25.
Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear.
An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause
in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him
to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which
he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires.
An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless
by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions.
GENERAL RULE: No written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear
in court for his client.
Rationale: Because an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent
any cause in which he appears.
EXCEPTION: On motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being
shown, the presiding judge may, require any attorney to:
1. produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and
2. disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed
him
An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions unless the attorney appeared leave of the
court.
CONRADO QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR., A.C. No. 7054, December 4,
2009
The Supreme Court found the respondent liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules
12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
DISBARRED him from the practice of law.
In the first instance, records show that the respondent filed the petition for
annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent
while the other 15 individuals did not. The SC cannot agree with the respondent’s
explanation that he truly believed that most of the litigants who signed the
certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary
authority to sign for the others.
The SC find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed
by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of
law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so
proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two
law firms with which he was previously associated. As Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan found, the respondent’s explanation of compliance with the rule on the
certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in
court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of
title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the
Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an
amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff
without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to
litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs – his
clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a
lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the
latter’s representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court. The willful
unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in each case constitutes
contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring
lawyer for professional misconduct.
No merit in the respondent’s defenses. “Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another.
In this case, respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients.
This conclusion is based from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he
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made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments
of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience
and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
Based on the foregoing, the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed
on members of the Bar.
26. Sophia Alawi vs. Ashary M. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed
for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In
connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had
resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence. He also wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the
Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him.
One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically
synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers has a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often
mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of the title “Attorney”, by Alauya, was proper.
Held:
The court held there was improper use of the title “Attorney”. It was stated that
persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not considered as fully pledged members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; hence they may only practice law before the
Shari’a courts. It is true that a person who passed the Shari’a bar and those who
passed the Philippine bar are considered as “counselors”, in a sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, however only the latter are lawyers. The
title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree to
the study of law and successfully take and pass the Bar examinations, and remain
members in good standing , are allowed to practice law in this jurisdiction.
27. RULE 138, Sections 12 & 13
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a
committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee
shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and
who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of
the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names
of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official
reports.
2018 Chairman: Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
2017 Chairman: Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin
2016 Chairman: Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any
member of the committee, and during examination the candidates shall not
communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The
candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be
barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and
further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the
discretion of the court.
28. Re: 1999 Bar Examinatons, Mark Anthony Purisima
Facts
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Purisima was admitted to take the 1999 Bar exams, conditioned on the submission
of the required certificate of completion of pre-bar review course within 60 days
from the last day of the exams. He later passed the Bar but the Court disqualified
him from becoming a member and declared his examinations null and void due to
the following grounds:
a. He failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar
review course under oath for conditional admission to the Bar Examinations
b. He made it appear in his Petition to Take the Bar Examinations that he took
the pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as certified by
Acting Registrar Rasalie Kapauan, PLS had not offered such couse since 1967 - a
serious act of dishonesty which rendering him unfit to become a member of the Bar
On April 13, 2000 he moved for the reconsideration but was denied.
On October 29, 2001, His father, retired RTC Judge Amante Purisima, filed a Petition
to Reopen Bar Matter 986, but the Court noted without action the petition and
further resolved that no further pleadings will be entertained
On July 2, 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process, where he explained that
the reason for his supposed enrollment and regular attendance in the pre-bar review
course at PLS and not in UST where he actually took the course, was that a
statement in his Petition, which provided that he enrolled and passed his fourth year
review class at PLS was a self-evident clerical error and a mere result of oversight
which was not tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood.
He also explained that upon obtaining a ready-made form of the Petition and affixing
his signature thereon, he requested his schoolmate Lilian Felipe to fill out the form,
have it notarized, and file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), and
that he was not able to check the veracity of the information provided for being too
consumed in his preparations. He likewise submitted numerous pieces of evidence to
support his claim, including the receipts to his enrollment, the car pass to UST's
campus, and individual affidavits of his classmates and one of the maintenance
staffmember in UST.
As to not having submitted the required certification of completion of pre-bar review
course within 60 days, Purisima thought it was unnecessary in view of the
Certification by Dean Dimayuga on Purisima's completion thereto.
After the conduct of a summary hearing on October 30, 2002 where clarificatory
questions were asked, OBC recommended that Purisima be given the benefit of the
doubt. His explanation as to non-submission of the certification was impressed with
truth
Ruling
Considering petitioner's explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents,
at the very least, petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed
to take his oath.
The Court is well aware of instances in the past when as a measure of compassion
and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioners
father pleaded that the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about
three years now should be enough penalty.
Courts growing concern over the apparent laxity of law schools in the conduct of
their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the attendance of
reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to comply
with the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar
review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for
those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.
For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it
can be done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or
idle ceremony; it is intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those
applying for admission to the bar.
29. ALAN F. PAGUIA vs OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, G.R. No. 176278 June 25,
2010
Facts:
Petitioner, as citizen an taxpayer, questions the validity of Respondent
Davide as Permanent Representative to the UN, as nominated by President Arroyo,
for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign
Service Act of 1991, which states the mandatory retirement age of all DFA officers
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and employees at 65, arguing that respondent Davide’s age, being 70 at that time of
his nomination in March 2006, disqualifies him from holding his post.
Respondents raise threshold issues against the petition:
1. Petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.
2. Neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with
standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner
remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit
which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal
disbursement of public funds.
3. Public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that
this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a
contender for the office in question.
They counter that Section 23’s mandated retirement age applies only to career
diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent
Davide.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner has cause of action to question the nomination.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with
standing to bring this suit. The court granted access to citizen’s suits on the
narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling
for urgent resolution. Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third
party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised:
1. the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy,
2. a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and
3. the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to
bring the suit.
None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to any of these parameters.
Career ambassadors of DFA forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement
age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioner’s
generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law. As compared to
Petitioner, they are the ones who have the cause of action to question the
nomination.
Petitioner cannot invoke being a taxpayer as well. Taxpayers’ contributions
to the state’s coffers entitle them toing a tax question appropriations for
expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal. However, the
salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic
rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was
included in the appropriations for the DFA’s total expenditures contained in the
annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davide’s nomination. Having
assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least
a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, negating petitioner’s claim of "illegal
expenditure of scarce public funds."
Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing
"any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." Preparing a petition raising
carefully-crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly
legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within
the proscribed conduct.
Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010, making the case moot
and academic.
30. RULE 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is
enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by
the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
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Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged
communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications
made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.
Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply
with the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of
an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for
disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).
The phrase “direct supervision and control” requires no less than the
physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance
with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit:
(a) To ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence
or inexperience of law students, who not having as yet passed the test of
professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act as counsels on
their own;
(b) To provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to
protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action
by their law students; and
(c) To ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to
practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a
license, as required by law. (In re: Need that Law Student Practicing Under Rule 138-
A Be Actually Supervised During Trial, Bar Matter No. 730, June 13, 1997)
31. Rule 138, Sec. 34.
Rule 138, Sec. 34. By whom litigation conducted.—In the court of a justice of the
peace (now, MTC) a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
WHO ELSE MAY PRACTICE LAW?
General Rule: Only Members of the Bar
Who may practice law.—Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. (Rule 138, Sec 1.)
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
1. Law Students
2. Agent
3. Litigation by Party (Rule 138, Sec 1.)
Non-Lawyers authorized to appear in court:
In cases before the MTC, a party may conduct his case or litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose (Sec.
34, Rule 138, RRC).
Notes from Agpalo:
In a democratic and civilized country where the rights of a person are determined in
accordance with established rules, the employment of a person acquainted with
those rules becomes a necessity both to the litigants and to the Court. A party
litigant needs the assistance of counsel in all proceedings, administrative, civil or
criminal.
When appearance by counsel not obligatory:
1. In a Municipal Trial Court, a party may conduct his litigation in person or with the
aid of a friend appointed by him for that purpose or with an aid of an attorney.
2. In the RTC and Appellate Courts, a party in a civil suit may conduct his litigation
either personally or by attorney unless the party is a juridical person.
3. And even if he has chosen to appear by counsel, he may at any time dispense with
the services of his lawyer and prosecute or defend his case personally.
Notes from the book of Agpalo
In a democratic and civilized country where the rights of a person are determined in
accordance with established rules, the employment of a person acquainted with
those rules becomes a necessity both to the litigants and to the Court. A party
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litigant needs the assistance of counsel in all proceedings, administrative, civil or
criminal.
Hypo Question:
A and B who are law students entered their appearances before the Municipal Court
as private prosecutors in a criminal case. This was disallowed by the trial judge. Is
this correct?
Answer:
NO. A non-lawyer may appear as a friend of the party before the Municipal Courts
under Section 34, Rule 138 Rules of Court; he may make such appearances either as
defense counsel or private prosecutor under the control and supervision of the fiscal.
The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for the appearance of a private
prosecutor, although if he so wishes, the fiscal may disallow participation in the trial
by handling the case personally. (Cantimbuhan, et al. vs. Hon. Cruz, G.R. No. 51813-
14, Nov.29, 1983)
32. Bulacan vs. Torcino, G.R. No. L-44388 , January 30. 1985
Gutierrez, Jr., J
Facts: A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory
injunction was filed with the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Plaintiff Victoriano
Bulacan against Defendants Faustino and Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed
by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but was verified by the
plaintiff himself.
When the defendants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the
complaint was signed by Nuñes, Jr. On February 10, 1973, the parties were then
ordered by the MC to settle the case amicably within 1 week and that failure to do so
will constrain the court to render judgment based on an ocular inspection which will
be conducted.
The parties failed to amicably settle the case amicably, thus the MC ordered the
defendants to demolish and remove the portion of their house which was
constructed on the land of Plaintiff. The defendants appealed the case before the CFI
of Leyte.
The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore
must be considered as sham and false.
Issue: Whether the complaint is irregular as it was not signed by the plaintiff or an
attorney.
Held: No. Under the facts of this case the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party
may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend,
agent, or an attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant
must be aided by a duly authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the
Torcinos applies only to cases filed with the regional trial court and not to cases
before a municipal court.
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like shares to the ignorant or
the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants
in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v.
Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the
Rules still allow a more educated or capable person to appear in behalf of a litigant
who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties and in the interest of
justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is
more stringent.
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