Singapore–Hong Kong Symposium on

Chinese Philosophy

13(FRI)-14(SAT), March 2015

Convenors: Dr. Franklin Perkins and Dr. Chenyang Li
Philosophy Programme, School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

中國
哲學
 Singapore-Hong Kong Symposium on Chinese Philosophy
13-14 March 2015

13 March 2015 (Friday)

08:30 – 09:00 REGISTRATION, HSS Conference Room (HSS-05-57)
09:00 – 09:10 WELCOME / OPENING REMARKS
Alan K. L. CHAN
Professor; Dean of the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
Nanyang Technological University
09:10 – 10:30 KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Chairperson: Chenyang LI, Nanyang Technological University
09:10 – 10:30 The Self-Cancellation of Monism: Transformation, Forgetting, and Zhuangzi's Rhetorical
Two-Step
Brook ZIPORYN
University of Chicago
10:30 – 10:55 TEA BREAK
10:55 – 12:25 SESSION 1
Chairperson: Franklin PERKINS, Nanyang Technological University
10:55 – 11:40 Zhuangzi on "The Transformation of Things"
CHONG Kim-chong
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
11:40 – 12:25 Zhuangzi's Philosophy of Thing
KWOK Sai Hang
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
12:25 - 13:35 LUNCH
13:35 – 15:50 SESSION 2
Chairperson: Mary RILEY, National University of Singapore
13:35 – 14:20 The Death of Hundun: Satire and Sanity in the Zhuangzi
Hans-George MOELLER
University of Macau
14:20 – 15:05 Ruan Ji's "Da Zhuang Lun"─A Neo-Daoist Metaphysics of Oneness
David CHAI
Chinese University of Hong Kong
15:05 – 15:50
Zhuangzi’s Idea of Spirit and Nourishment of Life
Wai Wai CHIU
Lingnan University
15:50 – 16:15 TEA BREAK
16:15 – 18:30 SESSION 3
Chairperson: HUANG Yong, Chinese University of Hong Kong
16:15 – 17:00 Cultivating Feeling: Education and the Emotions in Classical and Intercultural
Confucianism
Eric S. NELSON
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology/Univ. of Massachusetts Lowell
17:00 – 17:45 Zhu Xi’s Criticism on the Methodology of Moral Cultivation of the Hu-Xiang School NG
NG Kai-chiu
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
17:45 – 18:30 The Way without Crossroads Revisited
Dan ROBINS
University of Hong Kong
18:30 END OF DAY ONE
18:30 – 19:00 TRANSFER TO DINNER VENUE
19:00 – 21:00 CONFERENCE DINNER (For Speakers, Chairpersons & Invited Guests)

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 Singapore-Hong Kong Symposium on Chinese Philosophy
13-14 March 2015
14 March 2015 (Saturday)
08:30 – 09:00 REGISTRATION, HSS Conference Room (HSS-05-57)
09:00 – 10:30 SESSION 4
Chairperson: CHONG Kim-Chong, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
09:00 - 09:45 A Third Type of Knowledge in Addition to Knowing-that and Knowing-how?
HUANG Yong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
09:45 – 10:30 The Contemporary Construction of Chinese Philosophy
GUO Yi
Seoul National University
10:30 – 10:55 TEA BREAK
10:55 – 12:25 SESSION 5
Chairperson: Els VAN DONGEN, Nanyang Technological University
10:55 – 11:40 Two Views of Confucius in the Shanghai Museum Manuscripts
Scott COOK
Yale-NUS
Reconstructing Mozi’s Jian’ai 兼愛
11:40 – 12:25
Youngsun BACK
City University of Hong Kong
12:25 – 13:35 LUNCH
13:35 – 15:05 SESSION 6
Chairperson: Dan ROBINS, University of Hong Kong
13:35 – 14:20 Logos and Dao Revisited: A Non-metaphysical Interpretation
Steven BURIK
Singapore Management University
14:20 – 15:05 Philosophy of Music in Early China: Debates and Consummation
So Jeong PARK
Nanyang Technological University
15:05 – 15:30 TEA BREAK
15:30 – 17:00 SESSION 7
Chairperson: LOY Hui chieh, National University of Singapore
15:30 – 16:15 Being Contented versus Satisfying Our Desires: Zhuangzi and Xunzi and Their Attitudes
towards Life
TING On Ki Angel
Hong Kong Baptist University
16:15 – 17:00 Xunzi vs. the Primitivists on Nature and Culture
Frank SAUNDERS Jr.
University of Hong Kong
17:00 – 17:15 CONCLUDING REMARKS
17:15 END OF CONFERENCE

For inquiries about the conference, please contact Franklin Perkins, the conference convenor,
at fperkins@ntu.edu.sg and also Kyuhoon Cho, the coordinator, at khcho@ntu.edu.sg

Program Committee: Franklin Perkins (committee chair) (Nanyang Technological University/DePaul

University), Yong Huang (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Loy Hui Chieh (National University
Singapore), Chenyang Li (Nanyang Technological University), Dan Robins (University of Hong Kong)

This conference is sponsored by the Center for Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, the Philosophy
Programme, and the HSS Global Asia Cluster of Nanyang Technological University

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 Singapore-Hong Kong Symposium on Chinese Philosophy
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

The Self-Cancellation of Monism:

Transformation, Forgetting, and Zhuangzi's Rhetorical Two-Step

Brook ZIPORYN
University of Chicago
ziporyn@uchicago.edu

The Zhuangzi as a whole seems to express such a wealth of contradictory ideas that many
modern scholars have found it advisable to divide it into the works of many separate authors
expressing very different, and perhaps incompatible, points of view. I share the view that the
33 chapters of the extant Zhuangzi clearly show the work of several hands, working at
different times and with identifiably different styles and agendas. But I think the Inner
Chapters show an intricate inner coherence both philosophically and stylistically, which is
crucial grasp before the more interesting of its ideas can be understood. In particular, I want
to point today to a specific technique we find repeatedly in the Inner Chapters, but nowhere
else in the anthology in any comparable density, easily missed because of the lack of
punctuation and other inflectional markers in ancient Chinese writing. I will call this the
rhetorical technique of “making and going beyond a provisional statement without rejecting
it.” The high density of prevalance of this trope in precisely these chapters and not
elsewhere is one good marker which I hope will suggest a deep inner connection in these
texts, and perhaps help to argue against the view that they are a haphazardly assembled
collection of unrelated statements. Further sealing the deal, in my view, is the fact that the
examples of the same rhetorical trope repeat again and again weaving variations of a
progression through the same handful of ideas. In various forms, they rehearse the relation
between an expansion of perspective toward an awareness of a perspective that
encompasses many smaller perspectives toward a sense of a causal whole, which then
proceeds to an eschewal of this view of a known totality into a form of non-knowing, rooted
in the very same premises. Again and again we will see a stairstepping from a refutation of a
view of the world as consisting of a set of real distinctions of value, constituted by genuinely
distinct entities with fixed identities, linked to limited perspectives and positioning in their
proper places, resulting in the positing of a monistic view of a single total entity of the world
that serves as the source of all production and the undifferentiated encompassing whole of
all existence, to a further view that rejects the possibility of assigning any identity to that
causal whole, or of even definitely knowing it to be a causal whole, yielding instead a self-
forgetting transformation of perspectives and agnosis—non-knowing as a form of gnosis
which does the same work that the previous monistic causal whole view did. The Inner
Chapters of the Zhuangzi show us a multi-dimensional variation on the these themes, not a
philosophical argument but a fugue of sturucturally parallel conceptual rhymes: from
separate identities, to global vision of oneness of whole and source, to abandonment of
knowledge and oneness in forgtetting and transformation. The transforming agnosis view,
however, is not a refutation and rejection of the monistic causal whole view, but a further
self-negating entailment of it, with an appeal to both of these views as ultimately mutually
entailing and perhaps, in the final analysis, synonymous. We might call it successive mutually
eliciting momentary monisms, or omnicentrism.
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Brook A. ZIPORYN is a scholar of ancient and medieval Chinese religion and philosophy,
expositor and translator of some of the most complex philosophical texts and concepts of the
Chinese religious traditions. Professor Ziporyn received his BA in East Asian Languages and
Civilizations from the University of Chicago, and his PhD from the University of Michigan.
Prior to joining the Divinity School faculty, he has taught Chinese philosophy and religion at
the University of Michigan (Department of East Asian Literature and Cultures), Northwestern
University (Department of Religion and Department of Philosophy), Harvard University
(Department of East Asian Literature and Civilization) and the National University of
Singapore (Department of Philosophy).

Ziporyn is the author of six published books: Evil And/Or/As the Good: Omnicentric Holism,
Intersubjectivity and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought (Harvard, 2000), The
Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (SUNY Press, 2003), Being and
Ambiguity: Philosophical Experiments With Tiantai Buddhism (Open Court, 2004); Zhuangzi:
The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Hackett, 2009); Ironies
of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese Thought; Prolegomena to the Study of
Li (SUNY Press, 2012); and Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese
Buddhist Thought and its Antecedents (SUNY Press, 2013). He is currently working on a cross-
cultural inquiry into the themes of death, time and perception, tentatively entitled Against
Being Here Now, as well as a book-length exposition of atheism as a form of religious and
mystical experience in the intellectual histories of Europe, India and China.

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Zhuangzi on "The Transformation of Things"

CHONG Kim-chong
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
hmckc@ust.hk

In the very first passage of the Zhuangzi, the immeasurably large fish Kun ”transforms” (hua
化) into a bird named Peng. Peng’s wings are like clouds that spread across the sky and it flies
toward the southern darkness which is the “lake of heaven.” Two related concepts in the text
are thus introduced, namely, transformation and sky/heaven ( tian 天). Together, they signal
the concept of wu hua (物化) or the ”transformation of things.” I shall discuss this concept
and its implications for Zhuangzi’s philosophy as a whole. As we shall see, the butterfly dream
which appears at the end of chapter 2 of the Zhuangzi is only one of several fables, stories
and dialogues which depict this concept of the transformation of things, and it will be better
understood if we read it under this concept. A comparison will be made with the Confucian
philosopher Xunzi’s analysis of “transformation” to deepen our understanding of Zhuangzi’s
concept.

CHONG Kim-chong earned his BA from the University of Singapore, and his PhD from the
University of London. He taught at the National University of Singapore before joining the
faculty of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

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Zhuangzi's Philosophy of Thing

KWOK Sai Hang

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
shkwok@ust.hk

“Qiwulun” 齊物論 is one of the most philosophical texts in the Zhuangzi where the concept of
thing is discussed in detail. Previous studies of this chapter have focused on Zhuangzi’s
strategy of“equalizing things”齊物 while the concept of thing itself is seldom investigated
independently. When “equalizing things” has become the main topic, scholars have focused
only on how the myriad things can be equalized in a spiritual state. In this regard, their
discussion already assumes that things are beings existing independently in the external world
and thus can later be equalized or unified subjectively. Therefore, in their view, Zhuangzi only
proposed a specific perspective of how things can be perceived, namely, that of oneness.

However, is it true that Zhuangzi views oneness as a mere perspective? In this paper, we will
argue that Zhuangzi has in fact proposed a general theory of thing, or a philosophy of thing,
which reflects on how the concept of thing is commonly used. According to Zhuangzi’s
philosophy of thing, the concept of thing is just a linguistic construction which pragmatic
meaning is not only naming or referring; rather it is a linguistic action that transforms our
basic relationship with beings in the world. We find that Zhuangzi distinguishes two attitudes
of meeting beings in the world, namely weishi 為是 and yinshi 因是. In the yinshi attitude,
beings in the world are encountered in our using without intention (the use of uselessness). In
this state, they are functioning in a whole in our living background. However, by calling them
“things,” they are objectified by people from the living background and treated as beings that
embody facts and exist in the external world. This objective relation with beings in the world
is called weishi.

Base on this interpretation, I am going to argue that oneness is not a mere perspective or any
mystical spiritual states as some scholars claim; rather, oneness as the state of being of the
living background is just our primordial relationship with beings in the world. It is also the
condition for things being objectified. In this regard, what the “Qiwulun” conveys is not an
aesthetic perception of things against our natural attitude. Instead, it is a philosophical
reflection on how things are separated from oneness so that they are treated as things. In this
sense, I propose that there is a philosophy of thing in Zhuangzi’s thought.

KWOK Sai Hang is a research student of ph.D. in humanities in the Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology. He has earned his B.Sc. in mathematics and M.phil. in humanities in
the same institute in 2011 and 2013 respectively. His research interest includes Daoism,
Confucianism, phenomenology and comparative philosophy. Under the supervision of
Professor CHONG Kim Chong and Professor Eric Sean NELSON, he is conducting a research on
the phenomenology of life experience and the implication of the phenomenological
movement to ethics and philosophy of life.

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The Death of Hundun: Satire and Sanity in the Zhuangzi

Hans-George MOELLER
University of Macau
hmoeller@umac.mo

This paper discusses several interpretations of the parable of Hundun’s Death which
concludes the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi. The first part recapitulates readings of the tory
from mythological and “medicinal” as well as from metaphysical and moral perspectives. It is
argued that all these interpretations are equally justifiable because of the multi-
dimensionality of the text. The second part presents a reading of the story as a satirical
parody about three failed sages. It is argued that from this perspective, too, the story
addresses “medicinal” issues of sanity and insanity.

Hans-George MOELLER is full professor in the Philosophy and Religious Studies Program at
the University of Macau, Macau. He previously held positions at University College Cork,
Brock University, and Universität Bonn. His publication includes The Radical Luhmann (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), The Moral Fool. A Case for Amorality (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009), Daodejing (Laozi). A Complete Translation and Commentary
(Chicago: Open Court, 2007), Luhmann Explained. From Souls to Systems (Chicago: Open
Court, 2006), The Philosophy of the Daodejing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006),
Italian translation: La filosofia del Daodejing (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), Chinese Translation:
Daodejing de Zhexue (Beijing: Renmin, 2010), Daoism Explained. From the Dream of the
Butterfly to the Fishnet Allegory (Chicago, La Salle: Open Court, 2004), Laozi. Freiburg (Herder
Verlag, 2003), 8. In der Mitte des Kreises. Daoistisches Denken (Frankfurt/Main:
Suhrkamp/Insel, 2001; New Edition: Frankfurt/Main: Insel, 2010), Die philosophischste
Philosophie. Feng Youlans Neue Metaphysik. Mit einer Übersetzung der „Neuen Methodologie”
(The Most Philosophical Philosophy. Feng Youlan’s New Metaphysics) (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2000), Laotse. Tao-Te-King (Die Seidenmanuskripte von Mawangdui
(Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1995), and Die Bedeutung der Sprache in der frühen
chinesischen Philosophie (The Meaning of Language in Early Chinese Philosophy) (Aachen:
Shaker, 1994). Areas of his research interest are Chinese and comparative philosophy, social
systems theory, and ethics.

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Ruan Ji's "Da Zhuang Lun"─A Neo-Daoist Metaphysics of Oneness

David CHAI
Chinese University of Hong Kong
davidchai@cuhk.edu.hk

Ruan Ji’s “On Comprehending Zhuangzi” is an interesting work on two accounts: first, it was
written by a poet, not a philosopher; second, it attests to the worldview of Neo-Daoism in
which the sage, or in Ruan Ji’s case, the exemplary person, embodies the ideals of harmony
and spontaneity. Ruan Ji’s treatise is built around one principal task: to respond to his
interlocutor’s criticism of Zhuangzi for perverting the truth of the world by claiming that good
and bad fortune are without difference, life and death are equal, Heaven and earth are a
single body, and the myriad things of the world belong to one class. Ruan Ji is able to defend
Zhuangzi by employing the themes of harmony and spontaneity and by pointing out the flaws
of an over-reliance on rational thought and historical practices. Where he differs from
Zhuangzi is in his use of spontaneity as a supplement for Dao. He writes that “Heaven and
earth came into being spontaneously and the myriad things were born in heaven and earth,
thus there is nothing lying beyond spontaneity and so Heaven and earth derive their names
from it.” The task of this paper is thus to explore Ruan Ji’s understanding of unity through
spontaneity and to offer some possible explanations as to why he felt the need to modify the
Zhuangzi’s formulation so as to better convey the vision of Neo-Daoism.

David CHAI holds Masters (2005-2006) and Doctorate (2006-2012) degrees from the
University of Toronto where from 2010-2013 he served as a Sessional Lecturer for the
Department of Philosophy and the Department of East Asian Studies. Professor Chai’s
principal area of research is Chinese philosophy with a focus on Daoism, specifically Zhuangzi.
Secondary areas of research include Modern European philosophy, phenomenology,
hermeneutics, and comparative philosophy. Professor Chai endeavors to bring together the
philosophical traditions of East and West wherever possible and is currently doing so by way
of the doctrine of meontology—the study of nothingness.

In addition to general courses such as the History of Chinese Philosophy, Introduction to

Western Philosophy, and Introduction to Chinese Culture, Professor Chai has also taught
courses on Classical Daoism, Early Medieval Daoism, Medieval Chinese Philosophy,
Personhood in Ancient China, and reader courses on Laozi and Zhuangzi. In addition to
offering these at CUHK, future courses will be devoted to the subjects of cosmology,
temporality, technology, music, and nihilism.

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Zhuangzi’s Idea of Spirit and Nourishment of Life

Wai Wai CHIU

Lingnan University
waiwaichiu@ln.edu.hk

It is well known that, in the Zhuangzi, problems of understanding and practice arise from
taking one’s completed heart-mind (cheng xin 成心) as the guidance. Questions remain about
what can be the guidance in one’s person if the completed heart-mind is not in charge. One
possible candidate is spirit (shen 神), as discussed in several skill passages such as the story of
Cook Ding and the cicada catcher. In this article, I articulate the relationship between heart-
mind and spirit to show three points: first, spirit is a kind of qi 氣 that relates to clarity in
thinking or action, or rather the state in which that qi runs smoothly. This reading brings the
skill passages together with the fasting of heart-mind (xin zhai 心齋) passage. Secondly, the
proceeding of spirit admits no fixed ways and is not confined to any particular organ or
faculty, so it avoids the problem of self-assertion mentioned in Qiwulun. Thirdly, the
proceeding of spirit implies that one’s practice takes as many particularities of the context as
possible into account, so the person has a higher chance to reduce conflict in interacting with
things and other people and bring out their potential. This is a reason why skillful activates
are related to Zhuangzi’s ideal of nourishing life, both physiologically and psychologically.

Wai Wai CHIU is Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department at Lingnan University. He

received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of New South Wales. Areas of
specialization are pre-Qin Daoism and Mohism. His recent publications include “Assessment
of li in the Mencius and the Mozi.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13(2): 199-214
(2014), “Ming in the Zhuangzi Neipian: Enlightened Engagement.” Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 40 (3-4): 527-543 (2013), “Jian ai and the Mohist attack of early Confucianism.”
Philosophy Compass 8 (5): 425-437 (2013), and “Challenges and Arguments.” Journal of
Chinese philosophy and Culture 8: 325-351 (2010).

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The Debate over Confucius in European Philosophy

Eric S. NELSON
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology/University of Massachusetts Lowell
Eric_Nelson@uml.edu

Modern Western philosophy has been largely indifferent if not hostile to non-Western forms
of thought, including Confucian philosophy. However, an exceptional group of Western
thinkers have argued that Eastern forms of thought such as Confucianism offer suggestive
models for Western philosophical reflection and practice. Since Malebranche’s critique of
“Spinozist Confucianism,” the exotic figure of Confucius has been entangled in European
debates about the intrinsic religiosity of morality or the possibility of a more secular and more
rationalistic ethics. On the one hand, Confucius has been condemned by a series of
philosophers from Malebranche through Hegel to Rosenzweig for inadequately formulating
the religious character of morality. Confucian ethics has also been depicted as inadequate to
the rational character of ethics by Kant and as being yet another variety of priestly morality
by Nietzsche, However, on the other hand, Confucius is defended as an Enlightening religious
philosopher in the writings of Leibniz and Wolff, who prioritized the ethical in interpreting
religion, and understood as prefiguring or indicating the possibility of a secular non-religious
ethics in works from Voltaire through Misch to Fingarette. I will consider the philosophical
issue of whether ethics must be religious or whether there can be a valid secular ethics by
exploring select historical examples of the role and interpretation of Confucianism in German
philosophy. I examine in particular how a diverse range of religious and secular German
thinkers intellectually engaged Chinese culture and thought by debating the religious and
ethical significance of Confucian philosophy in a modern European context.

Eric S. NELSON is Associate Professor of Department of Philosophy at University of

Massachusetts Lowell. He received his PhD in Philosophy from Emory University in 2002. His
areas of research and teaching are “History of Philosophy: 18th- to 20th-Century German
Philosophy”, “Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of Nature and Environment, Philosophy of
Religion”, and “Chinese, Buddhist, and Comparative/Intercultural Philosophy and Religion”.
His publications include Between Levinas and Heidegger (Albany: SUNY Press, 2014),
Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), Anthropologie und
Geschichte. Studien zu Wilhelm Dilthey aus Anlass seines 100. Todestages (Würzburg:
Königshausen & Neumann, 2013), Rethinking Facticity (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), Addressing
Levinas (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005), Special Topic Issue: “Mind and
Emotion (xin)” in Frontiers of Philosophy in China (2014), and supplemental Issue on
European and Chinese Philosophy in Journal of Chinese Philosophy (2012).

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Zhu Xi’s Criticism on the Methodology of Moral Cultivation of the Hu-Xiang
School

NG Kai-chiu
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
kcng@cuhk.edu.hk

In the 12th century of China, there was an interesting philosophical debate on the
methodology of moral cultivation, an essential topic of Neo-Confucianism, between Zhu Xi (朱
熹, 1130-1200) and the Hu-Xiang School (湖湘學派). This paper aims at clarifying, assessing
and developing Zhu Xi’s criticism on his opposites.

Based on Mengzi (孟子, 372-289 BC), the Hu-Xiang School states that human mind is originally
moral. This mind manifests itself in many occasions in our daily life, such as the famous
example in Mengzi, “when seeing a child on the verge of falling into a well, one would
certainly be moved to compassion.” According to this theory, moral cultivation is equal to
cultivating or extending this mind, and to bring about successful moral cultivation, the very
first and essential step is to “識” – know and grasp – this mind. We can call this Hu-Xiang’s
view of moral cultivation as “the theory of knowing and grasping the mind”.

Zhu Xi objects to it. In his view, just as an eye cannot see itself, “the mind is a knowing subject,
how can we treat it as an object to be known and grasped?” The Hu-Xiang’s “theory of
knowing and grasping the mind” is simply mistaken.

However, doesn’t Zhu Xi’s criticism violate our common belief that our mind can reflect on
itself? It is so obvious that we can know that we know. That means the mind’s function of
knowing can be reflexive – “knowing” can be applied to “knowing” itself. An eye cannot see
itself, but the mind can know itself. The analogical argument seems not to be working as well
as Zhu Xi originally intended.

I will argue that Zhu Xi’s criticism is much more sophisticated than the literal sense. What he
really wants to point out is that “knowing one’s mind” in Hu-Xiang’s sense involves in fact two
different functions of the mind but not only one. For example, in the case of “seeing a child on
the verge of falling into a well”, the reaction that “being moved to compassion” is something
emotional, whereas “knowing and grasping” this “heart of compassion” have something to do
with judgment – to see the emotion as something valuable to keep and extend. As emotion
and judgment involve different functions of the mind, the work of “knowing and grasping the
mind” is not similar to “knowing one knows”. Finding the theory of Hu-Xiang unsatisfactory in
explaining our moral experiences, Zhu Xi would like to provide us a far more accurate one.

NG Kai-chiu graduated from the Department of Philosophy of CUHK (with honor, first class) in
2001, then continued his graduate study in that department, and finally got his Ph.D. in 2009.
He taught as an instructor at the Chinese Civilisation Centre (CCIV) of City University of Hong
Kong (2008), and at the Department of Philosophy of CUHK (2009-2011). He is currently
Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy of CUHK (since 2011).

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The Way without Crossroads Revisited

Dan ROBINS
University of Hong Kong
dan.robins@gmail.com

Herbert Fingarette argued that for Confucius the Way is \a way without crossroads," that is,
that a moral agent never genuinely faces a choice between competing ways. This paper
mostly defends that claim, though with reference to the Mencius rather than the Analects.

Some reformulation is required. Fingarette's conception of what it would be for a way to

feature crossroads is (intentionally) bound up with thick concepts of choice and responsibility
that derive from western traditions. This makes it unlikely that any early Chinese philosopher
conceived of the way as having crossroads in his intended sense. Accordingly, I reformulate
the idea in what I hope are less tradition-bound terms.

This leads me to focus on three questions. How did the authors of the Mencius conceive of
the ostensible ways of their rivals? What did they have to say about hard cases in which
norms they endorsed conflict? And what role if any did they give to normative judgment in
the moral cultivation of an individual? (This need not be the normative judgment of the
individual concerned, it might be the judgment of a teacher or an ancient sage, for example.) I
argue that the answers to these questions imply that the authors of the Mencius conceived of
their way as a way without crossroads.

Most of my time will be spent on the third question, since that turns out to be trickiest. I
argue that the authors of the Mencius thought of moral cultivation in such a way that it made
sense to ask whether and to what extent an individual was cultivated, but not whether the
individual had been cultivated in the right way. This is so even on interpretations (such as my
own) that take the Mencius to be advancing relatively modest claims about human nature:
even if the spontaneous dispositions of our nature do not do all the work in explaining how
we can develop morally, the texts consistently ignore, disavow, or rule out the possibility that
our cultivation will be guided by normative judgment.

Dan ROBINS was born in Toronto and schooled in Montreal and Hong Kong. Before returning
to HKU in 2012, I taught at the Richard Stockton College of New Jersey for several years and
at the University of Michigan for one. My work focuses on Chinese philosophy of the pre-
imperial Warring States period. I also enjoy poking around in various corners of ethics,
metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and so on. For less philosophical fun, I cook and
fiddle with software. I have a reasonably complete list of publications on academia.edu.

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A Third Type of Knowledge in Addition to Knowing-that and Knowing-how?

HUANG Yong
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
yonghuang@cuhk.edu.hk

Gilbert Ryle made the famous distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how (Ryle 1946,
1968 and 1990). While the former is theoretical, the latter is practical. The point that Ryle
attempts to make in drawing this distinction is to highlight the latter, as it has not been paid
enough attention to. Having initiated a debate between intellectualism and practicalism in
the Western scholarship (see Fantl 2008 and Hetherington 2011), this distinction has also
attracted a significant amount of attention from scholars doing Chinese philosophy. As the
type of knowledge emphasized in Confucianism is clearly practical, it is now claimed to be
knowing-how in contrast to knowing-that (see, for example, Raphals 1992: 9; Wong 1989;
Kupperman 2005, and Tu 2002). In this paper, by focusing on Wang’s liangzhi, I argue that
what is unique to Confucian knowledge cannot be explained by either knowing-that or
knowing-how. Liangzhi is not merely the knowledge of what is good and what is evil but also
the knowledge that loves the good and hates the evil; this love for the good and hate for the
evil is not included in Ryle’s knowing-that or knowing-how. For example if I know that I ought
to love my parents and I know how to love them, both in Ryle’s senses, it is still possible that I
don’t love them. However, if I have the liangzhi about love for my parents in Wang’s sense, I
will not only (1) know that I ought to love my parents but (2) will also be inclined to love them,
which will inevitably lead me to seek (3) the most appropriate and efficient ways to love them.
While the first is clearly knowing-that and the third the knowing-how, I dub the second the
knowing-to, not in the exactly same sense as Steve Hetherington and his colleague Karyn Lai
use it (see Hetherington forthcoming, Hetherington and Lai 2012, and Lai 2012). In this
understanding, Wang’s liangzhi includes both knowing-that and knowing-to, while knowing-
how is what liangzhi will naturally lead to. (Here I revise my previous view that liangzhi also
includes knowing how, as liangzhi, both knowing-that and knowing-to, is what everyone is
born with, while knowing-how is clearly not.)

HUANG Yong, Ph.D in Philosophy (Fudan University) and Th.D in Religious Studies (Harvard
University), had taught at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania since 1996 before he moved to
the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2013. With interest in both philosophy and religious
studies and familiar with both Western and Chinese traditions, his research focus has been on
moral (both ethical and political) issues from an interdisciplinary and comparative perspective.

Dr. Huang is currently a co-chair of the Confucian Tradition Group of American Academy of
Religion. He was a Co-chair of the University Seminar on Neo-Confucian Studies at Columbia
University until he moved to CUHK. In the past, he also served as the President of Association
of Chinese Philosophers in American (1999-2001). During this tenure, among other things, he
inaugurated a book series, ACPA Series in Chinese and Comparative Philosophy, and a
journal, Dao: A Journal of Comparative philosophy. He has been the chief editor of the latter
since the very beginning.

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The Contemporary Construction of Chinese Philosophy

GUO Yi
Seoul National University
gy62@yahoo.com

The Chinese philosophy was integrated by six parts, namely the theory of benyuan 本原论,
the theory of human nature, the theory of human mind, theory of human life, ethics and
politics. Among them, the theory of benyuan and the theory of human nature belong to the
learning beyond physical form 形而上学, the theory of human life, ethics and politics belong
to the learning under physical form 形而下学, and the theory of human mind belongs to the
learning between the beyond and the under physical forms. The learning under physical
learning reflects the value of the philosophers, while the learning beyond physical form is the
supporting theoretical structure for their value, and as the learning between the beyond and
under physical forms, the theory of human mind is the connection of the above two.

In the history, the development of Chinese philosophy was manifested on the level of value,
as well as on the level of the supporting theoretical structure. If we can use “Dao” to express
the value, so that the former is “broadening the Dao”弘道, the latter is “proving the
Dao”证道.

The development of contemporary Chinese philosophy will continue to manifest on the two
levels. As the level of “broadening the Dao”, it will absorb the universal values from the West
and other civilizations based on the universal values from the Chinese civilization. The so-
called Chinese universal values include taihe 太和 of Zhouyi, ziran 自然 of Daoism, renyi 仁义
of Confucianism and cibei 慈悲 of Buddhism. As the level of “proving the Dao”, the
philosophers will provide the supporting theoretical structures for the world universal values
which was fused by the universal values from all the civilizations on the world.

GUO Yi is a professor at Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (since

2003); vice Chair of Academic Committee, International Confucian Association (since 2002);
guest Professor at China University of Political Science and Law (since 2007); vice president
and chair of Academic Committee, Nishan Confucius Birthplace Academy (since 2008).

He was a researcher at Institute of Confucius, Qufu Normal University (1984-1993). After

receiving his Ph.D. from Fudan University in Chinese philosophy (1993), he was appointed as
assistant professor (1993-1996), then as associate professor (1996-2003) at Institute of
Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Afterward, he was appointed as visiting
scholar at Harvard, USA (1999-2001); as guest professor at Seoul National University, Korea
(2002-2004); and as Fulbright Research Scholar at University of Wisconsin at Madison, USA
(2008-2009).

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Two Views of Confucius in the Shanghai Museum Manuscripts

Scott COOK
Yale-NUS
scott.cook@yale-nus.edu.sg

Recently excavated Warring States bamboo manuscripts, especially the grave-looted

manuscripts of Chu purchased by the Shanghai Museum, include a number of texts in which
we find Kong Zi 孔子, Confucius, portrayed in dialogue with important ministers and disciples,
each offering relatively sustained discourse on some aspect of ethical governance. This paper
examines two of those manuscripts, “Kong Zi Had Audience with Ji Huanzi” 孔子見季桓子
and “Ji Kangzi wen yu Kong Zi” 季康子問於孔子, and analyzes what they might have to tell us
about the philosophical debates of the 4th Century BC.

Scott COOK 顧史考 received his Ph.D. in Chinese from the Department of Asian Languages
and Cultures at the University of Michigan in 1995, and spent the next eighteen years
teaching at Grinnell College, where he served as Cowles-Kruidenier Chair of Chinese Studies.
Beginning last year, he has moved on to serve as Tan Chin Tuan Professor of Chinese Studies
at Yale-NUS College in Singapore. He specializes in pre-Qin textual studies and early Chinese
intellectual history. He is author of the books The Bamboo Texts of Guodian: a Study and
Complete Translation (Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 2012), Guodian Chujian xian-Qin rushu
hongweiguan 郭店楚簡先秦儒書宏微觀 (The Pre-Imperial Confucian Texts of Guodian:
Broad and Focused Perspectives) (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 2006), editor of Hiding the World in
the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), and the author of
over fifty articles in English and Chinese.

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Reconstructing Mozi’s Jian’ai 兼愛

Youngsun BACK
City University of Hong Kong
youngsunback@gmail.com

This paper examines Mozi’s 墨子 doctrine of Jian’ai (兼愛). The secondary literature on
Mozi’s jian’ai has been written primarily based on the Mengzian contrast between Mozi’s
jian’ai as “love without distinctions” and Ruist ren (仁 benevolence) as “love with distinctions.”
According to Mengzi’s simply appraisal of “love without distinctions,” Mozi’s jian’ai has been
interpreted as prescribing universal obligations, meaning that all beings have the same ethical
duties toward all other beings. However, in this paper, I argue that Mozi’s jian’ai is a complex
and multilayered system that promotes universal obligations and, at the same time,
incorporates particularistic obligations as well.

In the first section, by analyzing the three chapters of “Jian’ai,” I argue that there are three
different layers in Mozi’s doctrine of jian’ai: Impartial Care1, Impartial Care2, and Impartial
Care3. At the basic level, Impartial Care1 applies to each distinct relationship we encounter in
our lives. By practicing Impartial Care1, we give equal weight to the well-being of another
person and our own, and thereby we fulfill our various obligations toward others. At the
second level, Mozi required a more demanding form of Impartial Care2: in our dealings with
non-particular others (i.e., strangers), we should take care of them as we take care of
particular others (e.g., family). At the third level, Mozi demanded the most difficult and
extreme form of Impartial Care3 from rulers: rulers should take care of all people equally.

In the second section, based on this analysis of Mozi’s jian’ai, I investigate to what extend
Mengzi’s criticism of Mozi was accurate and to what extent his criticism misrepresented
Mozi’s doctrine of jian’ai. I argue that Impartial Care1 does not in any way in conflict with the
Ruist emphasis on particularistic obligations. It is Impartial Care2 that is something similar to
what Mengzi criticized. Nevertheless, I argue that Mozi’s Impartial Care2 is a more complex
and nuanced one. Furthermore, concerning Impartial Care3, I think Mengzi would not have
opposed it either because he would not deny the portrayals of various sage kings that Mozi
provided in order to defend the practicability of his doctrine. However, I argue that there is a
crucial difference between Mozi and Mengzi in their ways of perceiving the ideal rulership.

My conclusion is that neither Mozi nor Mengzi ignored the significance of universal
obligations as well as particularistic obligations. Rather, a major difference between them lies
in the way that they related these seemingly conflicting notions of universal and
particularistic obligations into their own systems: Mozi’s “from the whole (universal
obligations) to the parts (particularistic obligations)” vs. Mengzi’s “from the parts to the
whole.”

Youngsun BACK received her BA in journalism from Ewha Womans University, an MA in

Korean studies from Ewha Womans University, and an MA and PhD in East Asian Languages
and Literature from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Her research interests include
Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, especially comparative study of Zhu Xi and Dasan.
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Logos and Dao Revisited: A Non-metaphysical Interpretation

Steven BURIK
Singapore Management University
stevenburik@smu.edu.sg

The notion of logos has been a long-time favourite amongst comparative scholars looking for
a term to translate dao. It seems that enough scholars have looked into possible connections
between the term logos and the notion of dao. After all, there are, at least on the surface,
similarities between the two: both can mean ‘speaking’, ‘discourse’, ‘language’, and both
refer to patterns in the world. I will argue that in many instances, the approach of some of
the scholars who have compared logos and dao has been one-sided and has mostly consisted
in comparisons of these two key notions that have sought to portray both as denoting some
kind of metaphysical principle underlying the processes that make up our world. However,
when another perspective is employed, logos and dao might fruitfully be compared on a
different level than most of these comparisons do. I will first provide an alternative to this
metaphysical approach to logos, and consequently to dao, using Heidegger’s interpretations
of logos through his rereading of Heraclitus. Instead of the usual metaphysical approaches
there is a different way to compare the two notions that is non-metaphysical, in other words,
an interpretation where logos and dao are not seen as principles that stand above and govern
in some way the world as we know it. Second, I will engage with the language component
that accompanies both notions of logos and dao. In the traditional view, language is seen as
an incomplete vehicle to be discarded when ‘real’ understanding of higher principles takes
place. But both Heidegger and the Daoists are of the view that such a shortsighted idea of
language is mistaken, and they are extremely aware of the necessity of language, and in their
own way argue for an opening up of language to its own possibilities, rather than remaining
in its limited metaphysical field. Language is not denied, but a certain idea and use of
language, the metaphysical or propositional and representational use, is denied dominance
and superiority over other avenues. As such thinking about language also opens up new ways
to understand both logos and dao. I will show that such an interpretation as I will venture is
much closer to both Heidegger and Daoism, and that consequently, comparative philosophy
needs to be aware of imposing metaphysical claims on culturally different ways of thought.

Steven BURIK is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in School of Social Sciences at Singapore

Management University. He obtained his PhD in Comparative Philosophy from National
University of Singapore in 2006 and his MA in Philosophy from Erasmus University Rotterdam
in 1999. His research interests are continental philosophy and Chinese philosophy.

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Philosophy of Music in Early China: Debates and Consummation

So Jeong PARK
Nanyang Technological University
selfsopark@gmail.com

Music has been a hugely missed theme in the field of Chinese philosophy despite its
significance in early China. This paper shows musical discourses in early China as a colorful
landscape, in which different thinkers weave their own patterns and different voices ring. I
will explore the process of development in musical theory and practice throughout the
debates between the various schools over different stages of the Warring States period. A
uniformed description of Confucian ‘ritual and music’ is misled. I will examine the aesthetic
positions of the different camps which had once attacked Confucian idea and explain the
different responses from the Confucian camps as well. We will see that as a result of internal
and external contention, musical discourse of the early China came to take on its unique
character.

So Jeong PARK is currently lecturer of Philosophy/Chinese at Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore. She received her Ph.D in Chinese philosophy from Yonsei University
(Seoul, Korea) in 2002, with a dissertation on Zhuangzi’s philosophy of art. Her publications
include “Musical Thought in the Zhuangzi: A Criticism of the Confucian Discourse on Ritual
and Music” (Dao, Fall 2013), “Sound, Tone, and Music in Early China: Philosophical
Foundation for Chinese Sound Culture” (Inter-culturality and Philosophic Discourse,
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). She is currently writing a book entitled Landscape of
Sound: Aesthetic Philosophy in the Music Theory in Early China.

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Being Contented versus Satisfying Our Desires:

Zhuangzi and Xunzi and Their Attitudes towards Life

TING On Ki Angel
Hong Kong Baptist University
tingonki.angel@gmail.com

Tian in the book of Zhuangzi and the book of Xunzi is portrayed as nature, or the natural
world, rather than an anthropomorphic heaven that directs the behaviours of humans.
Although both Zhuangzi and Xunzi acknowledges the importance of knowing this tian, the
implication of this knowledge on their attitudes towards life is vastly different - while
Zhuangzi emphasizes being the companion of tian (與天為徒), Xunzi emphasizes the division
between natue and mankind (天人之分), and the establishment of a good government to
organize the society and manipulate the nature.

Zhuangzi sees tian as nature with constant transformation, where myriad things in the world
come into existence through the transformation of qi (氣). Humans, being one of the myriad
things in the natural world, cannot escape this transformation of qi and hence they must
confront this natural world. Zhuangzi recognizes that humans often encounter circumstances
that are "inevitable" (不得已), which he referred to as fate (命). Nevertheless, rather than
seeking to change the world to satisfy human needs, Zhuangzi stresses that we must be
content with this fate (知其不可奈何而安之若命), by changing our beliefs so it conforms to
the transformation of myriad things; his ideal is to become companion with tian.

Unlike the traditional view of anthropomorphic tian described in the Analacts and Mencius,
Xunzi affirms that tian refers to an impersonal nature. Neither will it reward the good nor
punish the bad. All the celestial movements are natural phenomena that occur without
specific reasons. Nevertheless, a constancy (常) can be found in this course of nature, and the
duty of humans is to understand this constancy and establish a good government (治) by
making good use of the resources provided by the earth (天有其時，地有其財，人有其治).
For Xunzi, it is essential to establish an order because he recognizes the fact that humans
have various desires that needs to be satisfied, and desires can only be satisfied by making
good use of the resources available. With the emphasis on desire, humans are seen to be
motivated by their desire to change to world.

Through analyzing their conception of tian and the importance of knowing tian (知天), this
paper aims to show the difference in the motivational structures of Zhuangzi and Xunzi.
Zhuangzi, emphasizing on being content with fate, does not attempt to change the world in
order to fit the human nature. Instead, he urges humans to change their heart-mind in order
to participate in the transformation and become part of the natural cycle. In this sense, he
emphasizes changing the belief to fit the world, which is a "mind to world" direction of fit,
and hence this explains why he condemns people who actively participate in changing the
world, such as Confucianism. Xunzi, on the contrary, emphasizes satisfying human desires,
aims to organize the world through establishing a good government, which is a "world to
mind" direction of fit. This also explains why Xunzi highlighted the concept of desires.

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Xunzi vs. the Primitivists on Nature and Culture

Frank SAUNDERS Jr.

University of Hong Kong
frank.saunders.jr@gmail.com

I focus here on a dispute between the philosopher Xunzi and the primitivist authors of
Zhuangzi Books 8-10 about the relationship between nature and culture. Unlike Mencius, the
primitivists and Xunzi are in agreement that traditional cultural norms like ren-yi as
understood by the Ru and the Mo are not a part of our natural constitution, our xing (nature)
and qing (constitution). Their disagreement is over whether we should adopt traditional
moral and cultural norms anyway. The primitivists claim that a society with simple norms and
institutions—far less elaborate and invasive than ren-yi—that enables people to live in
accordance with their xing and qing is best. They call this ideal the “age of de” (de zhi shi
德之世) where de refers to simple activities that arise out of natural desires, such as farming
for food and weaving clothing to keep warm. Xunzi denies the possibility of such a society in
both XZ 23.3 and 23.4, claiming that all cultural norms inevitably cause us to go beyond or
oppose our xing. Xunzi’s catch-all term for culturally or socially motivated (as opposed to
spontaneous xing-motivated) behaviors is wei, and he spends much of Book 23 elaborating
the distinction between xing and wei. I argue that the primitivists’ example of the state of de
either undermines this distinction, or severely weakens its ability to justify Xunzi’s ideal state
and its demanding values like ren-yi. If a minimal state in harmony with xing is possible, then
Xunzi’s distinction falls apart. If we retain Xunzi’s distinction, however, and grant that the
“state of de” involves the curbing or suppression of some of our xing by wei, then Xunzi needs
an explanation of why his ideal maximally invasive state is better than the primitivists’
minimally invasive one. Essentially, Xunzi must explain why xing must always and to the
utmost be opposed by wei. I conclude that his most promising strategy is to appeal to the
“badness” (e 惡) of xing, which he does, but that this approach has serious problems of its
own.

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List of Participants

Name Affiliation Position Email Address

City University of Hong
1 Youngsun BACK Postdoc Fellow youngsunback@gmail.com
Kong
Singapore Management
2 Steven BURIK Asst. Professor stevenburik@smu.edu.sg
University
Chinese University of Hong
3 David CHAI Asst. Professor davidchai@cuhk.edu.hk
Kong
Nanyang Technological
4 Alan K. L.CHAN Dean alanchan@ntu.edu.sg
University
5 Wai Wai CHIU Lingnan University Asst. Professor waiwaichiu@ln.edu.hk
Nanyang Technological
6 Kyuhoon CHO Postdoc Fellow khcho@ntu.edu.sg
University
CHONG Kim- Hong Kong University of
7 Professor hmckc@ust.hk
chong Science and Technology
8 Scott COOK Yale-NUS Professor scott.cook@yale-nus.edu.sg
Nanyang Technological
9 Chenyang LI Assoc. Professor cyli@ntu.edu.sg
University
10 GUO Yi Seoul National University Professor gy62@yahoo.com
The Chinese University of
11 HUANG Yong Professor yonghuang@cuhk.edu.hk
Hong Kong
Hong Kong University of
12 KWOK Sai Hang PhD Candidate shkwok@ust.hk
Science and Technology
Franklin Thomas DePaul University/Nanyang Professor/ Visiting
13 fperkins@ntu.edu.sg
PERKINS Technological University Professor
Hans-George
14 University of Macau Professor hmoeller@umac.mo
MOELLER
University of Massachusetts
15 Eric S. NELSON Assoc. Professor Eric_Nelson@uml.edu
Lowell
The Chinese University of
16 NG Kai-chiu Asst. Professor kcng@cuhk.edu.hk
Hong Kong
Nanyang Technological
17 So Jeong PARK Asst. Professor selfsopark@gmail.com
University
National University of
18 Mary RILEY PhD Candidate mkriley@u.nus.edu
Singapore
19 Dan ROBINS University of Hong Kong Asst. Professor dan.robins@gmail.com
Frank
20 University of Hong Kong Mphil Student frank.saunders.jr@gmail.com
SAUNDERS
TING On Ki Hong Kong Baptist
21 Lecturer tingonki.angel@gmail.com
Angel University
Els VAN Nanyang Technological
22 Asst. Professor evandongen@ntu.edu.sg
DONGEN University
23 Brook ZIPORYN University of Chicago Professor ziporyn@uchicago.edu

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NOTES

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NOTES

23