Journal of Personality Assessment

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The Mentalization Scale (MentS): A Self-Report

Measure for the Assessment of Mentalizing
Capacity

Aleksandar Dimitrijević, Nataša Hanak, Ana Altaras Dimitrijević & Zorana

Jolić Marjanović

To cite this article: Aleksandar Dimitrijević, Nataša Hanak, Ana Altaras Dimitrijević & Zorana
Jolić Marjanović (2018) The Mentalization Scale (MentS): A Self-Report Measure for the
Assessment of Mentalizing Capacity, Journal of Personality Assessment, 100:3, 268-280, DOI:
10.1080/00223891.2017.1310730

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JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
2018, VOL. 100, NO. 3, 268–280
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2017.1310730

The Mentalization Scale (MentS): A Self-Report Measure for the Assessment

of Mentalizing Capacity
Aleksandar Dimitrijevi
c,1,2 Natasa Hanak,3 Ana Altaras Dimitrijevi
c,1 and Zorana Joli
c Marjanovi
c1
1
Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade, Serbia; 2International Psychoanalytic University, Berlin, Germany; 3Faculty of Special Education
and Rehabilitation, Unviersity of Belgrade, Serbia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The psychometric properties of a new 28-item self-report measure of mentalization, the Mentalization Received 28 October 2015
Scale (MentS), were examined in 2 studies: with a sample of employed adults and university students Revised 6 February 2017
(N1 D 288 C 278) and with a sample of persons with borderline personality disorder (BPD) and matched
controls (N2 D 62 C 62). Besides the MentS, both studies employed measures of attachment and the Big
Five; Study 1 also included assessments of empathy and emotional intelligence. MentS whole-scale
internal consistency was good in the community and acceptable in the clinical sample (a D .84 and .75,
respectively). A principal components analysis of Study 1 data yielded 3 interpretable factors, or subscales:
Self-Related Mentalization (MentS-S), Other-Related Mentalization (MentS-O), and Motivation to Mentalize
(MentS-M). These showed acceptable reliabilities (a D .74–.79), except for MentS-M in the clinical sample
(a D .60). MentS scores further exhibited a coherent pattern of correlations with cognate constructs and
the Big Five, relating positively to empathy, trait and ability emotional intelligence, openness, extraversion,
and conscientiousness, and negatively to attachment avoidance and anxiety, and neuroticism. Persons
with BPD scored significantly lower on MentS total and MentS-S. The proposed scale is thus deemed
suitable for quick, yet meaningful, assessments of mentalization in both individual differences research
and clinical contexts.

Mentalization is defined as “the mental process by which an
individual implicitly and explicitly interprets the actions of
himself and others as meaningful on the basis of intentional
mental states such as personal desires, needs, feelings, beliefs,
and reasons” (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, p. 21). It is conceptu-
ally closely aligned or even overlapping with such constructs as
empathy, social cognition, emotional intelligence (EI), and the-
ory of mind (ToM; Allen, 2006). However, unlike empathy and
social cognition, mentalization also involves self-reflection; it
goes beyond perceiving and understanding emotions (the realm
of EI) or attributing intentions, thoughts, and beliefs (the realm
of ToM), calling on various inner states and processes to inter-
pret manifest behavior.
Moreover, the concept of mentalization has spurred a dis-
tinctive and coherent line of research and clinical applications,
the main points of which can be summarized as follows:
1. The capacity to mentalize progresses along a distinctive
developmental trajectory (Fonagy & Allison, 2012).
2. Mentalization is closely related to the quality of attach-
ment (Fonagy & Target, 2008), with securely attached
persons displaying a superior capacity to mentalize com-
pared to those with insecure, particularly disorganized
patterns (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998).
3. Indicators of a well-developed mentalization capacity
include awareness of the nature of mental states, explicit
efforts to identify mental states underlying particular
behavior, recognition of developmental aspects of mental
states, and awareness of mental states in relation to the
interviewer (Holmes, 2006).
4. Signs of distorted mentalization are also established and
include a lack of interest in mental states, lack of imagi-
nation about the mental world of others, an emphasis on
external factors and behavioral descriptions, and loss of
awareness of the relationship between internal and exter-
nal reality (Fonagy & Target, 2008; Luyten, Fonagy,
Lowyck, & Vermote, 2011).
5. Mentalizing problems, just like insecure attachment,
might stem from a lack of parental sensitivity and failure
to foster the exploration of mental states in children
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2006).
6. Deficient mentalization seems to play an important role
in various mental disorders (for a detailed review, see
Bateman & Fonagy, 2011), and is particularly recognized
as a core feature of borderline personality disorder
(BPD), with BPD-diagnosed persons scoring signifi-
cantly lower than controls on an established measure of
mentalization.
7. Vice versa, mentalization is thought to promote mental
health and to be related with such qualities as resilience
(Stein, 2006).

CONTACT Aleksandar Dimitrijevi
c a.dimitrijevic@ipu-berlin.de International Psychoanalytic University, Stromstraße 3, 10555 Berlin, Germany.
Natasa Hanak is now at AWO Socio-Educational Institution for Children and Adolescents “Clearinghaus,” Dortmund, Germany.

© 2018 Taylor & Francis


8. Finally, according to a specific analysis of systematic clin-
ical interviews (Abu-Akel & Bo, 2013), there appear to be
significant gender differences in mentalization in favor of
women, as has repeatedly been evidenced for the related
construct of empathy.
Mentalization assessment
Although the construct of mentalization has solid research
and clinical underpinnings, its assessment is still fraught
with considerable challenges. For one, a review of instru-
ments used in mentalization assessment (Luyten & Fonagy,
2014; Luyten et al., 2011) reveals a habit of borrowing
measures actually designed to assess other constructs, such
as the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheel-
wright, 2004), originally intended to assess empathic capac-
ity, or the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence
Test Version 2.0 (MSCEITv2.0), which is in fact a direct
operationalization of the four-branch ability model of EI
(Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). Although there is an
obvious kinship between mentalization and these other con-
structs, their differences—briefly outlined in the opening
paragraph—should not be prematurely dismissed when it
comes to assessment. It seems a more reasonable approach
to operationalize mentalization adhering to its original
meaning and then validate it by locating its position within
the network of related constructs, than simply declare these
aspects of mentalization and, by virtue of common mea-
surement, blur any conceptual boundaries.
Efforts to develop specific measures of mentalization, on the
other hand, have resulted in time- and expertise-demanding
interview-based techniques, such as the Reflective Function
Scale (RFS)—an elaborate coding system allowing one to derive
a mentalization score from the Adult Attachment Interview
(AAI; Fonagy et al., 1998), as well as from the Parent Develop-
ment Interview, the Mentalization Stories Test for Adolescents,
or the Thematic Apperception Test (Luyten et al., 2011).
Although recognized as the gold standard in mentalization
assessment, the RFS is unsuitable for use in large-scale quanti-
tative research, and has actually only been validated in several
clinical studies (e.g., Bouchard et al., 2008; Fischer-Kern et al.,
2010; M€ uller, Kaufhold, Overbeck, & Grabhorn, 2006). We
therefore lack any information on how RFS-assessed mentaliza-
tion is related to massive differential-psychological constructs
(e.g., intelligence or the Big Five) or those conceptually most
akin to it (e.g., empathy, EI). Practically the same goes for the
Reflective Functioning Rating Scale (RFRS; Hill, Levy, Meehan,
& Reynoso, 2007; Meehan, Levy, Reynoso, Hill, & Clarkin,
2009): This 50-item instrument requires a competent observer
to judge various aspects of mentalization in another person,
and has thus been applied mostly in clinical contexts (e.g., eval-
uating the effects of psychotherapy), but barely beyond that.
The list thus boils down to one alternative interview-based
assessment procedure—the Brief Reflective Function Interview
(BRFI; Rudden, Milrod, & Target 2005). Requiring about
25 min of interview time, this procedure might actually be con-
sidered for use with larger samples, but has hitherto only been
validated with a small group (N D 27) of undergraduate partici-
pants (Rutimann & Meehan, 2012).
THE MENTALIZATION SCALE (MENTS) 269
Finally, a third path to mentalization assessment would
be to employ self-report measures based on an analysis of
the key indicators of the construct. Mentalization assess-
ment would thereby espouse the same idea that has been
fruitfully applied in the neighboring domain of EI research:
Performance measures demonstrate what one is capable of,
and self-reports tell us how much of that capability is expe-
rienced in daily life (Mikolajczak, Nelis, Hansenne, &
Quoidbach, 2008). In other words, self-report measures of
mentalization would make a valid complement to techni-
ques like the RFS; at the same time, they would be much
easier to apply with large samples, thus allowing mentaliza-
tion research in the vein of differential psychology.
Several commendable attempts have already been made to
create paper-and-pencil measures of mentalization based on
self-report, yet at each instance certain reliability, validity, or
applicability issues seem to have remained unresolved. To start
with, the Mentalization Questionnaire (MZQ; Hausberg et al.,
2012) is an instrument comprising four subscales with a total
of 15 items: Refusing Self-Reflection, Emotional Awareness,
Psychic Equivalence Mode, and Regulation of Affect. It was val-
idated in German on a large clinical sample and demonstrated
good total score reliability. Its subscales, however, are very
short, with reliabilities below .70. The instrument has not been
tested on a community sample, and in the 4 years since its pub-
lication, it has been employed in only three independent empir-
ical studies.
Next to appear was the Reflective Function Questionnaire
for Youths (RFQY; Ha, Sharp, Ensink, Fonagy, & Cirino,
2013). As its name reveals, the RFQY has been validated in a
sample of 12- to 17-year-olds, and is not intended for use with
adults. It is only very recently that this gap has been filled by
the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ; Badoud et al.,
2015; Fonagy et al., 2016). Through an impressive series of vali-
dation studies, its authors were able to show that the RFQ
correlates positively with related constructs (i.e., empathy,
mindfulness, and perspective-taking) and negatively with
indexes of psychopathology, while also discriminating between
persons with personality disorders and controls, and predicting
attachment. Still, it should be noted that this instrument com-
prises two fairly short subscales (six items each), namely
Certainty versus Uncertainty in the mental states of self and
others. Not only does this adversely affect internal consistencies
(which only approach the .70 threshold), but it also calls into
question the content validity of the instrument, which seems to
be tapping only some aspects of mentalization. Moreover, even
this huge endeavor remains entirely within the borders of
mentalization research as we know it, associating reflective
functioning with clinical phenomena, empathy, and attach-
ment, but failing to establish links with “mainstream” personal-
ity constructs (e.g., the Big Five).
The current studies: Testing a new self-report measure
of mentalization
In light of the foregoing, the purpose of this study was to
construct an easy-to-administer, reliable, self-report mea-
sure of mentalizaton, which would be comprehensively val-
idated on both a community and a clinical sample. Aware
270
HANAK, ALTARAS DIMITRIJEVIC,
DIMITRIJEVIC,
JOLIC

MARJANOVIC


of the difficulties imminent in such an endeavor, we
decided to proceed along two main guidelines. First, with
regard to the development of the instrument, we made it
imperative to stick to the original conception of mentaliza-
tion, without unduly narrowing or diluting its boundaries.
Second, in addressing validity questions, we saw it as our
aim to merge the traditional mentalization-research per-
spective with the broader viewpoint of differential psychol-
ogy. We thus sought to expand the list of probable
correlates of mentalization beyond “the usual suspects”
(i.e., attachment and BPD) to include other constructs such
as EI and the Big Five.
The instrument we propose here was originally developed in
Serbian and later translated into other languages, including
English. This article details its validation with Serbian-speaking
participants, with a Bulgarian and German validation under
way.
Item generation and pilot studies
Several sources were used in generating the initial item
pool: the Mentalization subscale featured in the Revised
Questionnaire for Attachment Assessment (QAA–R;
Hanak, 2004, 2010), the Manual for Reflective Functioning
(Fonagy et al., 1998), and the Handbook of Mentalization-
Based Treatment (Allen & Fonagy, 2006). The resulting list
of 55 items was reviewed for face validity by two indepen-
dent experts in attachment and mentalization theory, and
administered to students of psychology and education
(NP1 D 102) in the form of a 5-point Likert-type question-
naire, the anchor points being 1 (strongly disagree) and 5
(strongly agree). This sample provided feedback on the
clarity of item content and instructions, as well as on the
format of the instrument. Items that were deemed odd or
ambiguous were considered for rephrasing or exclusion,
whereas those exhibiting low item–total correlations
(<.30) or yielding an increase in alpha if deleted were
immediately left out. These revisions resulted in two
shorter versions of the instrument (containing 37 and 30
items, respectively), which were piloted with two further
samples of university students (NP2 D 87, NP3 D 91). To
increase alpha well beyond the .70 threshold, items
compromising internal consistency (i.e., showing only small
correlations with the total and yielding a higher alpha if
removed) were again dropped, and the questionnaire was
eventually reduced to its current 28-item form (see
Appendix).
Main studies
Described as the Mentalization Scale (MentS), this version
of the instrument was thoroughly examined for psychomet-
ric properties in two studies: Study 1 was carried out with a
sample of employed adults and university students, and
aimed at establishing the instrument’s reliability, factor
structure, and convergent–discriminant validity; Study 2
involved a sample of persons diagnosed with BPD and
matched controls, allowing us to also gauge the clinical util-
ity of the instrument.
Study 1: Internal consistency and validity of the MentS
in a community sample
Hypotheses
Several hypotheses were formulated as guidelines in evaluat-
ing the construct validity of the MentS. For one, we rea-
soned that a valid measure of mentalization should be
positively related to measures of cognate constructs, such as
empathy and trait EI, assessed via self-report (H1a), as well
as ability EI, assessed via objective performance (H1b). Fur-
ther, building on mentalization theory and previous
research, we expected MentS scores to be substantially
related to the quality of attachment—specifically, that they
correlate negatively with indicators of attachment anxiety
and avoidance (H2a), and that they differentiate signifi-
cantly between persons with secure and insecure attachment
patterns (H2b). With regard to personality, we postulated
that MentS scores should be associated with higher emo-
tional stability and Extraversion (H3a), two traits that have
consistently been found to promote quality of life and inter-
personal relationships (e.g., Austin & Deary, 2002); addi-
tionally, we assumed that MentS scores would also correlate
positively with openness, as the latter generally predisposes
one to embrace and analyze experiences, including their
mental aspects (H3b). Finally, in line with prior findings,
women were expected to outscore men on MentS-measured
mentalization (H4).
Method
Participants and procedure
Participants in Study 1 were 288 adults (44.4% female; age
range D 21–61, M D 40.4, SD D 8.21) employed at various
positions (e.g., production line workers, administrative staff,
managers) within a large dairy production factory, as well as
278 college freshmen (72.3% female; age range D 18–33, M D
19.29, SD D 1.16) engaged in various areas of study (compara-
tive literature, mechanical engineering, psychology, and special
education) at the University of Belgrade. In the first group,
68.8% of participants had a high school degree (11–12 years of
education), 26.2% held a university diploma (16–18 years of
education), and 3.5% obtained postgraduate academic titles
(> 18 years of education); the remaining 1.5% did not provide
information on their education.
Because the management of the dairy company had
kindly agreed to let all employees of their Belgrade branch
participate in the study, the employed adults were recruited
at their workplace and tested within working hours in suit-
able rooms on factory premises. The students were recruited
and tested during regular lecture hours, courtesy of our col-
leagues who were willing to spare some time from their les-
sons for research purposes. All participants were briefed
about the character of the study and the confidentiality of
data, whereupon they signed the informed consent forms.
They were not compensated financially, but were offered
and later provided individual feedback on their test results
(on request). The described research procedure had initially
been approved by the relevant committee of the Serbian
Psychological Association.
 THE MENTALIZATION SCALE (MENTS) 271

Table 1. Study 1 descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and gender differences.

Sample descriptive statistics Descriptive statistics by gender ANOVA by gender

Males Females

N M SD Range Skew Kurtosis a M SD M SD F d

Mentalization
MentS-Self 540 27.73 5.61 10–40 ¡.16 ¡.27 .77 28.53 5.72 27.18 5.48 7.64 .24
MentS-Others 540 38.64 4.83 18–50 ¡.42 .54 .77 37.42 4.99 39.48 4.54 24.85 ¡.43
MentS-Motivation 540 37.94 5.51 14–50 ¡.26 .24 .76 35.62 5.44 39.54 4.96 75.17 ¡.75
MentS total 540 104.31 11.96 68–140 .03 ¡.00 .84 101.57 12.32 106.20 11.34 20.27 ¡.42
Emotional intelligence
MSCEIT EP 274 .45 .11 .11–.64 ¡.68 ¡.06 .92 .44 .11 .46 .11 1.01 ¡.18
MSCEIT UsE 274 .43 .09 .14–.60 ¡.82 .66 .78 .42 .09 .44 .09 1.77 ¡.22
MSCEIT UE 275 .43 .08 .18–.62 ¡.46 .29 .67 .43 .08 .43 .07 .62 .00
MSCEIT ME 273 .30 .07 .14–.48 .21 ¡.50 .77 .30 .07 .30 .07 .04 .00
MSCEIT total 272 .40 .06 .22–.53 ¡.50 ¡.22 .90 .40 .06 .41 .06 .57 ¡.16
TEIQue WB 282 5.47 .71 2.37–6.90 ¡.51 .82 .78 5.49 .72 5.44 .70 .27 .07
TEIQue SC 282 4.81 .80 2.57–6.90 .15 .03 .83 4.96 .85 4.62 .68 13.35 .44
TEIQue E 282 5.15 .68 3.38–6.77 .15 ¡.61 .80 5.12 .71 5.19 .65 .69 ¡.10
TEIQue S 282 4.82 .74 2.77–6.58 .16 ¡.46 .81 4.91 .77 4.72 .70 4.63 .26
TEIQue total 282 5.08 .61 2.94–6.60 ¡.01 ¡.07 .96 5.13 .66 5.01 .54 2.82 .20
Big Five
Neuroticism 286 29.62 7.37 12–57 .22 .51 .80 27.94 6.97 31.72 7.36 19.77 ¡.53
Extraversion 286 41.76 5.85 24–56 ¡.09 ¡.06 .69 41.70 6.24 41.84 5.33 .04 ¡.02
Openness 286 38.21 5.36 22–53 ¡.18 ¡.02 .57 37.87 5.31 38.63 5.43 1.42 ¡.14
Agreeableness 286 43.11 5.31 26–58 ¡.16 .53 .62 42.66 5.21 43.68 5.40 2.60 ¡.19
Conscientiousness 286 49.60 5.47 34–60 .13 ¡.55 .78 49.29 5.65 50.00 5.23 1.19 ¡.13
Empathy
Empathy Quotient 564 18.15 4.62 2–31 ¡.06 .02 .56 17.65 4.86 18.51 4.40 4.72 ¡.18
Attachment
ECR–R Avoidance 542 59.95 13.65 21–122 .55 1.28 .84 60.34 13.08 59.68 14.05 .30 .05
ECR–R Anxiety 542 53.76 16.80 18–108 .45 .088 .89 51.33 15.26 55.44 17.62 8.34,a ¡.25

Note. ANOVA D analysis of variance; MSCEIT D Meyer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test; MSCEIT EP D MSCEIT Emotion Perception; MSCEIT UsE D MSCEIT
Using Emotions; MSCEIT UE D MSCEIT Understanding Emotions; MSCEIT ME D MSCEIT Managing Emotions; TEIQue D Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire; TEI-
Que WB D TEIQue Well-Being; TEIQue SC D TEIQue Self-Control: TEIQue E D TEIQue Emotionality; TEIQue S D TEIQue Sociability; ECR–R D Modified Experiences in
Close Relationships–Revised.
a
Welch statistic.

p < .05.p < .01.

Measures shown to reliably assess the two attachment dimensions

The main measure used in this study and completed by all par-
ticipants was the aforementioned 28-item version of the MentS.
Responses on the MentS are given on a 5-point Likert scale,
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree).
Other instruments administered to both subsamples were the
Modified Experiences in Close Relationships–Revised (ECR–R)
and the EQ. Measures employed only in the working adults sam-
ple were the QAA–R (another measure of attachment quality), a
questionnaire assessing trait EI, a test of ability EI, and an inven-
tory of the five basic factors of personality. This, along with
minor frequency of missing data, accounts for the present varia-
tions in the number of participants per analysis. The respective
measures are specified and described next, and their internal
consistencies established in this study are reported in Table 1.
The Modified Experiences in Close Relationships–Revised. The
ECR–R (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000) is a 36-item scale
that assesses attachment avoidance (Av, odd items) and attach-
ment anxiety (Ax, even items) in close relationships in general.
The label “modified” refers to the fact that items have been
reworded to probe beyond romantic relationships (e.g., “part-
ner” is substituted by “close person”). Responses are given on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). The Serbian adaptation of the modified
ECR–R, which we employed in this study, has previously been
(Hanak & Dimitrijevi
c, 2013).
Revised Questionnaire for Attachment Assessment. The
QAA–R (Hanak 2004, 2010) is a self-report measure based
on a theoretical analysis of the construct of attachment and
of other instruments designed to assess attachment quality,
such as the AAI (Main & Goldwyn, 1998) and the Adult
Attachment Projective (C. George & West, 2001). The
QAA–R features seven 11-item subscales, with internal con-
sistencies in the .69 to .87 range. Using a combination of
subscale scores and employing K-means cluster analysis
with initial cluster centers provided by the author, respond-
ents were classified into four groups, corresponding to the
four attachment patterns: secure, dismissing, preoccupied,
and fearful. The distribution observed in this sample was as
follows: 62 (23.6%) secure, 47 (17.8%) fearful, 63 (24.0%)
dismissive, and 91 (34.6%) preoccupied. Parenthetically, this
distribution of attachment patterns diverges from what
would be expected based on available meta-analytic studies
(Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2009), especially
in terms of the lower incidence of secure and higher inci-
dence of unresolved attachment. These results are, however,
in accordance with those obtained in other studies in for-
mer Yugoslavia (Hanak, 2010).
272
HANAK, ALTARAS DIMITRIJEVIC,
DIMITRIJEVIC,
JOLIC

MARJANOVIC


Empathy Quotient. The EQ (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright,
2004) is a self-report measure of empathy based on the
unifactorial model proposing a unity of cognitive and
affective aspects of empathy. Responses are given on a 4-
point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly
agree). Nonempathic responses are scored 0, and empathic
responses receive 1 or 2 points, depending on the degree
of empathy expressed. In this study, a shorter 22-item ver-
sion of the Serbian translation of the instrument
(Dimitrijevi
c, Hanak, Vukosavljevi
c Gvozden, & Opaci
c,
2012) was employed, the theoretical score range thus being
0 to 44.
Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire. The Trait Emo-
tional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides, 2009)
measures EI defined as a constellation of emotional self-per-
ceptions or emotional self-efficacy (Petrides, Pita, & Kokki-
naki, 2007). It consists of 153 items accompanied by 7-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Items are organized into 15 subscales and
eventually load on four factors: well-being, self-control,
emotionality, and sociability. A previous examination of the
Serbian version of the instrument (Joli
c Marjanovi
c & Alta-
ras Dimitrijevi
c, 2014) revealed very good reliability and
factorial validity.
Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test Version
2.0. The MSCEIT v2.0 (Mayer et al., 2002) test of ability EI
contains 141 items organized into four pairs of tasks, so as
to operationalize the four branches of the Mayer–Salovey EI
model: Perceiving Emotions, Using Emotions, Understand-
ing Emotions, and Managing Emotions. The first two form
the experiential area, and the latter two the strategic area of
EI. Besides branch and area scores, the MSCEIT also yields
an overall ability EI score. Test items employ either a multi-
ple-choice format, where test takers are required to choose
the best possible solution to the presented problem, or the
rate-the-extent form, where the task is to judge the appro-
priateness of each of several proposed options. In this study,
the Serbian translation of the instrument was used, which
was approved by the publisher (Multi-Health Systems) and
found to exhibit good reliability and convergent–discrimi-
nant validity (Altaras Dimitrijevi
c & Joli
c Marjanovi
c,
2010). Responses were scored by the publisher, using the
general consensus scoring method.
NEO Five-Factor Inventory. The NEO Five-Factor Inventory
(NEO-FFI; McCrae & Costa, 2004) is a short, 60-item version
of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R), an
inventory widely used to assess the five basic factors of
personality: Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness (O),
Agreeableness (A), and Conscientiousness (C). Although the
NEO-FFI scales (particularly O and A) exhibit somewhat lower
internal consistencies than those featured in the NEO PI–R, the
chosen inventory generally has good psychometric properties,
which also pertains to its Serbian translation (Knezevi
c,
Dzamonja-Ignjatovi
c, & Đuri
c-Joci
c, 2004).
Results
Internal consistency and descriptive statistics
The applied measures generally exhibit acceptable to high inter-
nal consistencies (see Table 1), comparable to those previously
established for the same instruments. Cronbach’s alpha is fairly
high for the proposed MentS, as well (a D .84).
As can be further seen from Table 1, the distributions of
most scores, including those on the MentS, fit normality
assumptions. Kurtosis values range from –.66 to 1.28 and can
be considered acceptable (D. George & Mallery, 2010). Like-
wise, relatively low skew values (< 1) and adequate dispersions
of scores (range) imply that present distributional asymmetries
are only slight.
Differences regarding gender and education
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed a number of signifi-
cant gender differences: Females scored higher on the MentS,
EQ, ECR–R Anxiety, and Neuroticism, whereas males did so
on TEIQue self-control and sociability (Table 1). According to
the cutoffs of the d statistic suggested by Cohen (1988), most
effect sizes were small to medium.
In the subsample of employed adults, we additionally tested
for differences in MentS scores between groups of differing lev-
els of education and for correlations with age. Participants
holding a university degree were found to score significantly
higher than those with 12 or fewer years of education on both
MentS total and the three subscales, F(1, 255) D 9.48–31.30,
p < .001, d D ¡.41– ¡.79. The same trend was observed for
empathy, trait, and ability EI. The MentS score was not signifi-
cantly related to participants’ age (r D ¡.08).
MentS structure
The MentS structure was examined by performing a principal
component analysis (PCA) with an oblimin rotation. Sample
adequacy and appropriateness of the PCA were confirmed by
the participants to variable ratio (540:28), the value of the Kai-
ser–Meyer–Olkin statistic (KMO D .843), and results of the
Bartlett’s test of sphericity, x2(378) D 3778.43, p < .001. The
PCA initially yielded seven components with eigenvalues over
1, altogether explaining 55.08% of the variance. The final num-
ber of extracted components was determined by means of par-
allel analysis, which was performed using an SPSS syntax
created by O’Connor (2000). To identify the number of compo-
nents with eigenvalues larger than those that might occur by
chance, 1,000 random data sets were created, each with 512
cases and 28 variables. In 95% of randomly created data sets
only the first three eigenvalues (1.51, 1.44, and 1.38) were nota-
bly lower than the corresponding ones in the original data set
(5.69, 2.98, and 1.83). Thus, the parallel analysis suggested a
three-component solution as the most fitting, with 37.51% of
the variability explained. Individual item loadings on the
retained components are listed in Tables 2 and 3.
The first component, explaining 20.34% of the variance, had
10 significant loadings (> .30; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, &
Black, 1998) allowing it to be identified as Other-Related Men-
talization (henceforth MentS-O). The second component,
explaining 10.64% of the variance, was determined by 8 items
concerning Self-Related Mentalization (henceforth MentS-S).
 THE MENTALIZATION SCALE (MENTS) 273

Table 2. Pattern matrix for the MentS in general sample. Table 3. Pattern matrix for the MentS in clinical sample.

Component Component

Item numbers MentS-O MentS-S MentS-M Item numbers MentS-S MentS-O MentS-M

12 .66 ¡.11 .05 22 .81 ¡.08 .10

10 .65 .03 ¡.11 18 .76 .03 .30
3 .62 .05 ¡.02 11 .71 .08 .05
23 .60 ¡.01 .11 21 .66 ¡.28 ¡.20
5 .60 .02 .20 26 .58 ¡.35 ¡.30
20 .53 .16 .03 25 .51 .00 ¡.14
25 .47 .32 ¡.13 8 .50 ¡.39 ¡.28
6 .42 ¡.02 .37 19 .43 .14 .05
2 .37 .15 .07 27 .41 .16 ¡.19
28 .30 ¡.05 .18 5 .38 .37 ¡.16
21 .15 .75 ¡.25 9 .32 .10 .04
22 .20 .69 ¡.10 24 ¡.05 .70 ¡.11
11 .09 .68 ¡.07 12 ¡.03 .69 ¡.03
8 .06 .67 ¡.16 10 .15 .67 .08
18 ¡.11 .59 .16 16 .12 .63 .09
14 ¡.03 .48 .09 4 ¡.17 .63 ¡.04
26 .09 .43 .35 3 .28 .48 ¡.20
19 ¡.02 .42 .28 1 .05 .43 ¡.25
9 ¡.24 .33 .68 23 .04 .40 ¡.31
4 .02 ¡.09 .67 13 ¡.06 .26 ¡.65
27 ¡.19 .37 .66 7 .03 ¡.16 ¡.62
24 .10 ¡.10 .63 28 ¡.06 .12 ¡.59
16 .15 ¡.10 .50 17 .37 .20 .52
13 .27 .04 .45 2 .18 .24 ¡.47
17 .24 ¡.03 .36 14 .36 ¡.30 ¡.46
1 .17 ¡.05 .35 20 .07 .18 ¡.43
7 .20 ¡.11 .35 15 .01 .04 ¡.42
15 .31 ¡.03 .34 6 .19 .24 ¡.30

Note. Extraction method: principal component analysis; Rotation method: Oblimin Note. Extraction method: principal component analysis; Rotation method: Oblimin
with Kaiser normalization. Loadings set in boldface type indicate the highest with Kaiser normalization. Loadings set in boldface type indicate the highest
loading across components for that item. MentS-S D MentS-Self; MentS-O D loading across components for that item. MentS-S D MentS-Self; MentS-O D
MentS-Others; MentS-M D MentS-Motivation. MentS-Others; MentS-M D MentS-Motivation.

The third, explaining 6.53% of the variance, was labeled Moti-
vation to Mentalize (henceforth MentS-M), as the 10 items
loading onto this component refer to one’s need to understand
the psychic world of self and others.
MentS internal consistency and item-level statistics
Reliability analyses evidenced satisfactory internal consistencies
for the three components identified through PCA: a was .77 for
MentS-O and MentS-M, and .76 for MentS-S.
Item–total correlations were in the .26 to .51 range, and
there was no relevant change (neither diminishment nor
improvement) in overall reliability if any of the items were
deleted. The same was true for item-level analyses performed at
the level of subscales.
Associations of MentS with other study variables
Table 4 presents the correlations of MentS scores with other
study variables.
MentS and Attachment. MentS scores had moderate negative
correlations with ECR–R Avoidance; correlations with ECR–R
Anxiety were generally small, except for the one involving the
MentS-S subscale, which was a large negative one.
Additionally, an ANOVA indicated significant differences in
MentS scores between groups with different attachment pat-
terns, F(3, 257) D 17.82–61.31, p < .001. Post-hoc tests
revealed that the “secure” group scored higher on MentS (at
both whole and subscale level) than any of the three insecure
groups. MentS means for the four attachment organizations are
given in Figure 1.
MentS and Empathy. Significant moderate-to-large positive
correlations with the EQ were established, the strongest associ-
ations being those of empathy with the MentS-S and total score.
MentS and EI. Similarly, a set of positive and generally signifi-
cant correlations was observed between MentS scores and both
ability and trait EI. In the case of ability EI, these associations
were weak to moderate, becoming stronger as one progresses
from the lower, experiential branches (i.e., perceiving and using
emotions) to the higher, strategic branches of EI (understand-
ing and managing emotions). The strongest correlations were
thus observed between MentS scores and managing emotions.
Correlations with the trait EI factors and total score ranged
from weak to strong, with the lowest values observed for the
MentS-M subscale, and the highest for MentS-S and the total
score.
MentS and Big Five. MentS scores were found to correlate
positively with all basic personality traits, except Neuroticism,
which was established as a significant negative correlate of
mentalization. The observed associations with the NEO-FFI
were generally weak to moderate, with a single nonsignificant
(MentS-O £ A) and a single large correlation (MentS-S £ N).
MentS-S correlated most strongly with Neuroticism, MentS-O
with Extraversion and Conscientiousness, and MentS-M with
 274
DIMITRIJEVIC,

Table 4. Zero-order correlations between study variables (Study 1 and Study 2).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

HANAK, ALTARAS DIMITRIJEVIC,

1. MentS-Self 1.00 .30 .35 .79 ¡.57 .29 .42 .50 .28 ¡.53 ¡.56
2. MentS-Others .30 1.00 .47 .73 ¡.15 .45 .65 .30 .34 ¡.27 ¡.02

JOLIC

3. MentS-Motivation .21 .53 1.00 .75 ¡.17 .02 .41 .40 .25 ¡.25 ¡.06
4. MentS total .69 .79 .78 1.00 ¡.46 .35 .63 .55 .38 ¡.49 ¡.34

5. MSCEIT EP .22 .11 .07 .18 1.00
6. MSCEIT UsE .31 .10 .12 .24 .47 1.00

7. MSCEIT UE .37 .13 .13 .29 .27 .30 1.00

MARJANOVIC

8. MSCEIT ME .42 .38 .34 .49 .35 .42 .33 1.00

     
9. MSCEIT total .44 .24 .21 .40 .78 .76 .63 .69 1.00
10. TEIQue WB .45 .33 .24 .45 .28 .28 .28 .50 .45 1.00
11. TEIQue SC .56 .30 .22 .48 .18 .17 .29 .40 .34 .60 1.00
12. TEIQue E .57 .53 .44 .67 .28 .31 .31 .52 .48 .63 .60 1.00
         
13. TEIQue S .50 .46 .30 .55 .21 .24 .28 .47 .41 .67 .50 .67 1.00
14. TEIQue total .62 .47 .35 .63 .28 .29 .33 .56 .49 .85 .81 .87 .82 1.00
15. Neuroticism ¡.53 ¡.23 ¡.16 ¡.42 ¡.21 ¡.19 ¡.31 ¡.41 ¡.37 ¡.67 ¡.71 ¡.55 ¡.60 ¡.76 1.00
16. Extraversion .20 .41 .32 .39 .12 .13 .11 .36 .24 .63 .39 .49 .61 .62 ¡.45 1.00
17. Openness .31 .34 .41 .46 .06 .13 .08 .33 .19 .25 .25 .36 .28 .35 ¡.20 .17 1.00
18. Agreeableness .17 .08 .14 .18 .12 .10 .07 .10 .14 .22 .29 .27 ¡.09 .23 ¡.23 .11 .15 1.00
19. Conscientiousness .35 .40 .35 .48 .22 .23 .17 .36 .35 .57 .55 .51 .44 .62 ¡.49 .46 .24 .26 1.00
  
20. EQ .43 .36 .35 .51 .21 .27 .27 .45 .40 .44 .48 .61 .50 .60 ¡.42 .29 .34 .23 .37 1.00
21. ECR–R Avoidance ¡.31 ¡.31 ¡.31 ¡.41 ¡.07 ¡.15 ¡.19 ¡.27 ¡.22 ¡.40 ¡.34 ¡.48 ¡.39 ¡.48 .32 ¡.42 ¡.27 ¡.11 ¡.25 ¡.35 1.00
22. ECR–R Anxiety ¡.54 ¡.22 .04 ¡.32 ¡.32 ¡.31 ¡.31 ¡.46 ¡.47 ¡.48 ¡.52 ¡.57 ¡.51 ¡.62 .54 ¡.26 ¡.31 ¡.17 ¡.32 ¡.28 .32 1.00

Note. Correlations below the diagonal are for the general population sample, and those above the diagonal are for the clinical sample. Correlations for N D 256–540 in general population sample and N D 38–62 in clinical sample.
MSCEIT D Meyer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test; MSCEIT EP D MSCEIT Emotion Perception; MSCEIT UsE D MSCEIT Using Emotions; MSCEIT UE D MSCEIT Understanding Emotions; MSCEIT ME D MSCEIT Managing
Emotions; TEIQue D Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire; TEIQue WB D TEIQue Well-Being; TEIQue SC D TEIQue Self-Control; TEIQue E D TEIQue Emotionality; TEIQue S D TEIQue Sociability; EQ D Empathy Quotient;
ECR–R D Modified Experiences in Close Relationships–Revised.

p < .05.p < .01.

120.00
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
MentS-S MentS-O MentS-M MentS total
Secure 33.36 42.21 40.85 116.43
Fearful 22.51 36.77 34.74 94.02
Dismissing 30.03 37.55 34.53 102.11
Preoccupied 26.79 38.49 36.44 101.73
Figure 1. MentS means for four attachment quality categories. Note. Analysis of
variance results: MentS-S, F(3, 258) D 61.53, p < .001; MentS-O, F(3, 258) D 16.86,
p < .001; MentS-M, F(3, 258) D 25.58, p < .001; MentS total, F(3, 258) D 57.31,
p < .001. Post-hoc tests results for MentS-S: mean difference(secure-fearful) D 10.85,
p < .001; mean difference(secure-dismissing) D 3.34, p < .001; mean difference(secure-
preoccupied) D 6.57, p < .001; mean difference(fearful-dismissing) D ¡7.05, p < .001;
mean difference(fearful-preoccupied) D ¡4.28, p < .001; mean difference(dismissing-preoc-
cupied) D 3.22, p < .001. Post-hoc tests results for MentS-O: mean difference(secure-
fearful) D 5.45, p < .001; mean difference(secure-dismissing) D 4.48, p < .001; mean dif-
ference(secure-preoccupied) D 3.72, p < .001; mean difference(fearful-dismissing) D ¡.98,
p > .05; mean difference(fearful-preoccupied) D ¡1.79, p > .05; mean difference(dismiss-
ing-preoccupied) D .74, p > .05. Post-hoc tests results for MentS-M: mean difference(se-
cure-fearful) D 6.12, p < .001; mean difference(secure-dismissing) D 6.30, p < .001; mean
difference(secure-preoccupied) D 4.41, p < .001; mean difference(fearful-dismissing) D .20,
p > .05; mean difference(fearful-preoccupied) D ¡1.69, p > .05; mean difference(dismiss-
ing-preoccupied) D 1.19, p > .05. Post-hoc tests results for MentS total: mean differen-
ce(secure-fearful) D 22.40, p < .001; mean difference(secure-dismissing) D 14.11, p < .001;
mean difference(secure-preoccupied) D 14.70, p < .001; mean difference(fearful-dismissing)
D ¡8.29, p < .001; mean difference(fearful-preoccupied) D ¡7.70, p < .001; mean dif-
ference(dismissing-preoccupied) D .59, p > .05.
Openness. Agreeableness stood out as the weakest correlate of
all four MentS scores.
Discussion
Study 1 evaluated the reliability, structure, and validity of the
MentS in a sample of 566 adults from the general population.
Despite being relatively short, the MentS showed good internal
consistency and a normal distribution of scores at the whole-
scale level. A PCA yielded three interpretable components, sug-
gesting that the instrument is comprised of three subscales:
MentS-O (10 items), MentS-S (8 items), and MentS-M (10
items). Reliability analyses indicated satisfactory internal con-
sistencies for all subscales, whereas item-level statistics (item–
total correlations, reliability if item deleted) confirmed the
instrument’s sound overall composition; that is, optimal num-
ber and relevant content of items.
A meaningful pattern of correlations emerged between MentS
scores and measures of other constructs. In line with our first
hypothesis, mentalization assessed via the MentS was positively
associated with cognate qualities of self-reported empathy and
emotional self-efficacy (i.e., trait EI, H1a), as well as with cognitive
processing of emotional information (i.e., ability EI, particularly
understanding and managing emotions, H1b). Moreover, attach-
ment avoidance and anxiety were established as significant negative
correlates of MentS-measured mentalization, as was purported in
H2a. Most indicative of the scale’s validity in this context is the
strong negative association between attachment anxiety and self-
related mentalization; that is, the fact that those with a negative
THE MENTALIZATION SCALE (MENTS) 275
model of the self were also more likely to report lesser capacity of
self-reflection. Finally, congruent with the third hypothesis, higher
MentS scores were related with higher emotional stability (reversed
Neuroticism), and Extraversion (H3a), as well as with higher
Openness (H3b), but a significant positive correlation with Consci-
entiousness also emerged. Even with this last construct unexpect-
edly entering the picture, the described pattern of correlations
serves to support the validity of MentS scores: a constellation of
N–, EC, OC, and CC should arguably be conducive of an adaptive
and fruitful exploration of the mental world of self and others. The
coherence of this general picture is even reflected in specific details
regarding MentS subscales: Those who are higher on Extraversion
and Conscientiousness (i.e., who are people-oriented and socially
active, but also behaving in a self-controlled manner) were particu-
larly more likely to also report higher other-related mentalization,
whereas those who are higher on Openness and lower on Neuroti-
cism (i.e., embracing new experiences and emotionally stable) were
particularly more likely to declare themselves ready to engage in
mentalization.
Of note, the observed correlations were generally of moder-
ate strength, implying that the assessment domain of the MentS
is rather distinctive from that of other applied measures. Over-
all, mentalization related most strongly to trait EI, followed by
empathy, which is understandable considering the conceptual
closeness of the respective constructs, boosted by similarities in
their measurement. Still, not even these associations were so
strong as to suggest redundancy of the MentS.
If some portion of the established correlations is to be writ-
ten off as an artefact of methodology, this is principally not
true for the overall significant positive associations between
MentS and MSCEIT scores. These actually serve as solid evi-
dence that those who describe themselves as good at grasping
the mental aspects of human functioning are indeed better at
solving emotion understanding and management tasks, at least
in a controlled test situation. The construct validity of the
MentS is thus supported not only in relation to a self-report,
but also to a performance measure of EI.
On top of that, several intelligible group differences in
MentS-measured mentalization were found. First, women con-
vincingly outscored men on the total score (d D ¡.42), as well
as on two subscales, Other-Related Mentalization (d D ¡.43)
and Motivation to Mentalize (d D ¡.75), which is consistent
with H4 and the findings of previous studies (e.g., Abu-Akel &
Bo, 2013; Baron-Cohen, 2004). The unexpected finding of
higher Self-Related Mentalization in men (d D .24) could likely
stem from a higher tendency in women to agree with the
reverse-scored items of the respective subscale, which tend to
refer to personal weaknesses and incapacities (e.g., “I find it dif-
ficult to …,” “Often I cannot …”). Although this interpretation
is supported by the finding of a more negative model of the self
in women (i.e., higher Anxiety on the ECR–R, d D ¡.25), it
also suggests that a rephrasing of several items of the MentS-S
subscale might be considered. Second, significantly higher men-
talization was reported by participants of higher education
(d D ¡.41–.79), just as was the case with related qualities—
empathy and EI. Finally, those identified as securely attached
(via the QAA–R) had by far the highest mentalization scores,
with the fearful group scoring lowest, and the preoccupied and
dismissive in between. This rank-order conforms to our
276
HANAK, ALTARAS DIMITRIJEVIC,
DIMITRIJEVIC,
JOLIC

MARJANOVIC

hypothesis (H2b) and mirrors the findings obtained with other
(well-established) measures of mentalization, such as the RFS
(Fonagy et al., 1998).
In sum, the results of Study 1 yield a rather favorable picture
of the psychometric properties of the proposed MentS, estab-
lishing fair internal consistency of scores and validating them
against a background of relevant variables.
Study 2: Clinical utility of the MentS
Going a step further, our second study aimed at establishing the
validity of the MentS in a clinical sample. Given the nature of
the construct assessed and the history of its research, persons
diagnosed with BPD were identified as the most suitable target
group to test the instrument’s criterion validity. We also sought
to confirm our previous findings on the questionnaire’s conver-
gent–discriminant validity, as well as to gain preliminary
insights into its structural stability.
Hypotheses
Based on clinical research on mentalization, we expected the
clinical group to score significantly lower on MentS than the
controls (H1). Furthermore, we expected to observe the same
pattern of correlations with attachment quality and the basic
personality traits (H2) as in Study 1.
Method
Participants and procedure
Participants were 62 persons with clinician-assigned diagnoses of
BPD, treated as both inpatients and outpatients in a major mental
health institution in Belgrade (clinical group). We also recruited a
control group of 62 persons with no psychiatric diagnosis, using
the snowball sampling method, relying on an initially small num-
ber of subjects to recommend further participants based on crite-
ria of age, gender, and educational level. These three variables
were actually used for matching the two groups, so that eventu-
ally each member of the clinical sample had a “mate” of the same
age, gender, and educational level in the control group.
The male–female ratio established for the clinical and repro-
duced in the control group was 20 (32.3%) to 42 (67.7%). The
distribution across age groups (again, in both the clinical and
the control sample) was as follows: 18 to 20, n D 11 (17.7%); 21
to 30, n D 18 (29.0%); 31 to 40, n D 21 (33.9%); 41 to 50, n D 7
(11.3%); and 51 to 60, n D 5 (8.1%). As for education, 3 (4.8%)
participants in each group had 8 years of elementary education,
42 (67.7%) had graduated from high school, and 17 (27.4%)
held a university degree.
Participation in the study was voluntary, and the procedure
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Institute of Men-
tal Health in Belgrade. After being briefed about the nature of
the study, the protection of anonymity and confidentiality of
the data, participants signed informed consent forms.
Measures
The number of measures was substantially reduced for
Study 2 to accommodate for the fact that persons with BPD
experienced the assessment procedure as more tiring than
members of the general population (which became apparent
in the early stages of data collection). The choice of meas-
ures against which the MentS would be validated eventually
included the ECR–R (for details about this measure see
Study 1) and the Big Five Inventory. Even with this reduc-
tion, a substantial number of participants from the clinical
group did not complete the session, which is why n is nota-
bly lower for the latter instrument.
The Big Five Inventory. The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John,
Naumann, & Soto, 2008) is a brief self-report measure of the Big
Five personality dimensions that contains 44 items, to be rated
on a 5-point scale. Reported alphas for all subscales are high.
Results
MentS internal consistency
To calculate MentS subscale scores we used the PCA-based
syntax generated in Study 1. After that, we examined internal
consistency at both the whole-scale and subscale level, for the

Table 5. Study 2 descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and group differences.

Sample descriptive statistics ANOVA

N M (SD) Range a

Clinical Control Clinical Control Clinical Control Clinical Control F (1, 122/1, 74) d

Mentalization
MentS-Self 62 62 27.73 (7.64) 32.42 (5.41) 13–45 21–41 .79 .74 15.58 ¡.71
MentS-Others 62 62 39.53 (5.58) 40.48 (4.82) 15–49 31–50 .75 .77 1.03 ¡.18
MentS-Motivation 62 62 33.00 (5.20) 33.39 (4.27) 21–43 24–44 .60 .74 .20 ¡.08
MentS total 62 62 100.26 (14.02) 106.29 (11.37) 58–135 84–131 .75 .77 6.92 ¡.47
Big Five
Neuroticism 38 38 3.82 (.87) 2.78 (.66) 1.50–5.00 1.75–4.13 .83 .82 34.53 1.35
Extraversion 38 38 3.26 (.77) 3.80 (.71) 1.88–4.75 1.50–4.88 .80 .83 9.98 ¡.73
Openness 38 38 3.95 (.74) 3.86 (.61) 1.70–5.00 1.80–4.90 .82 .86 .37 .13
Agreeableness 38 38 3.58 (.62) 3.96 (.50) 2.56–4.78 2.89–5.00 .72 .72 8.44 ¡.67
Conscientiousness 38 38 3.00 (.79) 3.73 (.55) 1.44–4.67 2.56–4.67 .84 .78 21.44 ¡1.07
Attachment
ECR–R Avoidance 62 62 63.39 (14.20) 53.79 (13.80) 31–93 28–98 .74 .84 14.56 .68
ECR–R Anxiety 62 62 71.48 (23.58) 46.98 (15.75) 29–115 19–95 .91 .89 46.29 1.22

Note. ANOVA D analysis of variance; ECR–R D Modified Experiences in Close Relationships–Revised.


p < .05.p < .01.

clinical and control group separately. Cronbach’s alphas were
found to be overall lower than in Study 1 (Table 5), but still
above the .70 threshold, with the only exception being MentS-
M in the clinical group.
Associations with attachment and the Big Five
The pattern of correlations between MentS and ECR–R scores in
the clinical sample was quite similar to the one in the community
sample: Associations with Avoidance ranged from ¡.25 to ¡.53,
whereas those with Anxiety were lower and below significance
level in two instances; however, the negative correlation between
MentS-S and Anxiety was again the largest one (Table 4).
As in Study 1, mentalization scores were positively related to
all Big Five traits except Neuroticism, which had a moderate
negative association with MentS-total and a large negative asso-
ciation with MentS-S. A peculiarity of the clinical sample, how-
ever, was that Agreeableness surfaced as a moderate-to-strong
and Openness as the strongest personality correlate of
mentalization.
Differences between the clinical and control group
The control group scored consistently higher on the MentS
than the clinical group, with differences being significant for
the total and the MentS-S subscale scores (Table 5). Parentheti-
cally, the mean MentS total score for the clinical sample was
also lower than the corresponding M for the community sam-
ple in Study 1 (cf. Table 1).
A discriminant analysis with MentS subscales as independ-
ents and group membership (clinical or control) as the group-
ing variable yielded one significant function (Rc D .34, L D .88,
x2 D 15.26, p D .002) defined predominantly by MentS-S
(Table 6), and allowing 67.7% of cases to be correctly classified
(66.1% in the clinical group, 69.4% in the control group).
Another discriminant analysis employing MentS subscale
scores and ECR–R subscales (the BFI was excluded due to small
number of cases) also resulted in a significant function (Rc D
.53, L D .71, x2 D 40.22, p < .001), which improved classifica-
tion accuracy (73.4% overall, 67.7% clinical, 79.0% control),
largely defined by ECR–R Anxiety. However, in this constella-
tion the MentS-S (along with ECR–R Avoidance) also contrib-
uted substantially to the differentiation between the clinical
and the control group (Table 6).
Table 6. Structure matrices for canonical functions discriminating the clinical and
control group.
MentS subscales MentS C ECR subscales
Function
Variables 1 Variables
MentS-Self .97 ECR–R Anxiety
MentS-Others .25 MentS-Self
MentS-Motivation .11 ECR–R Avoidance
MentS-Others
MentS-Motivation
Note. Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and
standardized canonical discriminant functions. Variables ordered by absolute size
of correlation within function. ECR–R D Modified Experiences in Close Relation-
ships–Revised.
THE MENTALIZATION SCALE (MENTS) 277
Tentative analysis of factor similarity
We dismissed the option of examining the MentS factor struc-
ture in the clinical sample via confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA), as none of the criteria for performing this analysis (i.e., N
 200 for theoretical, and N  300 for population models,
according to Myers, Ahn, & Jin, 2011; KMO > .70, according to
Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010) were met. However, to
obtain at least preliminary insights into the instrument’s struc-
tural stability, we tentatively performed a PCA, including a par-
allel analysis, and then used Pearson correlations and Tucker’s
congruence coefficients to establish the similarity of factors
obtained in two samples (cf. Barrett, 1986): the community sam-
ple from Study 1 and the clinical sample from Study 2. The
results of these analyses are referred to as tentative, because the
sample to item ratio (62:28) was suboptimal for a PCA as well;
still, the KMO value (.568) was acceptable, as was data suitability
as indicated by Bartlett’s test, x2(378) D 774.18, p < .001.
The parallel analysis, equivalent to the one performed in
Study 1, showed that only the first three (out of initially 10) data-
derived eigenvalues (5.45, 3.38, and 2.22) were higher or equal to
those extracted in 95% of the simulated data sets (2.76, 2.43, and
2.22). The retained three components accounted for 39.47% of
the variance (Table 3). The first component (19.47% of variance
explained) was equivalent to the MentS-S component estab-
lished in the community sample, with only minor differences in
content. The second (12.08% of variance explained) largely cor-
responded to the MentS-O subscale, but encompassed several
items from the MentS-M as well. Finally, the third component
(7.92% of variance explained) fairly resembled the MentS-M
subscale from Study 1, but also included items from MentS-O.
Correlations between regression scores on the three compo-
nents and scores calculated by applying the syntax from Study
1 were .97 for the first component and MentS-S, .85 for the sec-
ond component and MentS-O, and .61 for the third component
and MentS-M. As for Tucker’s Fs, the obtained values were .91
for MentS-S, .61 for MentS-O, and –.33 for MenS-M.
Discussion
The main purpose of Study 2 was to establish the utility of the
proposed scale in differentiating persons with BPD from a
group of matched controls. A further goal was to test its con-
vergent–discriminant validity in a clinical sample, and to tenta-
tively explore its structural stability.
Regarding the first issue, MentS-assessed mentalization was
indeed found to be lower in persons with BPD, as would be
expected from current knowledge on these phenomena
(Fonagy & Bateman, 2008) and as was ascertained in H1. The
observed effect, which is on the boundary of large (d D ¡.47),
Function can actually be traced back to large differences in self-related
1 mentalization, which contribute to discriminating BPD-diag-
.97 nosed participants from controls even with attachment quality
¡.56 in the picture.
.55 Additionally, MentS scores exhibited a very similar pattern of
¡.14
¡.06 correlations with indexes of the Big Five and attachment quality
as in the community sample (supporting H2), the few disparities
(e.g., larger correlations with Agreeableness and Openness in
the clinical sample) probably stemming from the difference in
measures of the basic five factors of personality (i.e., the BFI vs.
278
HANAK, ALTARAS DIMITRIJEVIC,
DIMITRIJEVIC,
JOLIC

MARJANOVIC


the NEO-FFI). Requirements regarding internal consistency
were also largely met, although alphas were lower than in Study
1 and below .70 in one instance, namely for MentS-M.
Not surprisingly, this same subscale turned out to be particu-
larly problematic in our tentative analysis of factor similarity in
the two studies. The results of this exploration would actually
lead one to conclude that only the MentS-S subscale is stable
across different samples. However, apart from the fact that this
finding was obtained with a relatively small and specific clinical
group, there is another reason to refrain from more general
inferences on the structural (in)stability of the MentS. In particu-
lar, we are referring here to the more recently acquired data
from the ongoing German validation of the MentS (Dimitrijevi
c
et al., 2017), where the original factors (from Study 1) were repli-
cated in both a community (N D 277, Tucker’s F D .87–.93)
and a student sample (N D 959, Tucker’s F D .89–.92).
In sum, although casting a slight shadow on the instrument’s
internal consistency and structural stability, Study 2 puts forth
additional evidence on the validity of the MentS. Moreover,
through the prism of MentS subscale scores, new light is shed
on the mentalizing experiences of persons with BPD, revealing
that difficulties in self-related mentalization might appear
alongside a rather “normal” motivation to mentalize. All this
suggests that the MentS could serve as a sound assessment tool
in clinical-psychological research and potentially grow into a
useful resource for diagnostic screening.
General discussion and conclusions
Although mentalization has become a salient construct in clini-
cal and developmental psychology, its assessment has remained
quite demanding, impeding the pursuit of large-scale quantita-
tive research. Our goal was therefore to construct and validate
a brief self-report measure of mentalization that would yield
quick assessments of the construct in adults from both the gen-
eral and clinical population.
Tested in a large community sample, the proposed 28-item
MentS evidenced good whole-scale reliability, but appeared to
actually cover three distinct aspects of mentalization: MentS-S,
MentS-O, and MentS-M. Admittedly, this structure was only
partially recovered in a much smaller sample of persons with
BPD, yet acceptable internal consistencies were established in
both studies for all subscale scores but the MentS-M in the clin-
ical sample.
Regarding construct validity, the MentS was found to
display a meaningful pattern of correlations with measures
of related constructs and the basic personality traits, corre-
lating positively (but not too strongly) with empathy, trait
and ability EI, Openness, Extraversion, and Conscientious-
ness, and negatively with attachment avoidance and anxiety,
and Neuroticism. Finally, as first evidence of criterion valid-
ity and clinical utility, the MentS significantly discriminated
between persons with BPD and controls, primarily due to
considerably lower MentS-S scores in the clinical group.
Limitations and future directions
Precluding a decisive positive judgment on the psychometric
properties and clinical utility of the MentS is, however, the fact
that the clinical sample was (a) relatively small, (b) limited to
persons diagnosed with BPD, and (c) not administered the full
battery of instruments employed in Study 1. Although one might
argue that the size of this sample reflected the actual number of
patients diagnosed with BPD in a relevant institution during the
course of a whole year, we still see it as a necessary next step to
extend the evidence on the scale’s clinical utility by recruiting
other clinical samples. Besides, the control group in our study
was not evaluated for BPD or other forms of psychopathology,
which should preferably be included in future research.
Moreover, due to constraints in human resources (i.e.,
availability of only one reliable coder), we were hitherto
unable to judge the validity of the MentS against the RFS
as the benchmark in mentalization assessment, but intend
to tackle this limitation in our ongoing research with the
German translation of the instrument. The importance of
this task notwithstanding, we approach it with the following
caveat: The RFS allows a performance assessment of men-
talizing capacity, whereas the MentS, like other self-report
instruments, seeks to capture an individual’s cognitive-affec-
tive representations of it. Bearing in mind this difference,
we think it at least equally relevant to further explore the
convergent validity of the MentS with relation to the newly
published RFQ or the MZQ. We should like to hope that
through these efforts, and given these findings, the MentS
might likely be recognized as a useful new tool for the study
of individual differences in mentalization and their mental
health and personality correlates.
Funding
Funding was provided by the Ministry of Education and Science, Republic
of Serbia, grant no. 179018.
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Appendix: MentS Questionnaire

This questionnaire consists of 28 items. Please, read each of the items carefully and CIRCLE a number on the scale from 1 to 5,

1 2 3 4 5
Completely incorrect Mostly incorrect Both correct and incorrect Mostly correct Completely correct

1. I find it important to understand reasons for my behavior. 1 2 3 4 5

2. When I make conclusions about other people’s personality traits I carefully observe what they say and do. 1 2 3 4 5
3. I can recognize other people’s feelings. 1 2 3 4 5
4. I often think about other people and their behavior. 1 2 3 4 5
5. Usually I can recognize what makes people feel uneasy. 1 2 3 4 5
6. I can sympathize with other people’s feelings. 1 2 3 4 5
7. When someone annoys me I try to understand why I react in that way. 1 2 3 4 5
8. When I get upset I am not sure whether I am sad, afraid, or angry. 1 2 3 4 5
9. I do not like to waste time trying to understand in detail other people’s behavior. 1 2 3 4 5
10. I can make good predictions of other people’s behavior when I know their beliefs and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5
11. Often I cannot explain, even to myself, why I did something. 1 2 3 4 5
12. Sometimes I can understand someone’s feelings before s/he tells me anything. 1 2 3 4 5
13. I find it important to understand what happens in my relationships with people close to me. 1 2 3 4 5
14. I do not want to find out something about myself that I will not like. 1 2 3 4 5
15. To understand someone’s behavior, we need to know her/his thoughts, wishes, and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5
16. I often talk about emotions with people that I am close to. 1 2 3 4 5
17. I like reading books and newspaper articles about psychological subjects. 1 2 3 4 5
18. I find it difficult to admit to myself that I am sad, hurt, or afraid. 1 2 3 4 5
19. I do not like to think about my problems. 1 2 3 4 5
20. I can describe significant traits of people who are close to me with precision and in detail. 1 2 3 4 5
21. I am often confused about my exact feelings. 1 2 3 4 5
22. It is difficult for me to find adequate words to express my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5
23. People tell me that I understand them and give them sound advice. 1 2 3 4 5
24. I have always been interested in why people behave in certain ways. 1 2 3 4 5
25. I can easily describe what I feel. 1 2 3 4 5
26. While people talk about their feelings and needs my thoughts often drift away. 1 2 3 4 5
27. Since we all depend on life circumstances, it is meaningless to think of other people’s intentions or wishes. 1 2 3 4 5
28. One of the most important things that children should learn is to express their feelings and wishes. 1 2 3 4 5

depending on how much the item is CORRECT FOR YOU PERSONALLY.