KRASMULLER, The Rejection of Landed Property

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The Execution of the Forty-

two Martyrs of Amorion:
Proposing an interpretation
Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki
Available online: 09 Jun 2010
To cite this article: Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki (2002): The Execution of the Forty-
two Martyrs of Amorion: Proposing an interpretation, Al-Masaq, 14:2, 141-162
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Al-Masāq, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 2002
The Execution of the Forty-two Martyrs of Amorion:

proposing an interpretation
ATHINA KOLIA-DERMITZAKI
ABSTRACT On the 6th of March 845 the Arabs executed forty-two Byzantine prisoners, some
of them very eminent, who had been captured after the fall of the city of Armorion in Asia
Downloaded by [Vienna University Library] at 09:10 01 August 2011
Minor. This seems, on the face of it, to defy logic, as it was common practice in those days to
keep prisoners in custody while negotiating an exchange, particularly of high-ranking of cials.
It seems even more perverse when one considers that the forty-two prisoners had been kept in
custody for six-and-a-half years before their execution and that an agreement for an exchange
had been concluded between the caliph and the emperor some months before. Moreover, the
Byzantines had a greater number of Arab prisoners awaiting exchange. However, by looking
at the internal policies of the caliph, al-Wāthiq, one can see a different picture: His
determination to impose the religious Mu¨tazila doctrine, by force if necessary, provoked a series
of uprisings (842, 844–46). The public decapitation of the forty-two of cers after they had
refused to pray with the caliph, was a valuable propaganda exercise, a show of power, which
mattered much more to him in those circumstances than the freedom of a number of his soldiers
and of cials.
On 15 August 8381 Amorion, the headquarters of the Anatolikon thema, was con-
quered by the army of the caliph at Mu‘tas½ im (218–227/833–842). The “glorious city”,
second after Constantinople, as it was described by the Martyrion of the Holy Forty-two
Martyrs (texts narrating their martyrdom), an exaggeration but suggesting that it was
the most important city of Asia Minor,2 was burned down and totally demolished. The
defence of this forti ed town was entrusted by the emperor Theophilos to the strategos
(general) of the Anatolikon patrician Aetios, the domestikos of the Excubita and
protospatharios Theophilos, the drouggarios of the Vigla patrician Konstantinos
Baboutzikos, who was the emperor’s brother in law and and, later, to the domestikos of
the Hikanatoi (or strategos of the Boucellarii) protospatharios Theodoros Krateros, who
was in charge of forces of up to 30,000 men.3 The Byzantine and Arabic sources (the
most detailed of which is that of T ½ abarõ¯ [d. 310/922–3]), that describe the events of the
siege and the capture of Amorion, suggest that all men were slaughtered and all women
and children were captured. Among those who survived and were imprisoned were the
above-mentioned leaders of the Byzantine army and many other generals (’a ´k k o i
p k « i˜r s o i s x ˜ n « ’n r s q a s g c iá i Ö d i a fa nx ˜ n, l « c i´r s o i Ö « ’l p q « ´ p o ns « Ö a ’xi x ´ l a r i n) according to
Ioannis Skylitzes.4 The majority of the prisoners, together with the rest of the plunder
was immediately sold to markets which were organized in situ, obviously because it
would be impossible to transfer such a great number of people without causing
dif culties to the movements of the Arab troops. The rest of the prisoners – including
Correspondence: Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, Palteia Kalliga 3, 112 53 Athens, Greece. E-mail: ako-
lia@arch.uoa.gr
ISSN 0950-3110 print/ISSN 1473-348X online/02/020141-22 Ó 2002 Society for the Medieval Mediterranean
DOI: 10.1080/0950311022000010547
142 Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki
the Byzantine army of cers and the eminent and wealthy citizens of Amorion – were
gathered to be transferred to Tarsus, where they were imprisoned, waiting for an
exchange with Arab prisoners kept by the Byzantines.5
Concerning the Byzantine of cers, the study of the texts of their Martyrion makes it
clear that they were initially imprisoned in Tarsus, and transferred to the capital
Sāmarra only when it was made clear to them that they had to decide between changing
their faith or execution.6
The Fate of the Eminent Prisoners

It must be noted that the Muslim jurists, notwithstanding that the Qur’ān makes some
relevant provision, often deviated from this and offered con icting solutions to the
problem of exchanging prisoners. Some of them totally prohibited exchange, while
others suggested ransoming.7 However, after the end of the eighth century, customs
relating to the exchange of prisoners between the Arabs and the Byzantines, stabilized.
The Byzantine legislation did not include special provisions regulating the treatment
of foreign prisoners. On the contrary, it emphasised the importance of the redemption
of the Empire’s citizens. However, some information about prisoners’ exchange can be
derived from the military manuals, the Taktika. So, in the Taktika of Leon V (886–
912), the possibility of exchange is anticipated. The writer advises the general not to kill
the prisoners before the end of the war, “especially those of the enemies who are
glorious and great, bearing in mind the uncertainty of fate and the constant rotation of
victory. In doing so, you (the general), should some of your people be caught or a castle
of yours captured, would be able to exchange them for those (the eminent enemies) and
retrieve the – as a matter of course – occurring defeats, obtaining the friends and allies
as against the enemies”.8
Thus, keeping the eminent prisoners alive was the usual practice, not only of Byzanti-
nes, but also of Arabs, giving them the advantage of being able to exchange their own
prisoners, i.e. members of the military or civil administration, of the aristocracy, or even
members of the sovereign families of both sides. They did not, therefore, sell them as
slaves, like the majority of the other prisoners; neither did they execute them but kept
them imprisoned till the time of their exchange. They often provided them with special
living conditions, totally different from those of the other, non-eminent, prisoners.9
One of the most characteristic examples is that of the poet Abū Firās al-H ½ amdānõ¯
(d. 357/968), relative of Sayf al-Dawla (333–356/945–967), who was captured during
the fall of Ierapolis (Manbij) in 962, and remained in excellent conditions in Constanti-
nopolis for four years until he was exchanged in 966.
Another case is that of the amõ¯r of Crete, Äbd al-Azõ¯z b. H
½ abõ¯b (337–350/949–961),
who was offered a great amount of silver and golden gifts by the emperor, as well as
land.10
On the Arab side, testimonies concerning favourable behaviour towards eminent
Byzantine prisoners are either not clear or controversial. An example of the rst case is
indirect evidence given by manuscript no 497 of the National Library of Paris, which
contains texts of the Fathers of the Church. The manuscript bears a note that attributes
the copying of the texts to the drouggarios tou ploimou (the commander of the imperial
eet), patrician Niketas, who was captured by the Arabs after the defeat of the
Byzantine eet in Sicily in 964 and imprisoned in Africa. This fact suggests quite good
living conditions for the eminent Byzantine prisoner.11 A second case, representing
more controversial evidence, is that of Konstantinos, son of domestikos Bardas Phokas
The Forty-two Martyrs of Amorion 143
and brother of Nikephoros Phokas, later to become emperor, and that of general Melias
accompanied by forty of cers. All of them died during their imprisonment a short time
after their capture. Ioannes Skylitzes, referring to the fate of Konstantinos, mentions
that he died in 953 being poisoned on the order of the amõ¯r of Aleppo, Sayf al-Dawla.
Matthew of Edessa, who describes the imprisonment of Melias and his of cers,
suggests that they died after being transported to Baghdad (973/4), without de ning the
way of their death. However, according to almost all Arab sources that mention them,
all these people died of natural causes.12
De nitely, on neither occasion were there any of cial executions of eminent prison-
ers, but there seems to have been assassinations or deaths caused by their conditions of
imprisonment, or even natural death. The attempt of the Arabs to hide the causes of
death, according to Byzantine sources, indicates that this was not the usual tactics
pursued concerning eminent prisoners.
In the Amorion case, T ½ abarõ¯ asserts quite de nitely, con rmed by both Syrian and
Greek sources, that al-Mu¨tas½ im gave the clear command to separate the eminent
Byzantines from the other prisoners who were to be sold immediately after the capture
of Amorion city. Later on he did the same thing, when, on the way back, he decided
on the exemplary punishment of 6000 prisoners, because a small group of Byzantines
had managed to escape, killing some Arab soldiers. Al-Mu¨tas½im ordered that the
eminent prisoners be put aside and executed 6000 from the others. These eminent
prisoners had to be kept untouched, obviously for a future exchange, and they included
the leaders of the army, accompanied by their of cers.13
The destruction of Amorion was indeed a real disaster for all the Byzantines and
mostly for the Emperor Theophilos. The latter immediately sent a deputation to the
caliph under the command of patrician Basileios, offering him 200 golden kentenaria
(200 pounds 5 1,440,000 coins) in order to ransom all the Amorion prisoners, and
especially the eminent men and their relatives. Al-Mu¨tas½im declined the offer and
argued that he had spent 1000 kentenaria in order to gather his numerous army.14 It is
dif cult to explain the caliph’s refusal, as the Byzantines had a great number of Arab
prisoners from the capture of Sozopetra and Arsamosata [which had taken place the
previous year (837) and it is well known that it was this that caused al-Mu¨tas½ im’s
attack against the cities of Ankara and Amorion]. According to Theophanes Continua-
tus (114 [lines 17–21]), there were about another 25000 prisoners from Theophilos’
expedition against the Arabs during 831.15 So one can only assume that al-Mu¨tas½ im’s
aim was the humiliation of the Byzantine Emperor, or that he wanted, indeed, more
ransom. A second deputation, sent by Theophilos in 841, did not achieve agreement on
exchange of prisoners, although gifts were mutually given and compliments paid.16
Specifying the Problem

The Amorion prisoners, as we have seen, were probably transported and imprisoned in
Tarsus, waiting for the conclusion of an exchange agreement. This exchange took place
precisely seven years after their capture, on 16 September 845. However, the leaders of
the Byzantine army and other Byzantine of cers, 42 all together in number, were not
among those liberated from the hardships of imprisonment, because they had been
executed on 6 March of the same year, with the exception of the general of the
Anatolikon thema, Aetios, who had been executed between 838–839.17
It is a fact that the Arabs decided on their execution, though they had been keeping
these men alive for six and a half years, presumably in order to have the means of
negotiating an exchange for their own eminent prisoners. This execution was an action
against their usual practice and their own bene ts, something, which gives rise to
speculation and requires further research regarding the reasons that had caused this
decision and an interpretation of their motives. It has to be noted that the reasons are
not mentioned in any of the sources.
Before proceeding to this research, I would like to suggest that one should not
consider the almost seven year period of time as ctitious, linked with the “magic”
sense of the number seven.18 This point of view is supported by the fact that two of the
texts of Martyrion group B, i.e. texts B and C , mention that the prisoners had been kept
for six years before the nal demand to renounce their Christian faith and convert to
Islam was imposed on them.19
I think that this differentiation, which has never attracted any notice till now, must
be due to the fact that both authors of these two texts, which along with the P text are
the oldest ones, did not lengthen the number of the imprisonment years to seven, as did
the majority of the Martyrion authors. There had been in fact precisely 6 years and 6
months of imprisonment. It is possible that this preference for the number seven by the
authors of the rest of the Martyrion texts instead of six, which might be more accurate,
could be due to the special semantic meaning of number “seven”. However, I do not
believe that the year of the prisoners’ execution must be doubted and besides, both
texts of Martyrion D and E (the latter one represents a variation of the text D ) do not
give a general reference to the time interval of six or seven years, but give a precise
dating: “the holy forty two martyrs died on 6 March of the 8 indictio, in the year 6353,
while Michael, Theodora and Thekla were reigning over the Romans”.20
The authors of three of the Martyrion texts, as we shall see below, attempted to give
an explanation for the caliph’s sudden decision to press hard on the prisoners to change
their faith after six and a half years of capture. According to them, this decision was
related to the protracted attempts by the Arabs to bend the will of the prisoners.21 The
authors sought an explanation in the moral strength of the martyrs, something well
suited to the ethical and educative aims of the texts.
Before looking for the reasons that led to the execution, the conditions of both the
imprisonment and the execution of the eminent prisoners should be brie y presented.
These conditions are described mainly in the hagiological texts, i.e. the Martyrion,
whereas the rest of the Greek, Syrian and Arab sources are restricted to a very short
account, with the exception of T ½ abarõ¯, who gives a very detailed description of the fall
of Amorion and the capture and fate of all the prisoners, whether eminent or not. It
must be noted that almost all of the Martyrion texts (eight published and one unpub-
lished) were written within the ninth century. The oldest one is considered to be the
Martyrion text C , which was written by Michael Synkellos, before January 846 or June
847 – very close to the prisoners’ execution. However, according to Sophia Kotzampas-
sis, it is possible that Martyrion text B and P are older than C . The only exceptions are
Martyrion text M, as it must have been written between the tenth and twelth century,
and the unpublished Martyrion text K, which represents a variation of the text M22 and
is dated in the tenth century.
The evaluation of the information provided by these hagiological texts is made with
special care, taking into consideration their eulogising nature.23
Three of the Martyrion texts [A, Z ( 5 Martyrion written by Euodios) and M, which
together with the unpublished K form a common group] provide a vivid and detailed
description of the hardships, which the 42 martyrs suffered during their imprison-
ment.24 Texts B, C and P are more synoptic, whereas text D only succinctly mentions
that the martyrs suffered “the usual hardships of a prisoner” (o i¨ã c a ` q j a i` p a ´ r v « i

a i ©v l a ´ k x s o Ö ).25
According to the rst three texts, the Arabs waited for the Byzantine dignitaries to
lose their physical strength and morale because of the unbearable prison conditions,
before demanding from them a denial of their faith. They considered that after the
period of six and a half years the prisoners should have been totally physically and
mentally exhausted and then they started to persuade them to accept Islam, either
trying to bribe them with offers of wealth and high rank or threatening them with
execution if they refused to convert.
The detailed description of the efforts made by the Arab representatives of the caliph,
the means of persuasion they applied and the considerably extended polemic dialogues,
containing the religious arguments presented by both sides showing the persistence of
the martyrs in their faith, will be omitted, since they are not directly related to this
study. The fact remains that it was the de nite refusal of the forty-two eminent captives
to accept Islam that led to the decision of their execution by decapitation.26
As far as I know, J. Bury has been the only historian who has attempted to interpret
this execution of the eminent prisoners, albeit without paying attention to the exact
moment the execution was decided. He argued that their execution should not be
attributed only to religious intolerance (which he takes for granted), but that it might
be considered that caliph al-Mu¨tas½ im and, later on, his successor al-Wāthiq (227–232/
842–847) tried in this way, by presenting the adoption of Islam as the only way to
freedom, to pressurise the Byzantines in order to get from them an extremely high
ransom.27
However, we have already seen that Theophilos had offered a ransom for the
prisoners, which was rejected by al-Mu¨tas½im. We must now look at the possibility that
the caliph’s aim was the great impression that the conversion of these eminent captives
would have made on the Christian and Islamic world. As has been mentioned before
(p. 141), one of the prisoners, Konstantinos Baboutzikos, was closely related to the
imperial family and according to the sources28 other relatives of Theophilos as well as a
member of the important and powerful family of Melissenoi, the tourmarches and
spatharios Kallistos were included.29 One way or another, by changing the prisoners’ faith
or extracting a very high ransom, the caliph would have been the winner of this con ict.
Additionally, we must not overlook the possibility of exchanging the prisoners for
eminent Arab ones, whose presence at the exchange that nally took place in 845, is
clearly declared by T ½ abarõ¯.30 There was also the possibility of exchanging one of them
for a great number of non-eminent Arab prisoners. This was the case of a Byzantine
patrician, who was exchanged for 1000 Muslims in 860.31 Whatever the case, the
refusal of the 42 prisoners to change their faith did not decrease their bargaining value
for the caliph, especially if the prospects of the exchange were already visible. Subse-
quently, the decision of al-Wāthiq to execute them at that speci c moment (beginning
of March 845) seems to be both illogical and almost inexplicable. The fact that the
caliphate authorities kept in their hands much fewer Byzantine prisoners than the
Byzantines had Arabs, makes this decision even more dif cult to interpret.32
The relations between Byzantium and the Caliphate around the end of 844 and the
beginning of 845 do not justify any action of revenge or exemplary punishment from
the Arab side. Theoktistos’s expedition versus Amer (Ämr al-Aqt½a¨, amõ¯r of Melitene
according to Vasiliev) in the year 844, who had invaded the Byzantine state, failed and
the Arabs won an important victory, whereas Theoktistos’s Byzantine army returned to
Constantinople. 33 Therefore, the caliph had every reason to feel bullish towards the
Byzantines, who had been seriously defeated two more times during the year 843: one
in Crete, when Theoktistos unsuccessfully attempted to re-conquer the island, and the
other one in the West, when Messina was captured. Moreover, next year (844), two
more cities and fortresses of Sicily were captured by the Arabs, despite the vigorous
resistance of the Byzantines.34 Because of all this, the Byzantine government decided to
send a deputation to the caliph al-Wāthiq requesting peace and an exchange of
prisoners.35
Negotiation Procedures for the Exchange of the Year 845

Is it possible to determine, even approximately, the time the Byzantines sent the
deputation, giving special consideration to the time of the prisoners’ execution? Tabarõ¯
is once more our basic source, as the Byzantine sources do not refer to this exchange
at all. However, the Arab historian just quotes successively six different testimonies,
thus making the researcher’s work even more dif cult.
According to Ah½ mad b. Abõ¯ Qah½ t½aba’s testimony, the eunuch Khāqān al-Khādim
was ordered by al-Wāthiq to accomplish the exchange. He started around the end of
230/18 September–6 September 845 in order to be ready on 16 September 845, the day
on which it had been agreed with the Byzantine ambassadors to exchange the prisoners.
Further on, the same eye witness, who was a companion of the eunuch Khāqān – states
that he went to Constantinople to investigate the number of the Arab prisoners that
were kept in the Byzantine prisons and found 3000 men and 500 women.36
Supposing, based on Ah½ mad’s testimony, that Khāqān started preparing the ex-
change during August or even July 845 (at the end of 230 AH37) Ah½ mad should by then
have returned from Constantinople with his report concerning the number of Muslim
prisoners. It must be noted that the number of Muslims reported by the Arab delegate,
was considerably higher compared to that of Byzantine prisoners kept by the caliph.
This obliged the caliph not only to buy out from their masters all the Byzantine
prisoners that had already been sold, but also to dispose of all the Byzantine women
prisoners, who had been kept at his personal service in his palace.38
It is obvious that the tracking down of an unknown number of Byzantine prisoners
sold as slaves39 in several places, as well as the negotiations to buy them must have been
extremely time consuming. Therefore, at least one month should have been needed for
the gathering together of the prisoners. Subsequently, Ah½ mad should have returned
from his journey to the Byzantine capital between June and July. The duration of
Ah½ mad’s journey from Sāmarra to Constantinople and the way back could be approx-
imately estimated on the basis of the route he followed and the speed he moved at.
If we suppose that the Arab delegate and his escort followed the route of Sāmarra –
Takrõ¯t–Mossoul–Amida–Melitene (Malatya) (through Samosata), a journey that lasted
27 days and then went from Melitene to Constantinople (through Kaesareia–Koloneia–
Aspona–Ankara–Nikomedia) in a time-span of another 27 days, travelling without haste
and with the assistance of imperial services as was common practice in Byzantium, we
can conclude that Ah½ mad needed almost two months to go and another two to return,
i.e. approximately four months.
In case he followed the route via Tarsus [Sāmarra–Takrõ¯t–Anbār–Raqqa–Bālis–Ier-
apolis (Manbidj)–Tarsus ( 5 42 days) and Tarsus–Constantinople ( 5 949 km: average
speed 45 km/day supported by the public road services 5 21 days), he would have
needed a total of 63 days to reach Constantinople and another 63 days to return, i.e.
again approximately four months.40
The latter route must be considered the most probable, since it was the road system
of Kappadokia that was mostly used by Byzantine and Arab delegations in the middle
of the ninth and in the tenth century41 and the SE–NW route via Asia Minor was
generally preferred. In any case, whatever route had been used by the Arab delegation,
as there existed much more than the two above mentioned, the divergence in time and
kilometres between them was, it seems, rather small. Thus, the estimated duration of
the journey from Sāmarra to Constantinople, mentioned above, remains approximately
four months.
By comparison, Ah½ mad’s stay in Constantinople cannot be so easily estimated but it
could not have been particularly brief, due to the fact that he had to investigate every
prison, not only in town42 but in other places, so as to locate all the Muslim prisoners.
Additionally, he had to meet with the Emperor (in this case Augusta Theodora) in
order to clarify the precise demands of the latter, according to T ½ abarõ¯.43
Taking as a sample the delegation of “Saracen friends”, which is described in the De

cerimoniis aulae byzantinae (by Konstantinos VII Porphyrogennetos) who stayed in the
capital from May till at least 30 August 946,44 we can consider that Ah½ mad spent at
least three months in Constantinople.45 It is possible, however, that the prolonged stay
of the former delegates in Constantinople was the result of certain particularities or
dif culties of their mission.
As can be seen from T ½ abarõ¯’s account, the preliminary agreement concerning the
exchange had been made; therefore the role of the Arab delegate was very concrete.
However, Ah½ mad could not have stayed in the Byzantine capital for less than a month.
Bearing these estimations in mind, we can assume that Ah½ mad started his journey at
least ve months before June–July 845, i.e. during January–February. This means that
the agreement for the exchange of the prisoners had been achieved at least one month
before as there would be a necessary time interval for the preparation of the long
journey of the delegation, between December 844 and January 845. Subsequently, it is
clear that the Byzantine of cers had been executed at the beginning of March, when the
caliph’s delegate was on his way to the capital of the Empire.46
Once it has been established that the Byzantines had in no way challenged the Arabs,
that the negotiations concerning the exchange had already begun, and that the number
of the Arab prisoners kept in Byzantium exceeded that of the Byzantines imprisoned by
the Arabs, it is in the internal situation of the Caliphate that one must seek for the
reasons which drove al-Wāthiq to this seemingly unjusti ed decision. Moreover, it
should be considered that the of cial execution of prisoners, in particular the eminent
ones, because they refused to convert to Islam, did not seem to be common practice in
the Caliphate. As can be derived from the testimonies of the sources on this subject, in
order to achieve the conversion of Christian prisoners to Islam, the Arabs’ usual
practice was restricted to the use of execution threats, imprisonment hardships and
other actions of a similar nature. These actions sometimes resulted in the conversion of
the Byzantine prisoners or they died from hardship or through assassination, if we
accept the testimony of the Greek sources about the way of death of Konstantinos, son
of Bardas Phokas, as mentioned previously.47
Religious and Political Developments in the Caliphate

Al-Wāthiq followed his father, al-Mu¨tas½im, politically, not only in the way of governing
the Caliphate but in the domain of religion as well. Al-Mu¨tas½ im had introduced the
institution of the “slave soldiers”, purchasing slaves and assembling a low in number,
but well trained, disciplined and particularly capable ghting corps, which in combi-
nation with his strong personality had secured him the succession to the throne after the
death of his brother al-Ma©mūn (198–218/813–833). In this way he had created a
military elite, which consisted of the Caliphate’s regional groups (such as Turks,
Armenians, Barbarians) and was, therefore, cut off from the rest of Arab society, by
reason of origins, language, customs and traditions.
Additionally, this new “aristocracy” took the place of the old one, which had
included mainly the descendants of Arab warriors, who had contributed to the con-
quests and therefore enjoyed special economic privileges such as a special salary, ‘at½ā’,
from the conquered regions, not only in the army but also in the governing of the
provinces.48
All these actions coupled with the effort on behalf of al-Mu¨tas½ im to impose a new
ideology based on the theological views of the progressive Mu¨tazila quite expectedly
provoked several reactions.

The Mu¨tazilite doctrine, a religious movement which made its appearance in Basra
in the rst half of the second/eighth century, refers to God’s nature and “attributes”
and purports that God is invisible not only in this world but in the other as well. It
promotes man’s free will, rejects the notion that destiny is pre-imposed by God and
considers the Qur’ān as God’s creation and not “uncreated” and “internal along with
God”.49
This doctrine, applied in the life of the Islamic community, something which, it is
worth noting, the Mu¨tazila were deeply interested in, enabled the imam, the religious
and political leader, to determine and extend revelation and tradition (Qur©ān and
sunna), so that they could be adapted to the demands of different periods and could be
replaced according to the judgement of the imām led by God.50
The rst leader who brought this kind of theological thought to the political scene in
early 827, was al-Ma©mūn, the predecessor of al-Mu¨tas½im. In 833, shortly before his
death, he announced that this doctrine was to be accepted by the government function-
aries, the Muslim “jurists” (the scholars of the Islamic law) and teachers. Thus, he
imposed an “interrogation”, a “trial” (mih½ na), the aim of which was to ascertain,
whether they accepted this doctrine or not, and were, subsequently, devoted to the
caliph, the central point being the matter of the creation of the Qur©ān by God.51
The main goal of al-Ma©mūn and his successors was the reconciliation of several
opposite religious–political groups that existed in the Caliphate. Nevertheless, this
doctrine caused resistance, particularly in Baghdad, which intensi ed during al-
Mu¨tas½ im’s reign and was related to the opposition and discontent about the creation
and support on behalf of al-Mu¨tas½im of this new military and governmental elite,
mentioned above, and to the religious intolerance of al-Mu¨tas½ im regarding the
in iction of Mu¨tazilite doctrine.52 The theological and political matters became so
greatly interlinked, that the admittance of this doctrine could also mean the acceptance
of the new political tendencies. Vice versa, any rejection could suggest opposition
towards the new military and political elite.
Al-Wāthiq’s Policy
Nevertheless, the one who imposed the procedure of “interrogation” with greater force,
was the son and successor of al-Mu¨tas½im, al-Wāthiq. The testimonies concerning his
personality are not at all attering: he was lustful, voluptuous, a drunkard, leading a life
of sin who had left the government of his country in the hands of three superior of cers,
who oppressed the people by imposing heavy taxes and ruled with great cruelty. Bar
Hebraeus’ reference to the sufferings and the economic “drainage” that “jurists” had
been exposed to, clearly depicts the violence of the measures that al-Wāthiq took in
order to impose the Mu¨tazilite doctrine.53
Perhaps a more realistic description of the way in which al-Wāthiq was oppressing his
people is clearly given by T ½ abarõ¯: in the year 231/845–6 the caliph ordered all the
inhabitants of the cities close to the frontiers to be “interrogated” (mih½ na) about the
creation of the Qur©ān. Four of them, who rejected the creation, were beheaded,
whereas the rest of them were presented with gifts. Furthermore, during the prisoners’
exchange in September of 845, al-Wāthiq ordered the “interrogation” of the Muslims
who were about to be exchanged. Everyone who accepted the basic principles of
Mu¨tazila’s doctrine, was exchanged. The rest were left in the hands of the Byzantines.
According to Masǖdõ¯ (d. 345/956–7), many prisoners chose to return to the Byzantine
territory rather than give up and accept these conditions.54

The gradually increasing opposition to the caliph’s politics was manifested in Bagh-
dad, where there was a movement organised under the leadership of Ah½ mad b. Nas½r
al-Khuzā©¯õ (d. 231/846). One of Baghdad’s most important personalities, he was a stout
supporter of the traditional orthodox Islamic doctrine, as represented by Ah½ mad b.
H½ anbal (d. 241/856) and who belonged to the group of old “aristocratic” Arab families,
which had lost their political power. Al-Khuzā©¯õ ’s strong pro le, as can be derived from
T½ abarõ¯’s detailed description of the events, established him as the leader of the
movement against al-Wāthiq. However, the plot was discovered on the eve of the day
that the revolt was to take place and al-Khuzā©¯õ was arrested and driven in front of the
caliph, facing the accusation of heresy, not treachery. Answering al-Wāthiq’s relevant
question, he refused to recognise the Qur©ān as a creation, thus provoking the caliph’s
rage. The caliph himself gave him a fatal wound with his sword and afterwards ordered
his body to be hanged in the centre of the city as an example. Al-Khuzā©¯õ ’s movement
can be characterised as a political–religious one, because it represented opposition to
both the prevalence of the slave mercenaries, mainly the Turks, and to the coercive
imposition of the caliph’s religious views.
However, the caliph laid greater emphasis on the dogmatic views of his opponent, as
can also be inferred from the fact, that on the scaffold, where al-Khuzā©¯õ ’s body was
hanged, there was placed an inscription presenting him as, “faithless polytheist, and
deviated (from the true faith)” (the translation belongs to J. Kraemer), because he had
rejected the doctrine imposed by the caliph, without though referring to Ah½ mad as a
“traitor”. In this way the religious dimension of the movement was particularly
highlighted while the political one was suppressed, showing that the caliph considered
the former to be much more important than the latter, and made his intention to
impose his theological views quite clear. At the same time, he gave a good example to
the supporters of the orthodox dogma.55
According to the sources, al-Khuzā©¯õ ’s movement took place in the year 231/7
September 845 – 28 August 846, while its repression and the execution of its protagon-
ist (who was later recognised as a martyr of faith) took place in April 846, a year after
the execution of the Byzantine eminent prisoners. The build up to this movement,
which had been the most serious one al-Wāthiq was faced with during his reign,56 a
movement which was mainly the outcome of increasing opposition to his religious
policy, must have started much earlier and the government of Sāmarra must have been
aware of the reactions caused by the “interrogation”, violently imposed by the caliph.
The Execution of the Byzantine Of cers

Attempting an Interpretation
While feelings of discontent, caused by the pressure exerted by the caliph in religious
matters combined with the following up of his father’s politics towards the new
military elite, were getting sharper, there was at the same time a lot of turmoil
in the Arab peninsula (around Medina) which nally became a revolt that lasted two
years (230–231/18 September 844–28 August 846). The main reason for this revolt was
the con ict between the powerful tribe of Banū Sulaym and the other Arab tribes,
concerning the exerting of in uence on the price formation in the markets of H ½ ijāz and
the control of the roads leading the pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, which crossed the
Sulaym area.57
The decision to execute the 42 Byzantine of cers was taken at the same dif cult
period so it is possible to see this action as a demonstration of power on behalf of the

caliph, who tried in this way to make clear his determination to enforce his policy
mainly concerning the matters of religion.
Two points seem to support this assumption. First of all, the most important point
is that, according to most of the Martyrion texts, special publicity was given to the
imminent event of the execution, particularly after the nal refusal of the prisoners to
accept the caliph’s faith. Thus, instead of being beheaded in Tarsus prison, where I
inferred they were kept,58 the prisoners were led to an area on the banks of the Tigris
river, 59 where they were executed in front of the caliph and an enormous crowd of
Muslims and Christians, who gathered there from all over the caliphate.60
In Martyrion texts A, Z and M it is clearly stated that the Byzantine of cers were kept
together with the rest of the prisoners and the Arabs picked them out from this crowd
just before they made the last attempt to persuade them to follow Islam.61 Thus, shortly
before the execution, they were kept in the same prison with other captives and were
not transferred to the capital. Their transportation must have fallen within the scope of
the pursued publicity, which would be of use to the caliph in both cases: either if the
high ranked Byzantines converted to Islam (in the doctrine supported by al-Wāthiq) in
public or, in the opposite case, if they were executed.62 The in ux of not only Christians
but also Arabs to the place of execution is probably an indication that the caliph aimed
at passing his message to the latter as well, if not mainly to them.63
The presence of the caliph himself at the prisoners’ execution place at the banks of
the Tigris is witnessed by the texts constituting the second group (Martyrion texts B, C ,
D , P). According to these texts, the caliph reached the place by boat. The texts of the
rst group (A, Z, M) give the information that the ’a ´q v x n s o n̄ p q x s o r t l b o t ´ k o t (possibly
the vizier Ibn al-Zayyāt (d. 233/847), the second in rank after al-Wāthiq),64 was ordered
by the Arab sovereign to be present at the execution. Besides, the case of Ah½ mad b.
Nas½ r al-Khuzā’õ¯ indicates that the caliph is present at the execution of his important
opponents.65
It is also worth noting that in the cases of both the martyrs and the Arab mutineers,
the caliph demanded from the prisoners a public declaration of conversion (to his own
religious doctrine). Whatever the case, in my opinion, the presence of either the caliph
himself or his vizier and the way they publicised the event show the particular
importance that the Sāmarra government gave to the execution of the eminent Byzan-
tine prisoners.
Moreover, the caliph’s great interest in the conversion of the Byzantine prisoners is
also apparent in the fact that his representatives, following his commands, urged the
captives to accept the circumcision and to pray together with al-Wāthiq. They promised
them that in this way they could be saved and become rich, while they could escape
during a future battle between Arabs and Byzantines (which means they would be
allowed to escape) and return as “fugitives to their religion and nation”.66 This
information, preserved in the texts of a common group (A) and also provided by
Theophanes Continuatus,67 could of course be considered as coming from the authors
of those Martyrion texts, who were attempting in this way to emphasize even more the
sacri ce of the martyrs in resisting such a tempting offer. However, estimating the
above mentioned information together with the rest of the data concerning al-Wāthiq’s
religious policy makes it quite plausible and presents the picture of an Arab leader who,
in spite of vehement opposition from his own people, wants to impose his own religious
views. So even a temporary acceptance of Islam by the Byzantine prisoners would be
a valuable propoganda tool and would have strengthened his position.
The authors of the Martyrion texts, trying to praise the refusal of the Byzantine
prisoners to accept Islam, express in a way the caliph’s real aim. Thus, they write that
al-Wāthiq considered that the prisoners’ change of faith would bring him much more
glory than the capture of the great and wealthy city of Amorion,68 thereby revealing
inadvertently, the great importance the whole matter had for the Arab leader.
I think that this point of view is supported by the reference to the crowd in ux, which
is made in all the texts of the Martyrion belonging to group A and additionally in texts
B and C of group B and which must have been the result of the announcement of the
forthcoming event by the caliph himself.
Aetios, the General of the Anatolikon thema

Before completing this attempt to interpret the event of the execution of the 42 eminent
Byzantine prisoners (6 March 845), who were declared martyrs a year after their
martyrdom, 69 it is necessary to refer to the fate of the chief of Amorion’s defending
forces, Aetios.
The information about Aetios is restricted to the statements of the historians and
chronographers, who describe the siege and the capture of Amorion. They refer to him
as a patrician and general of the Anatolikon thema and as one of the of cers, who were
captured while defending the city of Amorion. There is also a reference to Aetios on an
inscription in a temple devoted to the Virgin Mary at Sivrihisar (south of Nazianzos)
and another one on a seal, attributed to him by G. Schlumberger.70 Despite the fact
that certain historical sources refer to the event of his capture together with the rest of
the military leaders and that their authors consider that he suffered the martyrdom
together with them, his name is absent from the Martyrion texts of the latter.71
Among these texts, only A and B bear in their title the names of ve of the martyrs
(Theodoros Krateros, Konstantinos Baboutzikos, Kallistos Melissenos, Theophilos and
Vassois) and C bears those of three of them (Theodoros, Konstantinos, Kallistos). The
remaining thirty-seven of the martyrs are referred to as “their escort” (r t no d « iá a t ’s x ˜ n).
In the Martyrion texts themselves nominal references are made only to the ve:
Theodoros Krateros [in A, B, C , D , Z, M, P; he was the rst who suffered martyrdom
according to all the texts apart from text E, where his name is not mentioned at all,
while Theophanes Continuatus (p. 115 [lines 12–14]), presents him as “the leader of
the phalanx of the forty-two martyrs”], Konstantinos Baboutzikos (in A, C , D , E, Z, M,
P), Vassois (in A, B, C , D , E, Z, M, P), Kalllistos Melissenos (in C , D , E, P) and
Theophilos (C , D , E, P). Therefore, it is clear, that Aetios was not among the 42
martyrs.72
This fact becomes more obvious in the passage of Martyrion text D , where, just after
the description of protospatharios Theodoros Krateros’ beheading, there are given the
names of the remaining four of the above mentioned (and evidently most eminent
among the Byzantine captives) martyrs in the order in which they had been beheaded.
The order in which the author of this text refers to the martyrs, is correlated to
their of cial titles: patrician Konstantinos (Baboutzikos), protospatharios Theophilos,
spatharios (protospatharios according to text P) Kallistos Melissenos, dromeus (“runner”)
Vassois, who were followed by the rest of the prisoners.73 If patrician Aetios had
been included in the executed Byzantine captives, the texts would at least, have
mentioned his name while describing their execution. In that case he should have been
referred to rst, as being the general of the Anatolikon thema, he was the head of
the forces defending the besieged headquarters of the Anatolikon thema, the city of
Amorion.
On the other hand, some of the Greek historiographic and/or chronographic sources
do add Aetios to the 42 martyrs,74 whereas some others make a discernable differen-
tiation between Aetios and the rest of the army leaders, who were among the forty-two
martyrs.75 Ioannes Skylitzes76 mentions only three out of the ve leaders by name
[including Kallistos Melissenos, who, however, was captured not in Amorion but while
ghting against Paulicians considerably later (844/845)77], but leaves out Aetios and
Theophilos; Ioannes Zonaras,78 in his turn, referring to the Amorion’s defenders,
names only Theodoros Krateros, while concerning the executed leaders, he mentions
the same martyrs as Skylitzes does. It should, therefore, be considered, that Aetios was
captured together with the remaining Byzantine defenders of Amorion, during the fall
of the city.
The evidence for this is derived not only from the Greek sources but also from the
detailed description of the capture of Aetios given by T ½ abarõ¯: A section of the Byzantine
army was lost in ames, ghting obstinately around (or inside) a big church that had
been set on re by the Arabs. After that, Aetios gathered around him all those soldiers
of his army still alive together with the Byzantine citizens and continued to ght in the
tower, till everyone was either killed or injured. Then, surrounded by the Arabs led by
al-Mu¨tas½ im himself, he was forced to give up his sword and surrender.79
T
½ abarõ¯ makes one more reference to Aetios’ name – when stating that the latter was
cruci ed together with the Hourramite revolutionary Bābak at Sāmarra during 224/23
November 838 to 11 November 839.80
However, T ½ abarõ¯ suggests that Bābak was arrested in 223/3 December 837 to 22
November 838 and was cruelly executed in public on the 4 January 838. The same
author does not mention at all Aetios’ concurrent execution or even his presence.81
Apparently T ½ abarõ¯ could not correlate the two executions, as Aetios was captured eight
months later, on the 13 or 15 August of the same year. On the other hand, Masǖdõ¯
does not say explicitly that the two men were simultaneously executed, but that Aetios’
and Bābak’s bodies were hanging at the same place.82 Therefore, we must consider that
Aetios was executed between August 838 and November 839 and accept that T ½ abarõ¯,
or his source, got the impression that both men were executed simultaneously due to
the common place of their execution and of the exposure of their bodies. The time
deviation between the two executions does not seem to present a problem, since T ½ abarõ¯
states that Ah½ mad b. Nas½r al-Khuzā©¯õ ’s body, who, as mentioned above, was executed
in 231/845–846 at Sāmarra, was left hanging in common view as an example till
237/851–852, when caliph al-Mutawakkil ordered it to be rendered to his relatives so

that they could bury it!83
Thus, it has become obvious that the general of the Anatolikon thema and leader of
the military forces that had defended Amorion, was not executed together with the rest
of the forty-two prisoners. This is proved by the total absence of any reference to his
name in the Martyrion texts,84 while those of the other leaders are mentioned, if not
always together, i.e. those of Theodoros Krateros, Konstantinos Baboutzikos,
Theophilos, Kallistos Melissenos and Vassois. The reasons for Aetios’ execution,
almost one year after his capture, that means ve years earlier than the rest of the
eminent captives, still remain unknown.
Summarizing the Proposed Interpretation

Analysis of the data outlined above has led to certain interesting conclusions, which are
summarised as follows:
(a) A common standard tactic of both Byzantines and Arabs was to keep alive the
prisoners belonging to higher military and political rank, so that they could be
exchanged. Sometimes they were exchanged for a great number of non-eminent
prisoners, soldiers mainly, or simple citizens (this could be as much as 1 for 1000)
or they were bought off for high ransom. In spite of this, the Arabs in the case under
discussion decided on and conducted the execution of the 42 eminent prisoners
after having kept them imprisoned for the long period of six and a half years.
(b) The caliph decided to execute them, although negotiations concerning the ex-
change of prisoners had already started. It is a fact that the Arabs could earn much
more by exchanging the Byzantine eminent prisoners, as they, the Arabs, possessed
far fewer prisoners than the Byzantines did.
(c) There is no evidence in favour of the supposition that this execution was conducted
as an action of revenge or for exemplary reasons.
(d) The dating of the execution of the martyrs in the year 845 cannot be questioned,
neither can the reference to the seven years of their imprisonment be attributed to
the “magical” properties of number “seven”.
(e) The execution of prisoners in public, as a punishment for their refusal to convert
to Islam, was not, as it seems, common practice.
(f) The caliph al-Wāthiq encountered several reactions against his internal policy,
which, from the year 844 up to 846, resulted in several revolutions in the Arabic
peninsula.
(g) The caliph’s attempt to impose the Mu¨tazila doctrine violently was met with strong
resistance, mainly in the area of Baghdad. The reactions culminated in the organ-
isation of a conspiracy movement, which was revealed (April 846) and its leader,
Ah½ mad b. Nas½ r al-Khuzā’õ¯, was executed. He mainly faced the charge of refusing
to make a public statement of faith to the above-mentioned doctrine and was,
therefore, executed.
(h) Not only was Ah½ mad b. Nas½r al-Khuzā’õ¯ ordered to accept the Mu¨tazila doctrine,
but the eminent Byzantine prisoners were also to state their conversion in public
and to pray together with the caliph.
(i) The caliph himself (or the second in rank authority) was present at the
decapitation of the Byzantines.
(j) The forty-two prisoners were moved from Tarsus to Sāmarra, where the Arabs
asked
them for the last time to change their religion. Their transportation to a place some
42 days walking distance must have been caused by very serious reasons.
(k) If the special publicity that was given to the forthcoming execution of the Byzantine
captives is combined with points (e) to (i), then it will be quite clear that the
exemplary punishment of the Byzantines, who refused to renounce their faith and
accept in public the faith of Islam and more particularly the heretical form of the
Mu¨tazila doctrine, in the presence of the crowd, must have been of great import-
ance for al-Wāthiq.
The combination of all the above mentioned data leads to the following conclusions:
What should be accepted as the only possible explanation for the public decapitation of
the eminent Byzantine prisoners after six and a half years of imprisonment and when
negotiations for an exchange had already begun, is the fact that the caliph badly needed
to demonstrate his power to his subjects. This need for a show of power on the part of
the Arab sovereign was caused by the uprisings and general turmoil in his territory, one
of the main reasons for which was the coercive imposition of the doctrine taught by the
progressive Mu¨tazila. 85 Thus, we should consider that the decision which led the
prisoners to martyrdom, was due to the need of Sāmarra’s authorities to either cause a
distraction or to give a strong warning to those opposing their policy.
NOTES
1. According to some sources the city was captured on the 12 or 13 August. For the events of the siege
and capture of Amorion see A. Vasiliev (ed. M. Canard et al.), Byzance et les Arabes, I, La dynastie
d’Amorium (Bruxelles, 1935) (hereafter: Vasiliev, I), pp. 160–171 and J.H. Rosser, Theophilus “the
Unlucky” (829 to 842): A Study of the Tragic and Brilliant Reign of Byzantium’s Last Iconoclastic Emperor
(1972), pp. 231–241. For the date see as above, p. 170 and note 3, and Ath. Markopoulos, “The life
of the Empress Theodora (BHG 1731)”, Symmeikta, 5 (1983): 249–285, at pp. 279–280.
2. See Martyrion text B in: V. Vasilievskij and P. Nikitin, Skazania o 42 amoriiskich mucenikach
[Mémoires de l’Académie Imperiale des Siences de St. Petersbourg, VIIIe Série, v. V, No. 2] (St.
Petersbourg, 1905) (hereafter: Vasilievskij–Nikitin; for the edition of the Martyrion texts A–Z,
hereafter: Martyrion text A, B, C , D , E, Z.), 11 (lines 12–16); text D , 42 (lines 4–6); Martyrion text
M [ed. Sophia Kotzambassi, “S o l a q s t ´ q i o s x n l b 9 l a q s t ´ q x n s o t Al o q ió t . Ac i o k o c i j a ´ j a i
t l no k o c i j a ´ j « i´l « na ” (The martyrdom of the forty-two martyrs of Amorion. Hagiological and
hymnological texts), Epistemonike Epeteris Philosophikes Scholes Aristoteleiou Panepistemiou Thessa-
lonikes, periodos B9 , Tmema Philologias, volume II (Thessalonike, 1992), pp. 109–153 (hereafter:
Kotzambassi). Edition of the text in pp. 131–148, hereafter: Martyrion text M)], Ch. 12 (lines
4–8), Ch. 15 (lines 11–12). Cf. Ioannes Skylitzes, ed. I. Thurn, Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis
Historiarum [CFHB 5] (Berlin–New York, 1973) (hereafter: Skylitzes), p. 78 (line 34) (g ‘ s x ˜ n « ‘x ½´ x n
p o ´ k « x n d i a p q « p « r s « ´ q a ); Ya‘qūbõ¯, in: Vasiliev, I (hereafter: Ya‘qūbõ¯), p. 275. According to Michael
the Syrian: Amorion “gathered the population and wealth of many other cities [Chronique de Michel
le Syrien, partiarche jacobite d’Antioche (1166–1199), ed. J.-B. Chabot, volume III (Bruxelles, 1963;
rst published Paris, 1905), hereafter: Michael the Syrian], p. 100. See Sp. Vryonis, The Decline
of the Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamisation from the Eleventh through the
Fifteenth Centuries (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1971), pp. 20–21 and mainly C.S. Lightfoot,
“The survival of cities in Byzantine Anatolia: the case of Amorium”, Hommage à la mémoire de Jules
Labarbe, Byzantion, 68 (1998): 56–71, mainly 56, 58–60.
3. Theophanes Continuatus, X q onoc q a fiá , ed. I Bekker, Theophanes Continuatus … [CSHB] (Bonnae,
1838) (hereafter: Theoph. Cont.), p. 126 (lines 3–15); Skylitzes, 75 (lines 36–41). Cf. also with
Pseudo-Symeon, X q onoc q a fiá , ed. I Bekker, in Theophanes Continuatus … , as above (hereafter:
Pseudo-Symeon), pp. 638 (line 23)–639 (line 4); Georgius Monachus Continuatus, Bió i s x ˜ n n« ´ x n
b a r i k « ´ x n, ed. I. Bekker, Vitae imperatorum recentiorum in Theophanes Continuatus … , as above
(hereafter: Georg. Monachos Cont.), p. 805 (lines 14–19), where there is also mentioned the
tourmarches of Koloneia, Kallistos Melissenos (see also note 29), the dromeus (“runner”) Vassois (see
note 73) and many other leaders of the Byzantine army. Ioannes Zonaras, ©E p i s o l g ` Ïr s o q i x ˜ n, ed.
Th. Büttner-Wobst, Epitomae Historiarum, [CSHB] volume III (Bonnae, 1897) (hereafter: Zonaras),
pp. 377 (lines 12–17), 379 (lines 1–4), also mentions Kallistos, whereas he omits Aetios’s name
(about Aetios, see below, pp. 151–153). Concerning the martyrs’ personality, see the comments
of P. Nikitin, in: Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 202–219, in particular at 204–205 (Theodoros Krateros, who
he regards as the general of the Boukellarioi), 208–210 (Vassois), 212–214 (Konstantinos
Vavoutzikos), 215 (Theophilos), 215–218 (Kallistos); R. Guilland, Recherches sur les institutions
byzantines [Berliner Byzantinische Arbeiten 35] (Berlin–Amsterdam, 1967), I: 568–569 (Aetios,
Vavoutzikos), II: 101 (Theophilos, Krateros); H.-J. Kühn, Die byzantinische Armee im 10. und 11.
Jahrhundert [Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber 2] (Wien, 1991), pp. 88 (Kallistos), 99
(Theophilos), 107 (Vavoutzikos), 112 (Aetios); Vassiliki Vlyssidou, Eleonora Kountoura-Galaki,
St. Lampakis, T. Lounghis, A. Savvides, H Mi j q a ´ Ar iá s x n h « l a ´ s x n. ¡E q « t n« Ö p a ´ nx r s g
c « x c q a fi j g ´ ft r i oc nx l iá j a i p q o r x p o c q a fi á s x n b t za ns i nx ´ n h « l a ´ s x n s g Ö Mi j q a ´ Ö Ar iá Ö (7 o Ö –11o Ö
a i .) (Asia Minor of the “Themata”. Researches on the Geography and Prosopography of the
Byzantine “Themata” of Asia Minor (7–11th century)) [Ereunetike Bibliotheke 1] (Athens, 1998),
pp. 354 (Aetios), 210, 254, 409, 432 (Theodoros Krateros), 322, 486 (Kallistos Melissenos). Cf.
Vasiliev, I: 147 with note 1, 171, 230; Rosser, 208, note 39 and 242, note 129. For the total
number of the Byzantine troops that defended Amorion, see W. Treadgold, The Byzantine Revival
780–842 (Stanford, Calif., 1988), pp. 298 (note 408, concerning the leading of cers and the rank
of Theodoros Krateros ), 301, 303.
4. Skylitzes, 78 (lines 35–38); see also Ath. Markopoulos, 263, paragraph 7 (lines 1–4); Martyrion
text A, 1 (lines 14–15): j a i` p a ´ ns a Ö a ’na i q « i˜ l a v a i´q a ½ , s ot ´ Ö s « r s q a s i x ´ s a Ö s o t ´ Ö s « p o k i´s a Ö (“and he
knifed to death everyone, both soldiers and citizens”); text D , 42 (line 28)–44 (line 12); text Z, 65
(lines 4–10); text M, Ch. 12 (lines 36–41); text P (ed. Fr. Halkin, Hagiologie byzantine [Bruxelles,
1986], hereafter: P), pp. 156–157; Theoph. Cont., 129 (line 13)–131 (line 7); Ioseph Genesios,
Ba r i k « i˜ a i , ed. A. Lesmüller-Werner and I. Thurn, Iosephi Genesii Regum Libri Quattuor [CFHB 14]
(hereafter: Genesios), pp. 45 (line 51)–46 (line 84); Pseudo-Symeon, 638 (line 12)–639 (line 4);
Georg. Monachos Cont., as above; Michael the Syrian, 99–101; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography
of Gregory Abū’l-Faraj 1225–1286 … known as Bar Hebraeus, ed. and trans. E.W. Budge (London,
1932) (Amsterdam) (hereafter: Bar Hebraeus), p. 137; T ½ abarõ¯ (trans. C.E. Bosworth, The History
of al-T½ abarȭ, XXXIII (Albany, 1991) (hereafter: T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII), pp. 115–116. Concerning the
rest of Arabic sources see: Vasiliev, I: 268, 269, 275, 330–332, 348, 352, 372, 386, 387, 388.
5. Concerning the total number and the fate of the imprisoned citizens and defenders of Amorion,
see Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Some remarks on the fate of prisoners of war in Byzantium (9–10th
centuries”), in La liberazione dei ‘captivi’ tra Cristianità e Islam. Oltre la Crociata e il G Ï ihād:
Tolleranza e Servizio Umanitario. Atti del Congresso interdisciplinare di studi storici (Roma 16–19
settembre 1998), ed. G. Cipollone [Collectanea Archivi Vaticani 46] (Città del Vaticano, 2000),
pp. 583–620 (hereafter: Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”), on pp. 590–592. Of the 42 martyrs’
Martyrion text (A, 2 [lines 32–34] and Z, 67 [lines 16–18] and M, 138 [lines 11–12]) mention
70,000 imprisoned Byzantine soldiers, a number corresponding to the whole of Theophilos’
expedition army, and not only to the troops that were sent to Amorion (see also above, note 3).
6. See T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII: 119, who refers to the arrival of al-Mu‘tas½ im at Tarsus, without making clear
if the prisoners stayed there, or if they were immediately transported to Sāmarra. However, compare
Martyrion text P, 157–158 (after the prisoners had been imprisoned for seven years, probably in
Tarsus, where they suffered great misfortunes together with the other prisoners from Amorion, they
were transported to another prison near the Tigris river, apparently in the capital which was built on
the river), text A, 1 (lines 15–16), 6 (lines 13–15), text Z, 65 (lines 11–12), 75 (lines 15–17), text M,
Ch. 12 (lines 42–43) and Ch. 36 (lines 1–3) (simply that the caliph transported them to his country,
imprisoned them, and from there “they were dragged to the slaughter place”); text B, 12 (lines
28–30), 13 (lines 6–10) (he imprisoned them in his city, but after their refusal to revert they were sent
to him); text C , 29 (lines 29–33) (in Syria); text D , 44 (lines 9–12), 44 (line 27)–45 (line 5), 45 (lines
17–26) (initially, he sent them together with the rest of the prisoners to the “public prison”, after
seven years he invited them to his palace and, after their refusal, he sent them to the execution place,
that was about 15 hours walk). Although the name of Tarsus is not stated as the imprisonment place
of the eminent prisoners of war, all the above mentioned references lead to the conclusion, that the
prisoners were kept there until a short period of time before their execution. Besides, they were meant
for the exchange that usually took place at the river Lamos, a few kilometers away from Tarsus, the
city where the Byzantine prisoners, who were about to be exchanged, were kept (see F. Hild-H.
Hellenkemper, Kilikien und Isaurien [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 5] (Wien, 1990), p. 330. Therefore,
their immediate transport to Sāmarra, in the area of Mesopotamia, would have been totally meaning-
less. See also, p. 150.
7. M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 127–128; E. Graf,
“Religiöse und rechtliche Vorstellungen über Kriegsgefangene in Islam und Christentum”, Die
Welt des Islams, N.S., 8 (1962–63): 89–139 (104ff, 111ff); Rashad A. Khouri al Odetallah, ‘Aq a b « Ö
j a i Bt za ns i noi´. S o p q o ´ b k g l a s x n a i v l a k x ´ s x n p ok « ´ l ot (Arabs and Byzantines. The Problem of the
Prisoners of War) (Thessalonike, 1983), p. 27. Cf. Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 601–605 and the
rest of the relevant studies included in La liberazione dei ‘captivi‘ tra Cristianità e Islam …, as above
(note 5).
8. Leon VI, Taktika, Const. XVI, 11, Patrologia Graeca 107, vol. 909 (j a i` l a ´ k i r s a s ot ` Ö « ’nd o ´ xo t Ö j a i`
l « c a ´ k o t Ö p a q a ` s o i˜Ö p o k « l ió i Ö ’o ńs a Ö « ’nh t l o t ´ l « no Ö s o ` ’a ´ d g k o n s g ˜ Ö s t ´ v g Ö , j a i` s o ` p a k ińs q op on x ‘ Ö « ’ p i`
s o ` p o k t ` s g ˜ Ö ni´j g Ö ‘iń’ ’« ´v g Ö , « ’i ´ c « r t l b g ˜ ’g ` s x ˜ n t ‘ p o ` r « ` s i na ` Ö j q a s g h g ˜ na i , ’g ` j a ´ r s q ot c « n« ´ r h a i i’ d iót
r ot ‘a ´k x r i n, d i ’ a t ’ s x ˜ n a ’ ns i j a s a k k a ´ s s « i n j a i` a ’ na j a k « i˜r h a i s a ´ , x ‘ Ö « ’i j óÖ , r t l b a ińons a g ‘ s s g ´ l a s a . j a i`
a ’ ns i` s x ˜ n p o k « l i´x n a i’v l a k x ´ s x n a ’ na k a ´ b g ½ Ö s o t ` Ö u i´k o t Ö j a i` r t l l a ´ v o t Ö ). Cf. Leon VI, Sylloge
Tacticorum, ed. A. Dain (Paris, 1938), 50.6, 50.8. Concerning the treatment of war prisoners by
the Byzantine Law, see D. Letsios, “Die Kriegsgefangenschaft nach Auffassung der Byzantiner”,
Byzantinoslavica 53 (1992): 213–227.
9. See Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”; Rashad A. Khouri, 79–82.
10. Pseudo-Symeon, 760 (lines 3–4). Concerning Abū Firās and the rest Arab and Byzantine eminent
prisoners of war, see Sophia Patoura, Oi a i v l a ´ k x s oi x Ö p a q a ´ c ons « Ö « p i j oi nx niá Ö j a i
p k g q o fo ´ q g r g Ö (4o Ö –10o Ö a i .) (The Prisoners as Communication and Information Factors (4th–
10th centuries) [the National Hellenic Research Foundation, Institute for Byzantine Research]
(Athens, 1994), pp. 93–97, 101, 111–124.
11. Patoura, 119–120. Cf. G. Schlumberger, Un empereur byzantin au dixième siècle. Nicéphore Phocas
(Paris, 1923), pp. 377–378, 382–383. Leon Diaconos, Historiae, ed. C. Hase, Leonis Diaconi
Historiae [CSHB] (Bonn, 1828), pp. 75 (line 6)–77 (line 2), provides information about the way
of his liberation.
12. Skylitzes, 241 (line 24–27); Matthew of Edessa, transl. A.E. Dostourian, The Chronicle of Matthew
of Edessa (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972), pp. 17–18. Cf. Bar Hebraeus,
173–174 (Melias’ death caused by a disease). See also G. Schlumberger, L’épopée byzantine à la n
du dixième siècle. Jean Tzimiscès. Les jeunes années de Basile II le tueur des Bulgares (969–976) (Paris,
1896), pp. 259–261 and note 1 (who also mentions Abū l-Fidā’s statement that Melias was
poisoned after one year of imprisonment according to the caliph’s order, as well as the quite
opposite aspect, that the Arabs made in vain serious efforts to cure him from the disease, expressed
by Ibn al-Athõ¯r); M. Canard, Histoire de la dynastie des H‘amdanides de Jazȭra et de Syrie (Paris,
1953), pp. 776, 842; A. Vasiliev (ed. M. Canard), Byzance et les Arabes, II/i, La dynastie
macédonienne (Bruxelles, 1968), pp. 350–352; Khouri, 112–113, who justi es the Arabic sources
without any doubt and Patoura, 116–118. However, the number “forty” concerning Melias’
of cers could be symbolic and initiated by the forty martyrs of Sebasteia, who had suffered during
Likinios’ reign, and were honoured as patrons of the Byzantine army, or even the martyrs of
Amorion (see H. Grégoire, “Notes épigraphiques”, Byzantion 8 (1933): 79–88 (80–83). Cf. the
comments of P. Nikitin in: Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 130, 274–275, concerning the in uence of the
hagiological texts written for the forty martyrs of Sebasteia on some of the Martyrion texts praising
the martyrs of Amorion).
13. T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII: 116, 119. Cf. Martyrion text D , 44 (lines 17–18), Martyrion text M, Ch. 12 (lines
38–41) and Martyrion P, 157. Rosser, 241, misinterprets T ½ abarõ¯ and considers that only the
forty-two martyrs to be were saved among the rest of the prisoners who were following the caliph’s
army.
14. Theoph. Cont., 131 (lines 7–16); Genesios, 46 (lines 87–95); Skylitzes, 78 (line 42)–79 (line 49);
Zonaras, 3 (lines 4–11) 79 (both Skylitzes and Zonaras mention that Theophilos offered only 24
kentenaria). According to Bar Hebraeus, 138, the caliph demanded the hand over of the Persian
(Kurd according to others) defector Nas½ r/Theophobos and the domestikos of the Scholae Manouel,
as a presupposition for “peace”. Neither Bar Hebraeus nor Michael the Syrian, 96, refer to an
exchange against money. Cf. Vasiliev, I: 174–175, 413–417; Rosser, 242–243.
15. See Mas‘ūdõ¯, 336, who mentions that the exchange of the Sozopetra citizens took place just in 845.
Concerning both Theophilos’ expeditions, in 831 and 837 (against Sozopetra and Arsamosata),
see Vasiliev, I: 103–105, 137–142; Rosser, 154–155, 193–200; Treadgold, 275, 292–294. For the
fate of Arab prisoners, see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 588–590, 615, table II.
16. See Michael the Syrian, 102; Bar Hebraeus, 139 (both contain the obscure indication: “and there
was peace”). See Vasiliev, I: 176.
17. See, pp. 151–153.
18. See Aikaterine Christophilopoulou, Bt za ns i ng ` Ïr s oq iá (Byzantine History), volume II(i) (Thessa-
lonike, 1993), p. 206, note 2.
19. Martyrion text B, 13 (lines 6–10), text C , 29 (lines 32–34).
20. See the Martyrion text D , 52 (lines 7–9) and E, 59 (lines 19–22) (« ’ s « k « i x ´ h g r a n d « ` o i‘ ‘a ć i o i
s « r r a q a ´ j o ns a d t ´ o l a ´ q s t q « Ö l g ni` Ma q s i´x ½ & 9 ’i nd i j s i x ˜ noÖ H9 « ’n ’« ´s « i 9 & S NC 9 , b a r i k « t ´ o ns o Ö s g ˜ Ö
¨Rx l a i´x n a ’ q v g ˜ Ö Mi v a g ` k j a i` H« o d x ´ q a Ö j a i` H« ´ j k g Ö …) and the point of view of W. Treadgold,
“The chronological accuracy of the Chronicle of Symeon the Logothete for the years 813–845”,
Dumbarton Oaks Papers 33 (1979): 157–197 (185), where he supports the fact that 845 represents
the year of the martyrdom.
21. See below p. 145 and note 26. It must be considered as certain that such efforts had been also
made earlier, as they represented stable tactics of both opponents, Christians and Muslims, trying
to change the prisoners’ faith by offering them security and several facilitations. But in this case,
this was an ultimatum. See below p. 147 and note 47; M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of
Islam (Baltimore, 1955), p. 127; Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, O b t za ns i no ´ Ö i « q o ´ Ö p o ´ k « l oÖ . H « ´ nno i a
j a i g p q o b o k g ´ s o t h q g r j « t s i j o t ´ p o k « ´ l o t r s o Bt za ´ ns i o [Ir s oq i j « ´ Ö Mo no c q a fi´« Ö 10] (The
Byzantine “Holy War”. The Idea and Propagation of Religious War in Byzantium) (Athens, 1991),
pp. 273–274. Compare for example with T ½ abarõ¯’s narration, The History of al-Tabarȭ, trans. J.
Kraemer, volume XXXIV (Albany, 1989) (hereafter: T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV), pp. 138, 165, and Bar
Hebraeus, 144–145. However, the information of both authors, that Theodora (or the logothetes tou
dromou Theoktistos) ordered the execution of 12,000 prisoners, because they refused to accept
Christian religion (T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 43; Bar Hebraeus, 142), is considered by Vasiliev, I: 225, quite
correctly according to my opinion, to be particularly doubtful (it must be noted that everything
that Bar Hebraeus writes, in the above mentioned passages, is rather obscure). For the conversion
procedures and the living conditions of the Christians in the Islamic territory see M. Gervers and
R.J. Bikhazi (eds.), Conversion and Continuity. Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands.
Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries [Papers in Medieval Studies 9] (Toronto, 1990).
22. The Martyrion text K is dated in the tenth century, as it is found in the imperial Menologion (the
book of monthly feasts of the Orthodox Church) B of the codex Athoniticus Koutloumousiou 23,
which has been dated by Th. Detorakis, “H v q o no k o ´ c g r g s o t a t s o j q a s o q i j o t ´ l g no k o c ió t s o t B.
Latysev” (The dating of the imperial calendar by B. Latysev), Byzantinische Zeitschrift 83 (1990):
46–50. For the dating of the rest of the Martyrion texts, see Kotzampassi, 120–128, where there
are stated all the above-mentioned points of view.
23. See Fr Halkin, “L’hagiographie byzantine au service de l’histoire”, Proceedings of the XIIIth
International Congress of Byzantine Studies (Oxford, 5–10 September 1966) [Main Papers, XI]
(London, 1967), pp. 345–354; Evelyne Patlagean, “Ancienne hagiographie byzantine et histoire
sociale”, Annales 23 (1968): 106–126; E. Gamillscheg, “Historische Gegebenheiten im Spiegel
hagiographischer Texte”, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 25 (1976): 1–23 (mainly 1–2,
22 and note 3); Constantina Mentzou-Meimaris, “The life of saint’s biographers in the Middle and
Late Byzantine period”, Septième Congrès International d’Études de Sud-Est Européen (Thessalonique,
29 août–4 Septembre 1994) (Athènes, 1994), pp. 547–601 (551–555).
24. U q ot q a ˜½ l « ` n s o t ` Ö … a ’ q v g c o t ` Ö s x ˜ n r s q a s « t l a ´ s x n r j o s « i ng ½˜ s i ni j a i` d t r x d « r s a ´ s g ½ j a i` d i p k a r iá i Ö j a i`
s q i p k a r iá i Ö r i d g q op « ´ d a i Ö j a i` s g ½˜ s x ˜ n xt ´ k x n j a h « i´q x« i r t n« r fi c l « ´ not Ö « ’ na p os i´h « s a i , b q a v « i˜ d « ´ s i ni
’a ´q s x ½ j a i` b q a v t s « ´ q x ½ ‘t ´d a s i s o t ´ s o t Ö « ’ ns « i k a ´ l « no Ö s i l x q « i˜r h a i , ft ´ k a j a Ö j a i` s g q g s a ` Ö « ’ c j a h i´r s g r i n
x ‘ Ö l g ´ s i na p k g ` n s x ˜ n fq o t q « ´ x n s o t ´ s o i Ö p q o r o l i k g ˜ r a i . … o t ’ c a ` q s o r o t ´ s o t l « s « i˜v o n ‘t ´d a s oÖ ‘o ´r o n s x ˜ n
o ’ fh a k l x ˜ n p q o « ´ v o n s o ` d a ´ j q t o n. o t ’ s o r o t ´ s o t l « s « k a ´ l b a no n ’a ´q s ot … , ‘o ´r o n s g ˜ Ö a t ’ s x ˜ n r a q j o ` Ö
t ‘ fa i q o t ˜ ns o a ‘i fh « i˜q « ´ Ö s « j a i` o ‘i l t ´ « Ö j a i` s a ` « ’ p i` c g ˜ Ö zx t ´¨fi a ’i k t r p x ´ l « na . j k ińg a t ’ s o i˜Ö g ‘ c g ˜ , j a i`
t ‘ p o r s q x ´ l a s a g ‘ d t r x ´ d g Ö j a i` k « p s o s a ´ s g j o ´ ni Ö … . ©E j d « ` s o t ˜ r j o ´ s o t Ö o t ’ d « ` « ’ n a t ’ s g ˜½ l « r g l b q iá ½ s a ` Ö
a ’ k k g ´ k x n ’o ´w « i Ö a ’ j q i b x ˜ Ö « ’ p i c nx ´ na i g ’ d t ´ na ns o … . Ot ’ r t n« v x q « i˜s o a t ’ s o i˜Ö p q o r « k h « iñ b a k a n« i´x ½ , o t ’ j
a ’ p o j « i˜q a i s g ˜ Ö j o ´ l g Ö s o ` p « q i s s o ´ n, o t ’ v t ‘p o j a h i´r a i a ’ j s iña Ö g ‘ k i a j a ´ Ö … . [(The caliph) put the leaders
of the troops in a dark, extremely dirty prison bound up with double and triple iron and wooden
bonds. He ordered that—as a punishment—they would get only restricted portion of bread and even
more restricted portion of water and he placed guardians, so that the prisoners could talk only to the
custodians. … The water they got was less than their tears, the bread … was less than the esh of the
lice, the mice and the small animals of the earth, dirty with mud, exerted from them. The ground was
their bed and the stinking and extremely ne dust was their mattress … . It was
so dark, that even at noon they could not see each other … . They were not allowed to visit a bath,
to cut their hair, to expose themselves to the sunrays.] (Martyrion text Z, 65 [lines 11–27]). Cf. text
A, 1 (line 15)–2 (line 3), M, Ch. 14 (line 11) and Theoph. Cont., 132 (lines 1–8). Concerning both:
the two Martyrion groups and the relation between the Martyrion texts, see Kotzampassi, 113–120,
who does not though refer to their differentiation related to the caliph’s presence or not, during
the execution (see below, p. 150), and on the duration of their imprisonment. Concerning the
living conditions of the prisoners see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 599–600.
25. Martyrion text B, 12 (lines 28–31), C , 29 (lines 32–33), P, 157 and D , 44 (lines 23–24).
26. Martyrion text A, 2 (line 7)–6 (line 36), B, 13 (line 6)–20 (line 33), C , 30 (line 16)–35 (line 13),
D , 44 (line 27)–50 (line 13), Z, 66 (line 1)–76 (line 18), M, Ch. 15 (line 1), Ch. 38 (line 6), P,
157–160. The disputatious dialogues between the martyrs and the caliph’s representatives are,
apparently, created by the author (cf. also Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 278).
27. J. Bury, A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene (395–800), volume II (London,
1965), pp. 272–273.
28. Theoph. Cont., 131 (lines 10–11); Genesios, 48 (lines 90–91); Skylitzes, 78 (lines 42–44);
Zonaras, 379 (lines 7–8).
29. Kallistos had not fought in Amorion, but he was captured (844/845) ghting against the Paulicians
and rendered to the caliph, who ordered him to be imprisoned together with the prisoners from
Amorion. See Martyrion text C , 29 (lines 10–32); P. Lemerle, “L’histoire des Pauliciens d’Asie
Mineure d’après les sources grècques”, Travaux et Mémoires 5 (1973): 1–144 (Essais sur le monde
byzantin [London, 1980], IV), at pp. 89–91. In particular, for Kallistos, his rank and the family of
Melissenoi see the comments of P. Nikitin in Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 215–218. The Martyrion text C
is especially devoted to Kallistos, whereas his relation with the family of Melissenoi is stated by D ,
50 (lines 5–6) (Ka ´ k k i r s o n r p a h a ´ q i o n j a s a ` s ot ` Ö M« k i r r « i no t ` Ö k « c o ´ l « no n). Concerning Konstanti-
nos Baboutzikos and the rest of the of cers, see above, note 3.
30. See p. 41, where it is clearly mentioned the presence of the eminent Arabs at this exchange, to each
of whom al-Wāthiq offered a horse and 1000 dirhams [silver coins, see entry in G.C. Miles,
“Dirham”, Encyclopédie de l’Islam, volume II (Leiden, 1965), 2nd edn], apparently as a compen-
sation.
31. See Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, note 73.
32. See the relevant statement of T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 39–40. Cf. Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 591 with
note 29.
33. Pseudo-Symeon, 654 (lines 16–20), Georg. Monachos Cont., 815 (lines 7–18). See also Vasiliev,
I: 196 with note 2: ‘Amr accompanied the great raid of Abū-Sa‘õ¯d until the Opsikion thema.
34. Vasiliev, I: 193–196, 204–205; E. Eickhoff, Seepolitik zwischen Islam und Abendland (Berlin, 1966),
pp. 180–181. Cf. the description of Ibn al-Athõ¯r (Vasiliev, I): 363, who mentions the loss of 10,000
Byzantines in the same year, during the siege and the capture of one of Sicily’s cities, the name
of which in Arabic is given as S-r-h.
35. T½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 39; Ya‘qūbõ¯, 275. See also Vasiliev, I: 199–203. For the deputation exchanges
and generally the Byzantine–Arab relations see H. Kennedy, “Byzantine–Arab diplomacy in the
Near East from the Islamic conquests to the mid-eleventh century”, in Byzantine Diplomacy, Papers
from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge 1990, eds. J. Shepard and
S. Franklin (Aldershot/Brook eld, 1992), pp. 133–143.
36. T½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 40, 41. According to other statements the number of prisoners, who were
exchanged, reached 4600 or 4460 (see above, 41, 42). Concerning the number of the exchanged
prisoners, see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 591–592 and 615, table II.
37. It must be noted that an exchange represented a very important event for the Arabs (I refer to
them because the relative statements come mainly from Arabic sources) during which a great
number of people and army was gathered [see the narration of Mas‘ūdõ¯ for the exchange of
804/805, which is repeated by Maqrõ¯zõ¯ and the analysis of Maria Campagnolo-Pothitou , “Les
échanges de prisonniers entre Byzance et l’Islam aux IXe et Xe siècles”, Journal of Oriental and
African Studies 7 (1995): 1–56 (15, 34–36)]. At this exchange, there were present according to
T½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 41, 4000 Arab soldiers; on the other hand Ya‘qūbõ¯, 275–276, gives (though
exaggerating) 70,000 soldiers. The exchange procedures de nitely needed an important time
interval to be prepared.
38. T½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 39–40; Ibn al-Athõ¯r, in: Vasiliev, I: 353; Bar Hebraeus, 140.
39. T½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 39–40, states that al-Wāthiq gave an order to buy the slaves from the areas of
Baghdad and Raqqa, but Bar Hebraeus, 140, mentions that the slaves came “from all the border
lines”, meaning, probably, the areas near the Islamic border with the Empire, where it was most
probable to nd the Byzantine prisoners.
40. The calculations were based on: (a) the routes described by Ibn H ½ awqal, Con guration de la terre,
trans. J.H. Kramers and J. Wiet (Beyrouth/Paris, 1964), I: 129, 183–184, 190–191, 203, who
counts the speci c distances in day duration, (b) the routes suggested by F. Hild, Das byzantinische
Strassensystem in Kappadokien [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 2] (Wien, 1977) (mainly route C1,
pp. 77–103 as well as picture 1 and maps of the routes); K. Belke and N. Mersich, Phrygien und
Pisidien [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 7] (Wien, 1990), pp. 139–143; F. Hild and H. Hellenkemper,
Kilikien und Isaurien, as above (note 6), 132–133, and (c) the distances of several routes related
with the movement velocities (derived from different sources), which are included in I. Dim-
itroukas, Reisen und Verkehr im Byzantinischen Reich vom Anfang des 6. Jhr. bis zur Mitte des 11. Jhr.
[Historical Monographs 18] (Athens, 1997), I: 158, note 100, 244; II: 585–599 and I. Dim-
itroukas, E nd « i´x« i Ö c i a s g d i a ´ q j « i a s x n v « q r a i´x n s a xi d i x ´ n j a i l « s a j i ng ´ r « x n r s o Bt za ´ ns i o 6 –11
o Ö o Ö
a i .) (Indications for the duration of terrestrial travels and transportation in Byzantium [6th–11th
century]), Symmeikta 12 (1998): 7–42. Ibn H ½ awqal does not mention the duration of the route
Sāmarra–Takrõ¯t. The distance between them, however, is approximately 60 km. If we take into
account the fact that the traveller had to cross the river Tigris because the two cities were on the
opposite banks, he might have covered the distance in two days. The speed, at which the
deputations were moving, depends on various factors (the condition of the roads, the number of
the moving groups, the weather conditions, reasons for intensive marching or no etc.). There are
statements concerning velocities of 16.5 km/day, but also of 40–50 km/day in cases where the
deputations were low numbered and ordered to move quickly in areas such as Asia Minor, Syria,
Upper Mesopotamia. If we take into account the fact that Ah½ mad’s mission was speci c and the
armistice and exchange procedures had already been agreed, we can assume that this deputation
group was of low number and thus easily mobile, supported by the imperial services when moving
in the Byzantine territory and able to cover about 40–50 km/day, though there was no actual need
of haste. Concerning the road system of Asia Minor, see also Vryonis, 31–34.
41. Dimitroukas, I: 246; Hild, 33; Hild and Hellenkemper, 130–131 (route A1, A–A2).
42. Concerning the prisons of Constantinople see Kalliopi Mpourdara, “Oi Bt za ns i n« ´ Ö ft k a j « ´ Ö ” (the
Byzantine prisons) in Ë c j k g l a j a i s i l x q iá r s o Bt za ´ ns i o , ed. Sp. Troianos (Athens, 1997),
pp. 317–336 (319–322). Concerning the place and the imprisonment conditions of the prisoners
of war see Khouri, 79–82; Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 599–600.
43. See pp. 40 and 41 (Abu Quah½ t½aba (Ah½ mad) reported—he was the emissary … to the Byzantine
ruler whose task was to examine the number of prisoners and to ascertain the accuracy of what
Michael, the Byzantine ruler, claimed—that the number of the Muslims prior to the exchange was
3000 men, 500 women, and children, who were in Constantinople and elsewhere, save those
whom the Byzantines brought forth … ).
44. See Constantini Porphyrogeniti De Cerimoniis Aulae Byzantinae, ed. Io. Reiske (Bonn, 1829), Book
II: chapter 15, pp. 570 (line 11)–592 (line 19), where the reception (d o v g ´ ) of the ambassadors took
place on 31 May of the fourth indictio, whereas the circus ceremony was held on 6 August, day of
the Trans guration and the invitation (j k g s x ´ q i o n) on the ninth of the same month.
45. See F. Tinnefeld, “Ceremonies for foreign ambassadors at the court of Byzantium and their
political background”, Byzantinische Forschungen 19 (1993): 193–213 (195–196, 206). The meet-
ing of the ambassadors with the Emperor (in this case the Augusta Theodora) was usually
preceded by a rather time-consuming procedure: they had to pose a request for their reception,
which was accepted and enabled them nally to be of cially presented (see as above, p. 206; cf.
De cerimoniis … , as above, I: 89 and 90, pp. 402 (line 10)–410 (line 3).
46. According to relevant estimations the Byzantine ambassadors should have started their travel,
bringing peace and exchange proposals, at the latest in November–December of 844. The big
time-span between the beginning of the negotiations and the nal exchange should not be
considered as exaggerated, but apparently the usual one required by the necessary procedures. See
for example T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 156 and 168, where it is noted that the needed time interval between
the initial and the nal phase of the exchange of 860, exceeded one year, probably 14–16 months.
Cf. Ibn al-Athõ¯r, 319–320.
47. Andronikos Doukas, for example, together with his son Konstantinos and some of his relatives and
friends, were forced “to abjure their faith, because they were incapable of tolerating the hardships
of imprisonment” (Skylitzes, 187 [lines 91–94]; cf. Theoph. Cont., 373 [lines 8–11]; Pseudo-
Symeon, 711 [lines 8–10]; Georg. Monachos Cont., 868 [lines 3–5]; Zonaras, 451 [lines 9–13]),
although they had not been captured during a ght, but had taken refuge in the Caliphate after
Samona’s conspiracy and their rebellion against Leon VI, in 906–7. On this subject, see A.
Vasiliev, II/i: 184–189, and mainly D. Polemis, The Doukai. A Contribution to Byzantine Prosopog-
raphy (London, 1968), pp. 17–21. See also above, pp. 142–143, concerning the case of Konstanti-
nos Phokas, and T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 165, for the Byzantine patrician, who was handed over by
the inhabitants of Loulon, together with their city, to al-Mutawakkil in 860. The patrician was
threatened with execution, if he did not convert to Islam, but he did not yield. Finally, the Arabs
exchanged him for 1000 Muslims (see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, note 73 and 615, pl. II).
48. This body initially numbered approximately 4000 soldiers, who quickly reached 70,000. See
Patricia Crone, Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of Islamic Polity (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 74–85; D.
Pipes, Slaves Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, 1981); S. Sabari,
Mouvements populaires à Bagdad à l’époque Abbaside, IXème–XIème siècles (Paris, 1981), pp. 43–45;
H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates. The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the
Eleventh Century (London/New York, 1986), pp. 158–159.
49. See M. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh, 1972), pp. 58–71; A.
Giannoulatos, Ir k a ´ l . Vq g r j « i ok oc i j g ´ « p i r j o ´ p g r i Ö (Islam. An Overview on the Science of
Religion) (Athens, 1979), pp. 160–162, 236–237; see the entry D. Gimaret, “Mu‘tazila”, Encyclo-
paedia of Islam, volume VII (Leiden, 1992), 2nd edn, pp. 783–793, with the most recent
bibliography.
50. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … , 163.
51. See the entry M. Hinds, “Mih½ na”, Encyclopédie de l’Islam, volume VII (Leiden, 1993), 2nd edn,
pp. 3–6. Cf. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … ,163–164; Patricia Crone and
M. Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge, 1986),
pp. 92–96.
52. These reactions towards al-Mu‘tas½ im’s policy were the main reason why he transported the capital
from Baghdad to Sāmarra, situated on the bank of the river Tigris about 120 km north of Baghdad.
Sāmarra had represented the governmental centre till 892, when it was abandoned by al-Mu‘tas½ im,
and Baghdad became the capital once again. When al-Mutawakkil (232–247/847–861) ascended
the throne, he took dimensions from the policy of his predecessors not only in the religious domain
but also in the choice of the members of his government and abolished the “interrogation”
(mih½ na). See Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … , 164–165, 168–170; A.
Northedge, “Sāmarra”, Encyclopedie de l’Islam, volume VIII (Leiden, 1995), 2nd edn, pp. 1074–
1076. Cf. also the description of Ibn H ½ awqal, 236. See also below, note 59.
53. Bar Hebraeus, 140, 141; Michael the Syrian, 113. T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 8–11, 15–16, relates such types
of al-Wāthiq’s prosecutions against high-ranked administrative of cers (843–844) with their lack
of devotion to him, a fact that probably indicates their refusal to accept the theological views of
their sovereign. According to Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … , 168, al-Wāthiq
was the only sovereign of the middle ‘Abbāsid period, who left so little traces of his, short termed
anyway, government that we cannot possibly get a clear picture of his personality. See K.V.
Zettersteen, “al-Wāthiq bi’llāh”, Encyclopédie de l’Islam, volume IV (Leiden, 1934), p. 1194.
54. T½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 38–39, 40; Mas‘ūdõ¯, 336; Bar Hebraeus, 141.
55. See T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 27–35 and note 88 (for the rest Arabic sources and the bibliography); W.W.
Muir, The Caliphate. Its Rise, Decline and Fall, ed. by T. H. Weir (New York, 1975 [ rst published
1924]), pp. 520–521; Crone, 182–183; Sabari, 102; H. Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate. A
Political History (London–Totowa, NJ, 1981), p. 80 and idem, The Prophet and the Age of the
Caliphates…, 164.
56. It must be noted that revolutions were taking place during the whole reign of al-Wāthiq in several
places of all his territory. Quite menacing were those of Syria–Palestine (842), the Arab peninsula
(844–846), but most of all that of Baghdad. See W. Muir, as above, and exactly below.
57. T½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 17–26. The armed collision started between 13 February to 13 March 845, but
the rebellion had started even earlier, since al-Wāthiq had already sent there a military detachment
in order to protect Medina. See also Muir, 520, Vasiliev, I: 198 (related to the general reaction and
discontent for the caliph’s politics) and the entry, M. Lecker, “Sulaym”, Encyclopédie de l’Islam,
volume IX (Leiden, 1997), 2nd edn, pp. 852–853.
58. See above, pp. 141–142 and note 6.
59. According to Martyrion text D , 46 (lines 24–26), the prisoners marched for about 15 hours, from 3
o’clock in the afternoon till the next morning, until they reached the execution place at the banks of
Tigris. This place was 100 stadions far (18 km approximately) from the place in Sāmarra, where they
were temporarily kept (see Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 201–202, 207). In Martyrion text A, 6 (line 16), text
Z, 75 (lines 18–19) and text M, Ch. 36 (lines 5–7) and Theoph. Cont., 133 (lines 18–20), who must
have followed their description, Euphrates is referred to as their execution place. This is an error of
the authors of these Martyria, who seem to ignore the transportation of the capital from Baghdad
(which is by Euphrates river) to Sāmarra, at that time interval. Cf. the view of P. Nikitin in:
Vasilievskij–Nikitin as above. Concerning the foundation of the city in 836 by Mu‘tas½ im, its
location by Tigris river and the reasons, which caused the transportation of the capital from
Baghdad to Sāmarra, see above, note 52.
60. At ’ s i´j a d « ` a ’ n’ ‘a ´ p a r a n s g ` n R t q iá n g ‘ … p « q i h « ´ o t r a fg ´ l g s g ` n ’a ´ h k g r i n j a s « l g ´ nt « n. … s g ˜ Ö c a ` q
fg ´ l g Ö … d i a d q a l ot ´ r g Ö , g ‘ k i j iá p a ˜ r a j a i` c « ´ ng r t l l i c g ˜ ©Aq a ´ b x n s « j a i` s x ˜ n j a h ’ g ‘ l a ˜ Ö j a i` « ‘ s « ´ q x n
« ’ p i d g l o t ´ ns x n « ’ h nx ˜ n, j a h a ´ p « q s i q ‘ « t ˜ l a b i´ a i on « ’ j s x ˜ n o ’i j i x ˜ n j a i` a ’ c q x ˜ n p q ov t h « ´ ns « Ö , p a q a ´ s a ` Ö
o’´v h a Ö s o t ˜ S ić q i d o Ö r t ng ½ « r a n p o s a l o t ˜ [Immediately, the rumour, owing through all over Syria,
made their (forthcoming) martyrdom known. After the rumour had spread, people of every age,
mixed races of Arabs and of our people, as well as of other nations that were staying there, gathered
together near the banks of Tigris over owing from the houses and the elds like a violent stream]
(B, 13 [lines 10–18]). Cf. Martyrion text A, 6 (lines 14–15), text B, 16 (lines 4–12), 20 (line 34),
text C , 33 (lines 1–3), text Z, 75 (lines 17–18), text M, Ch. 36 (lines 3–5). See also note 65.
61. P, 5 (lines 17–20), 72 (lines 24–28), Ch. 30 (lines 1–7), respectively. Concerning the imprison-
ment of the martyrs at Tarsus, see also above p. 158 and note 6.
62. Since, as we have seen above (p. 146), the distance between Tarsus and Sāmarra was calculated
to 42 days, we must assume that the transfer of the eminent prisoners must have started around
the end of January 845, when it was also decided that there would be made just one more nal
effort for their conversion.

63. Of course, the rush of such crowds in cases of miracles accomplished by saints either during their
life or at the moment of their death, is quite common place in the hagiographical texts, the authors
of which aim at the promotion of the recognition of their holiness by crowds of believers. This is,
probably, the reason why the author of Martyrion text B (13 [lines 10–26], 16 [lines 13–17], 20
[line 34]–21 [line 5]) mainly emphasises the presence of Christians at the execution, which means
he wants to point out the effect exercised on the Christian crowd by the strength of the Byzantine
of cers’ belief and their immediate recognition as saints. However, the presence of a great number
of Arabs is also clearly stated here, as well as in the other Martyrion texts (see note 60).
64. B, 13 (lines 27–30), 15 (lines 27–28); C , 31 (lines 21–24), 32 (lines 20–21); D , 46 (line 17)–47
(line 9); P, 158 and A, 5 (lines 17–19), 6 (line 17ff.); Z, 72 (lines 24–26), 75 (line 15)–76 (line
2); M, Ch. 30, 1–3 and Ch. 36. The authors of the Martyrion texts with the word p q x s o r t ´ l b o t k o Ö
indicate the caliph. Concerning the vizier Ibn al-Zayyāt, who became of cer during al-Mu‘tas½ im’s
reign and also kept his of ce during al-Wāthiq’s reign, see entry in D. Sourdel, “Ibn al-Zayyāt”,
Encyclopédie de l’Islam, volume III (Leiden, 1970), 2nd edn, p. 999.
65. P. Nikitin, in Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 201–202, takes for granted the presence of the Arab sovereign
at the execution of the prisoners. See also, for example, the presence of al-Mu¨tas½ im at the
execution of the rebel Bābak (T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII: 86–88).
66. Martyrion text Z, 66 (lines 27–31); see also text A, 2 (lines 18–21); text M, Ch. 17 (lines 3–9) (E i’
d « ` j a ì l « h o ´ d o t d i a p o q « ˜i s « , p x ˜ Ö ’a ń s o r o t ´ s x n « ’ c j q a s « ˜i Ö a ’ c a h x ˜ n c « ´ ng r h « , d i d a ´ xo l « n r fo ´ d q a
fi k a nh q x ´ p x Ö . t ‘ p o j q i h « ´ ns « Ö t ‘ l « i˜Ö p « q i s l g ´ h g s « j a i` a t ’ s x ½˜ d g ` s x ½˜ p q x s o r t l b o t ´ k x ½ r t n« t ´ xa r h « ·
’« ´p « i s a , l t q i´ x n t ‘ p ’ « ’ j « ińo t l « s a r v o ´ ns « Ö a ’ c a h x ˜ n, « ’ n j a i q x ½˜ p o k « ´ l o t f« t j s « ´ o n t ‘ l iñ p q o ` Ö s g ` n
h q g r j « iá n t ‘ l x ˜ n j a i` s o ` ’« ´h noÖ j a i` o ‘t ´s x ni j g s a i` l « s a ` ni´j g n j a i` h a t l a r s oi` p a q a ` p a ˜ r i n
« ’p a n« k « t ´ r « r h « ).
67. P, 132 (line 15)–133 (line 2).
68. Martyrion text M (lines 136–137), Ch. 15 (lines 10–16) (Ot ’ d « ` n c a ` q ’« ´q c on « ’ d o ´ j « i s x ½˜ d « i nx ½˜ ’a ´q v o ns i
« ´ j « ińx ½ s g ` n ‘o ´k g n p a q a r s g ´ r a r h a i p o ´ k i n, l « c a ´ k g n o ‘t ´s x Ö o t ˜’ r a n j a i` p k ot ´ s x ½ b q i´h ot r a n. s o ` d « ` s ot ` Ö
a ‘ c iót Ö a ’ na p « i˜r a i s o t ´ s o t Ö a ’ p o l a h « iñ s g ` n « t ’ r « ´ b « i a n, s o t ˜ s o p q a ˜ c l a « ’ no l i´z« s o l ng ´ l g Ö ’a ´xi o n j a i`
p o k k g ` n a t ’ s x ½˜ d t na ´ l « no n p « q i p o i g ˜ r a i s g ` n « ’t ´j k « i a n, « ’ i` j a i` p ok k x ½˜ l « i˜zo n ’« ´fa r j « n « ˜’i na i s a ` Ö w t v a ` Ö
ni j g ˜ r a i l a ˜ k k o n ’g ´ r x ´ l a s a ). See also text A, 2 (lines 12–13) and text Z, 66 (lines 8–13).
69. See Kotzampassi, 120–123.
70. See note 3 concerning the Greek sources and literature; Ya‘qūbõ¯, 275 (who considers Aetios as the
uncle of Theophilos); T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII: 109–110, 115–116; Mas‘ūdõ¯, 332. See also H. Grégoire,
“Inscriptions historiques Byzantines”, Byzantion 4 (1927–1928): 437–446 (443–444); G. Schlum-
berger, Sigillographie de l’Empire Byzantin (Paris, 1884), pp. 340–341; R. Guilland, Recherches, as
above (note 3), who considers that, in fact, he suffered the martyrdom together with the rest of the
Amorion martyrs.
71. See below. This has also been noted by P. Nikitin in Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 202–204, who used it
as a means to show the greater reliability of the Martyrion texts versus the historical sources. Till
now, however, it has not attracted the researchers’ attention. Kotzampassi, 150, simply notices that
Aetios was not mentioned by Evodios, the author of Martyrion text Z.
72. Cf. p. 143 Nikitin, as above and p. 214. Concerning these martyrs see also above, notes 3 and 29,
as well as the following footnote.
73. Text D , 46 (line 2)–48 (line 12), 50 (lines 1–13). Cf. text P, 158–160; text C , 29 (lines 29–31),
where there is no reference to Aetios’ name in the passages describing the moment of meeting of
the just captured Kallistos (see above, note 29) with the rest captives from Amorion in prison. An
attempt to interpret the exact functions of dromeus (“runner”), the presence of Vassois among the
defenders of Amorion and the martyrs, and his place in the Byzantine army, was made by P.
Nikitin, in his comments (see Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 207–210).
74. See Pseudo-Symeon, 638 (line 23)–639 (line 23), Georg. Monachos Cont., 805 (lines 14–22).
75. Theoph. Cont., 126 (lines 3–14): Po k k x ˜ n o t ˜’ n r t l b ot k « t o ´ ns x n l « s oi j g ˜ r a i s o ` n « ’ n ©Al o q i´x ½ o i’j o t ˜ ns a
k a o ` n … , ’a ´s o p o n l « ` n « ’ fa iń« s o s o t ˜ s o s x ½˜ V« o fi´k x ½ j a i` ’a ńa d q on, j a k o ` n d « ` j a i` p q o ` Ö a ’ nd q « iá n « ’t ó d o n
s o ` l a ˜ k k o n « ’ p o v t q x ˜ r a i a t ’s o ` j a i` r s q a s g c o t ˜ c « nna ió t d i a r x ˜ r a i b o t k a i˜Ö . ©A« ´ s i oÖ g ˜’ n o t ˜’ s o Ö p a s q i´j i o Ö
j a i` s x ˜ n ©Ana s o k i j x ˜ n r s q a s g c o ´ Ö . … ©E p i` s ot ´ s oi Ö « ’ d i´d o t d g ` g ‘ c « l o ´ na Ö j a i` ’a ´q v o ns a Ö s o t ` Ö l « s a ` b q a v t `
l a q s t q g ´ r o ns a Ö , V« o ´ d x q o ´ n s « s o ` n Kq a s « q o ` n j a i` V« ófi k o n j a i` s o ` n Ba b o t ´ s zi j o n o ‘i ´s i n« Ö o t ’ l o ´ no n
« ’ j « ińot s o t ˜ k a o t ˜ a ’ k k a ` j a i` s g ˜ Ö fa ´ k k a c c oÖ s x ˜ n s « r r a q a ´ j ons a d t ´ o l a q s t ´ q x n c « c o ´ na r i n a ’ q v g c oi´.
[Many advised Theophilos (the Byzantine emperor) to move the inhabitants away from Amorion
(at the announcement of the approaching of the Arab army). … This seemed to him an inappro-
priate and cowardly action, while right and easily leading to bravery would be to better fortify it
(the city) and save it by means of the willpower of a brave general. This general was the patrician
and general of the Anatolikon thema Aetios. In addition, he (the emperor) gave (them) as princes
and leaders, those who would soon afterwards become martyrs, Theodoros Krateros and
Theophilos and Vavoutzikos. These men became leaders not only of that army but also of the
phalanx of the forty-two martyrs.] It could be considered that Theophanes Continantus assumes
that among the forty-two martyrs, were only the last three leaders. Cf. Skylitzes, 75 (lines 32–41).
76. See 78 (lines 35–37).
77. See above, p. 145 and note 26.
78. See 376 (lines 13–17), 378 (line 15)–379 (line 4).
79. T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII: 115–116. Cf. Michael the Syrian, 99–100; Bar Hebraeus, 137. The narration of
T½ abarõ¯ seems to be con rmed by the up to now results of the excavations that have been carried
out in the area of Amorion and have proved the presence of a basilica, which at its rst phase bears
traces of a great re (see Lightfoot, 67). According to my opinion T ½ abarõ¯’s narration can be easily
correlated with the foundation of the above-mentioned basilica. Concerning the tower, which also
bears traces of re, see Lightfoot, 60–62.
80. T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII: 177. Concerning Bābak’s revolution and execution see the relevant entry in D.
Sourdel, “Bābak”, Encyclopédie de l’Islam, volume I (Leiden, 1960), 2nd edn, p. 867; M. Rekaya,
“Mise au point sur Theophobe et l’alliance de Bâbek avec Theophile (833/34–839/40)”, Byzantion
44 (1974): 43–67 (mainly 49–60).
81. T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIII: 84–88. Compare also the Persian variation of T ½ abarõ¯’s description, Chronique
de … Tabarõ̂ traduite sur la version persane d’Abou-‘Ali Mo‘hammed Bel‘ami … par H. Zotenberg,
volume IV (Paris, 1958; rst published 1874), p. 545. Both texts vary considerably, but none of
them mentions a simultaneous execution of Aetios and Bābak; neither do Michael the Syrian, 90
or Bar Hebraeus, 136.
82. See p. 332.
83. T ½ abarõ¯, XXXIV: 34, 119.
84. Martyr Aetios is included in the hagiology of the Orthodox Church, with the difference that his
name is referred among the forty martyrs of Sebasteia (see F. Halkin, Bibliotheca Hagiographica
Graeca II [Bruxelles, 1957], no. 1203, p. 98).
85. It must be noted, that this doctrine showed tolerance towards Christians and Jews (see Kennedy,
The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates …, 164.

KRASMULLER, The Rejection of Landed Property

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The Execution of the Forty-two Martyrs of Amorion:

The Fate of the Eminent Prisoners

Specifying the Problem

that the martyrs suffered “the usual hardships of a prisoner” (o i¨˜a c a ` q j a i` p a ´ r v « i

Negotiation Procedures for the Exchange of the Year 845

Taking as a sample the delegation of “Saracen friends”, which is described in the De

Religious and Political Developments in the Caliphate

provoked several reactions.

territory rather than give up and accept these conditions.54

The Execution of the Byzantine Of cers

period so it is possible to see this action as a demonstration of power on behalf of the

Aetios, the General of the Anatolikon thema

237/851–852, when caliph al-Mutawakkil ordered it to be rendered to his relatives so

Summarizing the Proposed Interpretation

effort for their conversion.

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KRASMULLER, The Rejection of Landed Property

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The Execution of the Forty-two Martyrs of Amorion:

The Fate of the Eminent Prisoners

Specifying the Problem

that the martyrs suffered “the usual hardships of a prisoner” (o i¨˜a c a ` q j a i` p a ´ r v « i

Negotiation Procedures for the Exchange of the Year 845

Taking as a sample the delegation of “Saracen friends”, which is described in the De

Religious and Political Developments in the Caliphate

provoked several reactions.

territory rather than give up and accept these conditions.54

The Execution of the Byzantine Of cers

period so it is possible to see this action as a demonstration of power on behalf of the

Aetios, the General of the Anatolikon thema

237/851–852, when caliph al-Mutawakkil ordered it to be rendered to his relatives so

Summarizing the Proposed Interpretation

effort for their conversion.

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The Execution of the Byzantine Of cers