."
"tVber Philosophie und Christum," SW, II, 181.
75 "Anfang .. . , " SW,II, 234. 78 Cf."Grundsatze...," para.33,SW, II, 323.
7 "Nur das ist,fuir den Menschenwenigstens, wirklich,was ein Objectreeler,
wirklicher Thatigkeit ist."Ibid.,para. 15,289.
78 Cf. FD, 205; Hook,FromHegelto Marx,222,229.
79 "Wofiir mansichinteressirt, dazu hat manauchFahigkeit.Die Mystiker und
Scholastiker desMittelalters hattennurdarumkeineFahigkeit undGeschicklichkeit
zur Naturwissenschaft, weilsie keinInteressefurdie Naturhatten.""Grundsatze
. ," para. 15,SW, II, 290. 80Essence,20.
81 " . . limited understanding ... valuesthelimitednaturewhoseunderstand-
ingit is. Each is exactlyadaptedto the other.. . . The eye of the brutesees no
farther thanits needsand its natureno farther thanits needs."Essence. . . , 8.
82 "Subjektiven Absolutisten nenneich Feuerbachaber desswegen in der ausge-

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224 A. JAMES GREGOR

His essenceobjectified, is scienceand religion.M\anprojectshimself

upon the worldand thencomesupon his traceseverywhere.83 This
was thephilosophy, the"revision" ofGermanIdealism,whichFeuer-
bach gave to theyoungKarl Marx.In it are discernible thehuman-
ism,theimmanence of scienceand religionin Man, the emphasison
sensorypracticein the dialecticalprocessof humanself-realization,
whichmakeof it a naturalism infusedwithmuchof the essenceof
idealismitself.
Our purposehereis not to make this philosophy creditable,to
searchout implicationsand dissectmetaphors.It is to outlinea
philosophicalposition,heldby Feuerbachat a specific periodof his
development, in orderto understand thephilosophicalposturesofthe
youngKarl Marxin 1844and 1845.Whatshouldbe notedhereis the
criticalroleoftheanalysisofsensation;sensuousactivityestablishes
a realconnection betweensubjectand object,a relationship in which
bothsubjectand objectmutuallydefinethemselves. That sucha con-
nectionis possibleindicates,forFeuerbach,thatsubjectand object
sharea commonessence:nature.Bothare limited,concreteentities.
Universals,like Mind and Matter,are functionsof an abstract
summing up of real particulars.In thisway he soughtto avoid the
egocentricpredicament whichhe feltforever hauntedidealism.Where
Feuerbachhas notbeensystematically neglectedhe has beensystem-
aticallymisrepresented.84 But withouta tolerably accurateaccountof
Feuerbach's ifnotimpossible,
positionit is difficult, to understand the
positionoftheyoungMarx.Gentile,althoughhe failedto appreciate
the fullimportance of Feuerbachin theintellectual development of
Marx,correctly interpreted the firstof the "Theseson Feuerbach"
by virtueofhis specialfamiliarity withthephilosophy ofHegel.
We have givena summary accountofFeuerbach's"humanism"-
it remainsforus to traceits influence in thephilosophicallaborsof
Karl Marx duringthe years1843 to 1845. The youngKarl Marx
enthusiasticallymade thephilosophy of Feuerbachhis own.He was
to defendit duringthemostcriticalformative periodofhis life.For
Marxit wasFeuerbachwhohad givenGermany thepromise oflibera-
sprochenen Ansicht,weiler das Absoluteoderdas Gottliche als das Prinzipseiner
Weltanschauung undseinesStandpunktes in das Subjekt,oderdas Wesendes Men-
schenverlegt.Das subjektiveAbsoluteoder das Gattungsbewusstsein der Men-
schheitist also das G6ttlicheder Welt,d. h. das Prinzipund die Wesenheit auf
der objektiven Welt.. . . " Cornill,Ludwig Feuerbach undseineStellung zurRe-
ligionundPhilosophie(Frankfurt a. M., 1851),56.
83 Cf. Hook,From Hegelto Marx,257.
84 This is a chargewhichcan be leveledat Professor Marcuse,butit is interest-
ingto notethatGentilemisrepresents Feuerbach'spositionby emphasizing Feuer-
bach'slater"degenerate" sensationalism
whichdatesonlyfrom1850,longafterhe
ceasedto be an influence on Marx. Cf. FD, 206. Cf. Hook,FromHegel to Marx,
267ff.

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX' S PHILOSOPHY 225
tion,85
theonlythinker whohad advanceda seriouscriticism ofHegel-
ian Idealism.86
EchoingFeuerbach, Marx maintained thatphilosophy
mustcease its preoccupation withthe idea, the abstract,the spirit,
and mustrestorethe concreteas its interest.87 For by virtueof its
in
embroilment the abstractby reasonof its imaginary differences
fromtheworld,philosophy had leftrealhumanbeingsin real situa-
tionsout of its ken.88It had beenFeuerbach,Marx contended, who
had rendered it impossible forphilosophyanylongerto remainin the
heavenofspeculation and compelledit to stepdownto the depthof
humanmisery.89 For it is onlyin the real practicewhicharisesout
ofneedandpassion90 thattheproblems bornofspeculation findtheir
resolution.91
Whatis important to noteis thefactthatMarxis concerned es-
withthecontent
sentially ofphilosophyand notwithitsmethod.The
entirediscussion
in the "Critiqueof theHegelianDialecticand Phi-
losophyas a Whole,"in theEconomicand Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844,92concernsitselfwiththe contentof the Hegeliandialectic,
notwitha critiqueof themethoditself.Marx'sobjectionis thatthe
Hegeliandialecticis concerned withabstractself-consciousness
and
not withreal men.93
85 "Die einzigpraktisch
mnoigliche
Befreiung Deutschlandsist die Befreiungauf
dem Standpunkt der Theorie,welcheden Menschenfurdas h6chsteWesendes
Menschenerklirt."Marx,"Zur Kritikder HegelschenRechtsphilosophie," Friih-
schriften,223.
80' "von Feuerbachdatierterst die positivehumanistischeund naturalistische
Kritik.Je geriiuschloser,
destosicherer,tiefer,
umfangreicher und nachhaltiger ist
die Wirkungder Feuerbachschen Schriften,die einzigenSchriften, seit Hegels
Phdnomenologie und Logik,worineinewirkliche theoretische
Revolution enthalten
ist." "National5konomie... , " Friihschriften,
227 (EPM, 17); "Feuerbach ist der
einzige,der ein ernsthaftes und kritisches Verhaltniszur HegelschenDialektikhat
undwahrhafte Entdeckungen aufdiesemGebietegemacht hat,uiberhaupt
derwahre
tTberwinder deraltenPhilosophie ist."Ibid.,250 (EPM, 145).
87 "Nationalokonomie. . ," Friihschriften, 253ff.(EPM, 148f.); Die Heilige
Familie(Berlin,1953),142.
88 "Nationalokonomie . . .," Friuhschriften,
285ff.(EPM, 104ff.).
89 Die HeiligeFamilie,142.
90"Der Menschals eingegenstandiliches sinnliches
Wesenist dahereinleidendes
und weilseinLeidenempfindends Weseneimleidenschaftliches Wesen.Die Leiden-
schaft,die Passionist die nachseinemGegenstand strebende
energisch Wesenskraft
des Menschen.""Nationaldkonomie. . , Friihschriften,
275 (EPM, 159).
91... die Losungder theoretischen
Gegensatzeselbstnurauf einepraktische
Art,nurdurchdie praktische Energiedes Menschenmnglich ist und ihreLosung
daherkeinswegs nureineAufgabeder Erkenntnis, sonderneinewirkliche Lebens-
aufgabeist,welchedie Philosophie nichtl6senkonnte, ebenweilsie dieselbeals nur
Aufgabefasst."Ibid.,243 (EPM, 109).
theoretische
92 "National6konomie ... 248-88 (EPM, 142-71).
Friihschriften,
93 "Die Entseusserung des Selbstbewusstseins
... die Abstraktiondes Menschen,

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226 A. JAMES GREGOR

Man is a limited,concrete, naturalentity,subjectto needsand

to real activitydirectly
to the fulfilment of thoseneeds.94That man
suffersis testimonyto hisrealneeds;thathisneedscan be metis evi-
denceofa community ofessencebetweenneedfulmanand natureas
a sourceofsatisfaction.His needscompelmanto real,sensuousactiv-
ityand in thatactivityman creates(erzeugt)an objectiveworld.95
But sincemanis goadedintoestablishing realrelationsin theworld
ofnaturebyneed,theobjectwhichfulfills thatneedmakesmanifest
someelementoftheessenceofman.96 Man findshimself "objectified"
in things.Onceunderstood, thisthesisrevealsnatureto us as some-
thingsharinga commonessencewith man.97 Knowledgeof the
characterof the real connections establishedin natureprotectsus
frombetraying ourselvesto materialistor idealistpostures."Nature,
conceivedabstractly, in itself,fixedin its separationfromman, is
nothing forman."98 "Reality,"is rather,fortheyoungMarx,a "prod-
uct" of humanactivity,a productnot of Spiritbut of sensuous
activity.99For neitherobjectivenaturenor subjectivenatureare
simplygiven;100theybecomedistinguished Prac-
onlyin practice.10'
das Selbstbewusstsein... setztdieDingheit.. . nichtderwirkliche Mensch,darum
auchnichtdie Natur-derMenschist die menschliche Natur-als solcherzumSub-
ject gemachtwird.... " National6konomie ... ," Friihschriften, 272 (EPM, 155).
94 "Der Mensch. . . istNaturwesen. As Naturwesen ist er,tellsmitnatuirlichen
Krrften,mit Lebenskrdften ausgeriustet,ein tatigesNaturwesen;diese Krafte
existierenin ihm als Anlagenund Fahigkeiten, als Triebe; teilsist er als natii-
lichen,leibliches,
sinnliches, gegenstandliches Wesenein leidendes,bedingtesund
beschrinktes Wesen. . . die Gegenstdnde seinerTriebeexistieren ausserihm, als
vonihmunabhangige Gegenstdnde, aberdieseGegenstande sindGegenstdnde seines
Bediurfnisses,unentbehrliche,wesentliche Gegenstdnde." Ibid, 274 (EPM, 156).
85 "tDerGegenstand derArbeitist daherdie Vergegenstdndlichung des Gattungs-
lebendes Menschen... das praktische Erzeugeneinergegenstaindlichen Welt.. .. "
Ibid., 104f.(EPM, 75f.). 9I Cf.ibid.,242 (EPM, 107).
97 "Die Industrie
ist das wirklichegeschichtliche Verhiltnis derNaturunddaher
der Naturwissenschaft zum Menschen:wirdsie daherals exoterische Enthiillung
der menschlichen Wesenskrafts gefasst,so wirdauch das menschliche Wesender
Naturoderdas natilrliche Wesendes Menschen verstanden, daherdie Naturwissen-
schaftihreabstraktmaterielle odervielmehr idealistischeRichtung verlieren... ."
Ibid.,244f.(EPM, 110). 98Ibid.,285 (EPM, 169).
99"La realt'adunque,secondo[Marx], e una produzione soggettivadell'uomro;
produzionepero dell'attivit'a sensitiva(sinnlicheThdtigkeit);non del pensiero,
comecredevano Hegele glialtriidealisti."FD, 216.
100"Wederdie Natur-objektiv-nochdie Natursubjektivist unmittelbar dem
menschlichen Wesenadaquatvorhander." "Nationalokonomie ... ," Friihschriften,
275 (EPM, 158).
101... Produktion ist seinwerktitiges Gattungsleben. Durchsie erscheint die
Naturals seinWerkund seineWirklichkeit. Der Gegenstand der Arbeitist daher
die Vergegenstandlichung des Gattungslebens des Menschen:indemer sich nicht
nur im Bewusstsein intellektuell,sondernwerktatig, wirklich verdoppelt und sich

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX'S PHILOSOPHY 227
ticeis provoked byessentialneeds-theobjectsofhisneedsexistout-
side of him,as objectsindependent of himbut withwhichhe can
establishreal relations,fortheyanswerhis needs102- needswhich
inform us of the essentialcharacteristics
of man.To know"reality"
one mustknowman.Man, therefore, is the "secret"of Marx'searly
epistemology. "Nature,in theprocessofbecoming, is therealnature
ofman... nature,as it hasbecome,is trueanthropological nature."103
This humanistic naturalismresolves,according to Marx,the per-
plexitiesofmaterialism and idealism.104Subjectand objectare ever-
changing distinctionsmadein sensuouspractice.The objectdoesnot
standas an independent, substantialentityagainstconsciousness; 105
the actualityof the one limits,conditions and definesthe other.106
Nature,realitywillbe just as complexas are theessential,sensuous
activitiesofman.107 The implicationsofsucha philosophical position
are relativelyclear. There is no "reality"independent of man as
speciesbeing(Gattungswesen). "Reality"can onlybe a realityfor
man.Man-in-himself and nature-in-itselfare abstract,
negativemo-
selbstdaherin einervon ihmgeschaffenen Weltanshaut."Marx,"Zur Kritikder
Nationalokonomie," Kleine6konomische Schriften, 105 (EPM, 76).
102"i. . . die Gegenstiinde seinerTriebe existieren ausser ihm, als von ihm
unabhangige Gegenstdnde, aber dieseGegenstande sindGegenstdnde seinesBediurf-
nisses,unentbehrliche, wesentliche Gegenstande." "Nationaloekonomie . ., " Fruih-
schriften, 274 (EPM, 156). 103Ibid.,245 (EPM, 111).
104 "Wirsehenhier,wie derdurchgefuhrte Naturalismus oderHumanismus sich
sowohlvon dem Idealismus,als dem Materialismus unterscheidet und zugleich
ihrebeidevereinigende Wahrheitist." Ibid., 273 (EPM, 155).
105 "In der . . . Industrie . . . habenwirunterder Formsinnlicher, fremder,
niitzlicher Gegenstdnde, unterderFormderEntfremdung die vergegenstdndlichten
Wesenskrafte des Menschenvoruns."Ibid.,244 (EPM, 109f.).
106"Ich kannmichpraktisch nurmenschlich zu derSache verhalten, wenndie
Sache sichzumMenschenMenschlich verhalt."Ibid.,241,n. 1 (EPM, 107,n. 1).
"Indemdaherulberall einerseits demMenschenin der Geseilschaft, die gegenstand-
liche Wirklichkeit als Wirklichkeit und darum als Wirklichkeit seiner eignen
Wesenskriifte wird,werdenihm alle Gegenstandeals die Vergegenstdndlichung
seinerselbst,als die seinerIndividualititbestitigenden und verwirklichenden
Gegenstande, als seineGegenstande; d.h.Gegenstand seinerselbst.Wie sie ihmals
seinewerden,das h'angtvon der Natur des Gegenstandes und der Natur daher
entsprechenden Wesenkraft ab.... ." Ibid.,241f.(EPM, 107).
10? "Sie ist dahereben so vielfach, wie die menschlichen Wesensbestimmungen
undTatigkeiten vielfachsind.... " Ibid.,240 (EPAI, 106n.1). "Der Menscheignet
sichseinallseitiges Wesenauf seineallseitigeArt an, also als ein totalerMensch.
Jedesseinermenschlichen Verhaltnisse zurWelt,Sehen,H6ren,Riechen,Schmecken,
Fiuhlen, Denken,Anschauen, Empfinden, Wollen,Tiitigsein, Lieben,kurzalle Organe
seinerIndividualitiit, wie die Organe,welcheunmittelbar in ihrerFormals gemein-
schaftliche Organesindin ihremgegenstindlichen Verhalten oderin ihremVerhal-
ten zum Gegenstanddie Aneignung desselben,die Aneignung der menschlichen
Wirklichkeit; ihr Verhaltenzum Gegenstand ist die Betatigungder menschlichen
Wirlichkeit." Ibid.,240 (EPM, 106).

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228 A. JAMES GREGOR

mentsofconcrete nature.'08An objectwithoutthesubjectis as incon-

ceivableas thesubjectwithouttheobject.'09 To speculateuponsuch
Thoughtand being,
is to speculatemeaninglessly."10
"being-in-itself"
subjectand object,are a unity,"'weddedin sensuouspractice, sepa-
ratedonlyin abstraction. An "ultimate" an "objective"reality
reality,
An "objective"worldwouldbe a meaningless
is unattainable. world,
fornothingof man wouldbe reflected there.To be known,a world
mustbe a humanworld,a humanized world,man's"self-projection."
Withinthe compassof such a system,truthsare relative,de-
terminedby the needs and social circumstances of men-they are
dialectical.
historical, in complexity,
As societyincreases andpractical
experiences multiply, realitybecomesmoreintricateand varied.In
placeofthepassivecontemplation oftheobjectwhichconstitutes, for
materialism,thecommencement oftheepistemologicalenterprise,
the
youngMarx,following Feuerbach'srevisionistprogram, substituted
thedialecticofhumansensuousactivity. The object,reality,
can only
be understood subjectively, througha comprehensive understanding
of the activeroleof the sensingsubjectin its determination. Marx
proposedto retaintheHegeliandialectic, forits abstract
substituting
content"realsensuousactivityas such."Withthatdiscarded abstract
content wenttheuniversal andinfiniteSpirit.Man wasconceived as a
limited,determinate sensuousentityamongequallylimitedand de-
terminate naturalentities.
Man dialectically"objectifies"
himselfin nature,whoseessencehe
108"Wenn du nach der Sch6pfung der Natur und des Menschenfragst,so
abstrahierst du also vomMenschenund der Natur.Du setzestsie als Nichtseiend
und willstdoch,dass ich sie als seienddir beweise.Ich sage dir nun: Gib deine
Abstraktion auf, so gibst du auch deine Frage auf oder willstdu an deiner
Abstraktion so seikonsequent,
festhalten, undwenndu denMenschen unddieNatur
als nichtseiend denkend, denkst,so denkedichselbstals nichtseiend, der du doch
auchNaturundMenschbist.Denkenicht,fragemichnicht,dennsobalddu denkst
und fragst,hat deineAbstraktion von dem Sein der Natur und des Menschen
keinenSinn."Ibid., 247 (EPM, 113).
109 ". . . die gegenstandliche Wirklichkeit als Wirklichkeit der menschlichen
Wesenkraefte, als menschlicheWirklichkeit und darumals Wirklichkeit einereignen
Wesenskrafte wird,werdenihm alle Gegenstandeals die Vergegenstdndlichung
seinerselbst,als die seiner Individualitatbestatigenden und verwirklichenden
Gegenstande, als seine Gegenstande;d. h. Gegenstand seinerselbst."Ibid., 241
(EPM, 107).
110"In a systemwhichpositsas a fundamental thesistheintimate interrelation
betweenthe subjectand the object,and whichmakesof one the productof the
other,it becomesmeaningless to ask if thoughtachievesobjectivereality."Scalia,
op. cit.,16; cf.Labriola,op. cit.,38.
1ll "Denkenund Sein sind also zwar unterschieden aber zugleichin Einheit
miteinander." "Nationalokonomie . . . ," Friihschriften,
238 (EPM, 105).

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 GENTILE AND YOUNG MARX S PHILOSOPHY 229
shares.He comesto understand the "objectiveworld"becausethat
worldis essentiallyhisowncreation. "In theworking up oftheobjec-
tiveworld. . . natureappearsas hisworkand hisreality.The object
of laboris, therefore,the objectification
ofman'sspecieslife: forhe
duplicateshimselfnot only,as in consciousness, intellectually,
but
also actively,in reality,and thereforehe contemplates himselfin a
worldthathe has created."112
The firstthesisof Feuerbachis clearlya condensedstatement of
this position.As such severalthingscan be establishedwithsome
finality:
(1) Such a philosophic positioncannot,in anymeaningful sense,
be calledmaterialist:theprincipleVerumet factumconvertuntur is
thekeystone ofidealism.113
(2) At the timeof the writingof the "Theses on Feuerbach"
Marx's"break"withFeuerbachwas moreverbalthanphilosophical.
(3) Gentile'sinterpretationofthephilosophy oftheyoungMarx,
based upon the thesesof Feuerbach,was substantially correctand,
thus,providesan important insightintotheintellectualdevelopment
of the greatsocialist.
Marx neverseemedto have developedthe implications of his
"Humanism" and he graduallylost interestin the strictly
114 epis-
temological problem. His development has beencharacterized as one
fromphilosophical speculationto politicalactivism.115
It was leftto
Engelsto elaboratethe philosophic implicationsof Marxism,a task
towardwhichhe was,at best,ill-disposed. He was averseto "theoriz-
ing,"116and he was academicallyunpreparedfor such an enter-
prise.117The principalproductsof his philosophiclucubrations ap-
pearedin the Anti-Diuhring (publishedsomethirty-odd yearsafter
Marx'scompletion oftheDeutscheIdeologiein 1846) and in Ludwig
Feuerbach(whichEngelswroteonlyafterthedeathofMarxin 1883).
The notebooks whichhave beenpublishedunderthe titleDialectics
ofNaturearethefruitofworkconducted duringthedecade1872-82,
thatis,a quarterofa century aftertheDeutscheIdeologie.
Until the publicationof Marx's Paris manuscripts of 1844 the
Marxistscould withsomeplausibility maintainthat Engels was a
faithfulinterpreter of Marx,neglecting entirelyGentile'sanalysis.
112 EPM, 76. 113 FD, 210f.
114 Cf. H. Adams,Karl Marx in his EarlierWritings(London,1940),54.
11-5Cf.E. Buggenhagen, Die Stellungzur Wirklichkeit
bei Hegel und Marx
(Marburg,1933), 8, 18.
116Cf. Engels' letterto Marx, Der BriefwechselzwischenEngels und Marx
(Stuttgart, 1913),I, 8.
117 Cf. Buggenhagen, op cit.,12f.

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230 A. JAMES GREGOR

But oncethesemanuscripts becameavailabletherecouldbe no doubt

thatGentilehad beencorrect 118 and thatone couldnot acceptboth
thephilosophy of theyouthful Marx and thatof thematureEngels
withoutcompromise, so pronouncedare the divergencies. Gentile
creditedEngelswithbutimperfect acquaintance withHegelianism.119
As a consequencehe contendedthat the latter-dayMarxism,the
productlargelyof Engels'efforts, has but littleaffinityto the essen-
tiallyHegelian(moreproperly neo-Hegelian) philosophy oftheyoung
Marx.
The philosophy whichrevealsitselfin the worksof Engelsis in-
deeda strangebedfellow to the"positiveHumanism"oftheyouthful
Marx. And it wouldbe odd if Marx ever morethan toleratedit.
Engelstellsus 120 thatMarx readthe textof the Anti-Diihring and
"approved"it. But we do knowthat Marx did not confideall his
opinionsto Engelsand whatthejudgment on theepistemology ofhis
compatriot mighthave been we shall probablyneverknow,since
Marx's daughtertookit upon herselfto destroyherfather'scorre-
spondencewithhis wife;a vandalismundertaken in orderto avoid
"embarrassment" to Engels.'2'
GentileheldthatMarxhad notmadea substantial innovation in
the fundamental Hegelianconceptionof the world.Marx had at-
tempted,withFeuerbach,to substituteone contentforanotherin
dealingwiththeHegeliandialectic.But eventhissubstitution, Gen-
tileheld,wasreallyonlyapparent.Fora moresubstantial understand-
ingof idealismwouldhave revealedthatthe sensuousactivitywith
whichthe revisionists werepreoccupied was but the mostprimitive
momentof thespirttual life,'22thepriusout of whicharisesthe ob-
jectiveand subjectivemoment.It was in precisely thisfashionthat
Gentilewas to interpret sensationin his maturewritings.
Gentileconceivedhis ownActualismas a reform of Hegelianism.
He conceivedthephilosophy oftheyoungMarxin a similarlight.As
suchhe viewedMarxsympathetically as a thorough Hegelian,an heir
to thewholetradition ofGermanIdealism,and a precursor ofActual-
ism itself.'23
The twosystems, one to providethe rationaleforFas-
cism,theotherto becomean articleof faithforinternational Com-
munism,both findtheirsourcein Hegelianism, and theyseem to
have firsttakenleave of each otherwiththeirrespective analysesof
sensation.
UniversityofHawaii.
118 Cf. U.Spirito,Note sul pensierodi GiovanniGentile(Florence,1954),27.
119FD, 265f.
120 F. Engels,HerrEugenDiihring's Revolutionin Science(NewYork,1939),13.
121 E. Thier,"Etappender Marxinterpretation,"
Marxismusstudien (Tiubingen,
1954),27. 122FD, 301ff. 123Cf. FD, vii.

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