DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Petition)
questioning the Decision[1] dated January 28, 2015 and Resolution[2] dated August 3,
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 127757 and 127801. The CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Joint Resolution[3] dated May 30, 2012 (OMB Resolution)
of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), which found herein respondent P/Supt.
Ermilando O. Villafuerte (respondent Villafuerte) administratively liable with several
others for Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service.
This case arose from the infamous "chopper scam" that involved the procurement of
second-hand light police operational helicopters (LPOHs) for use of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). During the procurement process, respondent Villafuerte was the
Legal Officer of the National Headquarters Bids and Awards Committee (NHQ-BAC),
Secretariat Division (BAC Secretariat).
The Facts
The events precipitating the instant controversy were summarized in the CA Decision,
as follows:
The Bids and Awards Committee of the PNP resolved to award the contract
to MAPTRA. The head of BAC Secretariat PSSUPT Detran instructed
petitioner Villafuerte to prepare the necessary documents pertaining to the
award of the contract to the winning bidder MAPTRA. Hence, petitioner
Villafuerte prepared the Supply Contract and the Notice to Proceed was
signed by then PNP Chief Jesus Versoza.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated January 12, 2012, respondent Villafuerte claimed that his
only participation in the procurement process was the drafting of several documents
under the instruction of P/SSupt. Lurimer B. Detran, Head of the BAC Secretariat, to
wit:
(i) Negotiation Committee Resolution No. 2009-04, entitled
"Recommending the Award of Contract and Purchase Order to
Manila Aerospace Products Trading (MAPTRA[11]) for the delivery
of One (1) Fully Equipped and Two (2) Standard Light Police
Operational Helicopter All Brand New Worth One Hundred Four
Million Nine Hundred Eight-five Thousand Pesos
(P104,985,000.00) Inclusive of All Taxes, Import Duties and
Charges;"
Aside from the foregoing, respondent Villafuerte further alleged that he was also
instructed by P/Dir. George Quinto Piano, a member of the PNP Inspection and
Acceptance Committee, to draft a demand letter to MAPTRA for the replacement of the
LPOHs and a complaint-affidavit for Estafa against the officials of MAPTRA.[13]
In the OMB Resolution, the OMB concluded that the procurement process was marred
with irregularities and found substantial evidence to hold respondent Villafuerte guilty
of Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.[14]
The OMB likewise ordered the filing of a corresponding Information for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Villafuerte for the
same acts.[15]
The OMB found that the requirement in a negotiated procurement under the
Implementing Rules and Regulations Part A (IRR-A) of RA 9184,[16] i.e., that the
procuring entity directly negotiate only with a "technically, legally and financially
capable supplier, contractor or consultant,"[17] was not observed as MAPTRA was not so
qualified. In particular, considering that potential bidders are required to submit certain
documentary requirements to be evaluated by the BAC under the IRR-A, the OMB
concluded that respondent Villafuerte and his other co-respondents, given their
respective positions, conspired to award the LPOH contract to an unqualified bidder.[18]
The OMB Resolution held thus:
xxxx
Respondent Villafuerte thereafter questioned the OMB Resolution via a Petition for
Review[20] under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 127801. The case was consolidated with an appeal filed by P/Supt. Roman
E. Loreto, which similarly assailed the OMB Resolution.[21]
In his appeal, respondent Villafuerte argued that his duties and functions as a member
of the BAC Secretariat are merely administrative and ministerial in nature and that he
was merely following the instructions of his superiors.[22] Respondent Villafuerte
claimed that it is the Technical Working Group of the NHQ-BAC that has the duty and
responsibility to verify whether a proponent is indeed technically, legally, and financially
capable to enter into a contract with the PNP.[23] Lastly, respondent Villafuerte argued
that there was no positive and conclusive evidence to support the OMB's finding of
conspiracy against him and his co-respondents.[24]
Ruling of the CA
In the Decision[25] dated January 28, 2015, the CA reversed the OMB Resolution and
exonerated respondent Villafuerte from the administrative charges:
SO ORDERED.[26]
Herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, then filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in the Resolution[27] dated
August 3, 2015 for lack of merit. In the same Resolution, the CA granted a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration filed by respondent Villafuerte, ordering his reinstatement and
entitlement to backwages and other benefits pursuant to the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[28] to wit:
SO ORDERED.[29]
Issue
Whether the CA committed reversible error in reversing the OMB Resolution finding
respondent Villafuerte liable for Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.
As culled from the Petition, the principal issue for resolution is whether there is
substantial evidence to find respondent Villafuerte administratively liable.[32] The Court
finds in the negative.
In this case, the Court thus finds occasion to apply the exception considering the
different factual conclusions of the OMB and the CA regarding respondent Villafuerte's
administrative liability.
In the main, petitioner alleges that as a member of the BAC Secretariat, respondent
Villafuerte was charged with the duty of (i) taking custody of procurement documents
and other records, and (ii) assisting in managing the procurement processes and as
such, he was expected to know whether the legal specifications for the procurement of
the LPOHs under pertinent laws were satisfied.[38] Petitioner claims that since
respondent Villafuerte had custody over the procurement documents, he therefore had
the opportunity to examine the documents submitted by MAPTRA and should have
known that the latter failed to meet the requirements under the law.[39] Petitioner
further claims that respondent Villafuerte should have been cautious enough to inquire
behind MAPTRA's eligibility instead of "simply closing his eyes to the apparent and
obvious irregularities surrounding the procurement process."[40]
Proceeding from the foregoing, petitioner thus faults respondent Villafuerte for drafting
several documents that led to the award of the contract to MAPTRA, which allegedly
amounted to Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service.[41] Specifically, petitioner posits that respondent Villafuerte made it appear
that MAPTRA possessed all the qualifications of a qualified bidder — when in fact it did
not — thus resulting to damage to the Government.[42]
Essentially, petitioner would like to impress upon the Court that respondent Villafuerte,
through his individual actions, was part of a larger conspiracy in the procurement of the
LPOHs and as such, is liable for Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.
In any case, it bears stressing that while the OMB's factual findings in their entirety
tend to demonstrate a sequence of irregularities in the procurement of the LPOHs, this
does not ipso facto translate into a conspiracy between each and every person
involved in the procurement process. For conspiracy to be appreciated, it must be
clearly shown that there was a conscious design to commit an offense; conspiracy is
not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts.[43]
Conspiracy is never presumed.[44]
With respect to respondents Villafuerte and Loreto, they were legal officers
designated as members of the BAC Secretariat. As such, they had the
opportunity to examine the documents submitted by MAPTRA. They knew,
therefore, that the latter failed to meet the technical and financial
requirements required by IRR-A. However, they still proceeded to prepare
the necessary papers to recommend the award of the contract to the unqualified
supplier. Moreover, at the time respondent Villafuerte prepared the Supply
Contract, he saw the incorporation papers of MAPTRA Corporation
which indicated that it was issued Certificate of Incorporation on June 10, 2009.
He was present during the June 15, 2009 negotiations when MAPTRA Sole
Proprietorship submitted its proposal. Hence, when he drafted the Supply
Contract he already knew that MAPTRA misrepresented itself as a sole
proprietorship during the negotiations on June 15, 2009. This is not merely
tolerating an irregularity but clearly participating in the commission thereof.[45]
Aside from the sweeping statements of the OMB, there is a dearth of evidence on
record to arrive at a conclusion that respondent Villafuerte was complicit in a
conspiracy to defraud the Government. As consistently stressed by respondent
Villafuerte, the following documents were drafted upon the instruction of his
superior officer, P/SSupt. Lurimer B. Detran: (i) Negotiation Committee Resolution
No. 2009-04, (ii) BAC Resolution No. 2009-36, (iii) Supply Contract between the PNP
and MAPTRA; and (iv) Notice to Proceed addressed to Mr. Larry B. De Vera of MAPTRA.
[46] None of the aforesaid documents suggest that respondent Villafuerte had
In fact, the nature of the functions of the BAC Secretariat under the Amended
IRR-A of RA 9184 confirms that respondent Villafuerte does not possess
recommendatory authority of any kind:
2. Organize and make all necessary arrangements for the BAC meetings;
10. Be the central channel of communications for the BAC with end users,
PMOs, other units of the line agency, other government agencies,
providers of goods, civil works and consulting services, and the general
public.
Here, petitioner is imputing liability to respondent Villafuerte on the simple fact that the
award of the contract to MAPTRA was made through the documents that he drafted.
This is egregious error. Using the same logic, respondent Villafuerte's participation in
the alleged conspiracy thus becomes equivocal, to say the least, considering that he
was also the one who drafted the demand letter to MAPTRA for the replacement of the
LPOHs and a complaint-affidavit for Estafa against the officials of MAPTRA upon the
instructions of P/Dir. George Quinto Piano.[47] In other words, petitioner cannot judge
respondent Villafuerte's actions based on the end result of the documents drafted.
On this score, the Court finds merit m and accordingly adopts the following disquisition
in the CA Decision:
In the present case, no records will show that petitioners took part in the alleged
conspiracy. They were not signatories of any document pertaining
to the procurement of the three (3) helicopters. The petitioners were
neither part of the team who inspected the procured helicopters
nor were they signatories in the disbursement vouchers for the
payment of the said helicopters. Hence, there is no direct evidence that
will link them to the alleged conspiracy.
Petitioner Loreto was not present in the 15 June 2009 negotiation which
eventually led to the awarding of the Supply Contract to MAPTRA. Perforce,
there is no clear or substantial evidence proffered against him to become
administratively liable. Anent petitioner Villafuerte though he was
present in the 15 June 2009 negotiation, however, there are no
records to show that he has the power to recommend or decide on
the negotiation that was conducted. He was merely instructed to
prepare the Supply Contract, nothing more.
xxxx
It cannot be disputed that only the members of the Bids and Awards
Committee are the only persons authorized and empowered to decide on
matters pertaining to the bidding and procurement. The BAC Secretariat is
clearly given the mandate to only safe keep the documents and
facilitate the procurement process. They only rely on the decision of
the members of the BAC itself and to prepare whatever document
they are instructed to do so. Hence, it cannot be determined as to
what extent of culpability that petitioners committed in the alleged
conspiracy.
xxxx
Parenthetically, petitioner makes much of the fact that respondent Villafuerte was under
the Office of Legal Affairs of the PNP before being detailed to the BAC Secretariat.[49]
From this fact, petitioner concludes that respondent Villafuerte's legal background
"should have cautioned him that it was improper to award the contract to MAPTRA" and
therefore he could no longer escape culpability from his act of drafting the necessary
documents recommending the award to MAPTRA.[50] This reasoning is specious.
Even as petitioner does not contest the CA's finding that respondent Villafuerte's duties
as Member of the BAC Secretariat are ministerial in nature, it insists on holding
respondent Villafuerte liable. What petitioner is thus doing is effectively imposing
additional duties upon respondent Villafuerte by the mere fact that he
previously worked under the Office of Legal Affairs; that respondent
Villafuerte's purported failure to o above and beyond his regular functions
under the BAC Secretariat makes him equally responsible for the damage
resulting to the government. This is untenable and simply unfair. While
eagerness in public service is indeed ideal, there is simply no basis in fact to find
respondent Villafuerte liable for not examining each and every document and on the
basis of which make an independent assessment of the qualifications of bidders —
when, as a member only of the BAC Secretariat, he is merely charged with the custody
thereof. To be certain, an opportunity to examine documents does not, by any
means, impose a mandatory duty to examine the same.
The Court disagrees; without more, such bare circumstance does not qualify as
substantial evidence that respondent Villafuerte was guilty of any impropriety and therefore
administratively liable. No deliberate intention to mislead the Government in pursuance of
a larger conspiracy can be derived from the mere fact that there was a purported error in
designating MAPTRA either as a sole proprietorship or a corporation. In the first place,
as summarized in the OMB Resolution itself, the Negotiation Committee, which is in
charge of evaluating the eligibility of MAPTRA, had already made a finding thereon:
7.19. Since it was more than two (2) weeks from 15 June 2009, the
date of the negotiation conference, that the Respondent was
informed that after deliberating the matter the NHQ-BAC awarded
the supply contract to MAPTRA and the pertinent documents were given
to him, the Respondent presumed that the NHQ-BAC through the
Technical Working Group (TWG) already conducted verification of
the documents submitted by MAPTRA. The Minutes of the 15 June
2009 negotiation conference shows that members of the BAC TWG were
present, namely: Police Chief Inspector Cherry M Fajardo, Police Chief
Inspector Maria Josefina Recometa, SPO3 Ma. Linda A. Padojinog, and NUP
Ruben S. Gongona.
7.20. Further, considering that the NHQ-BAC must have already taken all the
MAPTRA documents into consideration, including the legal, financial and
technical aspects thereof, when they deliberated on the award made to
MAPTRA, as well as the fact that the Respondent is not aware of any
prohibition thereon, he proceeded in drafting the required documents as he
was commanded to do. Thus, when Respondent drafted the Supply Contract,
he indicated therein that MAPTRA is a corporation as can be gleaned from
the documents subsequently given to him by his superior officer.[52]
(Emphasis supplied)
Further on this matter, Justice Leonen, in his dissenting opinion, opines that respondent
Villafuerte should be held liable considering that he is a member of the bar.[53] He
argues that respondent Villafuerte's claim of performing ministerial duties is untenable
as having administrative or ministerial functions does not strip a lawyer of his ethical
duties as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[54] Specifically,
Justice Leonen argues that in the drafting of the subject documents, respondent
Villafuerte was engaged in the practice of law as it entailed application of his legal
knowledge, training, and experience.[55] Thus, Justice Leonen opines that respondent
Villafuerte's duties could not have been ministerial as his legal training should have
prompted him as to the impropriety of the contract and that his purported failure to
advise his superiors of irregularities rendered him liable.[56]
The Court cannot accept the foregoing ratiocination of Justice Leonen. While it may be
true that a lawyer cannot, at his convenience, shed himself of his ethical duties as a
member of the legal profession, holding him accountable for alleged violations of the
CPR must be done in strict observance of established procedure. Here, while there is an
apparent intersection between respondent Villafuerte's duties as Member of the BAC
Secretariat and his duties as a member of the bar, the Court cannot hold him liable for
violations of the latter as he was never properly charged for the same nor was he given
the opportunity to respond to any such charges. The two offices that respondent
Villafuerte occupy have separate and distinct duties and functions and are governed by
entirely different rules. Thus, to insist on penalizing him for acts done in violation of
one office despite being charged for violation of the other — no matter how patent the
infraction — would infringe upon the most basic requirement of due process.
More importantly, there is nothing explicit in the statutory duties of the BAC Secretariat
that would require respondent Villafuerte to further examine the findings of the
Negotiation Committee, which is the body charged with evaluating the qualifications of
MAPTRA. That respondent Villafuerte had incidentally applied his legal knowledge and
training does not discount the fact that he drafted the contested documents purely
under the instructions of his superiors — not as a result of any exercise of discretion on
his part. Such circumstance undeniably points to the conclusion that his duties are only
ministerial in nature.
Again, it is untenably and simply unfair to effectively impose additional duties upon
respondent Villafuerte by the mere fact that he is a lawyer so that his purported failure
to go above and beyond his regular functions under the BAC Secretariat makes him
part of a conspiracy to defraud the government. To reiterate, there is simply no basis to
find respondent Villafuerte liable for not examining each and every document and on
the basis of which make an independent assessment of the qualifications of bidders —
when, as a member only of the BAC Secretariat, he is merely charged with the custody
thereof.
All told, the Court is not prepared to punish respondent Villafuerte for merely
discharging the ministerial functions of his office as Member of the BAC Secretariat,
especially when such acts were made pursuant to the instructions of his superiors.
Without more, and there being absolutely no substantial evidence existing from the
records to hold respondent Villafuerte liable for either Serious Dishonesty or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, the judgment here can be no other than
total exoneration.
A final note.
The Office of the Ombudsman is, by special designation of the Constitution, the
"protector of the people."[57] As such, the Constitution has bequeathed upon it a
unique arsenal of powers to investigate any and all acts or omissions of public officers
that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.[58] As well, it is empowered to
impose penalties in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority.[59] In this
regard, while the nature of its functions is largely prosecutorial, the Office of the
Ombudsman is not, by any means, exempted from upholding the fundamental rights of
all citizens as safeguarded by the Constitution. This was stressed by the Court in
Morales, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales[60]:
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
In the same vein, it should be emphasized, following the cited provision, that
the CA has a concomitant responsibility to ensure that, in case of exoneration,
such a decision must perforce be immediately executory, notwithstanding an
appeal that may be lodged by the Ombudsman with the Court. The Court finds
such rule necessary to fulfill the interests of justice and fairness, given that
not only the livelihoods of our public servants are at stake, but likewise the
efficient operations of government as a whole.
All told, inasmuch as the Office of the Ombudsman enjoys independence, it cannot and
should not lose sight of our laws, which it is bound to uphold and obey.[63] The
Ombudsman is as much the protector of the innocent as it is the sentinel of the
integrity of the public service; the zeal of prosecution must, at all times, be tempered
with evidence. In this case, the cavalier attitude of the Ombudsman in distilling the
facts and meting out the most severe penalty of dismissal cannot go unnoticed; the
dismissal of an officer based on nothing but conjecture and a talismanic invocation of
conspiracy is, aside from being manifestly unjust, a gross disservice to its mandate. To
be sure, the cleansing of our ranks cannot be done at the expense of a fair and just
proceeding.
SO ORDERED.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on September 18, 2018 a Decision, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled cases, the
original of which was received by this Office on October 16, 2018 at 10:25
a.m.
[1] Rollo, pp. 59-68. Rendered by the Tenth Division and penned by Associate Justice
Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Carmelita S. Manahan
concurring.
[2] Id. at 69-73. Rendered by the Special Former Tenth Division and penned by
Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and
Socorro B. Inting concurring.
[5] Supplemented by a Verified Manifestation and Motion dated March 23, 2012. Id. at
76.
[6] Ronaldo V. Puno, Former Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
[10] Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 991936, August 31, 1999.
[11] Also referred to as MAPTRA Sole Proprietorship and MAPTRA Corporation in some
[33] See General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. v. National Housing
Authority, 753 Phil. 353, 359 (2015).
[34] Central Bank of the Philippines v. Castro, 514 Phil. 425, 434 (2005).
[36] Office of the Ombudsman v. Dechavez, 721 Phil. 124, 129-130 (2013).
[37] Field Investigation Office v. Piano, G.R. No. 215042, November 20, 2017, p. 8.
[54] Id.
[55] Id. at 3.
[56] Id.
[59] Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, 683 Phil. 553, 563 (2012).
[62] RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Rule III, Sec. 7, as
[63] Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 664 Phil.
16, 30 (2011).
LEONEN, J.:
I refuse to believe that the accused in this case was a mere unthinking bureaucrat who
had no duty except to draft documents. I believe that as a lawyer, he had the
competence to know when there was a defect in the procedure. As a public officer, he
was duty bound to exercise utmost responsibility to ensure that powerful individuals did
not abuse their positions.
Respondent P/Supt. Ermilando O. Villafuerte, in his Comment, admits drafting only the
following:
c) Supply Contract Between the PNP and MAPTRA. The Supply Contract was
eventually executed by and between PDIR Luizo C. Ticman, who signed for
the PNP, and the representative of MAPTRA, Mr. Larry B. De Vera. The said
contract was likewise approved and signed by Police Director General Jesus
Verzosa, Chief,PNP.
The ponencia sweepingly declared that "[n]one of the aforesaid documents suggest
that respondent Villafuerte had a material role in the awarding of the contract to
[Manila Aerospace Products Trading (MAPTRA)]."[2] Scrutiny of the documents is
indispensable. As the documents do not appear in the records of this case, this Court
turns to the findings of fact of the Ombudsman in its Joint Resolution[3] in OMB-C-C-
11-0758-L and OMB-C-A-11-0758-L to examine their contents.
The last statement alone was found to be false. According to the Ombudsman, the
irregularities were conspicuous in the very documents submitted to the Bids and
Awards Committee:
33. Further, MAPTRA Sole Proprietorship's single largest contract and the
only similar contract with that of the PNP was only for P15,295,000.00.
The NHQ-BAC Resolution No. 2009-36 "affirmed the recommendation of the Negotiation
Committee to recommend to the [Philippine National Police] Chief the award of the
supply contract to MAPTRA Sole Proprietorship."[6] The Supply Contract is where the
parties obligated themselves to deliver to the Philippine National Police one brand new
fully-equipped and two standard brand new Light Police Operational Helicopters for
MAPTRA, and to pay MAPTRA the amount of P104,985,000.00 for the Philippine
National Police.[7]
The Ombudsman found that the misrepresentations on the financial and technical
capabilities of MAPTRA were exhibited in the documents they submitted to the Bids and
Awards Committee.[8] To exculpate himself from the administrative charge, respondent
argues that his duties as a legal officer of the Bids and Awards Committee Secretariat
render him as performing ministerial duties. He insists that the Bids and Awards Committee
Secretariat's functions are purely administrative in nature.
The duties of a lawyer, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, are not
ministerial. I cannot agree with the ponencia's view that respondent's act of drafting
the procurement documents was administrative and ministerial.
The first canon in the Code of Professional Responsibility instructs lawyers to "uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes."[9] A lawyer must conduct himself with honesty and integrity in all his
dealings.[10] Further, he must maintain "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility."[11] The legal profession demands
exacting standards from its members.
Respondent alleged that he was under the Office of the Legal Affairs of the Philippine
National Police before he was assigned as the Legal Officer of the Bids and Awards
Committee Secretariat as an additional duty.[12] According to him, taking custody of
procurement documents and assisting in the management of the procurement process
were among the Bids and Awards Committee Secretariat's official functions.[13]
A duty is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of discretion or judgment.
Respondent is a high-ranking police officer and a lawyer. At its barest minimum, he is
no stranger to the law. In preparing the Bids and Awards Committee resolutions and
the supply contract in furtherance of the procurement, respondent made
representations concerning MAPTRA's qualifications for which he must have reviewed
the financial documents. This constituted practice of law and exercise of his judgment,
entailing application of his legal knowledge, training, and experience.[16] His duty was
not ministerial as his legal training prompted him of the impropriety of the task at
hand.
Respondent contends that he relied in good faith in the documents which his superior
presented to him and was "not aware of any prohibition thereon."[17] In preparing the
Supply Contract, he claims that he indicated that "MAPTRA is a corporation, as can be
gleaned from the documents."[18]
Respondent's narration of facts in his Comment appears to be quoted from his Petition
for Review before the Court of Appeals. Curiously, he omitted a damning statement:
In effect, what respondent claims and the majority is prepared to accept is that he
drafted the procurement documents without verifying the representations and
statements declared there despite personal knowledge of their falsehood. As it was his
superior's instruction, he prepared the documents unmindful of the supplier's financial
documents under his custody and for his perusal. In conclusion, the majority is
acquitting respondent high-ranking police officer-lawyer because his official function
was to merely keep the supplier's documents safe and to unthinkingly prepare the
procurement documents as instructed. I cannot condone this.
Respondent cannot hide behind his superior's alleged instruction to disavow liability. As
a public official, he performed the sovereign function of being the legal officer of the
Philippine National Police Bids and Awards Committee Secretariat. He served the
interest of the public, and not his superior's. Inept legal work of a public official
exposes the public to unnecessary risks and as in this case, blatant corruption.
Dishonesty has been defined "as the 'disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity' . . . ." Since the utmost
integrity is expected of public servants, its absence is not only frowned upon
but punished severely.
....
A conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is "any misconduct 'which need
not be related or connected to the public officers' official functions but tends to tarnish
the image and integrity of his/her public office.'"[30] There is no need to belabor this
point.
The "old boys club" is often used as metaphor for the existence of powerful but corrupt
leadership in an agency. It describes an atmosphere where all public officers look the
other way rather than evolve the courage to stand up and call attention to anomalies in
their office. The "old boys club" syndrome survives on the reality that the impoverished
masses who stand to benefit from the weeding out of corruption are not proximate. The
"old boys club" thrives on both fear from the powerful and the institutionalization of
powerlessness on the part of the other public offices in that office.
I disagree that a police superintendent could not have mustered the courage to do his
constitutional and statutory duty to serve the people with "utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency." Respondent saw that there was something amiss. He
saw the anomaly, yet he chose to do nothing. In effect, he conspired.
To allow respondent to go free without liability is contrary to the value of his office and
his rank. It is to allow the "old boys club" to continue.
Thus, I dissent.
[2] Ponencia, p. 9.
[7] Id.
[10] Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata, 486 Phil. 1, 6 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third
Division].
[11] Luna v. Galarrita, 763 Phil. 175 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc] citing Jinon v. Jiz,
705 Phil. 321 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], Molina v. Magat, 687 Phil. 1
(2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
[15] Id. at 20 citing Teodosio v. Somosa, et al., 612 Phil. 858, 872-873 (2009) [Per
Curiam, En Banc].
[16] Cayetano v. Monsod, 278 Phil 235 (1991) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
[18] Id.
[24] Government v. Springer, 50 Phil 259 (1927) [J. Malcolm, Second Division].
[30] Abos v. Borromeo IV, 765 Phil. 10 (2015) [Per. J. Leonen, Second Division] citing
Largo v. Court of Appeals, 563 Phil. 293 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].