G.R. No. 164789 August 27, 2009
00, inclusive of interest at 24% per
CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO and PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Rule 45 petition the legal issue of whether an action to
rescind a contract to sell a subdivision lot that the buyer found to be under
litigation falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
In this petition,1 Christian General Assembly, Inc. (CGA) prays that we set
aside the decision2 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. SP No.
75717 that dismissed its complaint for rescission filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan for lack of jurisdiction, as well as the CA
resolution3 that denied its motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The present controversy traces its roots to the case filed by CGA against the
Spouses Avelino and Priscilla Ignacio (respondents) for rescission of their
Contract to Sell before the RTC, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan. The facts,
drawn from the records and outlined below, are not in dispute.
On April 30, 1998, CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision
lot4 (subject property) with the respondents – the registered owners and
developers of a housing subdivision known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision
located in Barangay Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Under the Contract to Sell, CGA
would pay P2,373,000.00 for the subject property on installment basis; they
were to pay a down payment of P1,186,500, with the balance payable within
three years on equal monthly amortization payments of P46,593.85, inclusive
of interest at 24% per annum, starting June 1998.
On August 5, 2000, the parties mutually agreed to amend the Contract to Sell
to extend the payment period from three to five years, calculated from the date
of purchase and based on the increased total consideration of P2,706,600,
with equal monthly installments of P37,615.
annum, starting September 2000.
According to CGA, it religiously paid the monthly installments until its
administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property
suffered from fatal flaws and defects. CGA learned that the subject property
was actually part of two consolidated lots (Lots 2-F and 2-G Bsd-04-000829
[OLT]) that the respondents had acquired from Nicanor Adriano (Adriano) and
Ceferino Sison (Sison), respectively. Adriano and Sison were former tenant-
beneficiaries of Purificacion S. Imperial (Imperial) whose property in Cutcut,
Pulilan, Bulacan5 had been placed under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27’s
Operation Land Transfer.6 According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention
of five hectares of her land under Republic Act No. 6657,7 which the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted in its October 2, 1997 order
(DAR Order). The DAR Order authorized Imperial to retain the farm lots
previously awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries, including Lot 2-F previously
awarded to Adriano, and Lot 2-G Bsd-04-000829 awarded to Sison. On
appeal, the Office of the President8 and the CA9 upheld the DAR Order.
Through the Court’s Resolution dated January 19, 2005 in G.R. No. 165650,
we affirmed the DAR Order by denying the petition for review of the appellate
decision.
Understandably aggrieved after discovering these circumstances, CGA filed a
complaint against the respondents before the RTC on April 30, 2002.10 CGA
claimed that the respondents fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject
property was part of a property under litigation; thus, the Contract to Sell was a
rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. CGA asked the trial
court to rescind the contract; order the respondents to return the amounts
already paid; and award actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.11 Citing PD No. 95712 and PD
No. 1344, the respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA
opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of
contract, not specific performance, and is not among the actions within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as specified by PD No. 957 and PD No.
1344.
On October 15, 2002, the RTC issued an order denying the respondents’
motion to dismiss. The RTC held that the action for rescission of contract and
damages due to the respondents’ fraudulent misrepresentation that they are
the rightful owners of the subject property, free from all liens and
encumbrances, is outside the HLURB’s jurisdiction. 1avv phi1
The respondents countered by filing a petition for certiorari with the CA. In its
October 20, 2003 decision, the CA found merit in the respondents’ position
and set the RTC order aside; the CA ruled that the HLURB had exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it involved a contract
to sell a subdivision lot based on the provisions of PD No. 957 and PD No.
1344.
Contending that the CA committed reversible error, the CGA now comes
before the Court asking us to overturn the CA decision and resolution.
THE PETITION
In its petition, CGA argues that the CA erred -
(1) in applying Article 1191 of the Civil Code for breach of reciprocal
obligation, while the petitioner’s action is for the rescission of a
rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the same Code, which is
cognizable by the regular court; and
(2) in holding that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioner’s action by applying Antipolo Realty Corp v. National Housing
Corporation13 and other cited cases.
In essence, the main issue we are asked to resolve is which of the two – the
regular court or the HLURB – has exclusive jurisdiction over CGA’s action for
rescission and damages.
According to CGA, the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as set forth in PD
No. 1344 and PD No. 957, is limited to cases involving specific performance
and does not cover actions for rescission.
Taking the opposing view, respondents insist that since CGA’s case involves
the sale of a subdivision lot, it falls under the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find no merit in the petition and consequently affirm the CA decision.
Development of the HLURB’s jurisdiction
The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law governing at the time the
action was commenced. The jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter
or nature of an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’ consent or by
their waiver in favor of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the nature of an action.14 Thus, the determination of
whether the CGA’s cause of action falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB
necessitates a closer examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction
and authority.
PD No. 957, enacted on July 12, 1976, was intended to closely supervise and
regulate the real estate subdivision and condominium businesses in order to
curb the growing number of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators. As one of its "whereas clauses" states:
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value;
Section 3 of PD No. 957 granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the
"exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business."
Thereafter, PD No. 1344 was issued on April 2, 1978 to expand the jurisdiction
of the NHA to include the following:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
 C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Executive Order No. 648 (EO 648), dated February 7, 1981, transferred the
regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC). Section 8 of EO 648 provides:
SECTION 8. Transfer of Functions. -The regulatory functions of the National
Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and
other related laws are hereby transferred to the Commission [Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission]. x x x. Among these regulatory functions
are: 1) Regulation of the real estate trade and business; x x x 11) Hear and
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving
refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen;
and cases of specific performance.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the HSRC was
renamed as the HLURB.
Rationale for HLURB’s extensive quasi-judicial powers
The surge in the real estate business in the country brought with it an
increasing number of cases between subdivision owners/developers and lot
buyers on the issue of the extent of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction. In the
cases that reached us, we have consistently ruled that the HLURB has
exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to
make the subdivision a better place to live in.15
We explained the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction at length in Sps. Osea v.
Ambrosio,16 where we said:
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating
or empowering such agency. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344,
"Empowering The National Housing Authority To Issue Writ Of Execution In
The Enforcement Of Its Decision Under Presidential Decree No. 957," clarifies
and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the
HLURB in the following specific terms:
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority
must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.D. No. 957, "The
Subdivision And Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree." Section 3 of this
statute provides:
x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. - The National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
The need for the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the HLURB is
indicated in the second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs of PD 957
which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar
basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot
buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the
buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value;
 xxxx
WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate
subdivision and condominium businesses be closely supervised and regulated,
and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices and manipulations
committed in connection therewith.
The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding
subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an
appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in
the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with
respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. The business of
developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest
and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should
be brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In
the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This
ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the
regular courts.
As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under
the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times.
There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function by
virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function,
as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power
entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular
expertise.
In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages although this is
an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of justice.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is
justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and
competently to the pressing problems of the modern world. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Another case – Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA – explained the grant of
17
the HLURB’s expansive quasi-judicial powers. We said:
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability
to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially
factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion,
has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that
‘between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the
unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former’.
xxx
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers,
the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such contracts, One thrust of the
multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts
and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely
judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. [Emphasis supplied.]
Subdivision cases under the RTC’s jurisdiction
The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however,
that all cases involving subdivision lots automatically fall under its jurisdiction.
As we said in Roxas v. Court of Appeals: 18
In our view, the mere relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being
subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically
vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as
enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. 1344. On this matter, we have consistently
held that the concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority
(NHA) before and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and
statutory obligations.
xxx
Note particularly pars. (b) and (c) as worded, where the HLURB’s jurisdiction
concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As
to par. (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices," it would appear that the
logical complainant would be the buyers and customers against the sellers
(subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and realtors ),
and not vice versa. [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to Roxas, we held in Pilar Development Corporation v. Villar19 and
Suntay v. Gocolay20 that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed by
subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale behind this can be found in
the wordings of Sec. 1, PD No. 1344, which expressly qualifies that the cases
cognizable by the HLURB are those instituted by subdivision or condomium
buyers or owners against the project developer or owner. This is also in
keeping with the policy of the law, which is to curb unscrupulous practices in
the real estate trade and business.21
Thus, in the cases of Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc.,[22] and Cadimas v.
Carrion,23 we upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction even if the subject matter was a
subdivision lot since it was the subdivision developer who filed the action
against the buyer for violation of the contract to sell.
The only instance that HLURB may take cognizance of a case filed by the
developer is when said case is instituted as a compulsory counterclaim to a
pending case filed against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or
condominium unit. This was what happened in Francel Realty Corporation v.
Sycip,24 where the HLURB took cognizance of the developer’s claim against
the buyer in order to forestall splitting of causes of action.
Obviously, where it is not clear from the allegations in the complaint that the
property involved is a subdivision lot, as in Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 30, Manila,25 the case falls under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts and not the HLURB. Similarly, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of
Appeals,26 we held that the RTC had jurisdiction over a case where the conflict
involved a subdivision lot buyer and a party who owned a number of
subdivision lots but was not himself the subdivision developer.
The Present Case
In the present case, CGA is unquestionably the buyer of a subdivision lot from
the respondents, who sold the property in their capacities as owner and
developer. As CGA stated in its complaint:
2.01. Defendants are the registered owners and developers of a
housing subdivision presently known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision
located at Brgy. Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan;
2.02 On or about April 30, 1998, the plaintiff thru its Administrative
Pastor bought from defendants on installment basis a parcel of land
designated at Lot 1, Block 4 of the said Villa Priscilla Subdivision xxx
xxx
2.04 At the time of the execution of the second Contract to Sell (Annex
"B"), Lot 1, Block 4 of the Villa Priscilla Subdivision was already
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-127776 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Iluminada T. Soneja, married to
Asterio Soneja (defendant Priscilla T. Ignacio’s sister and brother-in-
law) and the defendants as co-owners, but the latter represented
themselves to be the real and absolute owners thereof, as in fact it was
annotated in the title that they were empowered to sell the same. Copy
of TCT No. T-127776 is hereto attached and made part hereof as
Annex "C".
2.05 Plaintiff has been religiously paying the agreed monthly
installments until its Administrative Pastor discovered recently that
while apparently clean on its face, the title covering the subject lot
actually suffers from fatal flaws and defects as it is part of the property
involved in litigation even before the original Contract to Sell (Annex
"A"), which defendants deliberately and fraudulently concealed from
the plaintiff;
2.06 As shown in the technical description of TCT No. T-127776
(Annex "C"), it covers a portion of consolidated Lots 2-F and 2-G Bsd-
04-000829 (OLT), which were respectively acquired by defendants
from Nicanor Adriano and Ceferino Sison, former tenants-beneficiaries
of Purificacion S. Imperial, whose property at Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan
originally covered by TCT No. 240878 containing an area of 119,431
square meters was placed under Operation Land Transfer under P.D.
No. 27;
2.07 Said Purificacion S. Imperial applied for retention of five (5)
hectares of her property at Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan under Rep, Act No.
6657 and the same was granted by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to cover in whole or in part farm lots previously awarded to
 tenants-beneficiaries, including inter alia Nicanor Adriano’s Lot 2-F and
Ceferino Sison’s Lot 2-G Bsd-04-000829 (OLT).
xxx
2.08 Said order of October 2, 1997 was affirmed and declared final and
executory, and the case was considered closed, as in fact there was
already an Implementing Order dated November 10, 1997.
xxx
3.03 As may thus be seen, the defendants deliberately and
fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff that fact that the parcel of land
sold to the latter under the Contract to Sell (Annexes "A" and "B") is
part of the property already under litigation and in fact part of the five-
hectare retention awarded to the original owner, Purificacion S.
Imperial.
xxx
3.05 Plaintiff is by law entitled to the rescission of the Contracts to Sell
(Annexes "A" and "B") by restitution of what has already been paid to
date for the subject property in the total amount of P2,515,899.20, thus
formal demand therefor was made on the defendants thru a letter
dated April 5, 2002, which they received but refused to acknowledge
receipt. Copy of said letter is hereto attached and made part hereof as
Annex "J". 27 [Emphasis supplied.]
xxx
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
We view CGA’s contention – that the CA erred in applying Article 1191 of the
Civil Code as basis for the contract’s rescission – to be a negligible point.
Regardless of whether the rescission of contract is based on Article 1191 or
1381 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that what CGA principally wants is a
refund of all payments it already made to the respondents. This intent, amply
articulated in its complaint, places its action within the ambit of the HLURB’s
exclusive jurisdiction and outside the reach of the regular courts. Accordingly,
CGA has to file its complaint before the HLURB, the body with the proper
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
October 20, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 75717
dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the CGA complaint filed with the RTC, Branch
14 of Malolos, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.

From these allegations, the main thrust of the CGA complaint is clear – to
compel the respondents to refund the payments already made for the subject
property because the respondents were selling a property that they apparently
did not own. In other words, CGA claims that since the respondents cannot
comply with their obligations under the contract, i.e., to deliver the property
free from all liens and encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the contract
and get a refund of the payments already made. This cause of action clearly
falls under the actions contemplated by Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No.
1344, which reads:

SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
G.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION AND/OR MAGDIWANG,
REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
LUCINA S. SENDINO and the OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila, respondents.
Siruelo, Muyco & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Sisenando Villaluz, Jr. for private respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement
with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in
Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque for P307,800.00 as its
purchase price. 1 She paid P1,000.00 as partial reservation fee on January 15,
1989 and completed payment of this fee on January 20, 1989 by paying
P4,000.00. 2
On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full
downpayment on the purchase price. 3However, she was advised by REVI to
change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to
do so.
For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the
appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, 4 REVI,
through its Vice-President for Marketing, informed respondent of the cancellation
of the contract on the 31st of July 1989. 5
On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific
Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
asking that respondent be ordered:
1. To comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot,
Block 4, Lot 17 at the Raymondville Subdivision, Sucat Road,
Paranaque, Metro Manila;
2. To pay complainant actual, nominal and moral damages, the
amount of which will be proved in the hearing;
3. To pay complainant attorney's fee in the sum of P10,000.00;
4. To pay complainant exemplary damages in the sum of
P10,000.00 to set an example and to avoid a repetition of such
illegal and unsound business practices of the respondent. 6
This petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading petitioners
Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which appeared to be the registered
owner of the subject lot as per TCT No. 76023.
On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the complaint
was challenged by REVI in its answer, 7 rendered its judgment in favor of private
respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot
and to pay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as exemplary
damages and P6,000 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. 8 An appeal from this
decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's
decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the
President, herein public respondent.
On January 7, 1993, the public respondent rendered its decision dismissing
the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied
by the public respondent on January 26, 1993. Consequently petitioners come
before this Court, in this petition, which the Court resolves to treat as a petition
for certiorari, raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
DECLARING THAT THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD HAS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS,
NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF EXPRESS GRANT BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 90 OF DECEMBER 17, 1986
WHICH CREATED IT. AND EVEN IF THE HLURB HAS
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS, PUBLIC RESPONDENT
LIKEWISE SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS IS ALLOWED TO SIT IN A
DECISION TO RENDER JUDGMENT AND TO DELEGATE
ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO A SUBORDINATE
OFFICE.
 II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT THE LOT SUBJECT OF
THE CONTRACT SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED IS
PARAPHERNAL DESPITE ADMISSION OF ITS CONJUGAL
NATURE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT ONLY NOTARIAL
NOTICE OF RESCISSION MAY VALIDLY CANCEL A
RESERVATION AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6552.
As the first and third issues raised by the petitioners strike at the core of the
case at bench, this Court deems it appropriate to initially dispose of the issue
of private respondent's capacity to bring her complaint before the HLURB-
OAALA.
It is settled that rules of procedure are as a matter of course construed liberally
in proceedings before administrative bodies. 9 In the instant case, the original
suit for specific performance and damages was filed by the private respondent with
the HLURB-OAALA, an administrative body not hamstrung by the strict procedural
technicalities of the Rules of Court. Under the circumstances, it was certainly
appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to have acted on the substantive questions
relating to the validity of petitioners' unilateral rescission of the contract without
unduly concerning itself with a mere procedural slip, the non-joinder of private
petitioner's husband in the original complaint before the HLURB. Moreover, since
petitioners participated in the administrative proceedings without objecting to or
raising the procedural infirmity, they were certainly estopped from raising it on
appeal before the Office of the President and before this Court.
Proceeding to the principal issues raised by the petitioner, while E.O. 85 dated
12 December 1986 abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is
patently clear from a reading of its provisions that the said executive order did
not abolish the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which
continued to exercise its powers and functions even after the Ministry of
Human Settlements ceased to exist. In spite of the Aquino Government's
stated intention of eradicating what it considered the vestiges of the previous
regime, it was not its intention to create a vacuum by abolishing those juridical
entities, agencies, corporations, etc., attached to or supervised by the MHS,
which performed vital administrative functions. Pertinently, Section 3 of E.O.
85 mandates that:
. . . The final disposition and final organizational alignment or
attachment of the juridical entities, agencies, corporations and
councils attached to, or under the administrative supervision of
the MHS including their respective existing projects,
appropriations and other assets shall be subject to subsequent
enactments by the President.
Pursuant to this provision therefore, the President subsequently issued
Executive Order No. 90, series of 1986, recognizing the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the principal housing
agencies of the government. Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981
transferred all the functions of the National Housing Authority (pursuant to
Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216 and 1344) to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions relating
to land use and housing development in a single entity. 10 Being the
sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the renamed body, the
HLURB, 11 would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the
petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor which
included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing
development and acquisition. Moreover, this Court has had the occasion to
definitively rule on the question as to whether or not the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board could exercise the same quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers possessed by the HSRC under the Ministry of Human Settlements in the
exercise of its regulatory functions when it held, in United Housing Corporation vs.
Hon. Dayrit 12 that:
As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for
specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against
the owner or developer, is vested exclusively in the HSRC,
Section 1 of PD 1344, in no uncertain terms, provides:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
 B. Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. (Emphasis Ours)
This is reinforced by section 8 of EO 648 (otherwise known as
the Charter of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission)
which took effect on February 7, 1981, thus:
Sec. 8. Transfer of Functions. — The Regulatory functions of
the National Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree
Nos. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby
transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.
. . . Among the regulatory functions are . . . (11) Hear and
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices, claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers,
dealers, brokers, or salesmen and cases of specific
performance (Emphasis Ours).
Private respondents reliance, therefore, on sections 1 and 8 of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is untenable. Thus, as
correctly pointed out by petitioner, section 19, paragraph 6 of
said law is material to the issue of where jurisdiction lies, and
We quote:
Sec. 19. . . .
(6) In all other cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, persons or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither can We accede to private respondents'
claim that resort to the courts is justified under
section 41 of PD 957 specifically under the
phrase "legal remedies that may be available to
aggrieved subdivision lot buyers."
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes
and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.
The constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to
the National Housing Authority (now Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board) over cases involving the sale of lots in
commercial subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v.
National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987]) and again
sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty Corporation v.
National Housing Authority (153 SCRA 399 [1987]) where We
restated that the National Housing Authority (now HLURB)
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957
which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
of said agency. 13
Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case
filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering
petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation
Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which
an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act.
In view of the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon.
Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's
powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions
from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981,
thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which
included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate
business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." 14 Obviously, in the
exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply
contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award
damages whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how the HSRC — which
possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific performance for contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers — had
suddenly lots its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through
E.O. 90. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the determination of private
rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely judicial function. 16 The
absence of any provision, express or implied, in E.O. 90, repealing those quasi-
judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority,
furthermore militates against petitioners' position on the question.
Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the OAALA should have
been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc, we find ample
authority — both in the statutes and in jurisprudence-justifying the Board's act
of dividing itself into divisions of three. Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which
defines the powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically
mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business" and
perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of (its)
above mentioned functions." Since nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90
or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory
functions to a division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of
effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial
powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into
various divisions. After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency
to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been
held "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function,
unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been
withheld." 17 The practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby cases
are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore assumes greater significance
when one notes that the HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full time
commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal with all the functions,
administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to
it. 18 As the Office of the President noted in its February 26, 1993 Resolution
denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, "it is impossible and very
impractical to gather the four (4) full time and five (5) part time commissioners
(together) just to decide a case." Considering that its part time commissioners act
merely in an ex-officio capacity, requiring a majority of the Board to sit en banc on
each and every case brought before it would result in an administrative
nightmare. 19
Finally, petitioners' assertion that RA 6552 is inapplicable in the instant case
because the said law does not apply to cases of reservation agreements finds
no merit in the case at bench in view of Section 24 of P.D. 957 which provides:
Sec. 24. Failure to Pay Installments — The rights of the buyer
in the event of his failure to pay the installments due for
reasons other than the failure of the owner or developer to
develop the project shall be governed by Republic Act No.
6552.
As the Solicitor General correctly pointed out, RA 6552 makes no distinction
between "option" and "sale" 20 which, under P.D. 957 also includes "an exchange
or attempt to sell, an option of sale or purchase, a solicitation of a sale or an offer
to sell directly." 21 This all-embracing definition virtually includes all transactions
concerning land and housing acquisition, including reservation agreements. Since
R.A. 6552 mandates cancellation by notarial
act — among other requirements — before any cancellation of a contract may be
effected, petitioners' precipitate cancellation of its contract with private respondent
without observing the conditions imposed by the said law was invalid and
improper.
In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its authority in ordering
petitioners to comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot subject of
the contract between the original parties. It cannot be gainsaid that the quasi-
judicial functions exercised by the body are necessary incidents to the proper
exercise of its powers and functions under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted
delineating the scope of authority of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the
body those functions so necessary in carrying out its power to regulate
housing and land use results in its effective emasculation as an important
regulatory body in an area vital to the national economy.
The acute housing shortage problem has prompted thousands of middle and
lower class buyers of houses and lots and condominium units to enter into all
sorts of agreements with private housing developers involving all manner of
installment schemes under contracts drawn exclusively by these developers.
Many of these virtual contracts of adhesion entrap innocent buyers by
requiring cash deposits under reservation agreements which include,
sometimes in the fine print, default clauses guaranteeing huge monetary
windfalls for the developers in the event that their buyers (oftentimes for the
flimsiest of reasons) default by failing to come up with certain requirements.
While the Court can take judicial notice of this pernicious practice, it can only
hope that future legislation would address the need to protect the innocent
middle or lower class home purchaser. In the case of the individual victim, this
Court can only go to the extent of awarding such damages as may be proper
under the peculiar circumstances of the cases brought before it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his
capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive
Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired
prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the
Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo
Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to
private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of
Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the
consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of
the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his
predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to
develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under
Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages
pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and
stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter Clause 17
reads:
Clause 17. — SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the
beauty of the subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban
development, the SELLER hereby obligates itself to provide the
subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
c) Asphalt paved roads
d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre
h) 24-hour security guard service.
These improvements shall be complete within a period of two
(2) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER
shall permit the BUYER to suspend his monthly installments
without any penalties or interest charges until such time that
such improvements shall have been completed. 1
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private
respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision
had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the
monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he
would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of
the representation in the notice.
In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its
request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the
decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October
1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S.
Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied
with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed
by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal
demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of
P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had
accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed —
i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly
installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo
Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture
of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his
dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA through a letter-
complaint dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was docketed in NHA as Case
No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September
1977. Antipolo Realty, without presenting any evidence, moved for the
consolidation of Case No. 2123 with several other cases filed against it by
other subdivision lot buyers, then pending before the NHA. In an Order issued
on 7 February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled
Case No. 2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the following conditions:
l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a
statement of account for the monthly amortizations from
November 1976 to the present;
m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from
November 1976 to the date of the statement of account; and
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the
arrears shown in the statement of account. 2
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had
been denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the
scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's
complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that
complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent
NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA
to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo Realty
had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its
counsel had failed to attend the hearing. 3 The case was submitted for decision,
and eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the complainant.
On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was
docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was
assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to
Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a
consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the
latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December
1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A
motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979.
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the
Office of the President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through
public respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in hearing the
complaint of private respondent Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter
beyond its competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to
perform.
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise
and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only.
Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative
agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National
Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, 7 basically
because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as
essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and
because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have
remained crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al.
vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice
Teehankee, said:
In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest
jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the
power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in
corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that
Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the
resolution of labor management controversies likely to cause
strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive,
although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held
that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of
 primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and
a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of
the regulatory statute administered" (Pambujan Sur United
Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil, 932, 941
[1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984,
the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in an
administrative body and a court, the unmistakeable trend has
been to refer it to the former, "Increasingly, this Court has been
committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan administrative
agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citing
precedents). The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. De
Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking
authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their
jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as
against the previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction
with the regular courts, "evidently, . . . had second thoughts
about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that
setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action
and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two
tribunals on one and the same claim."
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing
Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed that:
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes
and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.
The very definition of an administrative agency includes its
being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing
variety of powers and functions given to administrative
agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of
administrative agencies in matters calling for technical
knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot
possibly be handled by regular courts.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agency
concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such
contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and
the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our
regular courts.
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial
authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree
No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree
(emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in
the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the
statute which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers
have reneged on their representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems lighting systems and other similar
basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles
 free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to
different innocent purchasers for value — . (emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the
grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-
division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. (emphasis supplied.)
The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the
instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which
reads:
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment
payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium
project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited
in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due
notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment
due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved
plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount
paid including amortization and interests but excluding
delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate.
(emphasis supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain
specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two
years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not
entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence,
petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment
payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed,
under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent,
it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an
installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to
suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations
to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments
could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion
or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a
logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner
was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no
question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally
empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the
law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to
ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due
process. This assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of the
order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the
complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for
petitioner, as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said
copy indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But even if it be assumed,
arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not deprived of
due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its
side and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of
denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow. 16
We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner
insists had accrued during the period from September 1972 to October 1976,
when private respondent had suspended payment of his monthly installments
on his chosen subdivision lot. The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled
that the regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not accrue
during the September 1972 — October 1976 period:
[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of
his monthly installments until the improvements in the
subdivision shall have been completed. Respondent informed
 complainant on November 1976 that the improvements have
been completed. Monthly installments during the period of
suspension of payment did not become due and demandable
Neither did they accrue Such must be the case, otherwise,
there is no sense in suspending payments. If the suspension is
lifted the debtor shall resume payments but never did he incur
any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for
complainant to pay the arrears due during the period of
suspension of payment is null and void. Consequently, the
notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the s that
were not due and demandable is also null and void. 17
on the part of the lot buyer. In the words of the NHA resolution, "never would
[the buyer] incur any arrears."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the
lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under
the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which
extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly
installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been
paid. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of certification and
amplification. The NHA correctly held that no installment payments should be
considered as having accrued during the period of suspension of payments.
Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the installment payments which
would have accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension had no
default on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our mind, the NHA
resolution is most appropriately read as directing that the original period of
payment in the Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a period of time
equal to the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two (2) months)
during which extended time (tacked on to the original contract period) private
respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly installment payments until
the entire original contract price shall have been paid. We think that such is the
intent of the NHA resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, the
debtor shall resume payments" and that such is the most equitable and just
reading that may be given to the NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to
collect the disputed amount in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its
obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to defeat the purpose of the
authorization (under Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957, supra) to lot
buyers to suspend installment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out,
[s]uch must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending
payments." Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount that would
have become due would be an expressively harsh penalty upon the petitioner
and would result in the unjust enrichment of the private respondent at the
expense of the petitioner. It should be recalled that the latter had already
fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their Contracts to
Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer should not be regarded as delinquent and
as such charged penalty interest. The suspension of installment payments was
attributable to the petitioner, not the private respondent. The tacking on of the
period of suspension to the end of the original period precisely prevents default
 G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996]
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON PRESIDING
JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC,
MAKATI; REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION (PITC, for brevity) filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision
dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z.
Angeles. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 58, in civil Case No.92-158 entitled
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, et. al. vs. Philippine
Industrial Trading Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus of REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES
CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity) and FIRESTONE
CERAMICS, INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in the process,
declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITCs
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its
appurtenant regulations. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of Petitioner and Intervenor and against the Respondent, as
follows:
1) Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the
following issuances relative to the applications for importation of
products from the Peoples Republic of China, to wit:
a) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30,
1989 (Annex A, Amended petition);
b) Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);
c) Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-exporter-
importer (Annex C, Id.);
d) Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of
Administrative Order NO. SOCPEC 89-08-01 (Annex D, Id.);
e) Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule
of Fees for the processing of import applications (Annexes E, E-1.,
Ind.);
f) Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled
Undertakings and expired export credits (Annex Z, Supplemental
Petition),
the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional;
and,
2) Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending
applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the
petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without the
requirements prescribed in a the above-mentioned issuance.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, under which,
[1]
applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples
Republic of China (PROC. for brevity) must be accompanied
by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine
Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or
through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount
equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being
applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative
order read:
3. COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC
In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import
application for goods and commodities originating from PROC, it
is declared that:
3.1 All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied
by a viable and confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM of Philippine
products to PROC in an amount equivalent to the value of the
importation from PROC being applied for. Such export program
must be carried out and completed within six (6) months from date
of approval of the Import Application by PITC. PITC shall
reject/deny any application for importation from PROC without the
accompanying export program mentioned above.
3.2 The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the
following:
a. By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilities and
facilities to carry out the export of Philippine products to PROC in
his own name; or
b. Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and a legitimate
exporter (of Philippine products) who is willing to carry out the
export commitments of the IMPORTER under these rules. The tie-
up shall not make the IMPORTER the exporter of the goods but
shall merely ensure that the importation sought to be approved is
matched one-to-one (1:1) in value with a corresponding export of
Philippine Products to PROC. [2]
3.3 EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be
submitted by the importer together with his Import Application are
as follows:
a) Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.
b) Export Performance Guarantee (See Article 4 hereof).
c) IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-exporter
IMPORTER (PITC Form No. M-1006). This form should be used
if IMPORTER has a tie-up with an exporter for the export of
Philippine Products to PROC.
4. EXPORT GUARANTEE
To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are
carried out in accordance with these rules, all IMPORTERS
concerned are required to submit an EXPORT PERFORMANCE
GUARANTEE (the Guarantee) at the time of filing of the Import
Application. The amount of the guarantee shall be as follows:
For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied
for.
For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.
4.1 The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing
cash deposit; (ii) Bank hold-out in favor of PITC (PITC Form No.
M-1007) or (iii) a Domestic Letter of Credit (with all bank opening
charges for account of Importer) opened in favor of PITC as
beneficiary.
4.2 The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will be
automatically forfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if the
required export program is not completed by the importer within
six (6) months from date of approval of the Import Application.
4.3 Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER
is entitled to a (i) refund of the cash deposited without interest; (ii)
cancellation of the Bank holdout or (iii) Cancellation of the
Domestic Letter of Credit upon showing that he has completed the
export commitment pertaining to his importation and provided
further that the following documents are submitted to PITC:
a) Final Sales Invoice
b) Bill of lading or Airway bill
c) Bank Certificate of Inward remittance
d) PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005
5. MISCELLANEOUS
5.1 All other requirements for importations of goods and
commodities from PROC must be complied with in addition to the
above.
5.2 PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all import
application not in accordance with the rules and regulations herein
prescribed.
5.3 Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized
representatives make any false statements or fraudulent
misrepresentations in the Import/Export Application, or falsify,
forge or simulate any document required under these rules and
regulations, PITC is authorized to reject all pending and future
import/export applications of said IMPORTER and/or disqualify
said IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing
any business with SOCPEC through PITC.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private
respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic
corporations, organized and existing under Philippines laws,
individually applied for authority to import from PROC with
the petitioner, They were granted such authority after
satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they
executed respective undertakings to balance their
importations from PROC with corresponding export of
Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Remington was allowed to import
tools, machineries and other similar goods. Firestones, on
the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite, which it used for
the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings
to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their
importations, further import applications were withheld by
petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter
both barred from importing goods from PROC. [3]
Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus, with prayer for issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch
58. The court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
[4]
on January 21, 1992, ordering PITC to cease from exercising
any power to process applications of goods from
PROC. Hearings on the application for writ of preliminary
[5]
injunction ensued.
Private respondents Firestones was allowed to intervene
in the petition on July 2, 1992, thus joining Remington in the
[6]
latters charges against PITC. It specifically asserts that the
questioned Administrative Order is an undue restrictions of
trade, and hence, unconstitutional.
Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon
the hearing on the Preliminary Injunction was sufficient to
completely adjudicate the case, thus, the parties deemed it
proper that the entire case be submitted for decision upon
the evidence so far presented.
The court rendered its Decision on January 4, 1992. The
[7]
court ruled that PITCs authority to process and approve
applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has
already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February
27, 1987 by President Aquino.
The court observed:
Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be
PITCs regulatory authority under the Special provisions embodied
in LOI 444 from the enumeration of powers that it could exercise
effective February 27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No.
133, it may now be successfully argued that the PITC can no longer
exercise such specific regulatory power in question conformably
with the legal precept expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade
protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991, has empowered the PITC,
expressly or impliedly to formulate or promulgate the assailed
Administrative Order. This fact, makes the continued
exercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question
unworthy of judicial approval. Otherwise, it would be
sanctioning an undue exercise of legislative power vested
solely in the Congress of the Philippines by Section 1, Article
VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative
Order and other similar issuances by PITC suffer from
serious constitutional infirmity, having been promulgated in
pursuance of an international agreement (the Memorandum
of Agreement between the Philippine and PROC), which has
not been concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of
the Philippine Senate as required by Article VII, Section 21,
of the 1987 Constitution, and therefore, null and void.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued
in restraint of trade, in violation of Sections 1 and 19, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained
increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and, an expanding productivity
as the key to raising the equality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when
the public interest so requires. No combination is restraint of trade
or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Lastly, the court declared the Administrative Order to be
null and void, since the same was not published, contrary to
Article 2 of the New Civil Code which provides, that:
Article 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless the
law otherwise provides. xxx
Petitioner now comes to us on a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, questioning the courts decision particularly on
[8]
the propriety of the lower courts declarations on the validity of
Administrative Order No. 89-08-01. The Court directed the
respondents to file their respective Comments.
Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to
some extent, the submissions of the parties to the present
petition.
Following President Fidel V. Ramos trip to Beijing,
Peoples Republic of China (PROC), from April 25 to 30,
1993, a new trade agreement was entered into between
the Philippines and PROC, encouraging liberalization of
trade between the two countries. In line therewith, on April
20, 1993, the President, through Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of Trade
and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended by
PITC Board Resolution Nos. 92-01-05 and 92-03-08. [9]
In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose
Luis U. Yulo, Jr. issued a corporate
Memorandum instructing that all import applications for the
[10]
PROC filed with the PITC as of April 20, 1993 shall no longer
be covered by the trade balancing program outlined in the
Administrative Order.
Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to
import anew from the PROC, without being required to
comply anymore with the lifted requirement of balancing its
imports with exports of Philippine products to PROC. In [11]
its Constancia filed with the Court on November 22, 1993,
[12]
Remington expressed its desire to have the present action
declared moot and academic considering the new
supervening developments. For its part, respondent
Firestone made a Manifestation in lieu of its Memorandum,
[13]
informing the court of the aforesaid developments of the new
trade program of the Philippines with China, and prayed for
the courts early resolution of the action.
To support its submission that the present action is now
moot and academic, respondent Remington cites Executive
Order No. 244, issued by President Ramos on May 12,
[14]
1995. The Executive Order states:
WHEREAS, continued coverage of the Peoples Republic of China
by letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the
countrys national interest, as coursing Republic of the Philippines-
Peoples Republic of China Trade through the Philippine
International Trading Corporation as provided for under Letter of
Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade;
NOW, THEREFORE, I FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law, do hereby order:
The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with
Socialist Countries to delete the Peoples Republic of China from
the list of countries covered by Letter of Instructions No. 444.
Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Five.
PITC filed its own Manifestation on December 15, 1993,
[15]
wherein it adopted the arguments raised in its Petition as its
Memorandum. PITC disagrees with Remington on the latters
submission that the case has become moot and academic as
a result of the abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC
No. 89-08-01, since respondent Remington had incurred
obligations to the petitioner consisting of charges for the
0.5% Counter Export Development Service provided by PITC
to Remington, which obligations remain outstanding. The [16]
propriety of such charges must still be resolved, petitioner
argues, thereby maintaining the issue of the validity of
SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it was abrogated by
Executive fiat.
There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trade
balancing measures with PROC were lifted by the President,
Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01 no longer has
force and effect, and respondents are thus entitled anew to
apply for authority to import from the PROC, without the trade
balancing requirements previously imposed on proposed
importers. Indeed, it appears that since the lifting of the trade
balancing measures, Remington had been allowed to import
anew from PROC.
There remains, however, the matter of outstanding
obligations of the respondents for the charges relating to the
0.5% Counter Export Development Service in favor of PITC,
for the period when the questioned Administrative Order
remained in effect. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the
respondents freed from it?
To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the
constitutionality of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01, based on the arguments set up by the parties in their
Petition and Comment. In so doing, we must inquire into the
nature of the functions of the PITC, in the light of present
realities.
The PITC is a government owned or controlled
corporation created under P.D. No. 252 dated August 6,
[17]
1973. P.D. No. 1071, issued on May 9, 1977 which revised
[18]
the provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and powers of said
governmental entity were enumerated under Section 5 and 6
thereof.[19]
On August 9, 1976, the late President Marcos issued
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 444, directing, inter alia, that
[20]
trade (export or import of all commodities), whether direct or
indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and
other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC),
including the Peoples Republic of China (PROC) shall be
undertaken or coursed through the PITC. Under the LOI,
PITC was mandated to: 1) participate in all official trade and
economic discussions between the Philippines and
SOCPEC; 2) adopt such measures and issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge
of its functions under its instructions; and 3) Undertake the
processing and approval of all applications for export to or
import from the SOCPEC.
Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein
reproduced:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444
xxx
II. CHANNELS OF TRADE
1. The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any
of the Socialist and other centrally-planned economy countries
shall upon issuance hereof, be undertaken by or coursed
through the Philippine International Trading Corporation. This
shall apply to the export and import of all commodities of
products including those specified for export or import by
expressly authorized government agencies.
xxx
4. The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall
participate in all official trade and economic discussions
between the Philippines and other centrally-planned economy
countries.
xxx
V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt
such measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective discharge of its functions under
these instructions. In this connection, the processing and
approval of applications for export to or import from the
Socialist and other centrally-planned economy countries shall,
henceforth, be performed by the said Corporation. (Emphasis
ours)
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on
February 27, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Executive Order (EO) No. 133 reorganizing
[21]
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering the
said department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive,
facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for the
countrys trade, industry and investment activities (Sec. 2, EO
133). The PITC was made one of DTIs line agencies. [22]
The Executive Order reads in part:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133
XXX
Section 16. Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.
The following line corporate agencies and government entities
defined in Section 9 (c) of this Executive Order that will perform
their specific regulatory functions, particularly developmental
responsibilities and specialized business activities in a manner
consonant with the Department mandate, objectives, policies, plans
and programs:
xxx
d) Philippine International Trading Corporation. This corporation,
which shall be supervised by the Undersecretary for International
Trade, shall only engage in both export and trading on new or non-
traditional products and markets not normally pursued by the
private business sector; provide a wide range of export oriented
auxiliary services to the private sector; arrange for a establish
comprehensive system and physical facilities for handling the
collection, processing, and distribution of cargoes and other
commodities; monitor or coordinate risk insurance services for the
existing institutions; promote and organize, whenever warranted,
production enterprises and industrial establishments and collaborate
or associate in joint venture with any person, association, company
or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in the fields of production,
marketing, procurement, and other relate businesses; and provide
technical advisory, investigatory, consultancy and management
services with respect to any and all of the functions, activities, and
operations of the corporation.
Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of
President Aquino to the PROC, the Philippines and PROC
entered into a memorandum of Understanding (MOU) [23]
wherein the two countries agreed to make joint efforts within
the next five years to expand bilateral trade to US $600 US
$800 Million by 1992, and to strive for a steady progress
towards achieving a balance between the value of their
imports and exports during the period, agreeing for the
purpose that upon the signing of the Memorandum, both
sides shall undertake to establish the necessary steps and
procedures to be adopted within the framework of the annual
midyear review meeting under the Trade Protocol, in order to
monitor and ensure the implementation of the MOU.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC
entered into a Trade Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and
1991, under which was specified the commodities to be
[24]
traded between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement
to jointly endeavor to achieve more or less a balance
between the values of their imports and exports in their
bilateral trade.
It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in
keeping with the MOU and Trade Protocols with PROC that
PITC issued its now assailed Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01 on August 30, 1989(amended in
[25]
March, 1992).
Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is
empowered to modify and amend the provisions of LOI 444,
which was issued by then President Marcos, both issuances
being executive directives. As observed by us in Philippine
Association of Service Exporters , Inc. vs. Torres, [26]
there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President
to revoke the Letter of Instruction by way of an Executive
Order. This is notwithstanding the fact that the subject LOI 1190
was issued by President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily
empowered to exercise legislative powers, whereas EO 450 was
issued by Pres. Aquino when her transitional legislative powers
have already ceased, since it was found that LOI 1190 was a mere
administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered, or
modified by EO 450.
We do not agree, however, with the trial courts ruling that
PITCs authority to issue rules and regulations pursuant to the
Special Provisions of LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, have
already been repealed by EO 133.
While PITCs power to engage in commercial import and
export activities is expressly recognized and allowed under
Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is now limited only to
new or non-traditional products and markets not normally
pursued by the private business sector. There is no
indication in the law of the removal of the powers of the PITC
to exercise its regulatory functions in the area of importations
from SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the
grant of regulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent as to
the abolition or limitation of such powers, previously granted
under P.D. 1071, from the PITC.
Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating
that all laws, ordinances, rules , and regulations, or other
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the Executive Order
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, cannot operate
to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There
can be no repeal of the said powers, absent any cogency of
irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy between the
issuances, relating to the regulatory power of the PITC.
The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended
to overhaul the functions of the PITC. The DTI was
established, and was given powers and duties including
those previously held by the PITC as an independent
government entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC
was thereby attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of
the said department.
EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative,
promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of government for
the countrys trade, industry and investment activities, which
shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sector activity in
order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. In [27]
furtherance of this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among
others, to plan, implement, and coordinate activities of the
government related to trade industry and investments; to
formulate and administer policies and guidelines for the
investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment
incentives; to formulate country and product export strategies
which will guide the export promotion and development thrust
of the government. Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and
[28]
Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the departments
objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral
part to the said department as one of its line agencies, and
[29]
was given the focal task of implementing the departments
programs. The absence of the regulatory power formerly
[30]
enshrined in the Special Provisions of LOI 444, from Section
16 of EO 133, and the limitation of its previously wide range
of functions, is noted. This does not mean, however, that
PITC has lost the authority to issue the questioned
Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such
authority, and may legally exercise it, as an implementing
arm, and under the supervision of, the Department of Trade
and Industry.
Furthermore, the lower courts ruling to the effect that the
PITCs authority to process and approve applications for
imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations
pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. 1071 has been repealed by EO
133, is misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the
issuance of the later presidential edict.
The President could not have intended to deprive herself
of the power to regulate the flow of trade between
the Philippines and PROC under the two countries
Memorandum of Understanding, a power which necessarily
flows from her office as Chief Executive. In issuing Executive
Order 133, the President intended merely to reorganize the
Department of Trade and Industry to cope with the need of
streamlined bureaucracy. [31]
Thus, there is no real inconsistency between LOI 444 and
EO 133. There is, admittedly, a rearranging of the
administrative functions among the administrative bodies
affected by the edict, but not an abolition of executive
power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is
of prime importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the
contrary, all laws are presumed to be consistent with each
other. Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in
the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile
them, and to adopt a constructions of a statutory provision
which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory
provisions. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the
[32]
same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of
itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since
the law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one.
administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts
and the determination of private rights thereunder is no
longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our
regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National
Housing Authority, G.R. No. L- 50444, August 31, 1987, 153
SCRA 399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate
nay even with new discoveries in technology and electronics
notwithstanding, the time has come to grapple with
legislations and even judicial decisions aimed at resolving
issues affecting not only individual rights but also activities of
which foreign governments or entities may have
interests. Thus, administrative policies and regulations must
be devised to suit these changing business needs in a faster
rate than to resort to traditional acts of the legislature.
This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the
[33]

Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a
result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has
become necessary to create more and more administrative
bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified
activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them,
they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise
and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the
courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture
of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now
not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government. Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the
[34]
agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private parties under
such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of
subject, viz.:
Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create
detailed rules, however, it was soon clear that new governmental
arrangements would be needed to handle the job of rule-
making. The courts, moreover, many of them already congested,
would have been swamped if they had to adjudicate all the
controversies that the new legislation was bound to create; and the
judges, already obliged to handle a great diversity of cases, would
have been hard pressed to acquire the knowledge they needed to
deal intelligently with all the new types of controversy.
So the need to create a large number of specialized administrative
agencies and to give them broader powers than administrators had
traditionally exercised. These included the power to issue
regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and
decide cases powers that had previously been reserved to the
legislatures and the courts. (Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by
Administrative Agencies, p. 166.)
The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not
empowered to issue the Administrative Order because no
grant of such power was made under the Trade Protocols of
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the
UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does
not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the
Administrative Order.
This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera stated, thus:
[36]

1989, 1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The Trade Protocols

aforesaid, are only the enumeration of the products and
goods which the signatory countries have agreed to
trade. They do not bestow any regulatory power, for
executive power is vested in the Executive Department, and
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
[35]

it is for the latter to delegate the exercise of such power
among its designated agencies.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue
Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power
ancillary to legislation.
This does not imply however, that the subject
Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-
legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued
on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their
applications for importations, was not published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published,
is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which
reads:
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is
otherwise provided. xxx
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and Regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation,
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws.
 The Administrative Order under consideration is one of rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject to the
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, following MODIFICATIONS:
since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law 1) Enjoining the petitioner:
pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to
LOI 444 and EO 133. a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued Development Service fee of 0.5% of the total value of the
by the petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the private respondents;
same were never legally effective, and private respondents,
therefore, cannot be made subject to them, because b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative
Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant rules; and
never published, as mandated by law, for its effectivity. It was 2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending
only on March 30, 1992 when the amendments to the said applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the
Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center, and petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without complying
published in the National Administrative Register as required with the requirements prescribed in the above-stated
issuances.
by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to SO ORDERED
develop and strengthen trade relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. As declared by the President in EO 244
issued on May 12, 1995, continued coverage of the Peoples
Republic of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no
longer consistent with the countrys national interest, as
coursing RP-PROC trade through the PITC as provided for
under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an
unnecessary barrier to trade. [37]

Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the

restrained atmosphere of trading between
the Philippines and PROC should be done away with, so as
to allow economic growth and renewed trade relations with
our neighbors to flourish and may be encouraged.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court
is hereby AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is hereby
G.R. No. 1051 May 19, 1903
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
FRED L. DORR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
F. G. Waite for appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the
offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Commission, which is as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write,
publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or
which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his
office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities,
or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila
Freedom" of April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts."
The Attorney-General in his brief indicates the following passages of the article
as those upon which he relies to sustain the conviction:
Sidney Adamson, in a late letter in "Leslie's Weekly," has the following
to say of the action of the Civil Commission in appointing rascally
natives to important Government positions:
"It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil
Commission, through its ex-insurgent office holders, and by its
continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during
the military rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices,
constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in
jail or deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the
appointment of one Tecson as justice of the peace.] This is the
kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the
Islands, reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down
the men who have during the struggle, at the risk of their lives,
aided the Americans."
xxx xxx xxx
There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are
in a good many instances rascals.
xxx xxx xxx
The commission has exalted to the highest positions in the Islands
Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and
men of no personal character.
xxx xxx xxx
Editor Valdez, of "Miau," made serious charges against two of the native
Commissioners — charges against Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, which, if true,
would brand the man as a coward and a rascal, and with what result? . . .
[Reference is then made to the prosecution and conviction of Valdez for libel
"under a law which specifies that the greater the truth the greater the libel."] Is
it the desire of the people of the United States that the natives against whom
these charges have been made (which, if true, absolutely vilify their personal
characters) be permitted to retain their seats on the Civil Commission, the
executive body of the Philippine Government, without an investigation?
xxx xxx xxx
It is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized
by the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt. The fiscal system,
upon which life, liberty, and justice depends, is admitted by the
Attorney-General himself to be most unsatisfactory. It is a fact that the
Philippine judiciary is far from being what it should. Neither fiscals nor
 judges can be persuaded to convict insurgents when they wish to
protect them.
xxx xxx xxx
Now we hear all sorts of reports as to rottenness existing in the
province [of Tayabas], and especially the northern end of it; it is said
that it is impossible to secure the conviction of lawbreakers and
outlaws by the native justices, or a prosecution by the native fiscals.
xxx xxx xxx
The long and short of it is that Americans will not stand for an arbitrary
government, especially when evidences of carpetbagging and rumors
of graft are too thick to be pleasant.
We do not understand that it is claimed that the defendants succeeded in
establishing at the trial the truth of any of the foregoing statements. The only
question which we have considered is whether their publication constitutes an
offense under section 8 of Act No. 292, above cited.
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined
in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the
writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of
the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the
writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and
order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to
be punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature and
directed against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to some one
of the results enumerated in the section. The article in question is described in
the complaint as "a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tends to
obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tends to
instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which
suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the safety and order
of the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands." But it is "a well-settled rule in considering indictments that
where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the
offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or
more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any
one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense"
(Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., Mass., 206, 215), and the defendants may,
therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive charges into which the
complaint may be separated has been made out.
We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article in question
has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office," or to "instigate" any person or class of persons "to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people against the lawful authorities or
to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government." All these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of
Act No. 292, each one of which is made an element of a certain form of libel,
may be characterized in general terms as seditious tendencies. This is
recognized in the description of the offenses punished by this section, which is
found in the title of the act, where they are defined as the crimes of the
"seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."
Excluding from consideration the offense of publishing "scurrilous libels against
the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands," which may conceivably stand on a somewhat different
footing, the offenses punished by this section all consist in inciting, orally or in
writing, to acts of disloyalty or disobedience to the lawfully constituted
authorities in these Islands. And while the article in question, which is, in the
main, a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil Commission in appointing
natives to office, may have had the effect of exciting among certain classes
dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures, we are unable to
discover anything in it which can be regarded as having a tendency to produce
anything like what may be called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of
feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws. There can be no conviction, therefore, for any of the
offenses described in the section on which the complaint is based, unless it is
for the offense of publishing a scurrilous libel against the Government of the of
the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Can the article be regarded as embraced within the description of "scurrilous
libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government
of the Philippine Islands?" In the determination of this question we have
encountered great difficulty, by reason of the almost entire lack of American
precedents which might serve as a guide in the construction of the law. There
are, indeed, numerous English decisions, most of them of the eighteenth
century, on the subject of libelous attacks upon the "Government, the
constitution, or the law generally," attacks upon the Houses of Parliament, the
Cabinet, the Established Church, and other governmental organisms, but
these decisions are not now accessible to us, and, if they were, they were
made under such different conditions from those which prevail at the present
day, and are founded upon theories of government so foreign to those which
have inspired the legislation of which the enactment in question forms a part,
that they would probably afford but little light in the present inquiry. In England,
in the latter part of the eighteenth century, any "written censure upon public
men for their conduct as such," as well as any written censure "upon the laws
or upon the institutions of the country," would probably have been regarded as
a libel upon the Government. (2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of
England, 348.) This has ceased to be the law in England, and it is doubtful
whether it was ever the common law of any American State. "It is true that
there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication tending to "possess the
people with an ill opinion of the Government" is a seditious libel ( per Holt, C.
J., in R. vs. Tuchin, 1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellenborough, C. J., in
R. vs. Cobbett, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that
doctrine now. Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or
otherwise to disturb the peace and tranquility of the Kingdom, the utmost
latitude is allowed in the discussion of all public affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws
of England, 450.) Judge Cooley says (Const. Lim., 528): "The English common
law rule which made libels on the constitution or the government indictable, as
it was administered by the courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and
circumstances of the people of America, and therefore never to have been
adopted in the several States."
We find no decisions construing the Tennessee statute (Code, sec. 6663),
which is apparently the only existing American statute of a similar character to
that in question, and from which much of the phraseology of then latter
appears to have been taken, though with some essential modifications.
The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No.
292 by the expression "the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands."
Does it mean in a general and abstract sense the existing laws and institutions
of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals by whom the
government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered? Either sense
would doubtless be admissible.
We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the term government, that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are unnecessary to enable men to
live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By
"dministration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more
or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the
reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of
departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the
terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in their
strictness, and that "government" is often used for "administration."
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition
Act," it is made an offense to "write, print, utter, or published," or to "knowingly
and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false,
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the
United States, or either House of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or
either House of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or
either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or either or
any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States," etc. The term
"government" would appear to be used here in the abstract sense of the
existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the
Government — the Houses of Congress and the Executive — which are also
specially mentioned.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in which the term
is used in the enactment under consideration.
It may be said that there can be no such thing as a scurrilous libel, or any sort
of a libel, upon an abstraction like the Government in the sense of the laws
and institutions of a country, but we think an answer to this suggestion is that
the expression "scurrilous libel" is not used in section 8 of Act No. 292 in the
sense in which it is used in the general libel law (Act No. 277) — that is, in the
sense of written defamation of individuals — but in the wider sense, in which it
is applied in the common law to blasphemous, obscene, or seditious
publications in which there may be no element of defamation whatever. "The
word 'libel' as popularly used, seems to mean only defamatory words; but
words written, if obscene, blasphemous, or seditious, are technically called
libels, and the publication of them is, by the law of England, an indictable
offense." (Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B. D., 607, 627, per Bramwell L. J.
See Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., 206, 211.)
While libels upon forms of government, unconnected with defamation of
individuals, must in the nature of things be of uncommon occurrence, the
offense is by no means an imaginary one. An instance of a prosecution for an
offense essentially of this nature is Republica vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates (Pa.), 267,
where the defendant was indicted "as a factious and seditious person of a
wicked mind and unquiet and turbulent disposition and conversation,
seditiously, maliciously, and willfully intending, as much as in him lay, to bring
into contempt and hatred the independence of the United States, the
constitution of this Commonwealth and of the United States, to excite popular
discontent and dissatisfaction against the scheme of polity instituted, and upon
trial in the said United States and in the said Commonwealth, to molest,
disturb, and destroy the peace and tranquility of the said United States and of
the said Commonwealth, to condemn the principles of the Revolution, and
revile, depreciate, and scandalize the characters of the Revolutionary patriots
and statesmen, to endanger, subvert, and totally destroy the republican
constitutions and free governments of the said United States and this
Commonwealth, to involve the said United States and this Commonwealth in
civil war, desolation, and anarchy, and to procure by art and force a radical
change and alteration in the principles and forms of the said constitutions and
governments, without the free will, wish, and concurrence of the people of the
said United States and this Commonwealth, respectively," the charge being
that "to fulfill, perfect, and bring to effect his wicked, seditious, and detestable
intentions aforesaid he . . . falsely, maliciously, factiously, and seditiously did
make, compose, write, and publish the following libel, to wit; 'A democracy is
scarcely tolerable at any period of national history. Its omens are always
sinister and its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights or experience
blazing before our eyes, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form
of government. It was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in Sparta, and
worse in Rome. It has been tried in France and terminated in despotism. it was
tried in England and rejected with the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on
its trial here and its issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise
man but discerns its imperfections; no good man but shudders at its miseries;
no honest man but proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword
against its force. The institution of a scheme of polity so radically contemptible
and vicious is a memorable example of what the villainy of some men can
devise, the folly of others receive, and both establish, in despite of reason,
reflection, and sensation.'"
An attack upon the lawfully established system of civil government in the
Philippine Islands, like that which Dennie was accused of making upon the
republican form of government lawfully established in the United States and in
the State of Pennsylvania would, we think, if couched in scandalous language,
constitute the precise offense described in section 8 of Act No. 292 as a
scurrilous libel against the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
Defamation of individuals, whether holding official positions or not, and
whether directed to their public conduct or to their private life, may always be
adequately punished under the general libel law. Defamation of the Civil
Commission as an aggregation, it being "a body of persons definite and small
enough for its individual members to be recognized as such" (Stephen, Digest
of the Criminal Law, art. 277), as well as defamation of any of the individual
members of the Commission or of the Civil Governor, either in his public
capacity or as a private individual, may be so punished. The general libel law
enacted by the Commission was in force when Act No. 292, was passed.
There was no occasion for any further legislation on the subject of libels
against the individuals by whom the Insular Government is administered —
against the Insular Government in the sense of the aggregate of such
individuals. There was occasion for stringent legislation against seditious
words or libels, and that is the main if not the sole purpose of the section under
consideration. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Commission, in
enacting this section, may have conceived of attacks of a malignant or
scurrilous nature upon the existing political system of the United States, or the
political system established in these Islands by the authority of the United
States, as necessarily of a seditious tendency, but it is not so reasonable to
suppose that they conceived of attacks upon the personnel of the government
as necessarily tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems probable
that they would, like the framers of the Sedition Act of 1798, have expressly
and specifically mentioned the various public officials and collegiate
governmental bodies defamation of which they meant to punish as sedition.
The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the
United States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects
both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it
contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority of the
United States is enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a Civil
Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men
who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is
seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their
public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The
publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent,
constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-12859 November 18, 1959
CEBU UNITED ENTERPRISES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE GALLOFIN, Collector of Customs, Cebu Port, defendant-appellant.
Manuel A. Zoza for appellee.
First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitors Frine C.
Zaballero and Pedro Ocampo for appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This suit for mandatory injunction was instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu United Enterprise to compel Jose Gallofin, as collector of Customs,
Cebu Port, to release and deliver to the plaintiff two imported shipments of
7,834 bales of over issue newspapers purchased by the latter from the United
States. As ancillary relief during the pendency of the action, the plaintiff prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was
granted by the court after the plaintiff posted a bond in the amount of
P60,000.00 in favor of the defendant. Thereafter, the goods were released to
the plaintiff, it appearing further that the advance sales tax due on the same
had been duly paid upon arrival of the merchandise at port.
The importation of the aforesaid shipments was made under and by virtue of
an Import Control Commission License No. 1225, issued by the defunct Import
Control Commission. Under the terms of the license, the plaintiff could import,
on a no-dollar remittance basis, over issue newspapers up to the amount or
value of $118,000.00.
The refusal of the defendant to deliver the imported items is premised on his
contention that while the five bills of lading covering the two shipments of the
over issue newspapers were all dated at Los Angeles, U.S.A. December 17,
1953, or one day before the expiration of the import license in question, the
vessels M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN, carrying on board the said
merchandise, actually left the ports of embarkation, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco, on January 12 and January 16, 1954 respectively. Hence,
according to the defendant, the importation must be considered as having
been made without a valid import license, because under the regulations
issued by the Central Bank and the Monetary Board, "all shipments that left the
port of origin after June 30, 1953, and are covered by ICC licenses, may be
released by the Bureau of Customs without the need of a Central Bank release
certificate; provided they left the port of origin within the period of validity of the
licenses". No Central Bank certificate for the release of the goods having been
shown or presented to the defendant, the latter refused to make the delivery.
The lower court was thus conformed with the issue of determining whether the
valid period of the license in question should be counted up to the time when
the vessels carrying the imported items left the ports of origin on January 12
and January 16, 1954, or when the corresponding bills of lading were dated, or
December 17, 1953. The court chose the latter date, and held:
In view therefore, this Court pronounces judgment making writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued against defendant permanent,
with orders for the cancellation of plaintiff's bond, this after whatever
advance sales tax or any taxes, surcharges and so forth might be due
on the goods shall have been paid, without costs.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The question raised,
however, being purely one of law, the appeal was certified to us pursuant to a
resolution of said court dated July 19, 1957. The appeal has no merit.
The authority of the appellee to import was contained in the Import Control
Commission License No. 17225, validated on June 18, 1953, and under
Resolution 70 of the Commission (adopted March 27, 1952), the same had a
six-month period of validity counted from the said date June 18, 1953. This
license states, among other conditions, that —
Commodities covered by this license must be shipped from the country
of origin before the expiry date of the license, and are subject to sec.
13 of Republic Act. No. 650.
Although Republic Act No. 650, creating the Import Control Commission,
expired on July 31, 1953, it is to be conceded that its duly executed acts can
have valid effects even beyond the life span of said governmental agency.
What is important to consider only is the legal connotation of the word
"shipped" as the term was used in the license. Defendant maintains that it is
when the vessel leaves the port of embarkation, while plaintiff holds that it is
the dates of the bills of lading, which are usually issued after the cargo is
placed on board the vessel. The date of the shipment is the date when the
goods for dispatch are loaded on board the vessel, and not necessarily when
the ship puts to sea, is clearly implied from our ruling in the case of U.S
Tobacco Corporation vs. Rufino Luna, et al., (87 Phil., 4), wherein we said:
By section 6 of Act No. 426, all goods including leaf tobacco have been
placed under control. Petitioner's merchandise left the port of departure
before the passage of that Act but arrived in Manila after its approval.
For the purpose of enforcing or applying said section 6, there can only
be one date of importation. Which was the date? The date the goods
were ordered, the date they were put on board vessel, or the date they
reached the port of destination? We are of the opinion that the date of
importation is the date of shipment and not the date of Arrival in
Manila. (Emphasis supplied)
six months mean 180 days, which in this case expired on December 15,
cannot now be entertained because the defendant-appellant, under paragraph
3 of his answer to the Complaint, expressly admitted that the date appearing
on the bills of lading (December 17, 1953) as the date of loading on board the
vessels "is one day before the expiration of the validity of the import license".
What he only questioned in the court below is the legal connotation of the word
"shipped" under the import license.
In the light of the resolution we have taken on the main issue, it becomes
unnecessary for us to dwell further upon the other questions raised by the
parties.
Wherefore, the appeal should be dismissed and the judgment of the lower
court affirmed. So rendered.

The issuance of the bill of lading, furthermore, presupposes or carries the

presumption that the goods were delivered to the carrier for immediate
shipment (13 C.J.S. sec. 123 (2), p. 235, and cases cited therein). It does not
appear here that the bill of lading specified any designated day on which the
vessel were to lift anchor, nor was it shown that plaintiff had any knowledge
that the vessel M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN were not to depart soon after
he placed his cargo on board and the corresponding bills of lading issued to
him. From this latter time, the goods in contemplation of law, are deemed
already in transit (New Civil Code, Arts. 1531 and 1736).

It should also be considered that it is entirely outside the shipper's hands to fix
the dates of departure, route or arrival of a vessel (unless he charters the
whole ship [see Art. 656, Code of Commerce]).

Defendant's reliance upon Central Bank regulations that the shipment licensed
must have "left the port of origin within the period of validity of the "license" is
not maintainable in the present case, because the regulations came onto effect
only on July 1, 1953 already after issuance of the appellee' license and cannot
be read into the same.

The Solicitor General's contention that, assuming the six months are counted
up to the date the imports goods were placed on board the vessels for
shipment the period of validity had likewise already elapsed because, legally
G.R. No. 106296 July 5, 1996
ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15,
1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is partially granted. The
questioned Orders and writs directing (1) "reinstatement" of
respondent Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of "President
of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines", and (2)
payment of "salaries and benefits" which said respondent failed
to receive during his suspension insofar as such payment
includes those accruing after the abolition of the PCC and its
transfer to the PUP, are hereby set aside. Accordingly, further
proceedings consistent with this decision may be taken by the
court a quo to determine the correct amounts due and payable
to said respondent by the said university.
The background of this case is as follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of
the Philippines on July 17, 1974.
During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were
filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation
of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment,
grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases, which
were filed with the Office of the President, were subsequently referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, §3(e) and R.A. No. 992, §§20-21 and
R.A. No. 733, §14 were likewise filed against him with the Office of
Tanodbayan.
On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed
against him. The informations alleged that he appropriated for himself a bahay
kubo, which was intended for the College, and construction materials worth
P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the
College as his personal and family driver. 1
On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office
pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, §13, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo,
Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then as
Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO
A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS
CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was
appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of
six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment
acquitting petitioner of the charges against him. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Isabelo T.
Crisostomo, not guilty of the violations charged in all these
three cases and hereby acquits him therefrom, with costs de
officio. The bail bonds filed by said accused for his provisional
liberty are hereby cancelled and released.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and under which the accused has been
suspended by this Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976,
said accused is hereby ordered reinstated to the position of
President of the Philippine College of Commerce, now known
 as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, from which he
has been suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement, he is
entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in
these cases are hereby cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) were likewise
dismissed on August 8, 1991 on the ground that they had become moot and
academic. On the other hand, the administrative cases were dismissed for
failure of the complainants to prosecute them.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion
for execution of the judgment, particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to
the position of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other
benefits during the period of suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the trial
court on March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President Corazon C.
Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following
the expiration of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had
succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five nominees considered by
the President of the Philippines for the position.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, through respondent Judge
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued another order, reiterating her earlier order for
the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of PUP president. A writ of
execution, ordering the sheriff to implement the order of reinstatement, was
issued.
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the sheriff stated that he had executed the
writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not
vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines
first. This led to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing was set on
May 7, 1992. On May 5, 1992, petitioner also moved to cite Department of
Education, Culture and Sports Secretary Isidro Cariño in contempt of court.
Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R. No. 27931), assailing the two orders and
the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked for a temporary
restraining order.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order,
enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the PUP
pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court, and enjoining further
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-2329-2331.
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, 2 the dispositive portion of which is set forth at the beginning of this
opinion. Said decision set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued by the
trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing after the
conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and
benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioner's suspension until
the conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded to the trial court
for a determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the
PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had
intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC
was being "abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was
intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being
"created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the
existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position
as president.
In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained,
reinstatement is no longer possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No.
1437 by the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College
of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in
the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then
the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce.
What took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the
expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and
organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department
or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the
lawmaking authority says so. He cites the following examples:
E.O. No. 709:
§1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Trade and Industry,
hereinafter referred to as the Ministry. The existing Ministry of
Trade established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 721 as
amended, and the existing Ministry established pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 488 as amended, are abolished
together with their services, bureaus and similar agencies,
regional offices, and all other entities under their supervision
and control.
E.O. No. 710:
§1. There is hereby created a Ministry of Public Works and
Highways, hereinafter referred to as the Ministry. The existing
Ministry of Public Works established pursuant to Executive
Order No. 546 as amended, and the existing Ministry of Public
Highways established pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 458
as amended, are abolished together with their services,
bureaus and similar agencies, regional offices, and all other
entities within their supervision and control. . . .
R.A. No. 6975:
§13. Creation and Composition. -- A National Police
Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, is
hereby created for the purpose of effectively discharging the
functions prescribed in the Constitution and provided in this
Act. The Commission shall be a collegial body within the
Department. It shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4)
regular commissioners, one (1) of whom shall be designated as
Vice-Chairman by the President. The Secretary of the
Department shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the
Commission, while the Vice-Chairman shall act as the
executive officer of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
§90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. - Upon the
effectivity of this Act, the present National Police Commission,
and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the
nucleus of the integrated Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police, shall cease to be a major service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National Police, which
is the civilian component of the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police, shall cease to be the national police
force and in lieu thereof, a new police force shall be
established and constituted pursuant to this Act.
In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:
§1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby
converted into a university to be known as the "Polytechnic
University of the Philippines," hereinafter referred to in this
Decree as the University.
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier provided:
§1. The present Philippine School of Commerce, located in the
City of Manila, Philippines, is hereby granted full college status
and converted into the Philippine College of Commerce, which
will offer not only its present one-year and two-year vocational
commercial curricula, the latter leading to the titles of Associate
in Business Education and/or Associate in Commerce, but also
four-year courses leading to the degrees of Bachelor of
Science in Business in Education and Bachelor of Science in
Commerce, and five-year courses leading to the degrees of
Master of Arts in Business Education and Master of Arts in
Commerce, respectively.
The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not "one
and the same institution" but "two different entities" and that since petitioner
Crisostomo's term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC,
petitioner's term expired upon the abolition of the PCC. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court of Appeals took into account the following:
a) After respondent Crisostomo's suspension, P.D. No. 1341
(entitled "CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY,
DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS
CURRICULAR OFFERINGS") was issued on April 1, 1978.
This decree explicitly provides that PUP's objectives and
purposes cover not only PCC's offering of programs "in the
field of commerce and business administration" but also
"programs in other polytechnic areas" and "in other fields such
as agriculture, arts and trades and fisheries . . ." (section 2).
Being a university, PUP was conceived as a bigger institution
absorbing, merging and integrating the entire PCC and other
"national schools" as may be "transferred" to this new state
university.
b) The manner of selection and appointment of the university
head is substantially different from that provided by the PCC
Charter. The PUP President "shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and Culture after consultation with the
University Board of Regents" (section 4, P.D. 1341). The
President of PCC, on the other hand, was appointed "by the
President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Board
of Trustees" (Section 4, R.A. 778).
c) The composition of the new university's Board of Regents in
likewise different from that of the PCC Board of Trustees
(which included the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Education and the chairman of the House Committee on
Education, the President of the PCC Alumni Association as
well as the President of the Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines). Whereas, among others, the NEDA Director-
General, the Secretary of Industry and the Secretary of Labor
are members of the PUP Board of Regents. (section 6, P.D.
1341)
d) The decree moreover transferred to the new university all
the properties including "equipment and facilities:"
". . . owned by the Philippine College of
Commerce and such other National Schools as
may be integrated . . . including
their obligations and appropriations . . ." (sec.
12; emphasis supplied) 3
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to
create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a
school without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing
structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new
one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
The Court of Appeals also cites the provision of P.D. No. 1341 as allegedly
implying the abolition of the PCC and the creation of a new one - the PUP - in
its stead:
§12. All parcels of land, buildings, equipment and facilities
owned by the Philippine College of Commerce and such other
national schools as may be integrated by virtue of this decree,
including their obligations and appropriations thereof, shall
stand transferred to the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, provided, however, that said national schools shall
continue to receive their corresponding shares from the special
education fund of the municipal/provincial/city government
concerned as are now enjoyed by them in accordance with
existing laws and/or decrees.
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the
PCC were being "transferred" to the PUP but only that they "stand transferred"
to it. "Stand transferred" simply means, for example, that lands transferred to
the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of
the institution.
But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could
not be ordered by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had
been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities
and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and
authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of
incumbents who were not reappointed. P.D. No. 1437 provides:
§6. The head of the university or college shall be known as the
President of the university or college. He shall be qualified for
the position and appointed for a term of six (6) years by the
President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and Culture after consulting with the
Board which may be renewed for another term upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Education and Culture
after consulting the Board. In case of vacancy by reason of
 death, absence or resignation, the Secretary of Education and
Culture shall have the authority to designate an officer in
charge of the college or university pending the appointment of
the President.
The powers and duties of the President of the university or
college, in addition to those specifically provided for in this
Decree shall be those usually pertaining to the office of the
president of a university or college.
G.R. No. 115844 August 15, 1997
CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Brgy. 167, Zone 15, District II,
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary DILG, ALEX L. DAVID,
President/Secretary General, National Liga ng mga Barangay,
LEONARDO L. ANGAT, President, City of Manila, Liga ng mga
Barangay, respondents.

§7. The incumbent president of a chartered state college or

university whose term may be terminated according to this
Decree, shall be entitled to full retirement MENDOZA, J.:
benefits: provided that he has served the government for at
least twenty (20) years; and provided, further that in case the This is a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, §§ 1-2 of the
number of years served is less than 20 years, he shall be Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the
entitled to one month pay for every year of service. Liga ng mga Barangay Officers so far as they provide for the election of first,
second and third vice presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga
In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had been acting president of the Barangay and its chapters. The provisions in question read:
university since April 3, 1979, was appointed president of PUP for a term of six
(6) years on March 28, 1980, with the result that petitioner's term was cut §1. Local Liga Chapters. The Municipal, City, Metropolitan and
short. In accordance with §7 of the law, therefore, petitioner became entitled Provincial Chapters shall directly elect the following officers
only to retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay. Petitioner must and directors to constitute their respective Board of Directors,
have recognized this fact, that is why in 1992 he asked then President Aquino namely:
to consider him for appointment to the same position after it had become
vacant in consequence of the retirement of Dr. Prudente.
1.1 President
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by
1.2 Executive Vice-President
SETTING ASIDE the questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court directing
the reinstatement of the petitioner Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of
president of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines and the payment to 1.3 First Vice-President
him of salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension in
so far as such payment would include salaries accruing after March 28, 1980 1.4 Second Vice-President
when petitioner Crisostomo's term was terminated. Further proceedings in
accordance with this decision may be taken by the trial court to determine the 1.5 Third Vice-President
amount due and payable to petitioner by the university up to March 28, 1980.
1.6 Auditor
SO ORDERED.
1.7 Five (5) Directors
 §2. National Liga. The National Liga shall directly elect the
following officers and directors to constitute the National Liga
Board of Directors namely:
2.1 President
2.2 Executive Vice-President
2.3 First Vice-President
2.4 Second Vice-President
2.5 Third Vice-President
2.6 Secretary General
2.7 Auditor
2.8 Five (5) Directors
Petitioner Cesar G. Viola brought this action as barangay chairman of Brgy.
167, Zone 15, District II, Manila against then Secretary of Interior and Local
Government Rafael M. Alunan III, Alex L. David, president/secretary general of
the National Liga ng mga Barangay, and Leonardo L. Angat, president of the
City of Manila Liga ng mga Barangay, to restrain them from carrying out the
elections for the questioned positions on July 3, 1994.
Petitioner's contention is that the positions in question are in excess of those
provided in the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), §493 of which
mentions as elective positions only those of president, vice president, and five
members of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels. Petitioner
argues that, in providing for the positions of first, second and third vice
presidents and auditor for each chapter, §§1-2 of the Implementing Rules
expand the number of positions authorized in §493 of the Local Government
Code in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations
cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to
implement.
Although the elections are now over, the issues raised in this case are likely to
arise again in future elections of officers of the Liga ng mga Barangay. For one
thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected. For
another, this comes within the rule that courts will decide a question which is
otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." 1
We will therefore proceed to the merits of this case.
Petitioner's contention that the additional positions in question have been
created without authority of law is untenable. To begin with, the creation of
these positions was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga
ng Mga Barangay, which was adopted by the First Barangay National
Assembly on January 11, 1994. This Constitution and By-laws provide in
pertinent parts:
ARTICLE VI
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Sec. 1. Organization of Board of Directors of Local Chapters.
— The chapters shall directly elect their respective officers,
namely, a president; executive vice president; first, second,
and third vice presidents; auditor; and five (5) members to
constitute the Board of Directors of their respective chapter.
Thereafter, the Board shall appoint a secretary, treasurer, and
public relations officer from among the five (5) members, with
the rest serving as Directors of Board. The Board may create
such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter. Pending elections of the president
of the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan chapters of
the Liga, the incumbent presidents of the ABCs of the
municipality, city province and Metropolitan Manila shall
continue to act as presidents of the corresponding Liga
chapters, subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Sec. 2. Organization of Board of Directors of the National Liga.
— The National Liga shall be composed of the presidents of
the provincial Liga chapters, highly urbanized and independent
component city chapters, and the metropolitan chapter who
shall directly elect their respective officers, namely, a president,
executive vice president; first, second, and third vice president,
auditor, secretary general; and five (5) members to constitute
 the Board of Directors of the National Liga. Thereafter, the
Board shall appoint a treasurer, secretary and public relations
officers from among the five (5) members with the rest serving
as directors of the Board. The Board may create such other
positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the
National Liga. Pending election of Secretary-General, the
incumbent president of the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Barangay (PKB) shall act as the Secretary-General. The
incumbent members of the Board of the PKB, headed by the
Secretary-General who continue to be presidents of the
respective chapters of the Liga to which they belong, shall
constitute a committee to exercise the powers and duties of the
National Liga and with the primordial responsibility of drafting a
Constitution and By-Laws needed for the organization of the
Liga as a whole pursuant to the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The post of executive vice president is in reality that of the vice president in
§493 of the LGC, so that the only additional positions created for each chapter
in the Constitution and By-laws are those of first, second and third vice
presidents and auditor. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the creation of the
additional positions is authorized by the LGC which provides as follows:
§493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial,
Metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly
elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the
board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and
treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter. A secretary-
general shall be elected form among the members of the
national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of
the liga on the national level. The board shall coordinate the
activities of the chapters of the liga. (emphasis added)
This provision in fact requires — and not merely authorizes the board of
directors to "create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter" and belies petitioner's claim that said provision
(§493) limits the officers of a chapter to the president, vice president, five
members of the board of directors, secretary, and treasurer. That Congress
can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been settled by
our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the
President of the Philippines to create, abolish or merge officers in the
executive department. 2 The question is whether, in making a delegation of this
power to the board of directors of each chapter of the Liga ng Mga Barangay,
Congress provided a sufficient standard so that, in the phrase of Justice Cardozo,
administrative discretion may be "canalized within proper banks that keep it from
overflowing." 3
Statutory provisions authorizing the President of the Philippines to make
reforms and changes in government owned or controlled corporations for the
purpose of promoting "simplicity, economy and efficiency" 4 in their operations
and empowering the Secretary of Education to prescribe minimum standards of
"adequate and efficient instruction" 5 in private schools and colleges have been
found to be sufficient for the purpose of valid delegation. Judged by these cases,
we hold that §493 of the Local Government Code, in directing the board of
directors of the liga to "create such other positions as may be deemed necessary
for the management of the chapter[s]," embodies a fairly intelligible standard.
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress.
Justice Davide contends in dissent, however, that "only the Board of Directors
— and not any other body — is vested with the power to create other positions
as may be necessary for the management of the chapter" and that, in any
case, there is no showing that the Barangay National Assembly was
authorized to draft the Constitution and By-laws because he is unable to find
any creating it. The Barangay National Assembly is actually the Pambansang
Katipunan ng mga Barangay (PKB) referred to in Art. 210(f)(2)(3) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, which
Justice Davide's dissent cites. It will be helpful to quote these provisions:
(2) A secretary-general shall be elected from among the
members of the national liga who shall be responsible for the
overall operation of the liga. Pending election of a secretary-
general under this rule, the incumbent president of the
pambansang katipunan ng mga barangay shall act as the
secretary-general. The incumbent members of the board of the
pambansang katipunan ng mga barangay, headed by the
secretary-general, who continue to be presidents of the
respective chapters of the liga to which they belong, shall
constitute a committee to exercise the powers and duties of the
national liga and draft or amend the constitution and by-laws of
the national liga to conform to the provisions of this Rule.
(3) The board of directors shall coordinate the activities of the
various chapters of the liga.
 (Emphasis added)
Pursuant to these provisions, pending the organization of the Liga ng mga
Barangay, the board of directors of the PKB was constituted into a committee,
headed by the PKB president, who acted as secretary general, with a two-fold
mandate: "[I] exercise the powers and duties of the national liga and [2] draft or
amend the constitution and by-laws of the national liga to conform to the
provisions of this Rule." The board of directors of the PKB, functioning in place
of the board of directors of the National Liga ng mga Barangay, exercised one
of these powers of the National Liga board, namely, to create additional
positions which it deemed necessary for the management of a chapter. There
is therefore no basis for the claim that because the power to create additional
positions in the Liga on its chapters is vested only in the board of directors the
exercise of this power by the Barangay National Assembly is unauthorized and
illegal and positions created are void. The Barangay National Assembly was
actually the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay or PKB. Pending the
organization of the Liga ng mga Barangay, it served as the Liga.
But it is contended in the dissent that "Section 493 of the LGC . . . vests the
power to create additional positions in the Board of Directors of the chapter."
The implication seems to be that the board of the directors at the national level
did not have that power. It is necessary to consider the organizational structure
of the Liga ng mga Barangay as provided in the LGC, as follows:
§492. Representation, Chapters, National Liga. — Every
barangay shall be represented in said liga by the punong
barangay, or in his absence or incapacity, by a sangguniang
member duly elected for the purpose among its members, who
shall attend all meetings or deliberations called by the different
chapters of the liga.
The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial
and metropolitan political subdivision levels.
The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed
of the barangay representatives of municipal and city
barangays, respectively. The duly elected presidents of
component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the
provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision
chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and
metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the
National Liga ng mga Barangay.
§493. Organization. — The liga at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national
levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its
secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it
may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. A
secretary-general shall be elected from among the members of
the national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation
of the liga on the national level. The board shall coordinate the
activities of the chapters of the liga.
(Emphasis added)
While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions
to provide for the needs of the chapter, the board of directors of the National
Liga must be deemed to have the power to create additional positions not only
for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal, city,
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the National
Liga would be no different from the local chapters. There would then be only
so many local chapters without a national one, when what is contemplated in
the above-quoted provisions of the LGC is that there should be one Liga ng
mga Barangay with local chapters at all levels of local government units. The
dissent, by denying to the board of directors at the National Liga the power to
create additional positions in the local chapters, would reduce such board to a
board of a local chapter. The fact is that §493 grants the power to create
positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but to the board of the
Liga at the national level as well.
Indeed what was done in the Constitution and By-laws of their liga was to
create additional positions in each chapters, whether national or local, without
however precluding the boards of directors of the chapters as well as that of
the national liga from creating other positions for their peculiar needs. The
creation by the board of the National Liga of the positions of first, second and
third vice presidents, auditors and public relations officers was intended to
provide uniform officers for the various chapters in line with the mandate in Art.
210(g)(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 to the Barangay National Assembly to
"formulate uniform constitution and by-laws applicable to the national liga and
all local chapters." The various chapters could have different minor officers
depending on their local needs, but they must have the same major elective
officers, meaning to say, the additional vice-presidents and auditors.
The dissent further argues that, following the rule of ejusdem generis, what
may be created as additional positions can only be appointive ones because
the positions of secretary and treasurer are appointive positions. The rule
might apply if what is involved is the appointment of other officers. But what we
are dealing with in this case is the creation of additional positions. Section 493
actually gives the board the power to "[1] appoint its secretary and treasurer
and [2] create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter." The additional positions to be created need not
therefore be appointive positions.
Nor is it correct to say that §493, in providing that additional positions to be
created must be those which are "deemed necessary for the management of
the chapter," contemplates only appointive positions. Management positions
are not necessarily limited to appointive positions. Elective officers, such as
the president and vice-president, can be expected to be involved in the general
administration or management of the chapter. Hence, the creation of other
elective positions which may be deemed necessary for the management of the
chapter is within the purview of §493.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112745 October 16, 1997
AQUILINO T. LARIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE
COMMITTEE CREATED TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINT AGAINST AQUILINO T. LARIN, COMPOSED OF FRUMENCIO
A. LAGUSTAN, JOSE B. ALEJANDRINO AND JAIME M.
MAZA, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Challenged in this petition is the validity of petitioner's removal from service as
Assistant Commissioner of the Excise Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Incidentally, he questions Memorandum Order No. 164 issued by
the Office of the President, which provides for the creation of "A Committee to
Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue" as well as the investigation made
in pursuance thereto, and Administrative Order No. 101 dated December 2,
1993 which found him guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge
and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office.
Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. 132,
issued by President Ramos on October 26, 1993, which provides for the
"Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue," and of its implementing rules
issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, namely: a) Administrative Order No.
4-93, which provides for the "Organizational Structure and Statement of
General Functions of Offices in the National Office" and b) Administrative
Order No. 5-93, which provides for "Redefining the Areas of Jurisdiction and
Renumbering of Regional And District Offices."
The antecedent facts of the instant case as succinctly related by the Solicitor
General are as follows:
On September 18, 1992, 1 a decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan
convicting herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then
Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused
(except Justino E. Galban, Jr.) of the crimes of violation of Section 268 (4) of the
National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 14208-14209, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T.
Larin, Teodoro T. Pareno, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and Potenciana N. Evangelista,
Accused," the dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is now rendered in Criminal Cases
Nos. 14208 and 14209 convicting accused Assistant
Commissioner for Specific Tax AQUILINO T. LARIN, Chief of
the Alcohol Tax Division TEODORO P. PARENO, and Chief of
the Revenue Accounting Division POTENCIANA M.
EVANGELISTA:
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
The fact of petitioner's conviction was reported to the President of the
Philippines by the then Acting Finance Secretary Leong through a
memorandum dated June 4, 1993. The memorandum states, inter alia:
This is a report in the case of Assistant Commissioner
AQUILINO T. LARIN of the Excise Tax Service, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, a presidential appointee, one of those
convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 14208-14209, entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Aquilino T. Larin, et. al." referred to the
Department of Finance by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
The cases against Pareno and Evangelista are being acted
upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as they are non-
presidential appointees.
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear from the foregoing that Mr. Larin has been found
beyond reasonable doubt to have committed acts constituting
grave misconduct. Under the Civil Service Laws and Rules
which require only preponderance of evidence, grave
misconduct is punishable by dismissal.
Acting by authority of the President, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo
A. Quisumbing issued Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993
which provides for the creation of an Executive Committee to investigate the
administrative charge against herein petitioner Aquilino T. Larin. It states thus:
A Committee is hereby created to investigate the administrative
complaint filed against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, to be composed
of:
Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan — Chairman
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legislation
Mr. Jose B. Alejandro — Member
Presidential Assistant
Atty. Jaime M. Maza — Member
Assistant Commissioner for Inspector Services
Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Committee shall have all the powers and prerogatives of
(an) investigating committee under the Administrative Code of
1987 including the power to summon witnesses, administer
oath or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation
by subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.
xxx xxx xxx
The Committee shall convene immediately, conduct the
investigation in the most expeditious manner, and terminate the
same as soon as practicable from its first scheduled date of
hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the Committee directed the petitioner to respond to the
administrative charge leveled against him through a letter dated September
17, 1993, thus:
Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164 dated August 25,
1993, a xerox copy of which is hereto attached for your ready
reference, created an Investigation Committee to look into the
charges against you which are also the subject of the Criminal
 Cases No. 14208 and 14209 entitled People of the Philippines
vs. Aquilino T . Larin, et. al.
The Committee has in its possession a certified true copy of
the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in the above-mentioned
cases.
Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum Order No. 164, you are
hereby directed to file your position paper on the
aforementioned charges within seven (7) days from receipt
hereof . . . .
Failure to file the required position paper shall be considered
as a waiver on your part to submit such paper or to be heard, in
which case, the Committee shall deem the case submitted on
the basis of the documents and records at hand.
In compliance, petitioner submitted a letter dated September 30, 1993 which
was addressed to Atty. Frumencio A. Lagustan, the Chairman of the
Investigating Committee. In said latter, he asserts that,
The case being sub-judice, I may not, therefore, comment on
the merits of the issues involved for fear of being cited in
contempt of Court. This position paper is thus limited to
furnishing the Committee pertinent documents submitted with
the Supreme Court and other tribunal which took cognizance of
the case in the past, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing documents readily show that am not
administratively liable or criminally culpable of the charges
leveled against me, and that the aforesaid cases are mere
persecutions caused to be filed and are being orchestrated by
taxpayers who were prejudiced by multi-million peso
assessments I caused to be issued against them in my official
capacity as Assistant Commissioner, Excise Tax Office of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In the same letter, petitioner claims that the administrative complaint against
him is already barred: a) on jurisdictional ground as the Office of the
Ombudsman had already taken cognizance of the case and had caused the
filing only of the criminal charges against him, b) by res judicata, c) by double
jeopardy, and d) because to proceed with the case would be redundant,
oppressive and a plain persecution against him.
Meanwhile, the President issued the challenged Executive Order No. 132
dated October 26, 1993 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either
abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other
offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service,
of which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices
that was abolished by said executive order.
The corresponding implementing rules of Executive Order No. 132, namely,
Revenue Administrative Orders Nos. 4-93 and 5-93, were subsequently issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
On October 27, 1993, or one day after the promulgation of Executive Order
No. 132, the President appointed the following as BIR Assistant
Commissioners:
1. Bernardo A. Frianeza
2. Dominador L. Galura
3. Jaime D. Gonzales
4. Lilia C. Guillermo
5. Rizalina S. Magalona
6. Victorino C. Mamalateo
7. Jaime M. Maza
8. Antonio N. Pangilinan
9. Melchor S. Ramos
10. Joel L. Tan-Torres
Consequently, the President, in the assailed Administrative Order No. 101
dated December 2, 1993, found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the
administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with
forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including disqualification
for reappointment in the government service.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition on
December 13, 1993 to question basically his alleged unlawful removal from
office.
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside
the conviction of petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss
him from office. He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are
Career Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President exercises only
the power of control not the power to remove. He also averred that the
administrative investigation conducted under Memorandum Order No. 164 is
void as it violated his right to due process. According to him, the letter of the
Committee dated September 17, 1993 and his position paper dated
September 30, 1993 are not sufficient for purposes of complying with the
requirements of due process. He alleged that he was not informed of the
administrative charges leveled against him nor was he given official notice of
his dismissal.
Petitioner likewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the
reorganization made by the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to
Executive Order No. 132. Thus, he assailed said Executive Order No. 132 and
its implementing rules, namely, Revenue Administrative Orders 4-93 and 5-93
for being ultra vires. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress
which authorizes the reorganization by the Executive Department of executive
agencies, particularly the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He said that the
reorganization sought to be effected by the Executive Department on the basis
of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of Section 2 of
R.A. 6656, otherwise known as the Act Protecting the Security of Tenure of
Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization.
On the other hand. respondents contended that since petitioner is a
presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the President.
They also contended that E.O. No. 132 and its implementing rules were validly
issued pursuant to Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No. 7645. Apart from
this, the other legal bases of E.O. No. 132 as stated in its preamble are
Section 63 of E.O. No. 127 (Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance), and Section
20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987. In addition, it is clear that in Section 11 of R.A. No. 6656 future
reorganization is expressly contemplated and nothing in said law that prohibits
subsequent reorganization through an executive order. Significantly,
respondents clarified that petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of EO 132.
Respondents claimed that he was removed from office because he was found
guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him.
The ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case falls on the determination
of the validity of petitioner's dismissal from office. Incidentally, in order to
resolve this matter, it is imperative that We consider these questions: a) Who
has the power to discipline the petitioner?, b) Were the proceedings taken
pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164 in accord with due process?, c) What
is the effect of petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case to his administrative
charge?, d) Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to
issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132?, and e) Is the reorganization of BIR
pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad faith?
At the outset, it is worthy to note that the position of Assistant Commissioner of
the BIR is part of the Career Executive Service. 2 Under the law, 3 Career
Executive Service officers, namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be
identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the
President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed as Assistant Commissioner in
January, 1987 by then President Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential
appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential
appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is
in line with the well settled principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint" conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which
created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner,
was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of
removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be
pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security of
tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is co-
terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited
to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys
the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section
36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy
security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said
law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give
the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is
an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the
recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in
accordance with procedural due process.
Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid
proceeding?
Although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural
due process, this Court, however, considers that petitioner was not dismissed
for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative
committee to look into the administrative charge against petitioner is his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and 14209. As
admitted by the respondents, the administrative case against petitioner is
based on the Sandiganbayan Decision of September 18, 1992. Thus, in the
Administrative Order No. 101 issued by Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
Quisumbing which found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, it clearly states
that:
This pertains to the administrative charge against Assistant
Commissioner Aquilino T. Larin of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, for grave misconduct by virtue of a Memorandum
signed by Acting Secretary Leong of the Department of
Finance, on the basis of a decision handed down by the Hon.
Sandiganbayan convicting Larin, et. al. in Criminal Case Nos.
14208 and 14209. 4
In a nutshell, the criminal cases against petitioner refer to his alleged violation
of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and of Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019 as a consequence of his act of favorably recommending the
grant of tax credit to Tanduay Distillery, Inc.. The pertinent portion of the
judgment of the Sandiganbayan reads:
As above pointed out, the accused had conspired in knowingly
preparing false memoranda and certification in order to effect a
fraud upon taxes due to the government. By their separate acts
which had resulted in an appropriate tax credit of
P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay. The government had
been defrauded of a tax revenue — for the full amount, if one is
to look at the availments or utilization thereof (Exhibits "AA" to
"AA- 31-a"), or for a substantial portion thereof
(P73,000,000.00) if we are to rely on the letter of Deputy
Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos (Exhibits "21" for all the
accused).
As pointed out above, the confluence of acts and omissions
committed by accused Larin, Pareno and Evangelista
adequately prove conspiracy among them for no other purpose
than to bring about a tax credit which Tanduay did not deserve.
These misrepresentations as to how much Tanduay had paid
in ad valorem taxes obviously constituted a fraud of tax
revenue of the government . . . . 5
However, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by
the Sandiganbayan was set aside by this Court in our decision promulgated on
April 17, 1996 in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20. We specifically ruled in
no uncertain terms that: a) petitioner can not be held negligent in relying on the
certification of a co-equal unit in the BIR, b) it is not incumbent upon Larin to
go beyond the certification made by the Revenue Accounting Division that
Tanduay Distillery, Inc. had paid the ad valorem taxes, c) there is nothing
irregular or anything false in Larin's marginal note on the memorandum
addressed to Pareno, the Chief of Alcohol Tax Division who was also one of
the accused, but eventually acquitted, in the said criminal cases, and d) there
is no proof of actual agreement between the accused, including petitioner, to
commit the illegal acts charged. We are emphatic in our resolution in said
cases that there is nothing "illegal with the acts committed by the petitioner(s)."
We also declare that "there is no showing that petitioner(s) had acted
irregularly, or performed acts outside of his (their) official functions."
Significantly, these acts which. We categorically declare to be not unlawful and
improper in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very same
acts for which petitioner is held to be administratively responsible. Any charge
of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the petitioner is clearly belied by
our conclusion in said cases. In the light of this decisive pronouncement, We
see no reason for the administrative charge to continue — it must, thus, be
dismissed.
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are
independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the dismissal
or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of
administrative action nor carry with it the relief from administrative
liability. 6 However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart
from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where
the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the
criminal action which was later on set aside by this Court upon a categorical and
clear finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not
unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case
necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because
in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the
administrative suit.
On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was
given every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that the
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he
may have in support of his defense.7 The records clearly show that on October 1,
1993 petitioner submitted his letter-response dated September 30, 1993 to the
administrative charge filed against him. Aside from his letter, he also submitted
various documents attached as annexes to his letter, all of which are evidences
supporting his defense. Prior to this, he received a letter dated September 17,
1993 from the Investigation Committee requiring him to explain his side concerning
the charge. It can not therefore be argued that petitioner was denied of due
process.
Let us now examine Executive Order No. 132.
As stated earlier, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 132, some of the
positions and offices, including the office of Excise Tax Services of which
petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, were abolished or otherwise
decentralized. Consequently, the President released the list of appointed
Assistant Commissioners of the BIR. Apparently, petitioner was not included.
We do not agree.
Under its preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal bases of its issuance,
namely: a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No. 127,
and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies
Within the Executive Branch. — The heads of departments,
bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to
identify their respective activities which are no longer essential
in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service rules
and regulations. . . . Actual scaling down, phasing out or
abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars
or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
(emphasis ours)
Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and
abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer
of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in
the subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. — Unless
otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the
Philippines, no organizational unit of charges in key positions in
any department or agency shall be authorized in their
respective organization structures and be funded from
appropriations by this Act. (emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to
effect organizational charges including the creation of offices in the department
or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant
consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. 8 Unless and until a specific provision of the law
is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and biding for all intents
and purposes.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which states:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. — Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under
the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance with
law. (emphasis ours)
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the
law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential
Decree No. 1772 9 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries
and materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987
Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked." 10 So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.
Significantly, the Constitution itself recognizes future reorganizations in the
government as what is revealed in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from service
not for cause but as a result of the . . . reorganization following
the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay . . .
However, We can not consider E.O. No. 127 signed on January 30, 1987 as a
legal basis for the reorganization of the BIR. E.O. No. 127 should be related to
the second paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6656.
Section 11 provides inter alia:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch,
all departments and agencies which are authorized by
executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize
shall have ninety days from the approval of this act within
which to implement their respective reorganization plans in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. (emphasis ours)
Executive Order No. 127 was part of the 1987 reorganization contemplated
under said provision. Obviously, it had become stale by virtue of the expiration
of the ninety day deadline period. It can not thus be used as a proper basis for
the reorganization of the BIR. Nevertheless, as shown earlier, there are other
legal bases to sustain the authority of the President to issue the questioned
E.O. NO. 132.
While the President's power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not
mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance
with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid
provided it is pursued in good faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this Court has
had the occasion to clarify that:
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith"
if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually
occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is
done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where
there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample
funds. 11
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 lists down
the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result
of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be
removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and
hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a
bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or
rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or
consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the
service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service
Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in
the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise
to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved
party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or
agency concerned;
 b) Where an office is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department
or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided
in Section 3 hereof.
A reading of some of the provisions of the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly
leads us to an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances considered
as evidences of bad faith in the reorganization of the BIR.
Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:
1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the
Inspection Service are abolished. An Intelligence and
Investigation Service is
hereby created to absorb the same functions of the abolished
office and service. . . . (emphasis ours)
appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable
to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions
to positions next lower in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a career
executive officer who is holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have
been given preference for appointment in the position of Assistant
Commissioner. As claimed by petitioner, Antonio Pangilinan who was one of
those appointed as Assistant Commissioner, "is an outsider of sorts to the
Bureau, not having been an incumbent officer of the Bureau at the time of the
reorganization." We should not lose sight of the second paragraph of Section 4
of R.A. No. 6656 which explicitly states that no new employees shall be taken
in until all permanent officers shall have been appointed for permanent
position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is
hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of
seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of his
separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the meanwhile, he
would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in which
case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to
the corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2

(b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office is abolished and another one performing
substantially the same function is created.

Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the BIR

resulting to a significant increase in the number of positions in the said bureau
as contemplated in paragraph (a) of Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section
1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the Information Systems Group has two newly created
Systems Services. Aside from this, six new divisions are also created. Under
Section 1.2.1, three more divisions of the Assessment Service are formed.
With these newly created offices, there is no doubt that a significant increase
of positions will correspondingly follow.

Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as

Assistant Commissioner violates Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under said
provision, officers holding permanent appointments are given preference for
G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989
CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON.
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 81967 August 8, 1989
VICENTE A. FERIA JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME, and HON.
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 82023 August 8, 1989
ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN C. ESPIRITU,
DENNIS A. AZARRAGA, RENATO DE JESUS, NICASIO C. GAMBOA,
CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES, FELICITACION R. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO H.
FLORESCA, SUBAER PACASUM, ZENAIDA LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ,
GLICERIO R. DOLAR, CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS, FERMIN
RODRIGUEZ, DALISAY BAUTISTA, LEONARDO JOSE, ALBERTO
LONTOK, PORFIRIO TABINO, JOSE BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO,
ESTER TAN, PEDRO BAKAL, ROSARIO DAVID, RODOLFO AFUANG,
LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA CATRE, ROBERTO ABADA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M. MISON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, respondent.
G.R. No. 83737 August 8, 1989
BENEDICTO L. AMASA and WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, petitioners,
vs.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission and SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, respondents.
G.R. No. 85310 August 8, 1989
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Customs, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ABACA, SISINIO T., ABAD, ROGELIO C.,
ABADIANO, JOSE P., ABCEDE, NEMECIO C., ABIOG, ELY F., ABLAZA,
AURORA M., AGBAYANI, NELSON I., AGRES ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR,
AGUILUCHO MA. TERESA R., AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T., ALANO, ALEX
P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR., ALBANO, ROBERT B., ALCANTARA, JOSE G.,
ALMARIO, RODOLFO F., ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD RUDY M.,
AMOS, FRANCIS F., ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES, RICARDO S.,
ANOLIN, MILAGROS H., AQUINO, PASCASIO E., ARABE, MELINDA M.,
ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S., JR., ARPON, ULPLIANO U., JR., ARREZA,
ARTEMIO M., JR., ARROJO, ANTONIO P., ARVISU, ALEXANDER S.,
ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T., ASLAHON, JULAHON P., ASUNCION, VICTOR R.,
ATANGAN, LORNA S., ATIENZA, ALEXANDER R., BACAL, URSULINO C.,
BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE, Z., BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO, JOSE B.,
BARROS, VICTOR C., BARTOLOME, FELIPE A., BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.,
BELENO, ANTONIO B., BERNARDO, ROMEO D., BERNAS, MARCIANO S.,
BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G., BRAVO, VICTOR M., BULEG, BALILIS R.,
CALNEA, MERCEDES M., CALVO, HONESTO G., CAMACHO, CARLOS V.,
CAMPOS, RODOLFO C., CAPULONG, RODRIGO G., CARINGAL, GRACIA
Z., CARLOS, LORENZO B., CARRANTO, FIDEL U., CARUNGCONG,
ALFREDO M., CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO, ROGELIO B., CATURLA,
MANUEL B., CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F., CINCO, LUISITO, CONDE0, JOSE C.,
JR., CORCUERA, FIDEL S., CORNETA, VICENTE S., CORONADO,
RICARDO S., CRUZ, EDUARDO S., CRUZ, EDILBERTO A., CRUZ,
EFIGENIA B., CRUZADO, MARCIAL C., CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.,
DABON, NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D., DANDAL, EDEN F.,
DATUHARON, SATA A., DAZO, GODOFREDO L., DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA,
DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A., DE GUZMAN, RENATO E., DE LA CRUZ,
AMADO A., JR., DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C., DE LA PEÑ;A,
LEONARDO, DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO, DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.,
DEMESA, WILHELMINA T., DIMAKUTA, SALIC L., DIZON, FELICITAS A.,
DOCTOR, HEIDY M., DOLAR, GLICERIO R., DOMINGO, NICANOR J.,
DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR., DUAY, JUANA G., DYSANGCO, RENATO
F., EDILLOR, ALFREDO P., ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A., ESCUYOS,
MANUEL M., JR., ESMERIA, ANTONIO E., ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.,
ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO, RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.,
FELIX, ERNESTO G., FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M., FERRAREN, ANTONIO
C., FERRERA, WENCESLAO A., FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR.,
FUENTES, RUDY L., GAGALANG, RENATO V., GALANG, EDGARDO R.,
GAMBOA, ANTONIO C., GAN, ALBERTO R., GARCIA, GILBERT M.,
GARCIA, EDNA V., GARCIA, JUAN L., GAVIOLA, LILIAN V., GEMPARO,
SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B., GRATE, FREDERICK R.,
GREGORIO, LAURO P., GUARTICO, AMMON H., GUIANG, MYRNA N.,
GUINTO, DELFIN C., HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A., HONRALES, LORETO N.,
HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H., HULAR , LANNYROSS E., IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C.,
ILAGAN, HONORATO C., INFANTE, REYNALDO C., ISAIS, RAY C.,
ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B., JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER, AMADOR L.,
JAVIER, ROBERTO S., JAVIER, WILLIAM R., JOVEN, MEMIA A., JULIAN,
REYNALDO V., JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A., JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.,
KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR., KOH, NANIE G., LABILLES, ERNESTO S.,
LABRADOR, WILFREDO M., LAGA, BIENVENIDO M., LAGLEVA,
PACIFICO Z., LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.,
LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A., LAPITAN, CAMILO M., LAURENTE,
REYNALDO A., LICARTE, EVARISTO R., LIPIO, VICTOR O., LITTAUA,
FRANKLIN Z., LOPEZ, MELENCIO L., LUMBA, OLIVIA., MACAISA,
BENITO T., MACAISA, ERLINDA C., MAGAT, ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA,
FERNANDO P., MALABANAN, ALFREDO C., MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.,
MALIJAN, LAZARO V., MALLI, JAVIER M., MANAHAN, RAMON S.,
MANUEL, ELPIDIO R., MARAVILLA, GIL B., MARCELO, GIL C.,
MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V., MAROKET, JESUS C., MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.,
MARTINEZ, ROMEO M., MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M., MATIBAG, ANGELINA
G., MATUGAS, ERNESTO T., MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T., MAYUGA,
PORTIA E., MEDINA, NESTOR M., MEDINA, ROLANDO S., MENDAVIA,
AVELINO I., MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G., MIL, RAY M., MIRAVALLES,
ANASTACIA L., MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G., MONTANO, ERNESTO F.,
MONTERO, JUAN M. III., MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR., MORALES,
CONCHITA D.L., MORALES, NESTOR P., MORALES, SHIRLEY S.,
MUNAR, JUANITA L., MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R., MURILLO, MANUEL M.,
NACION, PEDRO R., NAGAL, HENRY N., NAPA, CORNELIO B.,
NAVARRO, HENRY L., NEJAL, FREDRICK E., NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.,
NIEVES, RUFINO A., OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T., OLEGARIO, LEO Q.,
ORTEGA, ARLENE R., ORTEGA, JESUS R., OSORIO, ABNER S., PAPIO,
FLORENTINO T. II, PASCUA, ARNULFO A., PASTOR, ROSARIO, PELAYO,
ROSARIO L., PEÑ;A, AIDA C., PEREZ, ESPERIDION B., PEREZ, JESUS
BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A., PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S., PUNZALAN,
LAMBERTO N., PURA, ARNOLD T., QUINONES, EDGARDO I., QUINTOS,
AMADEO C., JR., QUIRAY, NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.,
RAÑ;ADA, RODRIGO C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL, VIOLETA V.,
RAZAL, BETTY R., REGALA, PONCE F., REYES, LIBERATO R., REYES,
MANUEL E., REYES, NORMA Z., REYES, TELESFORO F., RIVERA,
ROSITA L., ROCES, ROBERTO V., ROQUE, TERESITA S., ROSANES,
MARILOU M., ROSETE, ADAN I., RUANTO, REY, CRISTO C., JR.,
SABLADA, PASCASIO G., SALAZAR, SILVERIA S., SALAZAR, VICTORIA
A., SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C., SALMINGO, LOURDES M., SANTIAGO,
EMELITA B., SATINA, PORFIRIO C., SEKITO, COSME B., JR., SIMON,
RAMON P., SINGSON, MELECIO C., SORIANO, ANGELO L., SORIANO,
MAGDALENA R., SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR., SUNICO, ABELARDO T.,
TABIJE, EMMA B., TAN, RUDY, GOROSPE, TAN, ESTER S., TAN, JULITA
S., TECSON, BEATRIZ B., TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A., TURINGAN, ENRICO
T., JR., UMPA, ALI A., VALIC, LUCIO E., VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.,
VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA, AVELINO A., VERAME, OSCAR E.,
VIADO, LILIAN T., VIERNES, NAPOLEON K., VILLALON, DENNIS A.,
VILLAR, LUZ L., VILLALUZ, EMELITO V., ZATA, ANGEL A., JR.,
ACHARON, CRISTETO, ALBA, RENATO B., AMON, JULITA C., AUSTRIA,
ERNESTO C., CALO, RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO, BENJAMIN R., DE
CASTRO, LEOPAPA C ., DONATO, ESTELITA P., DONATO, FELIPE S.,
FLORES, PEDRITO S., GALAROSA, RENATO, MALAWI, MAUYAG,
MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M., OMEGA, PETRONILO T., SANTOS,
GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO, VALDERAMA, JAIME B., and VALDEZ,
NORA M., respondents.
G.R. No. 85335 August 8, 1989
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE, FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, MA.
J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, LEODEGARDIO H. FLORESCA, LEONARDO
A. DELA PEÑ;A, ABELARDO T. SUNICO, MELENCIO L. LOPEZ,
NEMENCIO A. MARTIN, RUDY M. AMISTAD, ERNESTO T. MATUGAS,
SILVERIA S. SALAZAR, LILLIAN V. GAVIOLA, MILAGROS ANOLIN, JOSE
B. ORTIZ, ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M. GARCIA, ANTONIO A.
RARAS, FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG, ANICETO AGRES, EDGAR Y.
QUINONES, MANUEL B. CATURLA, ELY F. ABIOG, RODRIGO C.
RANADA, LAURO GREGORIO, ALBERTO I. GAN, EDGARDO GALANG,
RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR B. VASQUEZ, MANUEL ESCUYOS, JR.,
ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R. MANUEL, AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL,
LEONARDO ELEVAZO, VICENTE S. CORNETA, petitioners,
vs.
COM. SALVADOR M. MISON/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and the CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 86241 August 8, 1989
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Customs, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN S. DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P. ARABE
BERNARDO S. QUINTONG, GREGORIO P. REYES, and ROMULO C.
BADILLO respondents
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court writes finis to this contreversy that has raged bitterly for the several
months. It does so out of ligitimate presentement of more suits reaching it as a
consequence of the government reorganization and the instability it has
wrought on the performance and efficiency of the bureaucracy. The Court is
apprehensive that unless the final word is given and the ground rules are
settled, the issue will fester, and likely foment on the constitutional crisis for the
nation, itself biset with grave and serious problems.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated Proclamation No.
3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS
MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS,
ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN
ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION." Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of
the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust
and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime; 1
...
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be
given to measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication
of graft and corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under
the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service
as a result of the organization effected under this Proclamation shall, if
entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other
benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and other
properties of all government offices shall be carefully preserved. In
case any office or body is abolished or reorganized pursuant to this
Proclamation, its FUNDS and properties shall be transferred to the
office or body to which its powers, functions and responsibilities
substantially pertain. 2
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25, 1986,
when the President, in her first act in office, called upon "all appointive public
officials to submit their courtesy resignation(s) beginning with the members of
the Supreme Court."3 Later on, she abolished the Batasang Pambansa4 and
the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet 5 under the 1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and
directives reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which,
with respect to elected local officials, has been challenged in this Court, 6and
two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have likewise been
questioned herein. 7
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17,
"PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION."
Executive Order No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees" the ongoing
government reorganization had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the
separation/replacement of personnel," the following:
 SECTION 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation
replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Mnistry Head
concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of
functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is
unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in
the interest of the service.8
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No. 127,
"REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE." 9 Among other offices,
Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs 10 and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, 11 the Filipino people adopted the new
Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison
issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing the procedure in personnel
placement. It also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the employees covered by Executive
Order 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization
shall be:
a) informed of their re-appointment, or
b) offered another position in the same department or
agency or
c) informed of their termination. 13
On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization Appeals
Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the above
Memorandum. 14 On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed
several notices to various Customs officials, in the tenor as follows:
Sir:
Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of
implementing the Reorganization Program under Executive Order No.
127.
Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers and
employees of the Department of Finance, or the Bureau of Customs in
particular, shall continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents
whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or
who are not re- appointed, shall be deemed separated from the
service.
In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are
hereby terminated as of February 28, 1988. Subject to the normal
clearances, you may receive the retirement benefits to which you may
be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated list
compiled by the Civil Service Commission so that you may be given
priority for future employment with the Government as the need arises.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd)
SALVADOR M.
MISON
Commissioner15
As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients of these notices:
1. CESAR DARIO
2. VICENTE FERIA, JR. 22. PORFIRIO TABINO

3. ADOLFO CASARENO 23. JOSE BARREDO

4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA 24. ROBERTO ARNALDO

5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU 25. ESTER TAN

6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA 26. PEDRO BAKAL

7. RENATO DE JESUS 27. ROSARIO DAVID

8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA 28. RODOLFO AFUANG

9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES 29. LORENZO CATRE

10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ 30. LEONCIA CATRE

11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA 31. ROBERTO ABADA

12. SUBAER PACASUM 32. ABACA, SISINIO T.

13. ZENAIDA LANARIA 33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.

14. JOSE B. ORTIZ 34. ABADIANO, JOSE P

15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR 35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.

16. CORNELIO NAPA 36. ABIOG, ELY F.

17. PABLO B. SANTOS 37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.

18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ 38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.

19. DALISAY BAUTISTA 39. AGRES, ANICETO

20. LEONARDO JOSE 40. AGUILAR, FLOR

21. ALBERTO LONTOK 41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.

42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T. 62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P.

43. ALANO, ALEX P. 63. ASUNCION, VICTOR R.

44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR. 64. ATANGAN, LORNA S.

45. ALBANO, ROBERT B. 65. ANTIENZA, ALEXANDER R.

46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G. 66. BACAL URSULINO C.

47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F. 67. BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE Z.

48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R. 68. BANTA, ALBERTO T.

49. AMISTAD, RUDY M. 69. BARROS, VICTOR C.

50. AMOS, FRANCIS F. 70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A.

51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V. 71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.

52. ANGELES, RICARDO S. 72. BELENO, ANTONIO B.

53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H. 73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D.

54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L. 74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S.

55. ARABE, MELINDA M. 75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G.

56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S, JR. 76. BRAVO, VICTOR M.

57. ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR. 77. BULEG, BALILIS R.

58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M, JR. 78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M.

59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P. 79. CALVO, HONESTO G.

60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S. 80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V.

61. ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T. 81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C.

82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G. 102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.

83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z. 103. DANDAL, EDEN F.

84. CARLOS, LORENZO B. 104. DATUHARON, SATA A.

85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U. 105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L.

86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M. 106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA

87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J. 107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.

88. CATELO, ROGELIO B. 108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.

89. CATURLA, MANUEL B. 109. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.

90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F. 110. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.

91. CINCO, LUISITO 111. DE LA PEÑ;A, LEONARDO

92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR. 112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO

93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S. 113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.

94. CORNETA, VICENTE S. 114. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T.

95. CORONADO, RICARDO S. 115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.

96. CRUZ, EDUARDO S. 116. DIZON, FELICITAS A.

97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A, 117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M.

98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B. 118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J.

99. CRUZADO,NORMA M. 119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.

100. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M. 120. DUAY, JUANA G.

101. DABON, NORMA M. 121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F.

122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P. 142. GARCIA, JUAN L.

123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A 143. GAVIOIA, LILIAN V.

124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR. 144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G.

125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E. 145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.

126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H. 146. GRATE, FREDERICK R.

127. ESPINA, FRANCO A. 147. GREGORIO, LAURO P.

128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C. 148. GUARTICO, AMMON H.

129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I. 149. GUIANG, MYRNA N.

130. FELIX, ERNESTO G. 150. GUINTO, DELFIN C.

131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M. 151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.

132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C. 152. HONRALES, LORETO N.

133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A. 153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H.

134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S, JR. 154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E.

135. FUENTES, RUDY L. 155. IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C.

136. GAGALANG, RENATO V. 156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C.

137. GALANG, EDGARDO R. 157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C.

138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C. 158. ISAIS, RAY C.

139. GAN, ALBERTO P 159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B.

140. GARCIA, GILBERT M. 160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M.

141. GARCIA, EDNA V. 161. JAVIER, AMADOR L.

162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S. 182. LUMBA, OLIVIA R.

163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R. 183. MACAISA, BENITO T.

164. JOVEN, MEMIA A. 184. MACAISA, ERLINDA C.

165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V. 185. MAGAT, ELPIDIO

166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A. 186. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P.

167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F. 187. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.

168. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR. 188. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D.

169. KOH, NANIE G. 189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V.

170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S. 190. MALLI, JAVIER M.

171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M. 191. MANAHAN, RAMON S.

172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M. 192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R.

173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G. 193. MARAVILLA, GIL B.

174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G. 194. MARCELO, GIL C.

175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A. 195. MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V.

176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M. 196. MAROKET ,JESUS C.

177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A. 197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.

178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R. 198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.

179. LIPIO, VICTOR O. 199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.

180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z. 200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.

181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L. 201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.

202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T. 222. NAVARRO, HENRY L.

203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E. 223. NEJAL FREDRICK E.

204. MEDINA, NESTOR M. 224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.

205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S. 225. NIEVES, RUFINO A.

206. MENDAVIA, AVELINO 226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T.

207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G. 227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q.

208. MIL, RAY M. 228. ORTEGA, ARLENE R.

209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L. 229. ORTEGA, JESUS R.

210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G. 230. OSORIO, ABNER S.

211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F. 231. PAPIO FLORENTINO T. II

212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III 232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A.

213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR. 233. PASTOR, ROSARIO

214. MORALES, CONCHITA D. L 234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L.

215. MORALES, NESTOR P. 235. PEÑ;A, AIDA C.

216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S. 236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B.

217. MUNAR, JUANITA L. 237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M.

218. MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R. 238. PRE, ISIDRO A.

219. MURILLO, MANUEL M. 239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.

220. NACION, PEDRO R. 240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.

221. NAGAL, HENRY N. 241. PURA, ARNOLD T.

242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I. 262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S.

243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR. 263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.

244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C. 264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.

245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P. 265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M.

246. RANADA, RODRIGO C. 266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B.

247. RARAS, ANTONIO A. 267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C.

248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V. 268. SEKITO, COSME B JR.

249. RAZAL, BETTY R. 269. SIMON, RAMON P.

250. REGALA, PONCE F. 270. SINGSON, MELENCIO C.

251. REYES, LIBERATO R. 271. SORIANO, ANGELO L.

252. REYES, MANUEL E. 272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.

253. REYES, NORMA Z. 273. SUNICO, ABELARDO T .

254. REYES, TELESPORO F. 274. TABIJE, EMMA B.

255. RIVERA, ROSITA L. 275. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE

256. ROCES, ROBERTO V. 276. TAN, ESTER S.

257. ROQUE, TERESITA S. 277. TAN, JULITA S.

258. ROSANES, MARILOU M. 278. TECSON, BEATRIZ B.

259. ROSETE, ADAN I. 279. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.

260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR. 280. TURINGAN, ENRICO T JR.

261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G. 281. UMPA, ALI A.

282. VALIC, LUCIO E. 302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.

283. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B. 303. GALAROSA, RENATO

284. VELARDE, EDGARDO C. 304. MALAWI, MAUYAG

285. VERA, AVELINO A. 305. MONTENEGRO, FRANSISCO M.

286. VERAME, OSCAR E. 306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.

287. VIADO, LILIAN T. 307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO P.

288. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K 308. TEMPLO, CELSO

289. VILLALON, DENNIS A. 309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.

290. VILLAR, LUZ L. 310. VALDEZ, NORA M.

291. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V. Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the
petitioner in G.R. No. 81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva Julian
292. VILLAR, LUZ L. C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa,
Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R. Geluz Messrs.
293. ZATA, ANGELA JR. Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr. Jose B.
Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin
294. ACHARON, CRISTETO Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok,
Porfirio Tabino Jose Barredo, Roberto Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro
Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,, Ms. Leoncia Catre, and
295. ALBA, RENATO B. Roberto Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last
279 16 individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310.
296. AMON, JULITA C.
As far as the records will likewise reveal, 17 a total of 394 officials and
297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C. employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of
separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the
298. CALO, RAYMUNDO M. Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service
Commission. The first thirty-one mentioned above came directly to this Court.
299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling
300. DONATO, ESTELITA P. ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees, the 279 private respondents
in G.R. No. 85310, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
301. DONATO, FELIPE S
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
 1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of
comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of Customs
without loss of seniority rights;
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned from the
dates of their illegal termination based on the rates under the
approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former
salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as
an exoneration of the appellants from any accusation of wrongdoing
and, therefore, their reappointments are without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending
administrative cases, and where investigations have been
finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions;
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against
appellants with derogatory reports or information if evidence so
warrants.
SO ORDERED. 18
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor General,
filed a motion for reconsideration Acting on the motion, the Civil Service
Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. 19
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari proceedings
with this Court, docketed, as above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this Court.
On November 16,1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed the
appeal (from the resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more
employees, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately reappointed to positions of
comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of Customs
without loss of seniority rights; and
2. Appellants be paid their back salaries to be reckoned from
the date of their illegal termination based on the rates under the
approved new staffing pattern but not lower than their former
salaries.
This action of the Commission should not, however, be interpreted as
an exoneration of the herein appellants from any accusation of any
wrongdoing and therefore, their reappointments are without prejudice
to:
1. Proceeding with investigation of appellants with pending
administrative cases, if any, and where investigations have
been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate decisions;
and
2. The filing of appropriate administrative complaints against
appellant with derogatory reports or information, if any, and if
evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 20
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution in this Court; his petitioner has been docketed herein
as G.R. No. 86241. The employees ordered to be reinstated are Senen
Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bemardo Quintong,Gregorio Reyes, and Romulo
Badillo. 21
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE
SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22was
signed into law. Under Section 7, thereof:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service
Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of
this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be
without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of
separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and
employees, including casuals and temporary employees, who have
been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be
paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other benefits
under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the
effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt of the
 resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That
application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has
been made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who
are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in
the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service. Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority
of payment out of the savings of the department or agency
concerned. 23
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners
appointed by Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization
subject of this controversy, petitioned the Court to contest the validity of the
statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 83737.
On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil Service
Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30,1988 Resolution filed their
own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the said
Resolution. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 85335.
On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all seven petitions.
On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for hearing on January 12,
1989. At the said hearing, the parties, represented by their counsels (a) retired
Justice Ruperto Martin; (b) retired Justice Lino Patajo. (c) former Dean Froilan
Bacungan (d) Atty. Lester Escobar (e) Atty. Faustino Tugade and (f) Atty.
Alexander Padilla, presented their arguments. Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez argued on behalf of the Commissioner of Customs (except in G.R.
85335, in which he represented the Bureau of Customs and the Civil Service
Commission). Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla also appeared and argued
lâwphî1.ñèt
as amicus curiae Thereafter, we resolved to require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda which they did in due time.
There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a
government reorganization — insofar as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs — by mandate not only of the
Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders
decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority
under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted that
under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a
government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to certain
conditions. 24
The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the validity of a
reorganization per se the only question being, as shall be later seen: What is
the nature and extent of this government reorganization?
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue, 25 and other
technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the demands of public
interest, including the need for stability in the public service,"26 and because of
the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine
civil service and the rights of public servants.
The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution dated June 30, 1988 had attained a character of
finality for failure of Commissioner Mison to apply for judicial review or ask for
reconsideration seasonalbly under Presidential Decree No. 807, 27 or under
Republic Act No. 6656, 28 or under the Constitution, 29 are likewise rejected.
The records show that the Bureau of Customs had until July 15, 1988 to ask
for reconsideration or come to this Court pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential
Decree No. 807. The records likewise show that the Solicitor General filed a
motion for reconsideration on July 15, 1988.30 The Civil Service Commission
issued its Resolution denying reconsideration on September 20, 1988; a copy
of this Resolution was received by the Bureau on September 23,
1988.31 Hence the Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to elevate the matter
on certiorari to this Court.32 Since the Bureau's petition was filed on October
20, 1988, it was filed on time.
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310) raises
no jurisdictional questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 33 We find that the questions
raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are, indeed, proper
for certiorari, if by "jurisdictional questions" we mean questions having to do
with "an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, or omission
to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational
deliberation, 34 as distinguished from questions that require "digging into the
merits and unearthing errors of judgment 35 which is the office, on the other
hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said Rules. What cannot be denied is the
fact that the act of the Civil Service Commission of reinstating hundreds of
Customs employees Commissioner Mison had separated, has implications not
only on the entire reorganization process decreed no less than by the
Provisional Constitution, but on the Philippine bureaucracy in general; these
implications are of such a magnitude that it cannot be said that — assuming
that the Civil Service Commission erred — the Commission committed a plain
"error of judgment" that Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching
of Aratuc — as regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the
Civil Service Commission — which is that judgments of the Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
In Aratuc we declared:
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications
that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of
the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body
charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections.
The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite
knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings
of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court'. And
since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the
Commission's actuations be instead 'brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the
nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari,
compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.36
We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on Elections
and the Civil Service Commission (or the Commission on Audit for that matter)
in terms of the constitutional intent to leave the constitutional bodies alone in
the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with respect to the former, and
the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of government accounts,
with respect to the Commission on Audit). As the poll body is the "sole
judge" 37 of all election cases, so is the Civil Service Commission the single
arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil service.
It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973
Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari," 38 which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically
connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be subject to review
by the Supreme Court,' " 39 which in turn suggests an appeal by petition for
review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from
the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.
While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission are
"final and executory"40 and hence, unappealable, under Rule
65, certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal. 41
Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison petition (G.R. No. 85310) which
clearly charges the Civil Service Commission with grave abuse of discretion, a
proper subject of certiorari, although it may not have so stated in explicit terms.
As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of time, we reiterate that
it has been filed seasonably. It is to be stressed that the Solicitor General had
thirty days from September 23, 1988 (the date the Resolution, dated
September 20,1988, of the Civil Service Commission, denying reconsideration,
was received) to commence the instant certiorari proceedings. As we stated,
under the Constitution, an aggrieved party has thirty days within which to
challenge "any decision, order, or ruling" 42 of the Commission. To say that the
period should be counted from the Solicitor's receipt of the main Resolution,
dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should not have asked for
reconsideration But to say that is to deny him the right to contest (by a motion
for reconsideration) any ruling, other than the main decision, when, precisely,
the Constitution gives him such a right. That is also to place him at a "no-win"
situation because if he did not move for a reconsideration, he would have been
faulted for demanding certiorari too early, under the general rule that a motion
for reconsideration should preface a resort to a special civil action. 43 Hence,
we must reckon the thirty-day period from receipt of the order of denial.
We come to the merits of these cases.
G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335:
The Case for the Employees
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy
Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his relief on orders of
Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions the
legality of his dismiss, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127, supra, hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
SEC. 59. New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this Executive
Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits
unless in the meantime they are separated from government service
 pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom
Constitution.
The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry shall be
approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the
authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those
incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those
separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary
for every year of service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof
favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received but in no case
shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.
No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order to enjoin the separation/replacement of
any officer or employee effected under this Executive Order.44
a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked. He
avers that he could not have been legally deemed to be an "[incumbent] whose
[position] [is] not included therein or who [is] not reappointed"45 to justify his
separation from the service. He contends that neither the Executive Order
(under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing pattern proposed
by the Secretary of Finance 46 abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. 47 Nor can it be said, so he further
maintains, that he had not been "reappointed" 48 (under the second paragraph
of the section) because "[[r]eappointment therein presupposes that the position
to which it refers is a new one in lieu of that which has been abolished or
although an existing one, has absorbed that which has been abolished." 49 He
claims, finally, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss
public officials without cause ended on February 25, 1987,50 and that
thereafter, public officials enjoyed security of tenure under the provisions of the
1987 Constitution.51
Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy
Commissioner at the Bureau until his separation directed by Commissioner
Mison. And like Dario he claims that under the 1987 Constitution, he has
acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22,
1986 — during the effectivity of the Provisional Constitution. He adds that
under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,"52 the Commissioner
of Customs has the power "[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel, except those
appointed by the President," 53 and that his position, which is that of a
Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for
purposes of reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of
the Philippines, say, on the other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to
end corruption at the Bureau of Customs and that since there is no finding that
they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be validly dismissed from the service.
The Case for Commissioner Mison
In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's resolution in Jose
v. Arroyo54 in which the following statement appears in the last paragraph
thereof:
The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is violative of
the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service
employees security of tenure overlooks the provisions of Section 16,
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorize the
removal of career civil service employees "not for cause but as a result
of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this
Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even
after the ratification of the Constitution, and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without cause as a
result of such reorganization.55
For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are
allegedly no defense. He further states that the deadline prescribed by the
Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has been superseded by the
1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56 which allows
a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very Court has so
declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the employees'
argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable (in particular, to
Dario and Feria in the sense that retention in the Bureau, under the Executive
Order, depends on either retention of the position in the new staffing pattern or
reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not
been reappointed, they had been considered legally separated. Moreover,
Mison proffers that under Section 59 incumbents are considered on holdover
status, "which means that all those positions were considered vacant." 57The
Solicitor General denies the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la
Paz 58 because that case supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a
separation. He rejects, finally, the force and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17
and 39 for the reason that Executive Order No. 17, which was meant to
implement the Provisional Constitution, 59had ceased to have force and effect
upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order
No. 39, the dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations
now under question were "not for cause" and were a result of government
reorganize organization decreed by Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic
Act No. 6656, he expresses doubts on the constitutionality of the grant of
retroactivity therein (as regards the reinforcement of security of tenure) since
the new Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity.
G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241
The Position of Commissioner Mison
Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of the Civil
Service Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, reinstating the
265 customs employees above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated September
20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the Resolution, dated November
16, 1988, reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's arguments are as
follows:
1. The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a
"progressive" 60 reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire
government bureaucracy" 61 following the people power revolution of 1986;
2. There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various guidelines
issued by the President, in particular, as to deliberation, and selection of
personnel for appointment under the new staffing pattern;
3. The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of Executive Order
No. 127, on mere holdover standing, "which means that all positions are
declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No. 127 under
the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
The position of the Civil Service Commission is as follows:
1. Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in personnel or
redundancy of functions; there is no showing that the reorganization in
question has been carried out for either purpose — on the contrary, the
dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere service of notices;
2. The current Customs reorganization has not been made according to
Malacañ;ang guidelines; information on file with the Commission shows that
Commissioner Mison has been appointing unqualified personnel;
3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127, did not countenance
illegal removals;
4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in the course of
reorganizations.
The Court's ruling
Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of. —
I.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987
Constitution. We quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from the service not
for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution shag be entitled to appropriate
separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them
under the laws of general application in force at the time of their
separation. In lieul thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be
considered for employment in the Government or in any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision
 also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy, had been accepted. 63
The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It is the
only provision — in so far as it mentions removals not for cause — that would
arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It is the
single existing law on reorganization after the ratification of the 1987 Charter,
except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10, 1988.
[Nota been Executive Orders No. 116 (covering the Ministry of Agriculture &
Food), 117 (Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports), 119 (Health), 120
(Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare & Development), 124 (Public Works &
Highways), 125 transportation & Communications), 126 (Labor &
Employment), 127 (Finance), 128 (Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian
Reform), 131 (Natural Resources), 132 (Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade &
Industry) were all promulgated on January 30,1987, prior to the adoption of the
Constitution on February 2, 1987].64
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect
reorganizations under the past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a
mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices,
bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935
Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and employees in the existing Government of the
Philippine Islands shall continue in office until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their respective
office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if
such appointment is made within a period of one year from the date of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the
Republic of the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise
provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the
Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective
offices upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under
the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986.67
Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of this
Constitution," there is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the 1987
Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old
to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of
tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from
abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization
carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the
latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith.68 In case of
removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates,
the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because
the Constitution allows it.
Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career
public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic" vacancy-
authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by
provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987
Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to dismiss
public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter envisioned an
"automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms, as its 1935, 1973,
and 1986 counterparts had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The Constitution
meant to continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of the
Revolutionary Government), in the sense that the latter provides for
"automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to those 'automatic"
vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization — the first, to its conferment or authorization under
Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation
on its effectivity date (February 2, 1987). But as we asserted, if the intent of
lâwphî1.ñèt
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution were to extend the effects
of reorganize tion under the Freedom Constitution, it should have said so in
clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of reorganization
when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first
reorganization.
Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation for
victims" of constitutional revamps — whether under the Freedom or existing
Constitution — and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganization. We
turn to the records of the Constitutional Commission:
INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA
On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a specific
reference to Proclamation No. 3 and not merely state "result of the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution', Mr. Suarez,
on behalf of the Committee, replied that it is necessary, inasmuch as
there are two stages of reorganization covered by the Section.
Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposal of the Commission on
Government Reorganization have not been implemented yet, it would
be better to use the phrase "reorganization before or after the
ratification of the Constitution' to simplify the Section. Mr. Suarez
instead suggested the phrase "as a result of the reorganization
effected before or after the ratification of the Constitution' on the
understanding that the provision would apply to employees terminated
because of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 and
even those affected by the reorganization during the Marcos regime.
Additionally, Mr. Suarez pointed out that it is also for this reason that
the Committee specified the two Constitutions the Freedom
Constitution — and the 1986 [1987] Constitution. 69
Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from
the service. And the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of
(1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986,
(2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of
career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations
have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily
exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for
cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one
negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be for cause, and
2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations
mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional
Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to
February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only mean, then, that whatever reorganization is
taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon
the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it can not be legitimately
stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the
Revolutionary Government had started. We are through with reorganization
under the Freedom Constitution — the first stage. We are on the second stage
— that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the
permanent basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, supra, but is apparent from the Charter's own words. It also
warrants our holding in Esguerra and Palma-Fernandez, in which we
categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and
employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this reorganization is no
"purge" like the execrated reorganizations under martial rule. And, of course,
we also have the democratic character of the Charter itself.
Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as he contends that the
reorganization is open-ended ("progressive"), had it been a reorganization
under the revolutionary authority, specifically of the Provisional Constitution.
For then, the power to remove government employees would have been truly
wide ranging and limitless, not only because Proclamation No. 3 permitted it,
but because of the nature of revolutionary authority itself, its totalitarian
tendencies, and the monopoly of power in the men and women who wield it.
What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense
revolutionary powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her
rule. This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17, which established
safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that accompanies
reorganizations — notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom
were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would have
been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief Executive saw, as we
said, the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in the government rank
and file that reorganization was causing, and prescribed guidelines for
personnel action. Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees,
particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the
rules and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision
to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and performance
meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and
to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are
separated from the government service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals
should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to
render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore be
considered. We quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same
subject, I have ordered that there will be no further layoffs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a
manner that would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as
Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would
have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau
left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his "progressive" reorganization
theory, he would still have to come to terms with the Chief Executive's
subsequent directives moderating the revolutionary authority's plenary power
to separate government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations of;
Jose v. Arroyo, clarified. —
The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves, supposedly extended
the effects of government reorganization under the Provisional Constitution to
the regime of the 1987 Constitution. Jose v. Arroyo73 is said to be the authority
for this argument. Evidently, if Arroyo indeed so ruled, Arroyo would be
inconsistent with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra and the later holding
of Palma-Fernandez. The question, however, is: Did Arroyo, in fact, extend the
effects of reorganization under the revolutionary Charter to the era of the new
Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be explained. First, the
opinion expressed therein that "[b]y virtue of said provision the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even
after the ratification of this constitution and career civil service employees may
be separated from the service without cause as a result of such
reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an obiter dictum. We dismissed Jose's
petition 75 primarily because it was "clearly premature, speculative, and purely
anticipatory, based merely on newspaper reports which do not show any direct
or threatened injury," 76 it appearing that the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs had not been, then, set in motion. Jose therefore had no cause for
complaint, which was enough basis to dismiss the petition. The remark anent
separation "without cause" was therefore not necessary for the disposition of
the case. In Morales v. Parades,77 it was held that an obiter dictum "lacks the
force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such."78
Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma Fernandez is a full-
blown decision, although both are en banc cases. While a resolution of the
Court is no less forceful than a decision, the latter has a special weight.
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v.
Arroyo was promulgated on August 11, 1987 while Palma-Fernandez was
decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well-established that a later judgment
supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution
allude to two stages of the reorganization, the first stage being the
reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 — which had already been
consummated — the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory
provisions themselves — which is underway. Hence, when we spoke,
in Arroyo, of reorganization after the effectivity of the new Constitution, we
referred to the second stage of the reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot be
said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom Constitution to its
1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-
Fernandez (or Esguerra).
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987
Constitution is not as stern as reorganization under the prior Charter. Whereas
the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed constraints, envisioned a
purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization inferred under the
new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution seeks to usher in a
democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratiaargumenti that Section 16
is an exception to due process and no-removal-"except for cause provided by
law" principles enshrined in the very same 1987 Constitution, 79 which may
possibly justify removals "not for cause," there is no contradiction in terms here
because, while the former Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the
present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result
of reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for
"automatic" vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith — a test not
obviously required under the revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but
a test well-established in democratic societies and in this government under a
democratic Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive Order No.
127 after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a
reorganization provided that it is done in good faith. Otherwise, security of
tenure would be an insuperable implement. 80
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they
are pursued in good faith. 81 As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
"good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case,
security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab
initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the
existence of ample funds. 83
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of
good faith, we are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring.
Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good faith is still removal
"not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for
disciplinary action.**
Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime,
is judged from the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656,
we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed
except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization,
a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where there
is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in
terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where
there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. 84
It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner Mison's
good faith, or lack of it.
Reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,
Lack of Good Faith in. —
The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the
Customs hierarchy — except for the change of personnel — has occurred,
which would have justified (an things being equal) the contested dismisses.
The contention that the staffing pattern at the Bureau (which would have
furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the same s pattern
prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127 already prevailing when
Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm, has not been successfully
contradicted 85 There is no showing that legitimate structural changes have
been made — or a reorganization actually undertaken, for that matter — at the
Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which would have validly
prompted him to hire and fire employees. There can therefore be no actual
reorganization to speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel pure and simple.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394
Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. 86 This
betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did so, furthermore,
in defiance of the President's directive to halt further layoffs as a consequence
of reorganization. 87Finally, he was aware that layoffs should observe the
procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy
to the Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means with which it
was implemented is not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of. —
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that
under Section 59 thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not
included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from
the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have not
been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the
Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive
Order No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs
may "appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the
President." 89
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente
Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they
being Presidential appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered inoperative
according to our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 had
been on a mere holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by them
had become vacant. In Palma-Fernandez, we said in no uncertain terms:
The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of
office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the
performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity and could be
transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights,
is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was
conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25
February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to
February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De
Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31
August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on security
of tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison from
carrying out a reorganization under the transitory provisions of the 1987
Constitution. But such a reorganization should be subject to the criterion of
good faith.
Resume. —
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected
or appointed, without cause but only before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-
Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection, Section 59 (on non-
reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a basis
for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and
retirement benefits or upon their option be given reemployment opportunities
(CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the
Government resulting in the separation of career civil service employees
[CONST. (1987), supra] provided, that such a reorganization is made in good
faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No.
83737 is a challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is
argued that the Act, insofar as it strengthens security of tenure 91 and as far as
it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs counter to the transitory provisions of
the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatament of
employees separated without "a valid cause and after due notice and
hearing" 93 is not contrary to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution.
The Court reiterates that although the Charter's transitory provisions mention
separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must nevertheless be on
account of a valid reorganization and which do not come about automatically.
Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that
the statute itself recognizes removals without cause. However, it also
acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using the artifice of
reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For this reason, it has installed
safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about the Act.

We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's replacements would sustain.

We also commisserate with them. But our concern is the greater wrong
inflicted on the dismissed employees on account of their regal separation from
the civil service.

WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30, 1988, SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER
16, 1988, INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8,
1989, INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.

THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE
GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE
DISMISSED.

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE

EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED
JANUARY 26, 1988.

THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE

APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR
POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT
MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.

NO COSTS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989 Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported
deposition to support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search
THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner, warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the
vs. affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. 5
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ,
JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the
(MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents. Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search
warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
[effective "for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.
K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.
In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be:

1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the

SARMIENTO, J.:
petitioners;
The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's
2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State
arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in
Prosecutor;
the country (per Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as null and void two Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 1 and May 20, 1988, 2 reversing its 3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic
Decision, dated October 24, 1986. 3 The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had
Trial Court, 4 as well as its Order, dated August 21, 1985. The Resolution, dated September 24, 1987 already been implemented and executed. 8
disposed of, and granted, the private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.'s motion for reconsideration
of the October 24, 1986 Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn, denied the petitioner's own
motion for reconsideration. On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and
held:
The facts are not in controversy. We quote:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and
assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are
hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately all the
convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, personal properties and documents seized by them from the
160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., petitioners by virtue of the aforementioned search warrants.
Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans
Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, SO ORDERED. 9
Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine
Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin
On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.
Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P.
Lucman Enterprises.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the
respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty.
lower court.
Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of
the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of
Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:
 Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express
powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign
exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No.
1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks
with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar
had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question
null and void.
Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor
General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force is appealable to the Office of the President.10
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a
reconsideration, on the question primarily of whether or not the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer' countenanced
by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed
itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its
Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the
Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals "committed
grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction," 11 specifically:
a) In deviating from the settled policy and rulings of the
Supreme Court that no Regional Trial Courts may countermand
or restrain the enforcement of lawful writs or decrees issued by
a quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the
PADS Task Force;
b) For resorting to judicial legislation to arrive at its erroneous
basis for reconsidering its previous Decision dated October 24,
1986 (see Annex "I") and thus promulgated the questioned
Resolutions (Annexes "A" and "B"), which violated the
constitutional doctrine on separation of powers;
c) In not resolving directly the other important issues raised by
the petitioner in its Petition in CA-G.R. No. 08622-SP despite
the fact that petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently and
convincingly that respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned
Orders in Special Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes "C" and
'D"), committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in
excess of jurisdiction:
1. In ruling that (a) the description of the things to be seized as
stated in the contested search warrant were too general which
allegedly render the search warrants null and void; (b) the
applications for the contested search warrants actually charged
two offenses in contravention of the 2nd paragraph, Section 3,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; and (c) this case has not
become moot and academic, even if the contested search
warrants had already been fully implemented with positive
results; and
2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been
granted under PD 1936 'judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction. 12
We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential questions that confront us
are- (i) is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body,
and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and
accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and (ii) may the said presidential
body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution questions we take
up seriatim.**
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is
endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute
foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No.
1883." 13 "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which are
decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation on the charges
of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among
others, and depending upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding
information in court of Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
effective August 26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication ." 14
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, 15 was of the opinion that "[t]he grant of quasi-judicial
powers to petitioner did not diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a
law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this
function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two other coordinate branches
of the government, but solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law in every case which come
before them." 16
This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner
puts to question is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over
the private respondent's petition below and its subsequent countermand of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search and seizure, for
the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and
co-equal with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a
jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's
petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of
Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is
whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may
undertake such a review.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 17 the Court of Appeals exercises:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Court
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1)
of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 18
xxx xxx xxx
Under the present Constitution, with respect to its provisions on Constitutional
Commissions, it is provided, in part that:
... Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 19
On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. 20
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise:
... The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the
Regional Trial Court to handle exclusively criminal cases,
juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian case, urban
land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of
quasi- judicial bodies and agencies and/or such other special
cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice. 21
xxx xxx xxx
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: 22
... The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now, Court
of Appeals] from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as
the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg.
129. 23
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision
of existing law or Rule of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, decision, or
judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of
Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred
and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the
Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act
Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the
"Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the
Securities and Exchange Commission; the Social Security
Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and
the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the
Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein
provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed
questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds
of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 24
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special
courts, 25 jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding
amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations
Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, 'reviewable by this Court through a petition for
certiorari and not by way of appeal." 26
Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of the Commission of Land
Registration, en consults, are appealable to the Court of Appeals. 27
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise
appealable to the Appellate Court, 28 and so are decisions of the Social Security
Commission.29
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain
administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are
co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and
logically, beyond the control of the latter.
As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one
whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than
the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than
a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule making." 30 The most common types of such bodies have
been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the
government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special
privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on
Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans
Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to carry on certain government
functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of
Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central
Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is performing some business service for the public,
like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National
Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to regulate business affected with public
interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent
Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking under the police power to regulate
private business and individuals, like the Securities &
Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of
Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation
Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to adjust individual controversies
because of some strong social policy involved, such as the
National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian
Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the
Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards,
Women and Minors Bureau. 31
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims
and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to
the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become
executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's
organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise
quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its
judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar
salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, 32 it is tasked alone
by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. We quote:
SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force.-The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force,
hereinafter referred to as Task Force, shall have the following
powers and authority:
 a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute
all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports
and the undervaluation of exports;
b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts, records,
statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be
necessary in the conduct of investigation;
c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state
prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to
assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and
responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct
hearings, receive evidence, both oral and documentary, in all
cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or
regulations; and submit reports containing findings and
recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;
d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate
penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and to
adopt such measures and take such actions as may be
necessary to implement this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the
case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions
as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found
committing or to have committed acts constituting
blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided
said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances
constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign
exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the
country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted
against said person before any other judicial regulatory or
administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1883.
The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of
the Presidential Anti- Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in
Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign
exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials,
uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits,
interest rates and such other relevant factors.
The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain
Twenty percent (20 %) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be
entitled to Twenty percent (20 %) of the fine. Should there be
no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty
percent (40 %) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the
general funds of the National government. The amount of the
fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its
Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task
Force . 33
The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with respect to
the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative
intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses
punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is
simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing
of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry
preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate
authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify
haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government either, the
executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute cases involving "ill-
gotten wealth". It had been vested with enormous powers, like the issuance of
writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and similar processes, but that did not,
on account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as defined by
recognized authorities. It cannot pronounce judgement of the accused's
culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan. 34
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial
body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial
Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its
standing at par with the said court.
In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's
resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.
It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential Task Force has been
empowered to issue warrants of arrest, search, and seizure, makes it, ergo, a
"semi-court". Precisely, it is the objection interposed by the private respondent,
whether or not it can under the 1973 Charter, issue such kinds of processes.
It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest
and search are exclusive upon judges. 35 To that extent, the case has become moot and
academic. Nevertheless, since the question has been specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable to
resolve it as the final arbiter of legal controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution during
whose regime the case was commenced.
Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so
unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power to
issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of
legislation have been at best controversial. In Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 36 a 1975
decision, this Court ruled that a fiscal has no authority to issue search warrants, but held in the same vein that,
by virtue of the responsible officer" clause of the 1973 Bill of Rights, "any lawful officer authorized by law can
issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest.37 Authorities, however, have continued to express reservations
whether or not fiscals may, by statute, be given such a power. 38
Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, 39 in
which we categorically averred: Until now only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest." 40 "No law or
presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular responsible
officer ." 41
Apparently, Villaluz had settled the debate, but the same question persisted
following this Courts subsequent rulings upholding the President's alleged
emergency arrest powers .42 [Mr. Justice Hugo Gutierrez would hold, however, that a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) is (was) not a species of "arrest" in its technical sense, and that the (deposed) Chief
Executive, in issuing one, does not do so in his capacity as a "responsible officer" under the 1973 Charter, but
rather, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in times of emergency, or in order to carry out the
deportation of undesirable aliens.43 In the distinguished Justice's opinion then, these are acts that can be
done without need of judicial intervention because they are not, precisely, judicial but Presidential actions.]
In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the mayor has been made a "responsible officer' by
the Local Government Code, 45 but had ceased to be one with the approval of the 1987 Constitution
according judges sole authority to issue arrest and search warrants. But in the same breath, we did not rule
the grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the provisions of the former Constitution. We were agreed,
though, that the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of
approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 46
In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the respondent Court relied on
American jurisprudence, notably, Katz v. United States, 47 Johnson v. United
States, 48 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire 49 in which the American Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors
(like the petitioner) cannot be given such powers because of their incapacity for a "detached scrutiny" 50 of the
cases before them. We affirm the Appellate Court.
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or
was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be
said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of
probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a
prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office
"is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of
the person accused," 51 he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit
him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own
right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible
officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be
delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give
that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself
makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are
not saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or
any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty.
Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only
skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and independence
comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can
in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under
the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of due process,
notably, the assurance to the respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges
against him prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his property. We add
that the exclusion is also demanded by the principle of separation of powers
on which our republican structure rests. Prosecutors exercise essentially an
executive function (the petitioner itself is chaired by the Minister, now
Secretary, of Trade and Industry), since under the Constitution, the President
has pledged to execute the laws. 52 As such, they cannot be made to issue judicial processes
without unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the courts.
At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all questions on the matter,
although the Court hopes that this disposition has clarified a controversy that
had generated often bitter debates and bickerings.
The Court joins the Government in its campaign against the scourge of "dollar-
salting", a pernicious practice that has substantially drained the nation's coffers
and has seriously threatened its economy. We recognize the menace it has
posed (and continues to pose) unto the very stability of the country, the SPOUSES BERNYL G. R. No. 174350
urgency for tough measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and
foremost, the need for cooperation from the citizenry in an all-out campaign. BALANGAUAN &
But while we support the State's efforts, we do so not at the expense of KATHERENE
fundamental rights and liberties and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary BALANGAUAN, Present:
and unreasonable acts of Government. If in the event that as a result of this
ruling, we prove to be an "obstacle" to the vital endeavour of stamping out the Petitioners,
blackmarketing of valuable foreign exchange, we do not relish it and certainly, YNARES-
do not mean it. The Constitution simply does not leave us much choice. SANTIAGO, J.,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
TINGA,*
THE HONORABLE COURT CHICO-NAZARIO, and
OF APPEALS, SPECIAL REYES, JJ.
NINETEENTH (19TH)
DIVISION, CEBU CITY &
THE HONGKONG AND Promulgated:
SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, LTD.,
Respondents. August 13, 2008
x--------------------------------------------
------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Revised Rules of Court assailing the 28 April 2006
Decision[1] and 29 June 2006 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00068, which annulled and set
aside the 6 April 2004[3] and 30 August 2004[4] Resolutions of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 02-9230-I, entitled The
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Katherine
Balangauan, et al. The twin resolutions of the DOJ affirmed, in
essence, the Resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor,[5] Cebu City, which dismissed for lack of probable
cause the criminal complaint for Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa,
filed against petitioner-Spouses Bernyl Balangauan (Bernyl) and
Katherene Balangauan (Katherene) by respondent Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. (HSBC).
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene urge this Court to reverse and set aside the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, Special nineteenth (sic) [19 th] division
(sic), Cebu City (sic) and accordingly, dismiss the complaint
against the [petitioners Bernyl and Katherene] in view of the
absence of probable cause to warrant the filing of an information
before the Court and for utter lack of merit.[6]
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present
case are as follows:
Petitioner Katherene was a Premier Customer Services
Representative (PCSR) of respondent bank, HSBC. As a PCSR,
she managed the accounts of HSBC depositors with Premier
Status. One such client and/or depositor handled by her was
Roger Dwayne York (York).
York maintained several accounts with respondent
HSBC. Sometime in April 2002, he went to respondent HSBCs
Cebu Branch to transact with petitioner Katherene respecting his
Dollar and Peso Accounts. Petitioner Katherene being on
vacation at the time, York was attended to by another
PCSR. While at the bank, York inquired about the status of his
time deposit in the amount of P2,500,000.00. The PCSR
representative who attended to him, however, could not find any
record of said placement in the banks data base.
York adamantly insisted, though, that through petitioner
Katherene, he made a placement of the aforementioned amount
in a higher-earning time deposit. York further elaborated that
petitioner Katherene explained to him that the alleged higher-
earning time deposit scheme was supposedly being offered to
Premier clients only. Upon further scrutiny and examination,
respondent HSBCs bank personnel discovered that: (1) on 18
January 2002, York pre-terminated a P1,000,000.00 time
deposit; (2) there were cash movement tickets and withdrawal
slips all signed by York for the amount of P1,000,000.00; and (3)
there were regular movements in Yorks accounts, i.e., beginning
in the month of January 2002, monthly deposits in the amount
of P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 were made, which York denied
ever making, but surmised were the regular interest earnings
from the placement of the P2,500,000.00.
It was likewise discovered that the above-mentioned
deposits were transacted using petitioner Katherenes computer
and work station using the code or personal password
CEO8. The significance of code CEO8, according to the bank
personnel of respondent HSBC, is that, [i]t is only Ms.
Balangauan who can transact from [the] computer in the work
station CEO-8, as she is provided with a swipe card which she
keeps sole custody of and only she can use, and which she
utilizes for purposes of performing bank transactions from that
computer.[7]
Bank personnel of respondent HSBC likewise recounted in
their affidavits that prior to the filing of the complaint for estafa
and/or qualified estafa, they were in contact with petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene. Petitioner Bernyl supposedly met with
them on two occasions. At first he disavowed any knowledge
regarding the whereabouts of Yorks money but later on admitted
that he knew that his wife invested the funds with Shell
Company. He likewise admitted that he made the phone banking
deposit to credit Yorks account with the P12,500.00 and
the P8,333.33 using their landline telephone. With respect to
petitioner Katherene, she allegedly spoke to the bank personnel
and York on several occasions and admitted that the funds were
indeed invested with Shell Company but that York knew about
this.
So as not to ruin its name and goodwill among its clients,
respondent HSBC reimbursed York the P2,500,000.00.
Based on the foregoing factual circumstances, respondent
HSBC, through its personnel, filed a criminal complaint for
Estafa and/or Qualified Estafa before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Cebu City.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene submitted their joint
counter-affidavit basically denying the allegations contained in
the affidavits of the aforenamed employees of respondent HSBC
as well as that made by York. They argued that the allegations in
the Complaint-Affidavits were pure fabrications. Specifically,
petitioner Katherene denied 1) having spoken on the telephone
with Dy and York; and 2) having admitted to the personnel of
respondent HSBC and York that she took the P2,500,000.00
of York and invested the same with Shell Corporation. Petitioner
Bernyl similarly denied 1) having met with Dy, Iigo, Cortes and
Arcuri; and 2) having admitted to them that York knew about
petitioner Katherenes move of investing the formers money with
Shell Corporation.
Respecting the P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 regular monthly
deposits to Yorks account made using the code CEO8,
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, in their defense, argued that
since it was a deposit, it was her duty to accept the funds for
deposit. As regards Yorks time deposit with respondent HSBC,
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene insisted that the funds therein
were never entrusted to Katherene in the latters capacity as
PCSR Employee of the former because monies deposited at any
bank would not and will not be entrusted to specific bank
employee but to the bank as a whole.
 Following the requisite preliminary investigation,
Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Victor C. Laborte, Prosecutor II
of the OCP, Cebu City, in a Resolution[8] dated 21 February
2003, found no probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and
Katherene liable to stand trial for the criminal complaint of
estafa and/or qualified estafa, particularly Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the ACP recommended the
dismissal of respondent HSBCs complaint.
The ACP explained his finding, viz:
As in any other cases, we may never know the
ultimate truth of this controversy. But on balance, the
evidence on record tend to be supportive of
respondents contention rather than that of complaint.
xxxx
First of all, it is well to dwell on what Mr. York
said in his affidavit. Thus:
`18. For purposes of opening
these two time deposits (sic) accounts,
Ms. Balangauan asked me to sign
several Bank documents on several
occasions, the nature of which I was
unfamiliar with.
`20. I discovered later that these
were withdrawal slips and cash
movement tickets, with which
documents Ms. Balangauan apparently
was able to withdraw the amount from
my accounts, and take the same from the
premises of the Bank.
In determining the credibility of an evidence, it
is well to consider the probability or improbability of
ones statements for it has been said that there is no
test of the truth of human testimony except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience.
Mr. York could not have been that unwary and
unknowingly innocent to claim unfamiliarity with
withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets which
Ms. Balangauan made him to sign on several
occasions. He is a premier client of HSBC
maintaining an account in millions of pesos. A
withdrawal slip and cash movement tickets could not
have had such intricate wordings or terminology so as
to render them non-understandable even to an
ordinary account holder. Mr. York admittedly is a
long-standing client of the bank. Within the period of
long-standing he certainly must have effected some
withdrawals. It goes without saying therefore that the
occasions that Ms. Balangauan caused him to sign
withdrawal slips are not his first encounter with such
kinds of documents.
The one ineluctable conclusion therefore that
can be drawn from the premises is that Mr. York
freely and knowingly knew what was going on with
his money, who has in possession of them and where
it was invested. These take out the elements of deceit,
 fraud, abuse of confidence and without the owners
consent in the crimes charged.
The other leg on which complainants cause of
action stands rest on its claim for sum of money
against respondents allegedly after it reimbursed Mr.
York for his missing account supposedly
taken/withdrawn by Ms. Balangauan. The banks
action against respondents would be a civil suit
against them which apparently it already did after the
bank steps into the shoes of Mr. York and becomes
the creditor of Ms. Balangauan.[9]
The ACP then concluded that:
By and large, the evidence on record do (sic)
not engender enough bases to establish a probable
cause against respondents.[10]
On 1 July 2003, respondent HSBC appealed the above-
quoted resolution and foregoing comment to the Secretary of the
DOJ by means of a Petition for Review.
In a Resolution dated 6 April 2004, the Chief State
Prosecutor, Jovencito R. Zuo, for the Secretary of the DOJ,
dismissed the petition. In denying respondent HSBCs recourse,
the Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Sec. 12 (c) of Department Circular No. 70
dated July 2, 2000 provides that the Secretary of
Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright the
petition if there is no showing of any reversible error
in the questioned resolution.
We carefully examined the petition and its
attachments and found no reversible error that would
justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in
accord with the law and evidence on the matter.
Respondent HSBCs Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied with finality by the DOJ in a lengthier
Resolution dated 30 August 2004.
The DOJ justified its ruling in this wise:
A perusal of the motion reveals no new matter
or argument which was not taken into consideration in
our review of the case. Hence, we find no cogent
reason to reconsider our resolution. Appellant failed
to present any iota of evidence directly showing that
respondent Katherene Balangauan took the money
and invested it somewhere else. All it tried to
establish was that Katherene unlawfully took the
money and fraudulently invested it somewhere else x
x x, because after the withdrawals were made, the
money never reached Roger York as appellant
adopted hook, line and sinker the latters declaration,
despite Yorks signatures on the withdrawal slips
 covering the total amount of P2,500,000.00 x x x.
While appellant has every reason to suspect
Katherene for the loss of the P2,500,000.00 as per
Yorks bank statements, the cash deposits were
identified by the numerals CEO8 and it was only
Katherene who could transact from the computer in
the work station CEO-8, plus alleged photographs
showing Katherene leaving her office at 5:28 p.m.
with a bulky plastic bag presumably containing cash
since a portion of the funds was withdrawn, we do
not, however, dwell on possibilities, suspicion and
speculation. We rule based on hard facts and solid
evidence.
Moreover, an examination of the petition for
review reveals that appellant failed to append thereto
all annexes to respondents urgent manifestations x x x
together with supplemental affidavits of Melanie de
Ocampo and Rex B. Balucan x x x, which are
pertinent documents required under Section 5 of
Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000.[11]
Respondent HSBC then went to the Court of Appeals by
means of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
On 28 April 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision granting respondent HSBCs petition, thereby annulling
and setting aside the twin resolutions of the DOJ.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition
filed in this case. The assailed Resolutions dated April 6,
2004 and August 30, 2004 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
The City Prosecutor of Cebu City is hereby
ORDERED to file the appropriate Information against the
private respondents.[12]
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherenes motion for
reconsideration proved futile, as it was denied by the appellate
court in a Resolution dated 29 June 2006.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene filed the present petition
on the argument that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing and setting aside the resolutions
of the DOJ when: (1) [i]t reversed the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice, Manila dated August 30, 2004 and correspondingly,
gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari filed by HSBC on
April 28, 2006 despite want of probable cause to warrant the
filing of an information against the herein petitioners[13]; (2) [i]t
appreciated the dubious evidence adduced by HSBC albeit the
absence of legal standing or personality of the latter[14]; (3) [i]t
denied the motions for reconsideration on June 29, 2006
notwithstanding the glaring evidence proving the innocence of
the petitioners[15]; (4) [i]t rebuffed the evidence of the herein
petitioners in spite of the fact that, examining such evidence
alone would establish that the money in question was already
withdrawn by Mr. Roger Dwayne York[16]; and (5) [i]t failed to
dismiss outright the petition by HSBC considering that the
required affidavit of service was not made part or attached in the
said petition pursuant to Section 13, Rule 13 in relation to
Section 3, Rule 46, and Section 2, Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court.[17]
Required to comment on the petition, respondent HSBC
remarked that the filing of the present petition is improper and
should be dismissed. It argued that the correct remedy is an
appeal by certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, on the other hand,
asserted in their Reply[18] that the petition filed under Rule 65
was rightfully filed considering that not only questions of law
were raised but questions of fact and error of jurisdiction as
well. They insist that the Court of Appeals clearly usurped into
the jurisdiction and authority of the Public Prosecutor/Secretary
of justice (sic) x x x.[19]
Given the foregoing arguments, there is need to address,
first, the issue of the mode of appeal resorted to by petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene. The present petition is one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Notice that what is being assailed in this recourse is the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April
2006 and 29 June 2006, respectively. The Revised Rules of
Court, particularly Rule 45 thereof, specifically provides that an
appeal by certiorari from the judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the appellate court is by verified petition for
review on certiorari.[20]
In the present case, there is no question that the 28 April
2006 Decision and 29 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals granting the respondent HSBCs petition in CA-G.R.
CEB. SP No. 00068 is already a disposition on the
merits. Therefore, both decision and resolution, issued by the
Court of Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of the
case set before it, and which, under Rule 45, are appealable to
this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, viz:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme
Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is elementary in remedial law that a writ
of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is
available to an aggrieved party. A remedy is considered "plain,
speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioners
from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the
lower court or agency.[21] In this case, appeal was not only
available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.[22]And while it
is true that in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice,[23] this
Court has, before,[24] treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari, particularly if the petition
for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari;[25] this exception
is not applicable to the present factual milieu.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. The petition
shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution appealed
from, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for
new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. x x x.
a party litigant wishing to file a petition for review
on certiorari must do so within 15 days from receipt of the
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be appealed. In this
case, petitioners Bernyl and Katherenes motion for
reconsideration of the appellate courts Resolution was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 29 June 2006, a
copy of which was received by petitioners on 4 July 2006. The
present petition was filed on 1 September 2006; thus, at the time
of the filing of said petition, 59 days had elapsed, way beyond
the 15-day period within which to file a petition for review under
Rule 45, and even beyond an extended period of 30 days, the
maximum period for extension allowed by the rules had
petitioners sought to move for such extra time. As the facts
stand, petitioners Bernyl and Katherene had lost the right to
appeal via Rule 45.
Be that as it may, alternatively, if the decision of the
appellate court is attended by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then such ruling is
fatally defective on jurisdictional ground and may be questioned
even after the lapse of the period of appeal under Rule 45[26] but
still within the period for filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion
may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and
contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[27] The word capricious, usually used in
tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand
of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion is imperative.[28]
In reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ,
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene contend that the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals, when it resolved to grant the
petition in CA-G.R. CEB. SP No. 00068, did so on two
grounds, i.e., 1) that the public respondent (DOJ) gravely abused
his discretion in finding that there was no reversible error on the
part of the Cebu City Prosecutor dismissing the case against the
private respondent without stating the facts and the law upon
which this conclusion was made[29]; and 2) that the public
respondent (DOJ) made reference to the facts and circumstances
of the case leading to his finding that no probable cause exists, x
x x (the) very facts and circumstances (which) show that there
exists a probable cause to believe that indeed the private
respondents committed the crimes x x x charged against them.[30]
It explained that:
In refusing to file the appropriate information
against the private respondents because he does not
dwell on possibilities, suspicion and speculation and
that he rules based on hard facts and solid evidence,
(sic) the public respondent exceeded his authority and
gravely abused his discretion. It must be remembered
that a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. The term does not mean actual or
positive cause; (sic) nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. [Citation omitted.] A trial is there
precisely for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.
In this case, the petitioner had amply
established that it has a prima facie case against the
private respondents. As observed by the public
respondent in his second assailed resolution,
petitioner was able to present photographs of private
respondent Ms. Balangauan leaving her office
carrying a bulky plastic bag. There was also the fact
that the transactions in Mr. Yorks account used the
code CEO8 which presumably point to the private
respondent Ms. Balangauan as the author thereof for
she is the one assigned to such work station.
Furthermore, petitioner was able to establish
that it was Ms. Balangauan who handled Mr. Yorks
account and she was the one authorized to make the
placement of the sum of P2,500,000.00. Since said
sum is nowhere to be found in the records of the bank,
then, apparently, Ms. Balangauan must be made to
account for the same.[31]
The appellate court then concluded that:
 These facts engender a well-founded belief that
that (sic) a crime has been committed and that the
private respondents are probably guilty thereof. In
refusing to file the corresponding information against
the private respondents despite the presence of the
circumstances making out a prima facie case against
them, the public respondent gravely abused his
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[32]
The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJs failure to
identify and discuss the issues raised by the respondent HSBC in
its Petition for Review filed therewith. And, in support thereof,
respondent HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue that it
was not necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have his
resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was based,
because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully
comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
requiring that decisions rendered by them should state clearly
and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the
decision is based.[33]
Petitioners Bernyl and Katherene, joined by the Office of
the Solicitor General, on the other hand, defends the DOJ and
assert that the questioned resolution was complete in that it
stated the legal basis for denying respondent HSBCs petition for
review that (after) an examination (of) the petition and its
attachment [it] found no reversible error that would justify a
reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law
and evidence on the matter.
It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is
not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-
judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the
presence of probable cause. In Bautista v. Court of
Appeals,[34] this Court held that a preliminary investigation is not
a quasi-judicial proceeding, thus:
[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does
not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to
be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal.
Though some cases[35] describe the public prosecutors
power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity
ends at this point.[36] A quasi-judicial body is an organ of
government other than a court and other than a legislature which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule-making.[37] A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory
functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties,
and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a
preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
Information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or
when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or
resolutions. In this case, since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
body, Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution finds no
application. Be that as it may, the DOJ rectified the shortness of
its first resolution by issuing a lengthier one when it resolved
respondent HSBCs motion for reconsideration.
Anent the substantial merit of the case, whether or not the
Court of Appeals decision and resolution are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion in finding probable cause, this Court finds the
petition dismissible.
The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in reversing and setting aside the resolutions of the
DOJ. In the resolutions of the DOJ, it affirmed the
recommendation of ACP Laborte that no probable cause existed
to warrant the filing in court of an Information for estafa and/or
qualified estafa against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene. It was
the reasoning of the DOJ that [w]hile appellant has every reason
to suspect Katherene for the loss of the P2,500,000.00 as per
Yorks bank statements, the cash deposits were identified by the
numerals CEO8 and it was only Katherene who could transact
from the computer in the work station CEO-8, plus alleged
photographs showing Katherene leaving her office at 5:28 p.m.
with a bulky plastic bag presumably containing cash since
a portion of the funds was withdrawn, we do not, however, dwell
on possibilities, suspicion and speculation. We rule based on
hard facts and solid evidence.[38]
We do not agree.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.[39] A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.[40]
The executive department of the government is
accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation
being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary
component of the power to execute the laws is the right to
prosecute their violators,[41] the responsibility for which is thrust
upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not
probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an
accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion
to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof,
or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
But this is not to discount the possibility of the
commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely
possible that the investigating prosecutor has erroneously
exercised the discretion lodged in him by law. This, however,
does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[42]
And while it is this Courts general policy not to interfere
in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the
investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable
cause,[43] we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the
general rule, such as when the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority,[44] resulting from a grave abuse of
discretion. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for
the determination of probable cause, since the same must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such
a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge (public
prosecutor) or run counter to the clear dictates of reason.[45]
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition,
the reasons of DOJ for affirming the dismissal of the criminal
complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of
whether or not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring hard facts and solid
evidence as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the
crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of
probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of presumption that
a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion, that a thing is so.[46] The term does not mean actual
and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty.[47] It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief;[48] that is, the
belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. While probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction. Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no evidence was
actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records
of the case were teeming; or it discounted the value of such
substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was adequate
to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of. In
so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised its
discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which
rendered its resolutions amenable to correction and annulment by
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
 From the records of the case, it is clear that a prima
facie case for estafa/qualified estafa exists against petitioners
Bernyl and Katherene. A perusal of the records, i.e., the
affidavits of respondent HSBCs witnesses, the documentary
evidence presented, as well as the analysis of the factual milieu
of the case, leads this Court to agree with the Court of Appeals
that, taken together, they are enough to excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, that the Spouses Bernyl Balangauan and
Katherene Balangauan are guilty of the crime complained
of. Whether or not they will be convicted by a trial court based
on the same evidence is not a consideration. It is enough that acts
or omissions complained of by respondent HSBC constitute the
crime of estafa and/or qualified estafa.
Collectively, the photographs of petitioner Katherene
leaving the premises of respondent HSBC carrying a bulky
plastic bag and the affidavits of respondent HSBCs witnesses
sufficiently establish acts adequate to constitute the crime of
estafa and/or qualified estafa. What the affidavits bear out are the
following: that York was a Premier Client of respondent HSBC;
that petitioner Katherene handled all the accounts of York; that
not one of Yorks accounts reflect the P2,500,000.00 allegedly
deposited in a higher yielding account; that prior to the discovery
of her alleged acts and omissions, petitioner Katherene
supposedly persuaded York to invest in a new product of
respondent HSBC, i.e., a higher interest yielding time deposit;
that York made a total of P2,500,000.00 investment in the new
product by authorizing petitioner Balangauan to transfer said
funds to it; that petitioner Katherene supposedly asked York to
sign several transaction documents in order to transfer the funds
to the new product; that said documents turned out to be
withdrawal slips and cash movement tickets; that at no time did
York receive the cash as a result of signing the documents that
turned out to be withdrawal slips/cash movement tickets; that
Yorks account was regularly credited loose change in the
amounts of P12,500.00 and P8,333.33 beginning in the month
after the alleged transfer of Yorks funds to the new product; that
the regular deposits of loose change were transacted with the use
of petitioner Katherenes work terminal accessed by her password
CEO8; that the CEO8 password was keyed in with the use of a
swipe card always in the possession of petitioner Katherene; that
one of the loose-change deposits was transacted via the phone
banking feature of respondent HSBC and that when traced, the
phone number used was the landline number of the house of
petitioners Bernyl and Katherene; that respondent HSBCs bank
personnel, as well as York, supposedly a) talked with petitioner
Katherene on the phone, and that she allegedly admitted that the
missing funds were invested with Shell Company, of which York
approved, and that it was only for one year; and b) met with
petitioner Bernyl, and that the latter at first denied having
knowledge of his wifes complicity, but later on admitted that he
knew of the investment with Shell Company, and that he
supposedly made the loose-change deposit via phone banking;
that after 23 April 2002, York was told that respondent HSBC
had no new product or that it was promoting investment with
Shell Company; that York denied having any knowledge that his
money was invested outside of respondent HSBC; and that
petitioner Katherene would not have been able to facilitate the
alleged acts or omissions without taking advantage of her
position or office, as a consequence of which, HSBC had to
reimburse York the missing P2,500,000.00.
From the above, the alleged circumstances of the case at
bar make up the elements of abuse of confidence, deceit or
fraudulent means, and damage under Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code on estafa and/or qualified estafa. They give rise to
the presumption or reasonable belief that the offense of
estafa has been committed; and, thus, the filing of an Information
against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene is warranted. That
respondent HSBC is supposed to have no personality to file any
criminal complaint against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene
does not ipso facto clear them of prima facie guilt. The same
goes for their basic denial of the acts or omissions complained
of; or their attempt at shifting the doubt to the person of York;
and their claim that witnesses of respondent HSBC are guilty of
fabricating the whole scenario. These are matters of defense;
their validity needs to be tested in the crucible of a full-blown
trial. Lest it be forgotten, the presence or absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense,
the truth of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits. Litigation will prove petitioners Bernyl and
Katherenes innocence if their defense be true.
In fine, the relaxation of procedural rules may be allowed
only when there are exceptional circumstances to justify the
same. Try as we might, this Court cannot find grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, when it reversed
and set aside the resolutions of the DOJ. There is no showing
that the appellate court acted in an arbitrary and despotic manner,
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion or unilateral refusal
to perform its legally mandated duty. On the contrary, we find
the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals to be
more in accordance with the evidence on record and relevant
laws and jurisprudence than the resolutions of the DOJ.
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced
and our disquisition above, we hereby dismiss the instant petition
for being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as
well as for petitioner Bernyl and Katherenes failure to
sufficiently show that the challenged Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 28 April
2006 Decision and the 29 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB- SP No. 00068, are
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners -- Spouses
Bernyl Balangauan and Katherene Balangauan.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.
DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors
whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of
Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's
"buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were
dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went
unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on
February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-
02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No. XI-
02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice
(DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors,
Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of
Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the National Prosecution
Service, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to
the Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and distribution to panel
members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of
Legacy group of Companies in your respective offices with the exemption of
the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is covered by Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel at Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper
disposition.
For information and guidance.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel of the DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court
via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They
claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the
equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases.
They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the
rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No.
No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection
under the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary
of Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of
merit.
Issues
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate
petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?
 Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of
substance and merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming
directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify
the direct filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not
give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.4 An undue
disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the
dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,5 we explained why, to
wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts,
and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from
having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious
and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why
the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task
of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies
or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the
Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy
that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict
adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the
so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon
and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land,"
the Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to
the highest tribunal, viz:
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may
issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129
on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs
was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of
the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra—
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto
of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but
for the expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have
had to be filed with it.
1âw phi1
xxxx
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information
and evidence of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the
policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial
forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a
rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence,
every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined
in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan
if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional
trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.6
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court
was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7 "The sole office of the writ of
certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The
abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following
requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal,
board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the
assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with,
they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of
Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead,
the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly
intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
function involved was purely executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does
not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of
cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the
finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of
Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often
the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for
it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial
body quickly endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of
government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the
judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in
order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the
offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s
orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However,
we do not see how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what
manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed
issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we
already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of
jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section
2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a)
Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy
available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court."12 The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly
enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise
of discretion or to compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us,
was what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor.
Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of
Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of
its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended
the presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement
and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of
a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute
itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the
Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the
mandate of the DOJ to "administer the criminal justice system in accordance
with the accepted processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No.
10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and
Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it
became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and
invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not
authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating
that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and
other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the
performance of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987
and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the
assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive
petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong
done against them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were
designed to assist petitioners and others like them expedite the prosecution, if
warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong through the
creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in
order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation
and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act
arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in
DO No. 182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional
guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law.17
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated
estafa were filed with your office against officers of the Legacy Group of
Companies. Considering the distance of the place of complainants therein to
Manila, your Office is hereby exempted from the directive previously issued by
the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all
cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases involving the Legacy Group of Companies filed in
your office with dispatch and to file the corresponding informations if evidence
warrants and to prosecute the same in court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of
the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification.18 Hence, the Court
has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance
between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy
Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be
conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had
already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the
time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants
residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in
excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No.
182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was
really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind
the exemption upon the ground that the non-application of the exemption to
them would cause them some inconvenience.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy
disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there
would be considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would
definitely be "a flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to
speedy disposition of their cases."20
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the
Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such
speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken
into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a
case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought
and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.22 It is cogent to
mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
determinant of the concept.23
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and
vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related
questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of
Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible
means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a
comprehensive investigation of the cases.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more
cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and
other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other
and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The
Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue
delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy disposition of
their cases.
and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end,
the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional,
provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the
discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct
offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their
objectives, policies and functions.
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the
bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any
person or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected
should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and
regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of
Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.

Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated.
They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition SO ORDERED.
against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions

exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The
reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing
rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its
passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or
arises from procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182
constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being
unsubstantiated, was unfounded.

Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of

Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes
G.R. No. 81385 February 21, 1989
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND CONRADO S. REYES in their official
capacity as FISCAL AGENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION,
BRANCH 48, MANILA, PRESIDED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE
DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., M.B. OLIVARES, AUGUSTO VILLANUEVA,
ARACELLI LINSANGAN, LUISA LINSANGAN, ALEJANDRO MARAMAG,
MANUEL SALAK, TURNITA SORIANO, LINO SISON DOMINGO FLORES,
MILAGROS HIZON and CARIDAD ORPIADA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Delia L. Hermoso for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The parameters of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in relation to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Sandiganbayan are put
into issue in this petition.
On December 17, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint for injunction
and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
against petitioners and Winston Marbella, Gaston Ortigas, Robeto Federis,
Manuel C. Villa-Real, Emanuel Soriano, Jack Arroyo and Benjamin Tulio.
The complaint alleges, among others, that private respondents are the only
stockholders with the right to vote of the Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI)
Publisher of several daily periodicals such as Manila Journal, People's
Journal, etc. Sometime in 1977, PJI obtained from the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) certain financing accommodations and as security
thereof executed a first mortgage in favor of DBP on its acts enumerated in a
list attached to the mortgage. The PJI stockholders assigned to DBP the voting
rights over 67% of the total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of stock
of the company held by them. The DBP appointed said PJI stockholders as
proxies to exercise its right to vote. Due to some financial difficulty on its part,
PJI requested for a restructuring of its loan obligation with certain conditions.
The request was granted by the DBP in a letter dated August 4, 1986. Due to
the default on the part of the PJI the DBP cancelled the proxies in favor of the
assigning stockholders on September 30, 1986 and designated as its proxies
petitioner Eduardo Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon. DBP
scheduled a special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing a new set
of directors.
It is also alleged in the complaint that before the special meeting, petitioner
Olaguer asked private respondent Rosario M. Barreto Olivares to assign
qualifying shares not only to the three proxies of DBP but also to two others to
be chosen by him so as to enable the five of them to sit in the PJI board of
directors, and that, accordingly, they may be able to coordinate more
effectively with DBP as regards the early evaluation and approval of the
request for another restructuring of the PJI loan. Thus respondent Olivares
assigned her shareholdings covered by Stock Certificate. No. 34 (which were
at that time assigned to DBP) to petitioner Olaguer, Marbella, Ortigas, Mari
Velez and De Leon, at one share each. The deeds of assignment provided that
the said assignment are valid only as long as the nominee is the person
designated by the DBP as its representative to sit in the board of directors.
The complaint also alleges that although Olaguer was elected chairman of the
board and chief executive officer of PJI he failed to comply with his
commitment and that this gave private respondents a reason to cancel the
assignment. Olaguer also committed certain illegal acts which gave rise to the
filing of several complaints against him. However, before these cases could be
resolved, Olaguer's appointment as member of the board of directors of DBP
was terminated by President Corazon C. Aquino effective September 9, 1987.
He was informed about his termination through two letters dated August 27
and October 12, 1987.
It is likewise alleged that, the termination notwithstanding, Olaguer continued
to exercise and retain full management and control of PJI The DBP chief legal
counsel wrote to petitioner Reyes informing him of Olaguer's removal from
office and enjoining him from implementing or complying with any instructions
from Olaguer and from disposing of the properties of PJI and disbursing any
funds without prior approval of the board of directors of PJI which will soon be
elected, except such amounts needed in the ordinary course of business.
Accordingly, the DBP, acting through its Chairman, Jesus Estanislao and its
Director-in-Charge, Jose Mari Velez, entered into an Interim Agreement with
private respondents. The said agreement called for a special stockholders
meeting for the purpose of electing a new board of directors which shall hold
office until the next regular stockholders meeting to be held on February 2,
1988.
The complaint further alleges that in a letter dated December 14, 1987, the
DBP chief legal counsel informed the private respondents that the said Interim
Agreement cannot be implemented because Olaguer claims that he has just
been designated the fiscal and team leader of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) assigned to the PJI and that all his actions are
sanctioned and reported to PCGG Chairman Ramon A. Diaz, and that it is the
PCGG which exercises the voting rights of all PJI common stocks sequestered
since 1986, including those assigned to DBP and that the PJI qualifying share
now held by PJI Directors came from shares sequestered by the PCGG.
These observations are contained in a letter dated October 31, 1987 written by
petitioner Reyes in his capacity as chief legal counsel and corporate secretary
of PJI It is stated therein that Olaguer, together with Marbella, Ortigas,
Soriano, Federis, Arroyo and Villa-Real have been acting as corporate officers
and/or members of the board without their having been elected by the majority
vote of stockholders and without their owning in their own right even a single
qualifying share.
In addition, it is alleged that petitioner Reyes had been sending out notices to
private respondents about an alleged stockholders meeting to be held on
December 21, 1987 at the PJI building, and that in the letter written by the
DBP chief legal counsel, 1 it is stated that petitioner Olaguer and his associates
who claim to be members of the board and corporate officers of PJI do not
represent DBP and that they are not authorized to act in its behalf.
The complaint emphasizes that the claim of petitioner Reyes that Olaguer can
sit as chairman of the board of directos of PJI even if he is no longer a director
of DBP but as long as he is the fiscal agent and team leader of the PCGG
assigned is baseless because: (a) the writs of sequestration on the shares of
respondents Hizon, Orpiada, Maramag, Flores and Sison, served on them on
or about February 19, 1987, and on respondents Linsangan, Salak, Soriano
and Villanueva, served on them on or about April 28, 1987, bad been
automatically lifted last August 19, 1987 and October 28, 1987, respectively,
pursuant to Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution; and only the
sequestration on the shares of respondent Olivares has not been lifted since a
complaint was filed against her before the expiration of the constitutional
deadline for filing cases; (b) the sequestered shares of respondent Olivares
could not be voted upon by petitioners herein and their companions under their
claim of being PCGG fiscal agents under the recent pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in several cases clearly stating that sequestration does not
involve the right of ownership; (c) no other meeting has been validly called for
the election of a new set of directors after the members of the board elected
last October 2, 1986 had ceased to be such directors, either by virtue of the
cancellation of their qualifying shares or their resignation; (d) with the filing of
Civil Case No. 35 before the Sandiganbayan where the PJI was listed as one
of the involved corporations, all actions affecting said corporation, including
those which will affect rights of ownership and disposition of assets, must have
the prior approval of the Sandiganbayan which excercises jurisdiction over
these corporations as one of the properties in litigation; and (e) by order of
President Aquino, petitioner Olaguer's separation from the PJI was called for;
that the acts of all the petitioners and their companions of either continuing to
sit in the board of directors of PJI and/or representing and acting as its
corporate officers are illegal and are the acts of usurpers and intruders
violative of the rights of private respondents as stockholders and are causing
great damage and prejudice to them as well as to the rights of the DBP under
the Deed of Assignment, and that such acts of usurpation should be enjoined
by the trial court.
Under the second cause of action for damages, it is alleged that Olaguer acted
illegally and outside the authority granted him as nominee of DBP and,
accordingly, Olivares cancelled the Deed of Assignment of one qualifying
share to him as well as the Deed of Assignment in favor of Marbella and
Ortigas. The notice of cancellation was served upon them on December 5,
1986. As a consequence of such cancellation, the three failed to qualify to sit
as members of the board of PJI.
Private respondents also alleged that despite such notice, petitioner and his
associates continued to sit in the board and that Olaguer took over the
complete management of the corporation and even caused the appointment of
other members of the board and/or corporate officers even if such appointees
do not own PJI shares of stock in their own right. It is likewise alleged that the
petitioner and his associates should be enjoined from committing further acts
of usurpation and that they should be held liable for all unlawful disbursements
they have made. It is further alleged that some of the private respondents had
been unlawfully dismissed and/or retired one after another thereby depriving
them of all benefits they are entitled to and subjecting them to great mental
anguish, sleepless nights, deep humiliation and great anxiety for which they
must be paid damages in an amount left to the sound discretion of the court.
Private respondents also asked for exemplary damages as well as the sum of
P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Private respondents prayed that pending a hearing on the merits of the case, a
writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order be issued against
petitioner Reyes enjoining him from holding the special stockholders meeting
scheduled at 8:00 A.M. on December 21, 1987, and enjoining Olaguer and his
associates from sitting and acting as members of the board of directors of PJI
or as corporate officers. Private respondents also prayed that such temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent after
due hearing and that Petitioner Olaguer and his associates be made to pay,
jointly and severally, actual damages as may be proved after audit, including
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the
amount of P200,000.00, and the costs of the suit. 2
On December 18, 1987, an order was issued by the trial court setting the
petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for bearing on
January 4, 1988 at 1:30 in the afternoon. A temporary restraining order was
issued enjoining petitioner Reyes from holding the special stockholders
meeting scheduled for December 21, 1987 and enjoining all the other
petitioners including Olaguer from sitting and acting as members of the board
and/or corporate officers of PJI until further orders of the court.
On January 4, 1988, a motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners on the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners; that
they were not served summons and that the subject matter of the action
involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and
among stockholders which are covered by the provisions of Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A so that the matter is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); that
the venue for a petition seeking injunctive relief should be the Sandiganbayan
where aforesaid PCGG Case No. 0035 against Benjamin Romualdez, Rosario
Olivares, et al. is pending, pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 defining the
jurisdiction over cases involving the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Former
President Marcos, et al.; that it is the SEC which should exercise jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A; and that
the complaint states no cause of action inasmuch as the petitioners and the
other defendants hold shares emanating from the PCGG, and not from the
DBP; that the shares issued to DBP for Olivares, et al. on the basis of an
erroneous DBP legal opinion have been declared void ab initio and cancelled
by the PCGG on November 4, 1987 so that the DBP is not a stockholder of
record; that the call for the stockholders meeting by petitioner Reyes was with
the approval of the PCGG Chairman; that PJI is a sequestered corporation
listed as item No. 49 under "Shares of Stock" in "Assets and Other Property of
Benjamin Romualdez" marked Annex "A", in Case No. 0035 for
"Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," entitled
"Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff versus Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et
al.,"; that the PJI pursuant to its Board Resolution No. 43, dated November 14,
1987, has authorized the filing of criminal complaints against Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez, Rosario Olivares, Tuynita Soriano, Jose T. Abundo, Evelyn
Nicasio, Alejandro Maramag, Caridad Orpiada and other former and present
PJI officers and employees who defrauded the company by conspiring in
and/or authorizing the illegal disbursements of PJI funds amounting to P 10.6
million, all for the account and upon instructions of said Romualdez who was
neither an officer, director, stockholder of record of PJI nor a creditor or
supplier thereof; that regarding the sequestration of PJI pursuant to orders of
the PCGG dated April 22, 1986 and February 19, 1987, the actual
sequestration proceedings have not been terminated upon the filing of PCGG
Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan on July 31, 1987.
Petitioners maintain that under the pertinent provisions of the 1987
Constitution, the commencement of a judicial action does not ipso facto lift the
sequestration order. It is the non-filing of a judicial action within six months
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution if the sequestration order is issued
before the ratification, or within six months from the time sequestration order
was issued if the same was issued after such ratification, which will
automatically lift the sequestration order. Petitioners also stated that while the
PJI suffered huge loses under the administration of private respondents, the
corporation realized profits under the management of petitioner Olaguer. All
the common and preferred stocks of private respondents have been
sequestered pursuant to the orders of the PCGG dated April 22, 1986 and
February 19, 1987 and it is the PCGG which exercises the voting rights
pertaining to said sequestered shares pursuant to the Memorandum of
President Aquino to the PCGG dated June 26, 1986.
A Memorandum in support of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by
counsel for private respondents.
On January 14, 1988, an order was issued by the trial court denying the
motion to dismiss and issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for
upon a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 to be filed by private respondents.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/ or a writ of preliminary
injunction wherein the main issue is whether or not the trial court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
On January 26, 1988, a resolution was issued by this Court requiring the
respondents to comment therein within ten (10) days from notice. A temporary
restraining order was issued enjoining the respondent judge to cease and
desist from enforcing the order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 in Civil
Case No. 87-43156 as well as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against
petitioners.
Acting on the manifestation and motion filed by counsel for private
respondents on February 4, 1988, this Court issued a resolution enjoining
petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of PJI from holding another
special stockholders meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date thereafter
pending resolution of this case, and directing the parties to maintain the status
quo until further orders from the Court.
The private respondents filed their comment on the petition. Thereafter, the
petitioners filed their reply. On April 5, 1988, the court resolved to give due
course to the petition and considered the case submitted for decision.
Nevertheless, the private respondents filed a rejoinder.
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no dispute that the PJI is now
under sequestration by the PCGG and that Civil Case No. 0035 was filed in
the Sandiganbayan wherein the PJI is listed as among the corporations
involved in the unexplained wealth case against former President Marcos,
Romualdez and many others. The records likewise show that petitioner
Olaguer, among others, is a fiscal agent of the PCGG and that as Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the PJI he was acting for and in behalf of the PCGG.
Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds, moneys, assets
and properties illegally acquired by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents, or nominees," 3civil or criminal, including incidents
arising from such cases. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review
on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. 4
In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional
trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. 5 The
regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over the PCGG
in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Section
26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and
restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG. 6 By the same token, the
regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over the acts of fiscal agents of the PCGG
acting for and in behalf of said commission.
The Commission should not be embroiled in and swamped by legal suits
before inferior courts all over the land. Otherwise, the Commission will be
forced to spend valuable time defending all its actuations in such courts. This
will defeat the very purpose behind the creation of the Commission.
Accordingly, Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 expressly accorded the
Commission and its members immunity from suit for damages in that: "No civil
action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order."
Civil Case No. 87-43156 pending before the respondent judge is denominated
as one for "injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order and damages." Particularly, under paragraph 17(d)
of the complaint, private respondents admitted that the PJI is listed as one of
the involved corporations in Civil Case No. 0035 pending before the
Sandiganbayan which now exercises jurisdiction over the said corporation.
Petitioners Olaguer and Reyes appear to be fiscal agents of the PCGG. There
can be no doubt, therefore, that the subject matter of the action (the PJI its
properties and assets) falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners, as fiscal agents of the PCGG, cannot be sued in such capacity
before the ordinary courts. The tribunal for such purpose is the
Sandiganbayan.
It necessarily follows that the issues raised by the private respondents before
the respondent judge to the effect that petitioners are usurpers and have no
right to sit in the board of directors or act as corporate officers of the PJI are
issues which should be addressed to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent judge is
permanently enjoined from enforcing the order of the trial court dated January
14, 1988. The restraining order issued by this Court dated February 4, 1988
enjoining petitioner Reyes and/or the corporate officers of the PJI from holding
the special stockholders meeting on February 5, 1988 or at any date
thereafter, and to preserve and maintain the status quo, is hereby lifted. The
order of the trial court dated January 14, 1988 is hereby SET ASIDE and
another order is hereby issued dismissing the complaint, without
pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 141949 October 14, 2002 initiative…without prejudice to the final decision after completion of the
hearing…;"
CEFERINO PADUA, petitioner,
vs. 2. That the Provisional Relief shall be in form of an interim toll rate
HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF MAKATI, RTC, adjustment in accordance with Section 7.04(3) of the Supplemental
BRANCH 137, Toll Operation Agreement, dated November 27, 1995, referring to
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORP., Interim Adjustments in Toll Rates upon the occurrence of a significant
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, currency devaluation:
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. "Be APPROVED, as it is hereby APPROVED.

----------------------------- "RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby RESOLVED:

G.R. No. 151108 October 14, 2002 "That the ProvisionalToll Rates, which are not to exceed the following:

EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, petitioner,

vs. Toll Rates for
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD AND CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS Unrounded Implementation
Section
CORPORATION, respondents. Toll Rates CLASS CLASS CLASS
1 2 3
DECISION
Elevated
75.00 75.00 150.00 225.00
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Portion

At-Grade
The focal point upon which these two consolidated cases converge is whether Portion
Resolution No. 2001-89 issued by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) is valid.
Magallanes to
19.35 19.50 38.50 58.00
A brief narration of the factual backdrop is imperative, thus: Bicutan
Bicutan to Sucat 11.21 11.00 22.50 34.00
On November 9, 2001, the TRB issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing
provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway, effective January Sucat to Alabang 10.99 11.00 21.00 32.50
1, 2002,[1] thus:

"NOW THEREFORE, it is RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED: * includes C5 entry/exit and Merville exit.

1. That in view of urgent public interest, the Board hereby GRANTS to
the Metro Manila Skyway Project, Provisional Relief in accordance with
Rule 10, Section 3 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing
Hearing before the Toll Regulatory Board which states, among others
"that the Board may grant (provisional relief)…in its own
"For implementation starting January 1, 2002 after its publication once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and that
said Provisional Toll Rate Increase shall remain in effect until such time that
the TRB Board has determined otherwise:
"Be APPROVED as it is hereby APPROVED.
"RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, as it is hereby RESOLVED that the a. The Investor and/or the Operator shall be entitled to apply for and if
Provisional Toll Rates be implemented in two (2) stages in accordance with the warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of Toll Rates upon the
following schedule: occurrence of any of the following events:

Toll Rates for Implementation For Class 1 as xxx xxx

Unrounded
Toll Rates as Reference
Section (ii) a significant currency devaluation
Maximum for JANUARY 1, 2002 to JUNE 30, 2002 to
One (1) Year JULY 1, 2002 DECEMBER 31, 2002 xxx xxx
Elevated
75.00 65.00 75.00 (i) A currency devaluation shall be deemed "significant" if it results in a
Portion
depreciation of the value of the Philippine peso relative to the US dollar by at
At-Grade least 10%. For purposes hereof the exchange rate between the Philippine
Portion peso and the US dollar which shall be applicable shall be the exchange rate
between the above mentioned currencies in effect as of the date of approval of
Magallanes the prevailing preceding Toll Rate.
19.35 15.00 20.00
to Bicutan
(ii) The Investor’s right to apply for an interim Toll Rate adjustment under
Bicutan to
11.21 9.00 11.00 section 7.04 (3) (a) (ii) shall be effective only while any Financing is
Sucat
outstanding and have not yet been paid in full.
Sucat to
10.99 9.00 11.00 xxx xxx
Alabang

(iv) An interim adjustment in Toll Rate shall be considered such amount as

"PROVIDED that the recovery of the sum from the interim rate adjustment
shall be applied starting the year 2003.
"APPROVED as it is hereby APPROVED."
On December 17, 24 and 31, 2001, the above Resolution approving
provisional toll rate adjustments was published in the newspapers of general
circulation.[2]
Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said Resolution, it
appears that on February 27, 2001 the Citra Metro Manila Tollways
Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an interim
adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project – Stage 1.[3]
CITRA moored its petition on the provisions of the "Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement" (STOA),[4] authorizing it, as the investor, to apply for
and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in the event
of a "significant currency devaluation." The relevant portions of the STOA read:
may be required to provide interim relief to the Investor from a substantial
increase in debt-service burden resulting from the devaluation."[5]
Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S. dollar had devaluated from
P26.1671 in 1995 to P48.00 in 2000, CITRA alleged that there was a
compelling need for the increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of
the Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.
Due to heavy opposition, CITRA’s petition remained unresolved. This
prompted CITRA to file on October 9, 2001 an "Urgent Motion for Provisional
Approval,"[6] this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the "Rules of Practice
and Procedure Governing Hearing Before the Toll Regulatory Board" (TRB
Rules of Procedure) which provides:
"SECTION 3. Provisional Relief. – Upon the filing of an application or petition
for the approval of the initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, or at any stage,
thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or in its own initiative,
the relief prayed for without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the
hearing should the Board find that the pleading, together with the affidavits and
supporting documents attached thereto and such additional evidence as may
have been requested and presented, substantially support the provisional
order; Provided: That the Board may, motu proprio, continue to issue orders or
grant relief in the exercise of its powers of general supervision under existing
laws. Provided: Finally, that pending finality of the decision, the Board may
require the Petitioner to deposit in whole or in part in escrow the provisionally
approved adjustment or initial toll rates." (Emphasis supplied)
On October 30, 2001, CITRA moved to withdraw[7] its "Urgent Motion for
Provisional Approval" without prejudice to its right to seek or be granted
provisional relief under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB Rules of
Procedure, obviously, referring to the power of the Board to act on its own
initiative.
On November 7, 2001, CITRA wrote a letter[8] to TRB expressing its concern
over the undue delay in the proceeding, stressing that any further setback
would bring the Project’s financial condition, as well as the Philippine banking
system, to a total collapse. CITRA recounted that out of the US$354 million
funding from creditors, two-thirds (2/3) thereof came from the Philippine banks
and financial institutions, such as the Landbank of the Philippines and the
Government Service Insurance Services. Thus, CITRA requested TRB to find
a timely solution to its predicament.
On November 9, 2001, TRB granted CITRA’s motion to withdraw[9] the Urgent
Motion for Provisional Approval and, at the same time, issued Resolution No.
2001-89,[10] earlier quoted.
Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita assail before this
Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001-89.
Petitioner Ceferino Padua, as a toll payer, filed an "Urgent Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases"[11] in G.R.
No. 141949,[12] a petition for mandamus earlier filed by him. In that petition,
Padua seeks to compel respondent Judge Santiago Ranada of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City, to issue a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated August 4, 1989 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 13235. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals ordered the exclusion
of certain portions of the expressways (from Villamor Air Base to Alabang in
the South, and from Balintawak to Tabang in the North) from the franchise of
the PNCC.
In his urgent motion, petitioner Padua claims that: (1) Resolution No. 2001-89
was issued without the required publication and in violation of due process; (2)
alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the
provisional toll rate adjustments because the TRB is a collegial body; and (3)
CITRA has no standing to apply for a toll fee increase since it is an "investor"
and not a "franchisee-operator."
On January 4, 2002, petitioner Padua filed a "Supplemental Urgent Motion for
a TRO against Toll Fee Increases,"[13] arguing further that: (1) Resolution
2001-89 refers exclusively to the Metro Manila Skyway Project, hence, there is
no legal basis for the imposition of the increased rate at the at-grade portions;
(2) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without basis considering that while it
was signed by three (3) of the five members of the TRB, none of them actually
attended the hearing; and 3) the computation of the rate adjustment under the
STOA is inconsistent with the rate adjustment formula under Presidential
Decree No. 1894.[14]
On January 10, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed, in behalf
of public respondent TRB, Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Judge
Ranada, a "Consolidated Comment"[15] contending that: (1) the TRB has the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to toll rates; (2) Resolution No.
2001-89 covers both the Skyway and the at-grade level of the South Luzon
Expressway as provided under the STOA; (3) that while Resolution No. 2001-
89 does not mention any factual basis to justify its issuance, however, it does
not mean that TRB's finding of facts is not supported by evidence; and (4)
petitioner Padua cannot assail the validity of the STOA because he is not a
party thereto.
Upon the other hand, on January 9, 2002, petitioner Eduardo Zialcita, as a
taxpayer and as Congressman of Parañaque City, filed the present petition for
prohibition[16] with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against TRB and CITRA, docketed as G.R. No. 151108,
impugning the same Resolution No. 2001-89.
Petitioner Zialcita asserts that the provisional toll rate adjustments are
exorbitant and that the TRB violated its own Charter, Presidential Decree No.
1112,[17] when it promulgated Resolution No. 2001-89 without the benefit of
any public hearing. He also maintains that the TRB violated the Constitution
when it did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
Resolution No. 2001-89 was based. And lastly, he claims that Section 3, Rule
10 of the TRB Rules of Procedure is not sanctioned by P.D. No. 1112.
Private respondent CITRA, in its comment[18] on Congressman Zialcita’s
petition, counters that: (1) the TRB has primary administrative jurisdiction over
all matters relating to toll rates; (2) prohibition is an inappropriate remedy
because its function is to restrain acts about to be done and not acts already
accomplished; (3) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued in accordance with law;
(4) Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB Rules is constitutional; and (5) private
respondent and the Republic of the Philippines would suffer more irreparable
damages than petitioner.
The TRB, through the OSG, filed a separate comment[19] reiterating the same
arguments raised by private respondent CITRA.
On January 11, 2002, this Court resolved to consolidate the instant petitions,
G.R. No. 141949 and G.R. No. 151108.[20]
We rule for the respondents.
In assailing Resolution No. 2001-89, petitioners came to us via two
unconventional remedies – one is an urgent motion for a TRO to stop arbitrary
toll fee increases; and the other is a petition for prohibition. Unfortunately, both
are procedurally impermissible.
I
Petitioner Padua’s motion is a leap to a legal contest of different dimension. As
previously stated, G.R. No. 141949 is a petition for mandamus seeking to
compel respondent Judge Ranada to issue a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s Decision dated August 4, 1989 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 13235. The issue therein is whether the application for a writ of
execution should be by a mere motion or by an action for revival of judgment.
Thus, for petitioner Padua to suddenly interject in the same petition the issue
of whether Resolution No. 2001-89 is valid is to drag this Court to his web of
legal convolution. Courts cannot, as a case progresses, resolve the intrinsic
merit of every issue that comes along its way, particularly those which bear no
relevance to the resolution of the case.
Certainly, petitioner Padua’s recourse in challenging the validity of TRB
Resolution No. 2001-89 should have been to institute an action, separate and
independent from G.R. No. 141949.
II
The remedy of prohibition initiated by petitioner Zialcita in G.R. No. 151108
also suffers several infirmities. Initially, it violates the twin doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
P.D. No. 1112 explicitly provides that "the decisions of the TRB on petitions for
the increase of toll rate shall be appealable to the Office of the President within
ten (10) days from the promulgation thereof."[21] P.D. No. 1894 reiterates this
instruction and further provides:
"SECTION 9. The GRANTEE shall have the right and authority to adjust any
existing toll being charged the users of the Expressways under the following
guidelines:
xxx xxx
c) Any interested Expressways user shall have the right to file, within a period
of ninety (90) days after the date of publication of the adjusted toll rate (s), a
petition with the Toll Regulatory Board for a review of the adjusted toll rate (s);
provided, however, that notwithstanding the filing of such petition and the
pendency of the resolution thereof, the adjusted toll shall be enforceable and
collectible by the GRANTEE effective on the first day of January in accordance
with the immediately preceding paragraph.
xxx xxx
e) Decisions of the Toll Regulatory Board on petitions for review of adjusted
toll shall be appealable to the Office of the President within ten (10) days from
the promulgation thereof."
These same provisions are incorporated in the TRB Rules of Procedure,
particularly in Section 6, Rule 5 and Section 1, Rule 12 thereof.[22]
Obviously, the laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the
remedies of an interested Expressways user.[23] The initial proper recourse is
to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the TRB. The need for
a prior resort to this body is with reason. The TRB, as the agency assigned to
supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities, has the
necessary expertise, training and skills to judiciously decide matters of this
kind. As may be gleaned from the petition, the main thrust of petitioner
Zialcita’s argument is that the provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant,
oppressive, onerous and unconscionable. This is obviously a question of fact
requiring knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in
determining the assailed rates. Definitely, this task is within the province of the
TRB.
We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence on the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this
era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear
and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of
facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, is
indispensable. Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a
court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."[24] In Industrial
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[25] we ruled:
"x x x, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be
supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction
of a court."
Moreover, petitioner Zialcita’s resort to prohibition is intrinsically inappropriate.
It bears stressing that the office of this remedy is not to correct errors of
judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation of jurisdiction or authority by
inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their
jurisdictions. G.R. No. 151108, while designated as a petition for prohibition,
has for its object the setting aside of Resolution No. 2001-89 on the ground
that it was issued without prior notice, hearing and publication and that the
provisional toll rate adjustments are exorbitant. This is not the proper subject of
prohibition because as long as the inferior court, tribunal or board has
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the controversy, the writ will
not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an
erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment. And even in
cases of encroachment, usurpation, and improper assumption of jurisdiction,
the writ will not issue where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal,
writ or error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are available.[26]
In this case, petitioner Zialcita should have sought a review of the assailed
Resolution before the TRB.
III
Even granting that petitioners’ recourse to the instant remedies is in order, still,
we cannot rule in their favor.
For one, it is not true that the provisional toll rate adjustments were not
published prior to its implementation on January 1, 2002. Records show that
they were published on December 17, 24 and 31, 2001[27] in three
newspapers of general circulation, particularly the Philippine Star, Philippine
Daily Inquirer and The Manila Bulletin. Surely, such publications sufficiently
complied with Section 5 of P.D. No. 1112 which mandates that "no new rates
shall be collected unless published in a newspaper of general publication at
least once a week for three consecutive weeks." At any rate, it must be pointed
out that under Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A,[28] the TRB may grant and
issue ex-parte to any petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing,
provisional authority to collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits of
the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the TRB
may in its discretion provisionally grant. That LOI No. 1334-A has the force and
effect of law finds support in a catena of cases decreeing that "all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or
done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified,
revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, or other acts of the President."[29] In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[30] this
Court held:
"The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential
issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law
because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots.
Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI
474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter
of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos,
whose word was law during that time." (Emphasis supplied)
For another, it is not true that it was TRB Executive Director Dumlao, Jr. alone
who issued Resolution No. 2001-89. The Resolution itself contains the
signature of the four TRB Directors, namely, Simeon A. Datumanong,
Emmanuel P. Bonoan, Ruben S. Reinoso, Jr. and Mario K. Espinosa.[31]
Petitioner Padua would argue that while these Directors signed the Resolution,
none of them personally attended the hearing. This argument is misplaced.
Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may employ other persons,
such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence,
conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall
render its decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity.[32] Thus, in
Mollaneda vs. Umacob,[33] we ruled:
" x x x At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the term "administrative body or
agency" includes the subordinate officials upon whose hand the body or
agency delegates a portion of its authority. Included therein are the hearing
officers through whose eyes and ears the administrative body or agency
observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses and listens to
their testimonies.
"It must be emphasized that the appointment of competent officers to hear and
receive evidence is commonly resorted to by administrative bodies or agencies
in the interest of an orderly and efficient disposition of administrative cases. x x
x improvements, expansion or repairs of toll facilities and/or in great irreparable
"x x x Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the cardinal
requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, one of which is
that "the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate." Thus, it is logical to say that this
mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that in cases where the hearing or
reception of evidence is assigned to a subordinate, the body or agency shall
not merely rely on his recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and
assess the evidence which the said subordinate has gathered."
Be that as it may, we must stress that the TRB’s authority to grant provisional
toll rate adjustments does not require the conduct of a hearing. Pertinent laws
and jurisprudence support this conclusion.
It may be recalled that Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated
P.D. No. 1112 creating the TRB on March 31, 1977. The end in view was to
authorize the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements
in order to attract private sector investment in the government infrastructure
projects. The TRB was tasked to supervise the collection of toll fees and the
operation of toll facilities. One of its powers is to "issue, modify and promulgate
from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged the direct users of toll
facilities and upon notice and hearing, to approve or disapprove petitions for
the increase thereof."[34]
To clarify the intent of P.D. No. 1112 as to the extent of the TRB’s power,[35]
Former President Marcos further issued LOI No. 1334-A expressly allowing the
TRB to grant ex-parte provisional or temporary increase in toll rates, thus:
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby direct, order and instruct the Toll Regulatory Board to grant and issue
ex-parte to any petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing,
provisional authority to collect, pending hearing of and decision on the merits
of such petition, the increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the
Board may in its discretion provisionally grant, upon (a) a finding that the said
petition is sufficient in form and substance, (b) the submission of an affidavit by
the petitioner showing that the increase in rates substantially conforms to the
formula, if any stipulated in the franchise or toll operation agreement/certificate
of the petitioner and that failure to immediately impose and collect the increase
in rates would result in outright delay or stoppage of urgently needed
injury to the petitioner, and (c) the submission by the petitioner to the Board of
a bond, in such amount and from such surety or sureties and under such terms
and conditions as the Board shall fix, to guarantee the refund of the increase in
rates to the affected toll payers in case it is finally determined, after notice and
hearing, that the petitioner is not entitled, in whole or in part, to the same. Any
provisional toll rate increases shall be effective immediately upon approval
without need of publication."
Thereafter, the TRB promulgated as part of its Rules of Procedure, the
following provision:
"RULE 5
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF TOLL RATE
"Section 2. Provisional Relief – Upon initial findings of the Board that the
Petition for the approval of initial toll rate or the petition for toll rate adjustment
is in accordance with Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 2, Section 2 of Rule 3 and
Section 1 of Rule 4 hereof, the Board within a reasonable time after the filing of
the Petition, may in an en banc decision provisionally approve the initial toll
rate or toll rate adjustment, without the necessity of any notice and hearing."
From the foregoing, it is clear that a hearing is not necessary for the grant of
provisional toll rate adjustment. The language of LOI No. 1334-A is not
susceptible of equivocation. It "directs, orders and instructs" the TRB to issue
provisional toll rates adjustment ex-parte without the need of notice, hearing
and publication. All that is necessary is that it be issued upon (1) a finding that
the main petition is sufficient in form and substance; (2) the submission of an
affidavit showing that the increase in rates substantially conforms to the
formula, if any is stipulated in the franchise or toll operation agreement, and
that failure to immediately impose and collect the increase in rates would result
in great irreparable injury to the petitioner; and (3) the submission of a bond.
Again, whether or not CITRA complied with these requirements is an issue that
must be addressed to the TRB.
The practice is not something peculiar. We have ruled in a number of cases
that an administrative agency may be empowered to approve provisionally,
when demanded by urgent public need, rates of public utilities without a
hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are
by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the
definitive rates approved after final hearing.[36] In Maceda vs. Energy
Regulatory Board,[37] we ruled that while the ERB is not precluded from
conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority –which is of course,
the better procedure – however, it can not be stigmatized if it failed to conduct
one. Citing Citizens’ Alliance for Consumer Protection vs. Energy Regulatory
Board,[38] this Court held:
In the light of Section 8 quoted above, public respondent Board need not even
have conducted formal hearings in these cases prior to issuance of its Order of
14 August 1987 granting a provisional increase of prices. The Board, upon its
own discretion and on the basis of documents and evidence submitted by
private respondents, could have issued an order granting provisional relief
immediately upon filing by private respondents of their respective applications.
In this respect, the Court considers the evidence presented by private
respondents in support of their applications -–.i.e., evidence showing that
importation costs of petroleum products had gone up; that the peso had
depreciated in value; and that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) had
been depleted – as substantial and hence constitutive of at least prima facie
basis for issuance by the Board of a provisional relief order granting an
increase in the prices of petroleum products.
Anent petitioner Padua’s contention that CITRA has no standing to apply for a
toll fee increase, suffice it to say that CITRA’s right stems from the STOA
which was entered into by no less than the Republic of the Philippines and by
the PNCC. Section 7.04 of the STOA provides that the Investor, CITRA, and/or
the Operator, PNCC, shall be entitled to apply for and if warranted, to be
granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in case of force majeure and a
significant currency valuation.[39] Now, unless set aside through proper action,
the STOA has the force and effect of law between the contracting parties, and
is entitled to recognition by this Court. [40] On the same breath, we cannot
sustain Padua’s contention that the term "Metro Manila Skyway" Project
excludes the at-grade portions of the South Luzon Expressway considering
that under the same STOA the "Metro Manila Skyway" includes: "(a) the South
Metro Manila Skyway, coupled with the rehabilitated at-grade portion of the
South Luzon Expressway, from Alabang to Quirino Avenue; (b) the Central
Metro Manila Skyway, from Quirino Avenue to A. Bonifacio Avenue; x x x."[41]
Petitioner Zialcita faults the TRB for not stating the facts and the law on which
Resolution No. 2001-89 is based. Petitioner is wrong. Suffice it to state that
while Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based," this rule applies only to a decision
of a court of justice, not TRB.[42]
At this point, let it be stressed that we are not passing upon the
reasonableness of the provisional toll rate adjustments. As we have earlier
mentioned, this matter is best addressed to the TRB.
IV
In fine, as what we intimated in Philippine National Construction Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals,[43] we commend petitioners for devoting their time and effort
on a matter so imbued with public interest as in this case. But we can do no
better than to brush aside their chief objections to the provisional toll rate
adjustments, for a different approach would lead this Court astray into the field
of factual conflict where its pronouncements would not rest on solid grounds.
Time and again, we have impressed that this Court is not a trier of facts, more
so, in the consideration of an extraordinary remedy of prohibition where only
questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is to be
entertained.
And to accord the main petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 141949 the full
deliberation it deserves, we deem it appropriate to discuss its merit on another
occasion. Anyway, G.R. No. 141949 was consolidated with G.R. No. 151108
only by reason of petitioner Padua’s deviant motion assailing Resolution 2001-
89. As we have previously said, the main petition in G.R. No. 141949 presents
an entirely different issue and is set on a different factual landscape.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Padua’s "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases" is DENIED and petitioner Zialcita’s
"Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of the
Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, represented by SECRETARY
ROBERT Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R. SANCHEZ,
MR. OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial Vice-Governor of
Nueva Ecija, and MR. LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S.
ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS, MR. VICENTE C. PALILIO, and MR.
NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their capacity as Provincial Board Members
of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner
Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija. Private
respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of said province while private
respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos,
Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon Interior are members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the
President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging petitioner with
grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged that in
the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the
provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the
door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close
behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled
the area. Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their
resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the
province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine
National Bank; that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into
approving this loan; that fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was held that day for lack of quorum and the proposed
legislative measure was not considered; that private respondents opposed the
loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of
more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget officer and treasurer
had earlier disclosed that the province could not afford to contract another
obligation; that petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating private
respondents was a serious insult to the integrity and independence of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed
grave danger to private respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents
prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of
the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan
in light of the financial condition of the province, to wit:
In this regard, we respectfully request for the following assistance from
your good office:
1. To immediately suspend Governor N. [sic] Joson considering the
actual dangers that we are facing now, and provide adequate police
security detail for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija.
Should the evidence warrant after investigation, to order his removal
from office.
2. To conduct an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva
Ecija by the auditors from the Commission on Audit Central Office with
adequate police security assistance. Should the evidence so warrant,
to file necessary charges against responsible and accountable officers.
3. To advise the Philippine National Bank to review the capability of the
province of Nueva Ecija to secure more loans and the feasibility of the
same in the light of the present financial condition of the province. Or if
said loan will be contrary to sound banking practice, recommend its
disapproval. 1
The letter-complaint was submitted with the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien
and Jacqueline Jane Perez, two (2) employees of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who witnessed the incident. The letter was endorsed by
Congressmen Eleuterio Violago and Pacifico Fajardo of the Second and Third
Districts of Nueva Ecija, former Congressman Victorio Lorenzo of the Fourth
District, and Mayor Placido Calma, President of the Mayors' League of said
province. 2
The President acted on the complaint by writing on its margin the following:
17 Sep 96
To: SILG info Exec. Sec. and Sec. of Justice:
 1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force,
intimidation or armed followers in the situation of 12 Sep at the Session
Hall. 2. Take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions. 3
BREAK NOT the PEACE.
FIDEL V. RAMOS
(Signed). 3
President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session Hall," i.e.,
the refusal of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to approve the
proposed loan, did not appear to justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed
followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and
investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace."
The letter-complaint together with the President's marginal notes were sent to
Secretary Robert Z. Barbers on September 20, 1996. Acting upon the
instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case
against him 4 and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes.
In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his]
verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with such
documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt. 5
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and
summoned petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the
controversy. The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner
promised to maintain peace and order in the province while private
respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would adversely affect
their peaceful co-existence. 6
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private
respondents reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to
file his answer to the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. Petitioner
received a copy of this order on November 13, 1996. On the same day,
petitioner requested for an extension of thirty (30) days to submit his answer
because he was "trying to secure the services of legal counsel experienced in
administrative law practice. 7 The Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), acting through Director Almario de los Santos, Officer-In-
Charge of the Legal Service, granted the motion, with the thirty-day extension to
be reckoned, however, from November 13, 1996, i.e., the day petitioner received
the order to answer. 8
In a letter dated December 9, 1996, petitioner moved for another extension of
thirty (30) days to file his answer. He stated that he had already sent letters to
various law firms in Metro Manila but that he had not yet contracted their
services; that the advent of the Christmas season kept him busy with
"numerous and inevitable official engagements." 9 The DILG granted the request
for extension "for the last time up to January 13 only." 10
On January 7, 1997, petitioner requested for another extension of thirty (30)
days to file his answer. According to him, the Christmas season kept him very
busy and preoccupied with his numerous official engagements; that the law
firms he invited to handle his case have favorably replied but that he needed
time to confer with them personally; and that during this period, he, with the
help of his friends, was exploring the possibility of an amicable settlement of
the case. 11 The DILG granted petitioner's request "for the last time" but gave him
an extension of only ten (10) days from January 13, 1997 to January 23, 1997. The
DILG also informed him that his "failure to submit answer will be considered a
waiver and that the plaintiff [shall] be allowed to present his evidence ex parte." 12
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. He reiterated his prayer for
an extension of thirty (30) days on the following grounds: (a) that he was still in
the process of choosing competent and experienced counsel; (b) that some
law firms refused to accept his case because it was perceived to be politically
motivated; and (c) the multifarious activities, appointments and official
functions of his office hindered his efforts to secure counsel of
choice. 13
Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then
Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default
and to have waived his right to present evidence. Private respondents were
ordered to present their evidence ex-parte. The order reads as follows:
ORDER
It appearing that respondent failed to submit his answer to the
complaint despite the grant to him of three (3) extensions, such
unreasonable failure is deemed a waiver of his right to present
evidence in his behalf pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 of Administrative
Order No. 23 dated December 17, 1992, as amended.
 Respondent is hereby declared in default, meanwhile, complainants
are directed to present their evidence ex-parte. However, considering
the prohibition on the conduct of administrative investigation due to the
forthcoming barangay elections, complainants will be notified on the
date after the barangay election for them to present their evidence.
SO ORDERED. 14
Two days later, on April 24, 1997, the law firm of Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar &
Asuncion, representing petitioner, filed with the DILG an "Entry of Appearance
with Motion for Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam."
Petitioner received a copy of the order of default on May 2, 1997. Through
counsel, he moved for reconsideration. On May 19, 1997, Undersecretary
Sanchez reconsidered the order of default in the interest of justice. He noted
the appearance of petitioner's counsel and gave petitioner "for the last time"
fifteen (15) days from receipt to file his answer. 15
On June 23, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order stating that
petitioner's counsel, whose office is in Manila, should have received a copy of
the May 19, 1997 order ten days after mailing on May 27, 1997. Since
petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to have waived his right
to present evidence in his behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order
of default and directed private respondents to present their evidence ex-
parte on July 15, 1997. 16
The following day, June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion
to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the
day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him, to answer the
complaint.
On July 4, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of June 23, 1997 reinstating the order of default.
Petitioner also prayed that the hearing on the merits of the case be held in
abeyance until after the "Motion to Dismiss" shall have been resolved.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing
petitioner under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending
investigation of the charges against him. 17
Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the
implementation of the order of preventive suspension. In petitioner's stead,
Secretary Barbers designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor
until such time as petitioner's temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased to
exist. 18
Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of
default. 19
Meanwhile, the proceedings before the DILG continued. On August 20, 1997,
Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order denying petitioner's "Motion to
Dismiss" and " Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration." In the same
order, he required the parties to submit their position papers within an
inextendible period of ten days from receipt after which the case shall be
deemed submitted for resolution, to wit:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, both motions are denied. However, for
this office to have a better appreciation of the issues raised in the
instant case, the parties, through their respective counsels are hereby
directed to submit their position papers within a period of ten (10) days
from receipt hereof, which period is inextendible, after which the case
is deemed submitted for resolution. 20
On August 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the DILG a "Motion to Lift Order of
Preventive Suspension." On September 10, 1997, petitioner followed this with
a "Motion to Lift Default Order and Admit Answer Ad Cautelam." 21 Attached to
the motion was the "Answer Ad Cautelam". 22 and sworn statements of his
witnesses. On the other hand, complainants (private respondents herein)
manifested that they were submitting the case for decision based on the records,
the complaint and affidavits of their witnesses. 23
In his Answer Ad Cautelam, petitioner alleged that in the morning of
September 12, 1996, while he was at his district office in the town of Munoz,
he received a phone call from Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Jose del
Mundo. Del Mundo, who belonged to petitioner's political party, informed him
that Vice-Governor Tinio was enraged at the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who were in petitioner's party because they refused to place on
the agenda the ratification of the proposed P150 million loan of the province.
Petitioner repaired to the provincial capitol to advise his party-mates on their
problem and at the same time attend to his official functions. Upon arrival, he
went to the Session Hall and asked the members present where Vice-
Governor Tinio was. However, without waiting for their reply, he left the Hall
and proceeded to his office.
Petitioner claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the
employees. He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio, he was always
accompanied by his official security escorts whenever he reported for work. He
also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane
Perez was false. Escombien was purportedly not inside the session hall during
the incident but was at her desk at the office and could not in any way have
seen petitioner in the hall. To attest to the truth of his allegations, petitioner
submitted three (3) joint affidavits — two (2) affidavits executed by six (6) and
ten (10) employees, respectively, of the provincial government, and a third by
four members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 24
On September 11, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of August 20, 1997 denying his motion to
dismiss. The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" was rejected by
Undersecretary Sanchez on October 8, 1997. Undesecretary Sanchez,
however, granted the "Motion to Lift Default Order and to Admit Answer Ad
Cautelam" and admitted the "Answer Ad Cautelam" as petitioner's position
paper pursuant to the order of August 20, 1997. 25
On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation." Petitioner prayed that a formal investigation of his case be
conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991
and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23; and that this be held at the
province of Nueva Ecija. 26 On October 29, 1997, petitioner submitted a
"Manifestation and Motion" before the DILG reiterating his right to a formal
investigation.
In the meantime, on October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner's petition. 27
Hence this recourse.
The proceedings before the DILG continued however. In an order dated
November 11, 1997, the DILG denied petitioner's "Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation" declaring that the submission of position papers substantially
complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative
proceedings. 28
A few days after filing the petition before this Court, petitioner filed a "Motion
for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction."
Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the institution of this petition, the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments rendered a resolution on the
case finding him guilty of the offenses charged. 29 His finding was based on the
position papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The DILG
Secretary found the affidavits of complainants' witnesses to be "more natural,
reasonable and probable" than those of herein petitioner Joson's. 30
On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed
on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without
pay, to wit:
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government, respondent Nueva Ecija Governor Eduardo Nonato
Joson is hereby found guilty of the offenses charged and is meted the
penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6) months without
pay. 31
On January 14, 1998, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the order of the Executive Secretary.
On January 19, 1998, private respondents submitted a Manifestation informing
this Court that the suspension of petitioner was implemented on January 9,
1998; that on the same day, private respondent Oscar Tinio was installed as
Acting Governor of the province; and that in view of these events, the
temporary restraining order had lost its purpose and effectivity and was
fait accompli. 32 We noted this Manifestation.
In his petition, petitioner alleges that:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE
STRICTLY APPLIED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AND
CLEARLY PUNITIVE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE AGAINST
PETITIONER GOVERNOR EDNO JOSON;
II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
ALTER-EGO PRINCIPLE BECAUSE, CONTRARY TO LAW, IT WAS
THE SECRETARY OF THE DILG WHO WAS EXERCISING THE
 POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH ARE CLEARLY VESTED BY
LAW ONLY UPON HIM OR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT WHEN HE
FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN ANSWER, AS
DIRECTED BY THE DILG, BECAUSE A MOTION TO DISMISS
BASED ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS IS NOT A PROHIBITIVE
[sic] PLEADING IN ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASES.
IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
IMPOSITION OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AGAINST THE
PETITIONER WAS PROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO JOINDER
OF ISSUES YET UPON ITS IMPOSITION AND THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE OF GUILT AGAINST PETITIONER. 33
In his "Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction," petitioner also claims that:
I THE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 8, 1998 AND THE MEMORANDA
ISSUED PURSUANT THERETO (i.e., ANNEXES "C," "D," "E," "F,"
AND "G" HEREOF) WERE ISSUED WITH UNDUE HASTE, IN
VIOLATION OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE 1991
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO.
23, AND IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INVALID RESOLUTION OF
JANUARY 8, 1998 (ANNEX "C" HEREOF) BY THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS ENTITLES PETITIONER TO THE IMMEDIATE
ISSUANCE OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER/WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEREIN PRAYED FOR. 34
We find merit in the petition.
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are
governed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order
No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the Investigation of
Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces,
Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and
Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila." 35 In all matters not provided in A.O. No.
23, the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory
character. 36
I
Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code
enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended or removed from office. Section 60 reads:
Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. — An elective local official
may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the
following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or
dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days,
except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlunsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang
barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or
the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other
laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
When an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for
disciplinary action, the administrative complaint against him must be verified
and filed with any of the following:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified
complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as
follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly
urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall
be filed before the Office of the President.
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be
filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed
before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned
whose decision shall be final and executory. 37
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified
and filed with the proper government office. A complaint against an elective
provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the President. A
complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed
before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of
Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with
the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-
complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code. He
alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not
supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that private
respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the
verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with the
Office of the President. 38 To prove his allegations, petitioner submitted: (a) the
sworn statement of private respondent Solita C. Santos attesting to the alleged fact
that after the letter-complaint was filed, Vice-Governor Tinio made her and the
other members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan sign an additional page which he
had later notarized; and (b) the fact that the verification of the letter-complaint and
the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not indicate the document, page or book
number of the notarial register of the notary public before whom they were made. 39
We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence of the
document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing
officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries may
constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in complying
with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. They may give
grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission. 40 But they do not
indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-
complaint was filed with the Office of the President.
Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita
C. Santos. Private respondent Santos was one of the signatories to the letter-
complaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that she be dropped as one of the
complainants since she had just joined the political party of petitioner Joson.
She decided to reveal the intercalation because she was disillusioned with the
"dirty tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab power from petitioner
Joson. 41 Private respondent Santos cannot in anyway be considered an unbiased
witness. Her motive and change of heart render her affidavit suspect.
Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when
submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The
requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when
he acted on the complaint.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. 42 Verification is mainly
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in
good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. 43 The lack of
verification is a mere formal defect. 44 The court may order the correction of the
pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served. 45
II
In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority
of the DILG Secretary over the case. He contends that under the law, it is the
Office of the President that has jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that
the Court of Appeals erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the
power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the
DILG Secretary.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:
Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly
verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding
Section shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who may
act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as
the Disciplining Authority.
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He
may constitute an Investigating Committee in the Department of the
Interior and Local Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service,
constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government. 46
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the
Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority,
who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The
Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In
lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplinary Authority may designate a Special
Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions. 47
The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties." 48 If the subordinate
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. 49 The President's power
of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. 50Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. 51 And the power to discipline and ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order
an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good
of the public service so requires. 52 Thus:
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to
conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding, and
in view of the nature and character of the executive authority with
which the President of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional
grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over all local
governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must
be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or
conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless
thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not withou t limitation, but it at
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be
conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be
founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed
after careful study and investigation. 53
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials.
A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim.
The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to discipline. 54
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is
based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
Thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
 administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 55
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President. 56 The power of
control is provided in the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. 57
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. 58 As head of
the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some of his
powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts
personally. 59 The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in
certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is,
and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority. 60
The procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating Authorities should
exercise their powers is distinctly set forth in the Local Government Code and
A.O. No. 23. Section 62 of the Code provides:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — (a) Within seven (7) days after the
administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof, and commence investigation of the case within ten (10)
days after receipt of such answer of the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 5 61 of A.O. No. 23 provide:
Sec. 1. Commencement. Within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt of
the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the complaint and
answer, together with their attachments and other relevant papers, to
the Investigating Authority who shall commence the investigation of the
case within ten (10) days from receipt of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the
complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine
whether there is a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal
administrative proceedings.
When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining Authority
shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified answer
within fifteen (15) days from notice. Upon filing of the answer, the Disciplining
Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating Authority for investigation.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power
of the President when he required petitioner to answer the complaint.
Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President but
it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer.
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the
provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required petitioner to file
his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been
referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it
may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary
merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the
case. 62 The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to
warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter is
entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
III
In his third assigned error, petitioner also claims that the DILG erred in
declaring him in default for filing a motion to dismiss. He alleges that a motion
to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited by the law or the rules and therefore the
DILG Secretary should have considered it and given him time to file his
answer.
It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the Local
Government Code of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner, however, was
instructed not to file a motion to dismiss in the order to file answer. Thrice, he
requested for extension of time to file his answer citing as reasons the search
for competent counsel and the demands of his official duties. And, thrice, his
requests were granted. Even the order of default was reconsidered and
petitioners was given additional time to file answer. After al the requests and
seven months later, he filed a motion to dismiss!
Petitioner should know that the formal investigation of the case is required by
law to be finished within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time of formal
notice to the respondent. The extensions petitioners requested consumed fifty-
five (55) days of this period. 63 Petitioner, in fact, filed his answer nine (9) months
after the first notice. Indeed, this was more than sufficient time for petitioner to
comply with the order to file answer.
The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public
service. The efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a case
hangs over their heads. Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they are
innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the business of government will
not be prejudiced. 64
IV
In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in
recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during
the investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the
Local Government Code, viz:
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (a) Preventive suspension may be
imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues
are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of
the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided, That,
any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not
extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that
several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he
cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known
at the time of the first suspension.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at
any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is
strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that
the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President, imposed preventive
suspension on petitioner Joson after finding that:
xxx xxx xxx
DILG Secretary Robert Z. Barbers, in a memorandum for the
President, dated 23 June 1997, recommends that respondent be
placed under preventive suspension considering that all the requisites
to justify the same are present. He stated therein that:
"Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time
after the issues are joined, that is, after respondent has
answered the complaint, when the evidence of guilt is
strong and, given the gravity of the offense, there is a
great possibility that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence (Sec. 3, Rule 6 of Administrative Order
No. 23).
The failure of respondent to file his answer despite
several opportunities given him is construed as a
waiver of his right to present evidence in his behalf
(Sec. 4, Rule 4 of Administrative Order No. 23). The
requisite of joinder of issues is squarely met with
respondent's waiver of right to submit his answer. The
act of respondent in allegedly barging violently into the
session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct.
The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the
joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang
 Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive
of the province is in a position to influence the
witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational
politics in the province dictates that extreme
precautionary measures be taken."
Upon scrutiny of the records and the facts and circumstances
attendant to this case, we concur with the findings of the Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government and find merit in the aforesaid
recommendation.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the Department of the Interior
and Local Government, respondent EDUARDO N. JOSON, Governor
of Nueva Ecija, is hereby placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
FOR A PERIOD OF SIXTY (60) DAYS, effective 11 July 1997, pending
investigation of the charges filed against him.
SO ORDERED. 65
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of
preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's failure to file his
answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of
his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the
issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive Secretary also found
that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his
continuance in office during the pendency of the case could influence the
witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against
him.
V
We now come to the validity of the January 8, 1998 Resolution of the
Executive Secretary finding petitioner guilty as charged and imposing on him
the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months from office without pay.
Petitioner claims that the suspension was made without formal investigation
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7 of A.O. No. 23. Petitioner filed a "Motion
To Conduct Formal Investigation" three months before the issuance of the
order of suspension and this motion was denied by the DILG for the following
reasons:
On November 19, 1997, complainants, through counsel, filed a
Manifestation calling our attention to the Decision dated October 24,
1997 of the Court of Appeals, Fifth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 44694,
entitled "Eduardo Nonato Joson versus Executive Secretary Ruben D.
Torres, et. al." In the aforestated decision, the Court of Appeals
resolved to sustain the authority of this Department to investigate this
administrative case and has likewise validated the order of default as
well as the order of preventive suspension of the respondent.
We offer no objection and concur with the assertion of respondent that
he has the right for the conduct of formal investigation. However,
before there shall be a formal investigation, joinder of issues must
already be present or respondent's answer has already been filed. In
the case at bar, the admission of respondent's answer after having
been declared in default was conditioned on the fact of submission of
position papers by the parties, after which, the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution. Respondent, instead of submitting his position
paper filed his subject motion while complainants manifested to forego
the submission of position paper and submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings on hand.
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied (Concerned Officials of
the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Vasquez, 240
SCRA 502). The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may
have in support of one's defense (Tajonera v. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA
438). To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process (Juanita Y. Say, et. al; vs. IAC, G.R.
No. 73451). Thus, when respondent failed to submit his position paper
as directed and insisted for the conduct of formal investigation, he was
not denied of his right of procedural process.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for the Conduct of Formal Investigation, for
lack of merit, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 66
The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous.
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelled out in the following
provisions of A.O. No. 23, viz:
Sec. 3 Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the
complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine
whether there is a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal
administrative proceedings.
Sec. 4. Dismissal motu proprio. If the Investigating Authority
determines that there is no prima facie case to warrant the institution of
formal administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period
prescribed under the preceding Section, submit its recommendation to
the Disciplining Authority for the motu proprio dismissal of the case,
together with the recommended decision, resolution, and order.
Sec. 5. Preliminary conference. If the Investigating Authority
determines that there is prima facie case to warrant the institution of
formal administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period
prescribed under the preceding Section, summon the parties to a
preliminary conference to consider the following:
a) whether the parties desire a formal investigation or
are willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the evidence on record; and
b) If the parties desire a formal investigation, to
consider the simplification of issues, the possibility of
obtaining stipulation or admission of facts and of
documents, specifically affidavits and depositions, to
avoid unnecessary proof, the limitation of number of
witnesses, and such other matters as may be aid the
prompt disposition of the case.
The Investigating Authority shall encourage the parties and their
counsels to enter, at any stage of the proceedings, into amicable
settlement, compromise and arbitration, the terms and conditions of
which shall be subject to the approval of the Disciplining Authority.
After the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall issue
an order reciting the matters taken up thereon, including the facts
stipulated and the evidences marked, if any. Such order shall limit the
issues for hearing to those not disposed of by agreement or admission
of the parties, and shall schedule the formal investigation within ten
(10) days from its issuance, unless a later date is mutually agreed in
writing by the parties concerned. 67
The records show that on August 27, 1997, petitioner submitted his Answer Ad
Cautelam where he disputed the truth of the allegations that he barged into the
session hall of the capitol and committed physical violence to harass the
private respondents who were opposed to any move for the province to
contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In his Order of October 8, 1997,
Undersecretary Sanchez admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam but treated
it as a position paper. On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to
Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner reiterated this motion on October 29,
1997. Petitioner's motion was denied on November 11, 1997. Secretary
Barbers found petitioner guilty as charged on the basis of the parties' position
papers. On January 8, 1998, Executive Secretary Torres adopted Secretary
Barbers' findings and recommendations and imposed on petitioner the penalty
of six (6) months suspension without pay.
The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to
consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not
give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal
investigation would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a
motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded several rights
under the law, to wit:
Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. — The respondent shall be accorded
full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel,
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to
require the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documentary evidence in his favor through compulsory process
of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an
accused. 68 These rights are essentially part of procedural due process. 69 The
local elective official has the (1) the right to appear and defend himself in person or
by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;
and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the
Local Government Code 70 and in A.O. No. 23. 71 Well to note, petitioner, formally
claimed his right to a formal investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been
admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.
Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint
against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in
the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor
in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local
officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that
the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing. 72 A.O. No.
23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing
especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but
contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times
prepared with the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the
discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying
petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive officials and
employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government
officials are not exactly similar to those against appointive officials. In fact, the
provisions that apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from
appointive government officers and employees. This can be gleaned from the
Local Government Code itself.
In the Local Government Code, the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is
devoted to elective officials. It provides for their qualifications and
election, 73 vacancies and succession, 74 local legislation, 75 disciplinary
actions, 76 and recall. 77 Appointive officers and employees are covered in Title III of
Book I of the Code entitled "Human Resources and Development." All matters
pertinent to human resources and development in local government units are
regulated by "the civil service law and such rules and regulations and other
issuances promulgated thereto, unless otherwise provided in the Code." 78 The
"investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive
local officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal" are "in
accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws," the
results of which "shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission." 79
It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the Civil Service,
that primarily governs appointive officials and employees. Their qualifications
are set forth in the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. The
grounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V are much more in
number and are specific than those enumerated in the Local Government
Code against elective local officials. 80 The disciplining authority in such actions is
the Civil Service Commission. 81 although the Secretaries and heads of agencies
and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities are also given the power
to investigate and decide disciplinary actions against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. 82 When a complaint is filed and the respondent answers, he must
"indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not
considered satisfactory." 83 If the officer or employee elects a formal investigation,
the direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent "consist[s] of the sworn
statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint and answer, as
the case may be, without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence
deemed necessary . . ., upon which the cross-examination by respondent and the
complainant, respectively, is based." 84 The investigation is conducted without
adhering to the technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings." 85Moreover, the
appointive official or employee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1) the
charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is a
recidivist; and (3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable. 86
The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials are markedly different from appointive officials. 87 The rules on the
removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The
procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is
expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected. An
elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community
that elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is
relatively of short duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects
and shortens this term of office. When an elective official is suspended or
removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected.
Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the
elective official of their choice. 88 Suspension and removal are thus imposed only
after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him
strongly dictates their imposition.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public
respondent Executive Secretary is declared null and void and is set aside. No
Cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. &
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive
Service Board is challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility
and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On
September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank
by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil
Service Commission 2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that Civil
Service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission,
. . .;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides that "The Civil Service Commission, as
the central personnel agency of the government, is mandated
to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progresiveness
and courtesy in the civil service, . . .";
WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 grants the Commission the power,
among others, to administer and enforce the constitutional and
statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks
in the Civil Service;
WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 Provides, among others, that The
Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on
merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination, or based highly technical
qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) security of tenure;
WHEREAS, Section 8 (c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the
administrative Code of 1987 provides that "The third level shall
cover Positions in the Career Executive Service";
WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to
consolidate, integrate and unify the administration of all levels
of positions in the career service.
WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A.
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 confers on the
Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its
organization as the need arises.
WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides
that the Civil Service Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy
and the necessary implications thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil
Service Commission hereby resolves to streamline reorganize
and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant
thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be
known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career
Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner
as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, dated June 7, 1994,
the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential legal Counsel, stated:
xxx xxx xxx
 On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC
Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career Executive
Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of
CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, including whether the Civil
Service Commission has authority to abolish the Career
Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain
unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from
considering appointments of career service eligibles to career
executive ranks.
xxx xxx xxx
You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to
settle the legal issues arising from issuance by the Civil Service
Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance of
all concerned.
Thank You.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive
Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-
4359. The petition is anchored on the following arguments:
A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT
COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS
OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN
OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF
CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY
AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY,
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-
4359.
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions
of petitioner. Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It
posited the following position:
ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC.
II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO RANK OF
PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY
DEFECT.
III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECOMMENDATION
OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE
THE PRESIDENT HAS PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO
RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID
PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO
CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO
QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT
WHO HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE CESB.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE
COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec. 12 (1), Title I,
Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of the 1987).
THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN SETTLED
WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE
PETITION FILED BY THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., RENATO
V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R. NO. 114380. THE
AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED
 THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB WITH THE
COMMISSION.
We find merit in the petition. 3
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was
created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 4 which
adopted the Integrated Plan. Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan
provides:
Article IV — Career Executive Service
1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing
pool of well-selected and development oriented career
administrators who shall provide competent and faithful
service.
2. A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this
Chapter as the Board, is created to serve as the governing
body of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall consist
of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as presiding
officer, the Executive Secretary and the Commissioner of the
Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the
private sector and/or the academic community who are familiar
with the principles and methods of personnel administration.
xxx xxx xxx
5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures
on the selection, classification, compensation and career
development of members of the Career Executive Service. The
Board shall set up the organization and operation of the
service. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings
that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.
As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and
Employees, 5 viz:
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the
creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so
far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by
constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may
decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or
convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is
necessary to create and define duties, the legislative
department has the discretion to determine whether additional
offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be
attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An
office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of
that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and
the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit,
abolish the office.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts
from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of
CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of
its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the
Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one
Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are
necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission
may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must
be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the
offices under the respondent Commission, viz:
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall
have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive Director headed by an
Executive Director, with a Deputy Executive Director shall
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission; coordinate the programs of
the offices of the Commission and render periodic reports on
their operations, and perform such other functions as may be
assigned by the Commission.
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a
Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with
legal advice and assistance; render counselling services;
undertake legal studies and researches; prepare opinions and
ruling in the interpretation and application of the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations; prosecute violations of such law,
rules and regulations; and represent the Commission before
any court or tribunal.
(4) The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate
development plans, programs and projects; undertake research
and studies on the different aspects of public personnel
management; administer management improvement programs;
and provide fiscal and budgetary services.
(5) The Central Administrative Office shall provide the
Commission with personnel, financial, logistics and other basic
support services.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate
and implement policies, standards, rules and regulations
pertaining to personnel records maintenance, security, control
and disposal; provide storage and extension services; and
provide and maintain library services.
(7) The Office of Position Classification and
Compensation shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations relative to the administration
of position classification and compensation.
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Placement shall provide leadership and assistance in
developing and implementing the overall Commission
programs relating to recruitment, execution and placement, and
formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of the Commission's examination and
placement programs.
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide
leadership and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of
personnel systems and standards relative to performance
appraisal, merit promotion, and employee incentive benefit and
awards.
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide
leadership and assistance in the development and retention of
qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service; formulate
standards for training and staff development; administer
service-wide scholarship programs; develop training literature
and materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities
and evaluate training programs.
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop
policies, standards, rules and regulations for the effective
conduct or inspection and audit personnel and personnel
management programs and the exercise of delegated
authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil
Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the
implementation of their personnel programs and evaluation
systems.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership
and assistance in the development and implementation of
policies, standards, rules and regulations in the accreditation of
employee associations or organizations and in the adjustment
and settlement of employee grievances and management of
employee disputes.
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and
implement policies, standards, rules and regulations governing
corporate officials and employees in the areas of recruitment,
examination, placement, career development, merit and
awards systems, position classification and compensation,
performing appraisal, employee welfare and benefit, discipline
and other aspects of personnel management on the basis of
comparable industry practices.
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration shall be
responsible for the enforcement of the constitutional and
statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for
 the effective implementation of the retirement of government dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of
officials and employees. action.

(15) The Regional and Field Offices. — The Commission shall
have not less than thirteen (13) Regional offices each to be
headed by a Director, and such field offices as may be needed,
each to be headed by an official with at least the rank of an
Assistant Director.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the
respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent

Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the CESB was
intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached
to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization
Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the
problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a
broad and positive outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the
CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By
said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to
another is to attain "policy and program coordination." This is clearly
etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to
wit:

(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship

between the department or its equivalent and attached agency
or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached
agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with
or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;
having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the department or its
equivalent provide general policies through its representative in
the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.

Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al.,

vs. Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing
the abolition of the CESB was dismissed for lack of cause of action. Suffice to
state that the reliance is misplaced considering that the cited case was
G.R. No. 109406 September 11, 1998
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ROMEO T. ACOSTA, DINAH A. AGATI,
RODRIGO AGIR JR., REY M. T. AGUINALDO, ELEAZAR S. ALAIRA,
MARCIAL C. AMARO JR., LEONOR M. ARZADON, MARLENE C. ARZAGA,
MIGUEL G. BADION, NORMITA S. BALLON, SOCORRO B. DEL MONTE,
TEODORA B. CABRERA, ERLINDA CANTIL, ARIEL P. CATINDIG, MA.
HAYLEY N. CONCEPCION, MARY ANN C. CRUZ, MA. VICTORIA
ASUMPTU P. DACANAY, FEBES M. DE LEON, LIBERTY M. DELIMA,
MARITESS I. ESCUBIO, RITA D. FLORELIZ, CARIDAD C. FRANCISCO,
LEVI F. CABALFIN, FE GARRIDO, JULIE GOROSPE, NELSON V.
GOROSPE, IMELDA GUINTANGUIJO, NENITA GUTIERREZ, SALLY B.
IMPERIAL, NERISSA B. JARABE, FE G. LOO, MA. IRENE E. LORENZO,
LORIDA D. MACARAAN, DANILO P. MANOLOTO, ADORACION M.
MENDOZA, CECILIA MENDOZA, EMMANUEL MIRAFLORES, LLARINA S.
MOJICA, ZENAIDA B. MUNOZ, ALICIA S. NERY, NOEL O. PADILLA, ERVY
C. PASCUAL, MA. MADELINE R. PATAWARAN, CRISTINA B. PAULINO,
IRENEO T. PEREZ, MA. EVELINA RASCO, AUDREY T. ROSETE,
LUMINADA C. ROTOL, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., JULIET U. TEXON,
HELEN A. TOBIAS, LARRY R.VILLAFLOR, RAYMOND R. VIRGINO, LILY
YBAO, VICKY U. YLAGAN, NENITA R. ZABALA, CHARLIE U. AGATI,
NOEL C. AQUINO, ERLINDA P. AYAP, CONRADO A. BRAVANTE, JR.,
EMMA F. CABRERA, MAY R. CANLAS, SUSAN CASTILLA, CORAZON B.
CHECA, BLESILDA T. CORRO, EMMA DIEZ, MA. LOURDES G. FERRER,
LILIHUA B. GARCIA, JESLINA B. GOROSPE, MYRNA GUMANGAN,
LERMA D. HONRADO, ISRAEL S. INOCENCIO, JONAS P. LEONES, AVEL
A. MORADO, JUANITA NACINO,GENEVIEVE AUSTRIA PADILLA, ALMA
O. PELOBELLO, NELIA J. QUESADA, CRISTINA M. REGUNAY,
DEMILOUR B. REYES, MOLINA REYNALDO, GLENN ADONIS M. RICO,
BELEN E. SOTALBO, ANDREA B. TALOSIG, FLORDELIZA TENAZAS,
MERLY B. TOMILLUSO, MA. ROSALINA VELASCO, NATIVIDAD YABES,
PAULO F. ABESAMIS, FELICITAS AREVALO, FORCIA B. ATOS, BELINDA
I. DEANG, CONSUELO T. DUANO, ERNESTINA JOSE, GERARDO O.
MENDOZA, LUZVIMINDA P. MENDOZA, AMANTE S. PERALTA, YOLANDA
M. TATANG, DOLORES M. ANGCO, MA. VENUS BERONGOY, LYDIA M.
BONA, MA. LOURDES CASAL, MABEL COLOMA, MARY JUNE D.
DANDAN, ERLINDA O. DOMINGO, JOSEPHINE P. EBORA, ELENA B.
FERNANDEZ, EVANGELINE FERRER-LIMYOLO, AMPARO V. GEREZ,
ZENAIDA V. GUTIERREZ, MILAGROS C. IMBAO JULIE JALAAN, LETICIA
A. LLAMERA, CAROLINA A. LOPEZ, MARIUS NORMAN MACALALAD,
ALICIA L. MALLILLIN, REMEDIOS L. MERCADO, DINA B.
MONTEALEGRE, SUSAN MORTOS, JUANITO F. MUNSAYAC, PAULA
ONG, DALISAY PASCUAL, MA. ALMA M. PILIPINA, NICETA A. ROXAS,
AMADOR ATENDIDO, LUZCELY H. VEDAN, NELLY VILLARAMA, ESTALA
S. AGUILES, JEAN F. ALLADO, YVONNE B. BALDADO, EUPREFIA
BALDEMOR, NICETAS B. BAUTISTA, ANTONIO BENITEZ, JANETTE
BERNARDO, MARIA B. BONGCO, GREGORIO ALEXIS M. CAAYAO,
FREDESVINDA G. CASUNCAD, ROSA G. COPON, AMILYN DANTES,
HERMINIA ECLEO, FILIPINA V. EDRALIN, ROSALINA O. ENRIQUEZ,
MARY FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA B. GIMENO LEONARDO C. HERNANDEZ,
ERLINDA MENDOZA, AURORA V. PIDO, FORTUNATA C. RAYOSO,
MARIA V. RICAFORT, DORINA S. ROJAS, LEONITA R. SIBUNGA, ERNA
D. SY, ALMEIDA J. TAGALA, EDGARDO TUBANG, SOFIA VELACRUZ,
EUGENE N. ANTOLIN, MA. ELVIRA P. JAVIER, LISETTE G. MONENO,
CLEOFE P. PATANAO, MARY JEAN V. REYES, SHIRLEY G. AQUINO,
CHRISTY GEMPES, JOSE FEDERICO M. GEMDRANO, JOSEPHINE G.
RANCAP, JOSETTE B. SAN LUIS, MARINA A. BORRETA, CHERRY B.
CID, OLIVIA P. JOVE, MA. TERESA M. MARING, BETTY P. MOJICA,
EDITHA T. MUNIELA, EMMANUEL T. PILAR, JOVITA C. ROBOSA, MA.
NENA M. VILLANUEVA, MARK A. ANTONIO, PRISCILLA G. BACENA,
SUSAN C. BENOZA, RHODORA A. CALUNGCAGIN, ANA MARIA M.
CRISOSTOMO, ELENITO E. CUNANAN, ROMANA A. DE LEON,
EDMUNDO B. FLORENDO, DANIEL GARCIA, AMELIN F. MAGAT, PATRIA
A. NULLAS, MYRNA S. TADENA, THELMA TOTANES, ALFONSO A.
VERGARA, BELEN M. ANTIPORDA, ROSALINA B. CARANDO, ESTELLA
P. DE LEON, CRESENCIA I. OLIVAR, LOURIE A. OLIVERIO, TERESITA A.
RAMOS, ELISEO T. REYES, PUREZA T. SAYON, JOSEFINA B. TEJANA,
VILLAROSA C. ABEN, JONATHAN ACABAL, POLICARPIO ALCARAZ,
TERESITA C. AMOG, GLORIA AROGANTE, EVENLYN BANDOLIN,
GERRY BANDOLIN, ADOR BARROS, CELSO L. BAUTISTA, FELICITAS S.
BAUTISTA, CRISTNINA DE GUZMAN, ESTELA C. FACELO, RAMON
FLORES, ANGELITO V. FONTANILLA, GERMAN GALAOS, REMEDIOS S.
GARCIA, MANNY G. GINGCO, VIRGILIO HALILI, ZENAIDA IBAY,
ERNESTO B. JARABE, OSCAR LEANO, TEODORA O. LEONCIO,
CARMEN R. LUARCA, EMER REX MATIBAG, MARLYN R. MENDOZA,
BIBIANO C. MIRANDA, ROMERICO MA. T. MOLINA, ERLINDA C.
PAYOTAS, GIANINA H. PUNZALAN, CRISTINA H. REYES, PETER RAMIL
REYES, RUTH JEAN B. SOLANO, WILFREDO C. TORREDONDO,
NARCISO VILLAMOR, ERLINDAS S. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR H. VILLAS,
GUILLERMA B. ALCONIS, AGNES CAMPO, JOCELYN CLEMENTE,
AMADO B. ESPANOL, LEONILO G. GONZALES, FE A. MENDIZABAL,
TERESITA MORANARTE, ERLINDA P. ROMULO, FLORA TANGCO,
HONARIO T. TORRENUEVA, WILMA YNGENTE, SUSANA N. ANTOLIN,
JOEL U. BAUN, RHODORA C. BRUCAL, CARMELITA G. CAYABAN,
CARIDAD CLARIN, LIDINILA N. CONCEPCION, FARIDA F. FLAVIANO,
TEODORA B. MACARAYAN, HILARIA G. MAGCULANG, HERNAN
MARILLA, MONINA R. MENDRES, HERMINA A. MOLINA, YOLANDA GIGI
H. MOLINA, RHODORA C. PADILLA, SANTIAGO PALACPAC, JR.,
ROMMEL PANGILINAN, DIANA JEAN N. PINAROC, MELANIE C. REY,
MERCY L. REYES, HELEN RUTH BRIONES TABION, MARIA AMELITA DJ
ORTIZ TAMAYO, LEONIDES VALER, NELIA F. VILLANUEVA, MA.
CRISTINA F. ABAYA, MACARIO A. BASCON, NANCY ROSE CAUGMA,
ELIGIO T. ILDEFONSO, MA. DELIA P. MEIMBAN, ROMEO G.
MENDIZABAL, MICHAEL LL. TADEO, JOSE HENRY M. TALABIS,
MELCHOR R. TARUC, PONCIANO M. ARANEZ, REMEDIOS A. ASUNCION,
EDILBERTA BUENO, ELIZABETH F. CRUZ, ARACELI V. ESPINO,
RICARDO A. FIAN, LOURDES JM. FLORES, MA. ELIZABETH GALANG,
JOSE C. MORALES, JR., JOSELITO R. OCHING, JANET REYES, BENITO
C. SORIANO, MARCELO B. VALDERAMA, LINDBERG M.S. VALEROS,
SARITA RENDON VALEROS, STEPHEN E. ABELLA, MARIA FRANCIA
ALFEREZ, FELY BALABBO, FE BOJOCAN, CARMELO Z. CAUSAPIN,
NIDA R. DEDEL, JOSEFINA S. DIMALANTA, MARIA TERESITA ESPINOL,
BELEN FERNANDEZ, GERUNDO C. FERNANDEZ, HELEN LEE D.
JIMENEZ, JAKE MAKI, ROSITA M. PINIANO, CHITO REYES, EFREN F.
REYES, EVELYN REYES, ENRICO A.O. SANTOS, NELIE VALLANGCA,
VALENTE VILLANUEVA, MANUEL D. ROJAS, PAULINA G. CASTRO,
FANCY M. LEONES, ZENAIDA R. OPENA, FRANCISCO B.A. SAAVEDRA,
ARNOLD L. SINZACA, MANUEL P.S. SOLIS, DEMETRIA STA. ANA,
LALLY JEAN S. AGUILAR, ELENA D. APOLONIO, RODOLFO A. DE
AUSEN, MARITES O. DELFIN, EMMANUEL M. ESGUERRA, NELSON
ITLIONG, ALBINO A. BELEN, ROBERTO E. BELEN, FELIPE H.
CALLORINA, JR., ANTONIO CENTENO, ERNESTO R. FRUTAS, JOSEFINA
C. IGNACIO, PEDRITO N. KALALANG, BELLA P. MILLO, TIRSO P.
PARIAN, JR., CERLINO ALMENDAREZ, WILLIE V. AMBROCIO, MA.
TERESA G. AQUINO, JUANITA BAUTISTA, CELODONIO C. BERNABE,
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ALICIA CASTILLO, ANITA D. ESPARES, JOEL
FLORES, CITA G. GERADA, ROBERTO O. IGSOC, ANNALISA V. JAVIER,
VICTORIA B. MALACAD, ANTONIO C. MANILA, EVELYN MENDEZ,
LERMA M. MENDOZA, EUFEMIA NUCUM, LEONVINA A. OLIVO, AMIE T.
RABANG, LILIA J. RADA, DELAGIA D. ROBEL, DEGNISITA G. SERRANO,
PETRONIO TADIOSA, RODERICO A. TAN, CHARLITO VALDEZ, ALMA M.
VAZQUEZ, PEDRO E. VICTORIA, SERGIO ABUAN, RODOLFO ANGELES,
MARTINIANO ROTOL, MERLIE T. CASIGAY, THELMA F. CHUSON,
ENCARNACION CONCEPCION, IMELDA CORTEZ, OBDULIA B. DORADO,
EVELYN S. ESTRADA, MARIO S. FERNANDEZ, RUPERTO E. GABUTAN,
SONIA R. IGAYA, RAYMUNDA O. LABUGUEN, AUREA LACHICA, LINA M.
MANALAYSAY, SALVADOR MANIOSO BERLINA B. MANOSO,
FLORANGEL MEDRANO, TERESITA S. MESTA, JOCELYN MONTILLANO,
LUZ C. PERALTA, SOFIO B. QUINTANA, YOLANDA B. QUINTANA,
SANTOS RABARA, ROSALINO R. ROMUALDO, MARIFE RUBA,
CRISTETTA RULLODA, RHODORA SANTOS, VICTOR SEE, ELNORA G.
TALEON, VIRGINIA V. TALEON, MELCHOR U. TAMAYO, MILAGROS
VALDEZ, MARITA WELGAS-BRIZ, VISITACION A. ZANO, ELVIRA D.
AGPOON, VIRGINIA ANGELES, ISABELITA V. AUSTRIA, ADELAIDA S.
BALANZA, ORPHA B. BALILIA, FE T. CARPIO, LOIDA E. HUNAT,
ROSEMARIE LABIS, LUZ MARIA S. LANSIGAN, BONIFACIO RABANG,
ANGELITA RECELI, BERTRAM SIGAION, SARAH F. TUBIG, MYRNA M.
VILORIA, LOURDES C. WAGAN, SILVERIA M. ANTOLIN, BONOFACIO
ARCE, MARINA ASIAO, PERIGRINO S. BAGUNU, ARISCALITA A. BAKER,
MARIETTA L. BAL, NELY M. BUTIC, MOISES H. BUTIC, GLORIA S.
CABATIC, GERARDO T. CABREROS, BENJAMIN C. CARINO, ERASMO M.
CORTADO, EVANGELINE J. DE LEON, EVARISTO C. EUSEBIO, EDEN M.
GAZAL, EVA M. JACA, VELERIANO V. LADIA, JR., NORMA CASUCOG,
FELIX L. LECHONCITO, MA. DOLORES M. LEGARDA, RODOLFO P.
LIPAOPAO, JR., LETY A. LORENZO, MARLON C. MELCHOR, ELPIDIO M.
MOLINYAWE, JUAN S. ODANGA, SUEMELITO V. PAA, VENIA T. RAYALA,
FLORDELINO M. REY, CARME T. ROSETE, CORAZON C. SALAMAT,
ANASTACIO B. SISON, VICENTA F. GAERLAN, JULIET G. TOLENTINO,
GLORIA E. URBIZTONDO, ANDRA C. ABARQUEZ, THELMA S. ALCARAZ,
SALVE A. ASUNCION, ALLAN V. BARCENA, NERA S. BAYANI, NEMESIO
GERONILLA, PIO P. BOTE. DOLORES R. CATINDIG, CORWIN B.
CECILLANO, ALEX Z. CHENG, GERTRUDEZ C. CORTEZ, ARNULFO A.
ESCOBIDO, EUEGENE V. ESTRADA, GENESIS J. FRANCISCO, VIVIEN O.
GALEON, FLORDELIZA D. GARCIA, MITCHELLE A. LACHICA, THELMA I.
LAGMAN, MA. CAROLINA G. MELICOR, MA. MAGDALENA E. MORENO,
FRANCIONIE G. NONO, BERNARDO A. RESURRECCION, VILMA A.
SABADO, ELVIRA G. SABANDO, ALEJANDRO R. SIBUCAO, JR.,
WILFREDO H. ZAPANTA, HERMENIGILDO S. ALLASCO, REBECCA
BURGOS, MARIEL D. GARCIA, BELINDA M. LEAL, AGAPITA
MAGBOJOS, MA. LOURDES VICTUELLES, CARMELITA ALMENDAREZ,
PERLA ABELLA, ESMERALDA R. DE CLARO, LOURDES DECAMORA,
ROMUALDO DELA CRUZ, RUFINO DIAROG, HAYDEE LATTO, CARMEN
MELCHOR, MERCEDES U. ULIBAS, EMY R. ZAPANTA, NELDA C. ABLAN,
VENERANDO R. ATUD, NESTOR A. BAMBALAN, PROCESO V.
BAUTISTA, EMMA C. CONCEPCION, JUAN G. DAYAG, ELISA Q. FARRO,
EMILIE M. LICO, TEODORA B. PAJARILLAGA, CONSESA P. QUINONES,
VERONICA G. REY, TERESITA O. SERRANO, AVELINA VALDEZ, ELVIRA
L. ADVINCULA, RENATO P. AGUILAR, ROSALINA ALFORJA, LORENSO
ALMENDAREZ, SATA H. ALTAP, JAIME AQUINO, DOMINICO ARROBAN,
JR. OCTAVIUS L. ASPACIO, MYRNA V. BERNABE, CRESENSIO R.
CALDERON, JR., RUPITO C. CARACAS, PILAR F. CHUA, ENGRACIA M.
CRUZ, MANUEL CRUZ, AGUSTIN DELASAN, NATIVIDAD C. ESPIRITU,
ROLANDO I ETEROSA, EDEN FABIAN, LILIA A. FILAMOR, MIGUEL O.
GAPAS, ODENCIO GARCIA, PIEDAD R. GARCIA, BIEN GUICO,
PRESENTASION O. HAZAL, MARILYN B. LAGADAY, LORENZO
LAMENDAREZ, ALEJANDRINO MANAS, ROMEO L. MANOSO, MELINDA
MARTINEZ, JOYBERT MIJARES, WENCESLADA A. MIRAN, TEOFILO V.
OBLENA, AMELIA C. OLIVERIA, SOCORRO C. PALENCIA, NELSON
PANGILINAN, FAUSTINO PASON, ELIAS PATAL, ANDRES PELA,
AURORA V. PIOL, NOLI PRADO, ANITA C. RAMBAYON, EVANGELINE E.
RODRIGUES, ROSE R. SUNICO, JULIETA F. TABERNILLA, SALVACION
B. VAZQUEZ, EMILY VERANO, EDWIN VILLANUEVA, JOEL V. VILLAR,
SATURNINA VITE, DON ABARRIENTOS, JOSENDEL O. AGRA,
MARISTELA ARIEL, JOHN B. ARROBANG, ALBERTO A. BANATAO,
FEDERICO M. BARREDA, PAULO BERINA, RENATO M. BORJA, GENARO
BORQUIN, FLOR A. CABUNOG, ELIZABETH S. CALDERON, FRESCILLA
N. CALIMAG, CRISTETA A. CASTRO, MA. ELENA CONSTANTINO, MILA
CORRE, RENATO D. CRUZ, JOSEFINA L. DE LEON, RHODORA R. DE
VEYRA, CONSOLADORA A. DIMARANAN, ERNESTO R. DIONISIO,
ERNESTO S. DIONISIO, JR., LIGAYA B. DIONISIO, OSCAR EMBERGA,
PEDO FALLARIA. MA. LOURDES V. FELICITAS, GRISELDA V. GALEON,
CRESENCIO MAXIMO GARCIA, MARY ANN GENEROSO, WHYLEEN SM.
GONZALES, ANGELINA C. GREGORIO, SALVADOR B. JANA JR.,
LYNETTE T. LAROYA, OFELIA G. LIPORADA, GRACIANO MANUEL,
BIBIANO H. MEJINO, THEODORE MORAL, ANTONIO P. MORENO, JR.,
ANICETO D. ORDEN, IMELDA C. PANGGA, CONSOLACION PANGILINAN,
ROSITA P. PARINA, ELPIDIO N. QUITERO, MYRNA RAMOS, GLENDA B.
REFIL, MA. TERESA REFORSADO, HEIDI D. REGALA, RUFINA R. REYES,
SUSAN H. ROQUERO, AJIT RYE II, LEO J. SAGUGUIT, MARINO K.
SANTOS, LINA D. SEGUNIAL, ALBA SORIANO, JESSICA SORIANO,
ROMEO B. TRONO, ANGELITA T. VILORIA, TIRSO ABAD, FEDERICO
ABILO, LOLITA L. ANOVA, OPRIASA ANTONIO, JERRY B. AQUINO,
RODERICK ARAO, RENATO ARROYO, RUBEN ASENSI, ERNESTO
BALINGIT, ALBERTO A. BANATA, JOSEPHINE BARRIENTOS,
MARCELINO BERINA, WILFREDO BONILCA, ED C. BONILLA,
FRANCISCO BRAZA, ANONINA S. BRILLANTES, ROGELIO O. CADADAN,
RENE CALICA, TERESITA CALUMA, EDGARDO CAPARAS, ALEX M.
CARANDANG, MIGNON C. CARLOS, CRISTETA CASTRO, MA. ERLINDA
B. CAUSAY, REYNALDO M. CENTENO, DANILO CERVANTES, ELEJIA R.
CHARIE, CARMEN G. CLUTARIO, MANUEL F. CRUZ, DOMINGO DE
GUZMAN, ABAS DE JESUS, ROMULO DEL MUNDO, JUAN B.
DESPABELADERO, GAVINO ESMERO, FIDEL C. ESTANISLAO, ROWEN
A. EUSTAQUIO, CORAZON FERNANDEZ, ALBERTINE FLORES, RIOLITA
H. GALLEGO, MARCELINO GATCHALEAN, JIMMY GIDRAMA, RUFINO
GUTIERREZ, MERCEDITA S. HARING, MAY HARINGA, ROMEO P.
IBARRIENTOS, BERLINO INFANTE, JOSELYN V. VILLA, CATALINO
LIMBO, ORIOSA LISING, BOYET F. LITA, ENRICO LIWANAG, ALTHEA O.
LOTA, VINA P. MACATANGAY, NORBERTO MADADO, FLORINIA
NADADO, JAIME NADADO, CONNIE NAGAMOS, TESSIE NAGAMOS,
AMALIA U. NELL, EDILBERTO OROCAY, RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS,
ROSITA P. PARINA, EUGENIO PATAG, FERMIN PAVIA, BERNARDO
PENA, JOSEMARIA P. PEREZ, ARMIDA D. PULLO, LAURO S.
PUNZALAN, JUSTINA QUINORES, NANOY C. REANO, EDDIE REYES,
FRANCISCO ROMERO, SUSAN ROQUERO, WILFREDO RUZGAL,
CONRADO SALAZAR, ODENCIA C. SALVADOR, TEODORA B.
SANDOVAL, RODANTE SANTIAGO, GLORIA SANTOS, JOSE C. SANTOS,
FLORANTE P. SOMERA, MELISSA B. STA CRUZ, JOSE TABIGAN,
ANTONIO TALASTAS, DOMINGO G. TARNATE, JR., IGMEDIO TIONGSON,
STEPHEN U. TOLEDO, ROMEO UMAYAN, BENJAMIN URBANO, MALOU
B. VERA, JERRY VISTO, AUGUSTO YUSON, JOSE S. AGUSTIN, LEIS
ALEJANDRO, EDWIN E. ALLADA, ROLANDO ANDRADE, LHITA
CABUNGAN, LOUIE CATUDIO, REYNALDO M. CENTENO, DIOSMEDADO
T. COCAL, EVANGELINE I. CORCUERA, REMY D. CORTEZ, JONATHAN
C. DANGA, FRED DE CLARO, MAURO DE JESUS, EFREN DE JUCOS,
GEORGE DE LEON, SHIRLEY DEPASUCAT, MARIA REYNA DONDAY,
AURA ALELI P. DUIROS, DIONICA DURANTE, MARCELO ENRIQUE,
FERDINAND ESPIRITU, MIRASOL ESPIRITU, RUBY T. FAMORCAN, JOSE
C. FORTUNO, BEVERLY FRANCISCO, JOSE Z. GALLARDO, REYNALDO
GANTONG, NILO GARCIA, LONESTO GENOVEZA, FELIPE HERRERA,
FELIPE G. ISIP, JR., RANDY C. MABANA, CESAR MACAALAY, ROGELIO
MANGILIT, EMILIO MANUEL, JOSE MARINAS, JAIME MATA, DANILO
MIANO, JOVITO NAROG, FELISA A. NUESCA, REYNALDO OLAHAY,
ANSELMO PARANAS, JR., RESTITUTO P. PARDINAS, MARIAN G.
PASCUAL, MARCELLANO P. PEREZ, NEIL PIAMONTE, REYNALDO
QUIROS, EFREN RAMOS, CARLOS RAMOS, MAMERTO
RESURRECCION, QUINONES RONILO, ARTURO C. SANTOS, M.C.
SANVICTORES, ROMEO G. SUMULONG, AURELIO G. TAN, JUNIFER
TAN, TERESITA B. TOMAS, APOLLO URBANO, VICTORIA B. VALDEZ,
CONCESA L. ALDAY, ELMER Y. CORPUZ, ANNIE L. CORPUZ, ZENAIDA
M. DE GUZMAN, MERLINDA V. DE JESUS, ISAURO R. DOROSAN, MA.
ELENA D. EBONA, LETICIA C. EUSEBIO, ALEJANDRO V. FERNANDEZ,
EVITA B. GARABLIES, NELSON GARCIA, ROWENA M. HUISCA, JESSIE
LADISLA, JUVY P. LADISLA, RANDY LAGUNILLA, LANIE A. MABANA,
SAMSON MACOB, ANTONIO MAMMAY, RICARDO PALAGANAS,
LUNINGNING C. PANGILINAN, VILMA PORCADELA, ROGELIO
RONQUILLO, MA. VICTORIA P. SOMERA, MIRASOL R. TUGADE,
DOMINADOR ABAD, BRICCIO P. ABAN, KELVIN C. ABARRA, NESTOR
ABENIS, SYLVIA C. ABUNGAN, (ATTY.) ANSELMO ABUNGAN, ELENITA
A. ACUNA, DANILO C. ADINA, PETRONIO C. AGUILA, SYLVIA S.
ALCANTARA, MARCELO ALILIO, ROMEO L. ALMEDA, NORBETO
ALMERINO, LUISITO M. ALMOGELA, DAHLIA R. ALMOSARA, JOEL P.
ALMOSARA, CATER AMBROSIO, EDITHA A. AMISCARAY, MA. VICTORIA
I. AMORES, LEONARDO APIL, ANTONIO N. APOSTOL, JR., NENA T.
AQUINO, PATRICIO M. ARAGON, JR., SYLVIA ARBOLEDA, JOSE P.
ARZADON, MARIO ASIS, ADELAIDA AUAYANG, MARIO A. AURELIO,
ROBERTO M. AVELLANA, TERESITA J. AVENTURADO, EMOLYN E.
AZURIN, EDITHA BACHAR, GLORIA M. BACONG, GERONIMO BADULIS,
JR., GLADIOLA M. BAGADIONG, AMELIA G. BALAIS, FEDERICO A.
BALANON, RODRIGO BALILLA, JOFFER L. BALLESTEROS, TERESITA
P. BALMES, ANITA. BAURA, CRISANTO A. BAURA, JR., SERVIN
BAUTISTA, GABINO BELLEZA, FLORENCIA P. BENOSA, DANNY
BERCHES, HERNANI BERNAL, ELVIRA V. BERSABE, ISMAEL C. BOCO,
MARCIAL BENJAMIN BUNGOLAN, FELY A. BOSTON, ANGEL A. BRAVO,
RAUL BRITANICO, LILITA G. BROCES, EDUARDO S. BUTIERREZ,
JOSEFA C. CAABAY, MICHAEL B. CABALDA, SIROLAN B. CABE, CESAR
B. CABRERA, BENJAMIN S. CADAWAN, JR., VERONA J. CALAMANAN,
ADELAIDA B. CALOOY, ROBERT F. CALUGAY, JUANITO CALVEZ,
NECITA M. CAMANGONAN, SATURNINO Y. CAMANGONAN, JUAN G.
CANLAS, FRANCISCA D. CANUEL, ARTURO D. CANUELA, EVELYN
CANUELA, JESUS CANUELA, NELIA D. CANUELA, AVELINO C.
CAPARAS, RICARDO R. CARINGAL, MA. LOURDES CASIMIRO,
ARCADIO I. CASIS, DANIEL C. CASIS, ELENA C. CASIS, ROBERTO S.
CASTILLO, FELIPE P. CASUNCAD, JUANITO A. CATOR, RENATO
CATOR, JONAS R. CHECA, RENE A. CILINDRO, ELWIN B. CINCO,
ROSALINDA CIPRIANO, JOSE MARIE CLOMA, MARJORIE COLLADO,
ELVETA C. COMSTI, ALLAN ANTONIO C. CONDA, APOLONIO V. CRUZ,
FE C. CRUZ, FLORDELIZA CRUZ, LEODEGARIO CUEVAS, OLIVER
CUEVAS, REMEDIOS CUEVAS, GLORIA T. DACANAY, MARIBEL
DAMIAN, MARY ANNE C. DE CASTRO, CESAR S. DE CHAVEZ, ANICET F.
DE GUZMAN, AURELIO DE GUZMAN, JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, RUBY B. DE
GUZMAN, BERNARD DE LARA, ALFONSO S. DE LEON, DANILO DE
LEON, RETITUTO C. DE LEON, EDWIN L. DEVERA, HAROLD T. DE VERA,
CESAR M. DE VEYRA, ANACLETO C. DEL MUNDO, ALFONSO P. DELA
CRUZ, JR., EMERITA M. DELA CRUZ, HELEN T. DELA CRUZ, RIZALYN C.
DELA CRUZ, SERVILLANO R. DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA FUENTE,
WILFREDO C. DELA FUENTE, ARNOLD DELGADO, JAIME DELOS
REYES, MANUEL T. DEPANES, ANTONIO DEQUINA, ROLANDO D.
DESTACAMENTO, MARIETA L. DETERA, PRESENTACION C. DIEZ, RAUL
S. DIMALANTA, WENCESLAO DIZON, EDWIN G. DOMINGO, MELANIO O.
DONES, JR., ESTELITO DOROSAN, ISAURO DOROSAN, JR., CHARLIE M.
DULAY, ESTEBAN DULAY, JR., SATURNINO DULAY, MA. AIDA C.
DUROY, RIZAL P. ECHECHE, GASPAR G. ESCOBAR, GASPAR T.
ESCOBAR, ALICIA S. ESGUERRA, JACKSON I. ESPERO, LILIA
ESTOPAGE, DIGNA G. EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FALLESGON, ROQUE
M. FAMILARA, JERRY FARINAS, NIEVA FARINAS, NARCELYN FELIPE,
ERNESTO H. FELIX, MARIANNE V. FERNANDEZ, ALVIN LUCIO M.
FERNANDO, ALFREDO V. FERRER, NOEL V. FERRER, ELENA G. FETIZA,
AUGUSTUS C. FLORES, SANTIAGO R. FRAGANTE, MA. LUISA
FRANCISCO, EDWARD FRANCO, HELENITA EVELYN FRANCO, NOE
FREOLO, EDUARDO VICTORIO FREYRA, EDITHA P. FRIGILLANA,
TEOFILO D. FRONDA, ESTER M. FRONTERAS, HELENA GADDI,
ROBERTO D. GADDI, FELISA C. GALARAGA, ELLENGRACE R. GALISTE,
RESTITUTO G. GALO, MAXIMO V. GARCIA, JAIME M. GATAN, MARIO
GUERRERO, ANTONIO GUINSING, JR., ANGELINA P. GUTIERREZ,
AURELIO P. GUTIERREZ, HERMINIO O. GUTIERREZ, NELIA C. HALCON,
LOURDES V. HERNANDEZ, DIONISIO S. INCIONG, MARIO Z. JANDUMON,
RICARTE JAVELOSA, ADONIS S. JAVIER, ANGELO JAVIER, LOUELLA
G. JIMENEZ, LYNDA JIMENEZ, NONITA JORDAN, ROLANDO
LACANDASO, ELIZABETH C. LACSAMANA, BERNARD LANUZA,
PATRICIO B. LANUZA, SALVIO B. LASERNA, FLORINIO B. LAZO,
RODOLFO M. LEE, BEATRIZ D. LEGASPI, AMOR M. LIM, JAIME D.
LOMABAO, REGINA LOPEZ, REBE M. LOZANO, DANILO N. LUCAS,
EDEL LUPOS, CESAR LUCERO, SL MIRA, PATERNO M. MABASA,
RAMON V. MACABUHAY, EDITA M. MACALALAD, DIGNA V.
MACAPAGAL, LOUIE MADRID, POSALITO MAESTRO, ENRIQUE S.
MAGLANQUE, WENCESLAO MAGO, ERNESTO A. MALICAD, MA.
SOCORRO A. MALLARE, CLARO JOSE C. MANIPON, ELEAZAR C.
MANDARING, ELVIRA MARANAN, GERARDO MARCIANO, SALVADOR
MARTIN, ELENITA MARTINEZ, CRISOSTOMO V. MASANGKAY, MAXIMO
MATURAN, CONCHITA J. MEDINA, LAMBERTO R. MELAD, EDUARDO
MELEGRITO. (ATTY.) ADORACIO MENDOZA, ARLENE MENDOZA,
BERNARDO N. MENDOZA, LUIS C. MENDOZA, TITA M. MENDOZA, GINA
MAY P. MERCADO, TERESITA L. MIDEL, JULIET M. MIGUEL, VIRGINIA B.
MILANO, CONRADO MIRANDA, LIDA R. MIRANDA, LEOCADIO MOLINA,
ALEJANDRO M. MONTERO, JR., BENJAMIN J. MONZON, ELSA Y. MULA,
PERFECTO NACAR, JOEL A. NATIVIDAD, RUBEN C. NATIVIDAD, GLENN
MARCELO C. NOBLE, NICASIO NOGUERAS, LIWAYWAY A. NUNEZ,
ESTELA V. OSORIO, ELIZA PABELICO, ERNANI BERNAL PADILLA,
JESUS M. PADILLA, GERARD A. PANGILINAN, OMLYMPIA V. PARFILES,
ELMER PASCUA, ISABEL PASCUAL, MA. ISABEL M. PASCUAL,
MELODIE PASCUAL, SALVADOR L. PATA, PETRONILLA PAZ, JOSEFA
B. PELIAS, NESTOR PENA, NESTOR PENA, ROLANDO PENA, RENE
PERALTA, JOSUE L. PEREZ, SIMEON T. PERMEJO, ALFREDO
PERUCHO, REY V. PERUCHO, RENALDO J. POBLETE, RAMON D.
QUEBRAL, ROLENDO C. QUEMADO, EDNA V. RAGILES, ALVIN C.
RAMOS, EMERITO RAMOS, MAMERTO RESUBAL, ANGELA P. REVILLA,
ALICE REYES, DAISY M. RICAFORT, WILFREDO RICAFORT,
RAMONCITO L. RIVERA, REYNALDO RODELAS, FLORO RODRIQUEZ,
LILIAN A. ROLLAN, ROMUALDO AGUILOS, ANGELO A. ROMULO, JOSE
N. RONAN, TOMOSHENKO RONQUILO, NENITA A. ROQUE, BENJAMIN
R. ROSALDO, FIDEL ROVIRA, LIBERTY RUBIN, LIBERTY L. RUBIN, MA.
SALLY P. SAGRAGAO, REINHOLD PERFECTO M. SALAS, VIRGILIO
SALAS, ALEJANDRO B. SALONGA, EDWIN B. SANTELICES, EMMANUEL
A. SANTOS, FELIPE B. SANTOS, LETICIA C. SANTOS, ADRIANO R.
SARIAN, MA. CORAZON E. SERVANDO, RODOLFO SESPENE,
FERNANDO G. SOJANA, EXPIDITO SORIA, NORMA G. SORIANO,
RONALD G. STO. TOMAS, LUCIO R. SUYAT, JOYCELYN F. TAAL,
BARBARA BABSI I. TABACO, DELIA S. TALITE, ANUNSACION E. TAN,
MARIETTA N. TAN, HERMINIO G. TAQUIQUI, EDGARDO L. TOLENTINO,
MARCELINA M. TONDO, ANIANO D. TORRES, SALVADOR D. TORRES,
BEATRIZ L. TRINIDAD, RICARDO P. UGALE, ALICIA S. UMEREZ,
VIRGILIO B. URBANO, JOSEPHINE R. UYACO, RIZALINO N. UYACO,
LOYOLA M. VALDEZ, JEFFREY VAZQUEZ, RODOLFO L. VELASCO, JR.,
JOSELITO G. VELASQUEZ, EVELYN A. VIDAD, VICTORINO M.
VILLAGRACIA, ARIEL VILLANUEVA, CLARISSA G. VILLANUEVA,
JOCELYN C. VILLANUEVA, WILFREDO VILLANUEVA, RICARDO
VILLARBA, TITO S. VILLARIN, CARMELITA B. YALONG, ROBERTO A.
YAZON, LUCILLE V. ABAD, SILVESTRE L. ABAYA, ELIGIO L. ABRIGANA,
ANGELINA O. ABRIL, LORENA AFRICA, INOCENCIO A. AGRON,
CRISTINA P. AGUILAR, ARLEAN L. ALAMARES, ADORACION L.
ALEJANDRINO, RUTH B. ALICER, ROSALINA V. ALMONEDA, ALFREDO
ALVAREZ, ISABEL M. AMISCARAY, OSROXSON L. AMPARO, ANGEL B.
ANDEN, CAROLINA M. ANORES, THELMA P. ARTIFICIO, ANTONIO A.
ASADA, JR., MA. LUZ M. ASCANO, APOLINAR B. ASENCION, EDWIN
AZANON, ERLINDA M. BAGUE, ANGELINA R. BALAGTAS, RENATO T.
BANAGA, VALENTIN BARCENAL, ADELAIDA C. BARRIDA, BENJAMIN P.
BATOLINA, MARCELO BAUTISTA, SIMPLICIO BAYRON, CORAZON C.
BERNIDO, GLENDA P. BILOG, ALAN M. BORRAS, TERESA L. BORRAS,
EVANGELISTA BORROMEO, BEVERLY R. BRIONES, NESTOR J.
BUGADISAN, ADELINA DM. BULOS, SYLVIA S. BUSINE, EVANGELINE M.
CABATUANDO, EDUARDO T. CABILDO, ELIZABETH P. CABILDO,
EMMANUEL P. CAJIPE, JOSE N. CALAYCAY, VIRGINIA S. CALIX,
LOPITO CALUAG, EMMA L. CANCINO, ESPERANZA I. CANCIO,
BUENAVENTURA E. CANSINO, PERCIDITA T. CANSINO, GRACE M.
CARLOS, PATRICIA ANDREA V. CARRILLO, SOLEDAD S. CASTANEDA,
MARILYN K. CASTILLO, JEAN M. CASYAO, JUSTINA S. CERBOLLES,
MARIA LUCIA C. COBAR, AVELINO COLOMA, ANA ELENA L.
CONJARES, ALVARO CORDERO, ESTRELLA B. CORTEZ, DANILO A.
CUYCO, RUBEN DACOCO, ROSITA R. DAROY, DENIA A. DATO-ON,
PABLO DE CASTRO, MARIO M. DE GUZMAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN,
AZUCENA C. DE VERA, CECILIA M. DE VERA, LOUIE A. DE VERA,
NATHANIEL B. DE VERA, SALVACION O. DEAN, SOLIDAD Z. DEL
CASTILLO, ADELAIDA Q. DEL ROSARIO, ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, FE M.
DELA CRUZ, IMELDA S. DELFIN, DANILO D. DIAZ, FE R. DISCAYA,
EMERANCIANA B. DURAN, JAVIER M. EDUARDO, ELIXA ENRIQUEZ,
SOFRONIO ENRIQUEZ, LUZ V. ESGUERRA, JAIME B. ESTEBAN,
MERIAM F. FABRIGAS, LOURDES G. FERNANDEZ, LOURDES R.
FONTANILLA, ROBERTO FONTANILLA, REY M. GABRIEL, RICARDO L.
GALLARDO, CORAZON M. GARCIA, NARDO Q. GARCIA, TEOFILO Y.
GARCIA, TEOFILO Y. GARCIA, IRENEO GERILLA, NOEL B. GERILLA,
ALFONSO GRAFIA, JUANA S. GREGORIO, LEONARDO G. GUMASING,
LUZVIMINDA M. IGNACIO, RESTITUTO B. ILAGAN, ABELARDO A.
INOVERO, DOMINGO P. JACINTO, REYNALDO P. JACINTO, GLENDA S.
JAVIER, GLORIA JIMENEZ, REYNALDO S. JIMENEZ, JESULITO B.
JUNIO, JULIETA JUSON, JOCELYN S. LAGARDE, ALICIA F. LAGUNZAD,
LUNINGNING M. LANSANGAN, LUVIMINA G. LANUZA, AVELINA G.
LAPADE, DOLORES M. LAZO, RHODORA LEONIN, TEOFILO V. LEONIN,
JR., LEONARDO S. LEOPANDO, LAURA F. LEYVA, CRISANTO LIMEN,
ROEL LOTERINA, PABLITO MAAT, RUBY LIZA J. MAGLALANG,
WILFEREDO MAGSAMBOL, HILARION E. MAMARIL, MILA A. MANALO,
BENJAMIN F. MANDINGUIADO, AURELIO MANINGAS, ANGELES
MARCELO, EDITHA A. MARCELO, VERONICA J. MARCELO, RONNIE
MARCOS, REYNALDO R. MARIANO, JOHNNY R. MARIN, BENEDICTO E.
MARISFOSQUE, JOHN M. MARQUEZ, ALEJANDRO J. MATEO,
JOHNYLEN V. MELENDEZ, JORGE MENDOZA, JULIETA C. MENDOZA,
LUCY MENDOZA, QUIRINO M. MENDOZA, MYLENE M. MOLO, NELIA M.
MONTILLA, DEMETRIO A. MOOG, ERLINDA NATERA, JOSEFINA G.
NATERA, NICANOR P. NICOLAS, CARL M. NOHAY, VIDAL T. OLANDA,
JOSEFINA J. OMANDAM, CELIA M. OPRENARIO, NORMA L. PABLO,
LAMBERTO E. PALAD, FRANCISCO A. PANCHO, ROMEO PARADERO,
VANGELINE K. PARAMI, RENATO H. PECHO, REYNALDO V.
PEDREGOSA, CECILIA T. PEREZ, MARY AGNES PEREZ, CHRISTINA A.
PETRACHE, FEDERICO L. PINEDA, JR., LAURA R. PINEDA, MYRNA E.
PIQUERO, EDGARDO E. POBLETE, DIOSDADO A. QUIAMBAO,
BERNARDINO H. QUIZON, BOGAR G. RACHO, MANNY G. RAMA,
ANGELITO F. RAMOS, AURORA D. RAPADAS, ANTONIO E. REFRE,
ROSALINO B. REJAS, ESTRELLA D. RELUNIA, EDILBERTO A.
REMENTILLA, SOTERO RESILVA, ROLANDO Y. REYES, GERARDO M.
ROBLES, MARISSA ROBLES, CRISPINA M. ROSALES, BERNADETTE C.
SABLAN, CESAR M. SALABIT, MA. TERESITA A. SALABIT, ARTURO F.
SALIH, VIRGILIO R. SANTIAGO, FLORA L. SANTOS, GABRIEL SANTOS,
JR., IBARRA S. SANTOS, JULIETA E. SEGUIS, ROSALIE SEMANA,
ELVIRA SOMBRION, RODRIGO TABIOS, ESTELLITA U. TABORA,
ANGILEO P. TAGUIBAO, CARLITO G. TAMBOOM, MERRIAN DC.
TANGONAN, RICARDO TEMPLONUEVO, ANTONIO E. TIONG, MITOS M.
TOLENTINO, LUZ G. USMAN, FLORANTE M. VALDERAMA, BALDOMERO
VALENZUELA, ANA MARIA S. VELUZ, ERNESTO S. VENTURA, CRISOL
P. VILLANUEVA, PORTIA T. VILLEGAS, ARMINDA F. VINAS, MAGNO B.
YOSHISAKI, MA. TERESA YULO-NAZAREA, BRAHIM T. ABAS, RAUL G.
ABIQUE, LEZA A. ACORDA, ADELIA F. AGUILAR, REYNALDO P.
ALLANCES, BERNADETTE M. ANGCO, CLARISSA C. ARIDA, LEONITA D.
BAETIONG, EDNA R. BARLIS, SONIA R. BARLIS, BERNA A. BONDOC,
NANETTE BORJA, CORAZON S. BUSTAMANTE, VICTORIA ORMIN R.
CABRAL, WILLIE A. CANDELARIO, ARLINA G.A. CANTADA, ARACELI
CANTRE, JERRY CAPULONG, JEANNIE C. CASAURAN, REBERTO CO,
EMERLINDA N. DACARA, TERESITA T. DAVID, ELENIDA DEL ROSARIO,
MANUEL DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DIAZ LERMA DIMAYUGA, BERNARDITA
M. DUNGO, ANTONIO P. FAJARDO, CHARLES C. FORONDA, AURORA V.
GALVEZ, DAVINA CLEOFE GONZALES, NICK D. GUILLERMO, REBECCA
P. GUITERREZ, JOSEFINA P. HIPOLITO, EVELYN R. INCIONG,
IMMACULADA F. LA ROSA, ANABELLA C. LABORTE, NAPOLEON R.
LAPUZ, AMY LECCIONES, SAMUEL LIBOON, DEAN R. LOPEZ, MYLEEN
Z. LUZ, MERLINA G. MABUTOL, ALBERT A. MAGALANG, ROMANA B.
MAGAT, VICTORIA MALIHAN, JAIME MALLARE, REMY MAMON, ELVIRA
T. MANALO, ANDRES G. MANUELE, EVALINDA MERCADO, MA.
GERARDA MERILO, FATIMA MOLINA, JOSEPHINE L. MONILLA, EDWIN
ROMEL N. NAVALUNA, PERSEVERANDA-FE OTICO, FELIX A PASCUA,
JR., MARINELA T. PASCUA, ALBERTO C. PECHO, TERESITA PERALTA,
ELVIRA D. PIMENTEL, CRISTINA S. PIZARRO, ISAGANI R. POTES,
HARRY R. QUIAOIT, LINDA A. QUIOCSON, SOLON C. RATIVO,
MARCELINO R. RIVERA, JANE G. RODRIGO, DAMIAN P. RUBIO,
ESPERANZA A. SAJUL, ELVIRA L. SALVANI, MARICHU SANTIBANEZ,
VIRGILIO G. SANTOS, GERI GERONIMO R. SANEZ, REBECCA E.
SARACHO, MA. CECILIA B. STA. INES, PEDE SUMILDE, JESSIE
TANOLA, ROMEO T. TARRAY, DOLORES F. TOLENTINO, GRACIOLO DS.
TORRE, EDGARDO TORRES, ENRICA I. TUMBAGAHAN, MA. LOURDES
P. VARGAS, RENATO VENGCO, GRACE L. ALMERO, JUANITA P.
ARSOLON, LETECIA M. CENDANA, ELIZABETH A. CHUA, MABEL C.
CRISPARIL, MANUEL T. ESCASURA, JUANITA G. FERNANDEZ, VIRGILIO
O. FERRER, DELIA P. GEDALA, LAURO M. HERMOSURA, NATIVIDAD V.
IGAYA, ROSABEL T. JOSUE, EVELYN V. LLAMAS, ANNIE LOMIBAO,
ARLINE LUNA, BRILLA P. MALAMUG, ADELINDA L. MANALILI,
ROMUALDO S. MERCENE, JANET MIRANDA, LYDIA NUQUE,
FRUCTUOSA R. OBAY, CATALINA G. PRESTOZA, ROLANDO P. RANES,
JULIETA RIVERA, LOURDES T. SELLEZA, JESUSA A. VELASCO,
YOLANDA A. VERDIJO, JOSE VIDAL, FLORA ABADIN, ROMMEL D.
ABAN, ALLEN M. ABLANG, NORMA N. AGIR, RODRIGO AGIR III,
MARDONIO M. ALCANTARA, ROSALINDA ANGER, DANILO T.
ANONUEVA, REMEDIOS M. ANONUEVO, BONIFACIO APOLONIO, MARIO
G. AQUINO, MA. CHONA ARISTOTELES, DICK G. BACUNO, NILDA C.
BALAMONG, ARTHUR M. BALATBAT, FLORANTE G. BONGALON,
CEPRIANA S. BORJA, CRISANTO BRUSAS, RUFINO M. BUSTAMANTE,
MELICITA CAPULONG, AMADEO G. CARDINO, BONIFACIO CARLING,
LULU C. CORALES, JIMMY J. CRISOLOGO, CELIA J. CRUZ, NOEL C.
CRUZ, NORBERTO G. CRUZ, AMBROSIO DAGUPAN, MA. THERESA M.
DATU, JAIAME C. DE GUZMAN, ROLAND A. DE JESUS, MONA LISA F.
DE OCAMPO, SONIA C. DIMACULANGAN, LAUREANA C. ESTOROQUE,
PABLITO ESTOROQUE, JR., MARIO M. ESTRELLA, ANGEL FERNANDEZ,
ZENAIDA P. FERNANDEZ, EVELYN C. FLORES, VERONICA T. GARCIA,
JOSE M. GATONGAY, ARIEL A. HIMOC, BONNIE P. LISING, LOTA S.
LIZARDA, RUFINA LOPEZ, EDGARDO K. MAGNO, RODELIO M.
MALICAD, ZENAIDA MALLETE, MARILYN V. MANGEURRA,
CONSTANCIO MARIROSQUI, HIDELISA P. MARQUEZ, ROSARIO J.
MENDOZA, ELISA N. MOLA, NILO A. NERA, JUSTO NEYRA, JR.,
ANACLETA P. NILLO, RIBOMAJAL A. OBA, RODOLFO N. ORTIZ
MARITES O. PADOR, MA. VICTORIA P. PAELMO, MA. JANET PASCUA,
ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO, ESTELITO PENA, JOSIE S. PEREZ, ZENAIDA T.
RABAYA, JOSEFINA D. RAMOS, JENNIE P. SALVADOR, RODOLFO S.
SANTOS, LORETA C. TABAS, RAMONITO TALABUCON, PATRICIA N.
TALAMISAN, JULIE N. TANGUILIG, NUNILON R. TANGUILIG, DOMINGA
D. TOLENTINO, CLYDIE TORRES, ABRAHAM R. VILLANUEVA, AGNES
VINUMA, LUZ ANACTA, EDUARDO BALLESTEROS, RUBY BAUTISTA,
ELIZALDE BERANIA, CHARLITA BONGALON, ESTER CADANO, ALMA
CRISTINA COLLADO, EVELINDA CORONEL, BRIGIDA CORPUS, HILARIA
DEZA, LUCIA DIAGCO, CRISTINA ESGUERRA, EDNA ESQUILLO,
RHODORA ESTRELLA, CECILLA FRANCISCO, EMELLINA GAMBA,
MARCELA GARCIA, DIVINA GATMAITAN, ASUNCION GERVACIO, MA.
ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM, LYLEEN LIBAN, ZAIDA LIBAN,
BERNANDINO MANOSO, MARITESS PABLO, ANITA PANER, EDERLINA
RABE, JOSE RABE, ROSALIA REBULLANTE, ROBERTO SABELLA,
JUDITH SADALIA, CIELITA SARMIENTO, LUTHER VILLAMIN, ANITA A.
AALA, MARILOU L. ABARRO, PORFIRIO L. ALCACHUPAS, ISABEL V.
ARANZAZU, ROSIE L. ARENAS, CLARO S. ASTOVEZA, SUSAN C.
BONDOC, DOMINGO BRAVO, MARIANITO Z. CAJUCOM, SOFIA T.
CAMPOS, SONI G. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. COMIE, ADELINA G.
CORTIGUERRA, VIRGINIA DE SAGUN, DANIEL DELOS SANTOS, NIDA C.
DILAN, SELFA C. FERNANDEZ, LIGAYA G. GARCIA, MARLYN A.
GARCIA, SONIA B. IBANEZ, BONIFACIO S. LABANGCO, SR., JEAN
LADIA PERLA G. LORENZO, VIRGINIA B. LUNA, EDNA C. MABULAY,
MARILI T. MALASAGA, MELE T. MALASAGA, MA. TERESA E. MAPILI,
DAVID P. MARIANO, FRISCA P. MAYAMAYA, MARLENE S. MELARPIS,
ROLAND P. MENDOZA, VENER C. MERANA, LAMBERTA N. MERENA,
FELISA G. NARCIDA, NORMA M. NORIEL, FRANCISCO PANGAN,
APOLONIO C. SALANGA, JR., CARLOS E. SANCHEZ, SOFREMEO F.
SANTIAGO, JR., LUISA L. SANTOS, SOFIA S. SOLACITO, GENOFREDO
S. SOLMARIN, VIOLETA G. SORIANO, JUAN STA. ANA, SANNY B.
SULIBA, CARMELITA P. TAMARGO, ANTONIO P. TULLAS, JR., VIOLETA
A. VELA, CHONA C. ZAMORA, MA. THERESA P. EMPAYNADO, MABEL
GRASPARIL, EDMUND RAUL KAABAY, JR., MAGIN LABANGUIS, REY B.
SELLEZA, PERCIVAL VALDEZ, NORMA C. VASQUEZ, JUDY ABLAN,
MARIBEL M. ALCANTARA, ANGELITA C. AUKAY, MARLENE M.
BADILLA, DOMINADOR L. BIGSOT, ABRAHAM D. CABALSE,
EUFRECINA T. EUSEBIO, MARLON Q. GA, JOCELYN P. ILUSTRE,
PERCIDA G. NORTON, GODOFREDO RAMONES, ELISEO A.
VILLASTIQUI, ELY R YRA, VIRGINIA D. CADAVIS, CONSOLACION
CAYABYAB, PATROCINIA A. DIMAGUILA, JOLIZA O. ENCISA, LUCILA M.
FELIX, SALVACION T. GALLEGO, ELVIRA GEALON, WILMA T.
LAGRIMAS, REMEDIOS B. LIBERATO, JAIME MADAMBA, BERNICE R.
MANALATA, VILMA S. PALMES, EMPERATRIZ R. PIOQUID, LIGAYA R.
SAMSON, ROSALIE M. SANCHEZ, MARCEBENI D. TALABUCON, LILIA C.
TAMAYO, MERCELINA A. TUBALLA, ELDA Y. ZURBITO, ROWENA
ANDAYA, JACINTA B. ANONUEVO, BEATRIZ N. BELEN, TERENCIO
CADUYAC, RAMON C. DELA FUENTA, MIGUEL C. FERNANDEZ, DOLOR
MORADA, CLEMENCIO C. PAJARILLO, ELENILA PASCUAL, TERESITA
ADA, MARIO AQUINO, ROLANO BAGUNU, MARGIE I. BALLESTEROS,
ROMULOS BELTRAN, ANTONIO CORIA, EDWIN DELA CRUZ, YOLANDA
DELA CRUZ, ERLINDA ESTRELLA, AURELIO GUERRERO, MANUEL H.
HIZOLA, RUBEN A. MAGTIBAY, NICOLAS MASANGKAY, FRACTUOSA R.
OBAY, LIGAYA PASCUAL, NECETE PASTORFIDE, TRANQUILINO
PUNZALAN, MYRNA P. SUNIO, ARMANDO VILLAFLOR, MARIANO
VILLANUEVA, REMEDIOS ANONUEVO, RIBOMAPIL CLOA, MARINA
COLLANTES, ERLINDA DIMAPAWI, HEDELISA MARQUEZ, MA. VICTORIA
PAELMO, ILUMINADA SABORRIDO, DOMINGA D. TOLENTINO, MA.
VICTORIA ABRERA, ALFREDO AGACETA, JR., WILFREDO ANONUEVO
VERGILIO, BAGTAS, ROBERTO BERNAL, LORETO BOQUIREN, RAMIR
BUIZA, CELSO BULADO, NOEL CASTELO, WILLIAM DELA CRUZ,
GRACIA DIAZ, ROBERT ENCISO, ANTONIO FAJARDO, ROMEO GIANA,
JOYCELYN GOCO, JOSE GONZALES, TEMOTEO IDEA, EMMIE IGNACIO,
MA. VICTORIA LANDICHO, MARCIANO MANIEGO, CECILIA MERCADO,
REGULO QUEJADA, ARNEL ROMERO, MANUEL SABATER, NELIA
SANTOS, AMELIA DULCE SUPETRAN, ERNESTO J. ANDRES, LIBRADO
S. GESALTA, LORNA JEAN H. PALAD, PABLO SALIGAN, ZENY DE
GUZMAN, LORETO GALLER, EMMALYN C. TRIA, SEVILIO D. DAVID,
PASENCIA A. VOTACION, LEONIDO J. AMANTE, ALMA M. SACOPLA,
MARIETA CABREROS, EUGENIO O. DIAZ, JR., GUENDOLYN C.
BAMBALAN, GUYETO CABADING, MA. THERESA ENRIQUEZ, MA.
VICTORIA V. DE CASTRO, BENJAMIN DEVERA, JAIME OBAR, RAUL
VARELA, STEPHEN C ACEBEDO, ELEUTERIO AGBAY, ALMA G.
ALMONEDA, ANTONIO S. ARELLANO, FILIPINAS G. ATACADOR, MARIA
M. ATIENZA, MAGAMPON Q. BABISTA, HERMINILDA S. BALDEMOR,
ANGELITA I. BALIGAD, EDUARDO J. BANAWA, CARLOS P. BASILIO,
ALEJANDRO T. BATUHAN, ROLANDO BELANO, MARIVIC BERNARDO,
ADALIA A. BISCOCHO, NATIVIDAD B. BITOON, VICTORIA P. BORAC, M.
BURCE JR., YOLANDA M. BUSTAMANTE, PACITA C. CABANSAG,
GEMMA P. CAGUÑA, EDITHA T. CAPISTRANO, LOPE O. CARIÑO JR.,
EDUARDO M. CARPIO, EDUARDO CAVIZO, ROSALINA C. CERNADILLA,
ERNESTO C. CORPUZ JR., RENAN M. CRUZADO, CRISTINA T. DE MESA,
DANIEL C. DIAZ, DIOSDADO DOCTOR, ADELAIDA C. DUAD, INOCENCIA
A. DUMLAO, JAIME D. DYSUNANGCO, BENJAMIN A. EMANUEL, MARIO
EPAN, JR., VIRGINIA G. ESCOBAR, JOSEFINA P. ESPERAS, ERLYN C.
EZPELETA, ARNEL F. FERAREZA, AMELIA A. FINO, DOMINGO
FRANCISCO, TIMOTEO GAMIT, CRISTETA GARCIA, MILAGROS
GERONIMO, GINALYN GONZALES, QUINCHITA J. GRICALDA, RAFAEL
JARILLA, JR., VALE JOSE EXEQUIEL, JR., LUZ P. LAGUNERA, ROGELIO
M. LAPUS, RODOLFO A. LOPEZ, PATRICIA MALIHAN, GLORIA
MANALANSAN, EVANGELINE MARCELINO, JOYCE J. MARCIANO,
ELIZABETH Y. MATIBAG, CESAR D. MOMERACION, SALVACION R.
NOVINO, MARTINO B. OSITE, ELIZABETH PACUBAS, SATURNINO S.
PACUBAS, JR., SERAPIO S. PAHIGDANA, LEMELIE PASCUA, ALMA A.
PASCUAL, ARNOLD T. PASIA, JAIME PEDROCHE, MARILOU L.
PERALTA, HOMOBNUS PIDO II, ALFREDO G. PUNO, MARIVIC S.
QUIDES, MYRNA QUIPIT, PAULINO R. RECONDO, NELLIE REGINIO,
JOSE V. REYES, CHERRY B. RIVERA, SUSANA T. ROBOSA, YOLANDA
RODRIGUEZ, DIANA A. ROMERO, REY S. ROSALES, LUCIO G.
SANTIAGO, JOBINO S. SEVALLA, ULYSSES J. SIGATON, SUSAN T.
SOLOMON, LUZVIMINDA B. TABLATE, ROWENA R. TESTON, ERLINDA
TOLENTINO, JOSEFINA G. URRUTIA, LILIBETH L. VELOSO, OSCAR
VENTURA, JOSE VICTORIA, JR., ARNOLD N. VILLADOS, NOE L. ZETA,
EUGENIO ESGUERRA, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, DANIEL GARAS, MA.
LEONORA PADILLA, MAXIMIANO RAMOS, VILLELA REYNALDO,
ANGELICA SAJONA, ROSARIO SANTOS, ANGELITA L. CRUZ, EDWIN A.
LLAGAS, LUCILA SEVILLA, MERCEDES D. AGALOOS, VICENTA V.
AÑONUEVO, DALISAY S. AVELLANA, GERAROO BERNAL, LILIBETH L.
CANDONITA, FLORNIDO P. CASTRO, WILFREDO CINCO, LINO N.
DIMAPILIS, TITA P. DUEÑAS, WILFREDO C. ECAMINO, MYRNA D.
HABAGA, MARY JUNE F. MAYCA, NENITA G. MONTOYA, EDITHA N.
RECTRA, RICHARD G. SANDI, ROBERTO D. SHEAN, JUSTINA Q. UMALI,
VIOLETA B. VALERO, TELESFORO R. VILLAMAR, DANILO N.
VILLANUEVA, EUGENIO U. VILLANUEVA, EFREN R. WAKA, MARIO W.
ALBAN, EFREN ANONUEVO, VICENTA V. ANONUEVO, ROSALINDA C.
ANGEL, VIOLETA A. BUAGAN, ELENITA D. CABUEÑOS, FLORIAN S.
CANTOS, LOPE M. CARIÑO, SR., ROLANDO G. CLEMENTE, AREJOLA P.
CORAZON, ANTONIO D. CORIA, VIRGINIA I. DELOS SANTOS, LILY S.
DEROCA ERLINDA A. DIMAPAWI, RANDOLPH DISCIPULO, TITA P.
DUEÑAS, ERMIE B. DAGDAGAN, CORAZON Y. FERNANDEZ, NIDA G.
GUARINO, GLENN HERALDO, ESTELA B. HERMOSURA, ADORACION U.
HERNANDEZ, GONZALO IMPERIAL, DOLORES B. LA GUARDIA,
PERCIVAL LADUB, AGNES H. LAGON, TERESA M. MAÑALAC, ISAGANI
V. MANALILI, CONSTANCIO F. MARISFOSQUI, VIRGINIA A. MELCHOR,
RONALDO J. MIRANDA, FRANCIS M. MIRTO, EDWIN M. MOJARES,
ELISA D. MOLA, BENJAMIN MORTOS, CLEMENCIO A. PAJARILLO,
LAURO J. PANERIO, ELENITA G. PASCUAL, EXZER R. RABANG, EMILIO
RAMOS, VICENTE A. REGODON, ANDREA H. REYES, MA. CORAZON V.
STA. ANA, ZENAIDA P. STO. DOMINGO, ILUMINADA S. TALABUCON,
ANNIE E. TANTOY, MARLOU D. VAQUILAR, NOEL B. VELASQUEZ,
NANCY V. VILLAPANDO, ELISA B. VILLAR, BELOISIE M. ALMAZAN,
GLADYS B. BOQUIREN, ELIZABETH CARIÑO, LIZ CARPIO, LORMELYN
E. CLAUDIO, JOSE CORTEZ, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, NORBERTO A.
DEL ROSARIO, VILMA C. ELPA, OTTO E. ESPILOY, ALLAN L. LEUTERIO,
EMMANUELITA D. MENDOZA, NICANOR E. MENDOZA, CONCEPCION C.
OCAMPO, CARMELITA M. PASSE, JOSE SALVADOR PASSE JR.,
MORENO M. PENALBA, ELVIRA P. PIMENTEL, VIRGINIA V. QUIMO, NAP
ROQUE, CESAR S. SIADOR, JR., ILUMINADA SORIA JULITO G.
TANGALIN, GREGORIO A. TOMILLOSO, FELICISIMO I. VICENCIO,
RICARDO D. VICENTINO, RODOLFO ARELLANO, MYRNA R. CORTEZ,
EMMA N. CRUZ, CONCEPCIO C. CUNANAN, NELSON ITLIONG,
RESTITUTO S. MAGPANTAY, CATHERINE F. MANALANSAN, HENRY B.
MANDOCDOC, ISIDORO MONTOYA, JR., ANDREA A. RAMOS, ARSENIA
E. SAN DIEGO, VILMA SANTIAGO, PETRA T. TABUCOL, BRIGIDA T.
TACUBOY, MARILOU A. TIBOR, CORAZON R. VALDEZ, NESTOR U.
VENTURILLO, MARILYN ACOB, EMMA AGOT, DENCIO R. DADIS, MA.
AVA DATA, NORLIE N. DAVID, IRENE S. DELA CRUZ, NESTOR T.
GUERREN, GUILLERMA LACUMBAY, ANNA LEAH MELEGRITO, EDITO
MISTA, BELEN C. NUNEZ, ESTELA B. SARMIENTO, FRANCISCO TY,
CYNTHIA L. AUSTRIA, CORITA M. BARTOLO, AMELIA L. FLORES,
PRISCILA M. MOLINA, CORAZON P. PEREZ, MANOLITA L. VELASCO,
ANTONIO E. VELOIRA, OFELIA B. VELOIRA, MEMORY FABIAN,
ROSARIO MENESES, JULIANA M. ABEN, REMEDIOS F. BONIFACIO, MA.
THERESA M. ENRIQUEZ, OFELIA B. MENDOZA, LILY T. REYES,
NARCISA B. SESE, MA. THERESA M. VILLARUEL, JOHN R. ALMAZAN,
DOLORES C. VELASQUEZ, ALFREDO FERRER, ADGARDO CORPUZ,
ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, CONSOLACION B. CACULITAN, NORA Y.
CALIJA, YVONNE V. CARABEO, AIDA C. CORPUZ, ROSA P. DORAD0,
MINDA C. DUAD, CECILIA B. HIWATIG, RITA ORISTINA V. LAPUS,
CASILDA C. MAROHOM. CLEMENCIA A. MARQUEZ, MAXIMA MATIBAG,
EMELITA R. MENDOZA, CRISNATA S. MONTRESCLAROS, TERESITA L.
OBIAS, CHONA R. PASTORFIDE, MERLY H. PATUNGAN, ALNA U.
PINEDA, ANGELITO T. PINEDA, VILMA G. QUIAMBAO, ESTELITA T.
RAGASA, LUZVIMINDA L. RAMOS, NERISSA B. RAPANUT, CARMENCITA
S. SANCHEZ, ELSA M. SIGUE. ROWENA L. TEJADA, MYRNA M.
TORREGOZA, LERMA AQUINO, CORNELIA M. ARANETA, FERDINAND
BANGCUA, REYNALDO BARBADILLO, ALFREDO A. CLAVERIA, DAN
JORGE CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DAQUIGAN, REBECCA C. DE VERA,
ERLINDA B. DIZON, MARILYN P. ESTADILLA, CATALINA G.
GARINGARAO, MYRNA MALINAO, SILVESTRE C. MANGAWANG,
FLORENCIO C. NAVALED, NOEL D. OBRA, NELIO T. PAGLINAWAN, ANA
MARIE PASCUAL, ARTURO R. PRENDOL, OTELLA O. SANCHEZ,
REYNALDO TEJADA, CRISANTO BADENHOP, JEAN C. BORROMEO,
ANA MARIA C. BUESING, MARIA TERESA CHAVEZ, GIL F. FERAREZA,
MARITES L. GALVEZ, MIGUEL B. JIMENEZ, JR., RODANTE JOCSON,
MICHAEL A. JOSE, ARNEL H. LUZ, ARNEL C. MATREO, EDUARDA P.
MERCADO, BENEDICTO P. MURILLO, MINDA A. OSORIO, GLEN Q.
PASTORFIDE, ISMAEL S. RUIZ, FE B. SENDIN, HENRY P. SORIANO,
JOYCE SORIANO, FLORENCE V. VELASQUEZ, PRUDENCIO M.
VENTURA, ROY ALAN D. VIANZON, LORETO H. VILLAS, JR., CELESARIA
C. ZACARIAS, GEORGE P. ABAYA, ELIZABETH E. AMOR, LORNA ASIS,
IMELDA J. BALLON, LILIA M. BALTAZAR, AURORA I. BELEN, ELSA B.
BURGOS, CORAZON D. CALAMNO, FLORENCIO L. CARANDANG,
CYNTHIA V. CARPIO, ADAMELIA DE ONON, AMPARO L. DE RAMA,
LUVIMIN L. DELA CRUZ, VIOLETA R. GARCIA, PERLA P. MUÑOZ,
PAULINA D. PAGUINTO, JOEL PAJARILLO, ENCARMILA PANGANIBAN,
ERLINDA M. PARRENO, MA. SALVACION M. PEREZ, ALBINA L. PINEDA,
RAYMOND SANTIAGO, BRIGIDO G. SISON, REMEGIO SULLEZA,
TRAZION E. TUSCANO, MYRA B. VILLANUEVA, HENRY ABONETALLA,
MARILYN BABAAN, ELISA A. BERE, JUANITO J. BOLISAY, NORMA S.
CABALLA, ELMER CALLOPE, ELPIDIO T. DE LARA, AGNES G. DE LEON,
GERARDO R. ESPIRITU, ONOFRE P. LAXAMANA, ANSELMO LEGASPI,
CONSUELO MAGAYANES, DELEON L. MAROHOM, MARIO MELGAR,
CHOLITA R. ORTEGA MODESTA S. PADUADA, PATRIA C. PATRICIO,
LORETA N. RAMIREZ, TERESITA C. SAN JUAN, FELICISIMA SUMAGUE,
SOLAIMAN TAWA, VICTOR TOLENTINO, ANGELITO U. VALENZUELA,
DIOSDADO VELARDE, ROBERTO M. BASCO, JESUS B. CRUZ, JR.,
JOSEPHINE ESTRADA, LUCIA L. ESTRADA, LIGAYA C. EULOGIO,
LEONARD FALLER, DANILO J. GALAGNARA, MA. LOURDES P.
GOROBIA, JUAN ILARDE, ISMAEL R. JOSE, RICARDO P. MACALINO,
JR., ROPERTO MANALO, VIOLETA A. MARIANO, NOBLEZA C. MERINO,
PILAR C. MIGALANG, ALEJANDRO S. MINGOY, DANILO D. PONZALAN,
SERGIO TAMAYO, VIRGILIO V. URGEL, GLORIA VILLAMAR, JULIETA
ACHICO, FREDDIE P. AGAZETA, PEDRO AGONIAS, ALBERTO G.
ALBERTO, CRISTINA ALTOAR, SALVADOR BACANI, LEONIDA
BALINGAW, IMELDA BAUZON, VIRGILIO BELGIRA, GAUDENCIA
CABACUNGAN, LEONORA DAVID, VIRGILIO D. ESTRADA, CORSINO
GLORY, PRECIOSO A. LABUGUEN, BENJAMIN LACESTE, ROSITA
MACARANAS, FELIX MAURILLO, JOVENCIO PERALTA, RUBEN R.
PRENDOL, CORNELIO RETUTA, JERRY RETUTA BENEDICTO P.
RIVERA, CORNELIO TABLANTE, LEONILA VERGARA LAMBERTO
VILLAFUERTE, OFELIA B. AYSON, EDITA M. BALANZA, ROLANDO M.
BAUTISTA, OFELIA L. BUENO, CARMELITA G. CAJIPO, TERESITA C.
CANLAS, ROMEO C. ESTEBAL, IBANA FALLAR, ANASTACIO M. FLORES
JR., DEMOSTHENES GOTHIS, MENCHELITA M. GUCILA, EDMUNDO C.
LAGRIMA, ALLAN C. LEONCIO, MARVIN M. MORALES, DIGNA Z.
OBSTACULO CORNELIO O. PERALTA, CARLITO B. POMBO, MARIETA R.
RED, TRINIDAD A. TALARO, ADELA T. TONGCO, REGINA B.VILLADOS,
JESSICA R. ALMAZAN, PERFECTO U. ALMAZAN, BERARDO BADERE,
GENOVEVA A. BIGORNIA, NATIVIDAD J. BOCAL, LORNA CABADING,
EFREN E. CAWALING, AVELINA T. DURAN, ROMEO A. FELIPE,
CORAZON GARAPAN, ANITA B. IBARDOLASA, MARCIAL M. JACOBIA.
JOSE V. JARTEL, PIDO LOUISA, BASILIO H. MORENO, CARONIA L.
MURCIA, NONILA T. OMANA, AIDA P. PANGANIBAN, SUSAN CULANE
PAZ, ANITA Q. PEREYRA, MAMERTO C. PESTON JR., ROLANDO S.
RABE, VILMA SANSORONA, VICTOR TOLENTINO, LUZVIMINDA O.
YAGYA, JULIET S. AYENTO, DIGNO D. AYSON, NORENA R. CIASICO,
JOVENCIA L. FERNANDEZ, EMILIANO P. KEMPIS, EUFROCINA B.
QUIJANO, SIXTO E. TOLENTINO JR., AMPARO P. ABAYA, CR1STINA M.
ARINGO, LEONILO WILLOU M. BERANO, JOEY B. CASTILLO,
BERNARDO CLARION, MATIAS V. CRUZ, ERLINDA O. DELGACO,
ERLINDA B. DIZON, SENECIO D. FESTIN, FLORENTINA C. VALENCIA,
SARAH ABUNGAN, JUPITER C. ALMAZAN, OFELIA BIRON, MAMERTO C.
BOLIVAR, BIENVENIDO R. CINCO, METEDIO ESTRADA JR., GINALYN
GONZALES, ANTONIO M. LACHICA, NEMESIO RABAJANTE, NELZON
TENIOSO, HERMENEGILDO URRUTIA, JR., VIOLETA C. VALDEZ,
CRISANTO VAQUILAR, JOFRE B. ALTAREJOS, EDGARDO L.
BALDEDARA, RAUL SAUDE G. BECARES, RAMON R. BOADO,
MELCHOR R. BORLON, GEMMA CARINO, GEORGE M. CARPIO,
CARMELITA S. CUNANAN, ONESIMO A. DE CASTRO, PURIFICACION R.
DE GUZMAN, LEOPOLDO S. J. DE JESUS, JOCELYN R. DELA CRUZ,
DOMINGO U. ESGUERRA, VIRGINIA R. ESTRELLA, OFELIA A.
HERNANDEZ, TRINIDAD JAVIER, EUGENIA L. LAGMAY, ANGELITA B.
LIBIRAN, ARSENIO R. LIBIRAN, CARLOS M. LOPE, RODOLFO A. LOPEZ,
CELSO MAALIW, ROMUALDO E. MENDOZA, CRISPULO A. OCAMPO,
ANGELITA OLOG, EVANGELINE O. OPO, MAXIMO L. PEREZ, JOSE
PONPONILLA, SIXTO P. RIVAS, LYDIA C. OMERO, CATALINA F.
SIGATON, JESUS S. VIJIGA, MYRA K. VILLAPANDO, GALICANO I. NER,
OSCAR R. LAVIN, ESTEBAN S. CARAG, GRACE M. VILLACRUSIS,
JULIETA C. BONDAD, NILDA S. LINING, LUCY GRACE C. BURGOS,
MARIFE CHARO N. DOMINGO, MA. VICTORIA P. DA ROZA, NILDA
CATALAN, RAUL T. ORTEGA, EWARDO R. JOSON, PRUDENCIO M.
DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO L. CONDE, ARNEL M. ZURITA, EDISON A.
CALAOUR, VICTOR C. CANTOR, CARMELITA M. QUIRINO, AMBROSIO
ESTABILLO, ESPERANZA B. DALUSON, ALBERTO M. MADRILEJOS,
ROLANDO C. MANALO, RODOLFO R. RANGES, PHILIP A. PICHAY,
REYNALDO C. ALAMPAY, RENE E. FAJARDO, CELSO A. AGUILAR,
REMEDIOS E. ABING, JOSEFINA M. GAWARAN, FRANCISCO S.
PANGANIBAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON. CARLITO
R. ALETA, in his capacity as the Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute, respondents.
G.R. No. 110642 September 11, 1998
BERNARDO BALGOS, NICOMEDES C. AGBADA, EUFRONIO R. ALANO
JR., ERNIE S. ALINO, CORNELIO A. ARTIENDA. CARY L. ASANA,
TRANQUILINO ATIENZA, JR., JONATHAN A. AZUCENA, ROY M.
BARCERO, CLARITA S. BELONIO, WILFREDO E. CABEZON, CANDIDO A.
CABRIDO, JR., AMELITA B. CALER, DAREF MARCELINO M. CANET,
RONALD CANTONG, ALEJANDRO J. CATIPAY, JR., HERMINIA COLAR,
ELIZABETH A. DAYTO, SALOME G. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA ESTRADA,
AURORA M. FIGUEROA, MA. ANGELITA A. GADDI, RIO L. GULAPO, MA.
THERESA M. GUMABON, ANTONIO A. GUNAY, GERARD HURTADO,
ARIEL ILAGAN, WILMAR L. INFANTE, FLORECER M. LEACHON, ANNA
MA. VICTORIA LELINA, LIZA NONETTE A. MAÑIBO, EUGENIO P.
MANUEL, EDUARDO A. MENGUITO, ERIC AGAPITO NATIVIDAD,
LEONIDES N. NAVEA, MA. PERPETUA OCAMPO, REDENTOR B.
PACANO, ALMOND C. PALABRICA, ELMER T. PASCUA, CRISTY
CRISTETA A. RAMOS, HENRY B. RELLOSA, ROWENA M. RODANILLA,
JOSEPH SALVADOR, CARMELLE GEORGINA SIENA, CRECENCIANO I
SUAN, CESAR TAN, CECILIA T. VARGAS, GIL NOEL VILLANUEVA,
ANALYN S. VISTA, BENITO YU, JR., EDUARDO AKIATE, EARTHA G.
ALINO, TERESITA ANASTACIO, JOSELITO O. AVERION, ELINO
BAGOSO, FERDINAND B. BARBERO, ELSA J. BAUTISTA ELMER
CALDERON, FRANCIS CAMELLO, RENE CANARES, RODELIO B.
CARATING, JULIETA S. CONSTANTINO, EASTER LIZA CUETO, NANCY
V. CUETO, MARIFE DELOS REYES, JERWYN L DEMETRIO, EDUARDO
DIOKNO, MARGARET T. ESTANISLAO, MA. ARLENE M. EVANGELISTA,
SALVADOR A. FABULA, IRENE P. GERPACIO, ALMA GONZALES,
RICHMOND GONZALES, BENIE E. ILAGAN, OSCAR JALALON,
JOSEFINA JONAS, ELEANOR M. LIGANOR, FLORDELIZA MALLARI,
ROSARIO MAÑACAP, JOSE A. MANANGHAYA, JULIET R. MANGUERRA
GLENN A. MANILA, ANGELITA C. MARCIA, CECILIA MARQUESES, GINA
MARZAN, RICHARD M. MOJICA, JOSEFINA MORALES, SANTIAGO
MOSQUEDA, MELCHITO B. NOCEDA, SEGUNDO, PACARDO, SONNY
PACUNLA, ALEXANDER PANO, MA. ENQUITA PANOTES, ROMMEL M.
PARCASIO, IAN A. PEDALIZO, ROSANA PERMALINO, EVELYN PITOGO,
LOLITA POLIQUIT, LOURDES REGALA, MARIBEL REYES, JOVETTE
TENORIO, HIDALGO TOLENTINO, LUISITO TRINIDAD, MA. BLANCA A.
VALDEAVILLA, EDGARDO YBURAN, ROWENA ABELLANA, ARTURO
ACOBA, PALMAREN AGACIA, FLORENTINO AGUSTIN, JAIME ALAN,
EDUARDO ALBERTO, MACARIO ANACAN, HENRY APOLINARES,
EVELYN AUSAN, REBECCA BACUS, MARYLOU BARATANG, LORENZO
BERMILLO, LIGAYA BOBIS, MA. TERESA BOLOFER, ERNESTO
BRAMPIO, FLORA CABLIN, HENRY CACAYAN, LILIA CALICA, MA. ANA
CASUPANG, CHARITO CAUTON, ARMELYN Y. CLEMENTE, ROOSBELT
CREENCIA, FRANCISCO CRUZ, MARCELO DAYO, MARITES DE LEON,
JANE DELA CRUZ, EDGARDO DELOS SANTOS, IMELDA DELOS
SANTOS, RODEL DELOS SANTOS, ELISA DIZON, SUSAN DUMOT,
JOVEN ESPINELI, LEANDRO EVANGELISTA, EVANGELINE FERRER,
NESTOR FRANCISCO, CESARIO GEMINO, LAURO G. HERNANDEZ,
RACHEL HILARIO, MIGUEL IRACTA, OBEN LABONETE, JAIME
LADANGA, ISIDRO LEGAN, ELMIE MADRIAGA, DIOSDADO MANALUS,
OSCAR MANOIS, CRISTINA MEDRANO, LILIAN MILLAN, GLICERIO
MONTALLA, MADELEINE NAVARCE, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, PINKY
PADILLA, LUZ BRENDA PAGLINAWAN, PURISIMA PAJARO, JOSEPHINE
PASION, JOCELYN RAMOS, DOMINGO RODULFO, DELIA SADIASA,
VIRGINIA SALILI, GETULIO SAN JUAN, FLORFINA SANCHEZ, LEOLITA
SIASI, GLORIA TEJADA FRANCIS TORRES, ERNESTO VALMEO,
WILFREDO VELASCO, EPIFANIA VILLA JUAN, RAFAEL ACENA ELMER
ADRAQUE, EDITHA AIZON, RIZALDY ALBERTO, RAMON ALOBBA, ALAN
ANIDA, BERTOLIO ARELLANO, VERONICA AVILA, MAY BABARAN,
JOAQUIN BANZALI, MARILYN CAACO, ROSE NELIE CABATLAO,
JUANITA CALONGE, NILDA CAPANPANGAN, CECILIA CAPUNO,
TRINIDAD CARLOS, SALVACION CAS, AMADO CREUS, PEDRO DAILEG,
VIRGINIA DAILEG, NELITA DE GUZMAN, ROWENA DE GUZMAN, ALMA
ARRO DEL ROSARIO, AMELYN ANG, BERNADETTE ESPINOSA,
ESTRELITA FIDER, REYNALDO GABALLO, NOEMI GABATO, ELMER
GABAYA, MARIBELLE GAON, LILIA GONZALES, CARISA GOSO, ROMEO
HERNANDEZ, MYRNA JOVELLANA, RONALDO LIM, GREGORIO
LLANES, ROBERTO MABUTI, DANILO MACANSANTOS, CRISOSTOMO
MAMORBOR, MA. CONCEPCION MANZO, ROBERT MARGES, ANDRE
JOHN MARTINEZ, EUFRONIO MOJICA, HENRY MOJICA, LILIAN MONJE,
MA. RAYSOLYN NATIVIDAD, LAMBERTO NERI, NICANDRO OBEDENCIO,
LISETTE ORENSE, LEA PARDE, JEFFREY PAYNOR, EVA PUGAY,
GODOFREDO RAMOS, CRISPINA RAYO, CECILIA RITO, SALVACION
RITUAL, CRISTINA SANGALANG, ELVIRA SEGOVIA, RENE STA. MARIA,
GENOVEVA TULLAO, GLORIA URRIZA, RESTITUTO VEJERANO, RAUL
VILLACORTE, ZENYBEL VILLEGAS, ZARAH YAP, PHILIP YASAY,
TRINIDAD ACERON, FLORENTINO C. AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO ANGUE,
CESAR ATIENZA, CARLOTA AUSTRIA, JOVITA AUSTRIA, VICTORIA
BAHALLA, ALLAN BATUSBATUSAN, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, SONNY
BILBAO, GINA BRUGADA, AMELIA CABRERA, FRANCIA CAMUA,
RENATO CARRASCAL, RUSELL CASTRO, EDUARDO CAUSAREN,
NELSON CONCEPCION, MYRNA CORILLA, ROSALIA FLORA COSTALES,
NELSON CUSTODIO, DENNIS DE GUZMAN, EUFRACIO DE LUNA,
LUCIANA DELA CRUZ, JR., VENER DILIG, YOLANDA DINO, REMEGIO
DIWA, EDWIN DOGOMEO, MANUEL ELLANO, MITHI ENCIO, REYNALDO
ESPINO, DAVID ESPIRITU, EMILIANA GAMIT, ENRICO HERNANDEZ,
DORIS JAVATE, ALICIA JIMENEZ, ELEAZAR LOPEZ, MA. SUSANA
MARIANO, RONALDO MARAVILLA, PETER MAURICIO, ANITA OBRERO,
ARLENE OLEA, ROEL PARDE, MELCHOR PEREZ, ROGER PRINCIPE,
PRIMA PUJANTE, LILIA RAFAEL, AMELIA RALA ANTONIO RIVERA,
LIWAYWAY RONSARIO, ERLINDA SALCEDO, OFELIA SANGALANG
LUZVIMINDA SANTOS, EDESIA SEVILLEJA, NANETTE SUSA, NEIL
VALENTON, FILIPINA VENTIGAN, MA. IDA VILLARALVO, ADELINE
ABANCE, RAUL ACOSTA, MA. CECILIA ADAOAG, GLEN BABANTUGAN,
REMIGIO BACUS, PANTALEON BADION, JIMMY BAJADO, ARTHUR
BARAOIDAN, JULIE CABALLERO, FRANCISCO CADAJAS, EDITHA
CASIBANG, NORMAN CONDE, MENA CREUS, MARY CRUZ, MACARIO
DE GUZMAN, LUPO DE LUNA, RODOLFO DOMINGO, EMILIA
EVANGELISTA, REYNALDO FAUSTINO, ALICIA DELA CRUZ
FERNANDEZ, IAN FEROLINO, GIL GALAN, ANALIZA GARIBAY, JESUS
GARRIDO, FLORENCIO GATCHALIAN, CONSORIO GERONES,
VERONICA GULAFO, ALMA HERMINIA, PAUL RODERICK HOFELINA,
IDA JACA, ENRIQUE JACSON, NENEVEH LAPUZ, ROLANDO LEAL,
MILLER MANILA, DESALE MANZANO, ROLANDO MARAON, MARIANO
MARIANO, RODELIO MENORIA ROMEO MERIDA, JOSEFINA
MONJARDIN, NILO PARDE, EMMANUEL PASCO, NONITA QUITO, GLEN
RANCE, BONIFACIO RENOBLAS, JESUS REYES, JOSE REYES, RIZAL
REYLES, JUAN ROQUE, NENITA SALGADO, GAUDENCIO SALONGA
GALLARDO TOLENTINO, ALBERTO TRINIDAD, MA. FELISA VARGAS,
ROGELIO VAZQUEZ, WILLIAM VEJERANO, ELIZABETH VILLANUEVA
VIRGINIA VILLARUEL, SERGIO YEBAN, EVELYN M. ALONSO, MIE ARCA,
ARTHUR BARAOIDAN, CATHERINE BATUSBATUSAN, IRENEA
CARANDANG, LOURDES CARLENGGA, MA. ANNA F. CASUPANG,
ROSALIA FLORA O. COSTALES, ELSA DIZON, HENRY ESPINELI, JOVEN
ESPINELI, RICHARD FELIX, MA. CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENATO C.
FERNANDO, LYDIA A. FULGOSINO, RENATO GONZALES, BONIFACIO
JOGNO, OSCAR MANAOIS, JULITA MOJICA, ANGELINA MOYA, LUISITO
NACO, MA. ANA ORQUIZA, SUSAN PRIANES, EDMOND PRINCIPE,
TERESA A. RAMOS, ROBERTO REYES, MARTINET ROBLE, GRETA
SALVIEJO, PEPITO SAMSON, SALVADOR SOLIVEN, JOSE F.
SUMINISTRADO, ADELINA TRINIDAD, LUCITO AMISCARAY, FRANK
JAIME AQUINO, MARIO BAISA, ALTAIR BAUTISTA, TEODORO R.
BERSABE, MODESTO L. BORJA (DR.), EUGENIA A. BRIONES,
CONRADO S. COMIA, BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION, NELSON CUSTODIO,
DENNIS A. DE GUZMAN, EUFRACIO V. DE LUNA, LUCIANO DELA CRUZ,
JR., REYNALDO ESPINO, DAVID F. ESPIRITU, EDUARDO FERUELO,
JORGE Y. LILLO RONALDO I. MARAVILLA, CONRADO A. MERCADO,
LEILANI G. NAGA, NOE NAMBATAC, LARRY P. PINERA, BENEDICTO M.
QUITAIN, ERIBERTO L. RODRIGUEZ, FEDERICO SABADO, JR., OSCAR
C. SALONGA, OSCAR C. SANGANBAYAN, FERIOLA M. SERRANO,
ANDRES P. SEVILLEJA, FELICIDAD T. ZAMORA, ARIEL ARENAS, LOUIE
CRISMO, ALBERTO DE GUZMAN, GIDEON DE LUNA, JUNIBERT DE
SAGUN, ANGELICA ECITO, CLARON ESPESO, PORFERIO ESPINA,
LEVIN GABUTAN, NORMAN GALLEMIT, DIOSDADO JOSE, ANSELMA
JUNIO, MILA LAGRIMAS, NOEMI LASPINAS, SINFROSA PASCUA,
RENATO POLIDO, ROMY RAGMA, ROEL REYES, MARIBEL SANTOS,
EVELYN SERISOLA RAIDA V. ALEGRE, MINDA A. AMON, GREGORIO P.
ANTOLIN, JR., LUZ B. ARVIZO, ANDRES F. BAES, JR., ALEJANDRO R.
BALOLOY, BERNARDO B. BAYANGOS, NORA S. BOQUIREN, ELMER B.
BORRE, EDUARDO A. BRION, JAIME C. CABANDE, DELIA A. CALIXTO,
REYNALDO N. CONCEPCION, FARLEY O. CONDE, BIENVENIDO L DE
GUZMAN, CONRADO C. DE JESUS, CORAZON T. DE JESUS, JOSEFINA
G. DILOY, ASUNCION A. DIMAGUILA, ONOFRE DOLAR, JR., SERGIO S.
ENRIQUEZ, CORAZON P. ESPINO, SILVINO M. FELLO, COLITA J.
FRANCISCO, FEDERICO G. GOLDING, RENATO G. GONZALES,
ELIZABETH M. HERNANDO, LILIAN T. HURTADO, GLORIA C.
MACASAET, ERIC N. MARASIGAN, MARINA P. MARGES, NORMA M.
MAURICIO, GINA P. NILO, JANET G. OPERARIO, JULIANA J. ORDOÑA,
BERNARDO B. PASCUA, ELIODORA D. RAMOS, EVELYN C. RAMOS,
PERFECTO O. REYES, VICENTE V. ROBLES, FLORENCIO A. ROJALES,
CORAZON B. ROSALES, TEOTIMO L. ROTERSOS, ELIZABETH C.
SADORRA, FE D. SALIWAN, MOISES T. SANCHEZ, ESTER S. SANTOS,
RUFINO L. SANTOS, EMILIANO M. SIBOLBORO, BAYANI V.
VILLANUEVA, ERNESTO G. ALMENDRAL, TERESITA AVISO, CLARITA
BACATIO, ALFONSO G. BAUTISTA, NARDA A. BLASCO, LUNINGNING J.
BONDOC, JOSE B. BURA, ODON CAPANGPANGAN, VIRGILIO A.
CASTAÑEDA, MARIO B. COLLADO, ARSENIO L. CALONGE, LUISITO F.
COSTELO, OSCAR F. COSTELO, NILO A. CRUCENA, ARTURO A. DAYOT,
SUNNY A. DE GUZMAN, WILFREDO B. DELA CRUZ, JULIETA G.
ESPENELI, CECILIA C. ESTRADA, PERFECTO P. EVANGELISTA,
MAGDALENA Q. FAVIS, CRISTINA M. FERNANDEZ, RENE D.
FERNANDEZ, LOURDES S. GALANTA, RAYMUNDO G. GALANTA,
REDENTOR S. GATUS, JOSE G. GERPACIO, ARNULFO B. GESITE,
CLEOFE C. GONZALES, BELLA V. HERNANDO, CARMELITA B. INCILLO,
LIGAYA H. ISON, AIDA T. LATOZA, DEOGRACIAS R. MAGTALAS,
FLORENCIO G. MANANGHAYA, MAMERTO F. MARTINEZ, NESTOR T.
MERJILLA, ALENJANDRO G. MICOSA, PABLO M. MONTALLA, EDGAR P.
NATIVIDAD, QUERUBIN A. NAVERO, HENRY E. NOCEDA, NOEMI M.
PASCUAL, BERNA G. PASTOR, MADONNA H. PEÑALBA, CRISTY C.
PERLADO, DOMINCIANO D. RAMOS, JR., LEO RETAMAR, TERESITA V.
RETAMAR, ANDRES ARIEL B. REYES, JOSE D. RONDAL, MILAGROS F.
ROSALES, OSCAR C. SALONGA, EDNA L. SAMAR, ANTONIO SAN
ANDRES, MANUEL S. SANDOVAL, SHIRLEY A. SANTOS, MANUEL S.
STA. ANA, NESTOR M. TICSON, LORENZO M. TOMAS, REYNALDO R.
VILLANUEVA, MARIO E. VINLUAN, LOLITA C. AGUSTIN, CRISOSTOMO
B. ALCALDE, DIGNA R. ALLAG, MERLYNA F. ATIL, ELISA AYO, JULITA
M. AYUYAO, VICTORCITO V. BABIERRA, AMELIA A. BANGALAN,
ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA, ERLINDA D. BAUTISTA, CELSO R. BERSABE,
APOLINARIO P. CARANDANG, VIOLETA E. CASTAÑEDA, JOSEFINA L.
CREENCIA, ROGELIO CREENCIA, ESPERANZA V. DACANAY,
LEONARDO M. DE LEON, LEONORA P. DE LEON, LUCIANO C. DELA
CRUZ, AURORA B. DELOS SANTOS, ROMEO P. DELOS SANTOS, DAISY
T. ELICANO, MARCIANA B. ENRIQUEZ, NATIVIDAD P. ESCOBAR,
VIRGINCITO G. ESTOCONING, REDEMCION B. GRIFAL, CELIA C.
GROSPE, LORNA L. GULAFO, VIRGINIA S. HIIARIO, ARNIE C. ILAN,
ELISA N. LADANGA IGMIDIO B. LAPIS, ULYSIS M. LATOZA, BEATRIZ C.
MAGNO, JOSE D. MANGUERRA, MA. TERESA T. MANUEL, SERAFIN B.
MATAWARAN CONRADO A. MERCADO, RAFAEL A. MONTE,
VENERANDO F. NABOA, CLEOTILDE M. NICOLAS, ELSIE V. OBRERO,
MAXIMINA OMANITO, EMILIO M. OSALVO, JOEY V. PADILLA,
MARCELINA J. PALIS, REYNALDO G. PALIS, PERLA PANGANIBAN,
WILLIE C. PERLATA, IRENEO B. RAMAT, PERLITA M. RAMOS,
EDGARDO R. REYES, JOSEPH B. ROJALES, LEOGARDA T. RUBITE,
JACQUELINE A SABINO, ANITA M. SALANDANAN, MEDARDO P.
SALVADOR, WILFREDO B. SANIDAD, IMELDA E. SANTOS, LEONARDO
A. SEMANA, CARLOS P. SERRANO, FLORENCIO C. STA MARIA, RAMON
P. ULIBAS, GAVINO ISAGANI P. URRIZA, PETRONILLA T. VALENZUELA,
SALVADOR F. VILLAREY, AMY O. YAMBOT, FELIX N. ALBANO,
RICARDO C. ALEGRID, ARIEL G. ALMEDA, JULITA V. AÑONUEVO,
ULDARICO A. ANDAL, JAIME S. ANTONIO, REYNALDO P. BAJAR,
BERNARDO D. BALGOS, JOSELITO N. BANGAWAN, LEOVIGILIO R.
BANTIQUE, ELVIRA M. BAUTISTA, ERNESTO BELO, LUZ C.
CABAMONGAN, ANDRES B. CALIMUTAN, MARCELO S. CRISOSTOMO,
AGNEZ CRUZ, BERNARDINA I. DAGUIO, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN,
MARCELINO P. DE LEON, CARMEN P. DEL ROSARIO, EDIZA A. DIAZ,
TEODORICO C. ERNI, JULIANA M. FAJARDO, TEORODICO M. FAJARDO,
LEOVENILDA A. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN M. GALLARITA, CONSTANCIA R.
GANTIOQUI, EUGENIA G. GARCIA JOSE G. HAPAN, NORA B. INCIONG,
LALAINE JAVINEZ, GERMAN M. JONAS, BELTHA B. LANDICHO,
ERLINDA LOVERIZA, CLARITA J. MAESTRADO, JOSELITO MAGNO,
EDUARDO B. MALAPITAN, EDUARDO A. MANZANO, NAPTHALI Q.
MAYUGA, REMEDIOS B. MILLER, AMELIA R. MORENO, PONCIANO L.
MURILLO, JOSEPHINE L. NANA, ISABEL D. NASIS, MERCEDES V.
OCAMPO, GODOFREDO R. ODEJAR, TERESITA OLMELLA, GERMAN L.
OMAÑA, CECILIA B. ORLANES, BELINA P. PAJARITO, LUCINDA S.
PANGCO, JAIME PASCUAL, TERESITA S. PERLADO, VILMA M.
QUIMSON, CESAR H. RAMOS, ROMEO L. SACDALAN, CRISTINA M.
SANDOVAL, TERESITA S. SANDOVAL, FELICIANA A. SANTIAGO,
LORNA F. SANTOS, LUZDIVINA R. SISON, CRESENCIO O. SOLANO,
NELSON B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B. STA. CLARA, ANSELMA B.
TAJON, FE P. VADIL, ARTHUR O. ACHA, DANILO E. ADRIATICO,
MERLYN ALDABA, ARNALDO B. ALVAREZ, REYNALDA T. AMADA,
NELSON ANGELES, FRANCISCO A. BAYALAS, TEODORO R. BERSABE,
ELSA C. BORJA, MODESTO L. BORJA, EDUARDO O. BREGANZA,
EUGENIA A. BRIONES, EDMUNDO P. BUSTILLO, RENATO S. CABRERA,
MARINA N. CAMACHO, OSCAR O. CARPIO, BLESILDA C. CONCEPCION,
SAMUEL M. CONTRERAS, CORAZON J. CORPUZ, YOLANDA S.
COSTELO, RAMON S. ENRIQUEZ, MERCEDES S. FERNANDO, JOSE
ANTONIO GUATLO, MARUJA JARABEJO, RAUL M. LAURENA,
TERESITA D. LIZARDO, RODOLFO L. LUCAS, CESAR M. MAGADIA,
RICARTE A. MELCHOR, JOSIE P. MERCADO, LEILANI G. NAGA,
AURORA N. NOROMBABA, WILMA G. NOTA, REYNALDO O.
PEREGRINO, SALVACION L. PLANAS, ROGELIO L. PUMARAS, NARCISA
D. RAMIS, ROSEMELINDA R. REFORMA, ROBERTO R. REYES, LOLITA
M. RONDON, SONIA M. SALGUERO, NORBERTO SALILI, NATIVIDAD M.
SALONGA, ROSEMARIE C. SISON, VICTOR J. VILLANUEVA, ARMANDO
ARCAMO, BELINDA CABALLA, TERESITA DIVAD, PEPITO ESPENILLI,
BERCELIZA FAJARDO, NELIA GULAPO, CHRISTINE MANAGBANAG,
REYNALDO MANAGBANAG, LUIS MENDOZA, OSCAR OSTING,
EDGARDO REYES, DINO VELASQUEZ, MA. CECILIA O. DELA PEÑA,
ILUMINADA POJAS, NORA ABAYA, MARIETTA S. ABCEJO, VICTORIA E.
ABELLA, FILOMENA L. ABEN, MA. VICTORIA D. ABESAMIS, NITA D.
ABID, VERONICA ABIERO, RONELLO ABILA, DANILO ABON, EVA ABON,
EVA FE J. ABRAHAM, EDGAR A. ABRIOL, RUBY I. ABRIOL, REMEDIOS
ACASIO, ROMEO L. ACEDO, RIZALINA M. ACORDA SUSAN B. AGAPITO,
RODOLFO T. AGONCILLO, MARGARITA N. AGOOT, MARIA H. AGOOT,
ELIZABETH AGPAOA, AVELINO AGUINALDO, JOSE R. AJON, LOURDES
ALAG, LUZVIMINDA ALBAO, LUCITA ALEGRE, EXPEDITA S. ALEJON,
MELENIDA ALMAZAN, MANUEL T. ALMOGUERRA, CAROLINA J.
ALVIAR, ELVIRA D. AMA, JOHN AMARRA, BENEDICTO ARABIT,
AURORA M. ANCHETA, RAYMUNDO ANDAY, ERIC J. ANONAS,
ROSEMARIE N. ANTEGRO, CARMENCITA APELO (DR.), ESTER AQUINO,
ALEX AQUITAÑA, EDUARDO ARCA, NANCY I. ARCANGEL, CRISPINO
ARIAS, GAUDENCIO ARIAS, ESTHERLINA D. ARIFALO, ALICIA C.
ARJONA-LAYSON, RODRIGO L. ARMENIO, ABELARDO E. ARNAO,
ROSALINDA M. ARVESU, JOSEPHINE B. ASAS, MA. WYNNE A.
ASTUDILLO, VICTOR C. ATIENZA, DAVID AVANTE, LUISITO AVANTE,
ANITA C. AVILLA, HERNANDO F. AVILLA EUSTAQUIO AWTTAN,
ERNESTO BACOLOR, EFREN BACONAWA, MYRNA D. BALDECAÑAS,
JUANA BALOTRO, LORY C. BANGALISAN, GERMELINA T. BAOY,
ELVIRA BARREDA, DOLORES BAUTISTA, NIEVES V. BAUTISTA,
RENATO BAUTISTA, MELINDA A. BAYOT, EDNA T. BEGINO, BELLA C.
BELOY, CAROLYN C. BENIGNO, CALIXTA C. BERBA, JOSE C. BERNAL,
LILIA B. BERNAL, CALIXTO BERNARDO, DANTE C. BERNARDO,
ERNESTO BERNARDO, RENATO BERNARDO, MELENCIO BERNARDO,
ONOFRE S. BONIGFACIO, JOCELYN B. BOREJON, EDWARD S.
BRIONES, ROSALINDA R. BUADO, ERNESTO BUENAFLOR, FELIX
BUTUHAN, CECILLO CABUANG, GILDA CABUANG, WILFREDO
CABUANG, ROLANDO A. CAMBA, RONNIE CAPILI, AURORA CAPIRAL,
MARILOU CAPUNO, LEONCIO CARAAN, ESTELITA R. CARANDANG,
REMIA B. CARPIO, EDUARDO CASTELLANO, LOLITA A. CASTILLO,
BELLA U. CATACUTAN, CARINA P. CATIMBANG, MAURO CAYETA,
CRISANTO P. CEREZO, FELICIANO CONCEPCION, VIVIAN D.
CONCEPCION, RODANTE CONSTANTE, ADELA B. CONTRERAS,
JOSEFINA A. CONTRERAS, ANAMARIE P. CORONEL, CRISOSTOMO A.
CORTEZ, ERLINDA CORTEZ JOSEPH ALAN D. COSTALES, ROSARIO M.
COSTALES, RUBINA O. CRESENCIO, ANTONIO CRISTOBAL, BALGAMEL
C. CROOC, VIRGINIA CRUZ, LEONILO A. DABBAY, ROGELIO V.
DACULLA, AZUCENA DAMANG, LINO I. DANTE, ERLINDA N. DAUZ,
KAREN ROSE C. DAZO, DOLORES T. DE GUZMAN, MARISSA DE
GUZMAN, MYRILOU DE DUZMAN, NATALIA C. DE GUZMAN, REDEDIOS
DE JESUS, EMELINA C. DE LEON, ANGELES DE MAYO, VICTORIA B.
DEL PRADO, CESAR M. DELA CRUZ, ESTENELY M. DELA CRUZ, JOSE
K. S. DELA CRUZ, NICANOR S. DELA CRUZ, EDUARDO DELA TORNE,
REYNALDO DELOS SANTOS, VERONICA DELOS SANTOS, EVELYN
DELOS TRINOS, GLICERIA DERROTA GERMAN DIAZ, AUGUSTO
DIMAMENT, MEDIATRIX DIRECTO, ROMULO S. DIRECTO, JR., STELLA
DOCENA, RODOLFO DOMDOM, JACQUELINE DONESA, ALFREDO
DUCUSIN, PETRONILO B. DUMANGAS, LORNA D. EBIO, GILBERT R.
EGAÑA, ROBERT EGAÑA, ROMULO ELAMPARO, MARLENE ENRIQUEZ,
NICERATA ERMITA, LOURDES R. ERSANDO, HERMINIO ESCALONA,
NESTOR B. ESCANDOR, PEDRO ESCREZA, MARILOU B. ESCUREL,
TERESITA G. ESPOCIA, MARINA M. ESTACIO, NANETHA ESTANTE,
ELSIE ESTOPACE, MALANIE M. ESTOLE, RODOLFO C. ESTRELLA, RICA
EVASCO, LIWANAG C. FELICIANO, EDNA A. FELIPE, EVA FEMENTIRA,
BERNARDINO FERIDO, JR., PURIFICACION C. FERRER, FRANCISCO
FETALBERO, LUCIA FLORES, MA. GRACIA D. FLORES, NILO
FRANCISCO (DR.), ZENAIDA F. FRANCISCO, MANOLITA Z. GAERLAN,
EDITHA S. GOLLA, ANTONIO A. GANNABAN, CARLOS GARCIA,
CORAZON A. GARCIA, JULIE G. GARCIA, LIZA S. GAYAS, EVAN R.
GERONIMO, BONIFACIO GODOY, ARLENE GONZALES, HILDENCE B.
GONZALES, ILUMINADA B. GONZALES, GRACE L. GUILLERMO,
BENJAMIN C. GUTIERREZ, RODOLFO GUTIERREZ, ALEJANDRINO
HADUCA, MARILYN P. HERNANDEZ, NILDA HERNANDEZ, FREDERICO
HIFE, ERQUITA HORCA, LORETO HUMARANG, REBECCA M. IBAROLA,
MELINDA O. IGNACIO, FRANCIA ILAO, AURORA C. INDICO, DIANA
INOCENCIO, ALICIA M. IRANGA, DEOGRACIAS JAVIER, NELLY A. JIAO,
CHARITO GIMENO, DIDETTE M. JOCO, LOLITA JUNIO, LEWELLIE R.
KAMPITAN, ESTRELLITA KARGANILLA, GREGORIO LACSA, JR.,
ANTONIO LANDRITO, LETICIA R. LANDRITO, ANDRES LANGIT, MAXIMA
R. LAPUZ, ANICIA LAUREL, FLORENCIA B. LAURENCIANO, MARCELINO
E. LEGASPI, MARIO T. LEGASPI, FIDEL LIBAO, IMELDA LIBERATO,
ANITA LIBRADO, LILIA G. LIWANAG, EDEN P. LLANES, ANTONIO C.
LOPEZ, CERELINO LOPEZ, EMELINA A. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO LORENZO,
FLORO MAGO, JR., ZENAIDA MADERA, MELCHOR MAGNAYE, ARLENE
B. MAGPANTAY, FERMINA MAGPANTAY, MAGNO MALABANAN, PABLO
B. MALABANAN, LUISA MALALOAN, MERCIA MALLARI, RICARDO
MALLARI, RONALDO MALLARI, RUSTICO MALLARI, ANGELI, MALONZO,
PEDRO M. MANAIG, FLORITA S. MANGABAT, NEMESIA C. MANGABAT,
MANOLITO M. AVANTE, BERNARDO S. MANUEL, CECILIA MANUEL,
ROBERTO MANUEL, CLARIBEL MANZANO, PABLO MARASIGAN,
PEÑAFRANCIA H. MARASIGAN, RHODORA MARASIGAN, ANNABELLE
F. MARBELLA, FLORENCIO MARCIAL, HERMINIO D. MARCIAL.
RICARDO F. MARERO, JUANITO R. MARTIN, JR., BALTAZAR MATEO,
ROSALINDA P. MATEO, ESTELA MAYO, SOCORRO G. MERCADO,
AVELINO G. MILLORA, APOLINAR MIMIS, NORMA MIMIS, AL MINAÑO,
CONSUELO MIRANDA, LEONARDO MIRANDA, REBECCA R. MIRANDA,
LILIA B. MOSLARES, MARLYN MULATO, MA. VICTORIA L. MUNN SHA
KHATA, LEONCIA N. NABONG, AMELIA A. NACIONAL, FLORENCIO R.
NAGAÑO, JOEY N. NAPIZA, MARION NAPIZA, ZENAIDA NATIVIDAD,
ABELO NAVARRO, NICETAS S. NICOLAS, VICENTE M. NIM, JUAN
NIOLAR, LYDIA E. NONES, MARILOU W. NUESTRO, CLEOTILDE D.
OLAYRES, SUSAN R. OLID, AMELITA A. OLIVAS, BIENVENIDO L.
OPEÑA, FRANCISCA S. ORELLANO, CONSTANCIA ORLANDA,
GUELLERMO ORTICIO, BONIFACIO ORTILLANO, ANGEL PABLO,
EDUARDO PABLO, GENEROSO PACLITA, RAYMUNDO PADILLA, NANIE
L. PALABAY, ANGELINA N. PALOS, ALAN B. PANCHO, MELITA
PANCHO, ESTRELLA C. PANGANIBAN, GINA C. PANGANIBAN, LERMA
V. PANGANIBAN, PEDRO A. PANGANIBAN, RITO PARTOSA, CYNTHIA
PASADILLA, PRISCILLA E. PASCUA, JOCELYN C. PASCUAL, REBECCA
PASCUAL, FLORENCIO PASTULERO, GERMAN PATNONGON,
VENANCIO PATRICIO, CARLEEN R. PERALTA, MARITON T. PEREZ,
IMELDA D. PILLAS, RICARDO B. PINAY-AN, JUDITH A. PLATERO, EMILY
J. POLON, BILLYADONA B. PONCE, RAUL R. PONSECA, RAMY PRADO,
BERNADEL M. PRIVADO, FERNANDO S. PRONUEVO, CARMELITA C.
PUTOLINO, NORA QUINTOS, EDNA D. RAGUINDIN, JULIAN D.
RAGUINDIN, ANACLETA G. RAMILO, FRUTO RAMOS, JULIETA RAMOS,
ROMEO R. RAMOS, SABINA RAYMUNDO, FE BIEN R. REALON,
ALFREDO RECTRA, IRENEO REGIDOR, RACHEL C. REGIDOR, ALICE
REYES, ELIZABETH L. REYES, FLORDELIZA REYES, DOLORES E.
RICAFRANCA, MANUEL RICARDO, ROBERTA L. RIGUER, GRETEL F.
RIVERA, EFREN ROBLES, PROCESO RODRIGUEZ, REMEDIOS F.
RONATO, EDEN ROSON, LEOPOLDO U. ROXAS, MOISES SADURAL,
SR., MOISES A. SADURAL, JR., VALENTIN SADURAL, JOSEFINA A.
SAGUN, RUBY F. SAHAGUN, MAURA M. SALIBA, GERLIE SALVA,
LEONCIO SALUDARES, AVELINA M. SAMIANO, REYNALDO A.
SAMIANO, JAIME G. SAN PABLO, VERONIDIA G. SAN PABLO,
BARTOLOME SANCHEZ, JOSEPHINE L. SANDOVAL, EDA SANOPO,
ELIZA C. SANTIAGO, JOEL G. SANTIAGO, TIMOTEO SANTIAGO,
CONCEPCION W. SANTOS, FELIXBERTO SANTOS, JR., JOSEFINA C.
SANTOS, MARCELINO SANTOS, RODOLFO SANTOS CESARIO
SANTOSAN, JUMELLE G SARABIA, JOSEPHINE SARMIENTO, OFELIA
SARMIENTO, AURORA C. SAVELLANO, SALLY SERRANO, RODOLFO R.
SIBALUCA, MARINA SILVESTRE, BASILISA C. SISON, EDUARDO N.
SISON, SYLVANA R. SISON, ESTER SOBREMONTE, JAIME
SOBREMONTE, ALFREDO SORIANO, JR., JULIA PAULA M. SORIANO,
CARMEN STA. AGATA, DOMINGA SUBA, TETERIO SUÑER, JEROME
SUPLIDO, LINA A. TABUÑAR, FERMIN TACAZON, LORENZO TALATALA,
ADORA V. TAN, NELCY L. TAÑEDO, MILAGROSA T. TANALGO,
ALBERTO C. TANCHANCO, MELECIO TARIFE, ROSARIO K.
TATLONGHARI, RUFINA B. TAYAG, HERMINIA A. TECSON, PAPA
TENGCO, LOURDES L. TEVES, CRESENCIANA R. TIMBOL, NOLI N.
TIONG, VIRGINIA B. TIONG, LILIA TIONGSON, MA. ASUNCION N.
TIONGSON, JOSEPHINE TOLENTINO, BENJAMIN TORRENTE, OSCAR
TORRES, SONIA M. TRINIDAD, RIZALINA TROPA, CRISTINA TUAZON,
HOMER E. TUAZON, RICARDO TUBUNGBAMA, HYDEE N. TUYAY,
MERCY URRUTIA, LARNE VALCARCEL, EMILIANO B. VALDEZ, JR.,
REMEDIOS S. VALDEZ, JOSIE VARGAS, FELINO VELASQUEZ (DR.),
PEDRO A. VELASQUEZ, RAFAEL A. VELEZ, SYLVIA I. VERGARA,
BLESILDA VERIN, ADRIANO VICTORIO, JR., DOMINADO VICTORIO,
EMILY E. VICTORIO, GLORIA VIDA, LOURDES M. VILLAFLOR, ALBERTO
A. VILLAFLORES, LEONIDO Z. VILLAFLORES, ALICE VILLALOBOS,
CATHERINE P. VILLANUEVA, EDWIN G. VILLANUEVA, TERESITA S.
VILLARIAZA, FREDERICO G. VILLARTA, EDGAR VINCULADO, ZENAIDA
C. VINCULADO, EDITHA VITALICIA, AVELINO C. VIVO, ARLENE V.
VYTIACO, MILAGROS WABE, RODOLFO WENCESLAO A. WONOSUWAN,
HERMINIA V. YALUNG, LAARNI ZAMORA, MARY ANN R. ZEPEDA,
FERNANDO SQ, LATI M. SIRIOS, JOEL BOREJON, CONCHITA PUBLICO,
AGRIPINA BRIONES, MILTON SACRO, LOLITA RAZON, CONSOLACION
GUERRA, ANDRES ARAÑO, MARCELINO JUSTO, ROSALES REGINIO,
PEDRO RUBALA, BENJO BONIFACIO, ANGEL MATEO, EDUARDO QUE
MODESTA M. ANDAYA, ANTONIETTA M. APALISOK, VIENNA E.
BELTRAN, LORENZO N. BRIANA, CRISELDA L. CASTILLO, JUANITO B.
CHAN, JR., ORLANDO S. CUYUGAN, ZORAIDA F. DE GUZMAN, VITO F.
DEL FIERRO, JR., RELITA A. ROSA, HERMINIA S. DELOS REYES,
BEATRIZ C. DIZON, SUSAN A. FORONDA, MARY ANN P. FRANCO,
ROMULO M. GARCIA. JOVITA M. GONZALES, REBECCA O. JOSE,
MARCIA B. LANUZA, ALBERTO G. LEGASPI, ANGELINA A. MABUNGA,
CONSUELO B. MANGUBAT, ILUMINADA G. MAPAYE, AMELIA V.
MARCELO, GLENDA S. MARQUEZ, LOURDES IRENE N. MIÑOZA,
EULOGIO M. MONTEALTO, MARIO P. MUECO, LUCILDA L. PADAUAN,
EDGARDO V. SAN JUAN, MA. FATIMA S. SENGCO, CAROLYN O.
TABANGCURA, MARIETA U. TIBAYAN, MARIETA E. TUGADE,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. GODOFREDO N. ALCASID, JR., in this official capacity as the
Director of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management. HON. ROMEO N.
ALCASID, in hit official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, and HON. PEDRO O. OCAMPO, in his official capacity as the
Executive Director of the Livestock Development Council, respondents.
G.R. No. 111494 September 11, 1998
DIONELO D. IBABAO, ELVIRA F. SIMON, AURORA M. CRISTOBAL
ONOFRE T. SUBA, NELITA DIAZ, ERNESTO NUVAL, ENRIQUE LACSA,
SABINA DIAZ, MAGTANGGOL SANTIAGO, VALENTIN TANZUACO,
ANGELITO TABORA, LOIDA CAINGLIT, ALBERTO SANTIAGO III,
HOSPICIO C. MAHILUM, FRANCISCO SANTOS, JR., PABLO RABINO,
LORETO GANIR, MODESTO DAYON, GLICERIA TUAZON, HONOLITA
ALMONTE, RAQUEL RAMOS, ADORACION C. JASTILLANA, RICARDO
ESGUERRA, JONATHAN DICKSON, ROBERTO TIONGSON, BIENVENIDO
RICAFRENTE, ALFREDO TAYAG, ROLANDO CAJANDING, AMELITO
GOLLOSO, REYNALDO RONQUILLO, LEONCIO LEGASPI, REYNALDO
DELA CRUZ, NICANOR LLAMAS, MARIANO ODHOY, LORETO GANIR,
TERESITA MALLA, ORBETA GUERRERO, HILARION LAGUA, PABLO
ABAD, ALBERTO LAPERAL JR., CLARITA ULANDAY, TERESITA LOPEZ,
CRSENCIA MALONZO, NATIVIDAD LAGUA, JERICARDO MONDRAGON,
FILOMENA GANTE, JESUSA WAJI, LEONORA SIGNE, MARILOU
ROSANA, JOSEFINA FRANCISCO, MARIA AFRICA MENDIORO, SEVERO
BALANE, JR., TEODORO JOCSON, MARISSA ALBALADEJO, FLORA
CASEM, MILAGROS FLORADA, TOMASA CARANDANG, MERLY REPANI,
SUSAN GARCIA, BENJAMIN NUNEZ, ANA MARIE ARENAS, ROMUALDO
POL, JULITA LAVARO, HERMINIO MAHILUM, AMIANA ABELLA,
ADELAIDA ALCISTO, RIZALINA M. LEGASTO, MILAGROS LEDESMA,
LORNA P. ANACLETO, AUGUSTO T. REGIO, CYNTHIA P. ISAAC, FELIPE
ALBANO, ROSALINDA Q. DE LA CRUZ, MITZI C. FERNANDEZ, RUSSEL
DIAZ VALENTINO MACASAET, SALVADOR DELFINO, MAXIMO
ESGUERRA, JR., JUNELITA PACIO, ERNESTO TUZON, VIOLA MARIANO,
LUTGARDA SEBASTIAN, MARCO PEREZ, ISABELO MACABUGAO,
FRANCISCO FABRO, ERLINDA CLAVO, DOMINGO JOCSON, ENECITAS
TABORADA, LUISA TUASON, ROSALIO BAZ, JR., LUZVIMINDA SALDUA,
TEODORA OAMINAL, LEONOR BRINGAS, DAISY LADRA, MERCEDES
SANGREO, ZENAIDA MUNON, ANTONIO AMURAO, PERCIVAL ECITO,
SYLVIA MON, LOURDES MANGASI, BENIGNO MAGNO, ZOILO AQUINO,
ROSARIE ARREZA, PILAR FONTELAR, FLOR ABELLA, MERCEDITA
BANTAYA, PACIENCIA FIGUEROA, HILDA BALLO, MAURICIO BALLO,
RODOLFO C. PINTO, CESAR GUERRERO, VIRGINIA DE LOS SANTOS,
ALICE CORDERO, MYRNA ABILAR, ROSA BASSIG, ADORACION
OBINQUE, AMELITA MAGBAGO, MACARIA ANDRADE, CONSUELO
BALTAZAR, ELIZABETH VIANA, ROSARIO RAGAZA, JOSEFINO
MONDRAGON, CONRADO GANIR, FILIPINA GOJAR, EMILIA
BARRAMEDA, CIRILA LEYVA, FREDA ROXAS, CORAZON DE LA CRUZ,
ROSITA CALVELO, ROSARIO LIZARDO, CRISTINA NUQUI, FELICISIMA
MAXINO, JACINTO ARUCAN, JR., LORETA DE GUZMAN, LEONORA DE
LEON, LYDIA AGUILING, DALISAY MONEDA, LOURDES LIZA, PAZ
LADERAS, EFREN LUNA, EVELYN CABUS, ESTER CONCEPCION, ARIEL
BAUTISTA, FRANCIA AMAQUI, FRANCISCA BIANES, PAZ LUCERO,
ERLINDA ESPINOSA, TERESITA CATACUTAN, REGINO OGSIMER,
ESTRELLA ORENSE, MARYLOU VILLAREAL, ALMA DICKSON,
NATIVIDAD RAZO, ALICIA SUALOG, ERLINDA ARALAR, REDENTOR
GATUS, FORTUNATO CABEZAS, CECILIA REYES, AURORA REYES,
BARTOLOME, SANTIAGO, JESUS DELA TORRE, CONSOLACION
SEVILLA, HENRY LUGAYAN, ANGELES GALERA, REUBEN A.
GANADEN, JULITA ABULON, LINA SANTOS, GLORIA C. BERGADO,
ANSELMA S. LEGASPI, LEONORA RIVER, EDITHA MALOLOS, JESUS
SANCHEZ, ALBERTO MOLERO, DOMINGO TUAZON, JR., SOFIA S.
BASA, SUSANA EDIC, FELIPE ELEDA, ARMANDO LANDAYAN, RICARDO
MAR, JR., AUGUSTO SANTOS, ARSENIA AREVALO, ERLINDA ABUEVA,
VIRGILIO SANTOS, GAUDENCIO BADIOLA, JR., MODESTA ANGELES,
RENATO GUTIERREZ, LUCERNA ICAPIN, MARLENE CALANGIAN,
NEMENCIO AREVALO, NENITA DE GUZMAN, LOURDES PALO, MANUEL
CABRERA. BENJAMIN MAGAT, ERNESTO REYES, EUGENE
SANGALANG, ARMANDO ALCAZAR, JOSELITO MAGHIRANG, ROMEO
DIETA, ROFER ESQUIRRES, DONATO ALMARINEZ, MELITA CONSULTA,
RENATO VILLAFRANCA, LEONCIO ALVAREZ, MANUEL SOTOMAYOR,
LEOVELITO CATALLA, APOLINARIO GICOS, FLORIDA ARBOLEDA,
ROMEO PORNOBI, CANDIDO SOTOMAYOR, GREGORIO BARRION,
CARMELA EUBION, DANILO NAGPALA, ANGELITO VALDEZ,
LEONARDO SAN JUAN, CLAUDIO RESMA, CESAR GALERA. DANTE
AMURAO, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, EULENIA FERNANDO, BENEVERT
FERNANDO, AQUILINO RONQUILLO, MONA NARVAZ, VIVIAN NEBRES,
ALBERTO NUNEZ, MARINA DUMOL, ARCADIO ISON, NORMA BORJA,
REYMUNDO NEBRES, ALEX MOLE, NALDA TANADA, ARMANDO
VILLANUEVA, NIDA BALANE, ROSALIND SANTOS, NITA MITRA
MEDRANO, ELIZABETH BAUN, ALFREDO VILLATUYA, ROY GARCIA,
AVELINA BIERNES, RODOLFO ASIS, ARTEMIO GINES, AURITA
CASTILLO, HOMERTO RIOMALOS, ALICIA DELOS SANTOS, GRACE DE
VEYRA, SALUD R. GANADEN, LOLITA SUIZO, ERLINDA PICHAY, NELIA
TIEL, DORIS FRIAS, JOSIE SAN PEDRO, JOHNNY ICONAR, AURORA
ROCABO, ALICIA BORROMEO, RAMIR MASAYDA, JUANITA AMURAO,
BELINDA SAN DIEGO, SIMEONA REGIDOR, JOSEFINA GENESERA,
PATRICIA AQUINO, EDWYN ALESNA, HECTOR BAUN, DANILO LUCERO,
PURITA DELA PENA, FELIONOR ELESERIO, AUGUSTO HERNANDEZ,
LINA ZULUETA, PHOEBE LAQUINDANUM, ELMER ALBA, MYRNA
RAMOS, EFIPANIO ABAYA, LUZVIMINDA MATIGNAS, GUILLERMO
AQUINO, JR., RICARDO VERSOZA, NELSON FRANCISCO, EDUARDO
BUTAC, ADORADO CAINGLIT, ROLANDO SIKAT, THELMO MAGSUMBOL
ELOISA UZON, JUSTONATO PENIANO, PEDRO NATIVIDAD, DOMINGO
ASUNCION, NARCISO GARCIA, RESTITUTO SANCHEZ HELEN IBARRA,
ALFREDO DUCANTE, ARMANDO MARTINEZ, GLORIA PASCO, EMMA
MARFORI, RICARDO MENDOZA, ANTONIO MORALES, EDUARDO
TOLENTINO, TITO DELA CRUZ, REGINALD GONZALES, JOSE
PACLIBARE, JOSELITO SONGA, VIRGILIO LEOPANDO, LEVITA
ZAPANTA, FELIPA LOPEZ, ELPIDIO MENDOZA, EDMUNDO EDROSO,
DOMINGO CATALLA, VERGEL BIADO, DIEGO BUTAC, PROSPERO
PASTORAL, CESAR AMINES, REGINO OPORTO, JR., ARMANDO
LAGUIDAO, REYGALDINE RAMIREZ, SEVERINO ESCOBAR, JR.,
BERNABE GONZALES, MAXIMO GATDULA, ALEMAR SABATIN,
BONIFACIO GANDULLAS, MARCELINO TACADAO, SEVERINO
BARICANOSA, PACIFICO FRANCISCO, EDUARDO SALCEDO, RODOLFO
SINGH, FLORENCIO SERANILLO, ELPIDIO MACABALOS, FEDERICO
TRINIDAD, JOSE LACTAO, JULITA FADRIGUELA, PERFECTO
GUERRERO, JR., EDITHO DEMDAM, ROMEO B. DE SAGUN, VIOLETA
RAMOS, VIRGINIA LOPEZ, CARMENCITA TOCINO, SALVADOR
NIERRAS, MARILYN BERNALDO, CELIA BUSQUE, JOSE CALDERON,
AMADO ANONUEVO, LEODEGARIO CAWALING, CELSO IGANCIO,
MARCIAL CAGUICLA, CRISPIN DELA CRUZ, GIL FERRER, FARIDA
BATOLOS, MARGIE KILAKIL, EMMA BOROMEO, HERMINIO LEYVA
ROGELIO BERNABE, OSCAR BANDIOLA, MELCHOR TAYAMEN, RUBEN
REYES, ANGELITA SALGUET, JOEDOCIEL DANTING, ALMA MENDOZA,
RENATO MENDOZA, FRANK QUIMSON, EVELYN ZAFRA, MELITONA
PENADA, BENICIO SINGQUENCO, NICANOR CRISOSTOMO,
ROSEBELLA JUMARAN, ABNER BUENAVENTURA, ADELAIDA PALMA,
MARCELO VALDEZ, LILIBETH AFAN, JOSE NAVIDAD, JUANITO BACANI,
ROGELIO LONGALONG, GLICERIO SANTOS, AMOR SANTOS, FE DE
JESUS, JAIME DE JESUS, JOSE VICTORIO, ENRIQUE MARQUEZ,
EDMUNDO GADUANG, WESLEY ROSARIO, ROLANDO MIRANDA,
WILHELMINA NATIVIDAD, JOSE NATIVIDAD, GUILLERMO OQUENDO,
CLETO RAFER, JR., LEDA G. HANDOG, CORAZON MANUBAY, ELADIO
GONZALES, JOY DELA CRUZ, ADAN DIAMANTE, ELADIO VILLAMATER,
GLORIA MATIAS, VIRGINIA S. LUYUN, FIDELITO CALUPIG, RODOLFO
JEREMIAS, JOSEPH BANDALA, CONCEPCION JUICO, PRISCILLA
ANGELES, ALFREDO SANTOS, JR., PROCOPIO MACOLOR, AURELIA
RABARA, DANILO SINGQUENCO, HARRIETO CAMARINES, NAMNAMA
JAVELLOSA, AMELIA S. MAALA, RAFAEL RAMISCAL, FRANCISCO
TABORDA, CATALINO REYES, NELSON CALVELO, JOHN TABAY,
BENJAMIN PINEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, In His Capacity As Secretary Of The
Department Of Agriculture and HON. GUILLERMO R. MORALES, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Fisheries, and Aquatic Resources,
respondents.
G.R. No. 112056 September 11, 1998
JUVY CLAVEL P. GACULA, ANDY R. RIVERA, LORENZO T. SUBARIA,
LEO J. BERNAL, CYNTHIA L. DE VEAS, AVELINA L. DIOCES, FE Y.
FELICIANO, THELMA A. GECOLEA, RODOLFO R. PANGAN, MAURA
JASMIN A. REYES, PENNY MARIE G. TAN, TERESITA V. CHAN, NENA A.
INOCENCIO, PELAGIA O. ABAYA, FELIX P. BERNARDINO, MA. LUISA M.
CALDITO, EDGARDO F. DE JESUS, PARALUMAN T. DELA PAZ, RENATO
F. GILERA, LEOVIGILDO G. MALZAN, CLARITA O. OLANO, HERNAN Z.
PEREZ, MILAGROS S. PILAPIL, GAUDENCIO L. RAMOS, JR.,
ADORACION J. SANTIAGO, ANDREA O. TAMINA, TRINIDAD N.
TOLENTINO, CARMELITA F. ZAFRA, CARMELO P. ABADILLA, EMMA L.
LOGRONIO, CARMELITA B. AGPOON, ANTONIO G. ARIZALA, DOHME C.
ARPON, RENATO A. BACLAGAN, MANOLITO A. CUETO, REYNALDO G.
CUSTODIO, ROBLETO M. GULOY, OLIMPIO P. MARIBAO, JR., MANUEL
V. MIRANDA, JOSE RANADA, JR., JESUS R. REVIDAD, REX P. SEVILLA,
FEDERICO D. SORIANO, BENEDICTO L. STA. ANA, DANIEL S.
TOLENTINO, WILFREDO G. VILLANUEVA, GUILLERMO O. BALURAN,
JOSE G. BATTUNG, MANOLITO J. BERNAL, DELFIN R. BRAVO, PATRICK
V. CALDITO, DANILO L. CATIPUNAN, ANTONIO G. COSTOSA, ROLANDO
S. EBERO, BENITO W. GONZAGA, DIVINA S. LEANO, FREDDIE D.
LESTINO, RAUL A. LLAANZANA, JUANITO M. MANSANADEZ, IMELDA M.
MIRANDA, ROGELIO J. ORDONEZ, ESTEBAN M. PAREDES, ROMEO S.
CARDOSO, ROBERTO E. CASAYURAN, RAQUEL V. CATIPUNAN,
MARCIANO F. CRUZ, JULIEN C. DE TORRES, RAYMUNDO N. GABAY,
CRISANTA B. MALICDEM, GLENADO A. MIJARES, EDA R. NOCON,
ERNESTO Q. OBRIQUE, ROMEO D. SISNERO, ANGELITO C. TALAGON,
SOLEDAD S. CRUZ, JOSELITA G. ENCISO, JOSE CARMELO N. LEANO,
ROMEO S. SILORIO, EDGARDO L. VIBAR, LOURDES F. ELARDE,
ANGELINA E. RACHO, ROMILDA DE ASIS, GLYCIDAS P. INIGO,
CONCHITA M. LACEDA, AUREA M. LUCAS, JOSE ROLANDO J.
MANLULU, SERGIO R. MANRIQUE, ELVIRA G. NAZARET, JOSELINE P.
NIWANE, LYDIA J. RUIZ, ALFREDO M. TORRES, CESAR A. AQUINO,
MANUEL P. BALATINSAYO, MONETTE B. CADIANG, RODRIGO O.
ESTAMO, ADELAIDA Y. FERRER, EDNA L. LOGRONIO, LEONARDO B.
PONFERRADA, SUSANA M. SANTOS, CONCHITINA Y. SEVILLA,
LIBERTY Z. VALLESTERO, LERMA G. VILLANUEVA, ESPERANZA J.
MERCADO, MA. BESSIE P. DIAMANTE, ROSARIO G. MAYRINA,
MAXIMINA C. SABINORIO, YOLANDA G. ZALDUA, MA. VICTORIA B.
ANGELES, NOLASCO K. BALIBALOS, EDNA C. BAYUGA, MANUELITO C.
BONGABONG, GINA B. CRISOSTOMO, TERESITA N. CUNANAN,
FILIPINA G. DE MESA, LOIDA M. GARCIA, GODREY T. GOLLAYAN,
CYNTHIA B. LAGASCA, DIEMMA C. MUNDO, LEONOR S. PALMA, DELFIN
V. PILLE, PATRICIO G. REYES, JR., LOIDA M. VILLANUEVA, EVA G.
ZOSA, FELY C. ARANO, RUEL E. BADINAS, IMELDA F. BARRACA,
HELEN GRACE N. CRUZ, ERNESTO P. GIMAS, ALEX D. GUARDIAN,
BEHILDA L. HEZETA, JOCELYN D. NAGUIT, EDMUNDO A. NUEVO,
SOLOMON F. PAZ, LOURDES C. BALING, EMPERATRIZ N.
NEPOMUCENO, ROSAL C. GUARDIAN, REMEDIOS A. ANCHETA,
ROSEMARIE L. BOBIER, MA. ALICIA BONOAN, GEMMA V. BORJA.
ANELY BURGO, FINARDO G. CABILAO, ROSALIE F. DOBLES, EDNA E.
FRANCISCO, ANGELINA V. OPLEDA, MARITES K. RANESES, LIBERTY D.
RESTAN, ANNABEL ARRIETA, OSCAR B. BALAYAN, THELMA
BALAYAN, JESUSA A. CABILAO, ELISEO C. COPIAN, FERNANDO C.
DELA CRUZ, JESUS S. FAR, JOSE G. FUERTES, HANNIBAL A. GALANG,
RICARDO M. GALING II, ARNEL B. GARCIA, IRISH B. MANJARES,
MARITESS M. MARISTELA, SYLVIA S. RED, ARLENE M. REYES,
DELILAH H. SAMSON, FARAH D. SELGA, ERNESTINA Z. SOLLOSO,
HELEN URBANO, MARIVIC L. UY, OLIVIA A. UY, ROMEO S. ZAFRA,
CECILIA G. ALEMAN, JULIETA A. ALFEREZ, PERPETUA BALIBALOS,
MARILOU C. BANCUD, ARABECQUE T. BATILONG, PORFIRIO R.
BATUYONG, TONI BINALLA, AIDA E. BORINES, ELISIA D. CLAVANO,
ESTER R. EGAMINO, RAMIL R. EGAMINO, MARIAN L. LOFRANCO
FLORESA T. MARANAN, CYMBELINE S. MARTINEZ, LORELIE A. SUELO,
MARLYN B. AMIGO, LINA A. ARANETA, JOSEPHINE G. BANAAG,
ROWENA CABANERO, IRENE O. DE OCAMPO, LEAH C. EDADES,
FILOMENA LA CORTE, MILAGROS P. ORTICIO, MERLINDA C. SABIO,
ADANIA SAKALURAN, PRISCILA M. YBERA, DELIA G. CORPUZ, PILAR
B. MUSCAT, LIGAYA M. ORGANO, BARBARA LUZ R. PEREZ, NIMFA
MARIA C. VIDAR, CRISTINO G. BABIDA, NENITA G. CRUZ, MERLITA B.
CRUZADO, AMELITA O. DABBAN, EMMA C. DERICO, EMMANUEL M.
LASAC, ARACELI V. MALABANAN, MA. TERESA T. MONTALBO, LOLITA
R. NOBIO, GUILLERMO A. PINGOL, JR., JUDITH R. VILLEGAS,
CONSOLACION O. DELA CRUZ, ROSALINA J. DITAN, CARMEN I.
MONARES, DOMINGO O. JAVIER, JESUS B. REMEGIO, MARILOU S.
REMEGIO, ELSA L. MAGAT, RICARDO P. MASINSIN, SANDRA B.
PANAHON, MARIETTA T. FLOTILDES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, in her capacity as the Secretery of
the Dept. of Social Welfare and Development, respondent.
G.R. No. 119597 September 11, 1998
ASSOCIATION OF DEDICATED EMPLOYEES OF THE PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY (ADEPT), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.
PURISIMA, J.:
These are cases for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality and validity of Administrative Order Nos. 29 and 268 on
various grounds.
The facts in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are
undisputed, to wit:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government
departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year
1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"), otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19, 1993, then President
Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued Administrative Order No. 29
("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the
year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the
prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO
268"), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments,
offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity
Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1
hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of
the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days
after the issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of
the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
To prevent the respondents from making further deductions from their
salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before this Court to
seek relief.
In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a
common issue with the other consolidated cases. The petitioner,
Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority
("ADEPT"), is an association of employees of the Philippine Tourism
Authority ("PTA") who were granted productivity incentive bonus for
calendar year 1992 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971 ("RA 6971"),
otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject
bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground
that it was "prohibited under Administrative Order No. 29 dated January
19, 1993." 6 The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally
brought on appeal to the Commission an Audit (COA) which denied the
appeal in its Decision 7 of March 6, 1995, ratiocinating, thus:
. . . Firstly, the provisions of RA #6971 insofar as the coverage is
concerned refer to business enterprises including government
owned and/or controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions.
Sec. 1a of the Supplemental Rules
Implementing RA #6971 classified such
coverage as:
All business enterprises, with
or without existing duly
certified labor organizations,
including government owned
and/or controlled
corporations performing
proprietary functions which
are established solely for
business or profit and
accordingly excluding those
created, maintained or
acquired in pursuance of a
policy of the State enunciated
in the Constitution, or by law
and those whose officers and
employess are covered by the
Civil Service. (emphasis
supplied)
The PTrA is a GOCC created
in pursuance of a policy of
the State, Section 9 of
Presidential Decree No. 189
states that "To implement the
policies and program of the
Department (Dept. of
Tourism), there is hereby
created a Philippine Tourism
Authority, . . ." Likewise,
Section 21 of the same decree
provides that "All officials
and employees of the
Authority, . . ., shall be
subject to Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations, and the
coverage of the Wage and
Position Classification Office.
Furthermore, although
Supplemental Rules and
Regulations implementing
R.A. #6971 was issued only
on December 27, 1991, the
law itself is clear that it
pertains to private business
enterprises whose employees
are covered by the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as
mentioned in the following
provisions:
Sec. 5. Labor Management
Committee. . . . that at the
reguest of any party to the
negotiation, the National
Wages and Productivity
Commission of the
Department of Labor and
Employment shall provide the
necessary studies, . . . .
Sec. 8. Notification. — A
business enterprise which
adopts a productivity
incentive program shall
submit copies of the same to
the National Wages and
Productivity Commission and
to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for their information
and record.
Sec. 9. Disputes and
Grievances. — Whenever
disputes, grievances, or other
matters arise from the
interpretation or
implementation of the
productivity incentive
program, . . . may seek the
assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation
Board of the Department of
Labor and Employment for
such purpose. . . .
Therefore, considering the foregoing, the
PTrA is within the "exclusion" provision of
the Implementing Rules of RA #6971 and so,
it (PTrA) does not fall within its coverage as
being entitled to, the productivity incentive
bonus under RA #6971.
Secondly, Administrative Order No. 29
which is the basis for the grant of the
productivity incentive bonus/benefits for CY
 1992 also explessly provides "prohibiting
payments of similar benefits in future years
unless duly authorized by the President."
Thirdly, the disallowance of the Auditor,
PTrA has already been resolved when this
Commission circularized thru COA
Memorandum #92-758 dated April 3, 1992
the Supplemental to Rules implementing RA
6971 otherwise known as the "Productivity
Incentives Act of 1990." . . .
Lastly, considering the title of RA #6971, i.e.
"An Act to encourage productivity and
maintain industrial peace by providing
incentives to both labor and capital", and its
implementing rules and regulations
prepared by the Department of Labor and
Employment and the Department of Finance,
this Office concludes that said
law/regulation pertains to agencies in the
private sector whose employees are
covered by the Labor Code.
With the denial of its appeal, petitioner found its way here via the
petition in G.R. No. 119597, to seek relief from the aforesaid
decision of COA.
We will first resolve the issue on the applicability of RA 6971 to petitioner
ADEPT in G.R. No. 119597 before passing upon the constitutionality or
validity of Administrative Orders 29 and 268.
Sec. 3 of RA 6971, reads:
Sec. 3. Coverage. This Act shall apply to all
business enterprises with or without
existing and duly recognized or certified
labor organizations, including government-
owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions. It shall
cover all employees and workers including
casual, regular, supervisory and managerial
employees. (emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 10 8 of RA 6971, the Secretary of Labor and
Secretary of Finance issued Supplemental Rules to Implement the
said law, as follows:
Sec. 1. — Paragraph (a) Section 1, Rule II of
the Rules Implementing RA 6971, shall be
amended to read as follows:
Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:
(a) All business enterprises with or without
existing duly certified labor organizations,
including government-owned and controlled
corporations performing proprietary
functions which are established solely for
business or profit or gain and accordingly
excluding those created, maintained or
acquired in pursuance of a policy of the
state, enunciated in the Constitution or by
law, and those whose officers and
employees are covered by the Civil Service.
(emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner contends that the PTA is a government-owned and controlled
corporation performing proprietary function, and therefore the Secretary
of Labor and Employment and Secretary of Finance exceeded their
authority in issuing the aforestated Supplemental Rules Implementing
RA 6971.
Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform
governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the
purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose, is to obtain
special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is
proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the
advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general,
the function is governmental. 9 Powers classified as "proprietary" are
those intended for private advantage and benefit. 10
The PTA was established by Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended by order of priority
Presidential Decree No. 564 ("PD 564"). for
development of
Its general purposes 11 are: said areas; to
recommend to
1. To implement the policies the President
and programs of the the
Department of Tourism proclamation of
("Department"); a tourist zone;
and to define
and fix the
2. To develop tourist zones;
boundaries of
the zone;
3. To assist private
enterprises in undertaking
b. To formulate
tourism projects;
a development
plan for each
4. To operate and maintain zone;
tourist facilities;
c. To submit to
5. To assure rand availability the President
for private investors in hotels through the
and other tourist facilities; National
Economic and
6. To coordinate all tourism Development
project plans and operations. Athority for
review and
Its specific functions and powers 12 are: approval all
development
1. Planning and development plans before
of tourism projects the same are
enforced or
a. To assist the implemented;
Department
make a d. To submit to
comprehensive the President
survey of the an Annual
physical and Progress
natural tourism Report;
resources of
the Philippines; e. To assist the
to establish the Department to
 determine the having tourism
additional potential and
capacity earmarked in
requirements the Tourism
for various Priorities Plans
tourist facilities for intensive
and services; development
to prepare a into a tourist
ten-year zone or as a
Tourism part thereof,
Priorities Plan; subject to the
to update approval of the
annually the President.
ten year
Tourism b. To acquire
Priorities Plan. by purchase,
by negotiation
f. To gather, or by
collate and condemnation
analyze proceedings
statistical data any private
and other land within and
pertinent without the
information for tourist zones
the effective for any of the
implementation following
of PD 564. reasons: (a)
consolidation
2. Acquisition and disposition of lands for
of lands and other assets for tourist zone
tourist zone purposes development
purposes, (b)
a. To acquire prevention of
possession land
and ownership speculation in
of all lands areas declared
transferred to it as tourist
from other zones, (c)
government acquisition of
corporations right of way to
and institutions the zones, (d)
and any land protection of
water shed
areas and undertake
natural assets condominium
with tourism projects
value, and (e) thereon, and
for any other sell subdivision
purpose lots or
expressly condominium
authorized units to private
under PD 564. persons for
investment
c. For the purposes.
purpose of
providing land e. To take over
acquisition or transfer to a
assistance to registered
registered tourism
tourism enterprise in
enterprises, to accordance
sell, subdivide, with law any
resell, lease, lease on
sublease, rent foreshore areas
out, or within a tourist
otherwise, to zone or
said registered adjacent
tourism thereto, in
enterprises cases said
under areas are not
sufficiently soft being utilized
terms for use in accordance
specifically in with the PTA's
the approved zone
development of development
hotels, plan and
recreational wherein the
facilities, and lessee
other tourist concerned
services. does not agree
to conform
d. To develop accordingly.
and/or
subdivide any f. To arrange
land in its for the
name or reclamation of
 any land straighten,
adjacent to or obstruct or
adjoining a increase the
tourist zone in flow of water in
coordination streams.
with
appropriate 4. Zone adminstration and
government control
agencies.
a. To formulate
3. Infrastructure development and implement
for tourist zone purposes zoning
regulations.
a. To contract,
supervise and b. To determine
pay for and regulate
infrastructure the enterprises
works and civil to be
works within a established
tourist zone within a tourist
owned and zone.
operated by the
PTA. c. To ensure,
through the
b. To proper
coordinate with authorities
appropriate concerned, the
government ecological
agencies the preservation,
development of maintenance
infrastructure and/or
requirements rehabilitation of
supporting a the common
tourist zone. and the public
areas within a
c. To take water tourist zone
from any public and the
stream, river, environment
creek, lake, thereof.
spring, or
waterfall and to d. To identify
alter, and
 recommend to projects as it
the President may deem to
the be vital for
preservation recreation and
and/or rest but not
restoration of sufficiently
national attractive
monuments or economically
preserves; to for private
arrange for the investment.
preservation
and/or b. To construct
restoration of hotel buildings
the same with and other
appropriate tourist facilities
government within a tourist
agencies or zone and in
with the private turn lease such
sector or with facilities to
the owners registered
themselves of tourism
said tourist enterprises for
attractions; and operation,
to identify and management
recommend to and
the appropriate maintenance.
authorities
concerned the c. To organize,
declaration of finance, invest
tourist areas in, manage and
and attractions operate wholly-
as national owned
monuments subsidiary
and preserves. corporations.

5. Project and investment 6. Direct assistance to

promotions registered enterprises

a. To identify, a. To
develop, invest administer the
in, own, tax and other
manage and incentives
operate such
granted to f. To extend
registered technical,
enterprises. management
and financial
b. To evaluate, assistance to
approve and tourism
register or projects.
reject any and
all tourism g. To identify,
projects or contact and
enterprises assist in
established negotiations of
within the suitable
tourist zones. partners for
both local and
c. To grant foreign
medium and investors
long-term loans interested in
and/or re-lend investment or
any funds participation in
borrowed for the tourism
the purpose to industry.
duly qualified
registered h. To assist
tourism registered
enterprises. enterprises and
prospective
d. To guarantee investors to
local and have their
foreign papers
borrowings of processed with
registered dispatch by
enterprises. government
offices.
e. To provide
equity 7. Other powers and
investments in functions
the form of
cash and/or a. To engage or
land. retain the
services of
financial,
management, h. To purchase,
legal, technical, hold, and
and/or project alienate shares
consultants of stock or
from the bonds of any
private or corporation.
government
sector. i. To collect
fees or charges
b. To have the as may be
power to imposed under
succeed by its PD 564.
corparate
name. j. To contract
indebtedness
c. To adopt, and issue
alter, and use a bonds.
corporate seal.
k. To fix and
d. To sue and collect rentals
be sued under for the lease,
its corporate use or
name. occupancy of
lands,
e. To enter into buildings, or
any contracts other property
of any kind and owned or
description. administered
by PTA.
f. To own or
possess l. To do any
personal and/or and all acts and
real property. things
necessary to
g. To make, carry out the
adopt and purposes for
enforce rules which the PTA
and regulations is created.
to execute its
powers, duties Categorited in light of the foregoing provisions of law in point, PTA's
and functions. governmental functions include the first, third, fourth, and sixth of the
aforesaid general purposes. The second 13 and fifth general purposes
fall under its proprietary functions.
With respect to PTA's specific functions and powers, the first and fourth
are governmental in nature while the specific functions and powers are
proprietary in character. The second, third, sixth, and seventh specific
functions and powers can be considered partly-governmental and partly-
proprietary, considering that 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 3(a), 6(c), 6(d), 6(e),
7(h), 7(j), and 7(k) are proprietary functions while 2(f), 3(b), 3(c), 6(a), 6(b),
6(f), 6(g), 6(h), 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 7(f), 7(g), and 7(l) are governmental
functions. The specific functions and powers treated in 7(e) and 7(i) may
be classified either as propietary or governmental, depending on the
circumstances under which they are exercised or performed.
The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly
governmental, principally geared towards the development and
promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it is
irrefutable that PTA.also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by
its charter.
Reliance on the above analysis of the functions and powers of PTA does
not suffice for the determination of whether or not it is within the
coverage of RA 6971. For us to resolve the issues raised here solely on
the basis of the classification of PTA's powers and functions may lead to
the rendition of judgment repugnant to the legislative intent and to
established doctrines, as well, such as on the prohibition against
government workers to strike. 14 Under RA 6971, the workers have the
right to strike.
To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to
find out the legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of RA 6971
and other pertinent laws, that may aid the Court in ruling on the right or
officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses under RA 8971.
Petitioner cites an entry in the journal of the House of Representatives to
buttress its submission that PTA is within the coverage of RA 6971, to
wit:
Chairman Veloso: The intent of including
government-owned and controlled
corporations within the coverage of the Act
is the recognition of the principle that when
government goes into business, it (divests)
itself of its immunity from suit and goes
down to the level of ordinary private
enterprises and subjects itself to the
ordinary laws of the land just like ordinary
private enterprises. Now, when people work
therefore in government-owned or
controlled corporations, it is as if they are
also, just like in the private sector, entitled
to all the benefits of all laws that apply to
workers in the private sector. In my view,
even including the right to organize,
bargain. . . . VELOSO (Bicameral Conference
Committee on Labor and Employment, pp.
15-16)
After a careful study, the Court is of the view, and go holds, that contrary
to petitioner's interpretation, the government-owned and controlled
corporations Mr. Chairman Veloso had in mind were government-owned
and controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation
law. This is so because only workers in private corporations and
government-owned and controlled corporations, incorporated under the
general corporation law, have the right to bargain (collectively). Those in
government corporations with special charter, which are subject to Civil
Service Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively), except where the
terms and conditions of employment are not fixed by law 15. Their rights
and duties are not comparable with those in the private sector.
Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same
weapons employed by workers in the
private sector to secure concessions from
their employers. The principle behind labor
unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through
compulsion by law. Relations between
private employers and their employees rest
on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to
the minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation, the
terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through
 the process of collective bargaining. In
government employment however, it is the
legisleture and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads
of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements.
(Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister
of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1)
(emphasis ours)
Government corporations may be created by special charters or by
incorporation under the general corporation law. Those created by
special charters are governed by the Civil Service Law while those
incorporated under the general corporation law are governed by the
Labor Code. 16
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and controlled
corporations performing proprietary functions under the coverage of RA
6971 is gleanable from the other provisions of the law. For instance,
section 2 17 of said law envisions "industrial peace and harmony" and
"to provide corresponding incentives to both labor and capital;" section
4 18 refers to "representatives of labor and management," section
5 19 mentions of "collective bargaining agent(s) of the bargaining
unit(s);" section 6 20 relates to "existing collective bargaining
agreements," and "labor and management;" section 7 21 speaks of
"strike or lockout;" and section 9 22 purports to "seek the assistance of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of
Labor and Employment" and "include the name(s) of the voluntary
arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrator." All the aforecited provisions
of law apply only to private corporations and government-owned and
controlled corporations organized under the general corporation law.
Only they have collective bargaining agents, collective bargaining units,
collective bargaining agreements, and the right to strike or lockout.
To repeat, employees of government corporations created by special
charters have neither the right to strike nor the right to bargain
collectively, as defined in the Labor Code. The case of Social Security
System Employees Associalion indicates the following remedy of
government workers not allowed to strike or bargain collectively, to wit:
Government employees may, therefore,
through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress the betterment of the
terms and conditions of employment which
are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those
which are not fixed by law. If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council for appropriate action.
But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the
Government to accede to their demands,
(supra, footnote 14, p. 698; emphasis ours)
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 23 The
provisions of RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to
include only government-owned and controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions within its coverage.
Every statute must be construed harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 24 We note Section 1, Rule X of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, which reads:
Sec. 1. — Each department or agency of
government, whether national or local,
including bureaus and agencies, state
colleges and universities, and government
owned and controlled corporations with
original charters, shall establish its own
Department or Agency Employee
Suggestions and Incentives Award System
in accordance with these Rules and shall
submit the same to the Commission for
approval. (emphasis ours)
 It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and III. THE FORCED REFUND OF
controlled corporation with original charter subject to Civil INCENTIVE PAY IS AN
Service Law, Rules and Regulations, 25 is already within the UNCONSTITUTIONAL
scope of an incentives award systern under Section 1, Rule X of IMPAIRMENT OF A
the Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil CONTRACTUAL
Service Commission ("Commission"). Since government-owned OBLIGAITION.
and controlled corporations with original charters do have an
incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would IV. ASSUMING, FOR THE
address the same concern of officials and employees of SAKE OF ARGUMENT ONLY,
government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated THAT THE GRANT OF
under the general corporation law. PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVE
BENEFITS WAS INVALID,
All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no THE SAME SHOULD BE THE
reversible error in the finding by respondent Commission that PTA is not PERSONAL LIABILITY OF
within the purview of RA 6971. As regards the promulgation of OFFICIALS DIRECTLY
implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the "power of RESPONSIBLE THEREFOR IN
administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the ACCORDANCE WITH
statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative SECTION 9 OF AO 268.
enactment." 26 In the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules
Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment Issued by the then President Corazon Aquino ("President Aquino") on
and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions July 25, 1987 in the exercise ol her legislative powers under the 1987
of RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies Constitution, 27 EO 292, or the Administrative Code or 1987, provided for
to the petitioner. the following incentive award system:

We now tackle the common issue posited by the consolidated petitions Sec. 31. Career and Personnel Development
on the constitutionality of AO 29 and AO 268. Plans. — Each department or agency shall
prepare a career and personnel
Petitioners contend and argue, that: development plan which shall be integrated
into a national plan by the Commission.
I. AO 29 AND AO 268 ARE Such career and personnel development
VIOLATIVE OF THE plans which shall include provisions on
PROVISIONS OF EO 292 AND, merit promotions, performance evaluation,
HENCE, NULL AND VOID. in-service training, including overseas and
local schorlarship and training grants, job
II. AO 29 AND AO 268 rotation, suggestions and incentive award
UNLAWFULLY USURP THE systems, and such other provisions for
CONSTITUTIONAL employees' health, welfare, counseling,
AUTHORITY GRANTED recreation and similar services.
SOLELY TO THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION. Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and
Incentive Award Syatem. — There shall be
established a government-wide employee
 suggestions and incentive awards system
which shall be administered under such
rules, regulations, and standards as maybe
promulgated by the Commssion.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and
standards promulgated by the Commission,
the President or the head of each
department or agency is authorized to incur
whatever necessary expensesd involved in
the honorary recognition of subordinate
officers and employees of the government
who by their suggestions, inventions,
superior accomplishment, and other
personal efforts contribute to the efficiency,
economy, or other improvement of
government operations, or who perform
such other extraordinary acts or services in
the public interest in connection with, or in
relations to, their official employment.
Sec. 36. Personnel Relations. — (1) It shall
be the concern of the Commission to
provide leadership and assistance in
developing employee relations programs in
the department or agencies.
(2) Every Secretary or head of agency shall
take all proper steps toward the creation of
an atmosphere conducive to good
supervisor-employee relations and the
improvement of employee morale.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 12(2), 28 Chapter 3, Book V
or EO 292, the commission adopted and prescribed the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 which, among others,
provide:
Sec. 1. — Each department or agency of
government, whether national or local,
including bureaus and agencies, state
colleges and universities, and government
owned and controlled corporations with
original charters, shall establish its own
Department or Agency Employee
Suggestions and Incentives Award System
in accordance with these Rules and shall
submit the same to the Commission for
approval.
Sec. 2. — The System is designed to
encourage creativity, innovativeness,
efficiency, integrity and productivity in the
public service by recognizing and rewarding
officials and employees, individually or in
groups, for their suggestions, inventions,
superior accomplishments, and other
personal efforts which contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement
in government operations, or for other
extraordinary acts of services in the public
interest.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. — The incentive awards shall consist
of, though not limited to, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Productivity Incentive which shall be
given to an employee or group of employees
who has exceeded their targets or has
incurred incremental improvement over
existing targets.
On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO 268 which granted
"each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive
benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of his
one (1) month basic salary but in no case shall such amount be less than
two thousand pesos (P2,000.00)," 29 for those who have rendered at
least one year of service as of December 31, 1991. 30 Said AO carried the
prohibition, provided in Section 7 thereof, which reads:
 Sec. 7. The productivity incentive benefits
herein authorized shall be granted only for
Calendar Year 1991. Accordingly, all heads
of agencies, including the governing boards
of government-owned or -controlled
corporations and financial institutions, are
hereby strictly prohibited from
authorizing/granting productivity incentive
benefits or other allowances of similar
nature for Calendar Year 1992 and future
years pending the result of a comprehensive
study being undertaken by the Office of the
President in coordination with the Civil
Service Commission and the Department of
Budget and Management on the matter.
The formulation of the necessary
implementing guidelines for Executive
Order No. 486 dated 8 November 1991
establishing a performance-based incentive
system for government-owned or
-controlled corporations shall likewise be
included in the comprehensive study
referred to in the preceding paragraph.
On January 19, 1993, President Ramos issued AO 29 which granted
productivity incentive benefits to government employees in the
maximum amount of P1,000.00 31 for the calendar year 1992 but
reiterated the proscription under Section 7 of AO 268, thus:
Sec. 2. The prohibition prescribed under
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268 is
hereby reiterated. Accordingly, all heads of
government offices/agencies, including
government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, as well as their respective
governing boards are hereby enjoined and
prohibited from authorizing/granting
Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and
all similar forms of allowances/benefits
without prior approval and authorization via
Administrative Order by the Office of the
President. Henceforth, anyone found
violating any of the mandates in this Order,
including all officials/employees and the
COA Auditor-in-Charge of such government
office/agency found to have taken part
thereof, shall be accordingly and severely
dealt with in accordance with the applicable
provisions of existing penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative
authorizations to grant any form of
allowances/benefits and all forms of
additional compensation usually paid
outside of the prescribed basic salary under
R.A. No. 6758, the Salary Standardization
Law, that are inconsistent with the legislated
policy on the matter or are not covered by
any legislative action are hereby revoked.
The implementation of Executive Order No.
486 dated November 8, 1991, as amended by
Executive Order No. 518 dated May 29, 1992,
is hereby deferred until a more
comprehensive and equitable scheme for
the grant of the benefits that can be applied
government-wide is formulated by the
Department of Budget and Management.
Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292 and since the
latter is a law, it prevails over executive issuances. Petitioners likewise
assert that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach upon the constitutional authority
of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures to strengthen the
merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules, regulations and
standards governing the incentive awards system of the civil service.
The Court is not impressed with petitioners' submission. AO 29 and AO
268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive departments.
In establishing a Civil Service Commission, the 1987 Constitution
delineated its function, as follows:
 The Civil Service Commission, as the
central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service
and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service. It shall strengthen the merit and
rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all
levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual
report on its personnel programs. (Section
3, Article IX, B, 1987 Constitution)
The Commission handles personnel matters of the government.
As the central personnel agency of the Government, it is tasked to
formulate and establish a system of incentives and rewards for
officials and employees in the public sector, alike.
The functions of the Commission have been decentralized to the
different departments, offices, and agencies of the government —
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — The State
shall insure and promote the Constitutional
mandate that appointment in the Civil
Service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness; that the Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the Government shall establish a
career service, adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, and courtesy in the civil
service, strengthen the merit and rewards
system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and
ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability;
that public office is a public trust and public
officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people; and that
personnel functions shall be decentralized,
delegating the corresponding authority to
the departments, offices and agencies
where such functions can be effectively
performed. (Section 1, Chapter I, Subtitle A,
Title I, EO 292) (emphasis ours)
Specifically, implementation of the Employee Suggestions and
Incentive Award System has been decentralized to the President
or to the head of each department of agency —
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and
Incentive Award System. — There shall be
established a government-wide employee
suggestions and incentive awards system
which shall be administered under such
rules, regulations, and standards as maybe
promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations, and
standards promulgated by the
Commission, the President or the head of
each department or agency is authorized to
incur whatever necessary expenses
involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishment, and
other personal efforts contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement
of government operations or who perform
such other extraordinary acts or services in
the public interest in connection with, or in
relation to, their official employment. (EO
292) (emphasis ours)
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and
authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power
includes the control executive departments —
The president shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and
 offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully execute. (Section 17, Article VII,
1987 Constitution)
Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." 32 It has
been held that "[t]he President can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate
in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can
exercise this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any
party." 33
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive
benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the
refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was just
exercising his power of control over executive departments. This is
decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268 and AO 29, to
wit:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 268
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the Productivity incentive
benefits granted by the different agencies
are of varying amounts, causing
dissension/demoralization on the part of
those who had received less and those who
have not yet received any such benefit,
thereby defeating the purpose for which the
same should be granted; and
WHEREAS, there exists the need to regulate
the grant of the productivity incentive
benefits or other similar allowances in
conformity with the policy on
standardization of compensation pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6758;
xxx xxx xxx
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 29
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS the faithful implementation of
statutes, including the Administrative Code
of 1987 and all laws governing all forms of
additional compensation and personnel
benefits is a Constitutional prerogative
vested in the President of the Philippines
under Section 17, Article VII of the, 1987
Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional prerogetive
includes the determination of the rates, the
timing and schedule of payment, and final
authority to commit limited resources of
government for the payment of personnel
incentives, cash awards, productivity
bonus, and other forms of additional
compensation and fringe benefits;
WHEREAS, some government agencies
have overlooked said Constitutional
prerogative and have unilaterally granted to
their respective officials and employees
incentive awards;
WHEREAS, the Offioe of the President
issued Administrative Order No. 268, dated
February 21, 1992, strictly prohibiting the
grant of Productivity Incentive Bonus or
other allowances of similar nature for
Calender Year 1992 and future years
pending the issuance of the requisite
authorization by the President;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding said prohibition
some government offices/agencies and
government-owned and/or controlled
corporations and financial institutions have
granted productivity incentive benefits in
 varying nomenclature and amounts without
the proper authorization/coordination with
the Office of the President;
WHEREAS, the unilateral and uncoordinated
grant of productivity incentive benefits gave
rise to discontentment, dissatisfaction and
demoralization among government
personnel who have received less or have
not received at all such benefits;
xxx xxx xxx
The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate
the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of
government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The
President was only exercising his power of control by modifying
the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to
their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of
the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
government resources. In the view of the President, respondents
did a mistake which had to be corrected. In so acting, the
President exercised a constitutionally-protected prerogative —
The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control
of all executive departments. Thus it is, that
department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint
them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss
them at pleasure. Naturally he controls and
directs their acts. Implicit then is his
authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries. In this context, it may not be
said that the President cannot rule on the
correctness of a decision of a department
secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v.
Paño, 21 SCRA 898)
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority
of the Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government
personnel. AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees
to receive incentive benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and
amount thereof.
Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of
government are basically executive functions, 34 not the Commission's.
Implicit is this recognition in EO 292, which states:
Sec. 35. Employee Suggestions and
Incentive Award System. — There shall be
established a government-wide employee
suggestions and incentive awards system
which shall be administered under such
rules, regulations, and standards as maybe
promulgated by the Commission.
In accordance with rules, regulations and
standards promulgeted by the
Commission, the President or the head of
each department or agency is authorized to
incur whatever necessary expenses
involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the
government who by their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishment, and
other personal efforts contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement
of government operations, or who perform
such other extraordinary acts or services in
the public interest in connection with, or in
relation to their official employment.
(Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Book V) (emphasis
ours)
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or
agency who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in
the honorary recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the
government." It is not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of
the incentives. Such function belongs to the President or his duly
empowered alter ego.
Anent petitioners' contention that the forcible refund of incentive
benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation,
suffice it to state that "[n]ot all contracts entered into by the government
will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made
between its sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of America v.
Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)." 35 The acts involved in this case are
governmental. Besides, the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor
General that the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which
is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and Office of the
Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not covered by the
amount fixed by the President. As explained in Bengzon vs. Drilon (208
SCRA 133):
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and
utilize their resources with the wisdom and
dispatch that their needs require. It
recognizes the power and authority to levy,
assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in
the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from
outside control. If the Supreme Court says it
needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we
need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even
informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory
platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the manner
the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated
for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the
express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of
the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the
Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so
far limited their objections to constant
reminders. We now agree with the
petitioners that this grant of autonomy
should cease to be a meaningless provision.
Untenable is petitioners' contention that the herein respondents be held
personally liable for the refund in question. Absent a showing of bad
faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damage
resulting from the performance of official duties. 36
Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the
discharge of official duties. 37 Absent any showing of bad faith or
malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties. 38
In upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court
reiterates the well-entrenched doctrine that "in interpreting statutes, that
which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred." 39
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we
cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year
1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed,
no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed
such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were
due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and

112056 are hereby DIMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further
deductions from the salaries and allowances of petitioners are hereby
ENJOINED.

In G.R. No. 119597, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on

Audit is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR — CAR,
Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued,
Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX
T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ
Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF
Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private
Respondent, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V.
Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No.
52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his
heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such
order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR
Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the
Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November
16, 1989, 1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official
documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least
93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a
vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and
another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified
receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private
respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in
the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline
he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private
respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules
and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August,
September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total
amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by
deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of
accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials' under
code 8-70-600 of accounting rules."
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued
with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two
previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post
as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department
of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice
Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating
a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order
appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee
chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor
Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation
within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and
recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing
Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992.
Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his
counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondent's
complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day
extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that
the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like
him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict
Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent
weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondent's execution of an
affidavit of desistance. 5
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45
liters. He submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted as it was
the aggregate consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name
and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR. He
added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the
course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman,
Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these
receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement, it was
not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether
they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that
the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that
official transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said
that he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on
their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was
almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who
readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop
issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline.
Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this
explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990. 6 With respect to the accusation
that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job,
Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error committed
in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal
error or accountability.
To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and
regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of
P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification 7 of DAR-CAR Administrative
Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances on record
as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued
contended that private respondent was not terminated from the service but
was merely relieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences. While
admitting that private respondent filed the required applications for leave of
absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated
disapproval of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her
second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same
immediately with the head office or upon her return to work. He also asserted
that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent
was corrupt and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash
accountabilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by
P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the amount on
January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination,
Lumiqued asserted that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned
to jobs that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10,
1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date,
he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the
services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued
nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional
hearing, 8 alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was
forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently because
the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7,
1992, 9 State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was
discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992,
the date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of
respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that
respondent advised the Investigating committee of his
confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either
by himself or thru counsel. The records likewise do not show
that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of
respondent's condition on any reasonable date after July 17,
1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992,
respondent was already being assisted by counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted
reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of
the counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence
annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the
case based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as
far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed
much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered
a report dated July 31, 1992, 10finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against
him. It made the following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by
the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by the
complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent
for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in
claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses
were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox
Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the
certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the
respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" show
that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is
about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00, in contrast
to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an
average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here,
the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of
claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of
what he actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline receipts
were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern
and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the
government has, nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted
by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had
been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of
108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4
vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also admitted having
signed the receipts.
Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a
considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts constitutes
not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal
offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official
Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have
(sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in
violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash
advances totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly
documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the
vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The
mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the
DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences
(sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that
the respondent's act in relieving the complainant of her
functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an
act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two
weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The
recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on
Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after
the respondent's order relieving the complainant was issued.
His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a
complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part
of the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no
help to the respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is
capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him
dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino
III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal
or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal
charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin
M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos
dated October 22, 1992. He added that the filing of the affidavit of
desistance 11 would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the matter
considering that what was at stake was not only "the violation of complainant's
(herein private respondent's) personal rights" but also "the competence and fitness
of the respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office." He opined that, in fact,
the evidence on record could call for "a punitive action against the respondent on
the initiative of the DAR."
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the
findings of the Committee" with the DOJ. 12 Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra
indorsed the motion to the investigating committee. 13 In a letter dated April 1,
1993, the three-member investigating committee informed Undersecretary
Esguerra that the committee "had no more authority to act on the same (motion for
reconsideration) considering that the matter has already been forwarded to the
Office of the President" and that their authority under Department Order No. 145
ceased when they transmitted their report to the
DOJ. 14 Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued
that the investigating committee could no longer act on his motion for
reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the
Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilon's
recommendation. 15
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative
Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from
the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers
and that the auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should be
the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in question
were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that
those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the
official business for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the
drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want
us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as
well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily
established.
In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that
A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with
all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations." This
petition was basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain
Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having
authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's
being an "honest man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight)
turned over to him were "altered." 18
Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No.
52, the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging,
among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel
during the hearing. 19 On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could be
resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing
denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal
of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the
October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52
issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a
nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits
accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the
backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his
death on May 19, 1994." 22
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued
of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to
counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the
presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended
the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a
counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which
cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in
a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to
have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however,
was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for
the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice
Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws, a Committee to conduct the formal
investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression,
dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously
undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional
Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera
Autonomous Region, is hereby created . . . 24
 As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not
part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced
when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the
filing of a criminal case for malversation through falsification of public
documents in its report and recommendation.
a newspaper of general circulation, 34 much later than the July 1992 hearings of
the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the
same committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding Lumiqued of his right to
counsel. Thus, at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of
his option to secure the services of counsel:

Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation 25 conducted RSP EXEVEA:

against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ
conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ This is an administrative case against Director
shall "administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of complainant is present, Janet Obar-Zamudio.
offenders and administration of the correctional system, 26 conducting criminal Complainant has just been furnished with a
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions copy of the counter-affidavit of the respondent.
as may be provided by law," 27 prosecutors may be called upon to conduct Do you have a counsel, Director?
administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative
DIR. LUMIQUED:
investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.

I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin
went to see him, he told me, Sir, that he has
to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in
already set a hearing, morning and afternoon
an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective
today.
of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent
himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. 28 In an administrative proceeding such as the one that RSP EXEVEA:
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the
services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article So, we will proceed with the hearing even
VII of Republic Act No. 2260 29 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and without your counsel? You are willing to
Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules proceed with the hearing even without your
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 30 (otherwise known as the counsel?
Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of
the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he was confident of his DIR. LUMIQUED:
capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures Yes, I am confident. . .
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service. CP BALAJADIA:

Furthermore, petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil You are confident that you will be able to
Service Commission on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of represent yourself?
Administrative Investigation stating that a respondent in an administrative
complaint must be "informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his DIR. LUMIQUED:
choice," 32 is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to
cases brought before the Civil Service Commission. 33 Secondly, said resolution, That is my concern. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in
In the course of private respondent's damaging testimony, the investigating
committee once again reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go
through with this even without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have been
warning you to proceed with the assistance of
counsel but you said that you can take care of
yourself so we have no other alternative but to
proceed. 36 (Emphasis supplied).
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are
waiting for the supplemental affidavit you are
going to present to us. Do you have any
request from the panel of investigators, Director
Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer
I requested to assist me and was the one who
prepared my counter-affidavit is already
engaged for a hearing and according to him he
is engaged for the whole month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why don't you engage the services of another
counsel. The charges against you are quite
serious. We are not saying you are guilty
already. We are just apprehensive that you will
go through this investigation without a counsel.
We would like you to be protected legally in the
course of this investigation. Why don't you get
the services of another counsel. There are
plenty here in Baguio . . .
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given
one month to finish the investigation, Director
Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or
without counsel, we will proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the
document which we asked for and Director
Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses, please
bring them but reduce their testimonies in
affidavit form so that we can expedite with the
proceedings. 37
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the
services of counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
 I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent
is not being represented by a counsel. The last
time he was asked to invite his lawyer in this
investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer
to represent him in this investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my
lawyer, he told me that he had set a case also
at 9:30 in the other court and he told me if there
is a possibility of having this case postponed
anytime next week, probably Wednesday so we
will have good time (sic) of presenting the
affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director?
May I throw this to the panel. The charges in
this case are quite serious and he should be
given a chance to the assistance of a
counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-
affidavit has been furnished him only now and
this has several documents attached to it so I
think we could grant him one last postponement
considering that he has already asked for an
extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by
my heart ailment. 38
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released
from the hospital. Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the
committee of his confinement. Consequently because the hearing could not
push through on said date, and Lumiqued had already submitted his counter-
affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This did not
mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch
of the government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los
Baños) with the degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a
recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent training seminars
both here and abroad. 39 Hence, he could have defended himself if need be,
without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the
thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement,
"That is my concern," one could detect that it had been uttered testily, if not
exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, "You
are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?" despite his having
positively asserted earlier, "Yes, I am confident." He was obviously convinced that
he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that he could
avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of his
ability to defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more. One can
lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, 40 the Court said:
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in
a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while
desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored
or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he
cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more
practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual hearing is not
always an indispensable aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have
been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process. 43 Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. 44 Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions
for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee. 45
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and
property. 46 In the early case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal 47 the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This
jurisprudential pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under
Article XI, Section 1, on accountability of public officers, as follows:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it
"cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service." The
instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the "payment of retirement benefits
and other benefits," plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued's dismissal
until his demise, must, therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure,

however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense;
hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the
right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing
mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve
with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 48 In this case, it has been
clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.

The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and
grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with
procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented
and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that
findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or
preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in
administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 50

Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's

recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with
arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government officials are
presumed to perform their functions with regularity. Strong evidence is not
necessary to rebut that presumption, 51 which petitioners have not successfully
disputed in the instant case.