Available online at www.sciencedirect.

com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect
00 (2017)
Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017)000–000
447–454
Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000 www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia

Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM 2017)

Information Technology and Quantitative Management (ITQM 2017)
Media guiding effects on public perceptions of the Chinese government
Media guiding effects on public perceptions of the Chinese government
anticorruption: evidence from a survey experiment
anticorruption: evidence from a survey experiment
Meihong Zhua,*, Aihua Lib
Meihong Zhua,*, Aihua Lib
a
Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, 100070,China
ab CentralUniversity
Capital UniversityofofEconomics
Finance and
andEconomics, Beijng,100081,China
Business, Beijing, 100070,China
b
Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijng,100081,China
Abstract
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the guiding effect of media coverage on public perceptions of government
anticorruption
In this paper, inweChina. We design
examine a survey
the guiding experiment
effect of mediaframe in which
coverage the onlyperceptions
on public experimental of factor is the
government
information
anticorruption of in
media coverage.
China. Baseda on
We design the SoJump
survey online
experiment survey
frame platform,
in which thewe divide
only respondents
experimental intoisthree
factor the
treatment groups
information and acoverage.
of media control group
Basedwhere
on therespondents
SoJump online in each treatment
survey group
platform, we are stimulated
divide by one
respondents kind
into of
three
media coverage
treatment groups information.
and a controlWe collect
group wherea valid sampleinofeach
respondents about 5700 respondents.
treatment The results
group are stimulated of General
by one kind of
Linear Model (GLM)
media coverage analysis We
information. indicate thata three
collect validtreatments
sample ofofabout
experimental factor haveThe
5700 respondents. statistically significant
results of General
positive effects(GLM)
Linear Model on respondents’ perceptions
analysis indicate of treatments
that three governmentofanticorruption. Specifically,
experimental factor the groupsignificant
have statistically who are
asked
positivetoeffects
read information aboutperceptions
on respondents’ results or of achievements
government of government Specifically,
anticorruption. anticorruptionthegive the who
group highest
are
evaluation
asked to read on government
informationanticorruption,
about results then followed by the
or achievements group who read
of government informationgive
anticorruption aboutthedisclosed
highest
major corruption
evaluation cases, andanticorruption,
on government the group whothen read followed
informationby about the government
the group anticorruption
who read information policies
about and
disclosed
measures give thecases,
major corruption lowerand
evaluation
the group than
whotheread
firstinformation
two groups, and the government
about control group without any policies
anticorruption information
and
stimulus
measuresgivegivethethelowest
lowerevaluation.
evaluation Passingly, we find
than the first two two statistically
groups, and the significant disturbing
control group withoutvariables relevant
any information
to media give
stimulus coverage in our
the lowest design. The
evaluation. degree we
Passingly, of find
concern
two about anticorruption
statistically significantcoverage
disturbing significantly affects
variables relevant
respondents’
to media coverageevaluation.
in ourRespondents
design. The withdegree high degree of
of concern concern
about give high coverage
anticorruption evaluation. The information
significantly affects
channels
respondents’or platforms
evaluation.from which respondents
Respondents with high obtain anticorruption
degree of concerninformation, also has a significant
give high evaluation. effect
The information
on respondents’
channels evaluation.
or platforms from Respondents acquiring
which respondents anticorruption
obtain anticorruptioninformation fromalso
information, official
has media give highest
a significant effect
evaluation,
on respondents’and evaluation.
respondentsRespondents
getting information
acquiringfrom unofficial information
anticorruption media givefromranked-second
official mediaevaluation, and
give highest
those who never
evaluation, get any anticorruption
and respondents information
getting information from from any platform
unofficial media givegiveranked-second
the worst evaluation.
evaluation,These
and
conclusions
those who never will help
get management authority
any anticorruption to properly
information frommanage media platforms,
any platform give the and worstgive full play to
evaluation. the
These
positive roleswill
conclusions of media’s in guiding public
help management perceptions
authority of government
to properly manage media anticorruption.
platforms, and give full play to the
positive roles of media’s in guiding public perceptions of government anticorruption.
©
© 2017
2017 The
The Authors.
Authors. Published
Published by
by Elsevier
Elsevier B.V.
B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 5th International Conference on Information Technology
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the organizers of ITQM 2017
and Quantitative Management, ITQM 2017. B.V.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier
Keywords: media coverage;
Selection and/or perception;
peer-review anticorruption;of
under responsibility survey experiment;oftreatment;
the organizers ITQM 2017effect;China
Keywords: media coverage; perception; anticorruption; survey experiment; treatment; effect;China

*
Corresponding author. Tel: 86-10-83952180.
* E-mail address: zhumh1027@126.com.
Corresponding author. Tel: 86-10-83952180.
E-mail address: zhumh1027@126.com.

1877-0509 © 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Peer-review under responsibility of the scientific committee of the 5th International Conference on Information Technology and
Quantitative Management, ITQM 2017.
10.1016/j.procs.2017.11.392
448 Meihong Zhu et al. / Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017) 447–454
Meihong Zhu, Aihua Li / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000

1. Introduction

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its government, anticorruption is related to the fate and future
of the Chinese nation. Since 2013, the CCP and its government have extensively carried out the anticorruption
battle and have made remarkable achievements. In the real world, many corruption behaviours are covert and
the actual corruption degree of a country or a political party is difficult to measure. So, the corruption or
incorrupt situation is usually evaluated by public subjective perceptions. In addition, anticorruption means
more than simply prevention and punishment of corruption by the CCP and its government. Rather, it needs
public understanding and willingness to participate in the battle. So, understanding the public perceptions and
aspirations for anticorruption are crucial to the CCP and its government.
Public perceptions of the government anticorruption are affected by personal factors and social factors. Zhu,
Lu and Shi (2013) examined the effect of media channels on Chinese public perceptions of official corruption
by using survey data in 2002. They concluded that, people who get information from formal sources shape
more positive perceptions, while those getting information from informal sources such as rumors usually
generate negative perceptions. Li, Gong and Xiao (2016) examined the perceptions of Chinese citizens towards
government’s anticorruption through a survey of 1,604 Shanghai residents in 2008. They drew a conclusion
that, two personal factors, including personal perceptions of unfairness in income distribution and intrusion of
political power into economic affairs, affect respondents’ assessments on government anticorruption.
In this paper, we try to explore the effect of the information (or contents) of media coverage on public
perceptions of government anticorruption. Firstly, we develop hypotheses on the possible media coverage
effect on public perceptions of government anticorruption. Secondly, we design a survey experiment frame to
test these hypotheses. In all waves of survey experiments, the only common factor we concern about is the
contents of media coverage of government anticorruption. We design three levels or treatments for the factor:
(1) anticorruption policies and measures, (2) uncovered conspicuous corruption cases, and (3) anticorruption
achievements or results. All waves of the survey experiment process are embedded into the SoJump online
survey platform. In each wave of survey experiment, respondents are randomly allocated 4 groups in which the
respondents in the first three groups are respectively stimulated by the above three levels of media coverage
information and the respondents in control group are not given any information stimulation. Before filling in
questionnaires, respondents in the first three groups are asked to read the media coverage information about
government anticorruption. Rather, the respondents in control group can directly fill in questionnaires. In our
research, approximately 5700 records of respondents are collected in the period of Xi jinping holding power.
Then, we use General Linear Models (GLM) to test these hypotheses and to estimate the effect of the contents
of media coverage on public perceptions of government anticorruption.Our analysis reveals that, respondents'
perceptions of government anticorruption are very elastic to the contents of media coverage. Respondents in the
three treatment groups give higher evaluation on government anticorruption than those in control groups. In
order to reveal the influence of the media report more accurately, the individuals’ concerns about anticorruption
topic and demographic characteristics and are also taken into account.
Compared with the research of Zhu, Lu and Shi (2013), we also consider the influence of media information
channels on public perceptions of government anticorruption, but we view information channel as the
disturbing variable in analysis of the effect of the only factor(the contents of media coverage).

2.1 The characteristics of survey experiment

Causal inference is always a very important research task, and so far, experiment design is still an effective
tool for exploring it. In the field of social science, especially in that of public opinion research, small-scale
causal relationship studies have been widely conducted in laboratories (Druckman, 2006; Gaines BJ, 2007).
Since 1970s, with the rapid development of computer technology, computer-aided survey platforms have been
designed. Researchers have been able to put complex experimental research into survey research platform, and
then two kinds of researches are combined effectively, named as population-based survey experiments (Mutz,
 Meihong Zhu et al. / Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017) 447–454 449
Meihong Zhu, Aihua Li/ Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000

2011) or survey experiments (Sniderman, 2011). In survey experiment, random assignment of respondents to
treatment and control conditions enable to reveal whether one factor influences the target variable, while the
availability of a representatively large sample from the survey platform can allow sample generalization to
population. That is to say, survey experiments seem to maximize internal and external validity of casual
inference. It provides a more advanced methodology to reliably evaluate casual relationships. Survey
experiment is easy to implement, so it is widely used in social science, especially in public opinion research.

2.2. Setting of treatments

In this research, we focus on whether the contents of the media coverage about the Chinese government
anticorruption affect public’s perceptions or views about government anticorruption. So, in these series of
survey experiments, the only common and controlled factor is the contents of media coverage of government
anticorruption. It includes three levels respectively named as in table 1. Considering the control group, there are
4 levels or treatments in all.

Table 1. Treatments and data in each group

treatments treatment name: contents of media coverage groups and data

treatment 1 anticorruption policies and measures group 1: 1490
treatment 2 uncovered conspicuous corruption cases group 2 :1139
treatment 3 anticorruption achievements or results group 3: 1761
treatment 4 control group group4 : 1298

2.3. Design of questionnaires

The survey experiments are carried out in 9 separate waves from June 2014 to March 2017. All waves have
a common structure including 4 modules. Module A involves questions about that whether respondents concern
of government anticorruption and where they get the anticorruption information. Module B includes 3
treatments providing information about government anticorruption solely for the three treatment groups.
Module C describes 5 questions about respondents’ perceptions of government anticorruption. Module D lists
socio-demographic background questions including age, gender, education, income, and occupation status. The
order of modules for treatment groups is A, B, C and D, while that for control group is A, C and D. In each
wave, 3 treatments and a control group are shown by 4 kinds of independent questionnaires. The core structure
and questions of questionnaire are as follows.
Module A: respondents’ concerns of government anticorruption
A1. Do you concern of media coverage about the Chinese government anticorruption? Depending on the
concern degree from low to high, a respondent is asked to select a number value from the ranking of 0 to 5.
A2.Where do you get the information of media coverage about anticorruption (only for respondents whose
concern degrees in A1 are more than 0)? 4 sources of information are provided for selection: domestic official
media platform, domestic unofficial media platform, foreign media platform, and other media platform.
Module B: treatments setting
treatment 1: anticorruption policies and measures:7 important items are listed.
treatment 2: uncovered conspicuous corruption cases: 7 important items are listed
treatment 3: anticorruption achievements or results: 7 important items are listed
Module C :Assessment items reflecting government anticorruption status
450 Meihong Zhu et al. / Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017) 447–454
Meihong Zhu, Aihua Li / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000

C1. How well do you think of the government’s corruption prevention system?
C2.How well do you think of the government’s corruption supervision system?
C3. How well do you think of the government’s corruption punishment system?
C4. How well do you think of the government’s overall anticorruption work?
C5.How much belief do you have in the persistence, legalization and institutionalization of government's
anticorruption battle in the next 5 to 10 years?
For the above 5 items, 1-5 scale of scores are given for selecting where higher score indicates better
evaluation on government anticorruption.
Module D: information about respondents’ Demographic characteristics.
It includes gender, age, education, occupation, and income.

2.4. Randomization of respondents and collection of data

In each wave of survey experiment, based on the SoJump online survey platform, the respondents are
randomly divided into 4 groups, and each group is given a version of the questionnaire. The questionnaires
assigned to the first three groups have the identical structure as A+B1+C+D, A+B2+C+D, and A+B3+C+D,
while the last group only includes module A, C and D. Data available for this research include 5688 records.
Data distribution among groups is described in table 1.

3. Analysis

3.1. Hypotheses about effects

In this paper, we focus on the analysis that whether the contents of media coverage will affect public’s
perceptions and assessments of the Chinese government anticorruption status and what is the underlying
influence mechanism. According to the analysis target, we make two hypotheses: (1) Different treatments
generate different effects on respondents’ perceptions of government anticorruption. (2)The treatment effects
for those who are exposed to media coverage are larger than for those who don’t receive any media information
stimulus .To test the above hypotheses, we need to estimate the effect of each treatment of media coverage.

3.2. Models for effect estimation

In survey experiment, randomization ensures that the respondents in each of the treatment groups are
equivalent and thus the influence of confounding variables can be balanced. In general, when randomization is
successfully achieved, the estimation of treatment net effects can be simply expressed as the experimental
group’s assessment score minus that of the control group on a target variable (Imai K, 2008; Ron Kohavi, 2009;
Kathryn M. Yount, 2013; Dingding Chen, 2015). But in this research, there are three treatment groups to be
compared with control group, which belongs to the problem of multiple mean comparisons. If we compare one
treatment group with control group each time, we need to conduct three times of this comparison. But the
results of 3 times comparison are not stable. Even more unfortunately, since the randomization may not be fully
followed in implement of survey experiment in social science literature, possibly interfering variables should
be considered at the same time. In this case, the GLM analysis is appropriate.

3.3. Variables and measurements

According to the questionnaire structure and content，all variables used for analysis are summarized in table 2.
 Meihong Zhu et al. / Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017) 447–454 451
Meihong Zhu, Aihua Li/ Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000

Table 2. Variables and measurements

names measurements
Y1:assessment of government’s corruption prevention system ordinal :1-5
Y2: assessment of government’s corruption supervision system ordinal :1-5
Y3: assessment of government’s corruption punishment system ordinal :1-5
Y4: assessment of government’s overall anticorruption work ordinal :1-5
target variables
Y5:belief in the persistence, legalization and institutionalization of ordinal:1-5
anticorruption in the next 5 to 10 years
Y6:average of Y1,Y2 and Y3 scale
Y7:average of Y1,Y2, Y3, Y4 and Y5 scale
factor F:contents of media coverage nominal:treatmnt1-4
X1:degree of concerns about government anticorruption ordinal :0-5
X2:wave of survey experiment ordinal :1-9
X3:media platform getting anticorruption information nominal:1-5
possibly interfering X4:gender nominal:1,2
variables X5:age ordinal:1-6
X6:education ordinal:1-5
X7: occupation nominal:1-7
X8: income ordinal:1-8

3.4. Preliminary analysis of relationships among variables

In order to accurately estimate the net effects of all treatments of the media factor on target variables, we
first analyze the possible relationships between all independent variables and all target variables by using
one-way analysis of variance (one –way ANOVA). Table 3 describes the possible relationships. It can be
seen that, leaving out other variables, F and all Xs (except to X4 and X8) have significant relationships with
all Ys. These all significant variables will be incorporated into each GLM model for each Y in sequent
analysis.

Table 3. Possible relationships between all independent variables and all dependent variables

Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7
F sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.002 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000
X1 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000
X2 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000
X3 sig=0.000 sig=0.039 sig=0.002 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000
X4 sig=0.489 sig=0.724 sig=0.226 sig=0.710 sig=0.438 sig=0.786 sig=0.834
X5 sig=0.004 sig=0.048 sig=0.031 sig=0.001 sig=0.000 sig=0.006 sig=0.000
X6 sig=0.012 sig=0.001 sig=0.447 sig=0.075 sig=0.024 sig=0.054 sig=0.030
X7 sig=0.000 sig=0.039 sig=0.000 sig=0.002 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000
X8 sig=0.150 sig=0.584 sig=0.483 sig=0.224 sig=0.000 sig=0.181 sig=0.147

3.5. Estimation of treatment effects

Here, we build General Linear Models for each Y to eliminate the impacts of all possibly interfering
variables and to clearly reveal the net effect of each treatment. Estimations of regression coefficients of 4
treatments in the factor F with respect to each Y are shown in table 4. Then the net effects of the first 3
treatments relative to treatment 4 are directly the coefficients of them. For example, the data in the second
column of table 4 show that, under the circumstance of controlling all interfering variables, factor F has a
statistically significant affect on Y1. Detailedly, compared with the respondents in control group, the
452 Meihong Zhu et al. / Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017) 447–454
Meihong Zhu, Aihua Li / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000

respondents who are stimulated by treatment 1, give a higher evaluation by 0.157 points on the government's
corruption prediction system; Similarly, the respondents who are stimulated by treatment 2 give a higher
evaluation by 0.131 points and the respondents who are stimulated by treatment 3 give a higher evaluation by
by 0.192 points.

Table 4. The net effect of each treatment on each Y

treatment Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7

Significance of sig=0.02 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00

Factor F
1 .157 .158 .105 .144 .136 0.143 0.140
2 .131 .244 .226 .196 .183 0.203 0.196
3 .192 .210 .238 .236 .275 0.216 0.210
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
order of effects 3124 2314 3214 3214 3214 3214 3214

From table 4, it is clearly seen that, for each target variable Y, the media factor F is a statistically significant
factor. Compared with the control group, net effect of each treatment on each Y is positive, which means that
respondents who accept any type of anticorruption information stimulus will have more positive perceptions of
government anticorruption than those without receiving any information stimulus. However, different types of
information stimuli produce different net effects. Almost for all target variables, the orders of the net effects are
3>2>1, that is to say, respondents who receive information about government anticorruption results give the
highest evaluation on the government anticorruption, followed by the respondents who receive information
about conspicuous corruption cases, and then the respondents who receive information about anticorruption
policies and measures.

3.6. Estimation of other effects

Tables 5-8 show that, among all possible confounding variables X1-X8, only X1, X2, X3 and X8 present
constant and significant effects on all Ys. Detailedly, X1 has a significantly positive effect on each Y, which
means that the respondents who highly concerned about anticorruption issues give high evaluation on the
government anticorruption work. X2 has 9 values, which indicates that 9 waves of survey experiments are
implemented according to the timeline. It also has a significantly positive effect on each Y , that is to say, the
evaluation of respondents on anticorruption in recent years are better than that in past years. X3 represents
media platforms or sources from which respondents get anticorruption information. It also has a significant
effect on each Y. Compared with those who never concern of government corruption (X1=0), respondents who
get anticorruption information from official media give highest evaluation on government anticorruption, and
respondents who get information from unofficial media give ranked-second evaluation. In respect to occupation
X7, students, employee of state owned or institutions, and the unemployed or retired give higher evaluation
than others. In all GLMs, other demographic characteristics have almost negligible effects.

Table 5. The effect of X1 on each Y

Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7
Significance of X1 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00
0 -0.399 -0.434 -.364 -.424 -.386 -.397 -.384
1 -0.370 -0.349 -.403 -.395 -.323 -.372 -.341
2 -0.172 -0.146 -.182 -.207 -.192 -.159 -.182
3 -0.133 -0.049 -.078 -.146 -.069 -.106 -.103
4 -0.077 0.040 -.004 .011 .008 -.014 -.018
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
order of effects 654321 564321 654312 654321 564321 654321 654321
 Meihong Zhu, Aihua Li/ Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000

Meihong Zhu et al. / Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017) 447–454 453

Table 6. The effect of X2 on each Y

Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7
Significance of X2 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00
1 .012 _ .271 .003 -.294 .128 -.053
2 -.447 -.489 -.261 -.433 -.612 -.526 -.391
3 -.387 -.287 .019 .218 -.373 -.376 -.121
4 -.608 -.328 .011 -.063 -.311 -.260 -.247
5 .036 .288 .371 .018 -.170 .163 .050
6 .356 .040 0.181 .020 .052 .190 .119
7 .267 .459 .403 .167 .383 .294 .263
8 .006 .079 .230 -.160 -.051 .055 -.057
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
order of effects 6,7,5,1,8,9,3,2,4 7,5,6,9,8,3,4,2 7,5,1,8,6,3,4,9,2 3,7,6,5,1,9,4,8,2 7,6,9,8,5,1,4,3,2 7,6,5,1,8,9,4,3,2 7,6,5,9,8,1,3,4,2

Table 7. The effect of X3 on each Y

Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7
Significance of Factor X3 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.000 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00 sig=0.00
1:official media 0.512 0.186 .359 .371 .339 .411 .327
2 :unofficial media 0.340 0.065 .227 .232 .199 .265 .190
3:foreign media 0.279 -0.017 .144 .163 .103 .211 .113
4:other 0.321 0.045 .140 .075 -.001 .194 .058
5: never concern about anticorruption (X1=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
order of effects 12435 12453 12345 12345 12354 12345 12345

Table 8. The effect of X7 on each Y

Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7
Significance of Factor X7 sig=0.012 sig=0.001 sig=0.159 sig=0.015 sig=0.011 sig=0.019 sig=0.002
1: Employees of state owned or institutions .031 .050 - .060 .097 .020 .058
2: Employees of foreign, private and joint stock -.079 -.116 - -.044 -.076 -.104 -.090
enterprise
3: self-employed -.131 -.055 - .004 .022 -.074 -.034
4: farmers -.094 -.234 - -.196 -.089 -.181 -.151
5: Unemployed or retired .012 .000 - .058 .168 .006 .068
6: students .034 .069 - .089 .077 .023 .053
7: others 0 0 - 0 0 0 0
order of effects 6,1,5,7,2,4,3 6,1,5,7,3,2,4 - 6,1,5,3,7,2,4 5,1,6,3,7,2,4 6,1,5,7,3,2,4 5,1,6,7,3,2,4

4. Conclusions

According to our survey experiment design frame and general linear models, the contents of the media
coverage have important and significant impacts on the evaluation. Any kind of stimulus we list in this
research can have a positive effect on the respondents' evaluation. But different stimuli still produce
distinctly different effects. Specifically, the group of respondents who have read the materials about the
results or achievements of government anticorruption give the highest evaluation on the government
anticorruption work, then followed by the group of respondents who have read information about publicly
uncovered major corruption cases, and the group of respondents who are given information stimulus about
the government anticorruption policies and measures give the lower than the first two groups, while the
control group of respondents who do not accept any information give the lowest evaluation .
It is as expected that, respondents’ concerns about anticorruption topic have also significantly affect on
their judgments of government anticorruption. In addition, the type of information channels or platforms
from which the respondents obtain anticorruption information, also has a significant effect on their
evaluation. At this point, our conclusion is similar to that of Zhu (2013).
These conclusions are of great significance to the government's propaganda strategies of anticorruption. At
454 Meihong Zhu et al. / Procedia Computer Science 122 (2017) 447–454
Meihong Zhu, Aihua Li / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2017) 000–000

present, the Chinese government anticorruption situation is still grim. The media management authority should
understand people's attitude towards anticorruption and the guiding mechanism of media to the public in
viewing the government anticorruption (Stockmann, D.,2011). This will help the media management authority
to properly manage media platforms, and give full play to their positive roles in guiding the public.

Acknowledgements

This research has been partially supported by grants #14YJA910005, Humanities and Social Science
Research Fund of Chinese Education Ministry; # SM201510038006, Social Science Programme Found of
Beijing Education Commission.

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