SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO

C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGES; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH;

NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CONTRACT A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE. — There is nothing ambiguous
or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. In the case at bar, Gaspar
Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it
was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN A. MARRIAGE CAN BE HELD OUTSIDE OF THE JUDGE'S
CHAMBERS OR COURTROOM. — Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of
the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by
only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGES MAY SOLEMNIZE A MARRIAGE ONLY WITHIN HIS COURT'S
JURISDICTION. — More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only
to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing
officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A
priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so
only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue,
as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down
in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
4. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; IGNORANCE OF ELEMENTARY PROVISIONS
OF THE LAW; CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. — The Court finds respondent to
have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply
them is due to lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not
experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect
them to know and apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation
indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct
as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does
not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to
45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person
had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando
C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.
Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that:
"Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;" and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer
thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states
that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr.
and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent
judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia,
Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to
the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Italics added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear
and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family
Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions
of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage
shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them
in a sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers
or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no
pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only
to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing
officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized
to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a
Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting
us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like
the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the
errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrate may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore
void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a
deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be deat with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

| (Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, [July 19, 1996], 328 PHIL 435-445)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND

ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; REQUISITES; ABSENCE; EFFECT.
— At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF LACK OF RECORD; EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — Section
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was
not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license
was issued and such other relevant data. The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and
inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the
contracting parties.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF THE PETITIONER; WHEN CORROBORATING TESTIMONY NOT
NECESSARY; CASE AT BAR. — The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness
to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase
but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro
and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former. Surely, the fact that only private
respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas,
was dully served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he
chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent
cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was
absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her
husband Cardenas.

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F.
Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to
the solemnization of their marriage. LLjur
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in
default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated
without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of
the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the
name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to
Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the
couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter,
the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's
brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her
marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar,
regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila. It reads:
"February 20, 1987
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO
who were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June
20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear from our
records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio
(Sgd.) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry
Officer"
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to
apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the
marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City. LexLib
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the
alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It
ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that
there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the
certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the
marriage between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel
the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the
certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record
adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for
relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no
part in the procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption
regarding the validity of a marriage. prLL
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent
appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no.
3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued
by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations
was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage
license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record
or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove
its non-issuance. cdphil
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, viz:
"Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his contain
no such record or entry."
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his
office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not
a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly
due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil
ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as
a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting
parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former. llcd
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her.
Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the
petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly
declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate
in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the
contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a
spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. LLphil
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103047, [September 2, 1994], 306 PHIL 284-291)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004.]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision 1 dated October 21, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment 2 dated August 5, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison
term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution 3 of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigo's motion for reconsideration. CTAIHc
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from
1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with
each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant
to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August
30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17,
1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago 4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No.
6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused's
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place.cHESAD
 On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information 5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol. 6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion
was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When
arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED. 7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 8 the trial court ruled that want
of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not
be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur, 9 which held
that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial
status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucio's defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu, 10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know
that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between
Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from
this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio's marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The
reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact
that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 13 of the Civil
Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17 14 of the
Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a
foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People, 15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a
foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith. CIAHaT
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. 16 However, the
denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first
marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE
OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. 17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce
decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and
publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack
of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like
other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that
his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant
case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis, 18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 40 19 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a
party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as
everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil
Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
 Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first
determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 20 we
laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing
the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar
of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED. 21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by
the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 22 and 4 23 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with;
and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents
and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date
of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married." 24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the
two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge. IAETSC
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. 25 In the latter
case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second
marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." 26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six
months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio. ASHEca
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in
favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense
of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground
that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

||| (Morigo y Cacho v. People, G.R. No. 145226, [February 6, 2004], 466 PHIL 1013-1025)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 189538. February 10, 2014.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L.

OLAYBAR, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J p:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial
Court 1 (RTC) Decision 2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order 3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-
CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries
in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice.
She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she
did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate
is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
entries in the wife portion thereof. 5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well
as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. cIaHDA
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the
named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. 6 Respondent
also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent. 7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8 TADCSE
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the
petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED. 9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court
found basis in granting the latter's prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries
in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. 11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration couched in
this wise: aASEcH
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioner's counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED. 12
Contrary to petitioner's stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of theRules of Court being the appropriate
adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent's identity was used by an unknown person to
contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the
Family Code. 13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE
ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION
OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE VOIDAB INITIO. 14 IHDCcT
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the
entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter's personal circumstances. 15 In
directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect,
declared the marriage null and void ab initio. 16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. 17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question
of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the
examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. 18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is
whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit: TSEHcA
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
 SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto. TaSEHC
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction
for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of
a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation
of Republic v. Valencia 19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." 20 An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered. 21 AEIDTc
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register. 22 HIAcCD
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate. HTCSDE
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor
General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondent's signature appearing in some of her government issued identification
cards. 23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her
petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
of the National Statistics Office 24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage
in the civil registry. ScaEIT
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and
that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth
by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court
Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. SaHcAC
Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, [February 10, 2014], 726 PHIL 378-388)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO

III, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J p:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision 1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution 2 dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of
the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment
or for legal separation. 5Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent's
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition — Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
xxx xxx xxx
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried
while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy.
The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to
the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first
place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of theFamily Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
 On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case
at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to
re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also
be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that
this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. AETcSa
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. 11 In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent. 12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph
2 of Article 26. AHDTIE
 In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient
remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is settled rule
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15Furthermore, respondent
must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
we are unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor. CcAHEI
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, [October 5, 2005], 509 PHIL 108-117)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Singco & Cagara Law Office for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE

PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF HIS WIFE. — Using the guidelines established by jurisprudence, this Court finds that
the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The only substantial evidence presented by
respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being
self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of
evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband's
surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus's
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a
grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE CONTEMPLATES DOWNRIGHT
INCAPACITY OR INABILITY TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AND ASSUME THE BASIC MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS. — It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. As has already been stressed by this
Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CHARACTERISTICS, BEHAVIOUR AND ACTS OF RESPONDENT'S WIFE
DO NOT SATISFACTORILY ESTABLISH A PSYCHOLOGICAL OR MENTAL DEFECT THAT IS
SERIOUS OR GRAVE AND WHICH HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME OF CELEBRATION OF
THE MARRIAGE, AND IS INCURABLE. — Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may have hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the
rest of the family. Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics, behavior, and acts of Fely do not
satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave, and which has been in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage, and is incurable. Even when the rules have been
relaxed and the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
totality of evidence presented during trial by respondent Crasus, as the spouse seeking the declaration of
nullity of marriage, must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity; which, it failed to do so herein.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BY ITS PLAIN AND LITERAL INTERPRETATION, ARTICLE 26, PARAGRAPH 2
OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF RESPONDENT AND HIS WIFE
BECAUSE AT THE TIME THE LATTER OBTAINED HER DIVORCE, SHE WAS STILL A FILIPINO
CITIZEN. — As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation,
the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen
since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, AS THE PRINCIPAL LAW OFFICER AND LEGAL
DEFENDER OF THE GOVERNMENT IS AUTHORIZED TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE
REPUBLIC IN PROCEEDINGS FOR ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
— That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292,otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal
law officer and legal defender of the Government. His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
lawyers. The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in
mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather
than thwart it.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS AUTHORIZED TO BRING OR DEFEND
ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ONCE THE CASE
IS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT OR THE COURT OF APPEALS. — The general rule is that only
the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of
the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. While it is the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes
over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of
the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL TO INTERVENE AND TAKE PART
IN PROCEEDINGS FOR ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS WELL-
SETTLED AND INDUBITABLE. — This Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were
appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta — In the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals[268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213] This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated
its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. . . . Finally, the issuance of this
Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent
Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The
Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, 1 affirming the Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, 2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for declaration of
nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a
result of their union, they had five children — Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos — who
are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of
America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care
of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter
from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did
not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their
eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for
unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding
of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At
the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus,
and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in
his Complaint that Fely's acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to
Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines. ITDHSE
 Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim 4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she
admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted
the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more
hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
occasions but it was because of the latter's drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been
extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for
financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole
breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children
with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had
to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired
American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now
being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a
child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced
to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed
that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, 5 the RTC afforded
both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. 6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1)
his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint; 7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the
recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; 8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband's surname, Micklus. 9
Fely's counsel filed a Notice, 10 and, later on, a Motion, 11 to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the
Orders 12 and Commissions 13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California,
U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had
presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an
Order, dated 05 October 1998, 14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The
case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings —
The ground bearing defendant's psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff's testimony is decidedly credible. The
Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff
adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein
he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country. ACTESI
 Defendant's intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before
the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the
case in this instance.
Certainly defendant's posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her
very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the
foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations,
such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendant's own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant's psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the
time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff's testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that
the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already
there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant's own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to
declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null
and void ab initio. 15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30
July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered
additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to
wit —

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and

is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated
this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING
HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to
avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he
or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has
undoubtedly acquired her American husband's citizenship and thus has become an
alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be
 extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship
and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff
would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor
her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who
is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a
perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court's declaration of
the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following
arguments/grounds —
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent's wife do not per
se constitute psychological incapacity. SDEHIa
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with
law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors
of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the
case at bar. 18
In his Comment 19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely's psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because
the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner
Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads —
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this
Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus —
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
 disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. . .
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by —
(a) Gravity — It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 21
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 22 which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below —
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state. HaAISC
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 23
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. . .
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
 refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. . .
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. 26 Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by
the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. HTDCAS
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband's surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus's Complaint filed with the RTC, the
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented
her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 27 Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. 28
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 29
Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may
have hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Nonetheless, the afore-
described characteristics, behavior, and acts of Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave, and which has been in existence at the time of celebration of the
marriage, and is incurable. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of Fely
by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, 30 the totality of evidence presented during trial by
respondent Crasus, as spouse seeking the declaration of nullity of marriage, must still prove the gravity,
judicial antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity; 31 which, it failed to do so
herein.
Moreover, this Court resolves any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage. 32 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 33
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines —
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married
couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the
said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at
the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus. cSCTEH
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene,
on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides —
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
 That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292,otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal
law officer and legal defender of the Government. 34 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
lawyers. 35
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in
mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather
than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals. 36 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on
behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court.
Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances
demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta 37 —
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court
laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family
Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at
213] IDEHCa

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State. . .
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any
other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in
the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to
higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below —
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. —
xxx xxx xxx
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition
on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Memoranda. — The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the
trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall
be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent
summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice
to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 20. Appeal. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Notice of Appeal. — An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal
from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of
the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
At most, Fely's abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus
for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. 39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,
in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting. ISDCaT
 SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, [September 21, 2005], 507 PHIL 485-508)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.]

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in

her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; ADULTERY AND

CONCUBINAGE; SWORN WRITTEN COMPLAINT OF OFFENDED SPOUSE, JURISDICTIONAL. —
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court
over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just
as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIVE AND SUCCESSIVE RULE IN THE PROSECUTION OF SEDUCTION,
ABDUCTION, RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, NOT APPLICABLE TO CONCUBINAGE AND
ADULTERY. — Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses
above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State,
as parens partriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such
amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE IN CIVIL CASES, DETERMINED AS OF THE FILING OF
THE COMPLAINT, APPLIED TO PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES. — Corollary to such exclusive
grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. The absence of
an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines,
the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private
crimes", or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the
action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party
who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADULTERY AND CONCUBINAGE; AFTER A DIVORCE HAS BEEN DECREED, THE
INNOCENT SPOUSE NO LONGER HAS THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE
OFFENDERS. — American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer
has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings
have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; U.S. RULE APPLIED IN THIS JURISDICTION. — We see no reason why the same
doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural
policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-
vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates
the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
7. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY BETWEEN A FILIPINA AND A GERMAN, RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the
present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEVERANCE OF MATERIAL BOND HAD THE EFFECT OF DISSOCIATING THE
FORMER SPOUSES FROM EACH OTHER. — The allegation of private respondent that he could not
have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of
the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RULE IN MATA CASE
(18 PHIL. 4 90), NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The aforecited case of United States vs.
Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal
Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers
intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until
and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be
logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no
longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of
the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite
would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.

DECISION
REGALADO, J p:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough,
and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8,
1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were
accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case
No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case,
"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434
went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his
office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987.
The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William
Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of
the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined
and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the
aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue. LexLib
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is
a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the
court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is
just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The
so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do
not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens partriae, was added
and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity
to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or
petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary
since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of
the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-
called "private crimes", or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for
adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence
the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such
capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at
the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party
bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in
the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and
the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter. cdphil
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have
the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the
criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
" 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when
the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in
the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced." (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in
a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
 "There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any
State of the Union . . .
"It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law . . .
"Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets . . ." 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce
for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger
of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak
of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent.
In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal
Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely
stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital
vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract
declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect".
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration
of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said
declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action
for adultery was filedbefore the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio.
The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected,
as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, herein before cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein
had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency
but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to
the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J ., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid
also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an
absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife
actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the
woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is
free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the
theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is
no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an
American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because
of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband
is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially
grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is
the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While
under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the
application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an
injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute
divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose
marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the
new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with
respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.(139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as
the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

||| (Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, [June 30, 1989], 256 PHIL 407-421)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.]

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6 IHDCcT
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail
of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her
to be able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
 This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTC's ruling, 12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to
that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse — an interpretation
he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there
is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both
support Gerbert's position. SAcaDE
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT'S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages — void 15 and
voidable 16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family
laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an
alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20 andPilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 21 In both
cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse's assertion of marital rights after a foreign
court's divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn
v. Romillo that:
To maintain . . . that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered
still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations . . .
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served. 22 aCHDST
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph
in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity
are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion — i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens — with the complementary statement that this conclusion is
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states: aTEScI
 SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country." 28This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law
on divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. DCASIT
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand,
at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of
divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Codeprovides.
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate based
on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally improper;
hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person's legal capacity
and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for recording the civil status
of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces; EHDCAI
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicataeffect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
 out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion No.
181, series of 1982 37 — both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the
foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce
any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to
the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize thecancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. STHDAc
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located; 38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings; 39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry — one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability
of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October
30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, [August 11, 2010], 642 PHIL 420-438)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.]

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA

DANDAN, * respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED

PERSON; CONTROVERSIES SHALL BE HEARD AND SETTLED AS IN ORDINARY CASES. — The
provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. The Court agrees with
petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself
even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. cdasia
2. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGE; ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE
RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES, PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR
NATIONAL LAW; WHEN MAY BE APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In private respondent's motion to
set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed
therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address
the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but
proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
were married in the Philippines." It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. The Court deduces that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she
was stilla Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
Arturo.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FORUM SHOPPING; ELEMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. — For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. The
present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3)
trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging
to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping. cADEIa

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce
proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each
other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont. dctai
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred
to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of
Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal,
which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children)
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as
the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial
court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being
submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial
approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged
by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On
27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly,
equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15
February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other
half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records
of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing; in
violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of
the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April
1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
 Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of
the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second,
the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of
law which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of the
parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent courts is clear: If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases. cdphil
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary
shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court,
after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of
the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring
the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted
for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have
prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision
she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case
be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a
basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right
to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.
When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since
1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year.
Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her
citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.
Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings. LexLib
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit.
For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (½) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis,
all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary
rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. cda
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ ., concur.

||| (Quita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124862, [December 22, 1998], 360 PHIL 601-610)
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001.]

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R SANCHEZ, MTC,

Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C .J p:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R.
Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano
charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999. ICcDaA
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four children
were born out of that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he
knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. 4 According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano)
could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for
being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the
affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of
his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the
basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of
the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
 No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of
the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. HACaSc
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least
five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage. 6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a dirimant
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano's and Payao's
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree
of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at
bar. HIaTCc
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two
individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to
judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law
and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10
 ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

||| (Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 (Resolution), [March 8, 2001], 406 PHIL 434-
440)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008.]

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE

CASTRO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166, 2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. de Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a
marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with
Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering
the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. de Castro.
Since the child's birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court. 3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is
married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child." 4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice
from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband
and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, 5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license.
However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave
abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide
support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child. TSEHcA
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to
be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties' marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner's refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation,
as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner's "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated
7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of
the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for
the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it
that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon
petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation
of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 70, in
JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia
A. de Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring
the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until
properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
Costs against the appellant. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with
respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was
celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a
marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never
lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. 10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no
need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action
for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case,
petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it
was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities, 11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be
time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child's
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. 13 SDECAI
In her Comment, 14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to
thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but
can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard
to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
 For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for
the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog, 16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a
marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of
a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and
that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid. 17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the
findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to
support. 18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and
second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage. 20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22 cDHCAE
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. 23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they
presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. 24 However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus —
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and
wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the
Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir. 25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a
marriage license. 26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner's illegitimate daughter, and
therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. 27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. 28
The Certificate of Live Birth 29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner,
in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of
the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila; 30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not
only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondent's own admission in the
course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend.
While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter's house or clinic. At
times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances,
petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as
earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-
1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1"
and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs.
"D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner's finger
and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of
kissing the petitioner. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., * concur.

||| (De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, [February 13, 2008], 568 PHIL 724-734)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.

[G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.]

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between
Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio. CacHES
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of
them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that
he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a
boarder in Felisa's house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him
to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house.
When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance. EAIaHD
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him
on account of their age difference. 5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to
Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31
August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed
an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina
were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. 6 The Ombudsman found
Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not
deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. 9 caIETS
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose's version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for
[Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of
the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was
the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if
he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be
"taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa's] name in the
duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one
year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and
false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to
be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason
why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified
that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic]
brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken
on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed
she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.
The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud. 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had prescribed. It cited
Article 87 11 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus: AECIaD
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained
by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the
time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did
not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. . . . . 12
 Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In
a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 14 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by
law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose's appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on
Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had
already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15 TaEIcS
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
76 16 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity
of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein.
In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing
officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment
to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose's argument that neither he nor Felisa
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of
Appeals, Article 56 17 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 7 18 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties' marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from
a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together
as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio. AICHaS
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City. 19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog, 20 and reasoned that:
 In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the
age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
". . . In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and
its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should
be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons
are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to
the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from
the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage
license. 21 AaHTIE
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa's motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals'
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition
for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court's Amended Decision.
On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of
the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
 III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing
prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa
adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and
an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability. cSIADH
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners
Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the
claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court's
ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is
the Republic's position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer
was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic
opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition,
the Republic posits that the parties' marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and
must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Jose's notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12
May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa's name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by
the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had
lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID card, dated 2 May
1988, indicating Felisa's name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November
1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract: cTIESa
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58 27 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides,
save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75. 28 Article 80 (3) 29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. 30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law, 31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. CHDAEc
The reason for the law, 35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation
from legalizing their status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age
of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have
in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably construed. 39 They extend only so
far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule is established by statute with
exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the exception
in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the
age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to
read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state
the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that
the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage. TaISDA
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage. 43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her
by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution. 44 The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house. 45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-
year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court's review. 47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of
Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make
contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that
the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence. 48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa
to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites
were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement
of a marriage license. AIDTHC
Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same
finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question
that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every intendment of law or fact
leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and
unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage. 52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. 53 To permit
a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If
this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes
that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
 Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under
a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage
license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at
all. caTIDE
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from
his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law. 54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is
set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that
the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. 55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity;
hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisa's
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it
is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be
raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-
law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage. 57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years — and continuity
that is unbroken. 58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No
costs. aAEIHC
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, * Velasco, Jr. ** and Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Dayot, G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, [March 28, 2008], 573 PHIL 553-576)
 EN BANC

[A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.]

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.

VILLAMORA, complainants, vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding
Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE WITHOUT A

MARRIAGE LICENSE AND FAILURE TO SUPERVISE HIS CLERK OF COURT IN THE
PREPARATION OF MONTHLY REPORT OF CASES CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT; PENALTY;
CASE AT BAR. — In view of the findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently
show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that
he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July and
September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with
respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be imposed a
fine of TEN THOUSAND (10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be
more severely dealt with. The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed
in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the
marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a
marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Judge Palaypayon is likewise
liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in
the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report
of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report
of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to
closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of
court do not contain false statements. It was held that A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158). The
recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge
should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for
the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable
participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such
serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00
on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or
similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER
COURT PERSONNEL; CLERK OF COURT; FALSIFICATION OF MONTHLY REPORT OF CASES
AND OTHER SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE; SANCTION; CASE AT BAR. — In view also of
the finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the
months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having
failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to
account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the
solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of
which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the
amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y)
and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year
and five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash
bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and
redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she
issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank
or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against
farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the
Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said respondent
clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service. Respondent Baroy had either
failed to comply with the Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.
127, Manual for Clerks of Court, DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of
Court, and Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and
accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct
which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of
Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The
clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent
Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and
her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty
of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and (the Court)
ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in
any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
3. ID.; COURTS; EVERYONE CONNECTED WITH AN OFFICE CHARGED WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE SHOULD BE CIRCUMSCRIBED WITH THE HEAVY BURDEN OF
RESPONSIBILITY. — We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior
of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else,
must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, without
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-
bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
4. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; LIABILITIES OF PARTIES IN THE
IRREGULARITIES IN THE FORMAL REQUISITES THEREOF. — On the charge regarding illegal
marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage,
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages,
and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers
of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
 marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is
of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo

Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon,
Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of
the same court.

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on

October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing
fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective
Comments.3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the
Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was
however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval
inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this
administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each particular
charge against respondents. prcd
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license. viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie
Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts
(Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who
prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the
employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who
told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers that it was only lately
when she discovered that the court had a Marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo;
that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to
register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage
contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that
all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy; but the latter insists
that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their
marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the
marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish
the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the
latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of
which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the
administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not
signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias ande Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay
and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him
since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of
Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate,
he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present. LLpr
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages
solemnized and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7)
marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages
were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six
(6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred
thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00
therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages
celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of
complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held responsible for the
entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the payments made as
solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is
Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held
accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable
only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects
are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the
Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund
of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by
complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly
report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages
celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages
solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month since not all the
marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually only
six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts
issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any
unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register;
and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be
appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one
supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign
the same. llcd
 3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent
judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and
Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk
of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one
appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-
conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac
and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to
respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the
consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of
clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and
that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-
conditioning unit was bought from his co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992,
eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be
that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and
prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al.,
"bondswoman Januaria Decara was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond
to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt therefor
nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of
two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown
that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of
court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a
corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should the
bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure therefor.

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archived for failure of
the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has
nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in
his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of respondent judge,
the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was
archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992. LLpr
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention
prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived
because it had been pending for more than six (6) months and the accused therein remained at
large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said
fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondent Baroy contends that is was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro
(because respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of
docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for P800.00; that she was not
allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to
deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her
account; and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and
the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994,
together with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we
are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts
and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and
perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the
evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at
length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized without a
marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A).
Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the black space in the marriage
contracts to show the number of the marriage was solemnized as required by
Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties and
their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix
his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when
Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
In said marriages the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the
marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The testimonies of
Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon
solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were
advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage
was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime,
they already started living together as husband and wife believing that the formal
requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya
and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He
declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date
stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy
of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely
show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the
pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be
photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told
that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were
already invited and the place of the parties where the reception would be held
was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact
alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the same did not
bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a
copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not
solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the
testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya
and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days
with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table
(Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c, K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-
b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated
solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the
explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon
would allows himself to be photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on
a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons
given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be
used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte
were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their
marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge
Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was
under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was
solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2)
months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as
they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen
(13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to
believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to
have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage
license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he
solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he did
not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family
Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow
his instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show
when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano
and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to
the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to
appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not
marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional
character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require
the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized their marriage for the
second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano
and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the
date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were
not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not
any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family
Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid
(Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve
himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of this official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is
his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.

With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido

(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and
Carrido and Sabater and Nacario executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon
did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and
Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not
solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-
examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who prepared their
affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and
Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and
sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal
Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh.
f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses,
Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a
receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license. On her part,
respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she
was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she
answered that she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14;
10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon.
She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two
principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even
know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very
difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the
marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their
witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but
Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of
marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina,
Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina,
however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been
that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order
to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he
assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties
and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay
and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his
precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to
four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12; 2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed to be first
asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as
husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
(2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art.
6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his
alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as
shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs.
K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that
the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and
their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53; 10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he
was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary
his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-
seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the
whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows
also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent
Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in evidence several marriage
contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed
affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts
and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged
of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the
marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified
the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in
the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the
complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September,
1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for
July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for said month there were
six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to
Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly
report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six (6) notarized
documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not,
however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the
notarial fee for the six (6) documents were paid. Besides, the monthly report of
cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based
on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the
number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.
 Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and
checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on
his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have
checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is
already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is
required to have close supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of
cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's
Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581,
it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification
of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly
assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By
her own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was
supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the
notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a
month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he claims
that he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still
it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody
of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial register, among other
things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to
be in custody, control and supervision of all court records including documents
and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the
records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this case in connection with the charge of
falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what
happened to the notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the
month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also
sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit
them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary
receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been
notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said
month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as
notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were
fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized
as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo
declared that what was actually being charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy
declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really
sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each document
notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This
should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some
notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly,
the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that
she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license the solemnization fees were not
returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for their return.
Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to
lack of marriage license.

Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to
her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was not only because
Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel
of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy
informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she
assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial
fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents
notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already. Besides there never was any
demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in
spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to
the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond
deposit of a certain Decara in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in
any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on
the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was
deposited informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case
was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows
that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on
March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos of
the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only after
keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around
one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of
this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she
withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was
only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it,
when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28,
1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For
this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an an numbered
temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank
or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim.
Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It was on
April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an
order for the release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash bond
deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further admitted
that some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number
of the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93).
Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the
Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already
filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed
Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The
evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991
Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in
check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order
to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the
same box when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos on installment basis with a down payment
of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents
presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was
signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was
bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk
of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the
time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in
the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29,
1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily
prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a
witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and
the Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would subject (them) to
suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety
(Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond
deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without
issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge
Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited
(Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that
this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy
who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention
prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped while in his custody and
was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was
ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to
this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan
Adupe were arrested on april 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of
Tinambac, Camarines sur (Exhs. O, O-1, O-2 and O-3; Exh. 25). The evidence
presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal
jail where said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of
Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former
utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants
should have presented records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge
Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under
detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim.
Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without basis. The order
states: "This case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the
warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there
is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused"
(Exh. O-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a
return of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that
Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. O-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving
Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused who remained at large.
The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and
Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the
arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of
Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case
archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped. This
explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the
police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to
explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that
Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only
later on when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered
archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that he only heard that
Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano
might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could
not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees
on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which
was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees received was deposited by
respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented
show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil
cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred
(P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14
of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Bank (from) the payment
of filing fees on collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans
they obtained.

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the

filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who
received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her
part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records,
however, show that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank
dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would
submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent
Baroy).
 Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of
Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic
Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be
submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the
filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here,
there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable
officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr.
had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did
not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme
Court, particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been
proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified with respect to the
number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be
imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the
same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, there
were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were
solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts
and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage
contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible
for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage and
under Article 4(3) of theFamily Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the performance
of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly
report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only
signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed
the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check
and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not
contain false statements. It was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA
158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-
Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months
of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized,
for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2)
months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those
marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not
returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were
issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991
in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a
temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the
Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her
possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or
authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of
 Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No.
5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an
unnumbered temporary receipts (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with
a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for
requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on
February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal
Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said
respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of Court deposits shall be by the clerk of
court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer
for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order
of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184
and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of
deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit from party litigants and
thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial
treasurer and their deposits can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order
of the court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of
Court). Supreme CourtMemorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also
provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental
deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon
receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is
located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except
upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her
conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable
officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P.
Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M.
No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The Clerk of court is not
authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer, Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A
dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds
and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation
of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty
of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all
else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It
applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel,
they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court
of justice. LLpr
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity
in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance
with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the province of the
prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on
respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal
solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled
with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil
status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore
narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in
the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty. LLjur

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge

Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar
offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealth with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy
is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.

||| (Cosca v. Palaypayon, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-92-721, [September 30, 1994], 307 PHIL 261-287)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR.,petitioners,vs.NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.

Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. On February 19, 1997,
Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the
action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition. AcTDaH
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the trial court. The Court
ruled that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage license, therefore, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. According to the
Court, it can not be said that Pepito and respondent have lived with each other as husband and wife for at
least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and
his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each
other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife." The
Court also ruled that petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void because a void marriage can be attacked collaterally and can be questioned even after the death of
either party.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER; THE

5-YEAR COHABITATION PERIOD CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 76 OF THE CIVIL CODE SHOULD
BE THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE DAY OF THE MARRIAGE AND IT SHOULD BE A
PERIOD OF COHABITATION CHARACTERIZED BY EXCLUSIVITY MEANING NO THIRD PARTY WAS
INVOLVED AT ANY TIME WITHIN THE 5 YEARS AND CONTINUITY THAT IS UNBROKEN. — Working
on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.
In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;CASE AT BAR; THE FIVE-YEAR COHABITATION OF PETITIONERS' FATHER
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THE COHABITATION CONTEMPLATED BY LAW; THE
SUBSISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE EVEN WHERE THERE WAS ACTUAL SEVERANCE OF THE
FILIAL COMPANIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPOUSES CANNOT MAKE ANY COHABITATION BY
EITHER SPOUSE WITH ANY THIRD PARTY AS BEING ONE AS "HUSBAND AND WIFE." — In this
case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito
and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife."
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO FILE A PETITION TO DECLARE
THEIR FATHER'S MARRIAGE VOID EVEN AFTER HIS DEATH; VOID MARRIAGES CAN BE
ATTACKED COLLATERALLY AND CAN BE QUESTIONED EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF EITHER
PARTY. — Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can
file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is voidab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code. LibLex
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve
the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal,
with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito
G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment
that the allegations in the petition are 'true and correct.'" It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of
petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
 The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is
the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their
names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. cda
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained
the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether
there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded
any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
 Article 63:"....This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. ...."
Article 64:"Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath.
..."
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "....This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof.
...."
Article 18 reads in part: "....In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his
findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. ...." cdrep
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence
of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception
in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital
affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions
monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife."
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initiobecause of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before
the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can
file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage
was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing. cdasia
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except
in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,C.J.,Puno and Kapunan, JJ.,concur.
Pardo, J.,is on official business abroad.

||| (Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, [March 14, 2000], 384 PHIL 661-675)
 **A.M No. 02-11-10-SC

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.]

(formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.

OCCIANO, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law. Petitioner alleged that
the respondent judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at the
place outside of his jurisdiction. The Office of the Court Administrator, in its report and
recommendation, found the respondent judge guilty of the charges made. He was recommended to
be fined in the amount of P5,000.00.
According to the Supreme Court, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge was limited to
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur was contrary to law and should subject him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent
should also be faulted for solemnizing marriage without the requisite marriage license. The
respondent judge was fined by the Supreme Court in the amount of P5,000.00, with stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980; JUDGES, AS

SOLEMNIZING OFFICERS; CONFINED TO THEIR TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION; VIOLATION IN
CASE AT BAR. — Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him
to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage. aTAEHc
2. CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGE; VALIDITY; MARRIAGE WHICH PRECEDED THE ISSUANCE OF
THE MARRIAGE LICENSE IS VOID; RATIONALE. — In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is
the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT CANNOT EXONERATE
THEM FROM DISCIPLINARY ACTION; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent judge cannot be exculpated
despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of
cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act
of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair
the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.

DECISION

PUNO, J p:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent
judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties"
left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a
retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and
sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having
been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage
in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo
informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan
which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent
judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded. ETDaIC
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that
if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they
failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur.
 Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by
the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and
reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be
issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot
issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her
marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter
dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office
cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his
previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license
and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed
on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 1 respondent judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which
did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held
that: HCacDE
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability." 2 (Italics supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held
that:
 "The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant
case. . . . While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they
are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions
of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons." 3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion
but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara, 4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in
gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the
prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. 5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They
can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which
involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a
disciplining authority. 6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. ESCcaT
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

||| (Arañes v. Occiano, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 (formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ), [April 11, 2002], 430
PHIL 197-204)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 105540. July 5, 1993.]

IRENEO G. GERONIMO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO

ESMAN, respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner.

Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCLUSIVE;

RULE AND EXCEPTIONS; CASE AT BAR. — In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, (204
SCRA 601, 608-609 [1991]) which collated representative cases on the rule of conclusiveness of the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the exceptions thereto, we stated: "Settled is the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of this Court
to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law
that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, they must stand. There are, however, exceptions to this rule,
namely: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record." Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls
under any of the above exceptions. On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail.
2. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR THE ABSENCE OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE
AT BAR. — Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman
because the copies of the marriage contract he presented did not state the marriage license number. The
flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he
presented a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section where
the marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to assail
this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit "V," a certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1 October 1976 in favor of Edwin G.
Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals thus: "It is a
known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the Government like the
Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A) come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial
numbers. These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal treasurers concerned.
But the serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding
years when the same forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the serially-
numbered forms do not follow the same pattern. This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No.
5038770 which the appellant refused to acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No.
5038770 was requisitioned and received by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the
Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits
"1" and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07,
1955, another marriage license bearing the same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the
municipality of Pasig in October, 1959. Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No. 5038770
was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay City on June 29, 1976 that was used by a certain Edwin G.
Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to
prove the non-recording of the marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of the license
itself.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J p:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33850 1 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68,
Pasig, Metro Manila in Special Proceeding No. 10036 declaring valid the marriage between Graciana
Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman and appointing the latter as the administrator of the estate of the
deceased Graciana Geronimo.
The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the estate of
Graciana Geronimo-Esman.
On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the heirs
oppositor Antonio A. Esman and describing the latter as 'husband of the deceased'. On
April 4, 1988, an amended petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the
surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now describing the latter as the 'live-in partner of
the deceased' after finding out that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent
was a 'nullity for want of a marriage license'.
It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no
descendants nor ascendants. She was survived by her two brothers Tomas and Ireneo,
her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A. Esman . . . However, the
husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the decedent is now being
questioned in view of the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between
oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage license.
The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint a
judicial administrator is whether or not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and
Antonio A. Esman was valid. LLphil
Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister and oppositor
Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license issued to the
parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage
license number was not stated in the marriage contract (Exh. "I"); and that the marriage
contract itself does now (sic) show the number of the marriage license issued (Exh.
"J"). Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased
and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to
Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in October 1959.
On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere
concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents (Exhs. "I" and "J")
would show that except for the phrases 'not stated' and 'not recorded', the two certified
 copies of the marriage contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now
Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the certified
copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the original petition which named
the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked that these
phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the
marriage license number on the Registry of Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not
fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no marriage license was actually signed on
January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that the marriage
license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by the Bureau of Printing
with serialized numbers and distributed to various provinces of municipalities thru
proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the printing of the
marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the same
forms in the succeeding years.
Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the deceased and
oppositor were married. David Montenegro, an employee of the National Archives &
Records Section, testified that a copy of the marriage contract between Antonio A.
Esman and Graciana Geronimo celebrated on January 7, 1955, is on file with their
office. cdrep
Msgr. Moises Andrada, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that he
was asked to come over to teach in Guadalupe seminary and stayed in Pasig as
assistant priest of the parish of Immaculate Concepcion from 1975 to 1983. Here, he
came to know the spouses Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman whom he
attended to spiritually, conducted mass for, gave communion, and visited them socially.
He had occasions to go to the couple's garment business, Gragero Lingerie, and
observed that the couple were quite close with each other and with the people working
in their business.
Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business testified that
she was aware of the marriage which took place between Graciana Geronimo and
Antonio A. Esman; that they lived together as husband and wife in Bambang, Pasig,
after the wedding; and that it is the oppositor who has been successfully supervising
the lingerie business after the death of Graciana Geronimo.

Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office, testified that she is in charge of all
accountable forms being taken in the fourteen (14) municipalities of the province of
Rizal which include marriage licenses; and pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses nos.
5038751 to 5038800 was taken by the Municipality of Pateros way back in October 9,
1953.
Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila, testified that
in the entry of marriage book of Pateros, particularly page no. 23 of book no. 2 and reg.
no. 51, there is no column for the marriage license; that they started putting the
marriage license only in 1980; that they have a copy of the questioned marriage
contract in which the marriage license number is recorded; and that the records of 1959
were lost during a typhoon, but they sent a copy of the marriage contract to the
archives section.
Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana Geronimo on
January 7, 1955 in Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage license no. 5038770; and
that he was introduced by the deceased to the public as her lawful husband. (Decision,
pp. 1-3)" 2
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:
 "It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do not bear the
number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana Geronimo and the
herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the number could only
serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as
convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license. On the other hand,
the marriage license number (No. 5038776, [sic] dated January 7, 1955) does appear
in the certified archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit 7 and sub-markings).
The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by the
petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of
the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which requires that the
marriage license number would (sic) be indicated in the marriage contract itself." 3
Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the marriage between
Graciana Geronimo and Antonio Esman is void, and, perforce, the latter had no right to be appointed as
the administrator of the estate of the former, the petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any factual issue by now
posing the following question in this petition: "Can there be a valid marriage where one of the essential
requisites — license — is absent?" Doubtless, the query has been framed so as to apparently present a
question of law. In reality, however, the question assumes that there was no marriage license, which is, of
course, a factual contention. Both the trial court and the public respondent found and ruled
otherwise. LLpr
In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 4 which collated representative cases on the rule of
conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the exceptions thereto, we stated:
"Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law
imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, they
must stand. llcd
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record."
Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above exceptions.
On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse the mind of the
petitioner, we shall proceed to discuss the issue regarding the alleged absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman because the
copies of the marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and "J") did not state the marriage license
number. The flaw in such reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent
when he presented a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records
Section (Exhibit "7") where the marriage license number (No. 5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does
appear. Petitioner tried to assail this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit "V," a certification of the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1
October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was sufficiently explained by
the Court of Appeals thus:
"It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the
Government like the Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A) come from the National
Printing Office and are printed with serial numbers. These forms are distributed upon
proper requisition by the city/municipal treasurers concerned. But the serial numbers
printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding years
when the same forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the
serially-numbered forms do not follow the same pattern.
This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the appellant
refused to acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770
was requisitioned and received by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru
the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal (as explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and
borne out by Exhibits "1" and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman and Graciana
Geronimo in their marriage on January 07, 1955, another marriage license bearing the
same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in October,
1959 (Exhibit "L-1"). Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No. 5038770
was also issued to the Treasurer of Pasay City on June 29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that
was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V").
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 31-32)" 5
At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the non-recording of the
marriage license number but certainly not the non-issuance of the license itself. LibLex
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.

||| (Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105540, [July 5, 1993])

 SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 165424. June 9, 2009.]

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, petitioner, vs. CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J p:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court
denying petitioner's petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition
sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision 1 and September 24, 2004 resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent
Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a "joke". After the
ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing
respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling
him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry
that he found out that the marriage was not "fake".
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder,
particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness,
Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioner's personality disorder was serious and
incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to
respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. 3 cDICaS
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that
the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the
CA's decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage
to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He
stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more
than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, 4 this Court reiterated
that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis — guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
 Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 5
In this case, the testimony 6 of petitioner's expert witness revealed that petitioner was
suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can
you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent]
personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that
petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his
marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage,
sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity
to handle the essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a
very impulsive decision. I don't think he understood what it meant to really be
married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there was no
sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months
he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the
relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a really serious
matter at all.EHSAaD
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent
suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on
this?
A. . . . I don't think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It
was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get married . . . I don't
think they truly considered themselves married.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude . . .
that petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. . . . they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never
consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there
were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect
[for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder 7 as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments. At times they
actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where
to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
 In her psychological report, 8 Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner's dependent personality
disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended
on them for decisions. 9 Petitioner's mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when
he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. 10
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent
personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-
defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of
him. 11 This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father
who treated his family like robots 12 and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his
father. 13When petitioner could no longer take respondent's domineering ways, he preferred to hide
from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their
marriage. 14 HScCEa
Dr. Dayan traced petitioner's personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit: 15
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lester's family is dysfunctional. The father was very
abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the
children never had affirmation. They might [have been] . . . given financial
support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an
intact family. . . . The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I
would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and
somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it]
meant to have a real family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner's personality disorder was grave and
incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. 16
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was
grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that
individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term. 17Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving
that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect
all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who
display them and for others". 18
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008
resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. cHDAIS

||| (Halili v. Santos-Halili, G.R. No. 165424 (Resolution), [June 9, 2009], 607 PHIL 1-8)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 173138. December 1, 2010.]

NOEL B. BACCAY, petitioner, vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assails the Decision 1 dated August 26, 2005 and Resolution 2 dated June 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74581. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of
petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 4 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took up
Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced by a mutual
friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of
continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noel's proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel
considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive. 5
Noel's family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel
observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he
always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive occasions like birthdays,
Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noel's invitations and
whenever she attended those occasions with Noel's family, he observed that Maribel was invariably
aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of his family members. Noel would talk to
Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noel's
relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To give Maribel some
time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had
several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually since
Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in November 1998,
Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice of his mother, Noel
grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately wed on November 23, 1998
before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City. CTIDcA
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel's family in their house
at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noel's family, Maribel remained
aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the
house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all
expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel.
 Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms
of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribel's office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy
and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not
go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a
miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The
discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noel's mother tried
to intervene but Maribel shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam" at her. Because of this, Noel's
mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them
to pick her up. Maribel left Noel's house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate
with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected
his phone calls. 6
On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition 7 for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not
participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the public prosecutor manifested that no
collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or opposition to the
case. 8
On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties
hereto celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics Office
are hereby directed to record and enter this decree into the marriage records of the
parties in their respective marriage registers.
The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth,
they shall be governed by the property regime of complete separation of property.
With costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage,
and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder
characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical
psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as
witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because
of emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly
in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of
paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation. 10
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 38 declaring as null and void the marriage between petitioner-appellee
and respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DENIED. aTADCE
SO ORDERED. 11
The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribel's supposed Narcissistic
Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent
and incurable. Maribel's attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or signs of ill-will and
refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to psychological incapacity,
said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have failed or refused to perform her marital
obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short
of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital
obligations. 12
The CA further held that Maribel's refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not
constitute a ground to find her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As
Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before their marriage. Maribel
therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular obligation and that such
incapacity existed at the time of marriage. 13
Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was
an action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3) 14 of the Family Code. According to the CA,
Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances enumerated
under Article 46 15 of the Family Code. Maribel's misrepresentation that she was pregnant to induce
Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as it was not among the
instances enumerated under Article 46. 16
On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noel's motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribel's
personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to perform
the essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to her stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the
manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection with Maribel's failure to
perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribel's alleged psychological incapacity,
any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. 17
Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT
OF APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING
FROM NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER
FAILURE TO PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. 18
The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribel's refusal to procreate as
psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual intercourse with
Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had any sexual intimacy during
their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her
marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather
than to stubborn refusal. He insists that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual
encounters between him and Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to
procreate through marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and
consummation of the marriage for the start of family life is different from "plain, simple and casual
sex." He further stresses that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later
claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to
consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him. 19 HEIcDT
Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribel's psychological incapacity and that
she consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder before and during their marriage. He points out that Maribel would only mingle with a few
individuals and never with Noel's family even if they lived under one (1) roof. Maribel was also
arrogant and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his mother and was also "interpersonally
exploitative" as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. After
marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel and his family. She displayed indifference
to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the marriage she would display unfounded jealousy
when Noel was visited by his friends. This same jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying
her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribel's psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and
incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to participate in therapy session
and would reject any form of psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable.
Such persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality.
The psychologist added that Maribel's psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive
system since early childhood and manifested during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her
parents and mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their
over-protection of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was insensitive to
the needs of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or failure. 20
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribel's refusal to have sexual intercourse with
Noel did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her traits were
merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform her
marital obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable of entering into
marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was established that Noel and
Maribel had sexual relations prior to their marriage. The OSG further pointed out that the psychologist
was vague as to how Maribel's refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.
The petition lacks merit.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals 21 that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed
by Article 68 22 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to
the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court laid down the guidelines in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
 clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. ESDcIA
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis
ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding
that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel
refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their
quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that
Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during
childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming
the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel
was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain
one. 24 Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. aETASc
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders
her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." 25 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: 26
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. . . .
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Brion and Sereno, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
BRION, J., concurring:

I agree with the ponencia that the totality of evidence presented by the petitioner Noel Baccay
was not sufficient to sustain a finding that his wife, respondent Maribel Baccay, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, and, thus, there was no basis to declare
their marriage a nullity.
Noel primarily contended that Maribel failed to comply with her marital obligation to
consummate their marriage. While admitting that he and Maribel had several sexual encounters
before their marriage, Noel narrated that after getting married, Maribel senselessly and constantly
refused to have any sexual relations with him. He asserted that Maribel's unreasonable refusal
amounted to a psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Noel further pointed to several traits of Maribel that negatively affected their marital
relationship. Maribel was described as arrogant, haughty, rude, and disrespectful; she mingled only
with a few individuals and failed to endear herself to Noel's family, even if they lived with them under
the same roof. She was also "interpersonally exploitative," as shown by her misrepresentation of
pregnancy to force Noel to marry her. All of these, Noel contended, are manifestations of a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), which clinical psychologist Nedy Tayag diagnosed Maribel to
be suffering from. Accordingly, Noel petitioned the Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision that
reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court's decision granting his petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. ICDSca
Article 36 refers to the Incapacity to
Fulfill Essential Marital Obligations
due to a Psychological Condition
Article 36 of the Family Code states that —
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Dissecting the terms of the provision, we list down its elements:
1. a celebration of marriage;
2. non-performance of marital obligations;
3. the marital obligations which are not performed are essential obligations;
4. non-performance is due to causes psychological in nature and it is chronic:
constant and habitual;
5. the cause/s are present during the celebration of marriage although they may not be
manifest or evident at that point; and
6. the cause/s surface after the celebration of marriage. 1
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological incapacity relate to the essential
obligations of marriage, i.e., "it is the non-performance of this class of obligations which will lead to a
declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity." 2 Corollarily, "the non-compliance
with these non-essential marital obligations has no effect on the validity of the marriage." 3
The essential marital obligations under the Family Code are found in Articles 68 to 71, 4 220,
221, and 225. 5 Notably, these essential marital obligations refer primarily to obligations of
spouses towards each other and towards their children. While a harmonious relationship with the in-
laws is ideal, particularly in this country's cultural set-up, it appears that the law does not consider it
an essential obligation of either spouse to maintain one. The "incapacity should make the party
disabled from rendering what is due in the marriage, within the context of justice, not merely in the
sphere of good will." 6 Maribel's failure to socialize, interact, and endear herself to Noel's family, as
far as our family laws are concerned, is, thus, not considered a non-fulfillment of an essential marital
obligation. If at all, Maribel has failed to meet her husband Noel's expectations of how she should
conduct herself with and relate to his family, a matter not dealt with by Article 36.
The consummation of the marriage, on the other hand, is an essential marital obligation.
Marriage is entered into for the establishment of conjugal and family life; 7 its consummation is not
only an expression of the couple's love for each other, 8 but is also a means for procreation. 9 That
the Court nullified a marriage due to the husband's obstinate and unjustified refusal to have intimate
sexual relations with his wife indicates that the consummation of the marriage is considered an
essential marital obligation. 10
The failure to consummate the marriage by itself, however, does not constitute as a ground to
nullify the marriage. The spouse's refusal to have intimate sexual relations must be due to causes
psychological in nature, i.e., the psychological condition of the spouse renders him/her incapable of
having intimate sexual relations with the other. This crucial nexus between the non-fulfilled essential
marital obligation and the psychological condition was what Noel failed to allege and prove; Maribel's
refusal to satisfy Noel's sexual needs during their marriage was never proven to have been due to
some psychological condition. The evidence did not rule out the possibility that the refusal could be
caused by other factors not related to Maribel's psychological make-up; the refusal could very well be
attributed to Maribel's pregnancy and her subsequent miscarriage (assuming these were true). That
Maribel's refusal to have intimate sexual relations with Noel had more to do with the stresses brought
on by married life than her actual psychological condition is validated by Noel's statement that prior to
marriage, they have had several sexual encounters. The connection between the psychologist's
finding that Maribel was supposedly suffering from NPD and her refusal to have intimate sexual
relations was similarly not established.
Even supposing that a spouse's refusal to have intimate sexual relations with the other
spouse may be reasonably inferred from or connected with the traditional signs and symptoms
associated with NPD, 11 I have difficulty finding credible the psychologist's diagnosis of Maribel's
psychological condition.
The narration of facts declared that Maribel never participated in the proceedings below, and
indicated that the psychologist's evaluation of Maribel was based mainly on Noel's testimony. As the
petitioning spouse, Noel's description of Maribel's nature would certainly be biased, and a
psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as credible.
In Suazo v. Suazo, 12 the Court declared that —
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist [Nedy Tayag, who
incidentally is the same psychologist in the present case] evaluated [the husband's]
psychological condition only in an indirect manner — she derived all her conclusions
from information coming from [the wife] whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied
upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and
with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined
above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by
the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that
is grave, severe and incurable. cCDAHE
The Court's statement above should not be read as making mandatory the personal
examination by the psychologist or expert of the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated.
We have already stated in Marcos v. Marcos 13 that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist to
establish the former's psychological incapacity. Subsequently after the Marcos case, the Court
promulgated the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which stated that "[t]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as
are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert
opinion need not be alleged." 14
To balance, however, the need for an objective evaluation of the psychological condition of
the spouses alleged to be psychologically incapacitated and the non-necessity of an expert's opinion,
we refer again to the Court's ruling in Suazo, which declared that —
[F]or a determination . . . of a party's complete personality profile, information
coming from persons intimately related to [him/her] (such as the party's close
relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article
36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the
credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful
sources of information. 15
It did not help that Noel's case was based entirely on his testimony and that of the psychologist,
whose findings, in turn, were also based on Noel's description of Maribel. Apart from these biased
testimonies, there was no other evidence presented by which the Court could objectively evaluate
Maribel's psychological condition.
Psychological incapacity, by its
nature, refers only to the most
serious cases and is the root cause of
the failure to fulfill the essential
marital obligations
Noel enumerated other negative traits of Maribel 16 that he claimed were indicative of a
psychological illness, specifically, that of NPD. But not all negative traits exhibited by a person are
rooted in some psychological illness or disorder; these may simply be a character flaw or a bad habit
that the person has developed over the years. It has been said that "[a] deeply ingrained bad habit
does not qualify as a source of . . . incapacity." 17 Slight character flaws also do not make a person
incapable of marriage. 18
Assuming that these negative traits were indeed manifestations of NPD or some other
psychological illness, jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under Article 36. "[T]he
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage." 19 The psychologist testified that persons suffering from NPD were unmotivated to
participate in therapy sessions and would reject any form of psychological help, rendering their
condition long lasting, if not incurable, perhaps in an attempt to define the gravity and extent of
Maribel's NPD. This, however, is but a general description of persons with personality
disorders, 20 as the term is clinically defined; NPD is just one of the kinds of personality
disorders. 21 The testimony did not specifically refer to Maribel and did not paint a clear picture of the
seriousness of her NPD.
Furthermore, the petitioning spouse must also allege and prove that the psychological
illness/disorder/condition is the root cause of the respondent spouse's incapacity or inability to fulfill
any, some, or all of the essential obligations of marriage. Noel attempted to establish this link by
alleging that Maribel's NPD has made her view marriage simply as a piece of paper and made her
believe that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation. He claimed that she
entered marriage not because of an emotional desire for it, but to prove something. 22 TaDSHC
Rather than establishing Maribel's incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations, Noel's
contentions seem to indicate that Maribel was utterly unaware of the nature of marriage and its
consequent obligations. There is, however, a significant difference between lack of awareness or
understanding of marriage and its obligations, and lack of capacity to fulfill these marital obligations. A
spouse's lack of awareness or understanding of marriage and its obligation is an irrelevant
consideration for a petition filed under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code refers
to psychological incapacity to fulfill
essential marital obligations, not to
understand or appreciate what these
essential marital obligations are
Article 36 of the Family Code was based on Canon 1095 of the New Canon Law of the
Catholic Church. 23 Canon 1095 states that —
[t]he following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. Those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. Those who suffer from a grave lack of discretionary judgment concerning the
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted;
3. Those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Specifically, it is the third paragraph of Canon 1095 that provided for the model for what is now Article
36 of the Family Code. 24
The third paragraph of Canon 1095 does not refer to a defect in the consent of one of the
contracting parties to the marriage; in fact, it recognizes the existence of a valid consent. Rather, the
third paragraph of Canon 1095 refers to the incapacity to assume essential marital obligations.
Church decisions "held that a person may appear to enjoy full use of his faculties, but because of
some psychiatric defect, he/she may be incapable of assuming the obligations of marriage,although
he/she may have a conceptual understanding of such obligation." 25 Thus, a person's ability to give
a valid consent can be equated to his/her ability to know and understand the essential marital
obligations, but this does not necessarily equate to a similar ability or capacity to actually
fulfill them. The spouse "may very well know what are the substantive imperatives of marriage, and
[he/she] may also very much want to observe these unconditionally, but at the same time [he/she]
simply cannot do so for a given psychical causal factor that gravely lessens or seriously undermines
their self-dominion in terms of dysfunctional volitive faculty." 26 This situation was exemplified by
Adolfo Dacanay, S.J., in the following manner:
The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies
of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not
normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature
of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact
such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of
what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those
responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand
them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the
incapacity to posit consent itself. 27
In the same manner that the Church has limited the third paragraph of Canon 1095 to refer
only to lack of capacity to fulfill essential marital obligations (lack of due capacity), Article 36 of
the Family Code should also be interpreted as limited only to this kind of incapacity. The framers of
Article 36 of the Family Code intended that "jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of
the code's enactment . . . cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid . . . to the
interpretation and construction of the codal provision." 28
Accordingly, the incapacity that Article 36 speaks of is not the incapacity to know and
understand marriage and its concomitant obligations (lack of due discretion), but the incapacity to
fulfill these obligations for some psychological reason (lack of due capacity). A party may be
considered as incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage even though he may have
sufficient use of reason plus due discretion in judgment. The lack of due discretion, on the other
hand,may be indicative of vitiated consent, but this is not the concern of Article 36 of the Family
Code. Noel's assertion of Maribel's failure to appreciate marriage and its obligations was, therefore,
an irrelevant allegation insofar as his Article 36 petition was concerned.
Republic v. CA and Molina did
not set forth guidelines beyond
those contemplated by the framers
of Article 36 of the Family Code
Lately, the Molina case has been receiving flaks because, apparently, the guidelines it has
established created a straitjacket that unduly limited the application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
The case of Ngo-Te v. Te said that "[t]he resiliency with which the concept [of psychological
incapacity] should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition
of a set of strict standards in Molina." 29 Ngo-Te v. Te found it erroneous for courts to apply the rigid
set of rules laid down by Molina, without regard to the law's clear intent to treat each Article 36 case
separately. As a consequence, "the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals." 30 EICScD
I find Ngo-Te's argument contradictory. It advocates a case-to-case approach in resolving
psychological incapacity cases, yet, at the same time, implies that since the Church has already
annulled marriages on account of the enumerated personality disorders, the courts should declare the
marriage's nullity if these were alleged and proved in the case.
 Surprisingly enough, Ngo-Te backtracked on its criticism of Molina a month later by saying in
the case of Ting v. Velez-Ting 31 that Ngo-Te did not abandonMolina. Far from abandoning Molina,
Ting explains the Ngo-Te simply suggested a relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth
in Molina. 32
At any rate, whatever conflict and confusion that might have surfaced because of Ngo-
Te's attack against Molina, the Court reconciled these in Suazo, 33 saying that "[Ngo-Te] . . . merely
[stood] for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity." 34 It noted Ngo-Te for the new evidentiary approach it directed
the courts to adopt — to consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
The guidelines listed in Molina are but expositions of what the Court has determined
in Santos v. Bedia-Santos 35 as characteristics of the psychological incapacity that render a marriage
void under Article 36 of the Family Code; these guidelines merely incorporated the basic
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. 36 Molina did not create new rules, but
simply identified and consolidated the legislative intent behind Article 36 of the Family Code. A
majority of the guidelines listed corresponds to and is consistent with the concept of psychological
incapacity that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee had in mind, the interpretation
of Canon 1095 from which the provision was modeled after, and the existing laws, both procedural
and substantive. The guidelines in Molina were never intended to remove the resiliency and flexibility
envisioned by the framers in the application and interpretation of Article 36 of theFamily Code. The
resiliency and flexibility, however, are not a license to interpret Article 36 of the Family Code as
allowing any and every assertion of psychological incapacity to merit a declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court remains bound to interpret the provision in a manner consistent with the
Constitution and relevant family laws. For now, Article 36 of the Family Code will remain to be a
limited remedy, addressing only a specific situation — a relationship where no marriage could have
been validly concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of grave and incurable
psychological illness existing at the time when the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to
fulfill the essential marital obligations and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.
Outside of this situation, the Court is powerless to provide any permanent remedy. 37
SERENO, J., concurring:

Justice Eduardo Caguioa, member of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted
the Family Code, explained that the definition of psychological incapacity "has been left [by the Family
Code] for the determination by the judges since to define it in the Code would be straight-jacketing
the concept." 1 I disagree with the wisdom of leaving to the judiciary the task of defining psychological
incapacity. The legislature should have provided clear standards that the judiciary can apply even
while the latter takes into account the peculiar circumstances of each case brought before it.
However, I recognize that it has been twenty-two (22) years since theFamily Code took effect and so
much water has passed under the bridge. It is not an ideal situation and is not compatible with the
constitutional design of the division of labor among the three great branches of government. The
situation speaks poorly of the ability of the legislature to provide sufficient legal standards for
application by the judiciary of a law as important as the law on declaration of nullity of marriages.
To clarify the meaning of Article 36, we need to look closely at its origin and the journey it has
gone through in the courts. Article 36 of the Family Code was taken from paragraph 3 of Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law which took effect on 27 November 1983. 2 The Court at one time
explained the essence of "psychological incapacity" under the Family Code by referring to Canon Law
discussions comparing marriage in the context of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties to
a contract between the parties to sell a house, which, unknown to both, had already burned down. In
such a case, "the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire." 3
Refining the concept, we held in Santos v. Court of Appeals 4 that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity — the incapacity must be grave or serious, such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; (b) juridical antecedence
— it must be rooted in the party's history antedating the marriage, although overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability — it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure must be beyond the means of the party involved. 5
After observing that Article 36 was being abused as a convenient divorce law, 6 the Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its interpretation and application in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina. 7 While a majority concurred in the decision, three justices concurred only "in
the result" and another three rendered their individual Separate Opinions. 8 Justice Padilla warned
that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts." Justice Vitug preferred the earlier simpler legal
standard set in Santos v. Court of Appeals.
In Antonio v. Reyes, 9 the Court reinstated the trial court's declaration of nullity of the subject
marriage based on "the totality of the evidence," with the caveat that "Molina is not set in stone, and
that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception." We held that granting
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 is not incompatible with the
Constitution's recognition of the sanctity of the family. Rather, it "should be deemed as an implement
of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as
the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family
life." caIDSH
In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 10 after tracing the origin and development of jurisprudence relating to
Article 36, the Court noted that "(t)he resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had,
somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. . . . Far
from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. . . . The Court need not worry about the possible abuse
of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency. . . .
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child
abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape."
In Ting v. Velez-Ting, 11 the Court clarified that "(f)ar from abandoning Molina, we simply
suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein." Requiring petitioner to allege
in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of the accredited psychologist or psychiatrist proved to be too expensive and
adversely affected poor litigants' access to justice. This was the finding of the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC).
In Azcueta v. Republic of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, we then concluded that
"(w)ith the advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the
interpretation of Article 36, although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from
the Molina doctrine." 12
In this instance, whether we apply the Molina standard or a more relaxed interpretation and
application of Article 36, petitioner was unable to prove his case with preponderant evidence. Since
the presumption in favor of the validity of marriage 13 was not ably rebutted, this presumption
prevails. I therefore concur in the Decision denying the Petition, but I reach this conclusion based
solely on the insufficiency of the evidence presented by petitioner. However, I disagree with the
import this Decision conveys that Molina, in its undiluted form, should be reiterated and emphasized
in this case. Had the case gone forward to a choice between the strict application of Molina and the
more recent decisions cited, I would have submitted that a second hard look at Molina is warranted.

||| (Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No. 173138, [December 1, 2010], 651 PHIL 68-103)
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.]

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.

Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.

Prisciliano I. Casis for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; ASSAILED DECISION ON

ANNULMENT NOT BASED THEREON WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED AFTER TRIAL; CASE
AT BAR. — Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on
such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented. it became
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them. To prevent collusion
between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19). The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth.
2. ID.; ID.; EITHER SPOUSE MAY PETITION COURT FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE. — Neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner
and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that
there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may
be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have
sex with the other becomes immaterial.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL OF ONE OF THE PARTIES
TO FULFILL MARITAL OBLIGATION, EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. — Assuming
it to be so, petitioner would have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with
his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence
of his impotency and he is capable of erection. Since it is petitioner' s claim that the reason is not
psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon
him to prove such a claim. "If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted
refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity." Evidently, one of the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case
at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

DECISION

TORRES, JR., J p:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the
unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision on November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals 1 in its decision are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established:
"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the house defendant's mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse,
with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned
his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the
first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But,
they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were
all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days.
But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there
was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even
see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
"The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this
time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for
 her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according
to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile-with her husband.
"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his
part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is
still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can, still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities,
there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his
wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the plaintiff filed
this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to
return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are
still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh.
"2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether
or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches,
or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his
penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft
erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt.
Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
 the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with
petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion
except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and
should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment
on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it became incumbent
upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19). cda
 The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his
wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling
the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz.:
"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based
on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he
did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and
it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R
No. 112019, January 4, 1995)." 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e.,
physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want
to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner would have discussed with private respondent
or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find
out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's
Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5Since it is
petitioner' s claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity." 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
 "An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the
wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not
physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time
(from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife,
purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited
in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act which is not
psychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After
almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly,
and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code." 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate of court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno,
120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest
act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is
an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which
brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. cda
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is —
a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who
view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain
the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

||| (Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, [January 16, 1997], 334 PHIL 294-305)
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and

RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Juanito A. Orallo for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

CONFINED TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDER. —
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals,this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity ...and that (t)here
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;NOT A MERE OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT IN PERFORMANCE OF
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR INCOMPATIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. — On the other hand, in the present
case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears
to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the
gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr.
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 36. — The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness
must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
PADILLA, J.,Separate Statement:
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
EXISTENCE OF GROUND DEPEND ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE; TRIAL JUDGE MUST TAKE
PAINS IN EXAMINING FACTUAL MILLIEU AND APPELLATE COURT MUST AVOID SUBSTITUTING
ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT. — I concur in the result of the decision penned by
Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J.,Separate Opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; OPPOSING AND CONFLICTING
PERSONALITIES IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. — The majority opinion,
overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner
Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities
and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,
the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons, it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF MENTAL ILLNESS. — I
would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or
defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of consent, thus
rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
VITUG, J.,Concurring Opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
OTHER GROUNDS SHOULD BE READ ALONG WITH IT IN DETERMINING ITS IMPORT. — In
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along
with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that
would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the
law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, 'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. — In fine, the term psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz:First,the incapacity must be psychological or mental not physical, in nature; Second,the
psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand assume and
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering mutual help and support; Third,the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter;and Fourth,the mental disorder
must be grave or serious and incurable.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity."
Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying
said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of
a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O.Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity
and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and
was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them;
that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to
the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
 In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
"1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church
of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife."
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr.
Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed
Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema
to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights . . .." It concluded that:
"As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then
there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings and conclusions thus made."
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity ...and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
"COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions."
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part and of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. lexlib
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae,namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature." 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on
evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State
and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family
as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos,we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.and Torres,
Jr., JJ .,concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,concur in the result.
Padilla, Romero, Vitug, JJ.,see separate opinion.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J ., concurring:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
In Leouel Santos v.Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos,G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995,
240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of
the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an in-
depth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J ., concurring:
 The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial
Court ruling, upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so
much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of consent,
thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological
incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge ..." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex."
 The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they
will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility
that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not
ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was
to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations,"
hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization." liblex
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable
or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e.,it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can
never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with
a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a
number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes
of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil
law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917).This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three
old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be 'capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion
means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and
therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying
out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.The Rota had reasoned for the first time
in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present
in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof
of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
"Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent
to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are
now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent." 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from
assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage ...is not merely cohabitation
or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality community of
the whole of life; i.e.,the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to
accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of
marriage are rooted in a self-giving love;and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on
the strength of this interpersonal relationship.A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is
held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind,lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6)
an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
 Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion
even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving
rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that
does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift
in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),recent cases seem
to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their
responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence).An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's
failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was
entered into." 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well as in Santos v.Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the
Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband
for more than five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on
the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had
coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife
which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to
fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the
action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1) on psychological incapacity, concluded:
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his
or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity."
We declared:
"This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court."
 I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both spouses.

VITUG,J ., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia,
and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term
"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
"Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
"(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law " 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law —
"Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those) —
"1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
"2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
"3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code
must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds
enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio,or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article
55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 3 viz:
"(T)he use of the phrase psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances . . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
 mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.'
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity." 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests;viz.:
First,the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second,the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand,
assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
and rendering mutual help and support;
Third,the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth,the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be an
alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better; if it were otherwise, there
could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less,
has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and
the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
"Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State."
Section 12, Article II:
"Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution ..."
Section 1, Article XV:
"Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development." (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz,121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is
quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be
simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, [February 13, 1997], 335 PHIL 664-
693)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

Jimeno Jalandoni & Cope Law Offices for petitioner.

Macaraig Law Office for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

This petition assailed the Court of Appeals' decision which declared the marriage between the
parties valid, and which thereby reversed the RTC decision nullifying the marriage after finding the
appellant to be psychologically incapacitated because he failed to find work to support his family and his
violent attitude towards petitioner and their children. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision mainly
because respondent was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
In upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held: that personal medical
or psychological examination of respondent is not required for a declaration of psychological incapacity,
but the totality of the evidence petitioner presented does not show such incapacity to be permanent or
incurable and to have existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In this case, respondent left
and failed to support his family because he lost his job for more than six years. His condition is also not
incurable because now he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. At best, the petitioner presented
evidence which referred only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; NULLITY OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS

A GROUND FOR ANNULMENT. — The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now
that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. CIaASH
3. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SEPARATION; GROUNDS THEREFOR; PROPER REMEDY IN CASE AT
BAR. — [L]egal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 55588, which disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between
the parties is hereby declared valid." 2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is
declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal
properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same
Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is
granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent." HEcTAI
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their
appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by
Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command
Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children
were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxiliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After
the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
 "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard
of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy
Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and
then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife,
she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of
her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he
would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. ISHCcT
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chicken. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the
morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when
they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him
to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her
and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she
and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh.
G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went
to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon
seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he
ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp.
85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his
family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, . . . 3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set
forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the decision. SDIaCT
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee.
Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only
to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be
truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make
him or her . . . unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show
that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a
psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence
at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental — not physical to the extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the
marriage and [was] incurable." 4
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
issues: cSCTEH
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not
subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition." 7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is
not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence
she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue:
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have
been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no
choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
 In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9 were laid down by this Court as
follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally
'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists. DTIaCS
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
 complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095." 10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos
v. Court of Appeals: 11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Main Issue:
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case —
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker —
was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 12 At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage
void. aTcIEH
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines in outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, [October 19, 2000], 397 PHIL 840-852)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162368. July 17, 2006.]

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs. BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review oncertiorari of the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision 1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial
court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order 2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there
was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed 3 in toto the judgment of the trial court.
It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the
marriage. 4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance
of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that
the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a
natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of
petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. 7 The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment 8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's
motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. 9 Such factual
issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. 10 It is a well-
established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court, 11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
or when there is a misappreciation of facts, 12 which are unavailing in the instant case. CHcESa
 The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. 13 As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. 14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, 15 which
petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital
annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such
evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that
respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a
manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological
malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their
brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short
period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and
loving husband. . . . . Their problems began when petitioner started doubting
respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women
that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his
so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust
in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent
could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that
respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the
"dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from
such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision . . . lacks
specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's
information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner
herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive.
She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" . . . . She stated
that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral
element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting,
and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady
existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the
marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
 We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with
his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological
defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void
based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. 19 No less
than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage
as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state. 20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 21 37, 22 38, 23 and 41 24 that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 25 that would make the
marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. 26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. 28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY. cESDCa
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

||| (Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368 (Resolution), [July 17, 2006], 527 PHIL 722-733)
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.]

LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio
(petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we
reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born on
19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the
present. 8
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the
boy's parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her
when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and
told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities
with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village
Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. 16 Petitioner later found out that respondent
herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their
quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner
that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and
ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in
August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her
for good in November 1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests
they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of
person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner
was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect. 22 They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It
reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version, thus: ASHaDT
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband. 25
(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such
intent from David's act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at
the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and
she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson
& Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours.
She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof
were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States
while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely
asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husband's whereabouts. 30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00. 31
 In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the
totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute
the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by
his assistant, 33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the
presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes
as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii)
he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the
results of such test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's
propensity to lying about almost anything — her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others — had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent's fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to
her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of
the parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's
ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held
instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38Subsequently, the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It declared that the
requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 40 governing the application and interpretation
of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded
by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead,
the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent. 43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still,
the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also
known as the Molina case 45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molinaguidelines in reversing
the RTC in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 48 wherein
the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under
the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even
as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in
our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of
a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the
full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void, 52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married,
among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of
1917, 53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited
as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse's
incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack
thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio. 57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not
constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family
Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of
consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was
nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990
edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family
Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically
different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable
under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code . . . [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the
marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological
incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of
consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina 66 case.
Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then has
recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this
Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the
facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of
the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework
that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time,
the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception
of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no
cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the
considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a
solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil
law. 74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation
and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that
the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though
the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought
on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
 Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower
courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and
that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection
accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all
legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever
socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has
been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family
life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional
mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2
of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a
petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in
turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not
further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. SECHIA
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition
of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in
1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
 have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family
Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent
vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's
participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to
the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains
whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with
Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his
wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which
disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert
witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner's evidence
as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner. 80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot
be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the
Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or
Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily
negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's
decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities
and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in
particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals, 82testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that
there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There
are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in
the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. . . .
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
 A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack
of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the
basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness
for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page
six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that
there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an
affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That
is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now
and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having
an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband
is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call
that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically
incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma'am. 83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner.
While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos 85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of
respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as
the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by
petitioner's expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
 been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore
not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. 87
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural
child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondent's psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged
marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in
order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the
trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of
her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic
meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect
a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article
45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her
marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the
trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
 Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this
detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite
petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention
of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. DTISaH
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of
the marriage in question in a Conclusion 89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on
the part of respondent. 90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a
Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies
of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that
seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its
deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse
action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a
judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but
also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of
the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent's version as
correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter
would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and
not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as
she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws
the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses characterized
respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its
decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well beforeMolina was promulgated in 1997 and
made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion
by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96then the opinion of canonical
scholars, 97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule
on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity. 101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its
own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of
the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical
finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on
appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or
construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement
that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one
that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical
averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question
was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue
prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review,
where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies
heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert
medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago.
From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled
by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to
contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court.
 There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state,
remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact,
the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment to remain in the
marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in
legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

||| (Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, [March 10, 2006], 519 PHIL 337-371)
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004.]

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-

DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating
in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966. 1 The civil
marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967. 2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18,
1968; 3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969; 4 Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971; 5 and
Ingrid born on October 20, 1976. 6 The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor
debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature
wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a
clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship
with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two
children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along
her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in
Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a
petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149.
Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in
the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. 7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no
capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.
Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and
abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. 8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages
between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28,
1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential
obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is
dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the
said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family
Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. 9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that —
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINACASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal
of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. 10
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8,
2002. 11 Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in
its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her
marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls
short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant
sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 12 it was ruled:
. . . "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
 marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder,indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. 13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex
and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent's sexual
infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have
known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption
thereof. 14 It appears that respondent's promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later
affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. 15 It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of adisordered personality which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity 16or
sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article
55 17 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos 18 that Article 36 is not to be
equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void. AEIcSa
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the
church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the
Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the
grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are
circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem. 19While we sympathize with petitioner's marital predicament, our first and foremost
duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be. 20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., is on official leave.

||| (Dedel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, [January 29, 2004], 466 PHIL 226-235)