MOG-HSEQ-P-139 Rev A1 HSEQ-S Minimum Requiremnets For Contractors & Suppliers Activities22

Mellitah Oil & Gas – BV- Corporate HSE Philosophy
Revision History
E.Carvajal A. Elasfer A. Ganidi M. Oun

A1 Issued for approval and implementation
21/04/10 22/04/10 22/04/10
E.Carvajal A. Elasfer A. Ganidi NA
P2 Issued for review and comments
15/04/10 15/04/10 18/04/10
A.Espulgar E. Carvajal NA NA
P1 Draft
12/04/ 09 30/04/09
MOG- HSEQ-IN-G-064 Rev A2 Page 2 of 51

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROCEDURE 4
2 AREA OF APPLICATION 5
3 REFERENCE 5
4 ACRONYMS, TERMS AND DEFINITION 8
5 INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 10
6 DESIGN CRITERIA 11
7 LAYOUT PHILOSOPHY 21
8 HAZARDOUS AREAS CLASSIFICATION 24
9 PROCESS DESIGN SAFETY CRITERIA 26
10 PROCESS CONTROL 28
11 SAFETY SYSTEM 31
12 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 35
13 PERSONNEL HEALTH AND SAFETY 37
14 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 40
15 HEALTH PROTECTION 47

1 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROCEDURE
The objective of this document is to define the general principles and strategy of the company for all
MOG Oil and Gas projects to ensure that the same design philosophy is applied to all elements and
phases of the project.
The Corporate HSE Philosophy guidelines has been developed around the principle that the most
cost-effective design results from adopting inherently safe design solutions, such that hazards are
identified to an early stage and either eliminated or proper measures to effectively control or
mitigate them are provided.
Implementation of the Company Risk Management System (MOG-HSEQ-IN-P-009 Corporate HSE

Risk Management Procedure) will be compiled from the beginning of every single project to ensure
that HSE Philosophy objectives are met.
The HSE Risk Management System comprises, but is not limited to, the definition of the HSE
Philosophy to be followed in this document. In fact HSE Risk Management has to be performed
during all the design development, addressing HSE engineering activities and deliverables required
to support a project within the Opportunity and Project Development process (OPD) elaborating
during the design phases all the inputs coming from HSE and it continues during the operating
activities.
HSE activities have the scope of preventing and mitigating undesired major accidents (such as fire
events, explosion, toxic exposures etc.) that arise from unplanned and uncontrolled dangerous
substances release caused by inappropriate design and operative procedures or in general any
event connected with a facility, including a natural events, having the potential to cause multiple
fatalities of persons at or near the facility.
The grade of detail of HSE activities during design depends on the information available in each
OPD phase in which the activity is performed. During Evaluation and Concept Selection, for
example, the natural lack of project information allows to assess only qualitative studies (preliminary
HAZID, qualitative risk analysis, etc.). From the other side, during Concept Definition and Execution,
the great amount of project information allows to assess all enhanced studies (HAZOP, QRA, etc.),
according to the availability of the project documentation required.
HSE Risk Management in design is based on the iterative approach of the risk management
process.
An effective management of safety during design includes the following principles:

1. Identification, consultation and understanding of codes, standards, regulations and all

applicable laws.
2. Identification and consultation of all interested parties, inside and outside the company, in
order to ensure their correct involvement.
3. Risk assessment: Identification and definition of potential hazards and identification of risk
arising from the potential hazards identified.
4. Through safety studies during design, identification of preventive and/or mitigative barriers
able to reduce intolerable risk.
5. ALARP demonstration and cost/benefit analysis, where necessary.
6. Learning from experience.
Based on the continuous improvement approach and on previous projects experience, the learning
process involves the analysis of not appropriate design choices that could affect operation activities,
if implemented.
Similarly during the operating phase HSE Risk Management process has to be maintained and all
the required HSE activities have to be performed to assure plant Asset Integrity.
2 AREA OF APPLICATION
This document shall be applied to all Mellitah Oil and Gas BV Lybian Branch Projects from the
design phase to operating activities.
The present procedure is distributed to all MOG departments and archived by the HSE Department.
3 REFERENCE
3.1 Internal References
[Rif.A1] MOG-HSEQ-IN-P-004 Corporate HSE Risk Management Procedure
[Rif.A2] MOG-CIMS-G-021 Mellitah Oil and Gas BV Specification for PPE
[Rif.A3] MOG-CIMS-G-022 Corporate Guidelines for PPE Issuing Policy
[Rif.A4] MOG-CIMS-WI-023 Checklist and Quality Standards for PPE

[Rif.A5] MOG-HSEQ-SF-P-059 Management of NORM Activities
MOG-HSEQ-G-IN-070 Corporate Guidelines for HAZARD OPERABILITY

[Rif.A6] STUDY
3.2 External References
API RP 14J Recommended practice for design and hazards analysis for
[Rif.B1]
offshore production facilities
opi sg hse 010 r01 Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) Methodology

[Rif.B2]
opi sg hse 009 ep r01 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Methodology

[Rif.B3]
opi sg hse 016 ups r01 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

[Rif.B4]
opi sg hse 017 r01 Fire and Explosion risk assessment (FERA)
[Rif.B5]
opi sg hse 014 ep r01 Hazardous Area Classification Methodology

[Rif.B6]
opi sg hse 011 ep r01 Sub-Sea Isolation System positioning Methodology

[Rif.B7]
e&p Development DMS Best Practice Project Categorization bp dev-dms

[Rif.B8]
037 eni e&p
AMTE-TG-004_ECE_for_Development
[Rif.B9]
AMTE-TG-005_ESHIA_in_Development
[Rif.B10]
API RP 505 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for

[Rif.B11]
Electrical Installation at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Zone 0,
Zone 1 and Zone 2
API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for

[Rif.B12]
electrical Installation at Petroleum Facilities Classified as Class I, Division
1 and Division 2
API RP 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving

[Rif.B13]
Devices
API 521 Guide for Pressure-relieving and Depressurziing Systems

[Rif.B14]
Petroleum petrochemical and natural gas industries—Pressure relieving
and depressuring systems

IEC 60079 Explosive atmospheres – Part 10-1: Classification of areas –

[Rif.B15]
Explosive gas atmospheres; Part 20-1: Material characteristics for gas and
vapour classification – Test methods and data
ISO 13702 Requirements and guidelines for the control and mitigation of
[Rif.B16]
fires and explosion on offshore oil and gas installations
ISO 17776 Petroleum and gas natural industries – Offshore production

[Rif.B17]
installations – Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification
and risk assessment
IEC 61511 Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the

[Rif.B18]
process industry sector
IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical / electronic programmable

[Rif.B19]
electronic safety-related system

Mellitah Oil & Gas BV – Corporate Guidelines for HSE Philosophy
4 ACRONYMS, TERMS AND DEFINITION
4.1 Acronyms
API American Petroleum Institute
EDP Emergency Depressurization
EERA Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis
ESD Emergency Shut Down
ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve
ESHIA Environmental Social, and Health Assessment
FERA Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
GAP General Alarm Push Button
PAGA Public Address and General Alarm
HAV Hand Alarm Vibration
HAZID Hazard Identification System
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
LSD Local Shut Down
Norm Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
OPD Opportunity & Project Development
P&I Piping and Instrumentation diagram
POB Persons on Board
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PSD Process Shut Down
MOG-HSEQ-IN-G-064 Rev A2 Page 8 of 51

PSV Pressure Safety Valve
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
SCE Safety Critical Element
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
VOCs Volatile Organic Compounds
WBV Whole Body Vibration
4.2 Terms and Definition
As Low As Reasonably Practicable. The point at which the effort to

introduce further reduction measures become unreasonably
disproportionate to the additional risk reduction that will be obtained.
ALARP The concept of ALARP may be qualitative or quantitative and, where
necessary, guidance notes issued by the Authorities for application
should be adopted
The ability of an Asset to perform its required function, effectively and

Asset Integrity efficiently in order to achieve business objectives, safeguarding people,
environment, asset and Company reputation
Company Mellitah Oil and Gas B.V. Libyan Branch
Contractor(s), Subcontractor any supplier that the Company may have

Contractors contract or contract to.
Part of project management concerned with identifying through a formal

written technical evaluation the likely impact (positive and negative) of a
proposed development or activity on the natural and man-made
Environmental
environment. A process whereby the assessment is used in reaching a
Impact Assessment consensus on acceptable levels of change, defining the means by
(EIA) which agreed standards of operation and procedure will be achieved
and establishing management procedures to ensure these objectives
are achieved and maintained.
Anything with the potential to cause harm, including ill health or injury,
Hazard damage to property, plant, products or the environment; production
losses or increased liabilities
The systematic process of developing an understanding of hazards.

Hazard analysis The process consists of hazard identification, assessment and risk
determination

Part of the overall management system that facilitates the management

of the HSE risks associated with the business of the organization. This
HSE Integrated
includes the organizational structure, planning activities, responsibilities,
Management practices, procedures, processes and resources for developing,
System (HSE IMS) implementing, achieving, reviewing and maintaining the organization‘s
HSE Policy
Any approach, process and following action applicable at all levels of

Inherently Safe design and operation from conceptual design to plant operations having
Design the specific attention to the elimination or significantly reduction of
hazards rather than the control of hazards assessed.
Used as a general description of probability or frequency: can be

Likelihood expressed qualitatively or quantitatively
Generic term used for techniques which allow the risk associated with a
Qualitative Risk particular activity to be estimated in relative terms such as ―high‖ or
Assessment ―low‖ (ISO 17776:2000)
Combination of the likelihood (or probability, or frequency) and

Risk consequence(s) of a specified hazardous event occurring (OHSAS
18001:2007)
Use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate risks

Risk Analysis (ISO 17776:2000). (There is not a universally accepted distinction
between risk analysis and risk assessment)
Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation (ISO 17776:2000)
Risk Assessment
Judgment, on the basis of risk analysis, of whether a risk is tolerable

Risk Evaluation (ISO 17776:2000)
A management system which eliminates or mitigates the threat from

Risk management hazards
5 INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
5.1 Hierarchy in Laws and Standards Application
The aspects of the design which are related to HSE must be in line with the current applicable
Regulations, Codes of Practice and Standard being practice. The latter specify that
international codes and regulations shall be applied unless more stringent national rules exist.
In the applications of laws and standards the following hierarchy shall be used:

5.1.1 Local Regulations
Existing and current laws applicable that apply to HSE and other statutory regulations must be
taken into considerations (see updated legal index attached to the procedure MOG-HSEQ-IN-
P-003 Corporate HSE Legal).
5.1.2 International Codes, Standards & Guidelines
Whenever applicable all international codes, standards and guidelines that promotes and
provide HSE integrity shall be incorporated in all the phases of the projects.
5.1.3 Company General Specifications
Company HSE IMS procedures and guidelines shall be used as reference and complied in
alignment with the standards, codes and regulations being used in the projects.
6 DESIGN CRITERIA
6.1 Inherently Safe Design
The main objective of the HSE Philosophy is to ensure an inherently safe design of the
facilities by:
 minimizing the likelihood and consequences of an accidental event, such that the risk
to on-site personnel is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP);
 minimizing the potential of hazardous occurrences;
 ensuring a safe working environment for personnel;
 ensuring adequate means of escape are provided;
 maximizing the benefits of protection measures, such as layout and the separation of
identified non-hazardous and hazardous areas;
 providing sufficient safety devices and redundancy to isolate and minimize

uncontrolled releases of flammable liquids and gases;
 providing appropriate fire protection systems to control any reasonably foreseeable

fires which could develop during normal operations;
 minimizing the potential for pollution of the environment from accidental leaks or spills,
venting and flaring of hazardous materials;
 ensuring that the new proposals complement existing facilities and do not compromise
or conflict with them.

6.2 Key Design Points
The Engineering and design of the facilities shall pay specific attention to the following:
 Personnel Protection;
 Protection of the environment;
 Plant and Equipment Layout;
 Hazardous Area Classification;
 Safeguarding by instrumentation and control;
 Start-up, Shutdown and Blowdown
 Fire and Gas detection and alarm systems;
 Fire Protection Systems;
 Overpressure protection systems;
 Equipment isolation for maintenance;
 Vents and Flares;
 Drains;
 Specification breaks;
 Escape Routes and Safe Evacuation.
The following whenever applicable are additions to any Risk Based Designed Technique and
general principles of inherently safer design:
6.2.1 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
In inherently safe design hazards are avoided by identification early in the design process,
leading to a number of possibilities:
 Hazard Elimination at source (‗designed out‘) – eliminate hazards as a first priority

rather than accepting them and mitigating them as a risk reduction strategy once they
exist.
 Consequence Reduction (‗intensification‘) –where hazards cannot be completely

eliminated to accomplish the same design objective reducing exposure to a hazard,
reducing inventory of hazardous materials and substitution of less hazardous materials
will be used where economic and practicable
 Likelihood Reduction- reduce the likelihood of events by simplification and clarity.

Simpler system/processes to reduce potential loss of containment of possibility of
errors causing hazardous events (lowering the likelihood of an initiating event, and

layers of protection and redundancy of safeguards to reduce the progression of an

incident).
 Administrative Controls/Procedures- where human error is the most frequent cause of

the loss of containment, training and certification of personnel on critical procedures
are permanent considerations.
 Fail Safe Design – where design would be secured and ensured to be fail safe.
 Error Tolerance- where equipment and processes can be designed to be capable of

withstanding possible faults or deviations from design. A very simple example is
making piping and joints capable of withstanding the maximum possible pressure if
outlets are closed.
 Limit Effects: where Designing and locating equipment so that the worst possible
condition gives less danger, e.g. gravity will take a leak to a safe place, the use of
bunds.
 Software and management procedures.
6.2.2 Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study
HAZOP study is a formal systematic critical examination to the process and engineering
intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the hazard potential of mal-operation or
malfunction of individual items of equipment and the consequential effects on the facility as a
whole. The purpose of the HAZOP studies shall be to identify possible deviations from the
intended process and utility operating parameters, and any subsequent hazards or operability
problems associated with those deviations.
The HAZOP technique is focused on the adequacy and integrity of the proposed design;
HAZOP is not aimed at providing considerations for original design selection.
HAZOP studies shall be used to analyze the design of operating facilities, new facilities or
modifications to process and utility systems as a way of rigorously and systematically
checking the design for safety, operability and conformity with codes of practice.
The overall intent of an HAZOP study is to assist in demonstrating that the risk of accidental
failure associated with the operation of the plant has been reduced to an acceptable level by:
 Checking the design and considering whether any of the deviations which may occur,
either from a malfunction or mal-operation, cause a hazard to people working on the
installation and/or to the general public and/or a damage to the Assets and/or impacts
to environment or reputation.
 Checking whether the precautions and safeguards incorporated in the design are
sufficient to either prevent the hazard occurring or mitigate the severity of any
consequence to an acceptable level.

 Identifying and implementing additional precautions or safeguards to manage all the

hazards not sufficiently incorporated during the design phase.
 Ensuring the plant can be started up, operated, maintained and shutdown safely.
The HAZOP study shall be carried out by a multi-disciplinary team comprising chairman,
scribe, discipline engineer(s) and company representative(s). The team shall have the
independence to recommend design changes, where necessary, with minimal reference to
higher project authority. Additional specialists may be added whenever required in order to
answer specific questions.
A HAZOP study shall be applied and used whenever applicable in the conceptual design
phase of the project to identify hazards and operability problems in line with the procedure
MOG-HSEQ-G-IN-070 ―Corporate Guidelines for HAZARD OPERABILITY STUDY‖. The
concept involves investigating how the plant might deviate from the design intent.
Various stages of Hazard and Operability Study are generally undertaken. These are
summarized in the following table:
HAZOP
Description
Study
1 Identify major hazards and check for availability of key hazard data
2 Coarse HAZOP using flowsheet and block diagram
3 Full HAZOP on frozen P&I diagram
4 Check that all intended actions have been implemented, including hardware and
software
5 Pre-commissioning check including statutory requirement
6 Safety audit after a few months operation
These are equally applicable to plant modifications as new plant. However, written procedures
should be in place to determine what level of HAZOP (if any) should be applied.
 The degree of hazard and extent of the change;
 The worst case accident likely to arise as a result of the modification;
 Previous HAZOPs relating to the item being changed;
 The appointment of a competent person (excluding the HAZOP chairman) to decide

the requirements for HAZOP.

6.2.3 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study
The HAZID shall be applied and used whenever applicable to develop a systematic and
critical examination of the design and the main site activities (construction and operation) by
which the potential hazards, which could arise, are identified and their consequential effects
on health, environment and safety assessed qualitatively by a specific designated team.
The overall intent of an HAZID study is to assist in demonstrating that the risks associated
with all the identified hazards shall be managed during the whole activity and will be reduced
to an acceptable level by:
 Checking the design for project development and consider whether any external or
internal cause, may generate a hazard to people working on the installation and/or to
the general public, and/or a damage to the Assets and/or impacts to environment or
reputation;
 Checking whether the precautions and safeguards incorporated in the project

development are sufficient to either prevent the hazard occurring or mitigate the
severity of any consequence to an acceptable level;
 Identifying and implementing additional precautions or safeguards to manage all the

hazards not sufficiently incorporated during the design phase.
HAZID is a structured review technique for the early identification of all significant hazards
associated with the particular activity under consideration. HAZID is carried out by a
systematic analysis of all the potential external threats with the potential to generate health,
safety, environmental, asset and reputational risks. Once the hazards have been identified,
the associated risks are qualitatively assessed and risk prevention and mitigation measures
identified in consistency with the adopted Risk Management strategy
HAZID study is carried out starting from preliminary project design phases and his main
objective is the identification of all the credible project hazards and their associated risks.
HAZID follow-up will provide evidences on how these aspects will be managed throughout the
whole project development. Its field of application is extremely broad addressing different
topics (security, safety, health, engineering, drilling, subsea, environment, operations, logistic,
transports, etc…) which are strongly characterized by the project itself, therefore the presence
of relevant experts is crucial to obtain a good quality analysis.
The HAZID technique consists of a structured brainstorming of potential hazard scenarios

using a comprehensive set of guidewords. For each potential hazard that is identified, the
specific threat (or cause) and its associated consequences are derived. The adequacy and
presence of the existing safeguards (either preventive or mitigating) are assessed and finally,
the risk associated to the hazardous event is evaluated with the support of a risk matrix.
Recommendations for reducing risks shall be identified during the brainstorming, in
consistency with the expected level of risk and the applied risk management process.

The HAZID study shall be carried out by a multi-disciplinary team comprising chairman,
Scribe, project discipline engineer(s), operations and Company representative(s). The team
will have the independency to recommend modifications or additional studies, as necessary,
with minimal reference to higher project authority. Additional specialists may be added
whenever required in order to clarify specific questions.
A well-organized HAZID study activity will deliver a good identification of hazards and
safeguards at an early stage in the design of a facility. This will help ensure that:
 HSE hazards are revealed at an early stage in the project, before significant costs
have been incurred.
 Hazards and actions are recorded so that they can be avoided, mitigated or
highlighted during design.
 Action responses are auditable by Management and Legislative Inspectorates.
 Design or Construction delays and budget over-runs are avoided.
 Fewer hazards remain un-revealed at commissioning & operation of plant.
6.2.4 Qualitative Risk Assessment
Qualitative Risk Assessment shall be applied and used whenever applicable to have a
comprehensive identification and description of hazards from a specified activity, to people on
and off site or to the environment, and a qualitative assessment of whether the measures in
place make the risks ALARP. It shall represent the range of possible events by a classification
of the likelihood and consequences for comparison purposes and the identification of priorities
and must quantify the extent and severity of the ―worst-case‖ accident in each consequence
category. It shall also require a proportionate consideration of additional risk reduction
measures when the risks are not broadly acceptable. Even if the risk is at the broadly
acceptable level, there is an obligation to look for further measures and apply if reasonably
practicable.
6.2.5 Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)
The main objective of a Quantitative Risk Analysis is the assessment of all risks for the plant
under investigation and the quantification of specific personnel risk related to hydrocarbons
and non-hydrocarbons hazards. QRA shall be applied and used whenever applicable to
produce a full numerical representation of the frequency, and extent of a specified level of
exposure or harm, to specified people on and off-site, or the environment, from a specified
activity. It shall quantify individual risk for hypothetical people on and off-site and judge the
significance of the risk estimates by a comparison with specified relevant criteria. It may
require a proportionate consideration of all possible further risk reduction measures. The most
effective option must be considered first to assess whether it is reasonably practicable and

must demonstrate gross disproportion for options ruled out and should consider partial
implementation of the most effective options when appropriate.
6.2.6 Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis
The aim of a Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA) is the quantification of the risk for the
asset associated to uncontrolled hydrocarbon releases from process equipment. The
quantification of the risk is performed through the calculation of the frequencies and
consequences of final incidental scenarios.
Risk management is performed according to the criteria of tolerability reported in international

and company standards. The results coming from FERA studies are used to optimize the
layout of the plant and, according to the associated philosophies, the design of the fire
protection system (passive/active).
6.2.7 Other Safety Studies
Other Safety Risk studies mainly include Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA),
Dropper Object Study, Ship Impact Study.
EERA ensures that personnel can leave safely all dangerous areas in case of incidents and
verifies that the escape, evacuation and rescue system is identified and properly designed.
Dropped Objects analysis has the purpose to evaluate the risk associated to falling loads on
sensitive objects. Dropped Objects analysis is mainly applied to offshore platforms to assess
the risk from dropped crane / monorails loads onto equipment (on the platform decks) and
onto pipelines (subsea, riser, onboard). The result of the study is the identification of
protections required to mitigate the risk.
Only for offshore and floating installations, ship impact study during design includes the
identification of all the risks due to marine activities associated to ship collisions. The study
quantifies the expected frequency of occurrence of these impact events together with the
expected consequences.
6.2.8 Safety Critical Elements (SCEs)
Safety critical elements are any parts of the installation, plant or computer program whose
failure will either cause or contribute to a major accident or the purpose of which is to prevent
or limit the effect of a major accident. Critical elements are identified once the major accident
are assessed and any recommendation arose from safety studies have been implemented.
SCEs shall be able to perform their intended functions with the required availability and
reliability throughout their service. During the Concept Definition phase, where the FEED
studies are developed, the identification and demonstration of the suitability of the SCEs is
usually performed. The identification and the setting of performance standards are important
activities during design as they provide the foundation for managing Major Accident risks.

The main steps followed during SCEs design are:
 Collect information on Major Accident Hazards from the hazard identification

documents and risk studies
 Identify the SCEs for each identified Major Accident Hazard
 Identify and define the Design Performance Standards for each SCE
 Produce and issue the Design Safety Critical Elements and Performance Standard
Report and Register.
6.2.9 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a procedure for analysis of potential failure modes within a system for classification
by severity or determination of the effect of failures on the system. Failure modes are any
errors or defects in a process, design, or item, especially those affect the customer, and can
be potential or actual. Effects analysis refers to studying the consequences of those failures.
In FMEA, failures are prioritized according to how serious their consequences are, how
frequently they occur and how easily they can be detected. An FMEA also documents current
knowledge and actions about the risks of failures for use in continuous improvement. FMEA is
used during the design stage with an aim to avoid future failures. Later it is used for process
control, before and during ongoing operation of the process. Ideally, FMEA begins during the
earliest conceptual stages of design and continues throughout the life of the product or
service.
The purpose of the FMEA is to take actions to eliminate or reduce failures, starting with the
highest-priority ones. It may be used to evaluate risk management priorities for mitigating
known threat vulnerabilities. FMEA helps select remedial actions that reduce cumulative
impacts of life-cycle consequences (risks) from a systems failure (fault).It is used in many
formal quality systems such as QS-9000 or ISO/TS 16949.
 Development of system requirements that minimize the likelihood of failures.
 Development of methods to design and test systems to ensure that the failures have
been eliminated.
 Evaluation of the requirements of the customer to ensure that those do not give rise to
potential failures.
 Identification of certain design characteristics that contribute to failures, and minimize

or eliminate those effects.
 Tracking and managing potential risks in the design. This helps avoid the same
failures in future projects.
 Ensuring that any failure that could occur will not injure the customer or seriously
impact a system.

6.3 Safety Integrity Level
Safety Integrity Level shall be used and applied on all system that requires functional
assessment and integrity level. All critical system shall be fail safe and be validated for its
functionality and operability for safe operations. SIL study includes the SIL allocation and SIL
verification. SIL study is based on international IEC 61511 Functional safety – Safety
instrumented systems for the process industry sector and IEC 61508 Functional safety of
electrical / electronic programmable electronic safety-related system.
Following the HAZOP assessment in which all the Safety Instrumental Functions (SIF) are
updated, revised and confirmed, SIL allocation classifies the instrumentation protection
system. During SIL allocation and for each SIF, four SIL levels are defined (SIL 1, 2, 3, 4)
each of which identifies the grade of SIF reliability.
The objective of SIL verification is to verify that each SIF is able to satisfy the SIL level
identified during the SIL allocation.
6.4 SIMOPS
Simultaneous Operation is defined as performing two or more of the following operations

concurrently:
 Production Operations;
 Rig Operations;
 Construction Operations (Includes Electrical and Instrumentation);
 Anchoring of Vessels, etc.
A bridging document should be prepared to help create a tangible plan including completion of
a Risk Assessment and designation of the responsible parties for the various operations being
performed, including :
 Establish emergency response awareness and contacts;
 Identify hazards and appropriate mitigations (precautions and actions);
 Clarify communication between the various operations.
6.5 ESHIA
In addition to the above, an ESHIA study (preliminary and Full ESHIA -) will be performed as
well according to Ref 9 &10 The ESHIA is an iterative process that is an integral part of all
stages of project design and implementation, from opportunity evaluation through operations
and decommissioning. It helps to ensure that environmental, social and health considerations
become an integral part of planned activities, and it allows these issues to be addressed in a
timely and cost-effective way throughout the individual project‘s lifecycle.
The preliminary ESHIA considers all ESHIA contents, providing:

 a characterization, at high level, of potential impacts in the project area over its full life
cycle;
 an overview of the relevant legislative requirements and standards (national and

international);
 an high level summary of project alternatives;
 an alignment with eni policies and eni upstream technical guidelines.
 The ESHIA is to identify and address potentially significant project-related

environmental, social and health impacts on the basis of primary data collection.
These findings will then be used to help:
 Avoid or minimize as much as reasonable practicable of the negative ones and

enhancing those that are positive;
 Improve the decision-making processes in line with eni values, principles and
responsibilities;
 Ensure that the Local Authorities approve the project, as defined by the national/host
country legislative or other requirements; and
 Ensure support from other affected stakeholders.
The ESHIA:
 Identifies and assesses potential project-related environmental, social and health

impacts across the whole operational life cycle;
 Evaluates project alternatives (including geographical location and technical options);
 Specifies mitigation measures, monitoring and management plans for the identified
potential impacts to guarantee the protection of the natural and human environment;
 Can help identify potential business risks and opportunities;
 Provides support in the planning and management of community initiatives, defining

the most appropriate intervention areas for community investment in terms of both
local needs and company internal risks.
Applied effectively, ESHIA can be considered as an useful tool to help acquire social support
and a license to operate, promote sustainable development and enhance company reputation
and at the same time ensuring that environmental, social and health considerations become
an integral part of planned activities, allowing the issues to be addressed in a timely and cost-
effective way throughout the individual project‘s lifecycle.

7 LAYOUT PHILOSOPHY
7.1 General
This section is aimed at providing recommendations on measures to avoid or reduce the

effect of hazards on the unit or installation, by means of safe general arrangement of
structures, plants and facilities. The requirements for this section shall be applied to all units
and installations.
The primary consideration when laying out hydrocarbon processing facilities is its impact on
the public and the environment. Economics also affects the layout of the facilities; therefore
there must be balance between the incremental benefit resulting from greater spacing and
additional cost.
The layout and design of the offshore oil and gas production and onshore oil and gas
treatment shall reflect the results and recommendations of the hazards assessment studies,
plot plan reviews and the basic guidelines given in this document, as well as codes of
practice. As new equipment is being added within an existing plant, the availability of space
within the existing plant areas for new equipment will need to be carefully considered against
the layout principle detail below:
7.1.1 Segregation of Areas
 The unit or installation shall be divided into different areas according to the type of
activities that will be carried out and the associated hazard potential.
 Areas of high risk potential shall be segregated from areas of low risk potential, and
from areas containing critical safety functions. Incident escalation between areas shall
be avoided.
 Accommodation and other areas critical for safety, such as control stations, shall be
located in areas classified as non-hazardous by location, and as far as practicable
away from hazardous areas for hydrocarbon processing, hydrocarbon storage,
wellheads, risers and drilling. The effect of prevailing winds and potential for
segregation by less hazardous areas shall also be considered for area protection.
 Use of firewalls, blast walls, cofferdams etc. shall be considered in cases where
segregation by physical distance is not sufficient.
 Where control stations or control functions are located in a local equipment room
outside the accommodation block/safe area special precautions against gas ignition
related to gas detection, ventilation and shutdown will need to be provided.
7.1.2 Layout Principles
 Adequate separations between flammable hydrocarbons and ignition sources shall be

provided.

 Adequate separations shall be provided between hydrocarbon-handling areas and

emergency services, mainly safety systems and areas considered non-hazardous.
 Structural integrity shall be maintained during an incident to avoid escalation and

provide sufficient time to enable orderly and safe evacuation.
 The need for plant operability and maintainability shall be considered.
 Control facilities and related buildings shall be preferentially located so that they are
largely unaffected by leaks of flammable material, incident heat radiation or explosion
overpressures resulting from credible accidents. Where this cannot be achieved,
construction of buildings shall be sufficient to ensure that residual risk due to
accidental loads is within acceptable limits.
 Adequate access to all areas for fire-fighting shall be provided and adequate
separation or passive protections (i.e. fire resistant walls, blast walls) between items
with potential for flammable hydrocarbons leak and ignition sources shall be provided.
 Sufficient means of escape to enable efficient evacuation from all areas to be

designated assembly points/station bill/muster station under accident conditions shall
be provided.
 Suitable drainage and spill control shall be provided.
 The Equipment shall be located and oriented such that prevailing winds direct
flammable gases and routine emissions away from the safe areas and away from
identifiable strong sources of ignition, e.g. fired heaters.
 Atmospheric vents shall be located so as to cause minimum interference or hazards to

the facility and personnel.
 Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves shall be provided where high inventories of

hazardous materials may be released into vulnerable areas.
 Process piping and equipment which are sources of hydrocarbon leaks should be
routed so as to minimize the likelihood of external impacts.
 Emergency shutdown valves shall be provided and located in such a way that the risk
of involvement in a developing accident is minimized. Valves shall be fire-rated and
located a minimum practicable distance from the vessel and equipment served.
7.1.3 Requirements for Equipment Layout
The minimum requirements for equipment spacing and layout shall be separated in
accordance to safe distance and hazardous area shall never be less than required by the
result of risk assessment. Spacing maybe established according to accessibility, operability,
maintenance and emergency considerations. The Equipment shall be arranged to provide at
least two opposite/alternative escape routes from any operating area and Equipment shall be
arranged with a view to providing:

 safe escape from working areas;
 efficient ventilation of hazardous areas;
 minimal explosion overpressure in case of ignited gas release;
 access for firefighting and emergency response;
 prevention of serious consequences from dropped objects;
 facilitation of well operations and control in normal and emergency situations;
 minimal possibility for escalation of fires and other failures or accidents;
 safe containment of accidental release of hazardous liquids;
 planned simultaneous operations.
7.1.4 Access and Evacuation
 At least two escape routes shall be provided from all areas and buildings throughout
the facilities. The escape routes shall be based on providing the shortest route from
the hazard to a point of safety;
 Adequate access to all areas shall be provided for maintenance and emergency;
 Main escape routes shall have a minimum width of 1 meter and minimum height of 2.2
meters;
 Secondary escape routes shall have a minimum clearance width of 0.8 meters and a
minimum clear height of 2 meters;
 Every escape route shall be readily accessible, unobstructed and lightened at all
times;
 Direction arrows markers shall be strategically positioned along escape routes where it
is necessary to guide personnel to the assembly area;
 Escape ways shall be provided with emergency lights working at least for the time
required for the abandonment of the installation;
 Life Saving Appliances especially for offshore shall be able to complement 200% the
total capacity of the POB or Personnel On Board with Life Jackets, Life buoys with light
and Life Boat.
7.1.5 Accident Prevention and Control
 Suitable drainage and spill control shall be provided to minimize any escalation arising
from the spill;
 The layout shall meet the safety requirements for hazardous area classification
relevant to electrical equipment;

 Process piping, equipment, riser and conductors, which are potential sources of
hydrocarbons leaks, should be routed so as to minimize the likelihood of external
impacts (e.g from maintenance devices, ships, rigs etc);
 For gas systems, vents and relief valves shall be piped to safe location, should the
volumes to be vented capable to create a hazardous condition;
 Emergency shutdown valves shall be provided and located in such a way that the risk
of involvement in a developing accident is minimized. Valves shall be fire-rated and
located a minimum practicable distance from the vessel and the equipment served;
 The accumulation of flammable gases is avoided by providing adequate ventilation.
8 HAZARDOUS AREAS CLASSIFICATION
8.1 General
Hazardous Area Classification is a method of analyzing and classifying the environment

where explosive gas atmospheres may occur so as to facilitate the proper selection and
installation of equipment to be used safely in that environment.
Hazardous Area Classification study and Hazardous Area Classification Drawing may have an
impact on the plot plan involving modifications of the general arrangement drawings (eg.
Relocation of some equipment to avoid to be located in a hazardous area) during the design
phase.
Updating of hazardous area classification report and hazardous area drawings must be
carried out every time modifications or expansions are brought to existing plants.
 The facilities shall be classified according to the likelihood of flammable gases and
liquids being released and the hazards which they would present. The Classification
shall be carried out in accordance with IEC 60079. The extent of hazardous areas
shall be in accordance with recommendations in API RP 505 pr such other code as
identified by the Company e.g API RP 500 which is used to classify the existing areas
of the plant. The Layout of the new facilities shall endure that hazardous areas are
completely contained within boundaries of the facility and that ignition sources are
located outside hazardous areas. Care also shall be taken to ensure that shelters or
equipment enclosures do not inadvertently impair design.
 The layout and the design of the facilities shall ensure that control and electrical
rooms, as well as manned buildings, are non-hazardous by location and / or by
positive pressurization through the ventilation system.
 Hazardous area classification shall be documented by drawings including location and

selection of equipment, air inlets and exhausts.

8.2 Basic Principles
Hazardous areas shall be divided into zones depending upon the grade (frequency and
duration) of release:
 Zone 0: in which an explosive gas atmosphere is continuously present or present for

long periods. (Typical for continuous grade source present for more than 1000 hours a
year or that occurs frequently for short periods).
 Zone 1: in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation.

(Typical for primary grade source present between 10 and 1000 hours a year)
 Zone 2: in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal

operation, and if it does occur, is likely to do so infrequently and will exist for a short
period only. (Typical for secondary grade source present for less than 10 hours per
year and for short periods only).
Where there is a potential for large releases in operational situations covered by hazardous
area classification, e.g. process vents, the extent of the zone shall be larger than the boundary
of 50% LEL concentration. This shall be determined by a dispersion analysis. The resulting
zone will be defined as Zone 1 or Zone 2 depending on likelihood of release.
 Unclassified zones: a location not classified as zone 0, 1 and 2. (i.e: non hazardous)
8.3 Equipment Selection
8.3.1 Electrical Equipment
Electrical equipment installed in hazardous areas shall be suitable for used in the appropriate
area classification and shall comply with the requirements of IEC 60079 and be certified by a
recognized international authority e.g BASEEFA, CENELIC.
8.3.2 Mechanical Equipment
All mechanical equipment installed area shall be of a type that is non-sparking (otherwise
protected) and adequately protected against the generation of a static charge. All hot surfaces
shall be suitably insulated and/or segregated from personnel.
8.3.3 Ventilation
To minimize the classification of a hazardous area, adequate ventilation is necessary. In

unrestricted open areas a natural airflow across an area is considered sufficient by areas
classifications codes for it to be considered adequately ventilated.
For any enclosed areas in which flammable hydrocarbon processing equipment is to be

installed, there are specific ventilation requirements, as defined by codes.

8.3.4 Fired Equipment
Fire equipment (i.e. process heaters) presents an obvious source of ignition to any leaks
which might occur. The layout principle shall ensure that spacing between fired equipment
and the new facilities and related equipment which could leak far exceed area classification
spacing requirements.
8.4 Area Classification Drawings
Hazardous equipment schedules and area classification drawings shall be prepared and shall
include the following information:
 Identification of source of release;
 The Classification and extent of all hazardous zones; and
 Notes regarding selection of electrical equipment.
9 PROCESS DESIGN SAFETY CRITERIA

9.1 General
The following general aspect shall be taken into consideration during the design of new
facilities:
 The Process has to be simple as much as possible, to ensure the ease of operation
and the understanding of the consequence of the ongoing operations;
 The adoption of intrinsic safety principles shall be maximized, e.g. minimization of the
hydrocarbon hold up, replacement of ancillary hazardous fluids with less hazardous
ones whenever possible, etc
 ―Fail Safe‖ equipment has to be provided in order to limit the effects or leakages, i.e.
components will move to or stay in the predetermined safest configuration upon loss of
signal or power (e.g. BDV - fail open, ESDV – fail closed);
 The process control system and the emergency system shall be operated on
functionally independent basis (e.g. process control system different from shut down
system in each individual element)
 Maintenance activities on process equipment will be protected by ensuring positive

isolation from the process and should be adequately performed in order to assure a
correct operation of any equipment;
 All major hydrocarbons vessel will incorporate relieving system which will be vented to
flare;
 Relieving systems shall meet the requirements of API RP 521;

 All hydrocarbon-bearing pipe will be arranged in such a way as to minimize the risk of
mechanical damage;
 Production well, process and facilities will be designed such that no single failure
during the operations can lead to unacceptable hazardous situations. These principles
will apply to operational errors as well as equipment failure.
9.2 Flare and Blowdown Systems
A flare and blow-down system is required to handle relief load from process equipment. It is
proposed that the two flare systems, high and low pressure, each comprising header, knock-
out drum and stack will be provided. In addition for new facilities; The flare and vent systems
shall comply with API RP 521 or equivalent. The radiant heat intensities or emissions from
flares and vent systems shall not exceed the following limits:
 6.3 kW/m2 (2000 Btu/hr/ft2) in areas where emergency actions lasting up to one
minute may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing;
 4.7 kW/m2 (1500 Btu/hr/ft2 in areas where emergency actions lasting several minutes
may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing;
 1.6 kW/m2 (500 Btu/hr/ft2) at any location where personnel are continuously exposed;
 50% LEL at any point on the installation where the gas plume from a vent could be
ignited or personnel could get into contact with the gas. The most unfavorable weather
and process conditions have to be taken into consideration when calculating heat
radiation and dispersion;
 Depressurization systems will be designed in accordance with API RP 520/521 as far

practical;
 The effect of cooling due to the gas expansion during the depressurization will be
carefully evaluated both during normal operation and during emergencies;
 The Vent stack shall be sized to ensure under venting conditions that hazardous
concentrations of flammable gas do not reach manned areas of the facilities or ignition
sources (i.e. fire units);
 The Vent stack shall also be sized to ensure that, in case of accidental ignition of the
vent gas, hazardous levels of thermal radiation or dangerous concentrations of
combustion products are not possible in the manned areas of the facility;
 A knock out system to be provided when liquids are foreseen in the flared/vented gas
stream to be located at the lowest point of the blow down system and sized for the
maximum amount of liquid that can be relieved during an emergency situation.

10 PROCESS CONTROL
10.1 Process Control System
One of the main functions of the process control/safety system is to detect any abnormal
process conditions that might result in dangerous situation. The systems have a logic with
several levels of intervention in relation to the possible effects of the process deviation on
safety and production continuity. The following general criteria shall be applied to new
equipment:
 The process safety system will be designed such that they can be tested without
interrupting operations;
 Sensors and valves included in safety/trip system will be kept independent of, and in
addition to, the process control functions;
 The critical high-low situations on the process parameters will be monitored by

dedicated instruments;
 When the sensors activate a protection function, the location of the incident shall be
automatically signaled in the control room.
Control of the fire and safety system shall be exercised from one command point, located in
the control room, which is safe and permanently manned area. All pertinent information from
production, fire and gas detection and protection equipment, together with alarm and
communication systems, shall be monitored, displayed and controlled from this point.
All vessels containing hydrocarbons under pressure will have two means of protection against
overpressure (e.g. parallel relief valves and bursting discs.). Each shall have 100% capacity to
protect the item. The protective device will be designed in such a manner that they cannot be
taken out of service simultaneously. The exception shall be vessel with relief devices sized for
thermal expansion or fire case only. For these vessels a single relief valve or device only shall
be provided.
The protection system will be installed so that they cannot be isolated from the process
section they are intended to protect. Where isolation is provided upstream of relief valves in a
multiple-valve PSV arrangement, a key-interlock system shall be employed. Equipment and
instrumented parts of the process safety and control system will be of the fail-safe type.
10.2 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) and Depressurization (EDP) System
The Main purpose of the ESD system is to prevent potentially hazardous conditions from
developing into hazard or accident situations as well as to minimize the consequences of
accidental events. The following criteria shall be applied:

 The activation of the ESD system shall result in a shutdown of all the relevant facilities.
It will be possible to actuate it either automatically or manually by means of push
buttons located in the control room ( and throughout the Platform);
 The shutdown system, including sensors, actuators and associated connections and
circuits, shall operate independently of other process and alarm systems;
 The ESD system shall be based on programmable microprocessors, sensor will be

hardwired;
 Automatic sequences of shutdown will be actuated by means of air-operated on-off

valves;
 The ESD system design will consider interference from electromagnetic sources and
will incorporate suitable protection;
 It will be possible to test critical items of the ESD system without stopping to normal
process operation;
 The ESD central control unit shall be powered from the main power system and from a
monitored Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) capable of at least 30 minutes
continuous operation on loss of main power. The UPS shall be powered from both the
main and the emergency power system and in case that ESD circuits and actuators
shall fail to a safe position on loss of power;
 Flame retardant cables shall be used for instruments while fire resistant cables shall
be used for safety systems;
 ESD hand switches located in the main control room will be clearly marked and
protected from inadvertent use;
 ESD valves shall not auto-reset. Local reset switched shall be provided to identified
critical ESD valves;
 The ESD system shall be characterized by a logic with a number of intervention levels
whose priority shall be defined in a relation to the extent of the deviations and their
possible effects on production continuity, personnel and equipment safety;
 The ESD system shall have sufficient separation/protection to ensure that a failure in
any part of the system would not cause other part of the system inoperative (avoid
domino/cascading effects).
The design of the Emergency Depressurization (EDP) will be in accordance with API RP
520/521 and taking into account of the emergency depressurization philosophy.
Sequenced blow down maybe used to depressurize section in a fixed sequence, in order to
reduce the maximum load of the flare. This will be considered based on the results of the flare
systems studies, taking into consideration the location of the fire zones.

The whole ESD System shall be structured on different hierarchical safety shutdown levels
listed as it is here below in order of priority:
 Abandon Platform Shut Down (ASD) - Activated only by manual ASD call points on the
platform and from the remote control centre; this will cause activation of ESD and
closure of the wells SSV. The ASD pushbuttons shall be located at least in the
following areas: Head of platform‘s office (i.e. Radio Room), close to life boats.
 The ASD command shall determine irreversible shut downs (for the re-activation a
manual reset is necessary) and shall determine the following actions:
 activation of the emergency shutdown (ESD);
 shut down of the main power generator and emergency power generator;
 feeding of the vital electric appliances by emergency batteries;
 Activation of corresponding acoustic/visual signals (both at the offshore installation

and at onshore plant).
 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) - From the confirmed fire or manual activation (locally or
from the remote control centre); this will cause automatic shutdown with ESDVs
closure and depressurization. Confirmed gas detection will cause automatic shutdown,
with manual depressurization.
 Process Shutdown (PSD) - From detection of abnormal conditions that have potential
for developing into an accidental situation ,e.g. process upset in the platform, or
manual activation (locally or from remote control centre), this will stop the production.
 Local Shutdown (LSD) - From Local switches or from detection of abnormal conditions
in a non-essential unit where sparing of equipment is employed. This will cause the
shutdown of a single piece of equipment

11 SAFETY SYSTEM
11.1 Fire and Gas Detection System
Fire and gas detection system will be provided for the new onshore and off-shore facilities as
indicated by best practices and international codes and standards. A risk based approach
shall be employed in the design to ensure that the system provided are commensurate with
the identified risk presented by the facilities protected. Thus, the flammability, ignition
likelihood and qualitative assessment of the associated risk shall all be considered.
The purpose of the fire and gas detection shall be to detect a fire or gas release and
automatically initiate orderly shutdown, depressurization in case of fire and fire fighting actions
(where applicable) in order to achieve maximum safeguarding of personnel, environment and
assets.
The fire detection system shall be designed to:
 Detect fire as early as possible;
 Initiate preventive/shutdown actions at an early stage in order to mitigate the

consequences;
 Alert personnel of the danger;
 Initiate the ESD system.
The gas detection shall be designed to:
 Detect escape flammable gas as early as possible and warn personnel of impending
dangers;
 Allow preventive actions to be taken at an early stage, in order to reduce leakage and
isolate ignition source.
Fire and Gas Detection System will be designed so that maintenance, function, testing etc.
can be carried out without disabling the system.
11.1.1 Gas Detection
The requirement for a gas detection system will be considered for the new facilities, in order to
provide the earliest indication of a flammable hydrocarbon leak. The requirement for, number
and type of detectors will be based on an evaluation of:
 Hydrocarbons (or other materials) processed in each fire zone;
 Gas evolution rate;
 Process conditions which could affect the subsequent dispersion of the released
material;
 The likelihood of successfully detecting any released material.

The selection and positioning of hydrocarbon detectors shall take into account local ambient
conditions and strong ignition sources to ensure successful operation, reliability and minimize
spurious alarms.
Flammable gas detectors shall indicate two levels for detection of explosive mixtures in order
to facilitate prompt action in case of accidental gas release. The lower detection level, set at
20% of the lower flammability limit of the gas in open areas, shall initiate a pre-alarm signal.
On intervention at the upper detection level, set at 50% of the lower flammable limit of the gas,
an alarm signal shall be generated and, following detection by two or more devices in the
same voting group, shutdown actions shall be initiated, where appropriate.
Specific fire and gas detection and voting criteria shall be developed for each new area of the
facility where fire and gas accumulation hazard exist, taking account of any Hydrocarbon gas
detector shall, as minimum, be located:
 In all process areas where hydrocarbons are contained;
 In appropriate utility areas and working spaces that are open to the atmosphere;
 In all air intakes for HVAC system, fans and combustion engines;
 At doorways/ entrances and air locks to enclose non-hazardous areas;
 Within enclosed non hazardous areas required to remain operational in emergency

situations;
 Within generators enclosure ventilation air intakes;
 At all entrances of the Living Quarter.
In enclosed spaces, e.g. HVAC and combustion air inlets, lower detection thresholds will be
employed (10% of lower flammable limit for lower detection limit, 20% for upper). In order to
reduce the likelihood and severity of any explosion which might occur, confined or semi-
confined spaces on the process area will be avoided where practicable. The requirement for
gas detection measures in ventilation during manned areas or combustion air intakes will be
based on assessment of the proximity of the area of the hydrocarbon sources.
11.1.2 Fire Detection
The requirement for fire detection devices will be considered for all areas of the new facilities.
The requirement for, and type of, fire detectors employed will be based on the identified fire
hazards, burning characteristic of the fuel(s) involve and the environment in which the fire
could occur (open area or enclosed space).
Detector shall be weather resistant or provided with weather protection, unless placed in
environmentally controlled areas.

Detectors shall incorporate extensive self-diagnostic and alarm in the event of a detector fault
condition.
Detection employed will include flame detectors (open process areas) and heat and smoke
detectors (enclosed areas, non-process).
Smoke detectors shall be installed in enclosed areas containing electrical equipment and
general combustibles and HVAC air inlets. Detector shall be installed in ceiling and floor voids
where these contain potential sources of fire. Smoke detector shall also be installed inside the
Living Quarter. Heat detection shall be installed in gas generators hoods, engine rooms and in
general critical enclosed areas where sources of heat are generated. A minimum of 2 rate of
rise or rate compensated heat detector shall be used in each fire zone for which heat
detection is specified.
11.1.3 Fire and gas detection Monitoring, Control and Alarm
Fire ad gas detection system shall be monitored and controlled by a fire and gas alarm control
panel, generally installed in the Control Room. All alarms and the status of devices shall be
reported via an operator workstation located in any installation.
Audible alarms will be generated via the public address and General Alarm (PAGA) system,
on receipt of appropriate signals from the fire and gas system. Different alarm tones shall be
generated for each condition of concern (general/fire, gas).
11.2 Requirements of signaling, communication and alarm systems
Signaling, communication and alarm systems must be designated so that, during emergency,
they are able to send visual and acoustic signals to the places where occupants are and send
information about emergency to the Control Station.
Electric power supply must be assured by the invulnerable electric sources, if emergency may
occur.
11.2.1 Signaling Systems
The Units local panels shall be concerned by visual/acoustic signaling relevant to the safety
systems of the equipment involved. Visual and acoustic signals have been standardized within
the company according to the general safety specifications regarding both onshore and
offshore installations.
In general visual signals shall fulfill the following chromatic codes:
 Red Stop, Shut down or Emergency interception
 Yellow or Amber Advice to take precaution
 Blue Behavior or specific Actions

Two light signals which can cause confusion must not be used at the same time. Two acoustic
signals can cause confusion and must not be used at the same time; the priority signal must
silence other ones.
Into noisy rooms, according to Company Standards, shall placed red flashing lights which
shall be switched on for:
 First stage gas alarm (toxic or flammable) in all the areas;
 Second stage gas alarm (toxic or flammable) in all the areas;
 General alarm owing to fire into the noisy room;
 General alarm owing to heat sensor intervention;
 General alarm owing to smoke sensor intervention at the second stage;
 General alarm owing to flame sensors intervention at the second stage;
 Intervention of manual control of platform abandon, fire and man overboard;
 Safety plug intervention into the room‘s fire proofed by inert gas plant shall be provided
indoor and outdoor warning (yellow) and danger (red) signaling.
11.2.2 Communication System
All the plant (process and utility) Units shall be provided with alarm column push buttons
(GAP: General Alarm Push Button), from where a General Alarm can be sent. The alarm push
button shall be at least two for each Unit, placed on the boundary of the isle and on the
opposite side of the prevalent winds.
11.2.3 Alarm Systems
The Alarm system shall be at least two:
 Gas Alarm (Toxic or Flammable Gases), starting automatically up by the gas detection
systems (either at the first and the second alarm stage) when hydrogen sulphide or
flammable gases are present;
 General Alarm, starting up either manually GAP and automatically by fire detectors
(heat sensors and smoke/flame sensor at the second alarm stage).
The standard acoustic signals are:
 AS1 (HORN): acoustic alarm signaling the abandonment of the platform,

corresponding to a continuous sound with a frequency of 450Hz, activated by ASD;
 AS2 (YEOW): acoustic alarm signaling man overboard, corresponding to a bi-tonal

descending sound with a frequency of 600-1200 Hz, repeated every 1,5‖;
 AS3 (YELP) for gas detection corresponding to a short siren sound (600/1250Hz)
repeated with a 0.25‖ cycle;

 AS3 (SLOW HOOP) for fire and emergency situations, corresponding to bi-tonal rising
sound (500/1200 Hz)
The first two only concern the platform acoustic signals. AS3 signal takes priority as to AS4
and can silence it during simultaneous emergencies.
The head of Plant/Platform‘s message take generally priority and usually silence other
acoustic signals.
12 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
12.1 Fire Protection Philosophy
The fire protection is one of removal/elimination of fuel sources, reliable automatic detection
and rapid application of extinguishing media to control and extinguish fire. The removal of the
fuel source result from automatic emergency process and production shutdown, with relief
systems provided for hydrocarbon vessels, and equipment used to minimize the release of the
fuel source.
Although the principal means of fire limitations is by adequate separations distances between
individual items of equipment and between equipment areas, fire-fighting and protection
facilities shall be installed to control or extinguish potential fires and provide exposure
protection.
The fire protection requirements of the new facilities shall be determined by investigation of
the fire hazards, the nature of the equipment, the layout and manning levels.
In addition, the existing fire fighting capability shall be considered in establishing the
requirements for passive, fixed and portable fire protection. The fire hazards associated with
new facilities are essentially the same as those for the existing facilities, the process and
operating conditions being very similar.
The design of the fire protection system for new facilities will be based on one major fire or
incident occurring at any one time, which is assumed to be the design basis for the existing
system (to be confirmed following site survey).
Design of fire protection system will be generally in accordance with international codes and
standards and will be consistent with local regulation.
12.2 Active Fire Protection
The purposes of an Active Fire Protection system are:
 control fires and limit escalation;
 reduce the effects of a fire (thermal radiation, smoke) to allow personnel to undertake
emergency response activities or to evacuate;

 extinguish the fire where it is considered safe to do so;
 maintain structural integrity (combined with passive fire protection) by preventing or

delaying potential deformation collapse;
 limit damage to structures, vessels and equipment.
The Fire Protection system shall be designed according to international safety regulations and
standards, as well as company specifications. The design of the fire protection system shall
be based on the major credible fire or predictable incident for the installation and shall include:
 Firewater system
 Total flooding fire extinguishing system
 Mobile fire extinguishing systems;
 Foam and Powder Extinguishing system.
A Firewater system shall be designed to provide water at the required flow rate and pressure
in all plan units under all likely fire circumstances. A water-based system is provided for
exposure protection, fire control and/or extinguishment in order to minimize the extent and
consequences of a fire to personnel, the environment and the installation. Water systems will
be provided mainly for cooling purposes in order to protect equipment against the effects of
heat radiation. Foam will be provided for extinguishing purposes in case of pool fire
scenarios.
This system consists of the following main components:
 fire water storage source;
 fire water storage tank (when needed);
 fire water pumps system;
 fire water ring main.
Connected to this distribution system active protection systems are provided, such as:
 fire water equipment (hydrants, monitors, hosereels).
 foam systems;
 water deluge and water/foam deluge systems;
 sprinkler systems;
 water mist system.
Total flooding fire extinguishing consists of an agent supply and distribution network designed
to achieve total flooding condition (in terms of concentration in a specific period of time) in a
hazard volume. This system is adopted for in fixed closed enclosure.
Total saturation firefighting system is achieved using either carbon dioxide or clean agents.

Mobile fire extinguishing systems include portable or wheeled fire extinguishers to be used
primarily of value for immediate use on small fires, Portable and wheeled fire extinguishers
shall be located at strategic points all over the plant to provide rapid response and easy to
operate firefighting facilities to deal with small outbreaks of fire. Fire extinguishers shall be
provided at every facility functional unit in such number and such locations that at least one
extinguisher is readily accessible and immediately available in the event of fire.
For the helideck protection, fixed foam and powder systems shall be provided.
12.3 Passive Fire Protection
The aim of fireproofing is to avoid the escalation of the emergency, due to the collapse of
heavy structures or equipment containing dangerous fluids (e.g. flammables); protect
essential safety systems; protect critical components, such as separators, risers and ESD
valves; minimize damage to the installation by protecting the critical structural members and in
particular those members essential to enable orderly and safe evacuation.
The requirement for passive fire protection coatings on equipment and structural steel will be
based on an assessment of the implications for further loss of hydrocarbon containment
following structural failure, and the duration of fires relative to the time necessary for structural
failure to occur.
Structural passive fire protection and active fire protection could be considered together as
part of an overall fire protection philosophy.
The extent of provision of structural passive fire protection shall take into account the hazard
distances presented by credible fire scenarios, considering also the benefits of
depressurization system in reducing fire durations and hence heat doses to structures.
Identification of fire potential equipment, structures to be fireproofed and degree of protection
shall be in accordance with recognized international criteria.
13 PERSONNEL HEALTH AND SAFETY
13.1 Personnel Safety Equipment
The construction of new onshore and offshore facilities and their integration into the existing
plants involves specific health and safety issues within a construction and normal operation
context. Typical hazards such as working at height, electrical shock, excavation, ergonomic
conditions, confined spaces, etc. shall be considered during the construction phase of the
project to ensure local compliance with the health and safety legislations and company HSE
requirements.
Except where the risks are adequately controlled by other means, suitable Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) shall be used by the plant personnel, contractors and visitors as required by
the local HSE authorities and plant/company internal safety standards and regulations. PPE is
not to be considered as a first line of defense, but only a final means of protection. In all
cases, failings which pose possible hazard or risk shall be designed or managed out of
system, situations, work or operations.
Suitable PPE must:
 Be appropriate for the risk involved and the condition at the location;
 Take ergonomic considerations fully into account and be capable of being used
effectively by the employee concerned;
 So far as is practicable, prevent or adequately control the risk of exposure without

creating or increasing overall risk;
 Be designed and manufactured to an approved standards
13.2 Personnel Protection
Personnel Protection shall be provided to safeguard personnel from any danger during
construction, operation and maintenance of the plant and platform facilities. Each personnel
working or visiting the plant shall be equipped with safety helmets, shoes and gloves. First Aid
Box shall be provided for every plant and or platform. Personnel protection shall be provided
for all piping whose external temperature exceeds 65ºC and which could come into contact
with people performing normal duties. The protection may be thermal insulation, guards made
of suitable material and/or warning signs.
When working outdoors the effects of the weather in this environment can potentially have a
very serious impact on an employee‘s welfare if the risk have never been previously
considered or managed properly. This impact maybe immediate or it occurs over a long time
period.
Exposure to the sun can cause skin damage including sunburn, blistering and skin ageing and
in the long term can lead to an increased risk of skin cancer.
Plant personnel can avoid unnecessary exposure by such means as:
 Wearing long sleeve shirt or loose clothing with a close weave;
 Wearing hats and with rest brims;
 Taking breaks in the shade whenever possible;
 Scheduling work to cooler times of the day;
 If possible, provide shades where work task are being undertaken.
13.3 Safety Showers and Eyewashes
Each Safety shower and eyewash unit shall comprise a combined, free standing safety
shower and eyewash, with integral light fittings. Operation of both the shower unit and

eyewash unit shall be separate foot treadles and hand levers for each. Shower shall be
designed in accordance with ANSI Z358.1
The water supply to the shower shall be temperature controlled to avoid extremes of hot or
cold which could result of thermal shock to the user.
The shower and eyewashes units shall each be provided with a proximity switch for the
purposes of providing an alarm in the plant main control room. The shower and eyewash units
shall be suitable for use in hazardous area.
13.4 Safety Signs
Emergency signs shall be provided to inform personnel of escape routes, emergency exits
and the location of fire-fighting equipment.
Safety signs shall be in accordance with applicable national regulations and normal
international practice. Locations and number of signs shall be established during detailed
design. Normally unmanned buildings, such as the electrical substation, shall be provided with
emergency sign at all entrances.
Rooms or enclosure protected with gaseous fire extinguishing system shall be equipped at
their entrance with warning signs located outside the rooms to inform the personnel of
possible extinguish and discharge. This will be in addition to audible and visual alarms in the
protected area to warn of any impending gaseous extinguish and release.
Escape signs shall be installed so that wherever someone is standing in an occupied area
escape path shall be visible. Signs shall be pictorial as far as in practical and if text is required
this shall be in local language and English. Internal sign will be photo luminescent, other signs
will be either light reflective or photo luminescent as appropriate.
Safety signs are categorized under the following headings:
 Mandatory (white on blue)
 Prohibition (Red on white)
 Warning (black in Yellow)
 Fire Equipment (White on Red)
 Safe condition/Emergency and safety equipment (white on green)
All controls on fire and safety equipment including the hand wheels for isolation valves on the
firewater ring main, alarm and shutdown pushbuttons, fireman panels etc. shall be clearly
labeled with their function.
Platform status lights will be located in strategic locations on the platform in order to keep
personnel continually informed about the status of the installation:

The unit will compromise four different colored lamps:
 Red to indicate fire presence;
 Yellow to indicate gas presence;
 Green for normal operating conditions;
 Amber to signal abandon the platform.
A status light panel shall be provided close to the boat landing to warn arriving personnel
about the status of the platform. This panel shall always be activated. A specified flashing
beacon shall be visible from any approaching helicopter for offshore base. The light for alarm
close to helideck shall only be only one, a red flashing Wave-off light, in accordance with the
last revision of ICAO Annex 14. This beacon shall be placed on the heliport space not
forbidden to obstacle and so as to be seen by pilot from every deck-landing direction.
14 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
14.1 General
The following environmental issues should be considered as a part of comprehensive

assessment and management program that addressed project specific environmental risk and
potential impacts.
Environmental parameters shall comply with the limits detailed in the applicable local and laws
and company or recognized international standards.
The aim shall be to minimize wastes and other gaseous and liquid emissions. In particular, it
will be forbidden to discharge any polluting substances resulting from drilling, exploration,
testing of wells of production in the sea water.
Methodologies shall be developed to prevent, minimize, render harmless and manage

polluting releases, and to consider all environmental media as a whole both, in short and long
term basis. These shall be incorporated into international and local environmental legislation.
Potential environmental issues associated with both onshore and offshore oil and gas
development projects include the following:
 Air emissions and Air quality
 Waste water /effluent Discharge to Water
 Water conservation
 Soil and Groundwater Protection
 Solid Waste Management
 spills
 Noise

 Biodiversity and ecosystem services conservation
14.2 Emission to Air
The burning of hydrocarbon gas and liquid in flares, gas turbines, power generators and fired
heaters result in emissions of combustion gases to the atmosphere. The combustion products
comprise mainly carbon dioxide, with smaller volumes of nitrogen oxides, sulphur of oxide,
carbon monoxide and, to a lesser extent, particulate matter and methane derived from
incomplete combustion processes.
Even if fugitive emissions are usually small, it can be expected from oil storage tanks, valves,
pipe fittings and instruments. These largely comprise volatile organic compounds (VOC,
including methane) which are a range of hydrocarbon gases, some of which contribute to
depletion of stratospheric ozone.
Local environmental regulations and legislations concerning gases and particulate emissions
shall be met in the event of any occasional emissions to air.
Air emission specifications should be considered during all equipment selection and
procurement.
The engineering design approach shall be implemented to minimize emissions to air where
practicable and economically feasible. Where emissions are unavoidable the approach shall
be to provide, for point sources, stacks of adequate height to offer good dispersion and to
apply good engineering practice in then choice of materials and equipment in order to
minimize emissions. In general:
 The design of arrangement for taking samples of process fluids shall limit the loss of
volatile organic compounds (VOCs);
 Fugitive losses from valves, flanges, pumps seals, etc. shall be limited by good design
and operational maintenance;
 Hydrocarbons vapors from emergency relief /equipment depressurization shall be

directed to flare;
 Continuous vents to atmosphere from process equipment shall be avoided (all

discharges from process equipment shall be collected and flared); vents are only
allowed for small relief to depressurize in emergency some packaged equipment. An
environmental impact assessment maybe required for new developments and
equipment where the gases and particulate emissions in the atmosphere could have
local environmental impact of poor air quality.
 Continuous flaring of gas associated with oil production (routine flaring) shall be
avoided. Valorisation of associated gas shall be preferred. Gas flaring is allowed only
during emergency situation, plant upsets, start-up and shut down.

 For what concerns non routine operations, flaring shall be preferred to venting, having
a reduced impact on health, environment and climate.
 Also flaring during maintenance operation (planned/unplanned) should be avoided

applying a suitable sparing philosophy.
 General emissions reduction measures, consistent with the Global Gas Flaring and
Venting Reduction Voluntary Standard (Global Gas Flaring Reduction Public-Private
Partnership ,GGFR), shall be preferred.
 Best Available Technology shall be applied in conjunction with emission control

systems in order to minimize the release of pollutants by the offshore plant facilities.
14.3 Discharge to water
The water discharged from new facilities arises from:
 Water from the sanitary sewer system (domestic water);
 Rainwater, oily and accidentally oily drainages from process/chemicals paved areas;
 Process oily effluents (produced water) brought to the surface during hydrocarbon
production, often containing a mixture of inorganic and organic compounds and
residual chemical additives.
Water often accompanies the production of hydrocarbons from an oil or gas field and maybe
contaminated with heavy metals, dissolved organics, production chemicals and free
hydrocarbons in varying concentrations.
Produced water may sometimes be accompanied by other liquid wastes, such as liquid slugs
from wet gas lines, oily water from drip tray or wash-down water. The liquids would largely
consist of water contaminated with hydrocarbon products. These liquids waste shall be
handled and treated to ensure compliance with all local environmental legislation and
company liquid wastes management requirements.
14.4 Soil and groundwater protection
In the petrochemical and oil industries the soil and groundwater pollution is one of the major
environmental concern when uncontrolled and unconfined hydrocarbon liquids spillages and
escapes occur inside onshore facility.
The design approach to protecting groundwater resources shall be to ensure that all the areas
that could be contaminated by process fluids, chemicals, etc. are served with an appropriate
hard surface and drainage system to prevent contaminated water or pollutants liquids being
dispersed on the ground and entering the groundwater.
Provision shall be taken to provide with adequate bunds all hydrocarbons storage
tanks/vessels. Bunds will have a system to recover the liquids for reuse or safely disposed off.

Any potential sources of hydrocarbon spills shall be provided with an adequate drain system
to assure the spills are direct to a safe location where can be retained and either recovered or
disposed off.
14.5 Solid Waste Management
The first preference for the disposal of all solid hazardous wastes generated during project‘s
activities shall be to recycle by returning the materials to the original vendor or to an
appropriate plant for commercial regeneration. When no market or capability exists for a given
waste, the waste shall be disposed of to a licensed waste disposal facility. Any other disposal
method, such as landfill, will require a Waste Management License from the local
Environment Agency/Authorities.
Usually it is only like to be of significance during the construction and abandonment phases of
facility, since during normal operations waste volumes will be small and will most likely be
disposed of to a licensed landfill site.
Hazardous waste generated during the project lifecycle can be temporarily stored on site, but
specific facilities for final disposal shall be located taking into account the characteristics of the
hazardous waste. Hazardous waste shall not be allowed to accumulate at the storage sites.
Quantities stored shall be kept to the minimum and subject for Company approval.
All hazardous waste shall be stored in a suitably designed reception facility with impervious
flooring, roofing, and suitable drainage control; these waste materials shall be moreover
stored in a separate storage areas specifically dedicated for this purpose. Materials shall be
stored in good order, with labels. In particularly, containers shall be marked with clearly
identifiable labels to accurately describe their contents, chemical and commercial
denomination, type and degree of hazards.
Different categories of hazardous waste, such as reactive, flammable, acidic corrosive and
caustic corrosive materials, shall not be stored/placed in the same storage/containers area
and they shall be segregated separately:
 Cuttings and drilling contaminated mud;
 Scrap metals and wood;
 Paper and cardboard
 Waste drums;
 Waste and chemicals;
 Special waste, such as clinical waste (e.g. bandages, sharps) and radioactive sources
(e.g. used during welding checks);
 Naturally occurring materials (NORM)
 Domestic garbage;

 Spent batteries and filters.
 Excess biological sludge from the sanitary sewage treatment facilities
 Miscellaneous maintenance wastes
 Oily rags
The site organization and design of the process shall be optimized in order to minimize waste
production. Non-hazardous waste material maybe stored for a short period in a specific
temporary storage before disposal. Non-hazardous waste shall be stored and collected in a
way that prevents:
 Vermin breeding and harborage;
 Hazards to workers, user and public;
 Air, water and soil pollution;
 Objectionable odors, dust unsightliness and nuisance conditions;
 Corrosion or wear of storage containers and accidental spillage or leakage during

storage or transport.
Non-hazardous storage areas shall be sited taking into account the following considerations:
 Maximization of distance from domestic areas;
 Avoidance of flood areas;
 Minimization of wind exposure;
 Minimization of sun exposure.
All hazardous waste shall be stored in tightly closed, leakage proof containers made of, or line
with, materials that are compatible with the hazardous waste to be stored. Special precautions
shall be taken to treat surface run-off from this area and also for the disposal of fire water.
Waste shall be managed according to the following order of priority:
 prevention;
 preparation for re-use;
 other types of recovery, e.g. energy recovery;
 recycling;
 removal and final disposal
14.6 Noise and Vibration
The main sources of noise and vibration pollution from hydrocarbon installations are likely to
emanate from:

 Mechanical equipment and associated activities during construction, such as

excavations;
 Flaring, venting, control valves and rotating equipment during operations;
An environment impact assessment may be required for new developments and equipment
where the noise levels could be deemed a nuisance or harmful to health. Noise level shall be
limited throughout the installations with the aim of:
 Minimize the risk of hearing damage to personnel;
 Ensure alarm are audible;
 Allow adequate speech, telephone or radio communication;
 Maintain working efficiency;
Similarly, vibration levels shall be limited to:
 Prevent any health hazard;
 Maintain proficiency of personnel performing designated task.
If it is not cost-effective to use low noise equipment, sound proofing should be considered
using sound absorptive materials. Any sound proofing enclosure shall be designed to cause
minimum interference with routine inspection and maintenance of the equipment. Suitable
access doors and observation windows shall be provided.
Construction noise shall be monitored, assessed and controlled to ensure facility site and local
noise limits are not exceeded.
Priority shall be given to limiting emission of vibrations from equipment by balancing of

rotating equipment and anti-vibration mountings.
Hand arm vibration (HAV), basically associated to the excessive use of powered hand tools,
and the whole body vibration (WBV) associated to factors such as the industrial/construction
vehicles driving, poor posture and heavy lifting, are the causes of significant ill health.
14.7 Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM)
NORM encountered in oil and gas exploration, development and production operations
originates in substance formation, which may contain radioactive materials such as uranium
and thorium and their daughter products, radium 226 and radium 228. NORM can be brought
to the surface in the formation of water that is produced in conjunction with oil and gas. NORM
in these produced waters typically consist of the radionuclide, radium 226 and 228. In
addition, radon gas, a radium daughter, maybe found in produced natural gas.
Because the levels are typically so slow, NORM in produced waters and natural gas is not a
problem in onshore facilities unless it becomes concentrated in some manner. Through
temperature and pressure changes that occur in the course of oil and gas production
operations, radium 226 and 228 found in produced waters may co-precipitate with barium
sulfate scale in well tubular and surface equipment. Concentrations of radium 226 and 228
may also occur in sludge that accumulates in oilfield pits and tanks. These solids become
sources of oil and gas NORM waste.
Workers employed in the area of cutting and reaming oilfield pipe, removing solids from tanks
and pits, and refurbishing gas processing equipment maybe exposed to particles containing
levels of alpha-emitting radionuclide that could pose health risks if inhaled or ingested.
14.8 Spills
Spills from offshore facilities, including sea line, can occur due to leaks, equipment failure,
accidents, or human error. Spill prevention and control measures specific to offshore oil and
gas facilities include:
 Conducting a spill risk assessment for offshore facilities and support vessels;
 Design of process, utility, and drilling systems to reduce the risk of major uncontained
spills;
 Install valves, including subsea shutdown valves, to allow early shutdown or isolation
in the event of an emergency;
 Ensure adequate corrosion allowance for the lifetime of the facilities and / or
installation of corrosion control and prevention systems in all pipelines, process
equipment, and tanks;
 Develop maintenance and monitoring programs to ensure the integrity of well field
equipment. For export pipelines, maintenance programs should include regular pigging
to clean the pipeline, and intelligent pigging should also be considered as required;
 Install leak detection systems. Use of sub-sea pipelines measures, such as telemetry
systems, control systems, pressure sensors, shut-in valves, and pump-off systems, as
well as normally unattended installations (unmanned) facilities to ensure rapid
detection of loss of containment;
 For facilities with potentially significant releases, install an Emergency Shutdown

System that initiates automatic shutdown actions to bring the offshore facility to a safe
condition;
 Adequate personnel training in oil spill prevention, containment and response;
 Ensure spill response and containment equipment is deployed or available as

necessary for response.
All spills should be documented and reported. Following a spill, a root cause investigation
should be carried out and corrective action taken. A spill response plan should address
potential oil, chemical, and fuel spills from offshore facilities, support vessels including
tankers, and pipeline ruptures.

14.9 Biodiversity and ecosystem services conservation
Facilities design should consider the local environment context and the specific sensitive
biodiversity and ecosystem services components that can be affected by the project.
Design of the facility should take into account specific mitigation measures that are
recommended based on the outcome of the impact assessment of the project and guidelines
defined in the IFC Performance Standard 6.
14.20 EIA/EBLS
Environmental Impact Assessment ―EIA‖ and Environmental Base line Survey ―EBLS‖ Studies
in all Oil and Gas Facilities including Projects are mandatory to be carried out and approved
by Environmental General Authority (EGA) according to the Libyan National Corporation NOC
and Libyan Environmental Regulations.
15 HEALTH PROTECTION
The following general minimum requirements shall be considered:
 Appropriately equipped first-aid stations should be easily accessible throughout the

platform;
 Eye-wash stations and/or emergency showers should be provided close to all

workstations where immediate flushing with water is the recommended first-aid
response;
 Mechanical ventilation systems should be maintained in good working order. Re-

circulation of contaminated air is not acceptable. Air inlet filters should be kept clean
and free of dust and microorganisms;
 All piping whose external surface temperature exceeds 60°C and which could come
into contact with people performing normal duties shall be thermal insulated.
15.1 Noise level exposure
Noise levels and vibrations at the Platform facilities shall be monitored and shall be in
compliance with the requirements addressed in the Company and International Code
Standards.
Noise control during the platform operation phase shall be carefully addressed in order to
obtain a satisfactory acoustic environment and minimize the noise to achieve the following
objectives:
 conserve the hearing of personnel;

 reduce speech and work interference;
 ensure that warning signals are audible;
 allow adequate speech, telephone, and radio communication;
 provide quiet accommodation for personnel;
 minimise noise nuisance to the neighbouring community.
If it is not cost-effective to use low noise equipment, sound proofing should be considered
using sound absorptive materials. Any sound proofing enclosure shall be designed to cause
minimum interference with routine inspection and maintenance of the equipment. Suitable
access doors and observation windows shall be provided.
Personnel hearing protection shall only be used where engineering methods of noise control
are not cost-effective or reasonably practicable.
15.1.1 Absolute Limit
The sound pressure level shall not exceed 85dB(A) at any time and in every working area,
with the exception of start-up and shut-down operations and in case of emergency discharge
of safety valves.
15.1.2 Working Areas
 The noise level shall not exceed the value of 85dB(A) and shall be applied to the
whole working area, defined as any position not less than 1 meter from
 equipment surfaces which is accessible to personnel, or any position where an

operator‘s ear may be exposed to noise in the normal course of duty. It includes any
platform, walkway or ladder.
 Restricted areas are those working areas in the plant where it is not reasonably
practicable to reduce the noise level below the working area limit. Such areas shall not
be unduly extensive and best efforts should be made to reduce the noise level below
90 dB(A). The following areas are considered as restricted areas: gas turbine drivers
and their accessories, gas compressors, process heaters, operating platforms of air
cooled exchangers.
 Permanent warning signs to indicate the mandatory use of ear protectors shall be
erected at the boundaries of restricted areas.
15.2 Vibration Levels Exposure
Vibration levels shall be limited in order to prevent a health hazard and maintain the working
efficiency of personnel. Priority shall be given to limiting the emissions of vibrations from

process equipment by balancing of rotating parts and with the provision of anti-vibration
mounting.
Especially with regards to small bore connections, vibration shall thus be early considered on
an ad-hoc basis during the design stage.
15.3 Radioactive Materials
Special consideration shall be given to handling of radioactive materials, and use of

radioactive materials shall be minimized. Formal procedures shall be developed by
Contractors (subject to Company approval), and used whenever radioactive materials are
brought into the field, or onto the site, e.g. for radiography of equipment or pipelines.
Radioactive materials or equipment shall be manipulated only by certified personnel and shall
be handled under strict procedures. These procedures shall be written in the spoken language
of the people involved in their handling (as a minimum, English and French), subject to
Company approval.
The primary radio nuclides of concern in petroleum industry TENORM are radium-226 (Ra-
226), radium-228 (Ra-228) and their associated progeny. The waste streams most likely to be
contaminated by elevated radium concentrations include (1) produced water, which is
formation water that is brought to the surface along with the produced oil and gas; (2) scale,
which is a hard, insoluble deposit that accumulates on the surfaces of equipment and solid
debris that come in contact with produced water; and (3) sludge, which is a slightly granular,
usually hydrocarbon-rich deposit that accumulates in the bottom of some storage and process
vessels.
The evaluation of TENORM impact and management shall be considered. Reference shall be
made to Eni Standard No. 1.3.6.08 and OGP Guidelines No. 412.
15.4 Base Camp/ Living Quarter
For both the Process Platform and onshore plant, due to the complexity of processing facilities
and the size of the installation, a safe and comfortable living place shall be foreseen in the
installation named as ―Living Quarters‖/ ―Base Camp‖; its location shall be selected in order to
minimise health safety risk exposure to working personnel.
The Base camp / living quarter, will provide the personnel a suitable place to live and rest
during their off-shore presence and to mitigate the health issue associated with working under
stressing and extreme environment and to enhance the safety features of the platform,
reducing exposure risks.
The base Camp/ Living Quarters shall be designed to hold the maximum number expected of
personnel on-board (POB) and provide a safe location where resting, eating and relaxing. A
Primary Muster Point inside the Living Quarters shall be foreseen in order to safely collect and
muster all the personnel during emergency situation
Lights and safety signs shall be provided. Specific attention in the design of the installation
shall be given to the noise emissions associated to the Compression Unit on Process Platform
in order to guarantee tolerable noise levels in the Living Quarters and/or in other permanently
manned areas of the platform.
15.5 HVAC system
The HVAC system intent is to provide ambient conditions suitable for the electronic equipment
and for personnel. This system will also provide forced ventilation/pressurization to ensure any
flammable gases do not accumulate. Gas detection will be provided at the HVAC inputs
appropriate to the nature of hazardous area at the intake point.
In unrestricted open areas a natural airflow across the area is sufficient. In enclosed or
sheltered areas, forced ventilations by means of suitable stirrer fans is likely to be required to
achieve the appropriate number of air changes per hour necessary to prevent the area being
inadequately ventilated.
HVAC system for each room or enclosure shall be designed with due consideration for area
classification, equipment location, fire integrity, smoke/gas ingress and personnel
requirements. All air intakes for HVAC systems shall be located adequately far from any
hazard envelope defined on hazardous area classification drawings.
15.6 Ergonomics
Ergonomics and human factors aim to optimize the man-machine interface with respect to
efficiency and safety by examining the design of products, tools and working methods (e.g.
factors as work stress or response to emergency conditions).
Workplaces shall be designed such that the personnel are not exposed to excessive
workloads with risks of musculoskeletal injury.
15.7 Training
Training need for staff working in the new onshore plant and offshore platform will be
assessed and identified. Training should include the following as a minimum;
 Proper use of PPE and emergency safety equipment;
 Emergency response team;
 Emergency recovery team (confined space accident);
 Use of procedures specific to the new equipment.
Identification of existing company facilities procedures that will be changed; these will be
assessed, operating procedures amended and training provided to staff as appropriate to

ensure that new procedures are adopted. Impact on appropriate HSE procedures will also be
assessed.
15.8 Medical Facilities
The Medical Facilities will be provided including MEDEVAC Procedures to facilitate any
emergencies that may arise during the whole duration of the project. Competent medical
personnel shall be stationed to attend personnel health and occupational well beings in project
execution. This will include transportation and other medical emergencies coordination.
15.9 Emergency Response Plans
Specific response plans shall be provided for construction, commissioning and operating
phases to cover health, safety and environmental emergencies.
The plans shall define the organization structure, the communication channels and the main
actions to be taken by the designed personnel and resources available in case of emergency
situations. They shall also provide guidance to management and subcontractors about
emergency responses related processes, organizations, role and facilities.
All the accidental events such as the possible extreme weather conditions (i.e. cyclones) shall
be properly considered for the purposes of emergency plans.

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Mellitah Oil & Gas – BV- Corporate HSE Philosophy

E.Carvajal A. Elasfer A. Ganidi M. Oun

MOG- HSEQ-IN-G-064 Rev A2 Page 2 of 51

1 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROCEDURE 4

4 ACRONYMS, TERMS AND DEFINITION 8

5 INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 10

8 HAZARDOUS AREAS CLASSIFICATION 24

9 PROCESS DESIGN SAFETY CRITERIA 26

12 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 35

13 PERSONNEL HEALTH AND SAFETY 37

MOG- HSEQ-IN-G-064 Rev A2 Page 3 of 51

1 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROCEDURE

Implementation of the Company Risk Management System (MOG-HSEQ-IN-P-009 Corporate HSE

An effective management of safety during design includes the following principles:

MOG- HSEQ-IN-G-064 Rev A2 Page 4 of 51

1. Identification, consultation and understanding of codes, standards, regulations and all

5. ALARP demonstration and cost/benefit analysis, where necessary.

6. Learning from experience.

3.1 Internal References

[Rif.A1] MOG-HSEQ-IN-P-004 Corporate HSE Risk Management Procedure

[Rif.A2] MOG-CIMS-G-021 Mellitah Oil and Gas BV Specification for PPE

[Rif.A3] MOG-CIMS-G-022 Corporate Guidelines for PPE Issuing Policy

[Rif.A4] MOG-CIMS-WI-023 Checklist and Quality Standards for PPE

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[Rif.A5] MOG-HSEQ-SF-P-059 Management of NORM Activities

MOG-HSEQ-G-IN-070 Corporate Guidelines for HAZARD OPERABILITY

3.2 External References

opi sg hse 010 r01 Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) Methodology

opi sg hse 009 ep r01 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Methodology

opi sg hse 016 ups r01 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

opi sg hse 014 ep r01 Hazardous Area Classification Methodology

opi sg hse 011 ep r01 Sub-Sea Isolation System positioning Methodology

e&p Development DMS Best Practice Project Categorization bp dev-dms

API RP 505 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for

API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification of Locations for

API RP 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving

API 521 Guide for Pressure-relieving and Depressurziing Systems

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IEC 60079 Explosive atmospheres – Part 10-1: Classification of areas –

ISO 17776 Petroleum and gas natural industries – Offshore production

IEC 61511 Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems for the

IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical / electronic programmable

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4 ACRONYMS, TERMS AND DEFINITION

API American Petroleum Institute

EDP Emergency Depressurization

EERA Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis

ESD Emergency Shut Down

ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve

ESHIA Environmental Social, and Health Assessment

FERA Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

GAP General Alarm Push Button

PAGA Public Address and General Alarm

HAV Hand Alarm Vibration

HAZID Hazard Identification System

HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study

HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

HSE Health, Safety and Environment

LSD Local Shut Down

Norm Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials

OPD Opportunity & Project Development

P&I Piping and Instrumentation diagram