Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure

Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure
Brill’s
Cuneiform
Series inMonographs
Jewish Studies
General
Editors
Editor
t. abusch
David – m. j.(Tel
S. Katz geller
Aviv)
s. m. maul – f. a. m. wiggermann
VOLUME 40
VOLUME 38
Neo-Babylonian
Court Procedure
by
Shalom E. Holtz
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2009
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Neo-Babylonian court procedure / edited by Shalom Holtz.

p. cm. — (Cuneiform monographs, ISSN 0929-0052 ; v. 38)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-17496-2 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. Civil procedure (Assyro-Babylonian
law) I. Holtz, Shalom.
KL2447.N46 2009
347.35’05—dc22
2009007851
ISSN 0929-0052
ISBN 978 9004 174962
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‫לאהובתי‪,‬‬
‫בלב שלם ובנפש חפצה‬
‫‪To Leebie‬‬
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ....................................................................... xi
List of Tables .............................................................................. xv
Abbreviation and Transliteration Conventions .......................... xvii
Introduction ................................................................................ 1
A. Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Texts: Their
Contents and Provenance ................................................. 1
B. Litigation Records: The Study of the “Tablet Trail” ...... 3
C. Studies of Litigation Records from Earlier Periods ......... 5
D. Need for the Present Study .............................................. 10
E. Methods ............................................................................. 17
PART I: FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF TEXTS
Chapter One Decision Records .............................................. 23

1.A The Legal Function of the Decision Record ............... 23
1.B The “Royal Judges” Styles of Decision Records ......... 27
1.C The “Eanna” Styles of Decision Records ................... 47
1.D Comparison of the “Royal Judges” and the “Eanna”
Styles .............................................................................. 55
1.E Non-Stylized Decision Records .................................... 63
Chapter Two Other Text-Types Including the Resolution of

Disputes ................................................................................... 69
2.A Conclusions of Disputes ............................................... 69
2.B Memoranda Including Decisions .................................. 74
2.C Settlements .................................................................... 78
Chapter Three Preliminary Protocols and Records of

Statements in Court ................................................................ 85
3.A Preliminary Protocols .................................................... 85
3.B Memoranda of Proceedings ......................................... 99
3.C Records of Statements in Court ................................... 100
3.C.1 Accusatory Depositions .................................... 103
viii contents
3.C.2 Depositions of Testimony ................................ 107

3.C.3 Memoranda of Depositions ............................. 110
3.C.4 Sworn Depositions ........................................... 113
Chapter Four The dabābu- and quttû-Type Summonses .......... 117

4.A Summonses to Argue (dabābu) a Case ........................... 117
4.B Summonses to End (quttû) a Case ................................. 128
Chapter Five Text-Types Calling for Evidence ...................... 133

5.A Summonses to Establish a Case (kunnu) ........................ 133
5.B Guarantees for Testimony ............................................. 143
5.C Penalties Pending Evidence .......................................... 151
5.D Summary Discussion of Texts-Types Calling for
Evidence ........................................................................ 162
Chapter Six Text-Types Ensuring an Individual’s Presence .. 167

6.A Summonses to Present (abāku) an Individual ................ 169
6.B Guarantees for an Individual’s Presence ...................... 177
Chapter Seven Other Text-Types ........................................... 197

7.A Other Summonses ......................................................... 197
7.B Promissory Oaths .......................................................... 199
7.C Injunctions ..................................................................... 209
PART II: NEO BABYLONIAN ADJUDICATORY

PROCEDURE
Chapter Eight The Adjudication of Private Disputes:

The “Royal Judges” Decision Records and Other Texts ...... 223
8.A The Scene ..................................................................... 223
8.B The Initiation of the Case: dīna gerû and Similar
Terms ............................................................................. 224
8.C Summoning the Defendant .......................................... 232
8.D Oral Arguments: dīna dabābu ......................................... 235
8.E The Presentation of Evidence: “Establishing the Case”
(kunnu) and the Means of Evidence .............................. 239
8.F The “Hearing” of Oral Statements: šemû .................... 243
8.G Obtaining Evidence ...................................................... 245
contents ix
8.H Questioning the Litigants: ša ālu ................................. 247

8.I Oaths ........................................................................... 250
8.J The Conclusion of the Trial: Deliberation (mitluku)
and Decision ( purussû) ................................................. 252
8.K Adjudicating Authorities: Royal Judges ...................... 254
8.K.1 Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus in
Babylon ......................................................... 254
8.K.2 Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus
outside Babylon ............................................. 255
8.K.3 Royal Judges during the Reign of Cyrus
and Cambyses ............................................... 257
8.K.4 Royal Judges after the Reign of
Cambyses ....................................................... 258
8.K.5 Royal Judges under Nebuchadnezzar II ...... 261
Chapter Nine The Adjudicatory Process in the Eanna ......... 267

9.A The Scene ................................................................... 268
9.B The Initiation of the Case: Accusations .................... 269
9.C Investigative Procedures in the Eanna ....................... 270
9.D Summoning in the Eanna ........................................... 275
9.E The Answer of the Accused Individual: Confession
and Counter-Accusation ............................................. 278
9.F “Establishing the Case”: kunnu .................................... 282
9.G Questioning and Interrogation: ša ālu and
maš altu ......................................................................... 284
9.H Oaths ........................................................................... 290
9.I The Decision ............................................................... 295
9.J The Adjudicating Authorities in the Eanna ............... 296
Chapter Ten The Neo-Babylonian Tablet Trail in

Comparative Perspective ........................................................ 301
10.A The Decision Record .................................................. 302
10.A.1 The Legal Function of the Decision
Record ........................................................... 302
10.A.2 The Form of the Decision Record ............... 306
10.B Settlements .................................................................. 309
10.C Preliminary Protocols and Records of Statements in
Court ........................................................................... 310
10.D Memoranda ................................................................. 312
x contents
10.E dabābu-Type Summonses ............................................. 313

10.F Text-Types Calling for Evidence ................................ 317
Bibliography ................................................................................ 321

Index of Cuneiform Texts Cited ............................................... 329
Index and Glossary of Akkadian Terms Discussed ................... 334
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book began as a 2006 University of Pennsylvania doctoral dis-

sertation in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, entitled Neo-
Babylonian Decision Records and Related Documents: Structural, Procedural and
Comparative Aspects. The dissertation was written under the supervision
of Professor Barry Eichler, now an esteemed colleague and cherished
guide at Yeshiva University. His sensitive readings and careful eye
contributed much to the coherence of the original work, and I hope
the present monograph meets the high standards he has always set.
Professors Erle Leichty and Jeffrey Tigay, as readers of the original
dissertation, also gave freely of their time as the work took shape. I
thank them, as well as my other teachers in the departments of Near
Eastern Languages and Civilizations at both Penn and Harvard, for
all I have learned from them.
The original research for this work was supported by the University
of Pennsylvania’s William Penn, Ellis and University Dissertation Fel-
lowships. Most of my research was conducted in the Weigle Judaica
and Ancient Near East Seminar Room in Van Pelt Library, home to
books marked with notes by Professor E.A. Speiser, their previous owner.
Reading copies of cuneiform texts in the seminar room was, therefore,
an experience that spanned not only millennia of history, but several
academic generations, as well. I am grateful to Dr. Arthur Kiron, who
kept the room up to current research standards, and to the dedicated
staff at Van Pelt, who made the research possible. Books that were
not available at Van Pelt were usually available from the University of
Pennsylvania Museum library, the Center for Advanced Judaic Studies,
or from Professor Erle Leichty’s own research collection at the University
Museum’s tablet room.
Towards the end of my work on the original dissertation, I had the
fortunate opportunity to meet Bruce Wells of St. Joseph’s University in
Philadelphia. At the suggestion of Cornelia Wunsch, he and F. Rachel
Magdalene have included me in the NEH-funded Neo-Babylonian Trial
Proceedings Project. In addition to sharing their time and materials,
it was they who first suggested that this book should have a corollary
anthology of actual texts. With their encouragement and support,
xii acknowledgments
I have begun work on this anthology, provisionally entitled Neo-Babylonian

Adjudicatory Records, which will be published by the Society of Biblical
Literature’s Writings from the Ancient World series.
While revising the dissertation for publication, I have served as an
assistant professor of Bible at Yeshiva University. I am extremely grateful
to Yeshiva for the time and space in which I do my work, and especially
for my colleagues, junior and senior, who have taken interest in my
research and have provided invigorating intellectual stimulation. The
librarians at the Mendel Gottesman Library of Hebraica/Judaica and
its interlibrary loan service have been most attentive to my requests. I
thank Mr. Avi Kelin, a former student, for his proofreading assistance.
Our work together has, I hope, eliminated most errors, and I accept
full responsibility for any that remain.
My many friends have contributed to this work, by reading parts of
chapters, furnishing helpful references, or simply providing much-needed
diversion. Special thanks go to Spencer Allen and Karen Sonik, two
fellow students at Penn, for their on-the-spot consultations and for our
conversations over lunch. I wish them much success as they complete
their doctorates. I have known two fellow Penn alumni, Shawn Zelig
Aster and Moshe Simon-Shoshan, since before I was an undergradu-
ate student. I hope that they treasure our long-lasting friendship as
much as I do and that they have benefited from it as much as I have.
Since Zelig is also at Yeshiva, I am confident that I shall continue to
reap the rewards of being his colleague. In the category of longtime-
friends-turned-colleagues, I must also acknowledge two other former
Penn students, Debra Kaplan, whom I have known since high school
(and who knows my wife since before that), and Aaron Koller. Both are
now my neighbors on the fifth floor of Belfer Hall. May we continue
to share the joys of each others’ successes!
It was in the home of my parents, Drs. Avraham and Toby Berger
Holtz, that I was first introduced to the world of scholars and scholar-
ship, in general, and to the specific area of the study of the ancient
Near East. I thank them for contributing to my academic progress
longer than anyone else and pray that they may continue to do so for
many years to come. I especially thank my father for patiently read-
ing the dissertation and suggesting improvements in anticipation of its
publication as a book.
Like the original dissertation, this book is dedicated to my wife, Lee-
bie Mallin. Since my graduation, we have been blessed by the births
of a son, Zev Barukh Boaz (“Billy”), and a daughter, Avigayil Sara.
acknowledgments xiii
Their arrivals have made me all the more grateful for all Leebie has
given me.
544 Belfer Hall

New York, NY
January 13, 2009
"‫ג' לפרשת "ואנכי אהיה ﬠם פיך‬

‫יז בטבת תשס"ט‬
LIST OF TABLES
Summary Table 1.1 “Royal Judges Style A” Decision

Records .................................................................................... 41
Summary Table 1.2 “Royal Judges Style B” Decision
Records .................................................................................... 45
Summary Table 1.3 “Eanna Style A” Decision Records ........ 60
Summary Table 1.4 “Eanna Style B” Decision Records ....... 62
Summary Table 1.5 Non-Stylized Decision Records ............. 66
Summary Table 2.1 Conclusions ............................................ 72
Summary Table 2.2 Memoranda Including Decisions ........... 79
Summary Table 2.3 Settlements ............................................. 83
Summary Table 3.1 Preliminary Protocols ............................. 91
Summary Table 3.2 Memoranda of Proceedings .................. 101
Summary Table 3.3 Accusatory Depositions .......................... 108
Summary Table 3.4 Depositions of Testimony ...................... 111
Summary Table 3.5 Memoranda of Depositions ................... 113
Summary Table 3.6 Sworn Depositions ................................. 116
Summary Table 4.1 dabābu-Type Summonses ........................ 126
Summary Table 4.2 quttû-Type Summonses ........................... 132
Summary Table 5.1 Summonses to Establish a Case
(kunnu) ...................................................................................... 144
Summary Table 5.2 Guarantees for Testimony ...................... 150
Summary Table 5.3 Penalties Pending Evidence .................... 160
Summary Table 6.1 abāku-Summonses ................................... 178
Summary Table 6.2 Guarantees for Individuals’ Presence .... 194
Summary Table 7.1 Other Summonses .................................. 200
Summary Table 7.2 Promissory Oaths ................................... 210
Summary Table 7.3 Injunctions .............................................. 216
Table 8.1 Directory of Individuals Designated lu2DI.KU5 ...... 263
ABBREVIATION AND TRANSLITERATION CONVENTIONS
The abbreviation of references follows Erica Reiner and Martha Roth,

eds., The Assyrian Dictionary of the University of Chicago, vol. P. (Chicago,
2005), pp. vii–xxvii. In addition, the following abbreviations are used:
Abraham, Business Kathleen Abraham, Business and Politics under the

Persian Empire: The Financial Dealings of Marduk-
nā ir-apli of the House of Egibi (521–487 B.C.E.)
(Bethesda, 2004).
AuOr Aula Orientalis
Bongenaar, Ebabbar A.C.V.M. Bongenaar, The Neo Babylonian Ebabbar
Temple at Sippar: Its Administration and Its Pro-
sopography (Istanbul, 1997).
Moore, Documents Ellen Whitley Moore, Neo-Babylonian Business and
Administrative Documents (Ann Arbor, Michigan,
1935).
Sack, CuDoc Ronald H. Sack, Cuneiform Documents from the
Chaldean and Persian Periods (London, 1993).
Stolper, Entrepreneurs Matthew W. Stolper, Entrepreneurs and Empires:
The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm and Persian
Rule in Babylonia (Leiden, 1985).
Wunsch, BA 2 Cornelia Wunsch, Urkunden zum Ehe-, Vermögens-,
und Erbrecht aus verschiedenen neubabylonischen
Archiven (Babylonische Archive 2) (Dresden, 2003).
Wunsch, CM 3 Cornelia Wunsch, Die Urkunden des babylonischen
Gesschäftsmannes Iddin-Marduk. Zum Handel mit
Naturalien im 6. Jarhundert v. Chr. (Cuneiform
Monographs 3) (Groningen, 1993). [3a = volume
a, 3b = volume b]
Wunsch, CM 20 Cornelia Wunsch, Das Egibi Archiv: Die Felder und
Gärten (Cuneiform Monographs 20) (Groningen,
2000). [20a = volume a, 20b = volume b]
In the footnotes, articles and books are cited fully in the first reference
to them. Subsequent citations of articles are by author’s last name and
journal title. Subsequent citations of books are by author’s last name
xviii abbreviation and transliteration conventions
and abbreviated title. Akkadian texts first published in journals are cited
by the author’s last name, followed by the journal title.
Because of the erratic nature of Neo-Babylonian orthography, Akka-
dian and Sumerian forms are normalized following the grammatical
conventions of Old Babylonian. The transliteration of personal names
follows the indices at the ends of Kümmel, Familie, Wunsch, CM 3 and
Wunsch, CM 20.
INTRODUCTION
A. Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Texts: Their Contents

and Provenance
The textual legacy of southern Mesopotamia during the seventh,

sixth and fifth centuries BCE stands out for its abundance. The vast
majority of these texts pertain to legal and administrative, rather than
literary, matters. Loans, contracts, sales, marriages, adoptions and other
day-to-day affairs were recorded on clay tablets by scribes writing in
cuneiform script. Thousands of these tablets are known to today’s
scholars, while many more are believed to exist and await discovery or
publication.1 Modern Assyriological scholarship refers to these texts as
Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts. They offer pictures of
many aspects of Mesopotamian socio-economic and legal institutions
in the centuries immediately preceding the Common Era.
From the point-of-view of political history, the term ‘Neo-Babylonian’
refers to a specific historical period, which begins with the rise of the
Babylonian king Nabopolassar in 626 BCE,2 and lasts until the end of
the reign of Nabonidus, when Cyrus and the Achaemenid Persians con-
quered Babylonia in 539 BCE. However, because the cuneiform textual
record continues unchanged for a considerable time after the Achaeme-
nid conquest, for the purposes of studying cuneiform law there is no
reason to distinguish between texts written before and after Babylonia
came under Persian control. Thus, when the term ‘Neo-Babylonian’ is
used to describe cuneiform texts, rather than a specific historical period,
it can refer to texts written during the Achaemenid period and even
to texts written later, during the Hellenistic period (after 330 BCE).3
1
For estimates of the actual numbers, see Michael Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and
Administrative Documents: Typology, Contents and Archives (Guides to the Mesopotamian
Textual Record, 1) (Münster, 2005), p. 1.
2
All dates follow R.A. Parker and W.H. Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology 626 B.C.–
75 A.D. (Providence, 1956).
3
See Olof Pedersén, Archives and Libraries in the Ancient Near East 1500–300 B.C.
(Bethesda, 1998), pp. 181–182 and Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Docu-
ments, pp. 1–2. Note that both Pedersén and Jursa include texts from Babylonia before
the rise of Nabopolassar in the discussion of ‘Neo-Babylonian’ texts.
2 introduction
This book adopts the broader use of the term ‘Neo-Babylonian.’ It

considers texts that date to the reigns of the Babylonian kings from
Nebuchadnezzar II (son of Nabopolassar) through Nabonidus, as well
as texts dating to the Achaemenid emperors as late as Darius II.
Despite their abundance, most Neo-Babylonian legal and administra-
tive texts come from just five cities in southern Mesopotamia: Babylon,
Borsippa (modern Birs Nimrud and Tell Ibrahim al-Khalil), Nippur
(Nuffar), Sippar (Abu Habba) and Uruk (Warka).4 For the most part,
they stem either from private archives or temple archives.5 The private
archives contain texts pertaining to the property and business dealings
of individuals or families. Among the more famous examples of Neo-
Babylonian private archives are the Egibi archive from Babylon, the
Ea-Ilūta-bāni archive from Borsippa, and the Murašû archive from
Nippur.6 These are only three of the more extensive private archives
among numerous others.7 There are far fewer temple archives; less
than ten are known.8 Nevertheless, temple archives were much larger
than private archives. Thus, texts from temple archives, particularly the
Ebabbar temple at Sippar and the Eanna temple at Uruk, dominate
the Neo-Babylonian text corpus.9 These texts pertain to administra-
tive aspects of these institutions, such as the delivery of goods to the
temple, the organization of temple workers and the redistribution of
resources by the temple.
The classification of Neo-Babylonian texts into archives poses numerous
challenges. First, because most of the Neo-Babylonian legal and admin-
istrative texts do not come from well-documented excavations, exact
details about find-spots are often missing. Thus, the assignment of a
4
Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 2. Other sites, also discussed
by Jursa, have not yielded nearly as many texts as these five.
5
For discussion of the published Neo-Babylonian texts from the palace archives
at Babylon (the so-called “Kasr” texts) see Pedersén, Archives, pp. 183–184 and Jursa,
Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 60–61. On the somewhat anach-
ronistic use of the term “archives,” see G. van Driel, “The ‘Eanna Archive,’” BiOr
55 (1998), pp. 61–62.
6
For a survey of these and other private archives, including the numbers of tab-
lets included in each, see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp.
60–152.
7
Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents enumerates some 90 known
private archives.
8
Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 59 n. 359.
9
For an estimate of the size of the Ebabbar archives, see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal
and Administrative Documents, pp. 117–118. For the Eanna archive, see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian
Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 138.
introduction 3
particular text to a particular archive usually cannot be based on where

the text was discovered. Instead, archives must be reconstructed by
considering internal factors of each text, such as the prosopography of
the protagonists.10 This painstaking process of reconstruction is further
impeded by the fact that although the ancient archives originate from
a relatively limited geographical area, modern discovery has scattered
their contents throughout the world. To cite just one typical example,
the texts from the Eanna temple archive, which were probably kept in
a single location in antiquity, are now in at least five different collections
in Europe and the United States.11 The general disarray is reflected
in many of the first modern editions of Neo-Babylonian texts, which
do not present them as part of ancient archives but rather as part of
the collections of a particular museum or university. This approach to
publication makes texts available quickly, but allows the randomness
of modern collection to limit the study of antiquity. Students today
must sift through all the material in order to relate texts in different
museums to each other.12
B. Litigation Records: The Study of the “Tablet Trail”
The documents that survive from the Neo-Babylonian period attest

to a wide variety of legal transactions pertaining to the property of
the individuals or institutions that kept them.13 This book focuses on
litigation records: texts that attest to the adjudication of legal cases for
the most part by Neo-Babylonian authorities.
Litigation records, like other Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative
texts, come from both private and temple archives. In private archives,
litigation records pertain to cases surrounding the property of the
archive owner. For example, a slaveholder whose ownership of a slave
was disputed and then reconfirmed by a court might retain a record of
10
Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 57. For discussion of
the archaeological data pertaining to the archives from particular cities, see Pedersén,
Archives, pp. 181–212.
11
Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 138.
12
For a convenient schematic summary of the problems surrounding the reconstruc-
tion of ancient archives, see Heather D. Baker, The Archive of the Nappā u Family (AfO
Beiheft 30) (Vienna, 2004), pp. 5–6.
13
For a survey of the different categories of texts included in Neo-Babylonian archives
see Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 9–54.
4 introduction
the decision as proof of ownership.14 Temple archives provide records

of hearings conducted by temple authorities, such as the šatammu of
the Eanna, as part of the prosecution of the mishandling of temple
property.15 All of these litigation records, from both private and temple
archives, offer insights into the main question this book hopes to answer:
How was a case adjudicated in the Neo-Babylonian period?
The discussion in the following chapters will demonstrate that the
adjudication of cases in the Neo-Babylonian period generated a con-
siderable quantity of written records. Some records provide complete
descriptions of proceedings in court, from the initiation of a case
through its decision. Others record only one stage in the proceedings
that eventually led to a decision. Therefore, addressing the question of
how a case was adjudicated requires the study of what might best be
called the ‘tablet trail’ left behind when cases were brought to justice
in the Neo-Babylonian period.
The ideal situation for the study of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory
procedure would be the discovery of all the texts pertaining to one
particular case (the case’s ‘tablet trail’) in a single location. Having all
the relevant litigation records together would allow one to follow the
progress of the case in the texts it generated. Unfortunately, only in rare
instances has more than one record from any Neo-Babylonian legal case
survived.16 Instead, the numerous litigation records that have survived
pertain to different cases. Thus, for the most part, these records cannot
be studied within the context of a particular case. Rather, in order to
make the best use of the available evidence, one must group litigation
records together into text-types based on similarity of legal function.
When this is done, the litigation records offer insight into the different
14
See the discussion of decision records in the following chapter.
15
For a general overview of litigation records, see the discussion of “records of court
proceedings” in Jursa, Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 15–17. For a
description of the administrative structure of Neo-Babylonian temples, see Jursa, Neo-
Babylonian Legal and Administrative Documents, pp. 49–51 and Ronald H. Sack, “Royal and
Temple Officials in Eanna and Uruk in the Chaldean Period,” in Manfried Dietrich
and Oswald Loretz, eds., Vom Alten Orient Zum Alten Testament (AOAT 240) (Neukirchen,
1995), pp. 425–432. For discussions of the relationship of the royal establishment and
the temples, see Grant Frame, “Nabonidus, Nabû-šarra-u ur, and the Eanna Temple,”
ZA 81 (1991), pp. 37–86 and John MacGinnis, “The Royal Establishment at Sippar in
the 6th Century BC,” ZA 84 (1994), pp. 198–219.
16
Examples are collected in Cornelia Wunsch, “Und die Richter ins. berieten: Stre-
itfälle in Babylon aus der Zeit Neriglissars und Nabonids,” AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), pp.
59–100. See also M. San Nicolò, “Parerga Babylonica VII: Der §8 des Gesetzbuches
ammurapis in den neubabylonischen Urkunden,” ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 341–342.
introduction 5
text-types that might have been included in any particular case’s ‘tab-
let trail.’ By identifying these different text-types, one can reconstruct
a hypothetical ‘tablet trail,’ even if one cannot find all the litigation
records pertaining to any one particular case.17
C. Studies of Litigation Records from Earlier Periods
Litigation records written in cuneiform are attested beginning in the Ur

III period and continue to be attested throughout the over 1,000 years
of Mesopotamian history that preceded the Neo-Babylonian period.
Modern scholars have applied typological methods to these earlier texts
as a means of reconstructing court procedure. This book draws on the
methods pursued in the following studies of court procedure in four
earlier periods of Mesopotamian history:
• Adam Falkenstein’s Die Neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden (1956);

• Two studies of the Old Babylonian litigation records: Eva Dom-
bradi’s Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozeßur-
kunden (1996) and John D. Fortner’s Adjudicating Entities and Levels of
Legal Authority in Lawsuit Records of the Old Babylonian Era (1997);18
• Roy Hayden’s Court Procedure at Nuzu (1962);
• Remko Jas’s Neo-Assyrian Judicial Procedures (1996).
All of these studies attempt to describe the adjudicatory process, or at

least some aspect of it. To achieve this goal, all address the need for
typological classification of the litigation records. In all of these works,
classification of the texts and attention to legal terminology are the basis
for a description of the adjudicatory process. In order to illustrate this
connection between text-typology, the study of legal terminology and
the reconstruction of the adjudicatory process, the relevant aspects of
each of these works should be considered.
17
For a similar characterization of this aspect of the textual records, see F. Rachel
Magdalene, On the Scales of Righteousness: Neo-Babylonian Trial Law and the Book of Job
(Brown Judaic Studies 348) (Providence, 2007), p. 43.
18
For discussion and bibliography of earlier works on the Old Babylonian texts,
see Eva Dombradi, Die Darstellung des Rechtsaustrags in den altbabylonischen Prozeßurkunden
(FAOS 20) (Stuttgart, 1996), Vol. 1, pp. 1–2.
6 introduction
Falkenstein’s work is based on Sumerian court records from the Ur

III period (2112–2004 BCE), mainly those texts that carry the Sume-
rian designation d i. t i l. l a (“completed legal matter”). Falkenstein
begins with a discussion of the different text-types (“Textgattungen”) that
carry this designation, in which he distinguishes between texts that
record “judicial certification” ( gerichtliche Beurkundung) of transactions,
and those that record aspects of proceedings in court, which he labels
“protocols” (“Prozeßprotokollen”). Falkenstein also discusses “combined-
documents” (“Sammelurkunden”), which record more than one case, and
the “pisandubba (tablet-basket) labels (“pisandubba-Etiketten”), which
are labels for the baskets that held the court records.19 Falkenstein then
uses the information in the Sumerian court documents to describe
various aspects of law during the Ur III period. Most importantly,
his discussion opens with descriptions of court organization and legal
procedure.20 The discussion of legal procedure is divided into four main
sections which correspond to the main phases of a trial: the initiation
of proceedings, evidentiary actions, the decision, and the renunciation
of future claims (Verzichterklärung).21 This discussion includes a study of
the legal terminology associated with each of the phases, such as the
terms i n i m- g a r (literally “to set forth a matter”) for the asser-
tion of a claim22 and t u g2- u r3 (literally “to drag the cloak”) for the
renunciation of a claim.23
Both Dombradi and Fortner, who treat the Old Babylonian (2000–
1595 BCE) material, make extensive use of typological methods.24
Both distinguish between texts that describe entire trials and texts that
describe only part of the proceedings. The main differences between the
typologies that Dombradi and Fortner present appear in their further
classification of the documents. Dombradi, after making the distinc-
tion between “documents regarding trial proceedings” (“Urkunden über
19
Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, pp. 7–17. In his presentation of the texts
themselves, Falkenstein further classifies the texts based on subject matter. See the table
of contents in Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 2, p. V.
20
Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, pp. 18–80.
21
22
23
Falkenstein, Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, p. 79.
24
For Dombradi’s text-typology, see Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 161–204, especially
the outline on p. 168. Fortner’s typology appears in John D. Fortner, Adjudicating Enti-
ties and Levels of Legal Authority in Lawsuit Records of the Old Babylonian Era (Ph.D. Thesis,
Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 1997), pp. 29–81. See Table 4,
pp. 73–81 for Fortner’s classification of all the texts his dissertation considers.
introduction 7
Prozeßverfahren”) and “documents regarding trial actions” (“Urkunden über

Prozeßhandlungen”), subdivides each of these sets based on categories of
law (civil or criminal), legal formulations employed in the texts and pro-
cedures described. Fortner, on the other hand, specifically rejects the use
of legal terminology as the basis for classification.25 Instead, his typology
is based primarily on the legal function of the texts. Thus, because all
of the “lawsuit records” have the same legal function, Fortner does
not classify them any further. He does, however, divide the “associated
documents” into six types, each with a different legal function.
In addition to proposing typologies of the Old Babylonian litigation
records, both Dombradi and Fortner pay considerable attention to
the legal terminology used in the documents. Fortner’s terminological
discussion is devoted to three terms that describe the judges’ activities:
dīnam šū uzum, dīnam dânum, and awātam amārum.26 Dombradi considers
these terms, as well,27 but also studies other terms that pertain to other
aspects of the proceedings. She places special emphasis on terms for
the initiation of the lawsuit, such as ragāmum, baqārum,28 and abātum,29
as well as the various terms that describe the different decisions that
would bring the case to a conclusion.30
Apart from studying and defining the terms themselves, Dombradi’s
work also considers legal terms within the context of the phraseological
structure (Klauselnbestand) of the litigation records.31 She then identifies
the legal terms associated with each part of the adjudicatory process.
In this manner, Dombradi’s description and classification of the Old
Babylonian material goes beyond Fortner’s. Whereas Fortner limits his
discussion to functional aspects of the texts, Dombradi demonstrates
25
Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 35. Fortner’s system cannot, of course, ignore
the terminology used in the different texts. Thus, the register of lawsuit records and
associated documents (Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 73–81) also indicates certain
terminological aspects of the texts.
26
Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 82–168.
27
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 312–318 (dīnam šū uzum, dīnam dânum); pp.
327–329 (awātam amārum).
28
Both ragāmum and baqārum are discussed in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1,
pp. 262–294. The two verbs are discussed together because Dombradi concludes that
they are geographic variants with the same meaning. For a critique of this conclu-
sion, see Raymond Westbrook’s review of Dombradi, Darstellung in Or. 68 (1999), pp.
125–127.
29
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 295–302.
30
31
8 introduction
that these texts also had formal compositional aspects that must be
taken into account.
For both Fortner and Dombradi, the study of typology and legal
terminology is the basis for an inquiry into other aspects of the Old
Babylonian legal system. This part of Fortner’s study concerns itself
with the Old Babylonian “adjudicating entities and institutions.”32 In
particular, it is devoted to identifying these different adjudicating enti-
ties and institutions and to understanding the relationship between the
“levels of legal authority” and the “interplay which existed between the
crown administrative organization and the local judicial and administra-
tive infrastructure.”33 Dombradi’s typological and terminological studies
have a much broader goal. They form the basis for a comprehensive
description of Old Babylonian civil procedure.34 Like Fortner, Dombradi
also gives attention to understanding the adjudicating agencies (die Organe
der Rechtsprechung).35 In addition, however, Dombradi’s work also traces
the course of legal proceedings (Rechtsgang) from the assertion of the
claim (die Geltendmachung von Rechten) to the conclusion of the case.36
Hayden’s study of court procedure at Nuzi (c. 1500–c. 1350 BCE)
begins with the identification of adjudicating authorities and a descrip-
tion of court organization.37 It then continues with a thorough survey
of court procedure, which begins with the “initiation of the suit,” and
continues with descriptions of “the trial,” “the evidence,” “investiga-
tions,” “the ordeal,” “decisions,” “appeals,” “penalties,” and “enforce-
ment.”38 Although the main purpose of Hayden’s work is “to attempt
a reconstruction of the court procedure at Nuzu,”39 Hayden recognizes
that this reconstruction is dependent on understanding the different
types of documents in which court procedures are recorded. In his
own words:
Several types of documents furnish evidence for the reconstruction of the
court procedure at Nuzu. While the lawsuits are the main source, there
are also letters, memorandum tablets, and declarations in court. Often

32

33
34
35
36
37
Roy Edmund Hayden, Court Procedure at Nuzu (Ph.D. Thesis, Brandeis University,
1962), pp. 6–21.
38
Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 22–72.
39
Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 7.
introduction 9
a contract, with or without a penalty clause, helps us to understand the

reasoning behind a decision.40
As a result of this observation, Hayden devotes the latter part of his
work to presenting a selection of these different types of documents.
Hayden’s presentation begins with the most abundant text-type, which
he calls the “lawsuit.” These documents record the proceedings in court
up to and including the authorities’ decision. Typically, they begin
with the statement that “PN1 appeared with PN2 in court before the
judges” (“PN1 itti PN2 ina dīni ana pāni dayyānē ītelûma”),41 and end with
the statement that one of the parties “prevailed in the case” (ina dīni
iltēma).42 Hayden further classifies these texts based on subject matter, by
devoting separate sections to “civil lawsuits,” that pertain either to real
estate or to “personal” matters, and to “criminal lawsuits.”43 Besides the
“lawsuits,” Hayden’s typology of texts includes three other types that
specifically do not record the entire course of legal proceedings lead-
ing to a decision. Hayden calls these three types “declaration tablets,”
“memorandum tablets” and “letters.”44
Remko Jas studies the Neo-Assyrian (8th–7th centuries BCE) litigation
records. Jas states the goals and methods of his study as follows:
The main object of this study . . . is to gain some insight into the course of
the proceedings. This will be done by dividing the court documents into
groups based on strictly formal criteria in the belief that these formally
distinct groups of texts represent different stages in a trial. Every text will
then be analysed in detail which will . . . lead to a better understanding
not just of their background but also of their function.45
40
41
Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 25. The translation quoted is Hayden’s. Given the
adversarial meaning of the conjunction itti, especially in the context of lawsuits, a
better translation might be “PN1 came to court against PN2 before the judges.” See
AHw. dabābu 3b (p. 147) and AHw. itti 5 (p. 405). This translation also accords with
Hayden’s observation that the person mentioned first is generally the plaintiff (Hayden,
Court Procedure, p. 25).
42
43
Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 73–171.
44
The main description of these types occurs in the sections devoted to each type
in Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 172–181. Note, however, that the sections devoted to
the “lawsuits” also include some texts of other types. For discussion, see below.
45
Remko Jas, Neo-Assyrian Judicial Procedures (SAAS 5) (Helsinki, 1996), pp. 2–3. For
a similar use of individual documents to reconstruct the stages of the Neo-Assyrian
procedure for homicide, see Martha Roth, “Homicide in the Neo-Assyrian Period,” in
Francesca Rochberg-Halton, ed., Language, Literature, and History: Philological and Historical
Studies Presented to Erica Reiner (AOS 67) (New Haven, 1987), pp. 351–365, especially
10 introduction
Jas’s first classification of the Neo-Assyrian texts is based on formal

criteria. Using these criteria, Jas divides the texts into the following
groups: 1) texts that begin with the word dēnu (“lawsuit” or “judgment”);
2) texts in which the word sartu (“crime” or “fine”) occurs; 3) “murder
texts,” in which a murderer must pay blood money to the family of
the victim; 4) “theft texts,” in which a thief must make a payment for
stolen goods; 5) debt texts, which reflect the payment of a debt as the
result of a dispute; 6) texts that mention the uršān ordeal; 7) texts that
begin with the word šumma; 8) texts headed by a date; and 9) abātu-
summons. Recognizing that formally-similar texts may in fact have
different functions, Jas attempts to identify the purpose for which each
text was issued. Jas’s analysis demonstrates that different texts, even
within the same group, may have been composed at different stages in
the adjudication of disputes. For example, some sartu texts record the
imposition of a penalty that remains to be paid, while others record
the actual payment.46 Similarly, with regard to the “texts headed by
a date,” Jas writes that “some of the texts belong to the preparatory
stages of a lawsuit, while others represent attempts at solving a conflict
outside the courtroom.”47
D. Need for the Present Study
In contrast with the abundance of studies of legal procedure in ear-

lier periods of Mesopotamian history, no comprehensive study of the
Neo-Babylonian material has ever been undertaken. Writing in the
late 1990s, Cornelia Wunsch expressed the need for such a study in
a footnote to an article on records of legal cases from the time of
Neriglissar and Nabonidus. In her note, Wunsch writes: “Eine zusam-
menfassende Darstellung zum Gerichtswesen und Prozeßrecht in neubabylonischer und
achämenidischer Zeit fehlt bislang” (“a comprehensive description of court
practices and procedural law in the Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid
period has been lacking to date”).48 A survey of scholarship on Neo-
p. 362, and Pamela Barmash, Homicide in the Biblical World (Cambridge, 2005), pp.
56–70.
46
Jas, SAAS 5, p. 51.
47
Jas, SAAS 5, p. 81.
48
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 59 n. 1. For a similar sentiment, see Mag-
dalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39.
introduction 11
Babylonian legal proceedings before Wunsch’s comment and of some

of the research subsequent to it demonstrates that the lack observed
by Wunsch still remains.
Before turning to the survey itself, however, it is important to note
that existing discussions of Neo-Babylonian litigation records occur only
in broader discussions of related topics. In other words, there has not
yet been any separate discussion that addresses the specific subject of
litigation records on their own. Therefore, the present survey cannot
limit itself to previous studies of Neo-Babylonian litigation records.
Instead, it must consider the broader range of studies that include
Neo-Babylonian litigation records.
In general, the studies that include Neo-Babylonian litigation records
may be divided into three main categories: 1) text editions, whose main
purpose is the publication of cuneiform texts themselves, in hand copy
or transliteration, sometimes accompanied by translation and commen-
tary; 2) archival studies, whose main purpose is the reconstruction of
Neo-Babylonian archives or the study of one aspect of these archives;
and 3) legal studies, whose main purpose is the description of Neo-
Babylonian law. These categories are not, of course, exclusive. For
instance, an archival or legal study may include editions of relevant
texts. Nevertheless, these categories provide a useful framework for the
discussion of earlier studies.
Text editions are the earliest publications concerning Neo-Babylo-
nian legal and administrative texts. These early publications present
the texts as part of the collections of specific museums. Joachim N.
Strassmaier published hand copies of texts in the British Museum,
beginning in 1889 with texts from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar (Nbk)
and Nabonidus (Nbn), with a separate volume of copies for texts from
each king. These were followed by texts from the reign of Cambyses
(Camb) and Cyrus (Cyr) in 1890, and Darius (Dar) in 1892. Similarly
extensive early museum publications of hand copies include editions
of texts from the University Museum published by H. V. Hilprecht in
BE 9 (1898) and by Albert Clay in BE 10 (1904) and PBS 2/1 (1912),
Arthur Ungnad’s copies of texts from the Vorderasiatisches Museum
in Berlin in VAS 3–6 (1907–8), copies of texts from Yale by Raymond
P. Dougherty and Arch Tremayne in YOS 6 and 7 (1920 and 1925),
and Georges Contenau’s copies of texts from the Louvre in TCL 12
and TCL 13 (1927 and 1929). Transliterations and English translations
of the texts from the Louvre are published in Moore, Documents (1935).
Some more recent museum publications, such as McEwan, LB Tablets,
12 introduction
G. J. P. McEwan’s edition of the texts in the Royal Ontario Museum

(1982) and OIP 122, David B. Weisberg’s edition of texts at the Uni-
versity of Chicago’s Oriental Institute (2003), present more than hand
copies. They include transliterations and translations, as well as some
commentary to the texts.
The main purpose of text-editions is, as has been stated, to make
the Neo-Babylonian texts available. Thus, text-editions do not usually
include broader discussions of legal matters. However, text-editions
rarely consist solely of copies of the texts. Usually, text-editions include
indices of personal and geographic names, as well as a catalogue of
the texts contained in the edition. These catalogues list all the texts
in the edition and sometimes include a very brief description of the
contents of each text. Similar brief descriptions of Neo-Babylonian
texts are found in Erle Leichty’s Catalogue of the Babylonian Tablets in the
British Museum (1986–1988). They are also strewn throughout scholarly
discussions of the texts. These descriptions, however brief, often reflect
the editors’ attempts to classify the texts. In other words, they are the
result of a concern for text-typology.
Given the existence of brief descriptions in catalogues and elsewhere,
one might imagine that the need for a text-typology has largely been
addressed. However, this is not so for several reasons. First, because these
descriptions are so brief, they do not state the criteria by which a par-
ticular text is given a particular description. This poses problems for the
classification of newly discovered texts. Furthermore, these descriptions
are often quite general, and do not reflect a precise picture of a text’s
legal function. Terms like “court record,” “protocol” or “Prozeßurkunde”
might be used without attention to the different functions court records
might have. Finally, perhaps the most vexing problem is that different
authors use different brief descriptions to describe similar texts. For
example, one might be left to wonder whether a text formulated in
a particular way is a summons or a contract.49 Thus, although brief
descriptions of texts, in catalogues and elsewhere, clearly reflect attempts
at text-typology, no rigorous text-typology has yet been presented.
The problems of brief catalogue descriptions are, however, ancillary
to the main problem of text-editions based on museum holdings. As
has already been noted, these editions are limited by modern collection
49
For example, see the discussion in section 4.A below of the different descriptions
of dabābu-summonses (summonses to argue a case).
introduction 13
practices. It is true that the text-edition of a museum’s collection might

sometimes coincide with an ancient archive. This is the case with many
of the University Museum’s Murašû texts, which appeared under the
title Business Documents of the Murashû sons of Nippur already when they
were first published by H. V. Hilprecht in BE 9 (1898) and by Albert
Clay in BE 10 (1904) and PBS 2/1 (1912). Yet even the University
Museum’s early publications of the Murašû texts do not include all the
texts in the archive, and so do not provide a complete picture. Proper
understanding of the Murašû archive, as well as others, requires archival
studies that “break the museum barrier” to assemble all the texts that
were held together in antiquity. Thus, for the Murašû archive, there
are two main archival studies: Guillaume Cardascia’s Les Archives des
Murašû (1951) and, more recently, Matthew Stolper’s Entrepreneurs and
Empires (1985).50
Other ancient private archives have also been the subjects of archival
studies, as well. Numerous archival studies have examined the Egibi
archive, which is the largest Neo-Babylonian private archive from
Babylon. Among the more recent monographs are Cornelia Wunsch’s
on the documents of Iddin-Marduk in CM 3 (1993) and on the fields
and gardens in CM 20 (2000), as well as Kathleen Abraham’s Business
and Politics under the Persian Empire (2004).51 The Nappā u family archive,
the second largest Neo-Babylonian private archive from Babylon, is
the subject of Heather Baker’s The Archive of the Nappā u Family (2004).
Examples of archival studies of private archives from outside Babylon
include Francis Joannès’s Archives de Borsippa (1989), devoted to the
Ea-ilūta-bāni archive, and Michael Jursa’s Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni
(1999), about the archive of one family from Sippar.
The two major temple archives, the Ebabbar archives from Sip-
par and the Eanna archives from Uruk, have benefited from archival
studies, as well. Examples of book-length works include Cocquerillat,
Palmeraies (1968) a study of date farming as organized by the Eanna,
and Michael Jursa’s Die Landwirtschaft in Sippar in neubabylonischer Zeit
(1995), a study on the organization of agriculture on lands administered
by the Ebabbar at Sippar. The study of the temple archives has also
50
For the history of the discovery of the Murašû archives, see Matthew Stolper,
Entrepreneurs and Empires: The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm and Persian Rule in Babylonia
(Leiden, 1985), p. 1; 157–161.
51
For a summary of earlier studies of the Egibi archive, see Wunsch, CM 20a,
pp. 1–19.
14 introduction
benefited from prosopographical monographs, which are indispensable

to gaining a hold on the material. For the Eanna at Uruk, Kümmel,
Familie has updated and replaced Mariano San Nicolò’s earlier Beiträge
zu einer Prosopographie neubabylonischer Beamten der Zivil- und Tempelverwal-
tung (1941). Bongenaar, Ebabbar (1997) has made serious study of the
Ebabbar archive possible.
The archival approach is of inestimable value for the proper under-
standing of the Neo-Babylonian texts, and, more generally, for the
understanding of numerous aspects of ancient society and culture.
Nevertheless, when it comes to the elucidation of questions of law, the
archival approach is of only limited use. In order to describe the adju-
dication of legal cases, one cannot simply look at one archive, since any
one archive may or may not contain litigation records.52 Furthermore,
not every litigation record can be securely assigned to a specific ancient
archive. To be sure, the results of the archival approach are necessary;
situating a litigation record within an archive, when possible, often illu-
minates the legal question at hand.53 A comprehensive understanding
of legal procedure, however, requires cross-archival and extra-archival
research in order to select the relevant litigation records.
Legal studies approach the Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative
texts in just this manner. They bring together numerous texts from
different archival and extra-archival sources, among them litigation
records, in order to address one particular legal subject or to arrive at
a general description of Neo-Babylonian law. Studies of particular legal
subjects, such as Herbert Petschow’s Neubabylonische Pfandrecht (1956) or
Wunsch, BA 2 (2003), a collection of texts on marriage, property and
inheritance law, include litigation records that bear on these subjects.54
However, because they focus on other, distinct legal questions, these
works do not describe the adjudicatory process, per se. Similarly, San
Nicolò addresses some questions of legal procedure in his editions and
52
For example, litigation records in the Murašû archive are relatively rare. See San
Nicolò’s review of Cardascia, Murašû in Or. 23 (1954), p. 278 and Matthew W. Stolper,
“The Genealogy of the Murašû Family,” JCS 28 (1976), p. 195. For a general com-
parison between the contents of the Murašû archives and other archives, see Veysel
Donbaz and Matthew W. Stolper, Istanbul Murašû Texts (Istanbul, 1997), pp. 12–15.
53
For example, see the discussion of Wunsch, CM 20, No. 84 in Wunsch, CM 20a,
pp. 110–113 and of Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 in Wunsch, CM 20a, pp. 124–125.
54
See, for example, Petschow, Pfandrecht, p. 127 and Wunsch, BA 2, Nos. 42, 44,
45, 46, 47 and 48.
introduction 15
studies of texts from the Eanna archives.55 However, his work on this
subject never reaches beyond the level of comments on particular texts
in the course of discussing other issues.
Two early works that attempt a more comprehensive description of
Neo-Babylonian law are Aus dem babylonischen Rechtsleben by Josef Köhler
and Felix Ernst Peiser (1890–1898) and Neubabylonische Rechts- und Verwal-
tungsurkunden by Mariano San Nicolò and Arthur Ungnad (1935). Both
discuss litigation records in sections on procedural law.56 The work by
San Nicolò and Ungnad, however, is limited because it considers only
texts in the Vorderasiatisches Museum in Berlin.57 The work by Köhler
and Peiser considers texts from numerous collections, but not many of
the texts actually come from outside the British Museum. 58 Further-
more, neither Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben nor San Nicolò-Ungnad,
NRV considers the wealth of adjudicatory material available from the
Eanna archives. And, of course, neither work takes into account the
numerous texts that have seen light in the nearly 100 years since these
two works were published.
Despite these shortcomings, however, Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben and
San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV remain important because of their use of
text typology. In both works, the description of procedural law is based
on the authors’ classification of different litigation records. In fact, one
might argue that in both works, the heavy reliance on text typology
results in a somewhat atomized picture of procedural law. Because the
typological method requires close scrutiny of the texts, it prevents, to
some extent, a more general, descriptive synthesis of the material.
Throughout the twentieth century, Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben and
San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV remained the most comprehensive descrip-
tions of the Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory process. The early twenty-first
55
San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 327–348; “Parerga Babylonica IX: Der Mon-
streprozeß des Gimillu, eines širku von Eanna,” ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 61–77; “Parerga
Babylonica XI: Die maš altu-Urkunden im neubabylonischen Strafverfahren,” ArOr 5
(1933), pp. 287–302; Symbolae Koschaker, pp. 219–234; “Eine Kleine Gefängnismeuterei
zur Zeit des Kambyses,” in Wenger AV, pp. 1–10. See also Sibylle von Bolla, “Drei
Diebstahlsfälle von Tempeleigentum in Uruk,” ArOr 12 (1944), pp. 113–120.
56
Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, pp. 30–33; 2, pp. 63–79; 3, pp. 50–62; 4, pp. 80–89.
San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV, pp. 600–618.
57
Note that even at the time of its publication, San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV did not
include all the Neo-Babylonian texts known to have been in the Vorderasiatisches
Museum; texts from Uruk are not included. See San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV, p. III
(Vorwort).
58
See the indices at the end of each volume of Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben.
16 introduction
century has already seen an apparently renewed interest in the subject.

As of the current writing, there are four contemporary examinations
of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory procedure. These may be divided into
two categories: two studies that focus primarily on describing Neo-
Babylonian law and two studies that use Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory
law to inform discussions of the Hebrew Bible.
The two studies that focus primarily on Neo-Babylonian law are
found in broader works that take the first steps towards a history of
ancient Near Eastern law: Rendre la justice en Mésopotamie, edited by
Francis Joannès (2000) and A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, edited
by Raymond Westbrook (2003). In the first work, the Neo-Babylonian
period is represented by Francis Joannès’s own selection and transla-
tion of litigation records.59 This is the first such collection to combine
texts from both temple and private archives. However, because the
Neo-Babylonian section is just one part among several, the number of
texts it surveys is limited. Apart from the French translations, Joannès’s
discussion of the texts consists only of a brief general overview and a
separate introductory summary of each text. Joannès does not attempt
to classify the texts into text-types, nor does he attempt a general
description of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory procedure. In the work
edited by Westbrook, Neo-Babylonian law is described in a chapter by
Joachim Oelsner, Bruce Wells and Cornelia Wunsch.60 “Litigation” is
one of the numerous subjects that this chapter addresses.61 However,
the general synthesis that this chapter provides is quite brief and does
not engage in a more detailed description of litigation records or legal
terminology.
In addition to the two discussions focused primarily on Neo-Baby-
lonian law, two studies have been undertaken that examine Neo-Baby-
lonian procedural law in the context of comparison with law in the
Hebrew Bible. These two works are: The Law of Testimony in the Penta-
teuchal Codes by Bruce Wells (2004) and On the Scales of Righteousness Neo-
Babylonian Trial Law and the Book of Job by F. Rachel Magdalene (2007).
In Wells’s book, the discussion of Neo-Babylonian litigation records
is limited to those texts that inform an understanding of Biblical laws
59
Francis Joannès, “Les textes judiciaires néo-babyloniens,” in Francis Joannès, ed.
Rendre la justice en Mésopotamie (Saint-Denis, 2000), pp. 201–239.
60
Joachim Oelsner, et. al., “Neo-Babylonian Period,” in Raymond Westbrook, ed.
A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law (Leiden, 2003), pp. 911–973.
61
Oelsner et. al., in Westbrook, ed. History, pp. 921–923.
introduction 17
pertaining to the testimony of witnesses. Wells uses the litigation records

to “show witnesses in action and the court’s treatment of those witnesses
and their testimony” in a “working legal system in the ancient Near
East.”62 The primary goal of Wells’s work is, however, an understand-
ing of the laws of testimony, not a comprehensive understanding of
court procedure.
Magdalene seeks to understand the Book of Job in light of Neo-
Babylonian court procedure. One of her explicit goals is to uncover
“the machinery of justice in the Neo-Babylonian period—that is, those
formal steps that gave shape to a legal action.”63 To achieve this goal,
Magdalene devotes an entire chapter to “trial procedure in the Neo-
Babylonian courts,” in which she identifies and describes the “basic
phases of litigation.”64 Magdalene characterizes her own methodology
as “legal-historical.”65 This method is intended as a corrective to ear-
lier “philological” studies of the material, which, in Magdalene’s own
estimation, can lead one to “lose sight of the legal-historical forest for
[one’s] study of the philological trees.”66 In keeping with her stated
methodology, Magdalene does not engage in typological discussion of
the texts themselves, nor does she devote intensive study to the legal
terminology associated with the adjudicatory process. Thus, the need
remains for a thorough understanding of the legal texts themselves
and the terms they use.
E. Methods
The proposed reconstruction of the ‘tablet trail’ of adjudicated cases

faces a number of obstacles. Foremost among these challenges is one
common to any study of Neo-Babylonian legal and administrative texts:
assembling the texts. Just as modern collection and publication practices
have often not kept ancient archives together, they have not kept all the
texts in a particular text-type together, either. Thus, one must begin by
sorting through the numerous published texts in order to select those
62
Bruce Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes (Wiesbaden, 2004), p. 9.
63
Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39.
64
Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, pp. 55–94. The “phases” are outlined on
p. 66.
65
Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39.
66
Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 39 n. 42.
18 introduction
that are relevant to the adjudicatory process. Some texts, like those that
explicitly describe the adjudication of a dispute by judges or those that
record a particular procedure in court, are obviously relevant. Other
texts, however, do not give explicit descriptions of court activities but
do suggest that they were written as part of the adjudicatory process
because they contain references to procedures like summoning witnesses.
Before one can place any such text within the ‘tablet trail’ of adjudicated
cases, one must ask whether such a text belongs in the ‘tablet trail’ at
all. Only once one has addressed this fundamental problem can one
consider the question of any text’s legal function and determine the
stage in the adjudicatory process that the text represents.
Part I addresses these challenges in order to arrive at a typologi-
cal classification of the different Neo-Babylonian litigation records
that make up the ‘tablet trail’ of adjudicated cases. It is the result of
a survey of the numerous publications67 containing Neo-Babylonian
legal and administrative texts in order to select those texts that inform
the discussion of the adjudicatory process. By studying the contents
of the various text-types pertaining to court litigation, the typological
discussion attempts to characterize the different legal functions that
these texts served. Based on this, the discussion classifies the texts into
text-types. When the adjudicatory setting of these texts is not obvious,
those features of the different text-types that indicate that they were
composed as litigation records are identified.
The typology presented in Part I classifies the texts into text-types
based on legal function. This criterion for classification requires the
identification of the reason for which particular texts might have been
composed. As the typological discussion will show, the texts themselves
often furnish the information necessary to identify why they were com-
posed. Texts that show that they were composed for the same reason will
be said to have the same legal function and will, therefore, be classified
together into a text-type. Thus, the resulting text typology will illustrate
the different functions for which the adjudicating authorities might have
composed the different texts that make up the ‘tablet trail.’
In addition to the main criterion of legal function, Part I will also
consider the formal aspects of some of the texts. Thus, within text-
67
This book focuses only on published texts. This includes texts that have been
published in editions complete with transliteration and translation as well as those that
are known only in cuneiform copy. Numerous unpublished texts are known to exist in
museum collections, but these are not considered here.
introduction 19
types, the discussion will also distinguish between different compositional

styles. Each style exhibits consistent composition. One style differs
from another in terms of its formal characteristics, such as specific
phrasing or the order of compositional elements. However, despite the
compositional differences, different styles of the same text-type share
the same legal function.
Although the typology will consider formal aspects of the Neo-Baby-
lonian texts, it should be emphasized that the main basis of classification
is function, not form. The choice of function over form stems from a
concern that similarly-worded texts may actually have served different
legal functions.68 Thus, a functional typology is better suited to achieving
the goal of describing the process of adjudication. Only by identifying
legal function can one attempt to situate the different text-types within
the framework of the adjudicatory process.
One important consequence of the functional method of typology
pertains to the archival context to which the different texts belong. As
has already been noted, the texts considered in this book come from
two main sources: temple archives and private archives. Despite their
different origins, however, the needs of the adjudicatory process are the
same, regardless of the subjects to which it pertains. Thus, the ‘tablet
trail’ for both temple and private cases consists of the same text-types.
Because all of the texts pertain to the adjudicatory process in some
way, it is not surprising to find that texts from both temple and private
archives serve similar legal functions. In fact, to a large extent, texts
of the same text-types are found among the texts from both temple
archives and private archives. In some cases, the documentation is
predominantly from one context, but the existence of one or two texts
of the same text-type from the other context suggests that both the
temple and private contexts used the same text-type. In keeping with
the functional emphasis of the typology, texts of the same text-type are
all discussed at the same time. When the archival context is significant,
it will be mentioned, but the main distinctions between private and
temple archives will only be addressed in the discussion of adjudica-
tory procedure (Part II).
68
Jas, SAAS 5 is an example of a typology that is based primarily on form, and only
secondarily on function. This is based on Jas’s belief, stated in Jas, SAAS 5, pp. 2–3,
that “formally distinct groups of texts represent different stages in a trial.” However,
the discussion of the sartu-texts in Jas, SAAS 5, p. 51 shows that even Jas recognizes
that these formally-similar texts may actually reflect more than one stage in the trial.
20 introduction
Apart from achieving a comprehensive text typology, the typological

discussion has two additional results, one pertaining to legal procedure
and the other to legal terminology. In terms of legal procedure, the
typological discussion sets the different text-types within the framework
of the adjudication of cases and hence results in a textual record of
the different procedures involved. In addition, the close scrutiny of the
contents of the litigation records leads to the identification of important
legal terminology associated with adjudication. Both the procedural and
terminological results of the typological discussion are the basis of Part
II, which traces the progress of a case in the Neo-Babylonian period
from its initiation to its final adjudication. In doing so, Part II uses the
different text-types to outline the progress of the case. Furthermore, it
attempts to understand the adjudicatory process by defining the legal
terminology associated with each of its stages.
PART I
FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF TEXTS

CHAPTER ONE
DECISION RECORDS
1.A The Legal Function of the Decision Record
On 26 Šebā u, year 2 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon, Rēmanni-Bēl

came to court in an attempt to free his sister, Bābunu, and her children
from their enslavement to mNabû-mukīn-apli. The case was heard
by the judges of Nabonidus in Tapšu u. Two copies of the decision
record survive and are published as Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58
and Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 59. The proceedings and the judges’
decision are recorded as follows:1 2
1. di-i-ni ša2 mre-man-ni-dEN A-šu2 (1–5) The case which mRēmanni-
ša2 mte-rik-LUGAL-ut-su Bēl son of mTērik-šarrūssu
2. a-na mu - i fba-bu-nu u3 DUMU. argued against mNabû-mukīn-
MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 apli, regarding fBābunu and
3. ša2 mdNA3-<mu>-ki-in-IBILA her children, members of the
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdKUR.GAL- household of mNabû-mukīn-apli
MU-id-di-nam son of mAmurru-šuma-iddinam,
4. it-ti mdNA3-DU-IBILA a-na before the judges of Nabonidus,
ma- ar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ king of Babylon, thus:
5. ša2 mdNA3-na- -id LUGAL TIN.
TIRki id-bu-bu um-ma
f
ba-bu-nu
6. ša2 i-na E2-ku-nu2 a- a-ta-a ši-i (5–6) “fBābunu, who is in your
lu2
DI.KU5.MEŠ household, is my sister!”
7. m
re-man-ni-dEN iš-ta- -a-lu um-ma (6–7) The judges questioned
f
ba-bu-nu m
Rēmanni-Bēl thus:
8. NIN-ka ul-tu im-ma-ti ki-i (7–9) “Since when has fBābunu,
E2mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU your sister, been part of the
household of mAmurru-šuma-
iddinam, father of mNabû-mukīn-
apli?”
1
Text follows Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 59.
2
According to the opening lines, only one person, mAmurru-šuma-iddinam, is being
addressed. Therefore, the use of the plural possessive -kunu is difficult to explain.
24 chapter one
9. AD ša2 mdNA3–DU-IBILA ši-i (9–10) mRēmanni-Bēl said thus:

m
re-man-ni-dEN iq-bi
10. um-ma 40 MU.AN.NA.MEŠ (10–13) “For these past 40 years,
an-na-a-ti fba-bu-nu f
Bābunu, my sister has served
11. NIN-a mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU m
Amurru-šuma-iddinam. I argued
ta-pal-la di-i-ni a-na mu - i-šu2 a case regarding her against
12. it-ti mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU m
Amurru-šuma-iddinam, father of
AD ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA m
Nabû-mukīn-apli, but he has not
ad-di-bu-ub let her go from his household until
13. u3 a-di i-na-an-na iš-tu E2-šu2 la now!”
u2-še- i-iš
14. mre-ma-an-ni-dEN mim-ma (14–16) mRēmanni-Bēl did not
i-da-tu ša2 di-i-ni a-na UGU show the judges any evidence
15. fba-bu-nu it-ti mdKUR.GAL- of the case regarding fBābunu
MU-MU AD ša2 mdNA3-DU-A which he argued against
16. id-bu-bu a-na lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ la m
Amurru-šuma-iddinam, father
u2-kal-li-im of mNabû-mukīn-apli.
17. lu2
DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu-ti (17–18) The judges heard their
iš-mu-ma mim-ma i-da-tu4 arguments. They did not see
18. ša2 di-i-ni la i-mu-ru-u iš-ta-lu- any evidence of the case. They
mu 40 MU.AN.NA.MEŠ conferred.
19. an-na-a-ti fba-bu-nu mdKUR. (18–21) For these 40 years,
GAL-MU-MU AD ša2 mdNA3- f
Bābunu served mAmurru-šuma-
DU-IBILA iddinam, father of mBēl-mukīn-
20. tu3-pal-la man-ma di-i-ni u3 pa- apli. He did not have any case
qa-ri or claimant against him.
21. ina mu - i-šu2 la ir-ši
22. fba-bu-nu u3 DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 (22–23) They assigned fBābunu
UN.MEŠ E2 ša2 mdKUR.GAL- and her children, the members of
MU-MU the household of mAmurru-šuma-
23. a-na mdNA3-DU-IBILA iddinam to mNabû-mukīn-apli.
id-di-nu
m
Rēmanni-Bēl claims that the family of mNabû-mukīn-apli is in wrongful
possession of fBābunu. Upon questioning, mRēmanni-Bēl reveals that
f
Bābunu has been in the service of the family of mAmurru-šuma-iddi-
nam, father of mNabû-mukīn-apli, for forty years. mRēmanni-Bēl claims
to have tried to obtain her release by bringing suit against mAmurru-
šuma-iddinam. mRēmanni-Bēl is unable to produce any record of the
lawsuit which he claims to have brought. Seeing no evidence of any
legitimate claim against mAmurru-šuma-iddinam or his son, mNabû-
mukīn-apli, the judges decide that fBābunu and her children should
stay in the possession of mNabû-mukīn-apli.
decision records 25
The need to prove that a lawsuit had actually been brought lies at the
heart of this case. mRēmanni-Bēl is unable to produce “evidence of the
case” (i-da-tu ša2 di-i-ni ) that he claims to have argued (and presumably
won), so he loses his present claim. His opponent, mNabû-mukīn-apli,
on the other hand, will never have to face that problem. mNabû-mukīn-
apli will have a copy of the decision record to prove his ownership of
f
Bābunu and her children. The text itself continues with the following
lines, which state that this is its purpose:
23. . . . u3 a-na la e-ne-e (23–25) And so that (the decision)
24. up-pi iš- u-ru-mu ina na4KIŠIB. would not be changed they wrote a
MEŠ-šu2-nu tablet and sealed it with their seals
25. ib-ru-mu-ma a-na mdNA3-DU- and gave it to mNabû-mukīn-apli.
IBILA id-di-nu
The judges’ actual seal marks, which appear at the end of the text, prove
that these lines refer to the very text on which they appear. The decision
record was written “so that (the decision) would not be changed,” that
is, to prevent any claim against mNabû-mukīn-apli’s ownership.
Notices like the one just quoted appear at the end of a number of
other decision records.3 They illustrate explicitly that the legal function
of this type of text is to serve as proof that a case has been settled
and thereby to prevent any future claims. Those in possession of the
decision tablet would have a clear record of the case and of the ruling
in their favor.
An additional illustration of this purpose of the decision records
comes from two texts pertaining to the disputed property of fTašmētu-
damqat and her daughters. These women sold a field to mNabû-a ē-
iddin, a well-known descendant of the Egibi family from Babylon.
Another woman, f ibu u, and her son, mMušēzib-Marduk, question the
validity of the sale and bring their case before the judges of Nabonidus
in Babylon. The beginning of the case is recorded in Wunsch, CM 20,
No. 112, a fragmentary decision record. Both Roth and Wunsch recon-
struct the lost decision as follows.4 The judges allow fTašmētu-damqat
3
Other, similar expressions are found in: Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34–36;
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:32–35; Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:44; Nbn
1128:26–28, all “royal judges decision records” (see the discussion in section 1.B
below). Other non-stylized decision records including similar notices are: Wunsch, BA
2, No. 9:9–12; Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251:10–12.
4
Martha Roth, “Tašmētu-damqat and Daughters,” in J. Marzahn and H. Neumann,
eds., Assyriologica et Semitica, Festschrift für J. Oelsner (AOAT 252) (Münster, 2000), p. 397
and Wunsch, CM 20a, pp. 124–125.
26 chapter one
and her daughters to sell the land to mNabû-a ē-iddin. mNabû-a ē-

iddin, however, must make some compensation to f ibu u and her son.
This requirement is recorded in Nbn 355, a debt note composed in the
presence of judges of Nabonidus. This later text includes the following
notice, found in lines 11–13:
11. f
i-bu- u u mKAR-dAMAR. (11–13) f ibu u and mMušēzib-
UTU DUMU-šu2 Marduk, her son, will give the
12. up-pi di-i-ni ina ma- ar lu2DI. tablet of legal proceedings to
KU5.MEŠ m
Nabû-a ē-iddin before the
13. a-na mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU judges.
id-dan-na
Once they are paid, f ibu u and her son must give “the tablet of legal
proceedings” ( up-pi di-i-ni) to mNabû-a ē-iddin. Originally, this tablet
would have been in the possession of f ibu u and her son, as a record
of their claim to the compensation. Once mNabû-a ē-iddin has com-
pleted his payments to them, they demonstrate that their claim has been
satisfied by transferring the tablet of legal proceedings to him.
As Roth suggests, the decision record Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 is
the very uppi dīni to which these lines refer.5 From Roth’s correlation,
it seems that the Babylonians themselves recognized a specific text-type
whose purpose was to record the decision. This purpose is reflected in
the Akkadian designation uppi dīni. Thus, by identifying the decision
records, the present discussion arrives at the definition of a natively-
recognized text-type, the uppi dīni.
Because decision records must reflect the details of the particular
case which they describe, differences between one text and another are
to be expected. Nevertheless, the decision records may be classified
into several different styles. Each style is characterized by a consistent
use of compositional elements, such as the terminology describing the
legal proceedings and the ordering of elements within the text. The
different styles of decision records can be associated with the particular
venues in which the decisions were made and recorded. The following
discussion presents and describes four different styles of decision records:
two styles associated with the royal judges, which will be known as
the “Royal Judges” styles, and two styles of decision records from the
Eanna at Uruk, which will be known as the “Eanna” styles. A number
5
Roth, AOAT 252, p. 397. The term uppi dīni occurs in a similar context in TCL
12, 122:14, although the actual uppi dīni to which the text refers has not survived.
decision records 27
of decision records will be presented after the discussion of the “Royal

Judges” and the “Eanna” styles. These are texts whose formulation does
not easily fit into a particular style of decision record, but whose legal
function is nevertheless to record the decision in a legal case.
1.B The “Royal Judges” Styles of Decision Records
Twenty-eight decision records fall into two distinct styles based on their
compositional elements. Because most of these decision records involve
the royal judges,6 the two styles in which they are written will be des-
ignated “Royal Judges style A” and “Royal Judges style B.” Although
some of these texts do not actually involve the royal judges, they are
included in the present discussion because they share the characteristic
elements of these two styles.7
Of the twenty-eight “Royal Judges” style decision records, twenty
are written in “Royal Judges style A.” They come from Babylon, Sip-
par, Tapšu u and Uruk and date from as early as the regnal year of
Neriglissar to as late as year 9 of Cyrus. They all have the following
general outline:
I. Plaintiff ’s Statement
A. Opening (includes mention of plaintiff and adjudicating
authority)
B. Quotation of plaintiff ’s statement
C. Imperative to authority
6
In the decision records written in the “Royal Judges” styles, the name of the king
is included in the term designating these judges, lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (= dayyānū) ša2 RN
(“the judges of RN”). The more general term dayyānū ša šarri (lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2
LUGAL; “judges of the king”) is attested in addition to the term dayyānū ša RN in
Nbn 13:5 and in Wunsch, AuOr 17 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:15’, 20’, 26’. The des-
ignation lu2DI.KU5 ša LUGAL also follows the names of both judges recorded in Cyr
301:12–13. For more on the office of judges of the king, see the discussion at the end
of chapter 8 and Cornelia Wunsch, “Die Richter des Nabonid,” in J. Marzahn and
H. Neumann, eds., Assyriologica et Semitica, Festschrift für J. Oelsner (AOAT 252) (Münster,
2000), pp. 557–597.
7
The texts written in both styles are listed in summary tables 1.1 and 1.2 at the end
of this section. These tables also list the different adjudicating authorities mentioned
in these texts.
28 chapter one
II. Judicial Actions

A. šemû-clause
B. Judicial review of evidence
C. mitluku-clause
D. Decision
III. Conclusion
A. Introduction of authorities
B. Names of authorities
C. Scribe(s)
D. Place of composition
E. Date
Seals of authorities
All the “Royal Judges style A” decision records follow this general outline.
In order to illustrate this style, YOS 19, 101, a decision record from a
case that apparently pertains to a misappropriated shipment of dates,
will be quoted in full, divided according to the outline just presented:
I. Plaintiff ’s Statement (lines 1–25)
A. Opening (includes mention of plaintiff and adjudicating authority)8

1. U.GUR-re- u-u2-a lu2qal-la ša2
md
(1–3) mNergal-rē ūa the slave of
MU-dAMAR.UTU
m m
Iddin-Marduk said thus to the
2. a-na lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3- judges of Nabonidus, king of
IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki Babylon:
3. iq-bi um-ma

3. mMU-dAMAR.UTU EN-a (3–6) “mIddin-Marduk, my master,
4. 4 ME 80 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA loaded a shipment of 480 kur of
e-pi-ru-tu dates for transport (?)8 from the
5. ul-tu EDIN a-na gišMA2.MEŠ ša2 hinterland on the boats belonging
md
KUR.GAL-na-tan to mAmurru-natan, the boatman,
6. lu2MA2.LA 5 A-šu2 ša2 mam-ma-a son of mAmmaya.”
u2-še-li-ma
8
The Akkadian word epirūtu is not known as a qualification of dates. Both AHw.
decision records 29
7. pu-ut EN.NUN-tim ša2 ZU2. (7) “He had him bear the
LUM.MA u2-ša2-aš2-ši-iš responsibility for keeping the
dates.”
8. MA2.MEŠ a-na TIN.TIRki
giš
(8–10) “He brought the boats
u2-še-la-am-ma to Babylon and he gave me
9. ši-pir-tu4 ša2 mMU-dAMAR. m
Iddin-Marduk’s message. 480
UTU id-di-nam-ma Gur of dates was written i[n it].”
10. 4 ME 80 GUR ZU2.LUM.
MA ina lib3-[bi-šu2] ša2- i-ir
11. re-eš ZU2.LUM.MA aš2-ši-ma (11–12) “I took account of the
47 GUR 1 PI dates, and 47gur 1pi were missing.”
12. ina lib3-bi ma- u-¢u2Ü a-na UGU
13. mi- i-tu4 ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA it-ti (12–14) I raised a claim against
md
KUR.GAL-na-tan m
Amurru-natan concerning the
missing amount of the dates
and . . . thus:
14. ar-gum2-ma u2-ŠAR-X-RI
um-ma ZU2.¢LUM.MAÜ-ka
15. ul aš2-ši ar2?-ki ba-ti-qu (14–15) “ ‘I did not take your
XXX ... dates.’”
(15) “Afterwards, an informer . . .
16. 4! GUR 1 PI ¢ZU2.Ü[LUM. (16) “ ‘4 Gur 1 Pi of dates . . .
MA]
17. u3 ku-tal-la ša2 ¢gišMA2-niÜ (17) “ ‘and be hind m y boa t . . .
X-X u2
18. ZU2.LUM.MA šu2-nu-tu2 i-na (18) “ ‘those da tes in . . .
X-šu2-[
19. rik-su it-ti-šu2 ni-iš-ku-us (19–20) “We contracted a
20. um-ma 7 GUR 1 PI ZU2.LUM. contract stating thus: ‘mAmurru-
MA natan illegally took 7 gur 1 pi of
21. mdKUR.GAL-na-tan ina sar-tu dates.’ ”
iš-šu-u2
epēru II (p. 223) and CAD epēru (E, p 191) list the verb epēru as a variant of the verb
ebēru, “to cross” (AHw., p. 182; CAD E, p. 10). Note especially the /p/ variant in the
NB letter TCL 9, 102:91 listed by CAD). This verb is used in connection with rivers
and other bodies of water, which fits the present context. Therefore it seems that the
word in question is an adjective meaning “for transport.” Note, however, that it is the
Š-stem form of the verb which usually has this meaning.
30 chapter one
22. ar2-ki ri-ik-su šu-a-tu2 mdKUR. (22–23) “After mAmurru-[natan]

GAL-[na-tan] wrote this contract until today . . .
23. šu -ur-ma a-di u4-mu an-ni-i X
24. i-na-an-na i-na ma -ri-ku-nu (24) Now, I have brought him
ub-la-aš2 before you.”
25. EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na (25) “Establish our decision!”
II. Judicial Actions (lines 25–35)
A. šemû-clause
25. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu (25–26) The judges heard their
26. iš-mu-u2 arguments.

26. rik-su šu-a-tu2 u ši-pir-tu4 (26–29) They read before them
27. ša2 mMU-dAMAR.UTU ša2 4 that contract and mIddin-Marduk’s
ME 80 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA message in which 480 Gur of
28. ina lib3-bi ša -ru ša2 mdU.GUR- dates was written which mNergal-
re- u-u2-a ub-la rē ūa brought.
29. ma- ar-šu-nu iš-tas-su-u2
md
KUR.GAL-na-tan
30. i-ša2-lu-ma na-šu-u2 ša2 ZU2. (29–30) They questioned
LUM.MA ša2 ina sar-tu4 m
Amurru-natan.
31. na-šu-u2 e-li ra-ma-ni-šu2 (30–31) (Regarding) the taking
u2-kin-ma of the dates, he established about
himself that they were taken
illegally.
C. mitluku-clause
This clause is absent in YOS 19, 101, but is present in several other
“Royal Judges style A” texts. It is, therefore, considered a formulaic
component of “Royal Judges style A.” See the subsequent discussion
for more details.
decision records 31
D. Decision
32. 40 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA mi- i-tu4 (32–35) They decided that
ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA šu2-nu-šu2 m
Amurru-natan must pay 40 gur
33. e-li [m]dKUR.GAL-na-tan ip-ru- of dates, the missing amount of
su-ma those dates, and assigned them
34. a-na mdU.GUR-re- u-u2-a lu2[qal-la to mIddin-Marduk, [slave] of
ša2] mMU-dAMAR.UTU m
Nergal-rē ua.
35. id-di-nu
III. Conclusion (lines 35–43)
35. ina EŠ.BAR ¢di-i-niÜ šu-a-tim At the decision of this case:
36. U.GUR-[GI lu2DI.KU5]
md
(36) mNergal-[ušallim, the judge,]
DUMU ši-gu-u2-a descendant of Šigûa;
37. NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU lu2DI.
md
(37) mNabû-a ē-iddin, the judge,
KU5 [DUMU]¢e-gi-biÜ [descendant of] Egibi;
38. NA3-[MU-GI].NA lu2DI.KU5
md
(38) mNabû-[šuma-ukī]n, the
DUMU ir-a-[ni ] judge, descendant of Ir an[ni];
39. md
EN-[ŠEŠ.MEŠ]-¢MUÜ (39) mBēl-[a ē]-iddin, the judge,
lu2
DI.KU5 DUMU mdZALAG- descendant of Nūr-Sîn;
d
30
40. EN-[KAR]-¢irÜ lu2DI.KU5
md
(40) mBēl-ē ir, the judge,
DUMU md30-tab-ni descendant of Sîn-tabni;
C. Scribe(s)
41. NA3-MU-GAR-un DUB.
md
(41) mNabû-šuma-iškun, the
SAR DUMU lu2GAL-DU3 scribe, descendant of Rāb-bānê.
E. Date
42. TIN.TIRki ITI ŠE U4 4-kam2 (42–43) Babylon. 4 Addaru,
43. MU 10-kam2 mdNA3-IM.TUK year 10 of Nabonidus, king of
LUGAL TIN.TIRki Babylon.
32 chapter one
Left edge:
na4
KIŠIB mdU.GUR-GI lu2DI.KU5 Seal of mNergal-ušallim, the judge;
na4
KIŠIB mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU Seal of mNabû-a ē-iddin [the
[lu2DI].KU5 jud]ge;
na4
KIŠIB mdNA3-MU-GI.NA lu2DI. Seal of mNabû-šuma-ukīn, the
KU5 judge;
Right edge:
na4
KIŠIB mdEN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU Seal of mBēl-a ē-iddin, the judge;
lu2
DI.KU5
na4
[KIŠIB] mdEN-KAR-[ir] [Seal] of mBēl-ē [ir], the judge.
lu2
DI.KU5
In terms of its formulaic elements, that is those elements that do not
pertain to the specifics of the case, YOS 19, 101 closely resembles three
other texts: Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 6; Wunsch, AfO 44/45
(1997/1998), No. 21; and Nbn 356. All four texts were written by the
same court scribes, Nabû-šuma-iškun descendant of Rāb-banê (who
wrote YOS 19, 101) or Nādinu descendant of Pa āru, either together
or alone. These two men were, apparently, scribes of the court of the
royal judges of Nabonidus in Babylon, where all four cases were heard.
These texts exhibit the same formulaic components in their entirety or
with only minor variations. They will, therefore, serve as the basis for a
more general discussion of the formulaic components of “Royal Judges
Style A,” which are attested in sixteen other documents.
The following outline presents the formulaic components of the four
paradigmatic texts in terms of the general outline of “Royal Judges
style A” decision records:
I. Plaintiff ’s Statement
A. Opening
PN ana lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša mdNA3-IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.
TIRki iqbi umma
“PN said thus to the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon:”9
EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na
“Establish our decision!”
9
Because the plaintiff in Nbn 356 is female, the verb is taqbi rather than iqbi.
decision records 33

A. šemû-clause
lu2
DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu-u210
“The judges heard their arguments.”
C. mitluku-clause
im-tal-ku-u2
“They deliberated.”11
D. Decision
III. Conclusion
ina EŠ.BAR di-i-ni šu-a-tim
“At the decision of this case”
(Names of judges of Nabonidus)
C. Scribe(s)
m
Nādinu descendant of Pa āru
(and/or)
m
Nabû-šuma-iškun descendant of Rāb-banê
D. Place of Composition
Babylon
E. Date
The discussion will now turn to a more detailed presentation of the

variations that are attested within the formulaic components of the
“Royal Judges style A” decision records. The formulaic components of
the four paradigmatic texts will serve as the basis for this presentation.
Each component of the outline above will be described separately,
including the discussion of its variant forms. For ease of reference,
these variants are also presented in summary table 1.1 at the end of
the discussion of the “Royal Judges” styles.
10
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21:3’, as restored by Wunsch, AfO 44–45
(1997–1998), pp. 90–91, reads lu2DI.¢KU5Ü.[MEŠ] [1–en]-TA-AM3 dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu-
[u2-ma].
11
This clause is present only in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 21. Based
on its presence in other “Royal Judges style A” texts, it is considered to be a formulaic
component of the style.
34 chapter one
As the outlines show, decision records written in “Royal Judges style

A” begin with the plaintiff ’s direct address to the adjudicating authorities
(section I). In the four paradigmatic texts, as well as in most others, this
address is introduced with an opening sentence (element IA), includ-
ing the phrase iqbi umma (“said thus”). Two texts replace the verb qabû
with the verb ma āru12 (“to approach”). In these cases, only the particle
umma serves to introduce the plaintiff ’s direct address. Durand, Textes
babyloniens, No. 60 and Cyr 312 retain the verb qabû, but include the
verb abālu (“to bring”) before it. This additional verb indicates that the
plaintiff “brought” the defendant before (ana ma ri ) the judges.
Following the opening (IA), decision records in the “Royal Judges
style A” quote the plaintiff ’s particular statement to the judges (IB).
The formulation of this element varies to reflect the particulars of the
case at hand. The conclusion of the quotation, however, is a formulaic
imperative to the judges (IC). In the four paradigmatic texts, the plain-
tiff ’s statement ends with the sentence EŠ.BAR-a-ni ( purussâni ) šuk-na
(“Establish our decision!”). This imperative also exhibits variations. The
plaintiffs’ opening statement in BIN 2, 134, addressed to the šākin māti
alone, mentions the defendants in the concluding imperative.13 Another
version of the imperative employs the verbal construction dīna epēšu (“to
judge a case”) instead of purussâ šakānu (“to establish a decision”). The
imperative phrase is it-ti DEFENDANT ep2-šu2 di-i-ni (“Judge my case
against the defendant!”).14 Other decision records whose composition
otherwise closely resembles the four paradigmatic “Royal Judges style
A” texts omit this imperative.15
Before turning to other elements of the “Royal Judges style A”
decision records, the plaintiff ’s statement (section I) in Durand, Textes
babyloniens Nos. 58/59 should be considered. This text has a heading-
like opening (IA) that reads:
di-i-ni ša2 mPN1 a-na mu - i fPN2 u3 DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 ša2 mPN3
it-ti mPN4 ana ma- ar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-na- -id LUGAL TIN.TIRki
id-bu-bu um-ma
12
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:1–3; YOS 6, 92:1–3.
13
it-ti lu2qi-pa-a-nu ša2 E2.AN.NA EŠ.BAR-a-ni šu-kun (BIN 2, 134:11–12).
14
OIP 122, 38:27–28. See also Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:8–9 (it-ti fPN ip-ša2-
in-ni di-i-ni ). This imperative may be reconstructed in Cyr 332:17.
15
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5; Nbn 13; TCL 12, 86; Durand, Textes
babyloniens, No. 60; Cyr 301; Cyr 312.
decision records 35
The case regarding PN2 and her children, members of the household
of PN3, which PN1 argued against PN4 before the judges of Nabonidus,
king of Babylon, thus . . .
This opening is followed by a statement addressed by the plaintiff
directly to the defendant, instead of by a statement addressed to the
judges. Because of this change, the address does not conclude with an
imperative to the judges (IC). This text is considered to be written in
“Royal Judges Style A” because it opens with a direct quotation of the
plaintiff ’s statement in the presence of the judges of Nabonidus.16 Nbn
1128, on the other hand, whose opening is very similar to Durand,
Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59, is classified as a “Royal Judges style B”
document because it does not include any quotation of the plaintiff ’s
statement.
Following the plaintiff ’s statement, texts written in “Royal Judges style
A” record the actions of the judges (section II). In the four paradigmatic
texts, this section begins with the sentence lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-
nu iš-mu-u2 (“The judges heard their arguments”). Instead of the noun
dibbu (“case”), some texts use the noun amātu (“words, statements”) in
the formulation of this element (IIA).17 In Nbn 13:6, there is no noun
preceding the verb šemû. Other texts omit the clause altogether.18
In the paradigmatic form of the šemû clause (IIA), the noun dibbu
ends with the plural possessive suffix (-šunu). The plural form is used
despite the fact that in all four of the paradigmatic texts only one per-
son is presented as the plaintiff. Thus, it is clear that the word dibbīšunu
(“their arguments”) also refers to the defendant named in the preceding
statement of the plaintiff (section I).19 There are, however, also vari-
ant texts in which a singular possessive suffix is used in grammatical
agreement with the single plaintiff who makes a claim in the text.20
16
The structure of Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5 is similar. The plaintiff ’s
statement is addressed directly to the defendant and does not end with an imperative
to the judges.
17
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:20; Wunsch,
CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:23; OIP 122, 38:29.
18
YOS 6, 92; Cyr 312; Cyr 332.
19
Apart from the actual mention of the defendant in the plaintiff ’s statement, the
involvement of the defendant is similarly implied in the first-person common plural
possessive (-ni ) in the word purussâni in the imperative to the judges (IC).
20
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–10; OIP 122, 38:28–29. Note that in both
these texts, the noun in the imperative to the judges (IC) is dinī, which has a singular
possessive suffix, as well.
36 chapter one
This formulation must refer only to the plaintiff and does not refer to
the defendant, against whom the claim has been made.
In its position in the four paradigmatic texts, the šemû-clause (IIA)
marks the transition between the plaintiff ’s presentation of the claim
and the judges’ examination of the evidence. In a number of texts,
however, the šemû-clause appears only in the middle of the second sec-
tion, following the description of some judicial actions involving the
defendant.21 The defendant, therefore, has already been mentioned
outside the context of the plaintiff ’s statement. In these texts, the plural
suffix on the word dibbīšunu (“their arguments”) clearly refers not only
to the plaintiff, but to the defendants as well. The appearance of the
plural possessive pronoun following the involvement of the defendant
makes it clear that the plural refers not only to the plaintiffs, but to all
those involved in the dispute.22
In most “Royal Judges style A” decision records, the judicial review
of the evidence (IIB) is followed immediately by the decision (IID). In
six decision records, including one of the four paradigmatic texts, a
phrase with the verb mitluku (“to deliberate”) indicates that the judges
deliberated after hearing all the evidence (IIC).23 This phrase marks the
transition from the judicial review of the evidence (IIB) to the record-
ing of the decision (IID). It is omitted in most of the “Royal Judges
style A” decision records. The fact that in those texts in which it does
occur, the mitluku-clause occurs in the same position at the conclusion
of the review of evidence suggests that it should be considered as one
of the formulaic components of the style.
The “Royal Judges style A” decision records conclude with the names
of the adjudicating authorities (IIIB) and the scribes who wrote the
decision record (IIIC), followed by the place of composition (IIID) and
the date (IIIE). In the four paradigmatic texts, the concluding section
21
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 5; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59;
Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219; BIN 2,
134.
22
This is the case even though these texts also happen to be those in which there
is more than one plaintiff. Based on the typical position of the šemû-clause, the coin-
cidence of more than one plaintiff and the appearance of the šemû-clause at a point
not immediately after the imperative to the judges is probably nothing more than
circumstance.
23
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:28; Nbn 13:10; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998),
No. 21:20’; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:38; Cyr 332:24; OIP 122, 38:42. A
seventh text, Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58/59:18 has the verbal form iš-ta-lu-mu
(“they conferred”) instead of imtalkū.
decision records 37
(section III) begins with the introductory phrase ina EŠ.BAR (= purussê)
di-i-ni šu-a-tim (“At the decision of this case”). There are two variant
introductory phrases: ina ša āri uppi šuāti (“at the writing of this tablet”)24
and ina šemê dīni šuātu (“at the hearing of this case”).25 Apart from these
introductions, two texts present the names of the judges as part of a
complete sentence. This sentence begins with the prepositional phrase
ina ma ar (“before”), followed by the names of the judges, and ends with
the words ša āri (or uppi ) ša ir (“the tablet was written”).26
Most of the decision records written in the “Royal Judges style” are
written in “Royal Judges style A.” There are, however, eight decision
records involving the royal judges that have a different outline, called
the “Royal Judges style B.” The general outline of “Royal Judges style
B” is presented below, alongside the general outline of “Royal Judges
Style A,” for purposes of comparison between the two styles.
“Royal Judges Style B” “Royal Judges Style A”

I. Presentation of t he C ase I. Plaintiff ’s S tatement
A. Confrontation between A. Opening (includes mention
parties (sometimes including of plaintiff and adjudicating
subject of case) authority)
B. Appearance before B. Quotation of plaintiff ’s
authorities statement
C. Statements before authorities C. Imperative to authority
II. Judicial A ctions II. Judicial A ctions
A. šemû-clause A. šemû-clause
B. Judicial review of evidence B. Judicial review of evidence
C. mitluku-clause C. mitluku-clause
D. Decision D. Decision
III. Conclusion III. Conclusion
A Introduction of authorities A. Introduction of authorities
B. Names of authorities B. Names of authorities
C. Scribe(s) C. Scribe(s)
D Place of composition D. Place of composition
E. Date E. Date
Seals of authorities Seals of authorities
24
Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:33 and Durand, Textes babyloniens,
No. 60:42.
25
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:37.
26
Cyr 312:29–34 (ša āri) and OIP 122, 38:46–50 ( uppi).
38 chapter one
The comparison between the general outlines of the two “Royal Judges”
styles reveals several points of contact. The structure of the section in
which the judicial actions are presented (II) is the same in both styles,
as is the structure of the conclusion (III). These structural similarities
are reinforced by the use of similar terminology: the šemû27 and mitluku28
clauses are attested in both styles of decision records in the same posi-
tion in the outlines (elements IIA and IIC). The phrases introducing
the authorities (element IIIA) in style B—ina purussê dīni šuāti or ina ša āri
uppi šuāti—are both known from style A. These specific terminological
similarities, along with the fact that texts in both styles are sealed by
the adjudicating authorities, reinforce the general situational similarities
between the two styles of decision records.29
The main difference between the two styles occurs in the initial
presentation of the case (section I). Whereas “Royal Judges style A”
decision records begin with the plaintiff ’s statement, “Royal Judges style
B” decision records begin by mentioning a confrontation between both
parties (element IA). The following example, from Dalley, Edinburgh,
No. 69, will illustrate the typical beginning of a “Royal Judges style
B” text:
1. ¢fbuÜ-na-ni-tu4 DUMU.SAL- (1–3) fBunanītu daughter of
su ša2 mGAR-MU DUMU m
Šākin-šumi descendant of Eppeš-ilī
m
DU3-eš-DINGIR brought suit against mBēl-apla-iddin
2. a-na mdEN-IBILA-MU son of mNabû-šumu-līšir descendant
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-MU-SI. of Mudammiq-Adad.
SA2 DUMU mKAL-dIM
3. di-i-nu tag-re-e-ma a-na
ma- ar mmu-še-zib-dEN
lu2
GAR-UMUŠ TIN.TIRki
4. DUMU mUGU-DINGIR- (3–4) They arrived before
GAL-dAMAR.UTU lu2DI. m
Mušēzib-Bēl, the šākin- ēmi of
KU5.MEŠ u ši-bu-tu4 URU Babylon son of mEli-ili-rabi-
ik-šu-du-ma Marduk, the judges and the elders
of the city.
27
Wunsch BA 2, No. 42:5–6; Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:26’–27’;
Nbn 1113:8; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:9’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–10’.
See the accompanying summary table.
28
Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:31; Nbn 1128:12.
29
Also note the following similarity between the phrasing of two texts recording
cases heard by the judges of Neriglissar. Near the conclusion of the case, Scheil, RA
12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34 (style A) reads di-in-šu2-nu di-i-ni a-mat-su-nu gam-rat. Dalley,
Edinburgh, No. 69:43 (style B) reads di-in-šu2-nu di-i-nu EŠ.BAR-ši-na pa-ri-is.
decision records 39
5. dib-bi-šu-nu u2-ša2-an-nu-ma (5–6) They related their arguments.

f
bu-na-ni-tu4 taq-bi f
Bunanītu said thus:
6. um-ma
In this text, the verbal phrase di-i-nu tag-re-e-ma (“brought suit”) denotes
the initial confrontation between the parties. Another text uses the verb
ragāmu30 (“to raise a claim”). One “Royal Judges style B” decision record
indicates that two brothers and their uncle “fought each other” (a a
a a imta ū) over division of property before “they had a legal case”
(iršû dīni).31
The description of the confrontation (IA) in “Royal Judges style B”
decision records describing cases heard by the judges of Nabonidus
is somewhat more complex. The opening lines of Roth, AfO 36/37
(1989–1990), No. 1 will serve as an example:
1’ . . . mdNA3-tul-tab-ši-[li-šir] (1’–4’) (. . . the slavegirl) w hich
2’. [DUMU-šu2 ša2] mdEN- m
Nabû-tultabši-[līšir, son of ]
NUMUN-DU3 DUMU LU2. m
Bēl-zēra-ibni descendant of
SIMUG a-na Nappā u purchased at full price
3’. 2 1/3 MA.NA KU3.BABBAR for 2 1/3 mina of silver, so that
ŠAM2 gam-ru-tu i-ša2-mu-ma the slavegirl would work for
4’. a-mi-lut-tum ta-pal-la- u-šu i-na- him—
an-na
5’. fina-E2.SAG.IL2-ra-mat al-ti (4’–7’) Now, fIna-Esagil-ramât,
md
NA3-tul-tab-ši-SI.SA2 wife of mNabû-tultabši-līšir, and
6’. ¢u3 f Üdtaš-me-tu4-dam-ŠU.2 AMA- f
Tašmētu-damqat, her mother,
šu2 raised a claim [con]cerning that
7’. [a-na] UGU LU2-tu2 šu-a-tu2 slave.
ir-gu-mu
As these opening lines illustrate, this element begins with a description
of the subject of the case, a slavegirl purchased by mNabû-tultabši-līšir.
The actual description of the confrontation comes in the following
sentence, which usually begins with the conjunction inanna (“now”). It
indicates that the plaintiff has raised a claim (ragāmu).32
After the description of the confrontation (IA), the next element in
the outline of “Royal Judges style B” describes the parties’ appearance
before the adjudicating authority (IB). This deliberate mention of the
30
Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:5’.
31
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42:1–3.
32
Nbn 1113:1–4 is a similar example. Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:1’–4’ follows this
pattern without including the word inanna. In Nbn 495:10–12 the verbal phrase is
paqāri šubšû instead of ragāmu.
40 chapter one
appearance before the authority is another characteristic unique to

“Royal Judges style B” decision records. While “Royal Judges style A”
decision records simply imply that the parties have appeared before the
judges, “Royal Judges style B” decision records include a specific men-
tion of their appearance. Most of the texts use the prepositional phrase
ina ma ar or ana ma ar to indicate that the parties arrived “before” the
authorities named following the preposition, although two texts use the
synonymous prepositional phrase ina pāni. The verb used is usually kašādu
(“to arrive”), although some “Royal Judges style B” decision records use
the verbal construction dīna dabābu (“to argue a case”).33
The discussion thus far has defined the two “Royal Judges” styles of
decision records. The discussion will conclude by attempting to explain
when each of the two different styles was used. The two styles cannot
be attributed to the writing styles of different scribes, because the same
scribes are known to have written decision records in both styles. The
court scribes mNādinu descendant of Pa āru and mNabû-šuma-iškun
descendant of Rāb-banê, who wrote the four paradigmatic “Royal
Judges style A” decision records, also wrote Nbn 495, a “Royal Judges
style B” decision record. Similarly, the scribe mNergal-bānûnu descen-
dant of Rāb-bānê wrote both Nbn 13, a “Royal Judges style A” decision
record, and Nbn 1128, a “Royal Judges style B” decision record.
Instead, the key to understanding when each style was used lies in
the formulaic distinctions between the two styles. To recall, there are
two elements in the outline of “Royal Judges style B” which distinguish
it from “Royal Judges style A”: the notice of the confrontation between
the parties (element IA above) and the mention of the parties’ appear-
ance before the judges (IB). From these elements, it seems that the cases
described using “Royal Judges style B” appeared before the judges only
after an initial confrontation somewhere else, either in an informal
setting or in a lower court.34 In contrast, decision records written in
“Royal Judges style A” begin with a statement to the authorities. This
suggests that the initial attempt to resolve the case took place in the
court, rather than outside of it.
33
For occurrences of the different constructions, see summary table 1.2 at the end
of this section.
34
BIN 2, 134 is a “Royal Judges style A” decision record in a case that begins
before the šākin māti, who transfers the case to the šākin ēmi and the judges of the
šākin māti. From this text, it seems then, that if a case was initially heard in an official
setting (rather than informally), the entire case might have been recorded in “Royal
Judges style A.”
Summary Table 1.1 “Royal Judges Style A” Decision Records
TEXT Opening line Address to šemû mitluku Intro. of Authorities** Scribe Place of DATE
Judges authorities Composition
m
Wunsch, PN1 [u PN2 — *dib-[bi- — ina EŠ.BAR sukkallu, Nabû-mutīr- Babylon 10.VII.0 Ngl
AfO 44/45 ana] AUTH. šu-nu di-i-ni šu-a-ta judges of Ngl gimilli//
(1997/1998), [il-l]i-ku-nim- išmû] Ga al-
No. 5 ma it-ti PN3 Marduk
di-i-ni id-bu-
bu-ma
Scheil, RA 12 PN1 AUTH it-ti PN2 a-ma-tu [im-tal]- i-na še-me di-i- Judges of Ngl mZababa- Uruk 11.IX.2 Ngl
(1915), im- u-ru umma ip-ša2-in-ni PN1 iš- ku-ma ni šu-a-tu2 (qīpu of the šuma-ukīn/
m
pp. 1–13 di-i-ni mu-ma Eanna) Marduk-
šuma-ibni//
Šubarmana
m
Wunsch, PN ana EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bi- i-na EŠ.BAR Judges of Nādinu// Babylon ? Nbn
AfO 44/45 AUTH. iqbi ni šuk-na šu2-nu — di-i-ni šu-[a- Nbn Pa āru
m
(1997–1998), umma iš-mu-u2 tim] Nabû-šuma-
No. 6 iškun// Rāb-
bānê
decision records
lu2 m
Nbn 13 PN ana — iš-mu- DI. i-na EŠ.BAR Judges of Nergal- Babylon 12.XI.0 Nbn
AUTH. taqbi ma KU5. di-i-ni šu-a-ta Nbn bānûnu//
umma ME im- Rāb-bānê
tal-ku-ma
m
Durand, Textes di-i-ni ša2 — *dib-bi- iš-ta-lu- i-na EŠ.BAR Judges of Šamaš- Tapšu u 26.XI.2 Nbn
m
babyloniens, PN1 a-na šu2-nu-ti mu di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn šarra-u ur/
m
Nos. 58/59 mu - i fPN2 iš-mu- Bēl-šuma-
u3 DUMU. ma iškun//
MEŠ-šu2 Pa āru
UN.MEŠ E2
ša2 mPN3 it-ti
41
m
PN4 ana ma-
ar AUTH.
id-bu-bu um-
ma
Summary Table 1.1 (cont.)
42
m
Wunsch, PN ana EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bi- im-tal- ina EŠ.BAR Judges of Nādinu // Babylon 3 Nbn
AfO 44/45 AUTH. iqbi ni šuk-na šu2-nu ku-u2 di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn Pa āru
(1997/1998), umma iš-mu-
No. 21 u2-ma
m
TCL 12, 86 PN ana — dib-bi- — [i-n]a EŠ.BAR Judges of Nādinu // Babylon 6 Nbn
AUTH. iqbi šu2-nu di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn Pa āru
m
umma iš-mu-u2 Nabû-šuma-
iškun// Rāb-
bānê
m
Wunsch, PN ana ? ? ? [ina] EŠ.BAR sartennu; Nādinu // Babylon 2–6 Nbn
AfO 44/45 AUTH. iqbi di-[ni šu-a-tim] Judges of Pa āru
m
(1997/1998), umma Nbn Nabû-šuma-
No. 20 iškun// Rāb-
chapter one
bānê
YOS 6, 92 PN AUTH. it-ti PN — ? ina EŠ.BAR administrator mNādin/ Uruk 17.IX.7 Nbn
m
im- ur um-ma ¢ip?Ü-šu2 di-i-[ni MU]. of Eanna; Nergal-ina-
di-i-ni MEŠ šākin ēmi tēšê-ē ir//
of Uruk; Sîn-lēqi-
qīpi-official unninnī
of Eanna;
(assembly,
judges (?))
m
Nbn 356 PN ana EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bi- — ina EŠ.BAR Judges of Nādinu // Babylon 26.VI.9 Nbn
AUTH. taqbi ni šuk-na šu2-nu di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn Pa āru
m
umma iš-mu-u2 Nabû-šuma-
iškun// Rāb-
bānê
m
Wunsch, CM PN1 u PN2 ana ? ? ? [ina] EŠ.BAR Judges of Nādinu // Babylon 29.VII.9
20, No. 84 AUTH. iqbû di-i-ni [šu-a- Nbn Pa āru Nbn
m
umma tim] Nabû-šuma-
iškun// Rāb-
bānê
m
YOS 19, 101 PN ana EŠ.BAR-a- dib-bi- — ina EŠ.BAR Judges of Nabû-šuma- Babylon 4.XII.10
AUTH. iqbi ni šuk-na šu2-nu di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn iškun// Rāb- Nbn
umma iš-mu-u2 bānê
m
TCL 12, 122 PN ana ? ? ? i-na EŠ.BAR Judges of Nādinu // Babylon 21.X.12 Nbn
AUTH. iqbi di-i-ni [MU. Nbn Pa āru
m
umma MEŠ] Nabû-šuma-
iškun// Rāb-
bānê
Wunsch, ? EŠ.BAR-a- [lu2DI. — ? [ Judges of ? ? ? (After 12
AfO 44/45 ni šuk-na KU5. Nbn] Nbn. See
decision records
(1997–1998), MEŠ Wunsch,

No. 19 dib-bi- AfO 44/45
šu2-nu [1997/
iš]-mu-u2 1998], p. 88).
m
Wunsch, CM PN ana EŠ.BAR-a- *a-ma- — ina ša- a-ri up- Judges of Nabû-šuma- Babylon 11.VII.13
20, No. 90/ AUTH. iqbi ni šuk-na a-ti- pi šu-a-ti Nbn iškun// Rāb- Nbn
TCL 13, 219 umma šu2-nu bānê
iš-tim-
mu-ma
lu2 m
Durand, Textes PN1 u PN2 — *a-ma- DI. i-na ša- a-ra Judges of Bēl-kā ir// Babylon 24.V.17 Nbn
babyloniens, PN3 u PN4 itti a-ti- KU5. up-pi šu-a-tim Nbn Atkuppu
43
m
No. 60 PN5 a-na ma - šu2-nu MEŠ Bēl-iddina
ri AUTH. iš-tim- im-tal-ku- // Atû
u2-bil-lu-nim- mu-ma ma
ma iq-bu-u2
um-ma
BIN 2, 134 PN1, PN2, it-ti DEF. *dib-bi- ? ? šākin māti ? Uruk (?) 2 Cyr–5 Cyr
44
PN3 ana EŠ.BAR-a- šu2-nu (šākin ēmi of

AUTH. iqbû ni šu-kun iš-mu-u2 Uruk, Judges
umma of šākin māti)
m
Cyr 301 PN ana — ? — i-na EŠ.BAR šangû of Rīmūt/ Sippar (?) 21.II.8 Cyr
m
AUTH. iqbi [di-i-ni] Sippar; Bēl-
umma MU.MEŠ Judges of Cyr ušallim//
Adad-šammê
m
Cyr 312 PN1 PN2 — — ? ina “Great Marduk- Babylon 11.V.8 Cyr
ana ma -ri ma ri . . . ša2- a- Ones” Judges nā ir/mBāne-
AUTH. u-bil- ri ša- i-ir of Cyr ša-iliya
lam-ma iq-bi
um-ma
m
Cyr 332 [PN ana] it-ti DEF. — im-tal-ku- i-na EŠ.BAR šangû of Arad-Bēl/ Sippar (?) 8 Cyr
m
AUTH. [iqbi [ep-šu2 di- ma di-nu Sippar; Bēl-ušallim
umma] i-ni] MU.MEŠ (“temple //Adad-
(+IGI) enterers”; šammê
chapter one
elders)
m
OIP 122, 38 PN ana it-ti DEF. a-ma-tu- lu2DI. i-na ma- Judges of Cyr Ile i- Uruk 9 Cyr
AUTH. iqbi ep2-šu2 di- šu2 iš- KU5. ar . . . up-pi Marduk//
umma i-ni mu-u2 MEŠ ša2- i-ir Eppeš-ili
m
im-tal-ku- Bau-ēreš
ma scribe of
Gobryas
The following fragments appear to come from decisions written in the “royal judges” style, as well:
Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3, No. 874; Nbn 64; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47; Wunsch,
AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 25; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), No. 13; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 23; Wunsch, AfO 44/45
(1997–1998), No. 22; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 37.
* The šemu clause does not immediately follow the plaintiff ’s statement.
** Authorities not mentioned in the beginnings of the texts are listed in parentheses.
Summary Table 1.2 “Royal Judges Style B” Decision Records
TEXT Confrontation Appearance šemû Other Intro. of Authorities** Scribe Place of Date
terminology Authorities composition
Wunsch, BA 2, PN1 u3 PN2 . . . [ana] AUTH. a-ma-ti- ? šākin ēmi of ? ? ? Nbk

No. 42 ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni ik-šu-du-ni- šu-nu Babylon
im-ma [iš-mu]-u2 (elders)
Wunsch, PN1 a-na i-na pa-ni *a-mat ? sukkallu ? ? ? Ngl
m
AuOr 17–18 PN2 ir-gu-mu AUTH. PN Judges of
(1999–2000), um-ma di-i-ni id-bu- iq-bu-šu- Ngl
pp. 241–254 bu-u2-ma nu-ti iš-
mu-u2-ma
f m
Dalley, PN1 a-na a-na ma- ar — im-tal-ku-ma i-na ša- a-ri šākin ēmi of Marduk- Babylon 22.VII.1 Ngl
m
Edinburgh, PN2 di-i-nu AUTH. ik-šu- up-pi šu-a-tim Babylon šāpik-zēri/
m
No. 69 tag-re-e-ma du-ma dib-bi- Judges Mušēzib-
šu-nu u2-ša2- elders Marduk//
an-nu-ma Šu aya
m
decision records
Nbn 1113 PN . . . e-nin- i-na ma- ar dib-bi- mu-kin-nu- a-na ša- a-ri sukkallu, [mIle i- Bīt-šar-Bābili 17.VIII.? Nbn
ni ir-gu-mu um- AUTH. šu2-nu [ut]-su iš- [ up-pi ] “great ones,” Marduk,
ma di-i-ni id- iš-mu-u2 [mu-ma] šu-a-tim judges of the scribe,
bu-bu-ma Nbn descendant
of ] mEppeš-ili
m
Nbn 1128 [dib-bu] ša2 i-na ma- ar — im-tal-ku-ma i-na ša- a-ra sartennu Nergal- Babylon 11.II.1 Nbn
PN1 a-na AUTH. id- up-pi šu-a-tim Judges of bānûnu //
UGU SUBJ. bu-bu Nbn Rāb-banê
m
it-ti PN2 Nabû-a ē-
iddin//Egibi
45
46
TEXT Confrontation Appearance šemû Other Intro. of Authorities** Scribe Place of Date
terminology Authorities composition
Wunsch, CM SUBJ. + PN1 [a-na] ma- 1-en-ta3- [ina EŠ.BAR] Judges of ? ? ? Nbn
20, No. 112 u PN2 ana ar AUTH. am dib- di-i-nu šu-a-[ti ] Nbn
UGU SUBJ. [ik-šu-d ] bi-ši-na
su-a-tu2 ir-gu- u-nim-ma [išmû]
[mu-ma]
Roth, AfO SUBJ. + i- [a-na] ma- dib-bi- i-na EŠ.BAR Judges of ? ? ? Nbn
36/37 na-an-na PN1 ar AUTH. ši-na iš- di-i-ni šu-a-tim Nbn
(1989–1990), u PN2 [a-na] ik-šu-dumu-u2
No. 1 UGU SUBJ. nim-ma
šu-a-tu2 ir-
gu-mu
m
Nbn 495 SUBJ. + a-na ma- ar ? ? Judges of Nādinu// [Babylon] 17.I.12 Nbn
chapter one
i-na-[an-na] AUTH. Nbn Pa āru

m
PN pa-qa-ri ik-šu-du-ma Nabû-šuma-
e-li SUBJ. u2- iškun// Rāb-
šab-šu-u2 bānê
* The šemu clause does not immediately follow the plaintiff ’s statement.
** Authorities not mentioned in the beginnings of the texts are listed in parentheses.
decision records 47
1.C The “Eanna” Styles of Decision Records
In addition to the two “Royal Judges” styles there are two styles of
decision records from cases heard at the Eanna temple at Uruk, which
will be called “Eanna style A” and “Eanna style B.” “Eanna style A”
has the following general outline:
I. Subject of case
A. Evaluation of evidence
B. Decision
III. Conclusion
A. Names of authorities
B. Names of witnesses
C. Scribe
E. Date
In order to illustrate the features of the “Eanna style A” decision record,

the present discussion will take Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101 as
an example. This text records the decision in the case of two ducks
belonging to the Lady of Uruk that were stolen, killed and buried in
mud. The decision record will be divided according to the sections
presented in the outline above. A discussion of the particular features
of each section precedes the presentation of each separate section.
For ease of comparison, the different features are presented in graphic
format in summary table 1.3 at the end of this section.
I. Subject of Case (lines 1–4)

In the example below, as in several other examples, the subject of the
case is described in a third-person summary.35 In other “Eanna style
35
TCL 12, 119:1–5; TCL 13, 147:1–8; YOS 7, 161:1–6. YOS 7, 7 is a composite
decision record of the decisions in numerous charges against mGimillu. The entire
text reads as a series of “Eanna style A” decision records. The subject of each case
is presented in a summary form. The entire decision record begins with a summary
statement in lines 1–5.
48 chapter one
A” decision records, the subject of the case includes quotations of the

statements of parties to the case, such as an accusation.36
1. 2 UZ.TURmušen ša2 ¢dGAŠANÜ (1–4) 2 ducks, property of the
UNUGki u3 dna-na-[a ša2 qa-pu- Lady-of-Uruk and Nanaya [from
ut-tu4] the pen of ] mNidintu and mGuzānu,
2. ša2 mni-din-tu4 u3 mgu-za-nu sons of mNanaya-iddin [ . . . on 11
DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdna-na-a- Tebētu] year 2 of Cambyses king
[MU . . . U4 11-kam2 ša2 ITI AB] of Babylon king [of the lands] at
3. MU 2-kam2 mkam-bu-zi-ia the Ištar Gate, killed and [buried]
LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL in mud.
[KUR.KUR. . .
4. ša2 KA2.GAL d15 di-i-ku-ma i-na
i- u3 [qit-bu-ru . . . ]
II. Judicial Actions (lines 5–27)
A. Evaluation of Evidence (lines 5–18)

In the sample decision record, the evidence consists of the testimony of
the criminals themselves, as well as the corpses of the two dead ducks.
The testimony is presented to the šatammu and the ša rēš šarri admin-
istrator “in the assembly.” The corpses are inspected “in the assembly
of the qīpi officials and the mār banî.” These and other adjudicating
authorities, such as the scribes of the Eanna, play similar roles in the
evaluation of evidence in “Eanna style A” decision records.37
36
YOS 6, 123:1–6; YOS 6, 225:1–7; YOS 6, 231:1–9; YOS 7, 66:1–8; TCL 13,
170:1–7.
37
See the column labeled “Authorities in Body of Text” in summary table 1.3 at
the end of this section.
decision records 49
5. mŠEŠ-SUM.NA u3 mda-nu-ŠEŠ. (5–10) mA a-iddin and mAnu-

MEŠ-TIN-¢i Ü [DUMU.MEŠ a ē-bulli , [sons of mNabû-kā ir,
ša2 mdNA3-KAD2 mdna-na-a- m
Nanaya-a a-iddin] son of
ŠEŠ-MU] m
Nanaya-ēreš and mA a-iddin
6. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a- [son of Kīnaya . . .] in whose
KAM2 u3 mŠEŠ-SUM.NA working-area the birds were killed
[DUMU-šu2 ša2 mki-na-a. . . ] [and buried in mud], said thus
ID2 before mNabû-mukīn-apli, šatammu
7. ša2 MUŠEN.MEŠ i-na meš- i- of the Eanna, son of m[Nādinu
šu2-nu di-i-ku-ma i-[na i- u3 iq- descendant of Dābibī], and
te-bi-ru] m
Nabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš šarri,
8. a-na ma- ar mdNA3-DU- the administrator of the Eanna
IBILA lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN. [. . .], in the assembly:
NA DUMU-šu2 ša2 m[na-di-nu
DUMU da-bi-bi]
9. u3 mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG.
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN.
NA [ . . .]
10. ina UKKIN iq-bu-u2 um-ma U4
11-kam2 ša2 ITI AB MU 2-kam2
ni-i-ni u3 mdna-na-a-MU
11. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdin-nin- (10–11) “On 11 ebētu, year 2,
NUMUN-DU3 it-ti a- a-meš we were digging below the canal
ina ku-tal BAD3 ID2 ni- i-¢irÜ-ru wall, together with mNanaya-iddin
son of mInnin-zēra-ibni.”
12. 2 UZ.TURmušen.ME NIG2.GA (12–13) “When we killed 2 ducks,
d
GAŠAN UNUGki ša2 qa-pu-ut- property of the Lady-of-Uruk,
tu4 ša2 mni-din-tu4 u3 mgu-za-nu from the pen of mNidintu and
13. DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdna-na-a- m
Guzānu, sons of mNanaya-iddin,
MU ki-i ni-du-ku i-na i- u3 ni-iq- we buried them in mud.”
te-bir
14. ¢pagÜ-ra-nu ša2 UZ.TURmušen-a (14–18) The corpses of these
2 ša2 mŠEŠ-MU u3 mdDIŠ-ŠEŠ. 2 birds that mA a-iddin and
MEŠ-TIN-i DUMU.MEŠ m
Anu-a ē-bulli sons of mNabû-
15. ša2 mdNA3-KEŠDA-ir mdna-na- kā ir, mNanaya-a a-iddin son of
a-ŠEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 m
Nanaya-ēreš, mA a-iddina son
md
na-na-a-APIN-eš of mKīnaya, and mNanaya-iddin
16. mŠEŠ-SUM.NA DUMU-šu2 son of mInnin-zēra-ibni killed and
ša2 mki-na-a u mdna-na-a-MU buried in mud were inspected in
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdin-nin- the assembly of the qīpu officials
NUMUN-DU3 and the mār banî.
17. i-du-ku-ma ina i- u3 iq-bi-ri
i-na UKKIN lu2qi-pa-a-nu u
lu2
DUMU DU3-i.[MEŠ]
18. in-nam-ru-ma
50 chapter one
B. Decision (lines 18–27)

The judicial actions end with the actual decision. In the sample deci-
sion record, the decision is clearly marked with a sentence with the
verb parāsu (“to decide”). This is true of most “Eanna style A” decision
records. In other “Eanna style A” decision records, the conclusion of the
case with a decision is implicit in the end of the text. Thus, for example,
the judicial actions section in YOS 7, 66 ends with the notice that the
Eanna authorities returned the slave in question to its owners.38
18. ki-i pi-i lu2mu-kin-nu-tu ša2 (18–26) In accordance with
m
ŠEŠ-SUM.NA the testimony of mA a-iddin,
19. mda-nu-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-TIN-i m
Anu-a ē-bulli , mNanaya-
md
na-na-a-ŠEŠ-MU u3 mŠEŠ- a a-iddin and mA a-iddin against
MU i-na UKKIN qi2-pa-a-nu themselves in the assembly of the
20. u3 lu2DUMU DU3-i.ME e-li qīpu officials and the mār banî, and
ram-ni-šu2-nu ¢u3Ü [ma- ar] [before] mNabû-mukīn-apli, the
md
NA3-DU-IBILA šatammu of the Eanna, mNabû-
21. lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA a a-iddin, the ša rēš šarri,
md
NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG- administrator of the Eanna, the
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 assembly of Babylonians and
E2.AN.NA UKKIN Urukians—they decided that
22. lu2TIN.TIRki.ME u3 lu2UNUGki- m
A a-iddin and mAnu-a ē-bulli
a-a ki UZ.TURmušen 1-en a-di sons of mNabû-kā ir, mNanaya-
30 ku-um UZ.TURmušen.ME-a a a-iddin son of mNanaya-ēreš,
23. 2 e-li mŠEŠ-MU u3 mdDIŠ-PAP. m
A a-iddin son of mKīnaya, and
ME-TIN-i DUMU.MEŠ m
Nanaya-iddin son of mInnin-
ša2 mdNA3-KAD2 mdna-na-a- zēra-ibni, their accomplice in
ŠEŠ-MU crime who was not seen, must pay
24. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-KAM a thirty-fold restitution for the
m
ŠEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 2 ducks to the property of the
m
ki-na-a u mdna-na-a-MU Eanna.
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdINNIN.NA-
NUMUN-DU3
25. lu2EN ar!-<ni> šu2-nu ša2 la
in-nam-ru a-na e- e-ru a-na NIG2.
GA E2.AN.NA šul-lu-un-du
26. e-li-šu2-nu ip-ru-su UZ.TUR.
MEŠ-a 60-šu ib-ba-ku-nim-ma
a-na NIG2.GA E2.AN.NA
27. i-nam-di-nu (26–27) They shall bring and pay
these 60 ducks to the property of
the Eanna.
38
For other examples in which the verb parāsu is not used in the decision, see sum-
mary table 1.3 at the end of this section.
decision records 51
III. Conclusion
A. Personal Names of Authorities (lines 27–28)

In addition to mentioning the authorities in the judicial actions sec-
tion, the “Eanna style A” decision records also record the names of
overseeing authorities at the end of the text. Their role as authorities
is indicated by the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU (= ušuzzu) ša (“in
the presence of ”). As Eva von Dassow notes, this phrase is used “to
introduce officials in . . . records of procedures overseen or authorized by
them.”39 In the sample decision record, only the names of the šatammu
and the administrator follow this phrase. In other texts, a number of
other names appear in addition to the names of authorities mentioned
in the body of the text. These are probably the names of the members
of the “assembly.”40
27. ina u2-šu-uz-zu ša2 mdNA3- (27) In the presence of mNabû-
DU-IBILA lu2ŠA3.TAM mukīn-apli, the šatammu of the
E2.AN.NA DUMU mda-bi-bi Eanna, descendant of Dābibī.
28. md
NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG- (28) mNabû-a a-iddin, the ša rēš
LUGAL lu2EN SIG5 šarri, administrator of the Eanna.
E2.AN.NA
B. Names of Witnesses
In addition to the designation ina DU.ZU (= ušuzzu) ša, the sample
text also records names of individuals designated as lu2mu-kin-nu (“wit-
nesses”). Whereas the individuals whose names follow the designation
ina DU.ZU ša are the authorities, the individuals designated as lu2mu-
kin-nu serve as witnesses to the proceedings. Their precise role will be
considered in the procedural discussion (section 9.J). Unlike the sample
decision record, most “Eanna style A” decision records do not include
separate groups of names with both designations. Usually, there is only
one group of names following either the designation ina DU.ZU ša or
lu2
mu-kin-nu, but not both.
39
Eva von Dassow, “Introducing the Witnesses in Neo-Babylonian Documents,” in
R. Chazan, et al., eds., Ki Baruch Hu: Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Judaic Studies in
Honor of Baruch A. Levine (Winona Lake, Indiana, 1999), p. 13.
40
Kümmel, Familie, p. 162.
52 chapter one
28. lu2
mu-kin-nu md30-KAM2 (28) Witnesses: mSîn-ēreš son of
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-MU- m
Nabû-šumu-līšir descendant of
SI.SA Ibni-ilī;
29. DUMU mib-ni-DINGIR (29) mŠamaš-mukīn-apli son of
md
UTU-DU-IBILA DUMU- m
Madānu-a ē-iddin descendant
šu2 ša2 mdDI.KU5-PAP.ME-MU of Šigûa;
DUMU mši-gu-u2-a
30. mla-a-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU (30–31) mLâbāši-Marduk son of
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mIR3-dEN m
Arad-Bēl descendant of Egibi;
DUMU me-gi-bi mdAMAR. m
Marduk-šuma-u ur son of mBēl-
UTU-MU-ŠEŠ DUMU-šu2 uballi descendant of mBū u;
ša2 mdEN-TIN-i (31) mBēl-e ēri-Nabû, ša rēši; mAnu-
31. DUMU mbu-u2- u m<d>EN- šuma-ibni son of mNabû-ušēzib
KAR-dNA3 lu2SAG mda-nu-MU- descendant of [PN];
DU3 DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-
SUR DUMU md[PN]
32. INNIN-ŠEŠ-MU DUMU-
md
(32–33) mInnin-a a-iddin son of
šu2 ša2 mdNA3-DU3-ŠEŠ m
Nabû-bāni-a i descendant of
DUMU mKUR-i mlu- a-ana- Kurī; mLū a-ana-nūr-Šamaš son
ZALAG2-dUTU DUMU-šu2 of mŠulaya descendant of Šangû-
ša2 mšu-la-a Ninurta;
33. DUMU lu2E2.MAŠ-dMAŠ (33) mAnu-a a-iddin son of
md
DIŠ-ŠEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 m
Gimillu descendant of Kurī;
ša2 mŠU DUMU mKUR-i
C. Scribe
The sample decision record includes the names of two scribes, as does
YOS 7, 161. Other texts were written by only one scribe.
33–34. m
na-di-nu DUB.SAR (33–34) mNādinu, the scribe, son
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdEN-ŠEŠ. of mBēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of
MEŠ-BA-ša2 DUMU Egibi; mArad-Marduk, the scribe,
m
e-gi-bi mIR3-dAMAR. son of [mMarduk-šuma-iddin
UTU DUB.SAR descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur]
DUMU-šu2 ša2 m[dAMAR.
UTU-MU-MU DUMU
md
EN-A-URI3]
E. Date
35. UNUGki ITI AB U4 12-kam2 (35) Uruk. 12 ebētu, year 2 of
MU 2-kam2 mkam-bu-zi-[ia Cambyses, king of Babylon, king
LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL of the lands.
KUR.KUR]
decision records 53
The sample text includes the seals of the šatammu, the administrator
and the first three people listed as witnesses. As far as can be seen from
published drawings, most decision records from the Eanna at Uruk are
not sealed. Explaining why some Eanna decision records are sealed
and others are not requires a more complete exploration of the sealing
practices in the Eanna archives. Such an exploration goes beyond the
scope of the present inquiry.
Three decision records from the Eanna follow a different general
outline. This outline is designated “Eanna style B.” It is presented
below alongside the outline of “Eanna style A” decision records, for
comparison purposes:
Style B Style A
I. Opening I. Subject of case
A. Personal names
B. Transition
II. Subject of Case II. Judicial Actions
A. Evaluation of evidence
B. Decision
III. Judicial Actions III. Conclusion
A. Evaluation of A. Personal names of authorities
Evidence B. Personal names of witnesses
B. Decision C. Scribe
E. Date
IV. Conclusion
A. Scribe
B. Place of
composition
C. Date
Comparison between the outlines of the two “Eanna” styles of decision

records reveals that both styles record the same information. There
does not seem to be a difference between the cases that led to decisions
recorded in “Eanna style A” and those that are recorded in “Eanna style
B.” The difference between the two styles occurs only in the placement
of the personal names. “Eanna style A” decision records place these
names after the narration of the subject of the case and the judicial
actions. “Eanna style B” decision records, on the other hand, place the
personal names at the beginning, before the subject of the case and
54 chapter one
the judicial actions. In both styles, however, the name of the scribe, the
place of composition, and the date appear at the end of the text.
The “Eanna style B” decision records do not use the prepositional
phrase ina DU.ZU to designate the names of individuals in whose pres-
ence the decision was made. Instead, two of these decision records use
the transitional phrase lu2mukinnū ša ina pānišunu (“the witnesses before
whom . . .”) or an equivalent phrase lu2DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pānišunu
(“the mār banî before whom . . .”).41 This phrase appears in section I, after
the names that begin the decision record, while in style A, the names
appear in section III. The names at the beginning of the text, therefore,
are “witnesses.” The decision that is recorded in the remainder of the
text is made “before” them. The precise role of the witnesses in these
texts will be discussed in section 9.J below.
It now remains to explain the different situations in which the two
“Eanna” styles were used. As has been seen, both “Eanna” styles of
decision records involve the same adjudicating bodies, so that a dif-
ference in venue does not seem to explain the existence of the two
styles. However, a possible explanation for the two styles emerges from
examination of the names of the scribes who wrote the two different
styles of decision records. Most of the “Eanna style A” decision records
were written by the scribe mNādin son of mBēl-a ē-iqīša, descendant of
Egibi, either alone or together with other scribes.42 mŠamaš-mukīn-apli,
his son, wrote one “Eanna style A” decision record (YOS 7, 66) during
m
Nādin’s lifetime, and the scribe mNabû-mukīn-apli son of mMarduk-
šuma-iddin descendant of Balā u wrote another. On the other hand,
m
Nādin did not write any of the “Eanna style B” decision records. One
explanation, then, for the “Eanna style A” decision records might be
that this style is particular to the scribe mNādin and those scribes who
imitated him.
Another possible explanation is based on the status of these scribes.
The scribes who composed the “Eanna style A” decision records seem
to have been of especially high rank. In a number of texts, mNādin is
designated upšar Eanna (“scribe of Eanna”).43 The three other scribes
named in YOS 7, 7 together with mNādin are all designated upšarrū
41
On the equivalence of these two phrases and for a discussion of the term mār
banî (usually translated “citizens” or “freemen”), see von Dassow, “Witnesses,” p. 11
n. 24 and Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 919.
42
See summary table 1.3 at the end of this section.
43
decision records 55
Eanna (“scribes of Eanna”) in the text itself.44 The scribe mArad-Marduk

son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin, descendant of Balā u, who wrote Figulla,
Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101 and YOS 7, 161 together with mNādin is
also known to have been a “scribe of the Eanna,” although only after
the composition of these texts.45 mNādin’s son, mŠamaš-mukīn-apli, who
wrote YOS 7, 66 is not known with this title, although he is known to
have served as the šatammu of the Eanna after serving as a scribe.46 It
might be suggested, then, that the “Eanna style A” was used for cases
that required high-ranking scribes, perhaps because of the severity of
the crimes commmitted. This suggestion remains speculative, however,
because both the “Eanna style A” and the “Eanna style B” decision
records involve the same adjudicating authorities deciding cases of
crimes against the Eanna. Thus, it is difficult to determine what kinds of
cases would have required the presence of the higher-ranking scribes.
1.D Comparison of the “Royal Judges” and the “Eanna” Styles
The discussion of the “Eanna” styles has been limited until now to
the comparison between one Eanna style and the other. Similarly, the
discussion of the “Royal Judges” styles above focused only on the dif-
ferent situations in which the “Royal Judges style A” and the “Royal
Judges style B” documents were composed. One final question which
should be addressed is which cases were recorded in the Eanna styles
and which were recorded in the “Royal Judges” style.
One possibility that should be ruled out is the correlation between
authorities and style of decision record. It has already been noted above
(section 1.B) that the authorities deciding the cases in “Royal Judges”
decision records are not always the royal judges. In fact, the Eanna
authorities, who regularly appear in the “Eanna” style decision records,
are attested in “Royal Judges” decision records, as well. YOS 6, 92 is
a “Royal Judges” style decision record in which the plaintiff addresses
his statement to the šākin ēmi of Uruk, the ša rēš šarri administrator of
the Eanna and the qīpi official of the Eanna. These three officials seal
the document, as well. Whereas the “Royal Judges” documents may
44
YOS 7, 7:28.
45
46
56 chapter one
not always include royal judges, the “Eanna” style decision records do
always include the Eanna authorities. This does not mean, however,
that only these authorities are present. YOS 7, 161 is an “Eanna”
style decision record written in the presence of the šatammu and the
administrator of the Eanna. The judges who make the decision in this
case, mRīmūt and mBau-ēreš, are known to have been “judges of the
king” from other texts.47
The use of an “Eanna” style decision record or a “Royal Judges”
decision record does not, therefore, depend on the adjudicating author-
ity. Cases recorded in the “Royal Judges” style may be adjudicated by
Eanna authorities and cases recorded in the “Eanna” style may be
adjudicated by royal judges. The question of which authorities decided
which cases will not be addressed here. The question at hand pertains
only to the style of record. Is there a factor that determines whether a
case is written in the Eanna or the “Royal Judges” style?
Examination of the internal evidence of the different decision records
indicates that the style of decision record corresponds to the party
who would retain the record. Decision records written in the “Royal
Judges” styles were kept by private individuals, while those written in
the “Eanna” style were kept in the Eanna’s internal records. The earlier
discussion of the decision records indicated that they were retained by
the prevailing party. Therefore, one might expect all decision records in
which the Eanna prevails to be written in the “Eanna” style. Thus, for
example, in YOS 7, 161, the royal judges rule in favor of the Eanna
that one mBēl-iqīša must pay thirty-fold for branded sheep belonging to
Ištar of Uruk. The Eanna is the prevailing party, and so it would retain
the text as proof of mBēl-iqīša’s obligation. The text is written in the
“Eanna” style, even though royal judges make the decision. Similarly,
in YOS 6, 92, members of the Eanna administration rule in favor of
one of two litigants in a dispute pertaining to a plot of land. Because
the prevailing party is a private individual, and not the Eanna, the
47
See the discussion of mRīmūt and mBau-ēreš in Kümmel, Familie, p. 136 n. 198.
The present transliteration of the name mBau-ēreš follows Kümmel’s. Erle Leichty, in
personal communication, has suggested that the theophoric element Bau should be
read Baba, based on the regularly attested spelling of this divine name with the KA2
(= bābu) sign. The reading of this divine name poses difficulties in earlier periods, as
well. For a recent discussion and survey of the evidence, see Gianni Marchesi, “On
the Divine Name dBA.U2,” Or. 71 (2002), pp. 161–172. I am grateful to Philip Jones
for this reference.
decision records 57
private individual would retain the decision record, which is written in

the “Royal Judges” style.
One “Royal Judges” decision record, Durand, Textes babyloniens,
No. 60, however, undermines this direct correlation between the prevail-
ing party and the style. This text comes from a dispute over the posses-
sion of a slave branded as property of Ištar-of-Uruk and of Nanaya and
her son. The chief brewer of Ištar-of-Uruk and a scribe of the Eanna
present the case before the judges of Nabonidus in Babylon against
m
Nūrea, who is found to be in unlawful possession of the slave. The
proceedings, which end with the decision, are described as follows:
1. md
DI.KU5-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU (1–8) mMadānu-a ē-iddin, son
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mgi-mil-lu A of mGimillu descendant of Šigûa,
m
ši-gu-u2-a chief of the brewers of Ištar-of-
2. lu2
UGULA <lu2>SIRAŠ.MEŠ ša2 Uruk and mBalā u, son of mSîn-
d
INANNA UNUGki u3 mba-la- u ibni, scribe of Eanna, brought
DUMU-šu2 f
Nanaya- ussinni, a slavegirl
3. ša2 md30-ib-ni DUB.SAR E2.AN. whose hand was marked with a
NA fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni star and inscribed ‘of Nanaya’,
4. GEME2 ša2 kak-kab-ti rit-ta-šu2 and mTaddannu, son of fNanaya-
še-en-di-ti u3 ussinni, with mNūrea, son of
5. a-na dna-na-a ša -ra-tu4 u mta-ad- m
Kabtiya, before the judges of
dan-nu DUMU Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
6. ša2 fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni it-ti
m
ZALAG2-e-a
7. DUMU-šu2 ša2 DUGUD-ia a-na
ma -ri lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ
8. ša2 mdNA3-IM.TUK LUGAL
TIN.TIRki u2-bil-lu-nim-ma
9. iq-bu-u2 um-ma GEME2 an-ni-tu4 (9–10) They said thus: “This
za-ki-tu4 slavegirl, oblate of Nanaya, serves
m
Nūrea.”
10. ša2 dna-na-a mZALAG2-e-a ta- (10–11) mNūrea answered thus:
pal-la 3 mZALAG2-e-a i-pul
11. um-ma fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni (11–12) “I purchased fNanaya-
a-na KU3.BABBAR ussinni for silver.”
12. a-ta-bak u3 ina BAL-e mLU2- (12–15) “During the reign of
d
AMAR.UTU LUGAL Amēl-Marduk, king of Babylon,
TIN.TIRki when she escaped from my house,
13. ul-tu E2-ia ki-i ta -li-qu kak-kab-ti she marked her hand with a star
14. rit-ta-šu2 tal-te-mi-it u3 ša2- a-ri ina and wrote the inscription ‘of
UGU Nanaya’ on her hand.”
15. rit-ti-šu2 a-na dna-na-a-a tal-ta- ar2
lu2
DI.KU5.MEŠ
58 chapter one
16. fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni i-ša2-lu-ma (15–16) The judges questioned

f
Nanaya-hussinni.
17. taq-bi um-ma a-di la mZALAG2-e-a (17–19) She said thus: “Before
a-na KU3.BABBAR ib-ba-kan-ni mNūrea purchased me for silver,
18. DUMU-SAG.IL2-lu-mur EN-a mMār-Esagil-lūmur, my previous
md
ma -ra-a a-na master, dedicated me to Nanaya.”

19. dna-na-a uz-sak-ka-an-ni lu2DI.
KU5.MEŠ
20. a-ma-a-ti-šu2-nu iš-tim-mu-ma (19–22) The judges heard their
se-pi-ri u2-bil-lu-nim-ma statements. They brought a sēpiru48
21. rit-ti ša2 fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni before them and he informed
22. u2-ad-di-ma iq-bi um-ma ša2- a-ri them of fNanaya- ussinni’s hand.
la-bi-ri He said thus:
23. ša2 u4-mu ru-qu-tu4 a-na dna-na-a-a (22–24) “Her hand is inscribed
with an old inscription, from a
long time ago: ‘of Nanaya.’
24. rit-ta-šu2 ša -ra-at
25. u3 ša2- a-ru ša2-na-a ina ša2-pal (25–26) “And another inscription
ša2- a-ri is written under the earlier
26. ma -ra-a a-na dINANNA inscription: ‘for Ištar of Uruk.’”
UNUGki ša2- i-ir
27. DI.KU5.MEŠ a-na mdZALAG2- (27) The judges said thus to
lu2
e-a iq-bu-u2 um-ma mi-nam-ma m

Nūrea:
28. GEME2 ša2 a-na dINANNA (27–30) “Why did you purchase
UNUGki za-ka-a-ti kak-kab-tu4 for silver a slavegirl dedicated to
29. še-en-di-it-tu4 u3 rit-ta-šu2 a-na Ištar of Uruk, marked with a star,
d
INANNA UNUGki and inscribed for Ištar of Uruk
30. u dna-na-a ša -ra-tu4 a-na KU3. and Nanaya?”
BABBAR tab-ba-ak
31. u3 at-ta taq-bi um-ma i-na BAL-e (31–33) “And you say thus:
m
LU2-dAMAR.UTU ‘During the reign of Amēl-
32. LUGAL TIN.TIRki GEME2 Marduk, king of Babylon, the
ul-tu E2-ia ta -liq-ma slavegirl escaped from my house
33. kak-kab-tu4 rit-ta-šu2 taš-mi-it and marked her hand with a
mi-nam-ma star.’ ”
48
The sēpiru was the alphabetic scribe, who wrote on parchment (CAD S, pp. 225–
226). According to Daniel Arnaud, “Un document juridique concernant les oblats,”
RA 67 (1973), p. 156, this scribe was called because the mark on the slavegirl’s arm
was in alphabetic characters, used for ease of branding.
decision records 59
34. ina U4-me-šu2 a-na ma -ri lu2DI. (33–36) “Why did you not bring
KU5.MEŠ ul tu-bil-šu-ma her before the judges on that
35. ar2-kat-su ul ip-ru-us-ma it-ti LU2 day? Why did they not investigate
ša2 rit-ta-šu2 her circumstances? Why didn’t
36. iš- u2-ru ul i-di-in-ka e-li anybody judge your case against
the man who inscribed her wrist?”
37. fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni u (36–38) “You have no claim over
m
ta-ad-dan-nu DUMU-šu2 f
Nanaya- ussinni and mTaddannu
her son!”
38. ul ra-ša2-a-ti lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (38) The judges deliberated.
im-tal-ku-ma
39. fdna-na-a- u-us-si-in-ni u (39–41) They considered
m
ta-ad-dan-nu DUMU-šu2 f
Nanaya- ussinni and mTaddannu
40. it-ti um-man-ni za-bil tup-sik-ku her son among the gangs of
ša2 E2.AN.NA corvée laborers of Eanna.
41. im-nu-u2 mZALAG2-e-a it-ti m
Nūrea may argue a case with the
ar2-ki-šu2 ša2 LU2-ta id-di-nu-šu2 guarantor of (the one) who sold
id-dab-bu-ub him the slave.
The decision in this case is in favor of the Eanna authorities; the slavegirl
and her son belong to the Eanna, and not to mNūrea. Given the evi-
dence of YOS 7, 161, one would expect this decision to be recorded
in the Eanna style, as well, even though the royal judges hear the case.
Nevertheless, the decision is clearly written in the “Royal Judges” style.
The notice in line 41 seems to hold the key to an explanation. This
line allows mNūrea to reclaim his losses by bringing a case against the
person who had guaranteed clear title to the slaves. Based on this line,
it seems that this decision record was retained by mNūrea in order to
justify his eventual claim against the guarantor, rather than by the Eanna
authorities. Thus, even though the Eanna authorities prevailed in this
case, because the decision record was written for someone outside the
Eanna administration, it is written in the “Royal Judges” style.48
Based on the discussion above, one may conclude that the difference
between the “Eanna” and “Royal Judges” styles reflects the difference
between internal and public records. The “Royal Judges” decision
records, even in cases in which the Eanna prevails, were given to
someone outside the Eanna administration. Thus, one may say that the
“Royal Judges” styles are “public” styles, for use in texts which would
be held in personal archives. The “Eanna” styles, on the other hand,
are “internal,” for use in the Eanna’s own recordkeeping.
48
Summary Table 1.3 “Eanna Style A” Decision Records
60
Text Authorities in Decision Introduction Names at Scribe Date

Body of Text Terminology of names at end of text
end of text
m
YOS 6, 123 assembly; parāsu ina DU.ZU šanû of Uruk; Nādin/ mBēl-a ē-iqīša 5.VIII.9
adminstrators of 7 PNs; 1 scribe // Egibi Nbn
Eanna
m
YOS 6, 225 šatammu; scribes of (confirmation ina DU.ZU šatammu; 7 PNs; 1 scribe Nādin/ mBēl-a ē-iqīša 6.XI.12
Eanna; assembly of accusation?) // Egibi Nbn
m
YOS 6, 231 assembly parāsu ina DU.ZU šatammu; administrator; Nādin and mKīnaya 14.IV.17
2 ša rēš šarri officials; Nbn
2 PNs; 2 scribes
m
TCL 12, šatammu; (indication that ina DU.ZU šatammu of Ezida; Nādin/ mBēl-a ē-iqīša 4.V.17 Nbn
119 administrator of evidence is false) šatammu of Eanna; ša rēš // Egibi
Eanna; scribes of šarri administrator;
chapter one
Eanna 3 PNs;1 scribe

m
YOS 7, 7 qīpu-official of parāsu ina DU.ZU šākin ēmi of Uruk; Nādinu, mKīnaya, 3.VI.1 Cyr
m
Eanna; šatammu of qīpu-official of Eanna; Mūrānu, mBalā u (scribes
Eanna; šatammu of Eanna; of the Eanna)
administrator of administrator of Eanna;
Eanna; scribes of ša mu i quppi; 16 PNs;
Eanna; assembly 4 scribes
m
YOS 7, 66 qīpu-official of (deposit of slaves [lu2MU].DU 3 PNs; 1 scribe Šamaš-mukīn-apli/ 23.III.7 Cyr
m
Eanna; šatammu of with owner) Nādin// Egibi
Eanna; administrator
of Eanna; scribes of
Eanna
Text Authorities in Decision Introduction Names at Scribe Date
Body of Text Terminology of names at end of text
end of text
lu2 m
TCL 13, 147 šākin ēmi of Uruk; parāsu mu-kin-nu šušānu of the king; Nādin// Egibi 30.III.1
šatammu of Eanna; 3 PNs; 1 scribe Camb
assembly of
Babylonians and
Urukians
m
Figulla, šatammu of Eanna; parāsu ina u2-šu-uz-zu + šatammu; administrator; Nādin/ mBēl-a ē-iqīša 12.X.2
lu2
Iraq 13 administrator of mu-kin-nu 9 PNs; 2 scribes // Egibi; Camb
m
(1951), Eanna; assembly Arad-Marduk/
pp. 95–101 of qīpu-officials and [mMarduk-šuma-iddin //
mār banî; assembly Bēl-apla-u ur]
of Babylonians and
Urukians
decision records
m
YOS 7, 161 2 judges parāsu i-na u2-šu-uz-zu + šatammu; administrator Nādin // Egibi; 12.XII.3
lu2 m
mu-kin-nu of Eanna; 3 PNs; Arad-Marduk Camb
2 scribes Bēl-apla-u ur
lu2 m
TCL 13, 170 šatammu; scribe; ? mu-kin-nu 5 PNs; 1 scribe Nabû-mukīn-apli / 5 Camb
m
ša rēš šarri, assembly Marduk-šuma-iddin //
of mār banî Balā u
61
Summary Table 1.4 “Eanna Style B” Decision Records
62
Text Authorities in Decision Transitional phrase Names listed Scribe Date

Body of Text Terminology
m
YOS 19, 90 assembly (?) parāsu an-nu-tu lu2mu-kin-ne-e ša2 ina 5 PNs Šamaš-zēra- 26.X.1 Nbn
pa-ni-šu2-nu (1 scribe at end) šubši/ Silim-Bēl
lu2 m
YOS 19, 91 administrator of return of slave MU.DU.MEŠ ša2 ina šākin ēmi of Uruk; Ibni-Ištar / 2 Nbn
Eanna; assembly (see Beaulieu, pa-ni-šu2-nu scribe of Eanna; ša rēš mŠula[ya] //
YOS 19, p. 4) šarri in charge of the Gimil-Nanaya
chest; šušanu; 12 PNs
(1 scribe at end)
lu2 m
YOS 7, 128 assembly of [ parāsu] DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina 10+ PNs Šamaš-zēra-iddin 13.VII.2 Camb
Babylonians and pa-ni-šu2-nu (1 scribe at end) / mA ulap-Ištar //
Urukians; collegium Ekur-zākir
of the Eanna;
assembly of mār banî
chapter one
decision records 63
1.E Non-Stylized Decision Records
The decision records discussed until this point show signs of having
been composed according to an identifiable style. The discussion turns
now to those decision records that are not composed in one of the four
styles outlined above. Although these decision records do not present a
clearly defined style, their legal function is the same as other decision
records: to record the decision in a case. Therefore, these texts are
considered to be of the same text-type as other decision records.
In order to be considered a non-stylized decision record, a text must
not follow the stylistic criteria of one of the styles presented above. It
must, however, indicate the following information: 1) the dispute being
decided; 2) the adjudicating authorities; and 3) the authorities’ decision.49
The specifics of the different texts are presented in the summary table
at the end of this section.
The discussion of these texts will focus on two main issues: the inter-
pretation of the names at the end of the different texts and when the
texts were used. The non-stylized decision records all end with personal
names. In some, these names are presented in a manner that resembles
the end of the “Royal Judges” style texts in that the names are clearly
those of the adjudicating authorities. For example, Joannès, Archives de
Borsippa, p. 251 ends with the phrase ina ma ar (“before”) followed by
the names of the judges. Each name is followed by the designation
lu2
DI.KU5 (“judge”). Similarly, the designation lu2DI.KU5 follows four of
the names at the end of VAS 6, 171. The names at the end of Camb
412, apart from that of the scribe, do not carry any designation. The
text itself, however, does mention that the case appeared “before” (ina
ma ar) mBēl-uballi who is the šangû of Sippar, the “temple enterers of
Šamaš,” and the elders of the city.50 mBēl-uballi ’s name can be restored
49
In Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103 the elders of the city, who review the evidence,
do not actually reach a decision. Instead, the case ends when the plaintiff “turns back”
(i-tur-[ru?]) in the face of the evidence against him. This text is considered a decision
record (rather than a settlement) because it is the presentation of the evidence before
the elders that leads to the conclusion of the case. AnOr 8, 79, as edited by San Nicolò,
SBAW 1937, Vol. 6, pp. 45–47, seems to be the record of a penalty imposed for not
fulfilling a sworn obligation. It does not include any details about the procedures that
led to the imposition of the penalty, but it is likely that the penalty was imposed at a
hearing before the Eanna officials.
50
Camb 412:6–7, 9–10, 11.
64 chapter one
at the end of the text, along with the names of two other individuals,
m
Iqīša-Marduk son of mEtel-[pî-Šamaš descendant of Šangû-Sippar]
and mNabû-a ē-šullim son of mMušēzib-Marduk [descendant of
Šangû-Ištar]-Bābili. mIqīša-Marduk is known, from other texts, as a
“temple enterer of Šamaš,” while mNabû-a ē-šullim is also known
to have been active in the Sippar temple administration.51 Thus, it is
clear that Camb 412 ends with the names of authorities, even though
the manner in which the names are presented gives no clear indication
that they belong to the adjudicating authorities.
The names at the end of most of the non-stylized decision records,
however, are designated lu2mu-kin-nu (“witnesses”). In some texts, this
designation may, nevertheless, refer to the adjudicating authorities,
as it might in the “Eanna style B” decision records (see section 9.J).
Thus, both Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103 and Jursa, Das Archiv des
Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129 describe cases in which evidence is presented
“before the elders of the city”.52 It is tempting to identify the names
at the end of these texts with those of the elders, although there is no
solid evidence for this. Caution is similarly in order in the interpreta-
tion of Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 110. This text mentions an “assembly”
(lu2UKKIN), whose members may be identical to those individuals
named at the end of the text.
In other non-stylized decision records, the designation lu2mu-kin-nu
apparently refers to actual witnesses. Wunsch, BA 2, No. 9:12–13
indicates that the decision record was “[wr]itten before m[Marduk]-
šuma-iddin the šangû of Sippar” (ina ma- ar m[dAMAR.UTU]-MU-
MU[lu2]SANGA sip-parki ša- a-ru [ša]-ti-ir-ru). After this notice follow four
names designated as lu2mu-kin-nu. The text does not mention any other
adjudicating entities with which these four names might be identified.
This leads to the conclusion that these four people were witnesses to
the proceedings. Similarly, in Dar 410, the judge mItti-Nabû-balā u
“and his colleagues, the judges” (u3 lu2ki-na-at-te-e-šu2 lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ) are
mentioned in the body of the text.53 mItti-Nabû-balā u’s name does not
51
For m Iqīša-Marduk as a “temple enterer” see Bongenaar, Ebabbar, p. 162. For
m
Nabû-a ē-šullim’s activities see the different references listed in Bongenaar, Ebab-
bar, p. 527.
52
Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103:15 (a-na ma -ri ši-bu-ut URU); Jursa, Das Archiv
des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129:28 (i-na ma- ar lu2ši-bu-tu URU).
53
Dar 410:5.
decision records 65
appear at the end of the text, and none of the names at the end of the
text has the title lu2DI.KU5. In this case, too, the individuals designated
as lu2mu-kin-nu witnessed the proceedings but were not judges.
Finally, some attention must be given to explaining why the non-
stylized decision records exist alongside the “Royal Judges” and the
“Eanna” styles. As can be seen from summary table 1.5 below, a
number of non-stylized decision records were written in Nippur, Dilbat
and Borsippa, where no “Royal Judges” decision records are attested.
These texts may, therefore, reflect variant regional scribal practices of
recording decisions. Similarly, the non-stylized decision records from
Babylon are not written by the same scribes as the “Royal Judges”
style decision records. Thus, they too may reflect the practices of the
different scribes.
The non-stylized decision records from Sippar present a unique
problem, which is best illustrated by comparing Camb 412, a non-styl-
ized decision record, with Cyr 332, a “Royal Judges style A” decision
record. The same scribe, mArad-Bēl son of mBēl-ušallim descendant
of Adad-šammê, composed both of these texts. Thus, the difference
in style cannot be attributed to the practices of different scribes. The
difference in style is not due to different authorities, either, since the
same authorities appear in both texts. Furthermore, it is impossible to
distinguish between the subjects of the two texts, since both texts pertain
to private property. Therefore, it would be incorrect to suggest that in
the Ebabbar at Sippar, like in the Eanna at Uruk, the “Royal Judges”
styles were used for cases pertaining to private property while another
style was used for cases pertaining to temple affairs. Nevertheless, the
existence of decision records written in different styles by the same
scribe suggests that the different styles were used in different situations.
Unfortunately, the evidence of the texts themselves does not offer any
clear indication of what these different situations might be.
Summary Table 1.5 Non-Stylized Decision Records
66
Text Dispute Authority Decision Names at Scribe Place of Date

Terminology end of text Composition
lu2 m
Rutten, RA 41 PN pa-qa-ri a-na elders of the (claimant mu-kin-nu + 5 Ea-iddin/mBalā u Babylon 11.VI.1 Nbn
(1947), pp. 99–103 UGU u2-¢šeb-šiÜ city turns back) PNs; 1 scribe // Maštuk
(l. 13–14)
VAS 6, 171 (?) ? judges ? 4 judges; qīpu of mMarduk-balāssu- Dilbat 2.II.? (Persian
E-imbi-Anim; iqbi royal epithet)
šatammu of E-
imbi-Anim; 9
PNs; 1 scribe
f m
Wunsch, BA 2, PN1 . . . itti [mPN2] šangû of Sippar Termination ina ma- ar [Arad-Bēl /] [Sippar] 26.?.4 Cyr
m
No. 9 id-[bu-bu um-ma] of marriage [lu2]SANGA Bēl-ušallim//
(l. 1–4) sip-parki ša- a- descendant of
ru [ša]- i-ir-ru; Adad-šammê
chapter one
[lu2]mu-kin-nu +
4 PNs; 1 scribe
m
Cyr 184 (defendants’ šangû of Sippar; Payment (?) [lu2MU.DU] + [Arad-Bēl/ [Sippar] 26.?.4 Cyr
m
statement) scribes of 3 PNs; 1 scribe Bēl]-ušallim//
Ebabbar Adad-šammê
lu2 m
AnOr 8, 79 (?) (unfulfilled oath) (oath was sworn Payment MU.DU + Nabû-bēlšunu/ Uruk 30.III.8 Cyr
to ša rēš šarri) 3 PNs; 1 scribe Nūrea (as read by San
Nicolò, SBAW
1937 Vol. 6,
p. 46)
Text Dispute Authority Decision Names at Scribe Place of Date
Terminology end of text Composition
m
Camb 412 ? šangû of Sippar, Payment 3 PNs + Arad-Bēl/ Sippar 27.XI.8 Camb
m
“temple 1 scribe Bēl-ušallim//
enterers,” Adad-šammê
elders
lu2
Jursa, Das Archiv PN . . . ir-gu-um elders of the Ownership mu-kin-nu + [mBēl]-uballi / [Sippar] 11.VII.? Dar
des Bēl-Rēmanni, um-ma (l. 20–23) city of prebends 10 PNs; 1 scribe mLīšir // [Šangû-
pp. 128–129 Ištar-Bābili]
lu2 m
Dar 410 a-na ma- ar judges Ownership mu-kin-nu + Arad-Ba u// Babylon 10.VIII.15 Dar
AUTH. di-i-ni of house 12 PNs; 1 scribe Ašlāku
tu-te-lu- -ma (l. 5–7)
m
Joannès, Archives pa-qa-ru . . . iš-ku- judges Payments ina ma- ar + Mušēzibi-Bēl// Borsippa 9.I.32 Dar
de Borsippa, nu-ma (l. 5–8) 2 judges; Egibi
p. 251 1 scribe; 1 PN
decision records
PBS 2/1, 140 PN1 ša2 . . . it-ti assembly Payment — — [Nippur] 6 Dar II
PN2 . . . i-rag-gu-mu
lu2 m
Stolper, PN1 ša2 KI PN2 assembly [of Payment ? MU.DU + Tāqiš-Gula / [Nippur] [6 Dar II] (see
Entrepreneurs [ir-gu-mu iq-bu-u2 the citizens of (related to PBS 5(+) PNs (3 with mIddin-Bēl PBS 2/1, 140)
No. 110 um-ma] (l. 1–2) Nippur] 2/1, 140) titles); 1 scribe
67
CHAPTER TWO
OTHER TEXT-TYPES INCLUDING THE

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
The previous chapter focused on one text-type—the decision record—

and on analyzing the different styles in which decision records were
composed. This text-type, however, is not the only one that provides
evidence for the final resolution of disputes. There are three other text-
types that provide similar evidence: conclusions, memoranda includ-
ing decisions, and settlements. Like the decision records, these three
text-types include some mention of a dispute and how it was resolved.
Unlike the decision records, however, they were not composed only for
the purpose of recording the decision. Although these text-types men-
tion that a dispute has ended by means of a decision, this decision is
secondary to their actual purpose.
2.A Conclusions of Disputes
Like the decision records, these texts also mention a legal dispute and
the decision reached by the adjudicators. Unlike the decision records,
however, conclusions do not end with the authorities’ decision. Instead,
they continue with some record pertaining to the subject of the case
after the ruling. In most cases, the texts conclude with the transfer of
the property in question to its rightful owner in compliance with the
outcome of the recorded dispute. The different conclusions, which
depend directly on the particulars of each case, are listed in summary
table 2.1 at the end of this section.
The formulation of conclusions does not follow an identifiable
outline. To be classified as a conclusion, a text must include evidence
of the following: a dispute adjudicated by a legal authority and actions
pertaining to the subject of the dispute subsequent to the decision.
The evidence of these different elements from the texts classified as
conclusions is presented in summary table 2.1 at the end of this sec-
tion, as well.
70 chapter two
In order to describe the specific legal function of the conclusion, Nbn

668 will serve as an example. This text is especially illustrative because
it can be situated within a “dossier” of texts pertaining to the same
case. The case surrounds mBēl-rēmanni’s legal efforts to take possession
of four slaves as compensation for having repaid a debt on behalf of
m
Arad-Gula. As Wunsch has noted, Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998),
No. 13 and TCL 12, 122 are the two “Royal Judges” decision records
that indicate that mBēl-rēmanni was entitled to receive the slaves as
payment.1 Nbn 668 was composed one month after TCL 12, 122, the
second of the two decisions, by mNādin and mNabû-šuma-iškun, the
same court scribes who wrote TCL 12, 122. The conclusion begins by
presenting the basic history of the case. It then reads as follows:
9. ar2-ki mdEN-re-man-ni (9–13) Afterwards, mBēl-rēmanni
10. fa-na-dtaš-me-tum-at-kal brought fAna-Tašmētu-atkal,
f
GEME-ia f
Amtiya, fNanaya-ana-bītīšu and
11. fdna-na-a-a-na-E2-šu2 u mdza- m
Zababa-iddin, the household
ba4-ba4-SUM.NA slaves of mArad-Gula, which were
12. UN.MEŠ E2 ša2 mIR3-dgu-la E2 pledged to him, before the judges
maš-ka-ni-šu2 of the king.
13. a-na ma- ar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ
LUGAL ub-lam-ma
14. LU2-tu2 ša a-na ku-mu 3 (14–16) They gave the slaves
MA.NA 50 GIN2 [KU3. instead of the full price—3 mina
BABBAR] 50 šeqel [of silver]—to mBēl-
15. ŠAM2 gam!-ru-tu pa-ni mdEN-re- rēmannu, in accordance with his
man-nu tablet.
16. ki-i pi-i up-pi-šu2 u2-šad-gi-l[u]
17. na-din ma- ir a-pil2 ru-gum-ma-a (17) He is given, received, and
ul i-ši quit. He has no claim.
The mention that the judges transferred the slaves to mBēl-rēmanni
is the aspect of Nbn 668 that characterizes the text as a conclusion,
rather than a decision record.2 The decision in this case was reached
one month earlier, as is clear from the decision record TCL 12, 122.
Even with this decision record in hand, however, it took one month for
m
Bēl-rēmanni to gain possession of the slaves. Thus, although a ruling
had been reached, the matter was not closed until mBēl-rēmanni has
1
Wunsch, AfO 44–45 (1997–1998), pp. 68–70.
2
For similar notices in conclusions see McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:8; Stolper, Entre-
preneurs, No. 106: 21–23; BE 9, 69: 8–9 and Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109:15.
other text-types including the resolution of disputes 71
received the slaves. The notice in line 17 that “he is given, received,
and quit,” and that “he has no claim”, points directly to the purpose
for which the conclusion was written. The purpose of the conclusion
is to serve as record that the parties have actually complied with the
judges’ decision. It is at this point that the case is actually closed.
In addition to the notice that mBel-rēmanni has received payment,
Nbn 668 also includes the following statement:
18. u3 aš2-šu2 ma-ti-ma la sa- a-ri- (18–21) And so that there will be
im-ma no turning back and raising a claim
19. a-na UGU LU2-tu2 šu-a-tu2 la regarding these slaves, the judges
ra-ga-mu lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ wrote a tablet and sealed it with their
20. up-pi iš- u-ru-ma ina <seals> and gave it to mBēl-rēmanni.
na4
<KIŠIB>.MEŠ-šu2-nu ib-ru-
mu-ma
21. a-na mdEN-re-man-ni id-di-nu
This notice, and ones like it from other conclusions,3 is similar to those
mentioned at the beginning of the typological discussion of the deci-
sion records (section 1.A above). These notices state that the decision
records were written as proof of the decision in order to prevent future
claims. The appearance of such notices in the conclusions indicates
that the conclusions are written to prevent future claims, as well. The
conclusions, then, have a dual legal purpose. Like the decision records,
they serve as a record of the decision itself, and thus prevent reopening
the case. But they also go beyond the decision records by recording
that the parties actually complied with the decision.
One feature common to all the text-types discussed thus far is the
presence of a clearly identifiable adjudicating authority, such as the
royal judges or the assembly of the Eanna at Uruk. The role that these
authorities play as adjudicators is obvious from the texts themselves.
In the “Royal Judges” style decision records, for example, the judges
appear not only when their names are recorded at the end of the texts;
their actions as judges are recorded within the text, as well. The same
may be said for the other styles of decision records and for the conclu-
sions of disputes.
The presence of adjudicators is not entirely apparent in the other two
text-types that mention the decision of legal disputes: the memoranda
3
McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:7; Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106:23–26; BE 9, 69:9–14;
Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109:15–17.
Summary Table 2.1 Conclusions
72
Text Dispute Decision Conclusion Authority Names Scribe Place of Date

Composition
m
McEwan, [di-ni] ig-re-e-ma di-in-šu2-nu payment assembly ina [DU.ZU] Marduk- — 6.VI.5 ?
LB Tablets, (l. 2); di-i-ni id- un-de-e-si-ma + 9 PNs; 1 ibni/mA i-
No. 38 bu-bu-ma (l. 3) (l. 3–4); ip-ru- scribe [X]
su (l. 5)
m
Weidner, AfO ina pu ur ummāni la ba-la -su iq- sale of Nebuchadnezzar; ina ka-nak Nabû- Borsippa 22.XI.11
17 (1954– eli-šu u2-ki-in-ma bi-ma napišti-šu confiscated “assembly” IM.DUB šuāti; mukīn-apli/ Nbk
m
1956), (l. 17–18) ik-ki-su field ina ušuzzu ša2 Nabû-
pp. 1–5 (l. 19–29) + 10 PNs bēlšunu//
(including Iddin-d[X]
šangû of
Borsippa);
1 scribe
lu2 m
Nbn 668 DI.KU5.MEŠ giving control transfer of judges i-na ma- ar 5 Nādin and Babylon 26.XI.12
chapter two
ina up-pi iš- u- of property slaves as PNs up-pi ša2- mNabû- Nbn
ru-ma (l. 1–2) payment ir; 2 scribes šuma-iškun
[cf. Wunsch, (see “Royal
AfO 44/45 Judges”
(1997/1998), summary
No. 13 and tables)
TCL 12, 122]
m
Wunsch, BA 2, See Wunsch’s giving control transfer of šangû of Sippar; ina E³.BAR Arad- [Sippar] 4.I.7 [Cyr]
No. 48 restorations of property house to “temple enterers;” DI.KU5 Bēl/ mBēl-
heir city elders MU.MEŠ; ušallim//
šangû of [Adad-
Sippar; 1 PN; Šammê]
1 scribe
Text Dispute Decision Conclusion Authority Names Scribe Place of Date
Composition
lu2 m
VAS 4, 87 ina qi2-bi order to pay payment sartennu and judges mu-kin-nu + Marduk- Babylon 4.II.1 Dar
lu2
sar-ten-nu u 4 PNs; šuma-ibni/
m
DI.KU5.MEŠ 1 scribe Bēl-apla-
(l. 10–11) iddin//
Egibi
lu2
Stolper, PN1 ra-ga- ownership payment assembly of [mār MU.DU ? Nippur 6.IV.20
Entrepreneurs, [mu] . . . u2- of property banî ] of Nippur + 17 PNs Artaxerxes
No. 106 šab4-šu-u (l. established (including
8–9); PN1 PN2 šaknu and
u PN3 di-i-ni ina paqudu of
UKKIN [it-ti Nippur)
a- a-meš ] . . . id-
bu-bu-u2-ma (l.
12–14)
lu2 m
BE 9, 69 PN1 ša2 ina (ownership of payment assembly of MU.DU Bēlšunu/ Nippur 4.XII.39
m
UKKIN property) Nippur + 22 PNs; 1 Ninurta- Artaxerxes
EN.LIL2¢kiÜ a-na scribe nā ir
PN2 iq-bu-u2 um-
ma (l. 1–2)
m
Stolper, di-i-ni ir-gu-mu- ? payment ? [scribe] Ninurta- Nippur 9.XII.0
Entrepreneurs, šu2 . . . it-ti [PN] nā ir/ Dar II
m
No. 109 (l. 12–13) Manu-
other text-types including the resolution of disputes
Enlil-dāri
73
74 chapter two
including decisions and the settlements. Properly understanding these

two text-types requires attention to this additional ambiguity. More
specifically, in order to properly situate these text-types within the ‘tablet
trail’, one must determine not only what stage of adjudication they
reflect, but also how the cases they describe were adjudicated. Were
judges or other adjudicators present, or were the cases that these texts
describe settled without formal judicial intervention?
2.B Memoranda Including Decisions
The memoranda derive their name from the words ta sistu lā mašê
(“Memorandum, not to be forgotten”) that occur at the end of most of
them.4 One additional defining feature of this text-type is the absence
of the scribe’s name.5 The phrase ta sistu lā mašê commonly occurs in
Neo-Babylonian texts that do not include the name of the scribe.6 The
absence of the scribe’s name and the designation of some of the texts
as ta sistu point to the function of this text-type. The memoranda were
meant for the scribe’s own use, rather than as an official legal record
of how a case was decided. The scribe might have composed such a
document to remind himself of the actual proceedings. All the impor-
tant information would have been recorded, but the scribe’s own name
would not have been necessary. The memoranda might have served
the scribe in composing the more formal documents.
The memoranda may be divided into two styles, one from Babylon
and the other from outside Babylon. The memoranda written in Babylon
have the following basic outline:
I. Descriptive sentence(s)
A. Designation of names
B. Dispute
C. Decision
II. Names
III. Place of composition and date
IV. ta sistu lā mašê
4
TCL 13, 212:15; BE 8/1, 29:32; VAS 6, 38:21; VAS 6, 89:17.
5
This absence is first noted by San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV p. 608.
6
This conclusion is based on examination of the Neo-Babylonian examples cited
in CAD mašû A 1d (M1, p. 400) and AHw. ta sistu 4 (p. 1302).
The relevant parts of VAS 6, 89, a memorandum written in Babylon,

will serve to illustrate the different elements of this text-type. The text
will first be presented in its entirety. Then, the different components will
be presented in terms of the outline above. The specific details of
other memoranda are presented in summary table 2.2 at the end of
this section.
VAS 6, 89 pertains to a dispute between two descendants of the
Nappā u clan, mŠākin-šumi and mBalā u, over income from a cer-
tain prebend (isqu). mŠākin-šumi’s claim to the income is granted and
m
Balā u forfeits his claim to the income. mBalā u places the income at
the disposal of mŠākin-šumi, apart from 10 šeqels which mBalā u gave
on behalf of mŠākin-šumi in a payment of some kind.7 The text itself
reads as follows:8
1. lu2
DUMU-DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina (1–5) The mār banî before whom
pa-ni-šu2-nu mGAR-MU m
Šākin-šumi son of mNadnaya
2. A-šu2 ša2 mnad-na-a A descendant of Nappā u and
lu2
SIMUG u mTIN A-šu2 ša2 m
Balā u son of mMarduk-erība
md
AMAR.UTU-SU descendant of Nappā u argued
3. A lu2SIMUG it-ti a- a-meš a-na against each other regarding the
UGU is-qu prebend-income from Bēl-āliya of
4. pa-ni dEN-URU-ia ša2 urusar-ra- Šarrabanu.
ba-nu
5. id-bu-bu-<<ub>>-ma mTIN
a-na UGU is-qu
6. la u2-šar-šu-u2 mTIN a-na (5–6) They did not allow mBalā u
m
GAR-MU possession of the prebend-income.
7. iq-bu-u2 um-ma a-mur is-si-qi2 (6–7) mBalā u said thus to mŠākin-
ina pa-ni-ka šumi:
8. al-la 10 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR (7–10) “Look here! My prebend-
ša2 a-na msu-za-a income is at your disposal, except
9. a-na mu - i-ka ad-di-nu for the 10 šeqel which I gave to
10. i bi-in-nu m
Suzaya on your behalf. Give (that)
to me!”
11. mmu-ra-nu A-šu2 ša2 mDI.KU5- (11) mMūranu son of mDayyān-
d
AMAR.UTU A mdEN- -u2 Marduk descendant of Bēliyau;
12. mna-din A-šu2 ša2 ma-ta-mar- (12) mNādin son of Atamar-
d
A.NUN.SU d
Nusku;
7
For the later history of this income, see San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV p. 615 and
Baker, AfO Beiheft 30 (2004), p. 37 and pp. 129–130.
8
Readings follow Baker, AfO Beiheft 30 (2004), No. 50 (pp. 129–130).
76 chapter two
13. md
EN-u2-sep-pe A-šu2 ša2 mEN- (13) mBēl-useppe son of mBēlšunu
šu2-nu A mba-bu-tu descendant of Bābūtu;
14. mIR3-dgu-la A-šu2 ša2 mki-rib-tu (14) mArad-Gula son of mKiribtu
A lu2dul-lu-pu descedant of Dullupu;
15. EN-MU A-šu2 ša2 mdAMAR.
md
(15) mBēl-iddin son of mMarduk-
UTU-SU A lu2SIMUG TIN. erība descendant of Nappā u.
TIRki
16. ITI ŠU U4 25-kam2 MU (16–17) Babylon. 25 Du ūzu, year
17-kam2 mdNA3-I 17 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
17. LUGAL Eki ta -sis-tu4 la maš- (17) Memorandum not to be
še-e forgotten.
In terms of the outline above, the components of VAS 6, 89 may be
presented as follows:
I. Descriptive sentence(s) (Lines 1–6)

A. Designation of personal names (1)
lu2
DUMU-DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu
B. Dispute (1–5)
m
PN1 u mPN2 it-ti a- a-meš a-na UGU is-qu . . . id-bu-bu-<<ub>>-
ma
C. Decision (5–6)
m
PN2 a-na UGU is-qu la u2-šar-šu-u2
“The mār banî before whom mPN1 and mPN2 argued against each
other regarding the prebend-income . . . They did not allow mPN2
possession of the prebend-income.”
II. Names
5 PNs
III. Place of composition and Date
Babylon. 25 Du ūzu, year 17 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
IV. ta -sis-tu4 la maš-še-e
“Memorandum, not to be forgotten.”
The two extant memoranda not written in Babylon include all of the
same elements in a slightly different order. The names appear at the very
beginning. The following sentence identifies all the named individuals
as mār banî and mentions the dispute. For comparison purposes, the
outlines of the two different styles are presented here side-by-side.
Decision Memoranda from Babylon Decision Memoranda from outside

Babylon
I. Descriptive Sentence(s) I. Names
A. Designation of Names
B. Dispute
C. Decision
II. Names II. Descriptive Sentence(s)
A. Designation of Names
B. Dispute
C. Decision
III. Place of composition and date III. Place of composition and date
IV. ta sistu lā mašê IV. ta sistu lā mašê
VAS 6, 89, the memorandum quoted above, demonstrates that the situa-
tion described in this text-type is very similar to the situations described
in the decision records. A case is “argued” (dabābu) “before” (ina pāni )
a group of people; in VAS 6, 89 they are designated as mār banî. The
use of the prepositional phrase ina pāni together with the verb dabābu
suggests that the group of mār banî are the adjudicators.9 The same
idiom—dabābu ina pāni—or the semantically equivalent dabābu ina ma ar
occurs in a number of “Royal Judges style B” decision records, where
it describes the arguing of the case “before” the judges. In VAS 6, 89,
it is the mār banî who do not allow mBalā u possession of the prebend
income. Thus, the memorandum itself shows that the mār banî play a
role in adjudicating the case argued before them.
In VAS 6, 89, the evidence for the adjudicatory role played by the
named individuals comes from the use of the idiom dabābu ina pāni
together with the actions described. Several other memoranda offer
evidence in addition to the use of dabābu ina pāni which underscores
the fact that the named individuals play an adjudicatory role. This
additional evidence includes the designation of the individuals named
in Nbk 109 as lu2da-a-ne-e (“judges”) or, in BE 8/1, 29 as lu2ši-bu-tu ša2
EN.LIL2ki (“the elders of Nippur”). The opening sentence of VAS 6,
38 reads: lu2[mu-kin-nu ša2 ina] pa-ni-šu2-nu mP[ N1 itti ] mPN2 di-i-[ni-šu2
ša2] ša -le-e a-na UGU pi-i-šu2-nu iš-ku-un (“[The witnesses] before whom
9
See the “Appearance” column in the summary table of the “Royal Judges style
B” decision records (summary table 1.2).
78 chapter two
m
P[N1] presented [his c]ase regarding the cress [against] mPN2 for their
adjudication”).10 The verb dabābu does not occur, but the case (dīnu) is
presented (šakānu) before (ina pāni ) the individuals for their judgment.
Furthermore, in the lines that follow this introduction, the litigants
swear that “we shall not change their judgment that they judge for us”
(mim-ma ma-la i-di-nu-na-šu2 di-i-ni-šu2-nu nu-ul-ta-nu-u2).11
In the memoranda discussed thus far, there is clear evidence that
the people “before whom” the case is argued are those who decide the
case. There are, however, memoranda that use the idiom dabābu ina pāni
without any additional evidence that the people “before whom” the
case is argued play an adjudicatory role. The question arises in YOS
17, 320, in which the individuals are designated as lu2mu-kin-nu (“wit-
nesses”) and in TCL 13, 212, where the text containing the designation
is broken. On the one hand, the use of the term dabābu ina pāni may
indeed indicate that, like the “witnesses” in the Eanna decision records,
the individuals named in these memoranda served in an adjudicatory
capacity. On the other hand, the individuals “before whom” the case
was argued may have served not as judges, but as witnesses. It may be
that the case was argued and settled between the two parties without
any need for adjudication.
2.C Settlements
The presentation of the document typology began by positing that

each text-type has its own legal function. The identification of the
settlements, the text-type to be discussed here, deviates from this meth-
odological axiom. Instead of a common legal function, the settlements
share a common setting. All of them record disputes resolved without
mentioning a ruling by an authority. Because they share a common set-
ting, rather than a common legal function, texts of this text-type may
share a purpose with one of the other text-types described above. Thus,
for example, at least one settlement resembles a conclusion. It records
10
Restored based on the translation of VAS 6, 38:1 as “(Diese sind) d[ie Zeugen v]or
welchen” in San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV p. 609. Their translation reflects the restoration
of the line as lu2[mu-kin-nu ša2 ina] pa-ni-su2-nu. Whatever the missing noun, it is clear
from the remainder of the text that the people play an adjudicatory role.
11
For this interpretation of the oath, see CAD dânu b3’ (D, p. 103).
Summary Table 2.2 Memoranda Including Decisions

Text Designation Dispute Decision Place of Date
of Names Terminology Composition
TCL ? PN1 di-i-nu . . . it- ? — —
13, 212 ti [PN2] id-dab-
bu-ub-ma
(l. 12–14)
BE lu2
ši-bu-tu ša2 ? ? [Nippur] 15.VII.?
8/1, 29 EN.LIL2ki + Nbk
5 PNs; ina
DU.ZU + 7
PNs
YOS lu2
mu-kin-nu PN1 it-ti PN2 di- return of Nippur 21.IX.10
17, 320 i-ni i-dab-bu-ub- slave Nbk
ma (l. 11–13)
Nbk lu2
da-a-ne-e [di]-i-ni . . . id-bu- return of Babylon 6.I.17
109 bu (l. 5–6) property Nbk
to plaintiff
VAS 6, ? PN1 [it-ti] PN2 a-na PN2 Babylon 24.III.34
38 di-i-[ni-šu2] . . . a- iq-bu-u2 Nbk
na UGU pi-i- um-ma +
šu2-nu iš-ku-un (l. ruling
1–7) (l. 10–15)
VAS 6, lu2DUMU PN1 u PN2 it-ti la u2-šar-šu- Babylon 25.IV.17
89 DU3.MEŠ a- a-meš . . . id- u2 (l. 6) Nbn
bu-bu-ma (l. 1–5)
not only the ruling, but the compliance, as well.12 It is considered a

settlement rather than a conclusion because it does not mention the
activities of authorities.
The fact that these settlements result from a dispute is apparent
from the verbs used, or from the situations described by the texts.
This evidence is presented in summary table 2.3 below. The use of
terms such as dīna dabābu or dīna gerû may offer some insight into the
setting in which these texts were composed. In order to illustrate this
point, it is best to present one of the settlements, Dar 260. In this text,
m
Karêa and his wife, fNuptaya, initiate litigation against mNergal-a a-
iddin, fNuptaya’s son from a previous marriage. mNergal-a a-iddin is
12
BIN 1, 141.
80 chapter two
in possession of several slaves to whom mKarêa and fNuptaya have a

claim, presumably through fNuptaya. Fearing the pending litigation,
m
Nergal-a a-iddin returns the living slaves and swears that he will
compensate his mother and her new husband for the death of one of
the slaves. The litigants settle out of court. The text itself, before the
names of witnesses, reads as follows:
1. di-i-ni ša2 mka-re-e-a A-šu2 ša2 (1–4) The suit of mKarêa son of
md
EN-DA A mŠEŠ-u2-tu m
Bēl-lē i descendant of A ūtu and
2. u3 fnu-up-ta-a DUMU.SAL- f
Nuptaya daughter of mNabû-
su ša2 mdNA3-TIN-su-iq-bi balāssu-iqbi, his wife, regarding
¢DAMÜ-šu2 f
Kuzbaya and her sons and mNabû-
3. a-na mu - i fku-uz-ba-a u3 u uršu, the members of their
DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 u mdNA3- ur- household, which they brought
šu2 UN.MEŠ E2-šu2-nu against mNergal-a a-iddin son of
4. it-ti mdU.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 m
A êa.
ša2 mŠEŠ.MEŠ-e-a ir-gu-mu-
5. md
U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU di-i-ni (5–7) mNergal-a a-iddin feared
i-dur6 -ma it-ti mka-re-e-a the suit and he did not come to
6. u fnu-up-ta-a AMA-šu2 a-na da- argue the case against mKarêa and
ba-ba di-i-ni f
Nuptaya, his mother.
7. la il-lik fku-uz-ba-a u3 DUMU. (7) He returned fKuzbaya and her
MEŠ-šu2 i!-ter-ri-ba sons.
8. a-na mka-re-e-a u3 fnu-up-ta-a (8–10) He swore to mKarêa and
AMA-šu2 it-te-me f
Nuptaya his mother that [he will
9. ki!-i! 4 MA.NA KU3.BABBAR pay] 4 mina of silver in exchange
ku-um mdNA3- ur-šu2 ša2 ina E2 for mNabû-u uršu, who died in
md
U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU the house of mNergal-a a-iddin to
10. mi-ti a-na mka-re-e-a fnu-up-ta-a m
Karêa (and) fNuptaya, his mother.
AMA-šu2 [i-nam-din]
11. U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2
md
(11–12) mNergal-a a-iddin, son
ŠEŠ.MEŠ-e-a a-ŠIR-tu4 it-ti
m
of mA êa s hall p[ ay] . . . with
m
ka-[re-e-a] m
Ka[rêa] and fNuptaya, daughter
12. u3 fnu-up-ta-a DUMU.SAL-su of mNabû-balāssu-iqbi, his mother.
ša2 mdNA3-TIN-su-E AMA-šu2
i-nam-[din]
13. dib-bi ša2 mka-re-e-a u3 fnu-up-ta- (13–15) The case of mKarêa and
a [a-na mu - i] f
Nuptaya [regarding] the slaves and
14. a-me-lut-tu4 u3 man-da-at-tu4. the payments against mNabû-a a-
MEŠ it-ti m[dNA3-ŠEŠ-MU] iddin is settled.
15. qa-tu-u2
16. md
U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 (16–20) mNergal-a a-iddin son of
m
ŠEŠ.MEŠ-a-a m[ka-re-e-a] m
A ēa, m[Karêa] son of mBēl-lē i
17. A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-DA A mŠEŠ- descendant of A ûtu and f Nuptaya
u2-tu u3 fnu-up-ta-a his m other . . . swore by B ēl, Nabû
18. AMA-šu2 [. . .] a-na mu - i a- and the oaths of Darius king [of
a-meš Babylon and the lands] to each
19. ina dEN dNA3 u a-de-e ša2 mda- other:
ri- u-šu2 LUGAL [Eki u KUR. (20–21) “Whatever we have agreed
KUR] we have received.”
20. a-na a- a-meš it-te-mu-u2 ki-i
a-na UGU
21. ša2 ni-pu-uš ni-te-e -si man-da- (21–23) mKarêa son of mBēl-lē i
at-tu4.MEŠ descendant of A ūtu, and
22. mka-re-e-a A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-DA f
Nuptaya, his mother, have received
A mŠEŠ-u2-tu4 [u3 fnu-up-ta-a] the payments (for the slaves) from
23. AMA-šu2 ina ŠU.2 mdU.GUR- m
Nergal-a a-iddin.
ŠEŠ-MU
As with all the texts of this text-type, judges or other officials are not
mentioned as part of the proceedings. In fact, the text specifically men-
tions that the case never reaches a court because “mNergal-a a-iddin
feared the suit and he did not come to argue the case.” Thus, it is
possible that the entire text records a settlement reached between the
parties once mNergal-a a-iddin concedes. The text does not mention
the names of authorities because no authorities were involved. On the
other hand, the opening of the text describes the situation as dīni ša
m
Karêa u fNuptaya . . . itti mNergal-a a-iddin irgumū (“The suit which mKarêa
and f Nuptaya raised against mNergal-a a-iddin”). Similar phrases occur
in “Royal Judges style B” decision records, in which judges clearly have
a role. It is possible, therefore, that the opening phrase of Dar 260
indicates that judges were involved in an early stage of the process, but
that the settlement was reached before they had to decide the case.
Another settlement that raises similar ambiguities is VAS 6, 127. In
terms of form, this text closely resembles the memoranda from Baby-
lon described earlier (section 2.B). Before the names, the text reads as
follows:13
13
Transliteration and translation follow Baker, AfO Beiheft 30 (2004), No. 9.
82 chapter two
1. DUMU DU3-i.MEŠ ša2 ina

lu2
(1–3) The mār banî before whom
IGI-šu2-nu mni-din-tu A-šu2 ša2 m
Nidintu son of mNabû-šuma-iddin
md
NA3-MU-MU said thus to mIddin-Nabû son of
2. a-na mMU-dNA3 A-šu2 ša2 m
Nabû-bāni-zēri descendant of
md
NA3-DU3-NUMUN A Nappā u:
lu2
SIMUG
3. iq-bu-u2 um-ma ra-šu-ta-a ina (3–4) “There is no debt owed by
mu - i m
Šellebi, your son.”
4. mše-el-le-bi DUMU-ka ia-a-nu
5. u a-na mu - i-šu2 ul a-kaš2-ša2-du (5) “And I will not proceed against
him.”
The situation may be reconstructed as follows. mŠellebi, son of mId-
din-Nabû, has taken a loan from mNidintu. Apparently faced with the
threat of impending legal proceedings against his son, mIddin-Nabû
has repaid the debt. “Before” (ina pāni ) six mār banî, mNidintu declares
that mŠellebi is no longer in his debt. mNidintu also declares that he
will not undertake legal proceedings against mŠellebi.14 The role of the
mār banî in this text may simply have been as witnesses to mNidintu’s
declarations. It is also possible, however, that by their very presence
the mār banî constitute an adjudicating body. mNidintu may have begun
proceedings by turning to these mār banî, perhaps with a demand for
repayment of the debt. The debt was paid before any further action
was required; the case was thus settled.
The defining feature of the settlements is the absence of adjudicating
authorities. The discussion above has offered several ways to under-
stand this absence. It is possible that no authorities were ever involved
in the case. It stands to reason that not all cases had to appear before
judges or any other officially sanctioned adjudicating body. Alterna-
tively, because all the settlements include the names of witnesses or
mār banî, it is possible that these individuals served as arbiters in these
cases. Finally, the inclusion of dispute terminology such as dīna gerû or
dabābu raises the possibility of some official initiation of proceedings.
These phrases may indeed reflect a formal procedure, and not simply
an informal confrontation between the parties. If so, then it is possible
that even though judges or other adjudicators are not mentioned in the
settlements, they are nonetheless involved, at least in the initial stages
of the case.
14
For the translation of the expression kašādu ana mu i as “to proceed against” see
CAD kašādu 1d (K, p. 276) and AHw. kašādu 9 (p. 460).
Summary Table 2.3 Settlements

Text Dispute Decision Names Scribe Place of Date
Terminology Composition
BIN 1, di-i-ni ig-re-u2- ? (ul i-ta-tar- — — — —

141 ma um-ma ma . . . ul i -dab-
(l. 3–4) bu-ub)
Evetts, PN1 it-ti PN2 ? mu-kin-nu
lu2 m
Šamaš- Babylon 28.IV.2 Ngl
Ner. 36 i-dab-bu-ub um- + 6 PNs; zēra-iqīša/
ma (l. 9–11) 1 scribe m
Balā u//
Šigûa
YOS 6, PN1 a-na PN2 claim rejected lu2
mu-kin-nu m
Nabû-šuma- Uruk 8.XI.1 Nbn
18/ YOS u2-paq-qi-ru + 5 PNs; 1 imbi/mTaqīš-
19, 100 (l. 8–9) scribe Gula//
anbu
Wunsch, claim made in release of mu-kin-nu
lu2
[mItti-Nabû- ? [22.VI.5
CM 20, lines 3’–4’ property + 5 PNs + balā u]/ Camb?]
No. 59 1 scribe m
Marduk-
šuma-[u ur//
Nappā u]
Dar 260 di-i-ni ša2 PN1 dib-bi ša2 PN1 [lu2mu-kin- m
Nabû- Ša rini 25.VIII.9
u3 PN2 . . . it-ti u3 PN2 . . . qa- nu] + 12 apla-iddin/ Dar
PN4 ir-gu-mutu-u2 PNs; 1 m
Nabû-šuma-
(l. 1–4) scribe iškun//
Šangû-Nin-
Eanna
VAS 6, — a-na mu - i-šu2 6 mār banî — Babylon 18.VI.11
127 ul a-kaš2-ša2-du Dar
BE 10, 9 charge made DI.KU5 u ra- MU.DU
lu2 m
Šulaya/ Nippur 16.I.1 Dar
in l. 1–4 ga-mu . . . a-na + 9 PNs; 1 m
Ninurta- II
u4-mu a-a-tu2 scribe nā ir
ia-a-nu
CHAPTER THREE
PRELIMINARY PROTOCOLS AND RECORDS OF

STATEMENTS IN COURT
The text-types discussed until this point all include a record of the
outcome of a case. The discussion now turns to texts that end without
recording the case’s outcome. Instead, these texts reflect different stages
of the legal proceedings. The discussion will begin with preliminary
protocols (section 3.A) and memoranda of proceedings (section 3.B).
Like the decision records, both of these text-types include descriptions
of proceedings involving authorities. These descriptions provide the
necessary information to situate the texts within the context of a trial.
The discussion will then turn to the different text-types that record
only statements: accusatory depositions (section 3.C.1), depositions of
testimony (section 3.C.2), memoranda of depositions (sections 3.C.3) and
depositions under oath (section 3.C.4). These text-types do not explicitly
mention the activities of a court. Thus, identifying their place within
a trial and their legal function must depend on other factors, such as
the authorities involved or the content of the statements made. The
description of these two text-types will note these different factors.
3.A Preliminary Protocols
Texts of this text-type describe proceedings without recording the

outcome of the case. The absence of a record of the cases’ outcome
distinguishes the preliminary protocols from the decision records.
Because these texts include descriptions of procedures, and not only
records of statements, they are also to be distinguished from depositions
(discussed below in section 3.C).
The legal function of this text-type is to record the preliminary stages
of the trial.1 The most direct evidence for this use of the preliminary
1
For remarks about the preliminary nature of the proceedings, in general, see San
Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 76 and, about YOS 6, 223, in particular, San Nicolò, ArOr
5 (1933), p. 295. See also Cornelia Wunsch, “Neu- und spätbabylonische Urkunden
aus dem Museum von Montserrat,” AuOr 15 (1997), p. 163.
86 chapter three
protocols comes from the comparison between YOS 7, 140, a pre-

liminary protocol, and YOS 7, 161, a decision record, both of which
pertain to the same trial.2 YOS 7, 140 reads as follows:
1. 1-en UDU pu- al u3 4-ta UDU (1–6) 1 ram, 4 ewes, [total 5]
U8.¢MEÜ [NIGIN 5-ta] ¢ e-eÜ- sheep, branded with a star,
nu ša2 kak-kab-tu4 property of Ištar of Uruk [and
2. še-en-du NIG2.GA dINNIN Nanaya] belonging to mAnu-
UNUGki [u dna-na-a ] ša2 mda- šarra-u ur son of mŠarru-kīn, a
nu-LUGAL-URI3 herdsman of Ištar [of Uruk . . .],
3. A-šu2 ša2 mLUGAL-DU from the pen of mBēl-šarra-u ur
lu2
NA.GAD ša2 d¢INNINÜ son of mA iya-a[lidu, (regarding)
[UNUGki . . .] ša2 qa-pu-ut-tu4 which mNabû-a ā-iddin, the ša
4. ša2 mdEN-LUGAL-URI3 A- rēš ] šarri administrator of the
šu2 ša2 m¢ŠEŠÜ-ia-a-[li-du ša2 Eanna and [. . .] said thus:
md
NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG].
(6) “Who . . . these sheep [branded
LUGAL
with a star . . .] ?”
5. lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN.NA u3
[. . .] iq-bu-u2
6. um-ma man-na e-e-nu-a ša2!
[kak-kab-tu4 še-en-du . . .]
7. EN-LUGAL-URI3 ina
md
(7–9) In the assembly, mBēl-šarra-
UKKIN iq-bi ¢um-ma ina u ur said thus: “In year 2 of
MU 2Ü-[kam2 mkam-bu-zi ]-¢ia [Camby]ses king of Babylon, king
LUGAL TIN.TIRÜki LUGAL of the lands, mBēl-iqīša son of
KUR.KUR m
illaya [deposited] 1 ram and 4
8. 1-en UDU pu- al u3 4-ta UDU [ewe]s, [total] 5 [sheep branded
[U8].ME [NIGIN] 5-[ta e-e- with a star] with me.”
nu ša2 kak-kab-tu4 ] ¢še-en-duÜ
9. mdEN-BA-ša2 A-šu2 ša2 m il-la-a
ina ŠU.2!-ia [ip-qid mdEN-BA-
ša2]
10. i-bu-ku-nim-ma iš-ša2-al-[lu- (9–11) They brought [mBēl-iqīša]
šu . . . iq-bi ] and question[ed him . . . he said]
11. um-ma 1-en UDU pu- al 4-ta thus:
[UDU U8.ME ša2 kak-kab-tu
še-en-du] u3
2
The connection between the two texts is first identified by San Nicolò, ArOr 4
(1932), p. 341.
preliminary protocols & records of statements in court 87
12. 5-ta UDU la -rat.ME ta-mi- (11–15) “In Du ūzu, year 2,

¢im-ma-ta NIGIN 10 eÜ-[e-nu m
Anu-šarra-u ur gave me . . .
ul-tu] ¢ e-e-nuÜ 1 ram, 4 [ewes branded with
13. NIG2.GA dINNIN UNUGki a star] and 5 unbranded ewes,
¢ša2 qa-pu-ut-tuÜ ša2 mda-nu- total 10 sh[eep from the] sheep,
LUGAL-URI3 A-šu2 ša2 property of Ištar of Uruk, from
m
[LUGAL]-ki!-i-ni the pen of mAnu-šarra-u ur son
14. NA.GAD ša2 dINNIN
lu2
of mŠarru-kīni, herdsman of Ištar
UNUGki da-nu-LUGAL-URI3 [ of Uruk.”
15. ina ITI ŠU MU 2-kam2 id-
dan-ni [
16. u [. . .] ina UKKIN it-te-¢meÜ (16) and . . . swore in the assembly:
17. ki-i e-lat 1-en UDU pu- al 4-ta (17–21) “Indeed, I did deposit
UDU la -rat.ME ša2 kak-kab- with mBēl-šarra-u ur son of
tu4 še-en-du m
A iya-alidu, the shepherd of
18. u3 5-ta UDU la -rat.ME ta- Ištar of Uruk, in addition to 1
mi-im-ma-a-ta NIGIN 10-ta ram, 4 ewes branded with a star,
e-e-nu 5 unbranded ewes, total 10 sheep,
19. ku-um ra-šu-ti-ia mda-nu- which mAnu-šarra-u ur gave (me)
LUGAL-URI3 id-di-ni ša2 ina as (payment for) my claim, which
lib3-bi 1-en UDU pu- al u3 included 1 ram and 4 ewes, total
20. 4-ta UDU la -rat.ME NIGIN 5 sheep, branded with a star.”
5-ta e-e-nu ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-
en-du ina pa-ni mdEN-LUGAL-
URI3
21. A-šu2 ša2 mŠES-ia-a-li-du lu2NA.
GAD ša2 dINNIN UNUGki
ap-te-qid mdEN-LUGAL-URI3
22. ina UKKIN niš DINGIR. (21–22) In the assembly, mBēl-
MEŠ u LUGAL iz-kur u a-na šarra-u ur took an oath by the
md
EN-BA-ša2 u-ki-in um-ma gods and the king and established
1-en UDU pu- al (a case) against mBēl-iqīša thus:
23. u3 4! UDU U8.ME ša2 kak-kab- (22–24) “In Ara šamna, year 2,
tu4 ina ITI APIN MU 2-kam2 you did deposit with me 1 ram
ina pa-ni-ia ta-ap-te-qid and 4 ewes branded with a star.
24. ina ITI ZIZ2 MU 2-kam2 These 5 ewes (however) were
UDU U8.ME-a 5-ta ina pa-ni- born in my flock (later) in Šabā u,
ia it-tal-da- year 2.”
25. mu-kin-nu msi-lim-DINGIR
lu2
(25) Witnesses: mSilim-ili the ša rēš
SAG.LUGAL lu2ša2 mu - i
lu2
šarri in charge of the chest of the
qu-up-pu ša2 E2.AN.NA Eanna;
88 chapter three
26. NA3-DU-IBILA A-šu2 ša2

md
(26–27) mNabû-mukīn-apli son of
AMAR.UTU-MU-MU A
md m
Marduk-šuma-iddin descendant
m
ba-la- u mdNA3-na-din-ŠEŠ of Balā u; mNabû-nādin-a i son
A-šu2 of mArad-Bēl descendant of
27. ša2 mIR3-dEN A mMU-dPAP. Iddin-Papsukkal;
SUKKAL mdUTU-DU-A A- (27) mŠamaš-mukīn-apli son of
šu2 ša2 mdDI.KU5-ŠEŠ.MEŠ- m
Madānu-a ē-iddin descendant
MU A mši-gu-u2-a of Šigûa;
28. EN-KAR-dNA3 lu2SAG.
md
(28–29) mBēl-ē ir-Nabû, the ša rēš
LUGAL mlu-u -a-na-ZALAG2- šarri; mLū i-ana-nūri-Marduk son
d
AMAR.UTU A-šu2 ša2 of mNabû-a ē-bulli descendant
md
NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-TIN-i of Dābibī;
29. A mda-bi-bi mki-na-a A-šu2 ša2 (29) mKīnaya son of mInnin-līpi-
md
in-nin-li-pi-u2- ur u ur;
30. mna-di-nu mIR3-dAMAR.UTU (30) mNādinu, mArad-Marduk and
u mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN m
Itti-Marduk-balā i, scribes of the
lu2
DUB.SAR.ME ša2 E2.AN. Eanna.
NA
31. UNUGki ITI ZIZ2 U4 3-kam2 (31–32) Uruk. 3 Šabā u, year 3 of
MU 3-kam2 mkam2-bu-zi-ia Cambyses, king of Babylon, king
32. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL of the lands.
KUR.KUR
This text, written on 3.XI.3 Camb, records that five sheep belong-
ing to mAnu-šarra-u ur, branded for Ištar of Uruk, have been found
in the possession of mBēl-šarra-u ur. Upon questioning in the Eanna,
m
Bēl-šarra-u ur blames mBēl-iqcša for giving him the sheep. mBēl-iqīša
is brought to the assembly for interrogation, where he claims that he
received the five branded sheep directly from mAnu-šarra-u ur, the
original owner, along with five other unbranded sheep, as payment
for a debt owed by mAnu-šarra-u ur. He then swears that he deposited
these ten sheep (including the five branded sheep in question) with mBēl-
šarra-u ur. mBēl-šarra-u ur then swears that mBēl-iqīša did deposit the
five branded sheep in question with him, but that the five additional,
unbranded sheep, were born later to mBēl-šarra-u ur, with no con-
nection to mBēl-iqīša’s claim. Thus, mBēl-šarra-u ur’s oath undermines
m
Bēl-iqīša’s claim that all ten sheep were given together, and originally
represented the payment of a debt from mAnu-šarra-u ur. YOS 7, 140
ends with mBēl-šarra-u ur’s oath. The decision in this case is reached
more than one month later. It is recorded in YOS 7, 161, a decision
record dated 12.XII.3 Camb, in which two royal judges, mRīmūt and
m
Bau-ēreš, rule that mBēl-iqīša must pay thirty-fold for the branded sheep
as well as replace the five unbranded ewes. The purpose of YOS 7,
140, then, is simply to record the different claims made during a
preliminary hearing about the case. The royal judges probably used
this information in rendering the decision recorded in YOS 7, 161.
The preliminary protocols may also be divided into two styles
analogous to the two “Eanna” styles of decision records described
above (section 1.C). The two styles of preliminary protocols follow the
following outlines:
Style A Style B
I. Proceedings I. Opening
A. Personal names
B. Transition
II. Conclusion II. Proceedings
A. Names of authorities
(ina DU.ZU)
B. Names of witnesses
(lu2mu-kin-nu)
C. Scribe
E. Date
III. Conclusion
A. Scribe
B. Place of composition
C. Date
These two styles of preliminary protocols closely resemble the two

“Eanna” styles of decision records. Except for the fact that a decision
is not recorded, the outlines are identical. As is the case with the two
“Eanna” styles of decision records, both styles of preliminary protocol
record the same information. The difference between the two styles
occurs in the placement of the personal names. In style A preliminary
protocols, these names come after the narration of the specifics of the
case, while in style B preliminary protocols, they occur at the begin-
ning, before the details of the case. As in the “Eanna” style decision
records, the name of the scribe and the date appear at the end of both
styles of preliminary protocols.
It is difficult to determine when each of the two styles was used.
Geography does not seem to be a factor, since both styles are attested
in several locations. Furthermore, the same scribes are known to have
composed preliminary protocols in both style A and style B, so it is
difficult to associate one style with a particular scribe.
Most of the preliminary protocols come from cases pertaining to the
Eanna’s property. Officials of the Eanna, along with the “assembly,” are
mentioned as playing a part in the proceedings, especially in gathering
90 chapter three
evidence. Often, they are the ones who conduct the proceedings
described in the text. In addition, their names may be recorded together
with the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of ”). The
participation of these officials indicates that obtaining evidence involved
an official process, which was separate from the ultimate decision of
the case.3 A number of preliminary protocols even use the Akkadian
term maš altu (“interrogation”) to refer to one such evidence-gathering
process. Preliminary protocols from the Ebabbar at Sippar indicate
that the temple authorities were involved there, as well.4
There are two Eanna texts, YOS 7, 78 and TCL 13, 132, that do not
mention the involvement of officials. Nevertheless, it stands to reason
that both texts describe processes conducted by temple officials. The
cases in both texts involve temple property. The scribes who wrote
them, mPir u son of mEanna-cuma-ibni (YOS 7, 78) and mGimillu son
of mInnin-zēra-iddin (TCL 13, 132) are otherwise known from the
Eanna archives.5 In YOS 7, 78, the first individual to testify has been
“caught” (kal-du-ma),6 and is probably being held in official custody. In
TCL 13, 132, the statement of each party is preceded by the notice,
PN i-bu-ku-nim-ma iq-bi um-ma (“they brought PN and he said thus”).7
Presumably, the parties are brought before some official body. Thus,
although no officials are named in the texts, YOS 7, 78 and TCL 13,
132 belong to the category of preliminary protocols since they also
describe proceedings conducted by officials.
Although most of the preliminary protocols pertain to temple
property, two texts, Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12 and Camb 329,
demonstrate that this text-type was used in cases pertaining to private
property, as well. Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12 is a style A pre-
liminary protocol that describes a procedure overseen by the judges
of Nabonidus.8 Camb 329 is a style B9 preliminary protocol that does
3
See San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 292. For the different officials mentioned in these
texts, see summary table 3.1 at the end of this section.
4
MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 9 and Cyr 329 mention officials known to have
been involved in the management of the Ebabbar. See the references to the names
in Bongenaar, Ebabbar.
5
Kümmel, Familie, p. 123 (mPir u) and p. 113 (mGimillu).
6
YOS 7, 78:3.
7
TCL 13, 132:4, 7.
8
For the interpretation of the text as a preliminary protocol rather than a decision
record, see Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), p. 163.
9
The names in Camb 329 come after an introductory sentence instead of preceding
a transitional sentence as in most style B preliminary proceedings. Thus, in terms of
composition, it closely resembles a memorandum. However, because it includes the
name of the scribe, it is included in the present discussion.
Summary Table 3.1 Preliminary Protocols
Text Style Authorities in Procedures Term(s) Names Scribe Place of Date
body of text Described Introducing Names Composition
MacGinnis, A mār banî ša2 a-di interrogation — 5 + PNs (mār ? [Sippar] [18
<lu2>
Iraq 60 GAL X il- banî ?) Nabopolassar
(1998), No. 9 la-ku –4 Nbk]
Wunsch, A judges (of Nbn); oath; testimony i-na ma- ar lu2DI. Seals of 5 ? — (3–11 Nbn)
AuOr 15 šākin ēmi of KU5.MEŠ judges
(1997), No. Babylon MU.MEŠ!
12
m
YOS 6, 77 A šatammu of “interrogation” — — Mušēzib- Uruk 15.III.4 Nbn
Eanna; šešgallu Marduk/
of Eanna; Bēl-uballi //
the “temple Amēl-Ea
enterers,” the
collegium and
the mār banî (28
PNs)
lu2 m
YOS 6, 137 A administrator of “interrogation” mu-kin-nu 7 witnesses + Šumaya / Uruk 30.IV.7 Nbn
m
Eanna + preservation 1 scribe Ibni-Ištar//
of evidence Ašlaku
m
AnOr 8, 27 A — testimony; ina DU.ZU + ina DU.ZU: Nādinu/ Uruk 10.IV.12 Nbn
lu2
gathering of mu-kin-nu administrator, mBēl-a ē-
evidence qīpu-official, iqīša // Egibi
šatammu;
+ 5 witnesses
1 scribe
preliminary protocols & records of statements in court
lu2 m
YOS 6, 222 A šatammu + record mu-kin-nu 8 Witnesses Nādin/ Uruk 4.VII.12 Nbn
m
scribes of Eanna of crime; + 1 scribe Bēl-a ē-
91
imprisonment; iqīša // Egibi

gathering of
evidence
92

YOS 6, 223 A šatammu; scribes “interrogation;” — — — — 4.XIIb.12

of Eanna response Nbn
m
YOS 6, 235 A — statement; ina DU.ZU šatammu + Nādin/ Uruk 27.12b.12
m
questioning; 7 PNs + 1 Bēl-a ē- Nbn
response scribe iqīša // Egibi
lu2
Oberhuber, B šatammu of ? [DUMU.DU3. 6 mār banî ? [Uruk] 13 Nbn
Florenz, No. Eanna; ME]Š ša2 ina
155 ša mu i suti DU.ZU-šu2-nu
lu2
YOS 19, 92 B mār banî; šākin reading of DUMU ba-ni-i ša2 8 mār banî — Uruk 22.X.13 Nbn
ēmi of Uruk; tablet ina DU.ZU-šu2-nu
šatammu of
Eanna
chapter three
lu2 m
YOS 6, 224 B šatammu and statements; DUMU ba-ni-i ša2 9 mār banî Kīnaya/ Uruk 3.12b.15 Nbn
m
administrator of bringing of i-na DU.ZU-šu2-nu (including Zēriya
Eanna witness; oath šākin ēmi of
Uruk and
ša rēš šarri in
charge of
king’s chest)
+ 1 scribe
lu2 m
YOS 6, 116 B šanû of the rāb reading of DUMU.MEŠ- 5 mār banî; Nādin/ Uruk 23.IV.16 Nbn
m
rēši; assembly records DU3-i [ša2 i-na] 1 scribe Bēl-a ē-
u2-šu-uz-zi-šu2-nu iqīša // Egibi
lu2 m
TCL 12, 117 ? administrator of preservation of DUMU.DU3- ina DU.ZU: Gimillu/ Uruk 21.IX.16 Nbn
Eanna; evidence i.MEŠ ša2 i-na ša rēš šarri [in mInnin-zēra-
pa-ni-šu2-nu; ina charge of the iddin
DU.ZU; lu2mu-kin-nu chest] in the
Eanna;
lu2
mu-kin-nu
+ 7 PNs + 1
scribe
lu2 m
YOS 6, 156 A šatammu and statement; mu-kin-nu 4 witnesses + Nādin/ Uruk 11.V.17 Nbn
m
administrator of questioning; 1 scribe Bēl-a ē-
Eanna; assembly oath and iqīša // Egibi
testimony
lu2 m
Spar, AOAT B administrator of order to swear; DUMU-DU3. 6 mār banî + Gimillu/ Uruk ?.8.? Cyr
m
203, No. 1 Eanna statement MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni- 1 scribe Innin-zēra-
šu2-nu iddin
lu2 m
YOS 7, 88 B šatammu and statement; DUMU-DU3. 8 mār banî + Mūrānu/ Uruk 21.?.2 Cyr
m
administrator of examination MEŠ ša2 ina IGI- 1 scribe Nabû-bāni-
Eanna; assembly and gathering šu2-nu a i// Ekur-
of evidence zākir
VAS, Neue A ? “interrogation” ina DU.ZU šatammu and ? Uruk 2.VIb.2 Cyr
Folge 4, No. administrator
126 of Eanna,
šanû of Uruk;
8 (+) PNs (?)
93
94

lu2 m
AnOr 8, 38 A šākin ēmi of presentation mu-kin-nu 10 PNs +1 Gimillu/ Uruk 28.VIII.2 Cyr
m
Uruk; šatammu of cow in scribe Innin-zēra-
of Eanna; question; claims iddin
administrator of of litigants
Eanna; assembly
of Babylonians
and Urukians
lu2 m
TCL 13, 132 A — bringing of mu-kin-nu 8 PNs + 1 Gimillu/ Uruk 18.V.4 Cyr
m
defendant; oath scribe Innin-zēra-
iddin
lu2 m
TCL 13, 133 B assembly statement DUMU-DU3. 7 mār banî + Nabû- Uruk 22.V.4 Cyr
(including MEŠ ša2 ina IGI- 1 scribe mukīn-apli
accusation); šu2-nu / mMarduk-
confession to šuma-iddin//
chapter three
accusation Balā u
lu2 m
YOS 7, 42 A assembly “interrogation;” mu-kin-nu 4 PNs + 1 Gimillu/ Uruk 20.IV.5 Cyr
m
confession; scribe Innin-zēra-
gathering and iddin
examination of
evidence
lu2 m
AnOr 8, B — statement; DUMU-DU3- 8 PNs; 1 Gimillu/ Uruk 8?.V.5 Cyr
m
47// TCL questioning; i.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni- scribe Innin-zēra-
13, 138 testimony šu2-nu iddin
lu2 m
YOS 7, 91 A assembly examination of mu-kin-nu 5 witnesses + Gimillu/ Uruk 13.IV.6 Cyr
m
tablet 1 scribe Innin-zēra-
iddin
lu2
AnOr 8, 56 A šatammu and claims; mu-kin-nu 4 witnesses + mArad- Uruk 12.X.7 Cyr
administrator of temporary (?) 1 scribe Marduk/
m
Eanna award of slave Marduk-
to claimant šuma-iddin
// mBēl-apla-
[u ur]
m
Spar, AOAT A šatammu and address to — 1 scribe Arad- Uruk 16.XI.7 Cyr
203, No. 3 administrator of assembly; Marduk/
m
Eanna assembly’s Marduk-
report šuma-iddin
// mBēl
-apla-[u ur]
lu2 m
YOS 7, 78 A — testimony of mu-kin-nu 6 witnesses + Pir u/ Uruk 17.I.8 Cyr
m
suspects 1 scribe Eanna-
šuma-ibni
Cyr 329 A “elders of the inspection; — — ? [Sippar] 30.XII.8
city” assembling [Cyr]
elders;
statements
m
YOS 7, 97 A adminstrator statement; ina DU.ZU; ina DU.ZU: Gimillu / Uruk 19.IX.0
lu2
of Eanna and bringing of mu-kin-nu administrator; mInnin-zēra- Camb
asesembly of mār defendants; 6 Witnesses iddin
banî testimony; + 1 scribe
examination
of evidence;
95
further
testimony
96

YOS 7, 102 A šatammu and statements; — — — Uruk 27.IX.0

administrator of submission, Camb
Eanna; assembly citation and
review of
evidence
lu2 m
YOS 7, 106 B šatammu of imprisonment DUMU.DU3. 3 mār banî + Iddin- Uruk 13.XI.1
Eanna MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni- 1 scribe Marduk / Camb
m
šu2-nu Lâbāši-
Marduk//
Egibi
m
Spar, AOAT A assembly accusation; ina DU.ZU šatammu + Iddinaya Uruk 10.IV.2 Camb
203, No. 2 response 4 PNs + 1 / mInnina-
scribe šuma-u ur
lu2
TCL 13, 179 A administrator of statement; mu-kin-nu 5 (+?) [mGimillu]/ Uruk 3 Camb
chapter three
Eanna demand of witnesses + 1 mInnin-[zēra-

evidence; oath scribe iddin]
lu2
YOS 7, 159 A royal judge; accusation; mu-kin-nu 5 witnesses + mMarduk- Uruk 24.IV.3 Camb
scribe; summons; 1 scribe nā ir /
m
šatammu and testimony Madānu-
administrator of a ē-iddin
Eanna // Šigûa
lu2
YOS 7, 158 A šatammu and accusation; mu-kin-nu 4 witnesses + mArad- Uruk ?.VI.3 Camb
administrator of order to 1 scribe Marduk/
m
Eanna present stolen Marduk-
goods and šuma-iddin
criminals // Bēl-apla-
u ur
lu2
YOS 7, 149 A official in charge accusation; mu-kin-nu 7 witnesses + mŠamaš- Uruk 19.VI.3
of outstanding presentation 1 scribe zēra-iddin / Camb
m
debts; šatammu of evidence; A ulap-Ištar
of the Eanna; questioning; // Ekur-zākir
assembly of statement
Babylonians and
Urukians
lu2 m
Camb 329 B — arresting DUMU-DU3. 4 witnesses/ Bullu u Ša rīnu 1.IX.3 Camb
of debtor; MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni- mār banî / mIddin-
accusation; šu2-nu; lu2mu-kin-nu Marduk //
debtor’s Bu u
response
lu2 m
YOS 7, 146 A assembly questioning; mu-kin-nu 5 witnesses Gimillu/ Uruk 22.X.3 Camb
testimony (including one mInnin-zēra-
ša rēš šarri )+ iddin
1 scribe
lu2 m
YOS 7, 152 A šatammu and oath; counter- mu-kin-nu 5 witnesses Gimillu/ Uruk 22.X.3 Camb
administrator of accusation (including one mInnin-zēra-
Eanna ša rēš šarri ) + iddin
1 scribe
97
98

lu2 m
YOS 7, 140 A administrator of accusation; mu-kin-nu 7 witnesses Nādinu, Uruk 3.XI.3 Camb
m
Eanna; assembly summons; (including Arad-
questioning; ša rēš šarri in Marduk and
oath charge of the mItti-Marduk-
chest of the balā i, scribes
Eanna and of the Eanna
one other ša
rēš šarri ) +
3 scribes of
Eanna
lu2 m
YOS 7, 198 B administrator of order; note of qi-pa-nu u3 8 PNs Marduk- Uruk 18.X.6 Camb
lu2
Eanna escape (failure DUMU-DU3- (including nā ir /
m
to appear) i.ME ša2 ina pa-ni- šākin ēmi Madānu-
šu2-nu of Uruk; ša a ē-iddin
chapter three
rēš šarri in // Šigûa

charge of
the chest in
the Eanna;
ša rēš šarri
stationed in
the Eanna);
+ 2 scribes
lu2
TCL 13, 181 A šatammu questioning; mu-kin-nu 6 witnesses + mMarduk- Uruk 6.VI.2 Dar
of Eanna; oath; further 1 scribe nā ir //
administrator of questioning; Šigûa
Eanna; assembly response
of mār banî
not mention any adjudicating authority. In this text, mMadānu-bēla-

u ur detains (kullû) mKalbi-Ba u because of an unpaid debt of produce.
m
Kalbi-Ba u responds that he has paid the debt to another individual.10
m
Madānu-bēla-u ur detains mKalbi-Ba u “before” (ina pāni ) the indi-
viduals who are designated both as lu2DUMU-DU3.MEŠ (mār banî ) and
lu2
mu-kin-nu.11 Because no adjudicating authorities are mentioned, it is
possible that Camb 329 describes proceedings that took place without
the involvement of a court or any other formal body. On the other
hand, as was suggested with regard to the settlements discussed earlier,
it is also possible that the group of mār banî or witnesses, on their own,
may have constituted an official body of sorts.
Preliminary protocols describe a number of different procedures.
Most involve the collection of evidence, by obtaining oral statements,
by reading tablets, or by gathering actual physical evidence. Other texts
record the claims of two opposing parties or the holding of a suspect.
The specific procedures described in these texts are listed in summary
table 3.1. They will be analyzed in more detail in the discussion of
legal procedure in Part II.
3.B Memoranda of Proceedings
In addition to the preliminary protocols just described, there are three

memoranda that record proceedings without mention of a decision.
As discussed above (section 2.B), the defining feature of a memoran-
dum is the absence of the scribe’s name. This absence, together with
the fact that some of the memoranda include the label ta sistu lā mašê
(“memorandum, not to be forgotten”), suggest that the memoranda
were meant for the scribe’s own use. The memoranda of proceedings
apparently served as the scribe’s own record of the proceedings that
took place. In terms of style, the memoranda of proceedings follow the
conventions identified in section 2.B above. Nbn 68 and CT 2, 2
are composed in the “Babylon” style, even though CT 2, 2 probably
comes from Sippar, not from Babylon. BIN 1, 142 is written in the
“Non-Babylon” style.
Because the details of BIN 1, 142 are lost in the breaks in the text,
the main discussion will focus on CT 2, 2 and Nbn 68. CT 2, 2 records
10
See Dandamaev, Slavery, p. 434.
11
Camb 329:1, 12. See von Dassow, “Witnesses,” pp. 10–11.
100 chapter three
an investigation into the whereabouts of a linen garment missing from

the Ebabbar temple. The procedures described in this text closely
resemble those mentioned in the preliminary protocols from the Eanna
at Uruk. The šangû of Sippar and “temple enterers” of Šamaš question
a number of different workers of the temple “before”(ina pāni ) a group
of mār banî.
Nbn 68 comes from the Nūr-Sîn archive and records the reading of
a debt-note before witnesses in order to demonstrate that the debtor’s
name has been incorrectly written.12 As for the formality of the pro-
ceedings, it does not mention the involvement of any authorities. Nbn
68 does state, however, that the debt-note was “brought” (našû) before
(ina pāni ) the witnesses.13 This formulation recalls the language of more
obviously formal proceedings, such as those described in YOS 6, 116,
a preliminary protocol “in the presence” (ina ušuzzu) of mār banî in
which an official “brings” (našû) the writing boards to be read in the
assembly.14 This similarity may suggest that the text was composed as
part of a formal resolution of a dispute about the debt. The reading
of the debt-note may have served as evidence presented in a formal
process of resolving the question.
3.C Records of Statements in Court
From the preliminary protocols and the decision records, it is clear

that part of the decision process involved the hearing of testimony and
other statements. When such statements are recorded in the context of
a decision record or a preliminary protocol, then the context explains
the purpose of the statement. The next four text-types, however, record
only a statement or several different statements made by an individual
or individuals. Therefore, one must rely on additional factors to deter-
mine the context in which the statements were made. Only once this
determination is made can the texts be classified into text-types based
on their legal function.
12
See Laurence Brian Shiff, The Nūr-Sîn Archive: Private Entrepreneurship in Babylon
(603–507 B.C.) (University of Pennsylvania Ph.D. Thesis, 1987), p. 343 and Wunsch,
CM 3a, p. 74.
13
Nbn 68:1–5. Note that the 3ms subject of the verb našû is not clearly indicated.
Shiff, Nūr-Sîn, p. 342 translates “he (the scribe) has brought.”
14
YOS 6, 116:6–10. See also YOS 19, 92:9–16; YOS 7, 91:1–7.
Summary Table 3.2 Memoranda of Proceedings

Text Style Procedures Authorities Designation Place of Date
described of names Composition
BIN 1, “Non- presentation — an-nu-tu — —

142 Babylon” of evidence (?) lu2
mu-kin-ne-
e ša2 . . .
Nbn 68 “Babylon” presentation — lu2
mu-kin- — 10.IV.2
and reading of ne2-e ša2 ina Nbn
tablet IGI-šu2-nu
CT 2, 2 “Babylon” statement; šangû of lu2
DUMU- (Sippar) ?.II.
searching; Sippar; DU3.MEŠ 18 Dar
questioning; “temple ša2 ina IGI-
response; enterers” šu2-nu
further of Šamaš
questioning;
testimony
Taken together, these texts may be characterized as “depositions”

or “declarations.” This characterization, however, does not reflect the
different purposes that these declarations served. For this reason, texts
that record statements are classified into four text-types: accusatory
depositions, depositions of testimony, memoranda recording deposi-
tions, and sworn depositions. This classification emerges from a closer
examination of the actual contents of the statements.
Before proceeding with the specifics of the typology, however, a
general remark on the styles of these text-types is in order. The accusa-
tory depositions and depositions of testimony may be divided into three
styles. Two of these styles are analogous to the two styles of preliminary
protocols, and will be labeled style A and style B. The third style, style
C, closely resembles the “Babylon” memoranda, which begin with an
introductory sentence identifying the names that follow. The three
outlines are presented below:
Style A Style B Style C

I. Statement I. Opening I. Opening
A. PN iqbi umma A. Names A. Designation of
names
B. Statement B. Designation
of names
II. Conclusion II. Statement II. Statement
A. Names of authorities A. PN iqbi umma A. PN iqbi umma
(ina DU.ZU)
102 chapter three
B. Names of witnesses B. Statement B. Statement

(lu2mu-kin-nu)
C. Scribe III. Names
E. Date
III. Conclusion IV. Conclusion
A. Scribe A. Scribe
B. Place of B. Place of
composition composition
C. Date C. Date
Comparison between the three different styles shows that they present
the same information but in different orders. Common to them all is
the phrase PN iqbi umma (“PN said thus”) which precedes the speaker’s
statement. The variation between the styles cannot be readily explained
based on subject, scribe or place of composition.
Although these texts do not describe the entire dispute and decision,
many of the statements seem to have been made as part of a larger
legal process that required the presence of official authorities. In most of
the texts, officials of a temple are among the people hearing the state-
ments, which indicates that the statements were made before a formal
adjudicating body. Several texts use the preposition ana to indicate
that the statements are addressed directly “to” these officials.15 The
different authorities to whom these statements are addressed are listed
in the summary tables below in the columns labeled “ ‘To’ whom.” A
number of texts, from the Eanna and elsewhere, use the prepositional
phrase ina DU.ZU (“in the presence of”) to describe the presence of
individuals hearing the statement. In the Eanna decision records, this
prepositional phrase indicates that the named individuals oversee the
proceedings. The use of ina DU.ZU in the texts presently under discus-
sion suggests that the individuals in whose presence the statement was
made served in a similar capacity.
In addition to the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU (“in the presence
of ”) or the indication that the statements were made directly “to”
(ana) an authority, many of the texts indicate that the statements were
made ina pāni (“before”) a group of people. In some texts, the names
of officials follow this preposition, which suggests that the statements
15
AnOr 8, 21; YOS 6, 88; YOS 6, 57; YOS 6, 131; YOS 7, 10; YOS 7, 23; TCL
13, 125; Cyr 328 and Dar 128.
are official declarations of some sort. In several texts, however, there

is no indication that the individuals named are anything but witnesses.
Such texts raise the possibility that the statements were made in settings
other than official proceedings.
3.C.1 Accusatory Depositions

Texts of this text-type record the speaker’s accusation that another
individual has committed some wrongdoing. In order to be considered
an accusatory deposition, the statement recorded in the text must
indicate the wrong that another individual has committed. In most
accusatory depositions, the wrong committed is stated clearly as part
of the declaration. For example, YOS 7, 10, an accusatory deposition
from Uruk, reads as follows:
1. [m]dNA3-re- u-u2-a lu2qal-la ša2 (1–5) mNabû-rē ua, slave of
m
la-a-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU m
Lâbāši-Marduk son of mArad-
2. A-šu2 ša2 mIR3-dEN A me-gi-bi Bēl descendant of Egibi, without
ša2 la ma-ša2-a-a-al-tu4 a-na interrogation said thus to mNabû-
3. mdNA3-DU-NUMUN lu2ŠA3. mukīn-zēri, šatammu of the Eanna,
TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 son of mNādinu descendant of
m
na-di-nu A mda-bi-bi Dābibī and mNabû-a a-iddin, the
4. u3 mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. ša rēš šarri, administrator of the
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 Eanna:
E2.AN.NA iq-bi
5. um-ma U4 28-kam2 ša2 ITI (5–8) “On 28 Kislīmu, mIddinaya
GAN na4 AR a-ši-mur ša2 son of mLâbāši-Marduk
md
15-ŠEŠ-MU descendant of Egibi unlawfully
6. A-šu2 ša2 mdin-nin-MU-URI3 removed the cumin mill of mIštar-
A mdNA3-šar- i-DINGIR ul-tu a a-iddin son of mInnin-šuma-
mu - i ba-ab ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 u ur descendant of Nabû-šar i-ilī
UNUGki from the gate of the Lady-of-
7. ina sa-ar-tu4 ina mu-ši mSUM- Uruk at night and did not replace
na-a A-šu2 ša2 mla-a-ba-ši- (it).”
d
AMAR.UTU
8. A me-gi-bi it-ta-sa-a la il-ta-kan
9. u3 mdNA3-lu-u-da-a-ri lu2qal-la (9–11) And mNabû-lū-dāri, slave of
ša2 mba-ni-ia A-šu2 m
Bāniya son of mTaribiatim and
10. ša2 mta-ri-bi-ia-ti-im u3 m aš-da-a m
ašdaya brother of mIddinaya
ŠEŠ ša2 mSUM-na-a said thus in the assembly:
11. ina UKKIN iq-bi um-ma
na4
AR a-ši-mur ša2 m[PN]
104 chapter three
12. A md15-ŠEŠ-MU ina sa-ar-tu4 (11–13) “I found the cumin mill

na-ša2-a-ta of m[PN] son of mIštar-a a-iddin,
13. ina E2 mla-a-ba-ši-dAMAR. which was taken away unlawfully,
UTU AD-ia a-ta-mar in the house of mLâbāši-Marduk,
my father.”16
14. mu-kin-nu mri-mut-dEN lu2ŠEŠ.
lu2
(14–15) Witnesses: mRīmūt-Bēl, the
GAL E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 šešgallu of Eanna, son of mBēl-uballi ,
md
EN-TIN-i descendant of Gimil-Nanaya;
15. A mŠU- dna-na-a mGAR-MU (15) mŠākin-šumi son of mIbni-
A-šu2 ša2 mDU3-d15 A md30-tab-ni Ištar descendant of Sîn-tabni;
16. in-nin-MU-URI3 A-šu2 ša2
md
(16) mInnin-šuma-u ur son of
m
MU-dNA3 A mki-din-dAMAR. m
Iddin-Nabû descendant of
UTU Kidin-Marduk;
17. md
NA3-TIN-su-iq-bi A-šu2 ša2 (17) mNabû-balāssu-iqbi son of
m
ib-na-a A mE2.KUR-za-kir m
Ibnaya descendant of Ekur-zākir;
18. m
ze-ri-ia A-šu 2 ša 2 mdna-na-a- (18) mZēriya son of mNanaya-ēreš
KAM2 A mki-din-dAMAR.UTU descendant of Kidin-Marduk;
19. mIR3-ia A-šu2 ša2 map-la-a A (19) mArdiya son of mAplaya
md
NA3-šar- i-DINGIR descendant of Nabû-šar i-ilī;
20. mKAR-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 (20) mMušēzib-Marduk son of
ša2 mkab-ti-ia A mši-gu-u2-a m
Kabtiya descendant of Šigûa;
21. lu 2
UMBISAG m gi-mil-lu A- (21) Scribe: mGimillu son of
šu2 ša2 mdin-nin-NUMUN-MU m
Innin-zēra-iddin
22. UNUGki ITI GU4 U4 1- (22) Uruk. 1 Ayaru, year 1 of
kam2 MU 1-kam2 mku-ra-aš2 Cyrus, king of the lands.
LUGAL KUR.KUR
This text records two statements. In the first statement, mNabû-rē ua,
a slave, states that his master’s son, mIddinaya, stole a cumin mill. In
the second statement, m ašdaya, brother of mIddinaya, confirms that
the mill was found in their father’s property. The two statements are
clearly accusations of theft against mIddinaya. Both specifically mention
that the cumin mill was taken “unlawfully” (ina sarti ).16
16
From lines 9–10 it seems that there are two speakers, the slave mNabû-lū-dāri
and m ašdaya, brother of the suspected thief. The statement in lines 11–12, however,
seems to have been made by m ašdaya alone. The speaker refers to mLâbāši-Marduk
as “my father” (AD-ia), which can only be true of m ašdaya. Furthermore, the verbs
(including the verb iqbi following the names of both individuals) are all in the singular.
Thus, the role of the slave mNabû-lū-dāri is unclear.
There are other texts, however, in which understanding the statement

as an accusation depends on contextual factors. One such example is
TCL 13, 125, which records the following statement of mBalā u to the
šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna:
5. 2 AB2.GAL.MEŠ ša2 kak-kab- (5–8) “mGimillu son of mInnin-
tu4 še-en-du šuma-ibni led away from my
6. ša2 qa-pu-ut-tu4 ša2 AB2. hands 2 cows branded with a
GU4. I.A ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 star from the cattle-pen of the
UNUGki Lady-of-Uruk at my disposal.”
7. ša2 ina pa-ni-ia mgi-mil-lu A-šu2
ša2 mdin-nin-MU-DU3
8. ina ŠU.2-ia i-ta-ba-ku
Taken alone, this statement appears to be simply a declaration that two
cows were taken by mGimillu. However, this mGimillu was a notori-
ously corrupt official, known for misappropriating Eanna property.17
It stands to reason, then, that this statement is actually an accusation
made against mGimillu directly to the šatammu and the administrator.
The scribe mGimillu son of mInnin-zēra-iddin, who is known to have
written a number of preliminary protocols, also wrote TCL 13, 125.
His presence, therefore, may further support the understanding of
this text as an accusation against mGimillu made during the course
of proceedings similar to those that might have been recorded in a
preliminary protocol.
One way of placing the accusatory depositions within the different
stages of a trial is to understand the accusations as the initiation of the
dispute. This seems to be Peiser’s interpretation when he describes one
accusatory deposition (Cyr 328) as “Klageschrift des Civilklägers in einem
strafrechtlichen Processe” (“a plaintiff’s charge in a criminal case”).18 Simi-
larly, Cocquerillat refers to another accusatory deposition (YOS 7, 23) as
“la plainte . . . adressée aux autorités de l’Eanna” (“the complaint . . . addressed
to the Eanna authorities).19 According to this interpretation, the accu-
satory depositions were composed as a record of the very beginning
stages of the cases to which they pertain. They reflect the point when
the charge is first brought against the person to be tried.
17
For more on mGimillu, see San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 337–339; ArOr 5 (1933),
pp. 61–77; and von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941), pp. 113–117.
18
KB 4, p. xvi.
19
Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 85.
106 chapter three
A second understanding of the place of the accusatory depositions

emerges from examination of YOS 6, 131. Following the names of five
mār banî (including one designated as ša rēš šarri ), the text reads as follows:
5. DUMU.MEŠ DU3-i-<a> ša2
lu2
(5–8) The mār banî in whose
ina DU.ZU-šu2-nu presence mAnim-a ē-u ur the
6. mda-nim-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-URI3 lu2A- messenger of the crown prince
KIN ša2 DUMU-LUGAL said thus to mNabû-šarra-u ur the
7. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 ša rēš šarri administrator of the
lu2
SAG-LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 Eanna:
8. E2.AN.NA iq-bu-u2 um-ma 2
AB2.GAL
9. 1 AB2.TUR PAP 3 GU4. I.A (8–14) “When mBau-ētir son of
ša2 ina qa-pu-ut-tu4 m
Bāniya showed me 2 cows and
10. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 1 small cow, total: 3 bovines from
ina IGI mba-ni-ia the pen of the Lady-of-Uruk at
11. A-šu2 ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-SU the disposal of mBāniya son of
m
ba-u2-SUR <<A-šu2>> m
Marduk-erība, by the order of
12. A-šu2 ša2 mba-ni-ia ki-i u2-kal-li- the prince, when I led them away
man-nu I entrusted them to mBau-ē ir.”
13. ina a-mat DUMU LUGAL ki-i
a-bu-ku a-na
14. mdba-u2-SUR ap-te-qi2-id
15. u mba-u2-SUR a-na mdNA3- (15–16) And mBau-ētir said thus
LUGAL-URI3 iq-bu-u2 to mNabû-šarra-u ur:
16. um-ma AB.GAL-a 3-ta ša2 mda- (16–19) “mAplaya son of mNabû-
nim-ŠEŠ.ME-URI3 tabni-u ur unlawfully took away
17. lu2A KIN ša2 DUMU LUGAL from me the 3 cows which
ip-qi-du map-la-a m
Anim-a ē-u ur, the messenger
18. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-tab-ni-URI3 of the king, entrusted to me.”
a-na ši-gi-il-tu2
19. ina ŠU.2-ia i-ta-bak
20. UMBISAG mna-din A-šu2 ša2
lu2
(20–21) Scribe: mNādin son of
EN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-BA-ša2
md m
Bēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of
21. A me-gi-bi UNUGki ITI APIN Egibi.
22. U4 16-kam2 MU 10-kam2 (21–22) Uruk. 16 Ara šamna, year
d
NA3-I LUGAL TIN.TIRki 10 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
This text records two separate statements. In the first, the messenger
of the crown prince declares that mBau-ē ir was given three cows.
m
Bau-ē ir then accuses mAplaya of stealing those three cows. From
these two declarations, the following case may be reconstructed. Three
cows have gone missing from mBau-ē ir’s herd. The messenger of the
crown prince confirms that the cows in question were actually given to
m
Bau-ē ir, which makes mBau-ē ir responsible for them. mBau-ē ir’s
accusation is actually an attempt to clear himself of guilt by placing

the blame on mAplaya. Thus, the accusation in this text does not come
from the initial stages of the case. Instead, the accusation comes as part
of the original suspect’s own defense.
The accusatory depositions, then, come from two distinct stages in
the adjudicatory process. They serve as records of the initiation of the
dispute, in which a plaintiff states his charge against the defendant.
The accusatory depositions may also come from a stage after the trial
itself has begun. They record accusations made by an individual who
is originally suspected of some wrongdoing and who, in the course of
the trial, accuses another individual.
3.C.2 Depositions of Testimony

Like the accusatory depositions, this text-type also records an individ-
ual’s statement without any other explicit indication of the surround-
ing proceedings. Unlike the accusatory depositions, the depositions of
testimony are records of testimony rather than of a specific accusation.
Texts of this text-type serve as part of the evidence considered in the
adjudication of the case.
Not every statement made in the presence of witnesses is consid-
ered a deposition of testimony. In order to be included in the present
discussion, a text must indicate in some way that it emerges from an
adjudicatory context. The most direct evidence comes from Cyr 199,
which opens with the heading lu2mu-kin-nu-tu ša2 mPN (“testimony of
m
PN”), and includes names of officials of the Sippar temple among those
hearing the testimony itself. The use of this opening heading confirms
that this particular text was written as a record of testimony that the
speaker has provided. Unfortunately, the content of the testimony is
lost, but the heading preserves the purpose for which it was written.
Other texts do not provide the evidence of a label like that on Cyr
199. There are, however, other indications that a text belongs in an
adjudicatory context. This evidence may come from the content of the
statement itself, as in AnOr 8, 21, in which an individual provides the
names of the “criminals” (lu2sa-ar-ri-u2-tu) who committed a crime with
him. Similarly, the speaker in YOS 6, 183 declares that one individual
“has not committed a crime” (sa-aš2-ta ul i-pu-uš ).20 The speaker then
names the criminal, and reminds the authorities that he had caught
20
YOS 6, 183:11–17.
Summary Table 3.3 Accusatory Depositions
108
Text Style Accusation “To” whom Other Hearers Other Scribe Place of Date
Prepositions Composition
m
YOS 6, B Wrongful — 7 mār banî ina pāni Ištar-mukīn- Uruk 8.XII.5 Nbn
79 (?) sale of slave (including apli/ mZēriya
(?) administrator of
Eanna and qīpu-
official)
m
YOS 6, B Theft of administrator 5 mār banî ina DU.ZU Nādin / mBēl- Uruk 16.VIII.10
131 sheep of Eanna (including ša rēš a ē-iqīša // Nbn
šarri ) Egibi
m
YOS 7, 10 A Theft of šatammu and 7 witnesses — Gimillu / Uruk 1.II.1 Cyr
m
cumin mill administrator (including šešgallu) Innin-zēra-iddin
of Eanna
m
YOS 7, 14 C Non- — ša rēš šarri in ina pāni Rīmūt / City of Bīt- 5.III.2 Cyr
m
chapter three
payment (see charge of royal ina DU.ZU Iddinunu kuzba-ili

Cocquerillat, chest; 5 mār banî/
Palmeraies, witnesses
p. 85)
m
YOS 7, 23 A Non- šākin ēmi 8 witnesses — Nādin / mBēl- Uruk 26.IX.2 Cyr
BIN 2, payment of Uruk; a ē-iqīša //
115 šatammu and Egibi
administrator
of Eanna
Text Style Accusation “To” whom Other Hearers Other Scribe Place of Date
Prepositions Composition
m
TCL 13, A “Leading šatammu and 6 witnesses — Gimillu / [Uruk] 18.VIII.1 Cyr
m
125 (?) away” of administrator Innin-zēra-iddin
sheep by of Eanna
corrupt
official
m
TCL 13, A Non-delivery — 4 witnesses — Gimillu / Uruk 25.VII.4 Cyr
m
134 of sheep to Innin-zēra-iddin
Eanna
m
Cyr 328 A Theft šangû of 5 witnesses — Arad-Bēl/ Sippar 28.XII.8 Cyr
m
Sippar Bēl-[ušallim]//
Adad-šammê
Dar 128 A Non- šangû of 4 PNs ina DU.ZU — (Sippar) 27.VI.4 Dar I
payment Sippar
110 chapter three
him red-handed and had brought him before them. Other texts are
included because they name officials among those who hear the decla-
rations. In these cases, the contents of the declarations themselves do
not allude to any clear reason, such as a crime, for legal proceedings.
Nevertheless, the fact that officials hear the declarations suggests that
these texts were composed as part of the formal proceedings in which
the declarations were made.
3.C.3 Memoranda of Depositions

In addition to the two text-types described above, there are also memo-
randa that record an individual’s statement. Like other memoranda,
texts of this text-type are also characterized by the absence of the
scribe’s name. There are also two styles of this type of memoranda,
corresponding to the “Babylon” and “Non-Babylon” styles of other
memoranda. In memoranda written in the “Babylon” style, the designa-
tion of the names precedes the names themselves, while in memoranda
from outside Babylon, the designation follows the names (see outlines
in section 2.B above).
Most of the memoranda of this type record testimony. As with the
depositions of testimony, determining the adjudicatory context depends
on the content of the statement itself, or on the mention of adjudicating
authorities. VAS 6, 45 is a unique memorandum that corresponds, in
terms of statement recorded, to the accusatory depositions. The state-
ment itself is broken, but the opening sentence reads lu2mu-kin-ne2-e ša2 ina
pa-ni-šu2-nu mPN1 a-na mPN2 u2-paq-qi-ru [um-ma] (“The witnesses before
whom mPN1 claimed thus against mPN2”).21 The use of the locution
puqquru ana mPN2 indicates that the statement that follows is a claim
against mPN2, rather than simply testimony.
Most of the memoranda including statements do not mention adjudi-
cating authorities. Only Nbn 958 explicitly mentions that the statement
was made by an oblate of Šamaš ina pu- ur-ru (“in the assembly”).22
Otherwise, the memoranda record statements that were apparently
made without the presence of adjudicating authorities. As with other
21
VAS 6, 45:1–5.
22
Nbn 958:3. Three of the individuals who hear the statement, [mBēl-apla-iddin son
of mBēl]-Balī u descendant of Šangû-Sippar, mNabû-šuma-iddin son of [mŠamaš-apla-
u ur descendant of ] mIle i-Marduk, and mMarduk-šuma-ibni son] of mMušēzib-Marduk
[descendant of Šangû-Ištar-Bābili] can also be placed within the administration of the
Ebabbar at Sippar. See Bongenaar, Ebabbar, pp. 160–164.
Summary Table 3.4 Depositions of Testimony
Text Style Evidence of “To” whom Hearers Other Scribe Place of Date
adjudicatory Preposition Composition
context
m
Nbk 344 C officials among — 3 witnesses ina pāni Bul aya/ Babylon 16.II.39
m
hearers; see (including 2 ša rēš Rīmūt // Nbk
Wunsch, CM 3, šarri ) Pa āru
p. 16
m
YOS 19, 95 B Nādin known — 10 mār banî ina pāni — Uruk 27.I.? Nbn
among Eanna
officials (l. 3;
Kümmel, Familie,
p. 122); “temple
enterers”
mentioned
lu2 m
AnOr 8, 21 B sa-ar-ri-u2-tu (l. 34) administrator 10 mār banî ina pāni Gimillu / Uruk 17.V.4 Nbn
m
of Eanna Innin-zēra-
iddin
Stigers, JCS 28 — relation to AnOr — — — — — —
(1976), No. 39 8, 21
m
YOS 6, 88 C presence of administrator 2+ witnesses ina pāni Balā u/ Territory of 14.VI.4
m
administrator Mušēzib-bēl// the Lady-of- Nbn
Bēl-ušēzib Uruk
m
YOS 6, 57 B presence of administrator 5 witnesses ina pāni Nabû- Uruk 13.XII.4
administrator of Eanna mušētiq-uddê/ Nbn
m
Balāssu //
Dā iqa
m
YOS 6, 183 B sa-aš2-ta-a ša2 GU4 — 8 mār banî ina pāni Anu-a a-iddin Uruk 23.X.10
ki-i i-pu-uš ŠU.2 (including / mSîn-ibni // Nbn
i-bit-ti ina ŠU.2-šu2 administrator of Rē i-alpi

ki-i a -ba-ta Eanna)
(l. 14–16)
Text Style Evidence of “To” whom Hearers Other Scribe Place of Date
adjudicatory Preposition Composition
112
context
m
Sack, CuDoc, B determination of — 12+ mār banî ina pāni Mūrānu/ Uruk 1.?.14 Nbn
m
No. 77 status Nabû-bāni-
a i //
Ekur-zākir
m
Stigers, JCS 28 C assembly — qīpu of the ina pāni Nabû-ē ir- — 16.XII.4
(1976), No. 6 Eulmaš + 1 PN napšāti/ Cyr
m
Bāniya//
Šangû Akkad
Cyr 199 A text labeled lu2mu- — “temple enterer” ina pāni — Sippar 7.V.5 Cyr
kin-nu-tu of Šamaš;
vellum-scribe of
crown prince’s
house
Cyr 243 A presence of temple — šangû of Sippar; ina ma ar ? (Sippar) 6.?.6 Cyr
chapter three
officials “temple
enterers;”
elders
m
Sack, CuDoc, B presence of — 8 mār banî; ina pāni Gimillu/ (Uruk) 13.12b.6
m
No. 78 administrator administrator of Innin-zēra- Cyr
Eanna iddin
m
YOS 7, 107 C presence of officials — 9 qīpi officials ina DU.ZU Gimillu / Uruk 23.II.1
m
and mār banî Innin-zēra- Camb
(including iddin
šatammu and
administrator of
Eanna)
YOS 7, 22 A See Cocquerillat, — — — — Uruk 26.IX.2
Palmeraies, p. 85. Camb
such situations, the witnesses or mār banî who hear these statements
may have served as an informally-constituted court.
Summary Table 3.5 Memoranda of Depositions

Text Style Contents Evidence of Designation Place of Date
adjudicatory of names Composition
context
VAS 6, “Babylon” Testimony escaped an-nu-tu — —

253 slave [mu-kin]-
lu2
¢ne2Ü-e ša2 ina

pa-ni-šu2-nu
GCCI “Non- Testimony declaration [an-nu-tu2] Uruk 15.?.30
2, 195 Babylon” regarding lu2
DUMU. Nbk
oblate DU3.ME
[ša2 ina
IGI-šu2]-nu
VAS 6, “Babylon” Accusation u2-paq-qi-ru lu2
mu-kin-ne2-e — 25.III.38
45 ša2 ina pa-ni- Nbk
šu2-nu
Nbn “Babylon” Claims (?) oath mu-kin-ne2-e Babylon
lu2
10.IV.2
69 mentioned ša2 ina IGI- Nbn
šu2-nu
Nbn “Babylon” Testimony assembly [lu2DUMU Sippar ?.II.16
958 DU3].MEŠ Nbn
ša2 ina IGI-
šu2-nu
3.C.4 Sworn Depositions

Like the accusatory depositions (see section 3.C.1), the depositions of
testimony (see section 3.C.2) and the memoranda of depositions (see
section 3.C.3), sworn depositions also record statements made during the
course of legal proceedings. The difference between the sworn deposi-
tions and the other types of depositions is that the sworn depositions
record statements made under oath. Thus, texts of this text-type use the
verbal construction temû kî (“to swear that”) instead of qabû umma (“to
say thus”) to introduce the recorded statement under oath.23 In terms of
style, all of the sworn depositions follow “style A,” in which the names
of the witnesses follow the recording of the sworn statement.
23
Note that Cyr 293:7 uses the phrase MU dUTU iz-ku-ru-ma (“they spoke the
name of Šamaš”) instead of the usual itmû (“they swore”) to indicate that the speakers
made their deposition under oath. For more on these formulations, see the discussion
in sections 8.I and 9.H below.
114 chapter three
Sworn depositions, like the other text-types that only record state-
ments, do not include descriptions of the proceedings during which
the oaths were taken. Between this fact and the breaks in the texts, it
is often difficult to reconstruct the situations that led to the oaths. The
best-preserved examples record oaths taken in the context of the admin-
istration of the Eanna. One example, reconstructed by Cocquerillat, is
YOS 7, 165, in which mNabû-a ē-bulli‘ swears the following oath:24
1. NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-TIN-i A-šu2
md
(1–3) mNabû-a ē-bulli son of
ša2 [ m
PN swore by Bēl, Nabû and
2. ¢i-na dENÜ dNA3 u3 a-¢de-e ša2 the oaths of Cambyses, king of
m
kam2Ü-[bu]-zi-ia2 Babylon, king of the lands:
3. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL
KUR.KUR it-te-me ¢ki-iÜ [a-di
ŠE.BAR]
4. ša2 i-na ši-pir-tu4 ša2 mKI-dNA3- (3–7) “I [gave] the [barley] that
TIN lu2si-[pi-ri ša2] m
PN measured at the order of
5. i- u-um-mu lu2ša2 UGU
m m
Itti-Nabû-balā u, the parchment-
giš
BAN2 mPN scribe of m : ummu, the one
6. im-šu- u-mu a-na ZID2.DA a- in charge of the measure, for
na [nap-ta-nu] the flour for the king’s table
7. ša2 LUGAL a-na mdNA3-ŠEŠ- to mNabû-a a-iddin [the ša rēš
MU lu2[SAG.LUGAL at-ta-din] šarri ]!”
8. [ki ]-ma a-na UGU al-tap-par (8–10) “Since I sent word about
ŠE.BAR [. . .] it, barley . . . that came out
9. [it]-ta- u-u2 ni-ik-lu a-na mu - i (?). I have [not com]itted any
10. [ul at-ta]-ki-$il misdeed.”
The last words of the oath ni-ik-lu a-na mu - i [ul at-ta]-ki-il (“I have [not
com]itted any misdeed”) are the key to understanding the context of
this oath. It seems that mNabû-a ē-bulli‘ has been accused of misap-
propriating barley that he was supposed to give to the Eanna for flour.
In order to clear himself, he takes an exculpatory oath affirming that
he did indeed give this flour, which had been measured, to an official
in the Eanna and that he has not done any misdeed. Thus, Cocqueril-
lat is correct to consider this text among examples of “procès-verbaux de
défense” (“oral defense proceedings”).25
24
Transliteration follows Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 133.
25
Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp. 83–85. See also p. 60, where Cocquerillat offers a
similar interpretation of BIN 2, 108, another sworn deposition, and includes it among
“documents concernant les injustices dans l’estimation” (“documents relating to inconsistencies
in assessment”).
A somewhat different purpose for the oath may be inferred from Cyr
293. The text begins with the heading lu2mu-kin-nu-tu (“testimony”) and
continues with the names of three witnesses who present their testimony
under oath in the assembly. In this case, it seems that the oath was
testimony presented as part of a hearing regarding the possession of
a certain contract. The precise details of the sworn testimony are not
entirely clear,26 but the three people swearing are different from those
about whom they swear. In other words, the three people do not swear
about themselves, as is to be expected if the oath were exculpatory. It
seems, therefore, that the oath in this text is not exculpatory, but is,
instead, a means of ensuring the veracity of the testimony.
A more detailed account of the administration of oaths will be pre-
sented as part of the description of adjudicatory procedures in Part
II. For now, the discussion will focus on what can be said about the
formality of the proceedings in which the sworn depositions were made.
Officials of both the Eanna and the Ebabbar are included among those
who hear the oaths. In BIN 2, 108 and YOS 7, 153, the individuals
swear “to” (ana) officials of the Eanna.27 BIN 2, 108 also concludes with
a list of individuals in whose presence (ina DU.ZU) the oath was sworn,
including the qīpu-official of the Ebabbar.28 The oath in Cyr 318 is
pronounced “before” (ina ma ar) the šangû of Sippar, who is also present
in Camb 426. Even AnOr 8, 55 and YOS 7, 165, which do not specifi-
cally mention temple authorities, are written by the scribes mGimillu son
of mInnin-zēra-ibni and mNādinu son of mBēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of
Egibi, respectively. The presence of these scribes, who are known for
their involvement in recording other proceedings, suggests that these
texts were composed in similar contexts. All of the above indicates that
the sworn depositions were made in formal adjudicatory contexts.29
26
The text records the oath as follows: mPN1 ri-kis-su ša2 KU3.BABBAR a-na mPN2
la ip-qi2-du-ma mPN2 ri-kis u2- er-ri-ma a-na mPN1 id-din-nu (“mPN1 has not deposited his
contract regarding the silver with mPN2; mPN2 has given the contract which he repaid
to mPN1”).
27
BIN 2, 108:6; YOS 7, 153:5.
28
BIN 2, 108: 11.
29
Note, however, that there are texts, such as Dar 187 and BRM 1, 70, that
describe (promissory) oaths without any apparent official setting. See the discussion
in section 7.B below.
Summary Table 3.6 Sworn Depostions
Text Oath term “To” whom Other Hearers Other Scribe Place of Date
Preposition Composition
116
m
YOS 7, 18 ina dEN dNA3 u3 — šatammu and ina DU.ZU Gimillu/ mInnin- Uruk 15.V.3 Cyr
m
ku-ra-aš2 LUGAL administrator of zēra-ibni
¢TIN.TIRkiÜ Eanna; 15 PNs
LUGAL ¢KUR.
KURÜ it-te-me
m
AnOr 8, 55 ina dEN dNA3 u — 3 witnesses + 1 scribe — Gimillu/ mInnin- Uruk 12.XI.6
LUGAL it-te-mu zēra-ibni Cyr
ki-i
Cyr 293 MU dUTU iz-ku- — assembly, mMarduk- ina ma ar — (Sippar) 10.I.8 Cyr
ru-ma nā ir
m
Cyr 318 [it-te-me] ki-i — šangû of Sippar + 5 ina ma ar Arad-Bēl / [mBēl- Babylon (?) 28.VI.8
witnesses (including ša ušallim] // Adad- Cyr
rēš šarri ) + 1 scribe šammê
Camb 426 i-te-[mu . . .] ki-i — šangû of Sippar + 2 ? [mMušallim-Marduk]/ ? 25.IX.[1]
m
witnesses + 1 scribe Lâbāši // Ša-nāšīšu Cyr and
chapter three
Camb
m
BIN 2, 108 i-na dEN dNA3 u3 šatammu of qīpu of Ebabbar; 2 ina DU.ZU Marduk-nā ir / Ša eru 4.XI.?
m
a-de-e ša2 mka-am- Eanna PNs (witnesses?) + 1 Madānu-a ē- Camb
bu-zi-ia . . . it-te-mu- scribe iddin// [Šigûa]
u2 ki-i
m
YOS 7, 153 i-na dEN u dNA3 u3 šatammu and 3 witnesses + 1 scribe — Gimillu/ mInnin- Uruk 9.V.3
a-de-e ša2 mkam2-bu- administrator zēra-ibni Camb
zi-ia . . . it-te-mu-u2 of Eanna
ki-i
m
YOS 7, 165 ¢i-na dENÜ dNA3 u3 — 3 witnesses + 1 scribe — Nādinu/ mBēl-a ē- Uruk 24.V.4
a-¢de-e ša2 mkam2Ü- iqīša // Egibi Camb
[bu]-zi-ia2 . . . it-te-me
¢ki-iÜ
CHAPTER FOUR
THE DABĀBU- AND QUTTÛ-TYPE SUMMONSES
The typological discussion until this point has focused on text-types

that narrate activities in court during the course of a trial. The deci-
sion records and the preliminary protocols describe the activities of the
various people in the court, including the adjudicating authorities, wit-
nesses and parties to the proceedings. Similarly, the depositions record
statements that are made during the course of such proceedings.
This chapter and the two that follow discuss text-types that do not
necessarily narrate courtroom activities or record litigants’ statements.
This lack of narrative context means that in order to situate these
text-types within the ‘tablet trail’ one must reconstruct the situations
that led to their promulgation. One must, therefore, use the available
evidence to determine whether or not these text-types were composed
as part of the adjudicatory process and, if they were, how they might
have functioned.
This chapter considers two of these text-types whose place in the
adjudication of disputes is easiest to determine. Both the dabābu- and
quttû-type summonses employ phrases that allude to a dispute. Thus, it
is clear that they belong in the ‘tablet trail’ of texts composed during
the adjudication of disputes. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter
will focus primarily on determining the legal function of these two
text-types.
4.A Summonses to Argue (dabābu) a Case
Summonses of this text-type have the following general outline:
I. Summons clause:
U4 X-kam2 ša2 ITI MN MU X-kam2 RN, PN1 illakamma dīna1 itti
PN2 idabbub
1
For discussion of this transliteration, see the footnotes to section 8.D below.
118 chapter four
On day X of MN, year X of RN, PN1 shall come and argue

the case against (the claim of ) PN2
II. Penalty clause:
kî lā ittalka—
If he does not come > penalty against PN1
III. Witnesses + Scribe
IV. Place of composition and date
In order to illustrate these different components, YOS 7, 31, a dabābu-

type summons from Uruk, will serve as an example. The summons
clause of this text reads as follows:
1. U4 20-kam2 ša2 ITI GAN (1–3) On 20 Kislīmu, year 4 of
MU 4-kam2 mku-ra-aš2 Cyrus, king of Babylon, king of the
2. LUGAL TIN.TIRki lands, mMarduk-dīna-īpuš son of
LUGAL KUR.KUR m
ira a shall come to Babylon.
md
ASAR.LU. I-DI.KU5-
DU3-uš
3. A-šu2 ša2 m i-ra-a - a a-na
TIN.TIRki il-la-ka-ma
4. di-i-ni ša2 2 UDU.NITA. (4–10) He shall argue the case
MEŠ ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še- regarding 2 male sheep branded with
en-du a star that mGimillu son of mInnin-
5. ša2 mgi-mil-lu A-šu2 ša2 mdin- šuma-ibni led away from the flock
nin-MU-ib-ni of mMarduk-dīna-īpuš, against (the
6. ul-tu e-e-ni ša2 mdASAR. claim of ) mNidintu-Bēl the šatammu
LU2. I-DI.KU5-DU3-uš of the Eanna, mNabû-a a-iddin the
7. i-bu-ku it-ti mni-din-tu4-dEN ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna
lu2
ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA and the scribes of the Eanna, in the
8. mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG- king’s court of law.
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4
E2.AN.NA
9. u3 lu2UMBISAG.MEŠ ša2
E2.AN.NA ina E2 di-i-ni
10. ša2 LUGAL i-dab-ub-bu
The requirement in this type of summons is formulated using a com-
bination of two verbs: alāku and dabābu. The first verb indicates that
the summoned individual (PN1) must “come.”2 As can be seen from
the sample text, the verb alāku is usually preceded by the prepositional
2
This nuance is implied by the use of the ventive -am on the verb alāku. Note that
the ventive is absent in VAS 6, 99:3.
the DABĀBU- and QUTTÛ-type summonses 119
phrase “ana GN” (“to GN”) to specify the place to which the sum-
moned individual must come. In addition to specifying the location,
the summons clause above specifies that the case is to be argued ina bīt
dīni ša šarri (“in the king’s court of law”). Other summonses of this type
usually designate the authorities “before” (ina pāni ) whom the case is to
be argued. The different places and authorities specified in the different
texts are listed in summary table 4.1 at the end of this section.
In most of the dabābu-type summonses, as in the example above,
the requirement to argue the case is expressed using the verbal phrase
dīni . . . idabbub. Other texts use the synonymous phrase dibbu (followed
by a possessive suffix) idabbub.3 In the example above, the subject of the
case is stated in the relative clause following the word dīna. The case is
to be argued itti another party. In legal contexts, the word itti has an
adversarial connotation and should be translated “against.”4 Thus, a
simple translation of the verbal construction dīna itti PN2 dabābu is “to
argue a case against PN2.”
The dabābu-type summonses, however, are not simply a means of
beginning a case by bringing two parties to court to argue their claims
against each other. Instead, the dabābu-type summonses were written
after one party has already made a claim against the summoned indi-
vidual. This understanding of the dabābu-type summonses emerges from
consideration of the penalty clauses, which indicate that the dabābu-type
summonses were not written as a means of initiating a legal case. The
penalties mentioned in dabābu-type summonses are not uniform, a fact
that indicates that they are not a standardized fine for failure to appear.
These penalties are imposed only upon the summoned individual (PN1)
even though another party (PN2) is involved in the dispute. Furthermore,
the penalties are obligations of the summoned individual to the oppos-
ing party or the institution the opposing party represents. Thus, the
3
See summary table 4.1 at the end of this section for the texts which use dīni and
those which use dibbu. The use of the different nouns may be related to the provenance
of the texts. The phrase using the word dibbu appears in the documents written in
Babylon during the reign of Nabonidus, while the phrase using the word dīnu appears
in documents written outside Babylon after the reign of Nabonidus. For documents
using only the verb dabābu, see the discussion of Abraham, Business, Nos. 17 and 45
below. For documents using the phrase dibba quttû see the discussion in section 4.B
below. The phrase dīna quttû is a hypothetically possible combination and is attested
in other Akkadian contexts. It is not, however, attested in the documents considered
in this section (see CAD qatû 4d [Q , p. 181]).
4
See AHw. dabābu 3b (p. 147). For a similar meaning, see the use of itti with verbs
denoting war listed in AHw. itti 5 (p. 405).
120 chapter four
varying penalties reflect different disputed obligations to the opposing

party. The opposing party is a plaintiff who has already made a claim
against the summoned individual. The dabābu-type summonses are a
means of obligating the summoned individual to answer the plaintiff’s
claim. By not coming to argue the case, the summoned individual
implicitly accepts the obligation in question.
Given this information, the following general scenario emerges as
the background behind the texts in this text-type. The opposing party
(PN2) is a plaintiff who has already made a claim against PN1. The texts
in this text-type are a means of obligating PN1 to answer the plaintiff’s
claim. By not coming to argue the case, PN1 implicitly accepts the
obligation in question. To properly reflect this scenario, the translation
of the phrase dīna itti PN2 idabbub should not be simply “he shall argue
against PN2” but rather, “he shall argue against (the claim of ) PN2.”
This general scenario may be illustrated by returning to the sample
text, YOS 7, 31. The penalty clause in this text reads:
10. ki-i (10–12) If he does not go, he
11. la it-tal-ku UDU.NITA-a 2 shall pay 30-fold for these 2 sheep
12. 1-en 30 a-na dGAŠAN ša2 to the Lady-of-Uruk.
UNUGki i-nam-din
When this penalty is taken together with the summons clause, the fol-
lowing situation may be reconstructed. mMarduk-dīna-īpuš is responsible
for two sheep that mGimillu, known to have been a corrupt official,
led away from his flock.5 The šatammu and scribes of the Eanna have
already accused mMarduk-dīna-īpuš of misappropriation, for which
he would have to pay the standard thirty-fold penalty.6 Following the
accusation of the Eanna authorities, mMarduk-dīna-īpuš is summoned
to Babylon to make his defense (“argue the case”) against their claim.
If he does not appear, he incurs the penalty.
The earliest discussion of the legal function of this text-type occurs in
Köhler and Peiser’s description of Nbn 102. They describe this text as
“Fristenvertrag” (“a time-period contract”) and “eine vertragsmässige Klagfrist”
(“a contractual appointment-time for a trial”).7 Their use of the Ger-
man word “Vertrag,” meaning “contract,” indicates that they take Nbn
5
Following the example of TCL 13, 134, one may speculate that these two sheep
were for the Lady-of-Uruk, but mGimillu did not deliver them there.
6
For more on this subject, see San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 327–348.
7
Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 4, p. 80.
102 as a “contract” in which PN1 agrees to appear in court to respond

to PN2’s charge on a particular date. If PN1 does not appear, then he
agrees to submit to PN2’s claim. Although Köhler and Peiser do not
explicitly discuss who composed this document, their description of it
as a contract suggests that it was drawn up between the two parties
without any prior involvement of the court. From this perspective,
it would be incorrect to see any intervention by a legal authority to
compel the parties to bring the case to a conclusion.
On the other hand, Arch Tremayne, in his catalogue of YOS 7, uses
the word “summons” to describe the relevant texts in that volume.8
According to Tremayne, then, this text-type is not a contractual agree-
ment reached between parties. Rather it is a court order of sorts, a
summons, which requires PN1 to appear in court to respond to PN2’s
claim.
The difference between these two interpretations of the text-type
apparently reflects the ambiguity of the durative tense of the verbs
illakamma and idabbub in the summons clause. The Akkadian duratives
can bear the simple future sense of “he will go” and “he will argue.”
Thus, the texts could simply be contracts, as Köhler and Peiser would
have them. On the other hand, the duratives could also bear the sense
of “he must go” and “he must argue.” This understanding would sup-
port Tremayne’s interpretation of the texts as “summonses.”
The strongest evidence against the interpretation of the dabābu-type
summonses as a contract comes from YOS 7, 189. This text completely
describes the legal proceedings that led to its promulgation. The text
begins with the statement of mBau-ēreš, a shepherd of Ištar of Uruk,
who, in the assembly, accuses two slaves belonging to mKīnaya of having
stolen sheep. The text concludes with a summons requiring mKīnaya
to present the two slaves and argue his case against mBau-ēreš’s claim
before the royal judges. Failure to appear results in mKīnaya’s having
to compensate mBau-ēreš. It is clear, then, that YOS 7, 189 was issued
not as a contract between the two parties, but as a summons by the
court in direct response to the plaintiff’s initial complaint.
Apart from the very explicit evidence of YOS 7, 189, additional sup-
port for the involvement of an official body in the composition of the
documents comes from the mention of different legal authorities before
8
YOS 7, pp. 43–48.
122 chapter four
whom the defendant must appear.9 In the case of Nbn 102, the text that
Köhler and Peiser describe as a contract, the individual must argue his
case before officials of the Esagil temple. The requirement to appear on
a specific date indicates that these officials will hear the case on the date
specified. It would seem, then, that the officials were notified before the
document was issued.10 Similarly, VAS 6, 99:14–16 states clearly that
“the document was written in the (presence?) of mŠarru-lū-dār the qīpu
of the Ebabbar and mMarduk-šuma-iddin the scribe of Sippar.”11 The
decision records and preliminary protocols provide further evidence
for understanding the texts at hand as summonses issued by a court.
Several of these texts describe the judges bringing a defendant before
them after the plaintiff has detailed his complaint.12 The dabābu-type
summons, therefore, is a written record of the procedure by which the
judges bring the person before them for trial.
One complication in the interpretation of these documents as sum-
monses arises from the notices about where the documents were writ-
ten. Given that the summonses were written once the plaintiff had
approached the court, and that they express the authority of the court
to summon the defendant, one might expect the documents to have
been written in the court itself, or, at the very least, in the same city
as the court. This is the case in AnOr 8, 50, that summons mArdiya to
argue a case in Uruk and that was written in Uruk.13 In many cases,
9
See summary table 4.1 below.
10
Note that AnOr 8, 37 and YOS 7, 189 require the summoned individual to
appear before the judges of the king by (adi ), rather than on, a particular date. Based
on these two texts one might argue that a court might not have been involved initially
in these and in any other such texts. The evidence of the texts suggests otherwise. The
penalty clause in AnOr 8, 37:11–14 does not begin with the word adi, which suggests
that a specific date was intended, despite the word adi at the beginning of the text.
Even if the word adi is intended, the unspecified date does not necessarily mean that
these documents were written as agreements between the two parties rather than by
an official body. One might imagine that the court hearing the complaint could compel
the litigants to arrange a hearing by a particular time. This must have been the case
in YOS 7, 189, which describes the formal lodging of the complaint in the assembly
before recording the summons to appear by a particular date.
11
ina ¢ma?- ar?Ü mLUGAL-[lu]-¢u2Ü-[da-ar lu2]qi-i-pi E2.BABBAR.RA u mdAMAR.UTU-
MU-MU lu2UMBISAG UD.KIB.NUNki ša- a-ru ša2- i-ir-ru.
12
Examples include: Nbn 13:5–6; OIP 122, 38:28–30; and Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48:
10–12. In YOS 7, 159:7–8, the judges send a messenger to a particular defendant. See
the discussion in sections 8.C and 9.D below.
13
In Nbn 102, there is no specific mention of the city to which the individual is
summoned. However, the presence of the officials of the Esagil (Nbn 102:4) suggests
that the case was to be heard in Babylon. If so, then Nbn 102, which is also writ-
however, the dabābu-type summonses were written in a different loca-

tion from the summoning court. It is also noteworthy that while these
other summonses were written in Uruk or Sippar,14 all of them contain
summonses to Babylon. When these facts are taken together with the
understanding that the documents were composed only after the plaintiff
had lodged a formal complaint, one necessarily reaches the conclu-
sion that these summonses were written by local authorities acting on
behalf of the authorities in Babylon. Some support for this description
comes from VAS 6, 99, a summons to Babylon, which makes explicit
reference to the authorities in Sippar present at its composition. Thus,
it seems that the plaintiff first approached the local officials, who had
the authority to summon the defendant to Babylon on a later date, or
that the plaintiff had approached the authorities in Babylon who then
ordered the local authorities to issue the summons.15
Recently, Abraham has published two documents that appear to be
a variant of the dabābu-type summons.16 Both texts require an individual
to appear in Babylon and impose a penalty upon this individual if he
does not appear. The summons clauses in these two texts read:
1) Abraham, Business, No. 17:1–6

1. U4 20-kam2 ša2 ITI DU6 mgu-za- (1–6) On 20 Tašrītu, mGuzānu
nu A-šu2 ša2 son of mNabû-zēru-līšir
2. mdNA3-NUMUN-GIŠ A mga- al descendant of Ga al shall come,
il-la-kam2-<<am>>-ma and, in Babylon, argue against
3. ina TIN.TIRki it-ti mdAMAR. (the claim of ) mMarduk-nā ir-
UTU-na- ir-IBILA apli son of mIddinaya descendant
4. A-šu2 ša2 mSUM.NA-a A me-gi- of Egibi regarding the silver,
bi a-na mu - i the “contribution of the archer”
5. KU3.BABBAR ni-din-tu4 ša2 that mMarduk-nā ir-apli gave to
lu2
BAN ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- m
Guzānu.
ir-A
6. a-na mgu-za-nu id-din-nu i-dab-bu-ub
ten in Babylon, is another example of a document composed in the same city as the
summoning court.
14
AnOr 8, 37 and YOS 7, 31 were written in Uruk. VAS 6, 99 was written in
Sippar.
15
For more on this possibility, see Matthew Stolper, “ ‘No-one Has Exact Information
Except for You:’ Communication Between Babylon and Uruk in the First Achaemenid
Reigns,” Achaemenid History 13 (2003), pp. 265–287.
16
Abraham, Business, No. 17 and No. 45.
124 chapter four
2) Abraham, Business, No. 45:1–13

1. [U4 10-kam2 ša2 ITI AB MU (1–5) [On 10 ebētu, year 2]6
2]6-kam2 of [Darius king of Babylon and
2. [mda-ri-ia-muš ] ¢LUGALÜ [Eki u the lands] mBēl-upa ir [son
KUR.KUR] mdEN-NIGIN-ir of ] mNergal-iddin shall come to
3. [A-šu2 ša2 m]¢dU.GUR-MU a- [Baby]lon before mMarduk-nā ir-
naÜ [TIN.T]IRki a-na pa-ni apli son of mItti-Marduk-balā u
4. AMAR.UTU-na- ir-IBILA
md
descendant of Egibi.
A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTU-
TIN A me-gi-bi
5. il-la-kam2-ma a-na mu - i u2-
il3-tim ša2 1 MA.NA [KU3.
BABBAR]
6. BABBAR-u2 nu-u - u-tu ša2 ina (5–13) He shall argue against
¢1Ü GIN2 bit-qa 3 GUR ZU2. (the claim) of mMarduk-nā ir-
LUM.[MA] ¢u3Ü GU4? apli regarding the debt-note of 1
7. ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- ir- mina of medium-quality [silver]
IBILA ša2 ina mu - i-šu2 u3 in which 1/8 is alloy, 3 kur of
ša2- [a-ru.(MEŠ)] date[s and an ox] belonging to
8. ša2 a-na mu - i u2-il3-tim.MEŠ m
Marduk-nā ir-apli that he owes,
ša2 KU3.BABBAR ŠE.BAR and the [documents] regarding
ZU2.LUM.MA ¢u3 GU4Ü the debt-notes of silver, barley,
9. ša2 mdDI.KU5-EN-URI3 lu2qal- dates and cattle belonging to
la ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- ir- m
Madānu-bēla-u ur, slave of
IBILA m
Marduk-nā ir-apli, owed by
10. ša2 ina mu - i mdEN-NIGIN-ir m
Bēl-upa ir, that mMarduk-nā ir-
ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- ir- apli drew up against mBēl-upa ir
IBILA from year 20 of Darius.
11. ul-tu MU 20-kam2 mda-ri-ia-muš
it-ti
12. mdEN-NIGIN-ir iš- u-ru it-ti
13. mdAMAR.UTU-na- ir-IBILA
i-dab-bu-ub
Both texts require the individual to go to Babylon and both use the
verb dabābu to indicate the action that he must perform there. Neither
text, however, includes the noun dibbu or dīnu as an object in the dabābu
expression. Apparently because of this absence, Abraham translates the
verb in both texts as “to reach an agreement,” based on the meaning
of the verb dabābu in Neo-Babylonian letters.17 Furthermore, Abraham
17
Abraham gives her reasons in the discussion of No. 45 (Abraham, Business, p. 286).
Although she does not mention No. 17 in her discussion of No. 45, her translation of
No. 17 (Abraham, Business, p. 234) seems to reflect the same line of reasoning.
points to the fact that neither text mentions judges or another authority
before whom the summoned individual must appear. Therefore, she spe-
cifically rejects the possibility that the summoned individual, the debtor,
is to appear in court to plead against his creditor.18 Thus, according
to Abraham, these documents are not summonses to argue a case, but
“summons to settle payment”19 or “summons to settle debts.”20
Abraham’s interpretation is not convincing; there are still reasons
to understand these texts in the same way as the other dabābu-type
summonses. The absence of the noun dīna or dibba in the summons
clauses does not, of itself, indicate that the verb dabābu means anything
but “argue.” There are examples in which the verbal phrase itti PN
dabābu means “to argue against,” even without a preceding noun.21
Both summons clauses mention disputed debts, so this translation is
not out of context. In both texts, the summons clauses imply that the
individual who is the object of the preposition itti has already raised a
claim. This is also indicated in the penalty clauses (in the continuation
of both texts), which state that the summoned individual must make a
payment if he does not appear. Thus, the verbal phrase itti PN dabābu
should retain its meaning “to argue against (the claim of ) PN,” even
though the noun dīna or dibba is absent.
In light of this interpretation of the verb dabābu, one must reconsider
the fact that these texts do not mention legal authorities. Contrary to
Abraham’s interpretation, these texts require an “argument” rather
than an “agreement,” but do not mention the authorities before whom
the argument is to be made. Abraham’s suggestion that these texts do
not require a court appearance may, in fact, be correct. It is possible
that these summonses respond to the plaintiff’s claim by ordering the
defendant to make his arguments outside a court.22 This possibility,
however, seems somewhat remote, given that the very issuance of a
summons might have already involved adjudicating authorities.
There is, however, room to challenge Abraham’s rejection of
the possibility that the summoned individual must appear in court.
18
Abraham, Business, p. 286.
19
Abraham, Business, p. 194 and p. 234.
20
Abraham, Business, p. 194 and p. 284.
21
See CAD dabābu 4b (D, p. 9). CAD translates “to litigate.”
22
Compare this possibility with the discussion of the quttû-summons below. This
possibility should be considered especially in the cases of Abraham, Business, No. 45
and Dar 189 in which the summoned individual is required to appear “before” (ana
pāni ) the plaintiff.
Summary Table 4.1 dabābu-Type Summonses
126
TEXT Noun Authority Penalty Date Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe
Written Date of Time Appearance Composition
Wunsch, BA 1, dīnu mār banî (?) ? ? ? ? — ? ?

pp. 356–357
m
Nbn 102 dibbu qīpu- slave service 25.II.3 15.III 19 days — Babylon Bēl-iddin/
m
officials (?) Nbn (5/31) (6/19) Šāpik-zēri//
of Esagil Mandidi
BE 8/1, 48 dibbu — ? 22.VI.5 ? ? Babylon Babylon —
Nbn (10/1)
m
AnOr 8, 37 dīnī royal enslavement 18.XI.1 (adi ?) 15.I (< ?) 55 Babylon Uruk Balā u /
m
judges of slaves in Cyr (1/30) (3/26) days Sîn-ibni //
question Rē i-alpi
m
VAS 6, 99 dīnī sartennu payment of 3.VI.3 Cyr 15.[VII] 42 days Babylon Sippar Arad-Bēl/
m
+ royal losses due to (8/28) Bēl-ušallim
chapter four
judges stopped work //Adad-

šammê
m
MacGinnis, Iraq — rāb 30-fold 24.V.4 Cyr 25.V (9/8) 1 day Opis Sippar Iqīša-
60 (1998), No. ummānu/ payment (9/7) Marduk/
m
4 (?) šangû of Etel-pî-
Sippar Šamaš //
Šangû-Sippar
m
YOS 7, 31 dīnī (ina bīt dīni 30-fold 1.VIII.4 20.IX 48 days Babylon Uruk Gimillu/
m
ša šarri ) payment Cyr (12/30) Innin-zēra-
(11/12) iddin
TEXT Noun Authority Penalty Date Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe
m
AnOr 8, 50 dīnī royal payment for 18.XI.5 7.XII (3/5) 19 days Uruk Uruk Šamaš-
judges use of slave Cyr (2/14) mukīn-apli/
m
Nādin//
Egibi
m
YOS 7, 189 dīnī royal repayment of 7.II.6 adi 1.III < 23 — Uruk Marduk-
judges loss Camb (6/14) days nā ir /
m
(5/22) Madānu-
a ē-iddin //
Šigûa
m
Dar 189 — — payment 8.XII.5 adi 10.IV < 120 — Babylon Nabû-iddin/
m
Dar (2/26) (6/25) days Nabû-gāmil
// Su aya
m
Abraham, — — 1 mina 12.VII.6 20.VII 8 days Babylon ursagkalamma Šamaš-
Business, Dar (11/1) iddina //
No. 17 (10/24) Sagdidi
Abraham, — — repayment of 2.IX.26 10.X. (1/7) 38 days Babylon ? ?
Business, debts Dar
the DABĀBU- and QUTTÛ-type summonses
No. 45 (11/30)
Dates are calculated according to Parker and Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology. Lengths of time do not include date of composition.
127
128 chapter four
The use of the verb dabābu alone, without the noun dīnu or dibbu does
not, of itself, preclude the possibility that the summoned individual
is to actually appear before adjudicating authorities.23 The fact that
these texts specifically require the individual to come to Babylon on
a particular date suggests that, as is the case with other dabābu-type
summonses, a formal appearance is required. Furthermore, these
texts were composed in response to a plaintiff’s claim, which implies
(as does Abraham’s own classification of the texts as summonses) that
some official body has already been involved in their issuance. Thus,
even though Abraham, Business, No. 17 and Abraham, Business, No. 45
do not mention an adjudicating authority, it is still possible that they
require the summoned individuals to actually appear in court. Like the
other dabābu- type summonses, these texts may require the defendant’s
appearance in court to argue a case against the plaintiff’s claim.
In summary, the dabābu-type of summonses are composed by author-
ities in response to a plaintiff’s claim. Their legal function is to require
a defendant to go and argue his case against the claim of a plaintiff.
The requirement to argue the case may be expressed by the verb dabābu
alone or in combination with the noun dīnu or dibbu. Most dabābu-type
summonses specify the authorities before whom the defendant must
argue his case. Those which do not may, nevertheless, require an
appearance in court.
4.B Summonses to End (quttû) a Case
The formulation of this type of summons resembles that of the dabābu-

type summons. Like the dabābu-summonses, the quttû-summonses include
varying penalties for failure to appear that are always the obligations
of the summoned individual to the opposing party.24 If the summoned
23
This much is clear from another text which uses the verb dabābu without a noun:
MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 4:3–4. In this text, even though no noun is used, the
individual must appear “before the chief of the workers” (ina IGI lu2GAL um-ma-nu)
and “in the presence of ” (ina DU.ZU) the šangû of Sippar. Because the rest of the text
is unclear, the use of the verb dabābu here remains in question. MacGinnis actually
translates the verbal phrase itti PN idabbub in the summons clause as “will speak with
PN.”
24
This is true even in Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 276/Joannès, Archives de Borsippa,
p. 243: 8–15, which includes obligations upon both the summoned individual and
the opposing party. Only the obligation upon the summoned individual is contingent
upon his failure to appear.
individual does not come to end the case, then he implicitly accepts
the obligation in question. Thus, it seems that both the dabābu- and
quttû-type of summonses were composed as a response to a claim.
However, instead of the verb dabābu (“to argue”), documents of this
text-type use the verbal construction dibbišu quttû (“to end his case”)
to express the summoned individual’s obligation. The use of the verb
quttû rather than dabābu implies that the two types of summonses have
different functions.
An example of this type of summons is Nbk 379. According to
Wunsch’s collations,25 the text reads as follows:26,27
1. a-di U4 X-kam2 ša2 ITI (1–4) By X Ulūlu II, mKalbaya son
KIN 2-kam2 mkal-ba-a of mNergal-ušēzib shall come and
2. A-šu2 ša2 mdU.GUR-u2-še-zib end his case against (the claim of )
il-la-kam2-ma f
Lū-bal at concerning the silver and
3. dib-bi-šu ša2 KU3.BABBAR the barley.
u ŠE.BAR it-ti
4. flu-bal- a-at u2-qa-at-ta
5. ki-i la it-tal-ka 6 G[IN2?] (5–7) If he does not come, he shall
K[U3.BABBAR?]26 pay fLū-bal āt 6 š[eqel (?)] of s[ilver
(erasure)- a-at (?)] of not . . .
6. ša2 la ta-x -tu4 a-na flu-bal-
a-at
7. i-nam-din
8. mim-ma ma-la ina ŠU.2 flu- (8–9) Whatever, in total, he . . . from
bal-[ a-at x x]-su f
Lū-bal āt he shall return.27
9. i-tur fga-ga-a pu-ut
10. e- er ša2 KU3.BABBAR u (9–10) fGagaya bears responsibility
ŠE.BAR na-ša2-ti for the repayment of the silver and
the barley.
25
Wunsch, CM 3, No. 39.
26
Wunsch’s tentative restoration raises the following problem: the initial presentation
of the case (line 3) and the guarantee clause (line 10) include barley, but the penalty
for not appearing does not seem to include payment of the barley. Note, however,
that the words mim-ma ma-la in the penalty clause (line 8) represent the totality of the
disputed debt, and so, may reflect both barley and silver.
27
San Nicolò-Ungnad translate the G form of the verb târu as a transitive, “to pay
in return,” while noting this uncharacteristic usage (San Nicolò-Ungnad, NRV No. 34,
n. 10 [p. 48]). Wunsch and the present translation follow San Nicolò-Ungnad. For a similar
usage, see Nbk 52: 9 and the translation in Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben, p. 31.
130 chapter four
11. mu-kin-nu mSUM.NA-

lu2
(11–12) Witnesses: Iddin-Marduk,
ŠU2 A-šu2
d
son of mIqīšaya descendant of Nūr-
12. ša2 mBA-ša2-a A mZALAG- Sîn;
d
30 mkal-ba-a (12–13) mKalbaya, son of mNādin
13. A-šu2 ša2 mna-din A mEN. descendant of Ma ār-abulli;
NUN-KA2.GAL
14. u lu2UMBISAG mdAMAR. (14–15) And the scribe: mMarduk-
UTU-GI A-šu2 ša2 mSU- ušallim son of mErība-Marduk
d
ŠU2 descendant of Mandidi.
15. A mman-di-di TIN.TIRki (15–17) Babylon. 25 Ulūlu year
ITI KIN u4 25-kam2 41 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of
16. MU 41-kam2 dNA3-NIG2. Babylon.
DU-PAP
17. LUGAL TIN.TIRki
This text is the result of a dispute about a debt of barley and silver that
m
Kalbaya owes fLū-bal āt. Apparently, fLū-bal āt has claimed that mKal-
baya has not paid his debt. mKalbaya is summoned to “end his case”
(dibbišu quttû) against fLū-bal āt’s claim by (adi ) a particular date. If he does
not come, then mKalbaya must pay fLū-bal āt. A guarantor named fGagaya
assumes responsibility for the repayment of the silver and barley.
As stated, the difference between the dabābu- and quttû-type sum-
monses is apparent from the use of the different verbs. Unlike the
verb dabābu, the verb quttû (derived from the verb qatû, “to end”) does
not imply arguing a case, even in conjunction with the noun dibbu.
Furthermore, a number of other differences between the dabābu- and
quttû-summonses underscore the distinction between the two text-types.
Unlike the dabābu-type summonses, the quttû-type does not mention
any adjudicating authority before whom the summoned individual
must appear. Another difference between the two text-types relates to
the date of appearance. Because the dabābu-type summonses require
an appearance in court, they usually give a precise date on which the
summoned individual must come to argue the case. The quttû-type
summonses, on the other hand, begin with the word adi, indicating
that the summoned individual may come to “end his case” at any time
before the specific date. Furthermore, from the scant data available,
it also appears that the quttû-type documents usually allow for less time
than the dabābu-type summonses between the date of the writing of the
summons and the settlement.28
28
See summary tables 4.1 and 4.2 for calculations of length of time. Note the excep-
These differences between the dabābu- and quttû-type summonses

suggest that the quttû-type summonses require an informal settling of
the case rather than a formal argument in the presence of adjudicat-
ing authorities. The case will “end” by, but not on, a particular date,
because there is no need to arrange a formal hearing. An informal
settlement might also require less time than arguing a case.
This interpretation raises the possibility that, unlike the dabābu-type
summonses, these texts were not written by a court. It is possible that
the plaintiffs made their claim directly to the summoned individuals,
and that the document was written to arrange the settling of the case.
Joannès describes Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 276, a quttû-type text,
as an “accord ” (“agreement”) between the two parties.29 This understand-
ing implies that there was no formal complaint before the document
was written. Instead, the two parties reached an agreement to settle
by a certain date without any official body compelling either of them.
According to Joannès, then, it would be incorrect to apply the label
“summons” to this text-type, since no authority issued the summons.
On the other hand, there are reasons to retain the label “summons”
and to consider the texts as coming from a court. The setting of a dead-
line, even if not a specific date, and the requirement that the summoned
individual “come” somewhere, even if the location is not specified,
suggest that there is a need to compel the summoned individual to act.
One might argue, then, that the plaintiffs have sought redress from a
court that issued the summons ordering the summoned individuals to
“end the case.” If this interpretation is correct, then both the dabābu-
and quttû-types of summons are issued by a court. The only difference
between the two text-types is how the case is to be concluded. The
dabābu-type summonses require the summoned individual to appear
before a court of law. The quttû-type summonses, on the other hand,
do not require an appearance in court, but nevertheless require that
the case come to an end. If the summoned individuals do not act to
end the case, then they face the penalty.
If, as has just been suggested, the quttû-summonses also originate in
a court, then they may be related to another text-type, the guarantees
tionally short span of time (1 day) in MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 4, which may be
a dabābu type of summons. Dar 229, in which an individual swears to “settle” within
2 days, provides additional support for the correlation between short time span and a
summons to informal settlement (rather than to formal proceedings).
29
Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 56.
132 chapter four
for testimony (see section 5.B). In these texts, a guarantor assumes

responsibility for “establishing the case” (kunnu) against another indi-
vidual. Sometimes, as will be seen below, the guarantors are accused
individuals who have attempted to clear themselves by accusing another
individual. Therefore, the guarantors assume responsibilty for substan-
tiating the accusations. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is
important to note that this text-type does not specify a date on which
or by which the guarantors must provide the evidence. Thus, based
only on the guarantee for testimony, the case against the guarantors
would remain unsettled for an unlimited time. The quttû-summonses,
which do specify a terminus by which the case must be “ended,” might
address this problem. By issuing a quttû-summons, a court might indicate
that individuals who have assumed responsibility for substantiating an
accusation in order to clear themselves must provide the evidence by
a certain time or face a penalty.
Summary Table 4.2 quttû-Type Summonses

TEXT Penalty Date Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe
TuM 2–3, 1 mina ?.VI.7 ? adi qīt ša ITI ? — Borsippa m

Itti-
213 [ MN ] Nabû-
balā u/
m
Nabû-x
Nbk 379 6 šeqel 25.VIb. a-di ?.VIb <6 — Babylon m
Marduk-
41 Nbk days ušallim/
(9/28) m
Erība-
Marduk
//
Mandidi
Joannès, payments 29.VII.2 adi 5.VIII <6 — Borsippa m
Nabû-
Archives de Camb (10/30) days ē ir/
Borsippa, (10/20) m
Mār-bīti-
p. 276/ iddin //
Joannès, Raksu
Archives de
Borsippa,
p. 243
Dar 159 — 8.III.5 ? ? Babylon Babylon m
Muna tu-
(?) Dar Marduk/
(6/4) m
Liblu //
Egibi
Dates are calculated according to Parker and Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology. Lengths of time do not include
date of composition.
CHAPTER FIVE
TEXT-TYPES CALLING FOR EVIDENCE
This chapter analyzes three text-types that call for the presentation of
evidence: the kunnu-type summonses, the guarantees for testimony and
the penalties pending evidence. Before discussing the three text-types
themselves, two terms should be clarified: summonses and guarantees.
Both terms refer to text-types that require a specific person to perform
a particular action, often on or by a certain date. Both summonses and
guarantees may impose a penalty for failure to perform the action. The
major difference between the two is that the guarantees explicitly use
the phrase pūta našû (“to assume responsibility”) while the summonses
do not use this phrase. This difference in formulation may imply a
difference in function.
5.A Summonses to Establish a Case (kunnu)
The summonses of this type require an individual to establish (kunnu)

a case against (ana) another individual. The use of the verb kunnu is
common to all the summons in this type. In its most basic form, the
summons clause of this type of summons reads as follows:
U4 X-kam2 ša ITI MN PN1 ana PN2 ukân1 ša . . .
On day X of Month MN PN1 shall establish (the case) against PN 2
that . . .
This basic summons clause is followed by the charge that the summoned
individual (PN1) must prove against an opposing party (PN2).
This summons clause may be modified in two ways: 1) a date may
not be specified or 2) witnesses may be stipulated as the means of proof.
1
The present normalization is to the Old Babylonian D durative, 3cs form of the
verb kânu. This normalization is for ease of reference, despite the fact that in all the
Neo-Babylonian texts the verb is written with a vowel at the end. Usually, the final sign
is /nu/, although in Nbk 183:6 and Nbk 366:5 the form ends in /ni/, and in YOS 7,
35:17, it ends in /na/. Note also that PBS 2/1, 126:7 apparently uses the verb kullumu
(“to show”) instead of kunnu (“to establish”). It is included in the present type because
it, too, requires PN1 to prove his case.
134 chapter five
Summons clauses that do not specify a date on which (or by which)2

PN1 must establish the case use the open-ended terms ina ūmu (“on the
day that”)3 or kî (“if ”).4 The summons clauses that require the sum-
moned individual to present witnesses read as follows:
U4 X-kam25 ša2 ITI MN PN1 mukinnēšu6 ibbakamma ana PN2 ukân7 ša2
On day X of MN PN1 shall bring his witnesses. He shall establish (the
case) against PN2 that . . .
This version of the kunnu summons places two requirements on the
summoned individual. In order to meet the general requirement to
“establish the case,” the summoned individual is required to bring
(abāku)8 his witnesses.
Following the summons clauses, the kunnu-summonses have penalty
clauses that govern two situations: the situation in which the summoned
individual establishes the case and the situation in which the summoned
individual does not establish the case. Based on the clause that governs
failure to establish the case, the kunnu-summonses may be divided into
2
OIP 122, 34 and Nbk 52 require the summoned individual to establish the case
in a certain month. Nbk 366 requires the summoned individual to establish the case
by (adi ) a certain date. The details of the different kunnu-summonses are presented in
summary table 5.1 at the end of this section.
3
Nbk 361:1; Nbn 679:1; YOS 7, 192:8; PBS 2/1, 126:7. BIN 1, 113:10 uses only
the word ūmu without the preposition ina.
4
Nbk 266:7.
5
Most summons clauses requiring witnesses specify the date. Nbk 361 and YOS 7,
192 are exceptional cases which require witnesses but do not specify the date.
6
The plural normalization is based on Nbk 366:3, where the form lu2mu-kin-ne-e-šu2
appears. The additional e is written, apparently, to emphasize that more than one
witness is intended.
7
The present normalization is to the Old Babylonian D durative, 3cs form of
the verb kânu, as in the basic formulation. Because the verb is always written with a
vocalic ending, in the texts requiring witnesses, one may wish to take the final vowel,
especially u, as a marker of the plural. This would mean that the witnesses are the
subject of the verb, rather than PN1. The choice of the singular follows the translation
of Nbk 365:3 in Cornelia Wunsch, “ ‘Du hast meinen Sohn geschlagen!’ ”, in Cornelia
Wunsch, ed. Mining the Archives: Festschrift for Christopher Walker on the Occasion of His 60
Birthday (Babylonische Archive 1) (Dresden, 2002), p. 361 and of Nbk 183:6 in Köhler
u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, p. 31. This choice is borne out contextually by those texts which
do not specifically require witnesses to be brought. From these texts it is clear that the
subject of the verb kunnu can only be the summoned individual. Therefore, even in
texts which specifically require witnesses to be brought, it is the summoned individual
who “establishes the case,” not the witnesses.
8
Note that Nbk 183:4 uses a form of the verb paqādu (“to place”) rather than the
usual verb abāku. The use of the different verb still indicates that the first named indi-
vidual is to bring the witnesses to a specific location.
text-types calling for evidence 135
two subtypes. In one subtype, which will be known as the exculpatory

kunnu-summons, the summoned individuals face a penalty, explicitly or
implicitly, if they fail to establish the case. In the other subtype, which
will be called the general subtype of kunnu-summonses, the summoned
individuals do not face a penalty if they fail to establish the case. Because
both subtypes present the same ultimate requirement, establishing a
case, they all have the same legal function. They are, therefore, texts
of the same text-type. However, because each subtype was composed
under different circumstances, each will be discussed separately. The
exculpatory kunnu-summonses will be discussed first, followed by the
general kunnu-summonses.
In the exculpatory kunnu-summonses, the penalty clauses usually
read as follows:
(a) kî uktinnušu . . .
If he (PN1) establishes (the case) against him (PN2) > Penalty against PN29
(b) kî lā uktinnušu . . .
If (PN1) does not establish (the case) against him (PN2) > Penalty against PN1
These clauses indicate that if the summoned individual (PN1) establishes
the case, then the opposing party (PN2) will make a payment. If the
summoned individual (PN1) does not establish the case, then the sum-
moned individual (PN1) incurs the penalty in the case.
In order to illustrate this subtype, BIN 1, 113 will be presented in
its entirety. The text reads as follows:10
1. mri-mut-dEN A-šu2 ša2 (1–5) mRīmūt-Bēl son of mNusku-
md
ENŠADA-MU ša2 lu2NU. iddin, about whom the gardeners
giš
KIRI6.MEŠ who cut the dates constituting
2. ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA ZAG A.ŠA3. the imittu-yield10 of the fields
MEŠ NIG2.GA dINNIN belonging to Ištar of Uruk and
UNUGki Nanaya, of year 1 of Cambyses
3. u dna-na-a ša2 <<1>> MU 1- king of Babylon king of the lands
kam2 mkam2-bu-zi-ia LUGAL the sūtu-tax of mBaniya son of
TIN.TIRki m
Kalbaya, established thus:
4. LUGAL KUR.KUR ša2 gišBAN
ša2 mba-ni-ia A-šu2 ša2 mkal-ba-a
5. ik-ki-su ina UKKIN u2-kin-nu-uš
um-ma ZU2.LUM.MA
9
Nbk 266 and Nbk 366 state only that PN1 is clear (zaki ), but do not impose a
penalty on PN2.
10
For the meaning of this term, see CAD imittu B (I/J, pp. 123–125).
136
11 chapter five
6. ina ZAG A.ŠA3.MEŠ ša2 ina pa- (5–7) “mRīmūt-Bēl took the dates
ni-ni mri-mut-dEN ina ŠU.2-i-ni from the estimated yield of the
7. iz-zi-bi-il u3 mri-mut-dEN ina fields at our disposal from our
UKKIN hands.”
8. DUMU.DU3.MEŠ iq-bu-u2
lu2
(7–8) And mRīmūt-Bēl said thus in
um-ma ZU2.LUM.MA ša2 ina the assembly of the mār banî:
ŠU.2-šu2-nu (9–10) “The dates that I took from
9. aš2-šu-u2 ina E2 mba-ni-ia A-šu2 their hands I put in the house
ša2 mkal-ba-a of mBaniya son of mKalbaya for
10. a-na KAŠ.SAG at-ta-di U4-mu beer.”
ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA
11. [lu2]ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA (10–14) The day that mNabû-
A-šu2 ša2 mna-din A mda-bi-bi u mukīn-apli šatammu of the Eanna
md
NA3-ŠEŠ-MU son of mNādin descendant of
12. [lu2]SAG.LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-ti Dābibī and mNabû-a a-iddin the
E2.AN.NA re-eš ša rēš šarri administrator of the
13. [m]ri-mut-dEN i-na-aš2-šu-u2 il- Eanna summon mRīmūt-Bēl, he
la-¢kam2Ü-ma shall come and establish (his case).
14. u2-ka-nu
15. ki-i mri-mut-dEN la qir-bi11 ZU2. (15–17) If mRīmūt-Bēl does not
LUM.MA ma-la arrive, mRīmūt-Bēl shall pay the
16. lu2NU.gišKIRI6.MEŠ a-na mri- property of the Lady-of-Uruk
mut-dEN u2-kin-nu- whatever amount of dates that the
17. ri-mut-dEN a-na NIG2.GA
m
gardeners establish.
d
GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam-
din
18. mu-kin-nu mdEN-su-pe-e-mu- ur
lu2
(18–19) Witnesses: mBēl-supê-
A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dUTU-TIN mu ur son of mItti-Šamaš-balā u
19. A mdEN-A-URI3 mdNA3- descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur;
NUMUN-DU A-šu2 ša2 (19–20) mNabû-zēra-ukīn son
md
NA3-ka- ir of mNabû-kā ir descendant of
20. A mar2-rab3-tu4 <m>dEN-A-MU Arrabtu;
A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-TIN-i (20–21) mBēl-apla-iddin son of
21. A lu2ša2-MUN. I.A-šu2 mŠU- m
Bēl-uballi descendant of Ša-
d
UTU A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-SUR- ābušu;
ZI.MEŠ (21–22) mGimil-Šamaš son of
22. A me-gi-bi m
Nabû-ē ir-napšāti descendant of
Egibi;
23. UMBISAG mmu-še-zi-
lu2
(23) Scribe: mMušēzib-Šamaš son
ib-dUTU A-šu2 ša2 md15- of mIštar-zēra-ibni.
NUMUN-DU3
Note that the penalty clause governs only failure to establish the case. YOS 7,
11
35 is similar. The use of la qir-bi to describe the failure to appear (and establish the
case) is unique to this text.
24. UNUGki ITI BAR2 U4 30- (24–25) Uruk. 30 Nisannu, year 1

kam2 MU 1-kam2 mkam2-bu-zi- of Cambyses, king of Babylon,
ia2 king of the lands.
KUR.KUR
The situation in this text may be reconstructed as follows. A discrep-
ancy has arisen regarding the dates that mKalbaya owes as sūtu-tax.
The gardeners who cut those dates testify that mRīmūt-Bēl received
the dates of the imittu-yield of those fields from them. In the assembly,
m
Rīmūt-Bēl asserts that he delivered those dates to mKalbaya’s house
for beer processing. When the šatammu and the administrator summon
m
Rīmūt-Bēl, he must establish his claim. If he does not appear, then he
must pay whatever amount of dates the gardeners establish.
The general scheme of the penalty clauses and the specifics of BIN 1,
113 indicate that the present subtype of kunnu-summonses were written
because the summoned individual (PN1) wishes to avoid payment of a
penalty. In an attempt to clear himself, he has raised a claim against
another individual (PN2). If the summoned individual establishes his
claim against the opposing party, then the opposing party must make
the payment and the summoned individual is clear. The evidence he
is to bring is, therefore, exculpatory.
Within the corpus of exculpatory kunnu-summonses there are two
exceptional texts that should be considered. Both texts, Nbn 679 and
YOS 7, 192, impose a penalty against the opposing party if the sum-
moned individual establishes the case. They do not, however, include a
penalty clause against the summoned individual for failure to establish
the case. Nevertheless, both texts apparently call for exculpatory evi-
dence and are, therefore, included in the present subtype. In Nbn 679,
the summoned individual is an escaped slave. If she establishes that
the person to whom she escaped knew her situation, then that person
must make payment to her former master. This text, therefore, seems
to result from the slave herself wishing to avoid the payment.12 In order
to do so, she has blamed the person to whom she has escaped, and
must now “establish the case” or bear the penalty. In YOS 7, 192, the
opposing party swears that he did not take any temple property from
the house of the summoned individual. The summoned individual
must establish that the opposing party actually did steal the items.
12
See Wunsch, AfO 44–45 (1997–1998), No. 17 (p. 87).
138 chapter five
This must be because the summoned individual is himself responsible

for these items. By proving that the opposing party stole the items,
the summoned individual can avoid payment. Thus, even though they
do not explicitly state that the summoned individual bears a penalty,
both Nbn 679 and YOS 7, 192 document cases in which exculpatory
evidence is required in order to avoid payment.
The second subtype of kunnu-summons is the general kunnu-summons.
In contrast with the exculpatory subtype, the general kunnu-summonses
do not impose a penalty against the summoned individuals if they fail
to establish the case. Instead, the penalty clauses in this subtype read
as follows:13
(a) kî uktinnušu . . .
If he (PN1) establishes (the case) against him (PN2) > penalty against
PN2
(b) kî lā uktinnušu zaki
If he (PN1) does not establish (the case) against him (PN2), he (PN1) is
clear.
Nbk 365 will serve to illustrate the features of this subtype:
1. U4 5-kam2 ša2 ITI GAN (1–2) On 5 Kislīmu, mŠarru-kīn
m
LUGAL-GI.NA DUMU-šu2 son of mAmmanu shall bring his
ša2 mam-ma-nu witnesses to the city of Piqūdu.
2. lu2mu-kin-ne-šu2 i-na URU pi-qu-
du ib-ba-kam2-ma
3. a-na mi-di- i-DINGIR DUMU- (3–5) He shall establish (the
šu2 ša2 mdi-na-a u2-ka-nu case) against mĪdi i-ilu son of
4. ša2 mi-di- i-DINGIR a-na m
Dīnaya, that mĪdi i-ilu sent thus
LUGAL-GI.NA-a iš-pu-ra to mŠarru-kīn:
5. um-ma di-i-ni ša2 lu2qal-li-ka ša2
di-i-ki
6. it-ti-ia la ta-dab-bu-ub a-na-ku (5–6) “Do not bring the case
against me regarding your slave
who was killed.”
7. nap-ša2-ti ša2 lu2qal-li-ka u2-šal- (6–7) “I shall pay you for your
lam-ka slave’s life.”
13
Among the texts in this subtype, the clause expressing the penalty (a) is written
first in Nbk 52, Nbk 183 and Nbk 365. The zakû clause (b) is written first in OIP 122,
34 and Nbk 366. Nbk 419 does not include a zakû clause.
8. ki-i uk-tin-nu-uš 1 MA.NA (8–10) If he establishes (the case)

KU3.BABBAR ŠAM2 against him, mĪdi i-ilu shall pay
9. ša2 lu2qal-li-šu2 mi-di- i- 1 mina of silver, the price of his
DINGIR.MEŠ a-na slave to mŠarru-kīn.
10. mLUGAL-GI.NA i-nam-din
11. ki-i la uk-tin-nu-uš ¢za-kiÜ (11) If he does not establish (the
case) against him, he is clear.
12. mu-kin-ni mna-zi-ia
lu2 lu2
SAG. (12) Witnesses: mNaziya, the ša rēš
LUGAL šarri;
13. mKUR.GAL-MU A-šu2 ša2 (13) mAmurru-iddin son of
m
ri-mut-DINGIR m
Rīmūt-Ili;
14. mše-gu-zu DUMU-šu2 ša2 mta- (14) mŠeguzu son of mTala , the
la- lu2GAL KAR ša2 U 2ki rāb kāri of Opis;
15. u3 lu2DUB.SAR mdNA3-ŠEŠ. (15–16) and the scribe: mNabû-
MEŠ-MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 a ē-iddin son of mŠulaya
descendant of Egibi.
16. mšu-la-a A me-gi-bi U 2
ki
17. ITI APIN U4 7-kam2 MU 40- (16–18) Opis. 7 Ara šamna, year
kam2 40 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of
18. dNA3-NIG2.DU-URI3 Babylon.
LUGAL TIN.TIRki
This summons pertains to the death of mŠarru-kīn’s slave. After his
slave was killed, mŠarru-kīn sought to press charges against mĪdi i-ilu.
m
Īdi i-ilu wrote to mŠarru-kīn asking him not to bring the case to
court, and agreeing to compensate him for the slave. mŠarru-kīn now
wishes to collect the payment from mĪdi i-ilu, but apparently cannot
present the actual document that mĪdi i-ilu sent him. mŠarru-kīn must
bring witnesses to the city of Piqūdu to confirm that mĪdi i-ilu indeed
wrote to him. If mŠarru-kīn brings the witnesses and establishes the
case against mĪdi i-ilu, then mĪdi i-ilu must pay mŠarru-kīn 1 mina of
silver (the price of the slave). If he does not establish the case against
m
Īdi i-ilu, then mĪdi i-ilu is clear.
As has already been noted and can be seen from Nbk 365, there
is no penalty against the summoned individual for failure to establish
the case. Thus, general kunnu-summonses are not composed because
the summoned individuals are defendants who face a penalty of some
sort and have attempted to clear themselves by accusing other indi-
viduals. Instead, these kunnu-summonses were composed because of
a disputed claim brought by the plaintiffs, who are the summoned
individuals. The evidence that the summoned individuals must bring
is not exculpatory.
140 chapter five
From the discussion thus far, the following description of the kunnu-
summonses emerges. Like the dabābu-type summonses (see section
4.A above), the kunnu-type summonses are a response to a claim. The
summoned individuals in the kunnu-type summonses are the individuals
who have made the claim, rather than those against whom the claim
has been made. These individuals may have been defendants in a legal
case who made the claim in the face of an impending penalty. To avoid
paying the penalty, they must present exculpatory evidence to prove the
claim. The exculpatory kunnu-summonses come from such situations.
Alternatively, the summoned individuals may be the plaintiffs in a legal
case who have made a claim that is contested by the defendant. If the
summoned individuals can establish the claim, then the defendant will
have to make whatever payment is due. If, however, the claim remains
unestablished, then the opposing party faces no penalty. In this situa-
tion, a general kunnu-summons would be written.
Although both the kunnu- and the dabābu-type summonses are writ-
ten as responses to claims, only the dabābu-type summons specifically
allude to an eventual confrontation in court. The basic formulation
of the kunnu-type summonses, on the other hand, does not explicitly
indicate that they were issued as part of the official adjudication of a
dispute. Thus, in order to address the issues of the setting in which
the kunnu-summonses were composed, two main questions must be
answered. First, was the claim that must be established made in court
or outside of court? That is, were the kunnu-type summonses, like the
dabābu-type, issued by a court during formal proceedings, or were they
composed outside of an official adjudicatory setting? Second, the nature
of “establishing the case” must also be discussed. Do these texts require
a formal evaluation of evidence, or might they envision a less formal
procedure? Answering these questions allows a more precise definition
of the legal function of these summonses.
A number of exculpatory kunnu-summonses, like BIN 1, 113, describe
the proceedings that took place before the summonses were issued. For
example, YOS 7, 35 specifically describes the hearing “in the assembly”
during which the accusation against the summoned individual is made.
Four scribes bearing the title “scribes of the Eanna” wrote the text “in
the presence” (ina DU.ZU) of the šatammu and the administrator of the
Eanna.14 Most of the kunnu-summonses, however, are not as explicit
14
See also YOS 7, 192, which opens with the defendant’s oath claiming innocence.
as YOS 7, 35 or BIN 1, 113, and, in fact, do not even name specific

adjudicating authorities. Nevertheless, the consensus of scholarship is
that these documents were also composed in a court of law.15 Despite the
lack of specific references to judges or courts, there is reason to concur
with the prevailing understanding. Many of these texts were written by
the same scribe, mNabû-a ē-iddin son of mŠulaya of the Egibi family
during the latter part of the reign of Nebuchadnezzar.16 In later texts,
m
Nabû-a ē-iddin is known as one of the judges of Nabonidus. Follow-
ing van Driel, one might understand the writing of the summonses to
present witnesses as reflections of the early stages of mNabû-a ē-iddin’s
climb towards becoming a royal judge.17 It is plausible that mNabû-a ē-
iddin began his legal career as a court scribe. If this understanding is
correct, then the presence of mNabû-a ē-iddin as scribe suggests that
the texts of this text-type that he wrote, as well as others like it that he
did not write, originated in a formal court setting.
The question of the setting in which the evidence was to be evaluated
has already been addressed by Köhler and Peiser’s discussion of where
the testimony of the summoned witnesses is to be heard. On the one
hand, they raise the possibility that these documents are orders to settle
out of court, by means of a private hearing of testimony (“Privaternehm-
ung”), outside of the official adjudicatory process. On the other hand,
they strongly consider the possibility that these documents call for formal
testimony in the presence of court officials.18 The evidence of the texts
themselves is inconsistent and leaves both possibilities open. In BIN 1,
113, the case is to be established “the day that” (U4-mu) the šatammu
and the administrator call for the summoned individual. Apparently,
Nbk 266 begins by quoting the defendant’s statement in a manner which suggests that
it was made as a declaration in court.
15
G. van Driel, “The Rise of the House of Egibi: Nabû-a ē-iddina,” JEOL 29
(1985–1986), pp. 54–55. See also Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, p. 31. Peiser’s earlier
label of Nbk 365 also implies the involvement of a court in the composition of the
document (KB 4, p. XX). Similarly, see Weisberg’s label of OIP 122, 34 as an “order
to produce witnesses,” which suggests that a court has issued the order. None of these
interpretations includes any citations of evidence from the texts themselves.
16
See summary table 5.1 below. The year in Nbk 419:14, also written by the same
scribe, is broken. Van Driel, JEOL 29 (1985–1986), p. 55 notes that all of the texts
dated to year 40 were written in Opis, and suggests that they reflect a tour of duty. If
so, then Nbk 419, also written in Opis, may date from the same stint.
17
Van Driel, JEOL 29 (1985–1986), p. 55. According to Wunsch, AOAT 252,
p. 572, the case of mNabû-a ē-iddin may be exceptional. See, however, the discussion
of the career of the scribe mIle i-Marduk in section 8.K.2 below.
18
142 chapter five
in this specific case, the evidence will be evaluated in a hearing before

these authorities. BIN 1, 113 is unique in this regard, since other texts
do not name authorities who will summon the individual. Similarly, the
summons clauses in both Nbk 227 and YOS 6, 153 specifically men-
tion that the summoned individual must “bring” the opposing party
in order to establish the case against him.19 This additional stipula-
tion suggests that the case is to be established in a formal setting. In
addition, as can be seen from summary table 5.1 below, a number of
kunnu-summonses specify a date and location for the presentation of the
evidence. These specifications suggest that the case is to be established
in a formal hearing. On the other hand, those texts that leave the date
open and do not otherwise mention authorities may require only an
informal evaluation of the evidence outside.
The question of whether or not the evidence is to be evaluated in
a formal hearing has direct consequences for determining the place of
these texts within legal proceedings, and, in turn, the legal function
of these texts. On the one hand, the documents might call for the
evidence to be heard in court. Therefore, one might argue that the
judges remain involved, since they would decide if the evidence had
indeed “established” the case. On the other hand, because many of the
kunnu-summonses include the results both of presenting the evidence
and failure to present it, they seem to reflect a concluding stage of the
proceedings. There seems to be no further need for any adjudicating
authority to render a decision. If so, then texts of this text-type mark
the end of the judicial activities in these particular cases.
Both of these possibilities are reflected in the existing interpreta-
tions of these texts. The first possibility, which suggests that the court
remains involved even after the composition of the summonses, is
implied in Peiser’s label for Nbk 365 and Nbk 266. In his catalogue,
Peiser calls these texts a “Vorentscheidung” (“a preliminary decision”)
written during the course of legal proceedings.20 Although Peiser does
not expand his description, the term implies that this document records
one stage in a more protracted process of adjudication. According to
this understanding, the kunnu summonses are the written means by
19
Although the verb abāku appears in the summons clauses of both these texts,
the inclusion of the verb kunnu indicates that their main purpose is as exculpatory
summonses to establish a case. For a description of the abāku-summonses, see the
discussion below.
20
KB 4, p. XX.
which judges obtained the testimony necessary for deciding a case.

Thus, the case would remain before the court even after the issuance
of the summonses.21
The possibility that the texts represent the end of the court’s involve-
ment is reflected in Köhler and Peiser, Rechtsleben. In this work, the
kunnu-summonses are called “Beweisverträge” (“contracts to present
evidence”).22 This label suggests that the documents reflect an agree-
ment or settlement reached between the parties, which, based on the
evidence discussed earlier, was written for them in the presence of the
court. This interpretation understands the documents not as an interim
stage in proceedings, but as a conclusion to the case. In the presence
of a court, the two parties agree to settle their case according to the
testimony of the witnesses. Because these “contracts” were written in
a court, it may be that the parties agree to return to court to have the
testimony heard. However, the label “Beweisverträge” leaves open the
possibility that the parties will not return to court, but will settle once
the summoned individual presents his evidence.
5.B Guarantees for Testimony
Texts of this text-type record an individual’s assumption of the obliga-

tion to provide testimony. They include the following characteristic
formula:
pūt mukinnūtu ša2 . . . PN naši
PN assumes responsibility for the testimony concerning23 . . .
21
For a similar understanding of these texts, particularly Nbk 366, see Oelsner, et al.,
in Westbrook, History, p. 923.
22
Kohler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, pp. 30–33. For Nbk 366 see Kohler u. Peiser,
Rechtsleben 1, p. 13. See also Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, pp. 46–48, which is a discussion
of Nbk 366. See also Petschow, Pfandrecht, p. 61 n. 172 (end of note, on Nbk 419).
23
In Nbn 343:1, YOS 6, 108:1, YOS 6, 208:17, Cyr 311:1, and YOS 7, 96:23 a
personal name follows the word ša. In these texts, it is, therefore, possible that the
guarantee is for the testimony “of,” that is testimony given by, that particular person.
See, for example, the translation in CAD mukinnūtu c (M2, p. 187). Note, however, that
this translation is impossible in Sack, CuDoc, No. 80:1 and TCL 12, 96:1 because in
both cases the noun which follows the word ša is inanimate. Therefore, the present
translation of all the texts of this text-type translates the relative particle ša as “regard-
ing.” This translation is not meant to preclude the possibility that a particular person
is required to testify.
Summary Table 5.1 Summonses to Establish a Case (kunnu)
Text Subtype Requirement Penalty Date Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe
144
written date of Time Appearance Composition

m
OIP general il-la-kam2-ma PN2 must pay 19.XII.4 Du’ūzu (no 106–135 Uruk Uruk Innin-zēra-
lu2
122, 34 mu-kin-ne- amount PN1 Nbk (3/7) day specified) days ušabši/ mNergal-
šu2 . . . ib-ba- establishes (6/15–7/14) šuma-ibni //
kam2-ma Šamšiya
m
Nbk 52 general it-tal-ku- payment of 14.VI.6 Addaru (no 163–193 Larsa City of Liblu /Nergal-
m
ma . . . ik-te-nu barley Nbk (9/15) day specified) days Mušallim- iddin
(2/25–3/26) Marduk
lu2 m
Nbk general mu-kin-ni- payment of 28.IV.28 2.V 4 days Gate Babylon Nabû-a ē-
183 šu2 . . . ip-qi2-di clothing Nbk (7/27) (7/31) iddin/ mŠulaya//
Egibi
m
Nbk exculpatory PN ib-bak- silver 27.XI.30 20.II (5/17) 80 days — Sippar Šamaš-nā ir/
m
227 kam2-[ma] . . . u2- Nbk (2/26) Ša-pî-Bēl //
ka-an-šu2 Mušēzib
m
Nbk exculpatory uk-kin-nu sheep 2.VI.36 — — — Tagretain Nabû-a ē-
chapter five
266 Nbk (8/31) iddin/ mŠulaya//

Egibi
lu2 m
Nbk exculpatory mu-kin-ni-šu2 double payment 21.IV.40 — — — Opis Nabû-a ē-
361 i-tab-kam2-ma (for wrongful Nbk (7/11) iddin//Egibi
seizure of
property)
lu2 m
Nbk general (?) mu-kin-ni-šu2 silver 19.VI.40 ?.VIII 40–70 — Opis Nabû-a ē-
363 ib-ba-kam2-ma Nbk (9/4) [10/14–11/12] days iddin/ mŠulaya//
Egibi
lu2 m
Nbk general mu-kin-ne- silver 7.VIII.40 5.IX 27 days Piqūdu Opis Nabû-a ē-
365 šu2 . . . ib-ba- Nbk (11/17) iddin/ mŠulaya//
kam2-ma (10/20) Egibi
Text Subtype Requirement Penalty Date Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe
written date of Time Appearance Composition
lu2 m
Nbk ? mu-kin-ne- barley 23.VIII.40 a-di 1.IX < 8 days Opis Opis Nabû-a ē-iddin
366 e-šu2 . . . ib-ba- Nbk (by 11/13) / mŠulaya //
kam2-ma (11/5) Egibi
lu2 m
Nbk general mu-kin-ni-šu2 implement 29.I.[40] ?.III 31–59 — Opis Nabû-a ē-iddin
419 ib-ba-kam2-ma Nbk [5/20–6/17] days // Egibi
[4/19]
m
YOS 6, exculpatory PN ib-bak- silver 22.IX.1 10–15.XII 19–23 Uruk Uruk Pir u/ mTabnêa
153 kam2-ma a-na Nbn (2/10) (3/1–3/5) days // Bā iru
PN u2-kan-na
m
Nbn exculpatory tu-uk-tin-nu slave’s 20.XIIa.12 — — — Babylon Nabû-apla-iddin/
m
679 compensation Nbn (3/8) Nummuru //
Mi iraya
m
YOS 7, exculpatory u2-kan-na sheep 27.XI.3 15.XII (3/15) 28 days (Uruk?) Uruk Nādin, mKīnaya,
m
35:14– Cyr (2/15) Mūrānu and
m
20 Balā u, scribes of
the Eanna
m
BIN 1, exculpatory il-la-kam2-ma dates 30.I.1 — (upon — (Uruk?) Uruk Mušēzib-Šamaš /
m
113 u2-ka-nu Camb summons by Ištar-zēra-ibni
text-types calling for evidence
(5/11) authorities)
m
YOS 7, exculpatory lu2mu-kin-ne-e 30-fold 30.III.7 — — (Uruk?) Uruk Nabû-bēlšunu/
192 PN1 i-tab-kam2- penalty Camb Nūrea
ma a-na PN2 (7/3)
uk-ti-in-ni
m
PBS exculpatory PN uk-tal- silver 6.XI.6 — — — Nippur ?
2/1, [lim . . . [Dar II]
145
126 (8/21)
Dates are calculated according to Parker and Dubberstein, Babylonian Chronology. Lengths of time do not include the date of composition.
146 chapter five
In most guarantees for testimony, the guarantor (PN in the above

formula) assumes this obligation because he has attempted to clear
himself of a charge by accusing another person. Thus, as is the case
with the exculpatory kunnu-summonses, the guarantor often faces a
penalty for failure to provide witnessed testimony.24 YOS 6, 208 will
serve as an example. This text also records the questioning that led up
to the assumption of a guarantee. Therefore, it has the added advantage
of setting the scene in which such texts might have been composed,
although most of these texts do not include such a description. The
text reads as follows:25
1. mtab-ne2-e-a A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dEN- (1) mTabnea son of mItti-bēl-tabni;
tab-ni
2. mgi-mil-lu A-šu2 ša2 mZALAG2 -e2-a (2) mGimillu son of mNūr-Ea;
3. mla-ba-ši A-šu2 ša2 mdUTU-ŠEŠ- (3) mLâbāši son of mŠamaš-a a-
MU iddin;
4. i-di- i-DINGIR.MEŠ A-šu2
m
(4) mIdi i-ilī son of mIddin-Nabû;
ša2 mMU-dNA3
5. mnar-gi-ia A-šu2 ša2 mEN-šu2-nu (5) mNargiya son of mBēlšunu;
6. DUMU-DU3-i ša2 ina IGI-
lu2
šu2-nu mgi-mil-lu presence mGimillu son of mInnin-
7. A-šu2 ša2 mdINNIN-na-MU- šuma-ibni25 said thus to mNabû-
DU3 a-na mdNA3-MU-MU šuma-iddin son of mAplaya:
8. A-šu2 ša2 map-la-a iq-bu-u2 um-ma
9. mi-nam-ma GU4 bu-uš-tu4 ša2 (9–10) “Why [. . .] a cow of the
d
GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki Lady-of-Uruk that is bran[ded]
10. ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-en-[de-e-ti . . .] with a star?”
11. mNA3-MU-MU iq-[bu-u2] (11–12) mNabû-šuma-iddin s[aid]
12. um-ma mbal- i-ia [A-šu2 ša2] thus:
13. ša2 mdINNIN-na- NUMUN-TIL (12–16) “From Simānu, year 17
ul-tu ITI SIG4 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon,
14. MU 17-kam2 dNA3-I LUGAL m
Bal iya [son of ] mInnina-zēra-
TIN.TIRki šubši gave it to me for its hire of
15. a-na i-di-šu2 a-na MU.AN.NA 4 kur of barley, 1 pi 4 sūt sesame,
4 GUR ŠE.BAR per year.”
16. 1 (PI) 4 ŠE.GIŠ.I3 id-da-na-aš2
pu-ut
24
See summary table 5.2 below for the variety of penalties. Although YOS 7, 96
does not specify a penalty, it is clear that the guarantor has accused a number of people
about whom he must provide testimony in order to clear himself.
25
This text dates to the beginning of the career of the notorious temple official,
m
Gimillu son of mInnin-šuma-ibni. At that time, he served as the collection official, ša
mu i rē ānu. See Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 102.
17. mu-kin-nu-tu ša2 mbal- i-ia

lu2
(16–18) mNabû-šuma-iddin
18. NA3-MU-MU na-ši U4-mu
md
assumes responsibility for
uk-tin-nu-uš testimony concerning mBal iya.
19. za-ki ia-a-nu 1-en 30 a-na (18–19) On the day he establishes
d
GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki (the case) against him, he is clear.
20. i-nam-din GU4 bu-uš-tu4 mgi- (19–20) If not, he shall pay
mil-lu 30-fold to the Lady-of-Uruk.
21. ina ŠU.2 mdNA3-MU-MU i-ta- (20–21) mGimillu has led the cow
bak u2-il3-ti3 away from mNabû-šuma-iddin.
22. ša2 mdNA3-MU-MU u mbal- i-ia (21–24) mNabû-šuma-iddin shall
it-ti a- a-meš give mGimillu the note that
23. i-il-lu- mdNA3-MU-MU a-na m
Nabû-šuma-iddin and mBal iya
24. mgi-mil-lu i-nam-din drew up together.
lu2
UMBISAG
25. md
NA3-EN-šu2-nu A-šu2 ša2 (24–25) Scribe: mNabû-bēlšunu
m
ZALAG2-e-a son of mNūrea.
26. URU ša2 md
NA3-MU-MU (26) City of mNabû-šuma-iddin.
27. ITI SIG4 U4 9-kam2 (27–29) 9 Simānu, year 17 of
28. MU 17-kam2 dNA3-I Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
29. LUGAL TIN.TIRki
This text is considered a guarantee because it records mNabû-šuma-
iddin’s guarantee to provide testimony about mBal iya (lines 16–18).
m
Nabû-šuma-iddin assumes this responsibility in the wake of questioning
about a branded cow belonging to the Lady-of-Uruk that is apparently
found in his possession. He professes his innocence by informing mGi-
millu, the questioner, that the cow is rented from mBal iya. In order
for mNabû-šuma-iddin to establish his own innocence, he must provide
testimony against mBal iya. If he successfully establishes the case against
m
Bal iya, the text specifically states that mNabû-šuma-iddin is clear of
any obligation (lines 18–19).26 If he is unable to provide the testimony to
establish the case, then he must pay the thirty-fold penalty himself.
From YOS 6, 208 it is apparent that the guarantor’s original accusa-
tion was made in a formal court of law. Although not all guarantees
for testimony provide the same contextual information, there is addi-
tional evidence that suggests that they were also composed in similar
settings. The guarantor in Sack, CuDoc, No. 80 must establish the case
with testimony “in the presence” (ina DU.ZU) of the šatammu and the
26
Sack, CuDoc, No. 80:7 contains a similar clause to indicate that the guarantor is
clear if he provides the testimony.
148 chapter five
administrators of the Eanna.27 Other texts name the authorities involved

in their composition.28 The scribe who wrote TCL 12, 96, mMušēzib-
Marduk son of mKabtiya descendant of Šigûa, is known as one of the
scribes who worked in the Eanna at Uruk.29 This raises the possibility
that the guarantee was composed in the Eanna, perhaps as a result of
a formal complaint raised there, even though the text does not mention
any Eanna authorities.
There was probably official involvement in the composition of Cyr
311, as well, even though it does not name any authorities, either.
In this text, mNargiya has accused a father and a son of falsifying a
marriage document between mNargiya’s son and a slavegirl. The two
accused men have apparently claimed that they are innocent. In order
to clear themselves, they guarantee testimony regarding the role of
m
Mušēzib-Bēl, who ordered them to write the marriage document on
behalf of his master, the owner of the slavegirl. If they do not produce
this testimony then they must compensate mNargiya. This case came to
trial three days later, as can be seen from Cyr 312, a decision record. 30
Unfortunately, the decision record does not include the actual testimony
regarding mMušēzib-Bēl that was to have been provided according to
Cyr 311. Nevertheless, Cyr 312 clearly indicates that the royal judges
rendered the decision in the trial, which suggests that they were involved
in composing Cyr 311, as well.
Most of the guarantees for testimony can be shown to be the result
of the guarantors’ accusations that must be substantiated. In these
cases, the accusations were made during formal hearings after which
the guarantor assumed responsibility for the testimony. One exception
is Nbn 343, which consists only of the following guarantee clause, fol-
lowed by the names of witnesses, scribe and date:
27
Sack, CuDoc, No. 80:5–7.
28
See the summary table.
29
See Kümmel, Familie, p. 118. YOS 6, 153 may provide further support for this
suggestion. This kunnu-summons pertains to the same case and illustrates that the
guarantor failed to meet the obligations of TCL 12, 96. It, too, was written by a scribe
known from the Eanna, mPir u son of mTabnêa descendant of Bā iru (see Kümmel,
Familie, p. 123).
30
See the interpretation offered in Joannès, Justice, pp. 206–207.
1. mMU-MU ¢A-šu2 ša2 mÜdUTU- (1–9) mŠuma-iddin son of

MU-u2-kin m
Šamaš-šuma-ukīn descendant
2. A lu2PA.ŠEki pu-ut lu2mu-kin-nu-tu of Isinaya assumes responsibility
3. ša2 fra-mu-u2-a ša2 flu-u2-bal- a-at for testimony regarding fRamûa,
4. fqal-lat ša2 fbu-ra-šu2 DUMU. that fLū-bal āt, slavegirl of
SAL-su f
Burašu, daughter of mGimillu
5. ša2 mgi-mil-lu A mDU3-eš- descendant of Eppeš-ilī, gave the
DINGIR son to whom she gave birth to
6. ma-ri ša2 tu-ul-li-du-ma f
Ramûa and she na[med] him
7. a-na fra-mu-u2-a ta-ad-di-nu-ma m
Tattadannu.31
8. mtat-at-ta-dan-nu MU-šu 2 ta[z-
ku-ru]
9. na-ši
This text does not impose any penalty upon the guarantor for failure
to provide testimony. Thus, it is not clear that the guarantor must
provide the testimony in order to substantiate an accusation and clear
himself. This text also does not offer any information about the setting
in which this guarantee was composed.31
With the exception of Nbn 343, most of the guarantees seem to have
a purpose similar to that of the exculpatory kunnu summonses. Both
text-types require accusers to present evidence in order to substantiate
their accusations and clear themselves of a charge. Both text-types seem
to have the same function of obtaining evidence. These similarities may
explain why some have referred to these documents as “summonses.”32
This interpretation implies that, like other summonses, these texts were
composed as an order by the court. According to this understanding,
the guarantors play the same role as the summoned individuals who
must provide testimony to substantiate a claim.
The inclusion of the guarantee clause in the texts in this text-type,
however, suggests other possible interpretations. In the summonses, the
verbs in the summons clause are in the iparras form, which bears a modal
sense and allows the understanding of the summonses as orders.33 The
verb in the guarantee clause, however, is in the paris form which does
31
Restored based on Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 2, p. 68 n. 2. It is not clear which
of the two women in the text, fRamûa or fLū-bal āt, named the child mTattadannu.
32
Moore, Documents, p. 97 (regarding TCL 12, 96) and Sack, CuDoc, p. 49 (regard-
ing Sack, CuDoc, No. 80). In both cases, the references are titles for the text and do
not include further discussion.
33
For the function of the iparras as a modal in NB see Michael P. Streck, Zahl und Zeit:
Grammatik der Numeralia und des Verbalsystems im Spätbabylonischen (Cuneiform Monographs 5),
(Groningen 1995), II §8 (pp. 94–98). See also von Soden, GAG §78d–e (p. 102).
150 chapter five
not bear this modal sense.34 This suggests that these documents should
be understood more as descriptions of obligations rather than as actual
orders of the court. Thus, it seems that these documents indicate that the
guarantors have accepted the obligation, either as it has been imposed
by the court or on their own.35 Although the obligation created by the
exculpatory kunnu-summonses and the guarantees for testimony is the
same, the two text-types reflect two different perspectives: the sum-
monses reflect the court’s demands of the summoned individuals, while
the guarantees reflect the guarantors’ acceptance of these demands.
Summary Table 5.2 Guarantees for Testimony

Text Authorities Penalty Place of Scribe Date
Mentioned Composition
Sack, šatammu + 30-fold Uruk m

Nabû-bāni- ?.IV.14 Nbk
CuDoc, No. administrator payment a i/mIbnaya
80 of Eanna // Ekur-zākir
Nbn 343 — — Babylon m
Bullu u ?.III.9 Nbn
TCL 12, — — Uruk m
Mušēzib- 20.VIII.10
96 Marduk/ Nbn
m
Kabtiya //
Šigûa
YOS 6, šatammu of 30-fold Uruk m
Nādinu/ 7.XIIb.12
175 Eanna payment [mBēl-a ] ē- Nbn
iqīša// Egibi
YOS 6, — i- u ša2 Uruk m
Lū i-ana- 22.IX.15
108 LUGAL nūri-Marduk/ Nbn
i-zab-bil m
Nabû-bāni-
a i// Dābibī
YOS 6, 5 mār banî 30-fold City of m
Nabû- 9.III.17 Nbn
208 (+ ša mu i payment Nabû-šuma- bēlšunu son
rē ānu) iddin of mNūrea
34
See Streck, Zahl und Zeit, II §37e–g (pp. 169–173) for the different functions of
this form.
35
For the understanding of these documents as records of accepted obligations, rather
than as summonses, see Raymond P. Dougherty, “Cuneiform Parallels to Solomon’s
Provisioning System,” AASOR 5 (1923–1924), p. 41; Dougherty, Shirkutu, pp. 60–61;
Koschaker, Burgschaftsrecht, pp. 157–160; San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 336; San Nicolò,
Or. 23 (1954), p. 354 and Johannes Renger, “Notes on the Goldsmiths, Jewelers and
Carpenters of the Neo-Babylonian Eanna,” JAOS 91 (1971), p. 500. Most of these
authors do not directly address the question of whether the obligation is self-imposed
or imposed on the guarantor by the court. Note, however, that Dougherty, Shirkutu,
p. 61 specifically states that the guarantor “was required by the temple to become
surety that the facts would be properly presented in court.”

Text Authorities Penalty Place of Scribe Date
Mentioned Composition
Cyr 311 — payment Babylon m

Nabû-mukīn- 8.V.8 Cyr
zēri/ mNabû-
šuma-ēreš //
Ēreb-bīti
YOS 7, 96 šatammu + — Uruk m
Arad- 28.IX.0
administrator Marduk Camb
of Eanna /mMarduk-
šuma-iddin //
Bēl-apla-u ur
5.C Penalties Pending Evidence
Texts of this text-type have the following basic structure:
I. Requirement of evidence
ina ūmu36 lu2mukinnu u lū lu2bātiqu37 ittalkamma38 PN uktinnu ša . . .
On the day that a witness or an informer comes and establishes39
(the case) against PN, that he . . .
II. Penalty against PN
36
The word U4-mu without the preposition ina appears in YOS 17, 32:1 and TCL
12, 50:1. The word ki-i appears instead of ina ūmu in Nbk 104:6 and YOS 6, 204:7.
YOS 6, 177 does not include any opening adverbial phrase. Instead, the requirement of
evidence is embedded in the phrase mim-ma ma-la e-lat 1 ME 30 GUR ZU2.LUM.MA
lu2
mu-kin-nu ana PN u2-kan-nu-u2-¢maÜ ina mu - i-šu2 il-lu-u2-nu (“whatever amount above
130 kur of dates which a witness establishes that he owes”) (YOS 6, 177:6–9).
37
BE 9, 24:6 reads lū bātiqu lū mukinnu. The following texts omit the word lu2bātiqu:
Nbk 104:1; YOS 17, 32:1; TCL 12, 50:1; TCL 12, 70:1; YOS 19, 97:1; YOS 6, 134:1;
YOS 6, 160:1; YOS 6, 179:1; YOS 6, 193:1; YOS 6, 180:1; YOS 6, 177:7; YOS 7,
24:1; YOS 7, 26:1; YOS 7, 141.
38
The following texts omit the verb alāku: Nbk 104:6; TCL 12, 60: 5; YOS 6, 160:4;
GCCI 1, 380:2; YOS 6, 203:3; YOS 6, 191:3; YOS 6, 214:3; YOS 6, 179:3; YOS 6,
193:2; YOS 6, 180:3; AnOr 8, 39:3; YOS 7, 24:3; AnOr 8, 61:18; YOS 7, 141:1.
39
San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 329 n. 4 notes that the word lu2mu-kin-nu is a singular
form which is to be understood as a collective, as at the beginning of the witness lists.
Therefore, he translates all occurrences as plural, even though he translates the word
lu2
ba-ti-qu as a singular. San Nicolò employs this translation even against the evidence of
the apparently singular form it-tal-kam2-ma. Assuming parallelism in the phrase mukinnu
u lū bātiqu, the present translation takes both nouns as singular. Additional support for
the translation in the singular may be found in the verbal form uk-ti-i-in (referring to the
152 chapter five

IV. Date
Texts of this text-type impose a penalty upon individuals should evidence

against them, usually testimony,40 become available. YOS 6, 122 will
serve as the first example of this text-type:
1. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu lu-u2 (1–10) On the day that a witness
lu2
ba-ti-qu or an informer comes and
2. it-tal-kam2-ma mlu-u2-šu-um-mu establishes (the case) against
3. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-NUMUN- m
Lušummu son of mNabû-zēra-
DU3 lu2 uruia-a-šu-ba-a-a ibni descendant of Yašubaya, that
4. uk-tin-nu ša2 KU6. I.A ina he unlawfully fished fishes from
GARIN.MEŠ ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 the pools of the Lady-of-Uruk
UNU[Gki] above the king’s canal, (and that)
5. ša2 ina UGU ID2 LUGAL a- he unlawfully carried off willow,
na ši-gil-ti poplar, reeds and straw from the
6. i-ba-a-ri giš i-li-pu giš ar-ba-ti fields, forests and marshes of the
7. GI.MEŠ u3 giš u- a-bi Lady-of-Uruk
8. a-na ši-gil-ti ul-tu
9. A.ŠA3.MEŠ gišTIR u3 gišAMBAR
10. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki iš-šu-u2
11. 1-en 30 a-na dGAŠAN ša2 (11) He shall pay 30-fold to the
UNUGki i-nam-din Lady-of-Uruk.
12. ina DU.ZU ša2 mdNA3- (12–13) In the presence of
LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG m
Nabû-šarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri
LUGAL administrator of the Eanna.
13. lu2EN pi-qit-ti E2.AN.NA
witness) in Nbk 104:7, the relevant line in this text. The (erroneous) ommission of the
u reveals that, at least in the scribe’s mind, the form agrees with a singular subject,
and that the final u should be taken only as a marker of the subjunctive and not as
a marker of the plural. Similarly, the apparently singular form lu2ba-ti-iq, without the
ambiguous final vowel, occurs in AnOr 8, 61:17. Note that the form lu2mu-kin-nu-ne-e
in YOS 6, 180:3 and the verbal form u2-kan-nu-¢nimÜ-ma in YOS 7, 141:9 may indicate
that more than one witness was required in these texts. The verb alāku, which might
have provided further evidence, does not appear in either of these texts. Translation
with singular forms follows Raymond P. Dougherty, Nabonidus and Belshazzar: A Study of
the Closing Events of the Neo-Babylonian Empire (YOR 15) (New Haven, 1929), p. 114 and
“The Babylonian Principle of Suretyship as Administered by Temple Law,” AJSL 46
(1929–1930), pp. 73–103 (see also the note in GCCI 1, p. 67 regarding GCCI 1, 380);
Moore’s translations of TCL 12, 50 and similar documents in Moore, Documents; Renger,
JAOS 91 (1971), pp. 501–503; Cardascia, Archives, p. 184; Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp.
83–86 and Beaulieu’s note regarding YOS 19, 98 (YOS 19, p. 14).
40
In addition to testimony, TCL 12, 60:4 and BE 9, 24:5–6 mention the possibility
that the suspect himself is found in possession of the missing objects. YOS 6, 204 does
not specify the type of evidence which might become available.
14. mu-kin-nu mdin-nin-na-

lu2
(14–15) Witnesses: mIninna-šarra-
LUGAL-URI3 u ur son of mNergal-ušallim
15. A-šu2 ša2 mdU.GUR-GI A descendant of Sîn-lēqi-uninnī;
md
30-TI-ER2
16. mna-din A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-ŠEŠ. (16) mNādin son of mBēl-a ē-
MEŠ-BA-ša2 A me-gi-bi iqīša descendant of Egibi;
17. mKAR-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 (17–18) mMušēzib-Marduk son of
ša2 mdEN-TIN-i m
Bēl-uballi descendant of Amēl-
18. A mLU2-dIDIM lu2UMBISAG Ea;
md
15-DU-A (18–19) Scribe: mIštar-mukīn-apli
19. A-šu2 ša2 mdin-nin-NUMUN- son of mInnin-zēra-šubši.
GAL2-ši
20. UNUGki ITI GAN U4 8-kam2 (20–21) Uruk. 8 Kislīmu, year 9
MU 9-kam2 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
21. dNA3-I LUGAL TIN.TIRki
The main purpose of this text is the imposition of the thirty-fold penalty
upon mLušummu if a witness comes and establishes that he unlawfully
fished or gathered wood from the property of the Lady-of-Uruk. Most
other texts of this text-type also involve similar violations of temple
property. Accordingly, the penalty imposed is thirty-fold payment to the
temple.41 In other texts, which do not specifically pertain to violations of
temple property, additional factors indicate that the payment imposed
is actually a penalty for some wrongdoing. Thus, for example, BE 9,
24 uses the expression ina qāt ibitti (“in possession of stolen goods”) to
describe the possibility that the accused might be found in wrongful
possession of stolen sheep.42
From the basic outline and the text quoted above one might argue
that texts of this text-type are issued in order to prevent any wrong-
doing. This interpretation is implicit in Dougherty’s brief description
of YOS 6, 122 as a “provision for supplying the temple with fish and
wood.”43 According to this understanding, YOS 6, 122 was written when
m
Lušummu was employed to provide fish and wood to the Lady-of-Uruk.
41
YOS 19, 98 and AnOr 8, 61 both involve violations against the Eanna but
impose other penalties.
42
For discussion of this idiom see CAD ibittu 4 ( , pp. 156–157).
43
YOS 6, p. 44. See Dougherty’s similar descriptions of other such texts in YOS 6,
pp. 41–47 and Tremayne’s descriptions in YOS 7, pp. 43–48. Similarly, see Dougherty’s
description of YOS 6, 134 in “A Babylonian City in Arabia,” AJA 34 (1930), p. 310.
Note, however that Dougherty’s description of YOS 6, 134 in YOS 6, p. 44 and of
GCCI 1, 380 in GCCI 1, p. 67 both mention “action upon the decision of a witness.”
Dougherty’s wording implies that these two texts were not issued as preventative mea-
sures against future misdeeds, but were, instead, issued in light of an actual suspicion.
154 chapter five
Should a witness ever testify that mLušummu abused his position and
took fish or wood for himself, then mLušummu would have to pay thirty-
fold. If this interpretation is correct, then the texts of this text-type do
not belong in a discussion of the adjudicatory process since they were
not issued during the adjudication of disputes.
There are, however, other existing interpretations of the penalties
pending evidence that situate this text-type within the adjudicatory
process. San Nicolò describes the adjudicatory context in which these
texts were written, and specifically rules out the possibility that these
texts are “Beweisverträge” (“evidence-contracts”) drawn up between two
parties outside the context of legal proceedings.44 Cocquerillat offers
a similar description of the “procès-verbaux” (“oral proceedings”) that
resulted in the issuance of these texts.45 Weisberg emphasizes the role
of an official adjudicating body by listing YOS 17, 32 among “court
documents” and by labeling OIP 122, 35 as a “court order.”46
The texts themselves indicate that the penalties pending evidence
were issued during the adjudication of legal disputes. For example,
TCL 12, 70 reads as follows:
1. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu it-tal- (1–8) On the day that a witness
kam2-ma comes and establishes (the case)
2. a-na mina-gišMI-dINNIN lu2qal-la against mIna- illi-Ištar, slave of
3. ša2 mMU-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 m
Iddin-Marduk son of E ēru, that
ša2 me- e3-ru he opened the storehouses where
4. uk-tin-nu ša2 qa-ra-a-tu4 ša2 m
Nabû-ušabši son of mNabû-zēra-
ŠE.BAR ukīn placed the tithe-barley of the
5. eš-ru-u2 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 Lady-of-Uruk, and took (it)—
UNUGki ša2 mdNA3-GAL2-ši
6. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-NUMUN-
DU ina lib3-bi id-du-u
7. u mina-gišMI-dINNIN ip-tu-u2-ma
8. iš-šu-u2 ŠE.BAR ma-la iš-šu-u2
9. NA3-GAL2-ši MU
md
(8–12) mNabû-ušabši shall swear
DINGIR.MEŠ u2-še-el-li-ma (to) whatever amount of barley he
10. ŠE.BAR ma-la ina lib3-bi id- deposited therein, and whatever
du-u2 barley he (mIna- illi-Ištar) took,
11. 1-en 30 mina-gišMI-dINNIN he shall repay thirty-fold to the
a-na Lady-of-Uruk.
12. dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-nam-
<din> ki-i
44
San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 333 n. 1.
45
Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, pp. 85–86.
46
YOS 17, p. 2 and OIP 122, p. 60.
13. lu2mu-kin-nu la uk-tin-nu-uš (12–14) If a witness does not

14. mina-gišMI-dINNIN za-ki ina establish (the case) against him,
DU.ZU m
Ina- illi-Ištar is clear.
15. ša2 mKAR-dAMAR.UTU (14–15) In the presence of
lu2
qi2-i-pi ša2 E2.AN.NA m
Mušēzib-Nabû, qīpu-official of
the Eanna;
16. mDU3-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN. (16–17) mBāniya, šatammu of the
NA A-šu2 ša2 Eanna, son of Tabnêa descendant
17. mtab-ne-e-a A lu2ŠU. A mdEN- of Bā iru;
na-din-A (17–18) mBēl-nādin-apli son of
18. A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN-TIN. m
Zēr-Bābili descendant of Ile i-
TIRki A mDA-dAMAR.UTU Marduk;
19. mtab-ne-e-a A-šu2 ša2 NA3-
md
(19) mTabnêa son mNabû-īpuš;
DU3-uš
20. lu2
UMBISAG mna-din A-šu2 ša2 (20–21) Scribe: mNādin son of
md
EN-ŠEŠ.ME-BA-ša2 m
Bēl-a ē-iqīša descendant of
Egibi;
21. A me-gi-bi UNUGki ITI (21–23) Uruk. 15 Addaru II, year
DIRI.ŠE.KIN.KUD 3 of Neriglissar, king of Babylon.
22. U4 15-kam2 MU 3-kam2
d
U.GUR-LUGAL-URI3
23. LUGAL TIN.TIRki
This text imposes a thirty-fold penalty upon mIna- illi-Ištar should a wit-
ness come and establish that he stole tithe-grain. In addition, however,
the clause in lines 12–14 states that mIna- illi-Ištar is “clear” (zaki ) if a
witness does not establish the case against him. This additional notice,
which does not appear in other texts of this text-type, implies that
m
Ina- illi-Ištar has actually been accused of stealing the tithe barley and
is now under suspicion. This suspicion must be confirmed before he
can be penalized. Thus, TCL 12, 70 shows that the penalties pending
evidence were not composed as a preventative measure, before any
suspicion arose. Instead, texts like this were composed in the face of
actual suspicions in need of confirmation.
In addition, TCL 12, 70 provides some insight into the court setting
in which it was composed. It indicates that it was composed “in the
presence of ” (ina DU.ZU) authorities of the Eanna. The use of this phrase
in this text, as well as in others of this text-type, suggests that these
texts were composed during a formal hearing.47 This formal hearing
The following texts use the phrase ina DU.ZU: TCL 12, 70:14; YOS 6, 122:12;
47
YOS 6, 148:12; YOS 6, 134:9; GCCI 1, 380:11; TCL 12, 106:12; YOS 6, 203:18;
156 chapter five
would be the forum in which the initial accusation against the suspect
was raised. In response to this accusation, the authorities present had
the penalty pending evidence drawn up by the scribe.
Besides the use of the prepositional phrase ina DU.ZU in TCL 12,
70, support for the understanding that the penalties pending evidence
were drawn up during formal proceedings comes from two features of
other texts. These two features are: records of the accused individual’s
statement and guarantees for the appearance of the accused individual.
Both of these features are present in YOS 6, 191. In this text, mNabû-
ē ir is suspected of having received silver and gold from two smiths
who have pilfered precious metals of the Eanna.48 If a witness or an
informer establishes the case against mNabû-ē ir, then he must repay
thirty times the amount that the witness or informer establishes. The
text, in its entirety, reads as follows:
1. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu lu-u2 lu2ba-ti-qu (1–8) On the day that a witness
2. mdNA3-KAR-ir A-šu2 ša2 mdEN- or informer establishes (that)
ŠEŠ-GAL2-ši A mDIL-SUR m
Nabû-ē ir son of mBēl-a a-
3. uk-kin-nu lu-u2 KU3.BABBAR lu-u šubši descendant of Eda-ē ir
KU3.GI ina ŠU.2 mKI-dUTU-TIN had received silver or gold
4. tab-la-nu u3 mkal3-bi-dba-u2 lu2KU3. from mItti-Šamaš-balā u, the
TIM tab-la-nu pilferer, or mKalbi-Bau, the
5. A-šu2 ša2 mna-di-nu im- u-ru e-lat goldsmith, the pilferer, son of
8 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR m
Nādinu, apart from the 8
6. ša2 mdNA3-KAR-ir iq-bu-u2 um-ma šeqels of silver about which
3 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR a-na m
Nabû-ē ir said thus: “He gave
7. 1 TUG2.KUR.RA u3 5 GIN2 me 3 šeqels of silver for a
KU3.BABBAR ‘mountain cloak’ and 5 šeqels
a-na NINDA. I.A u3 KAŠ. I.A of silver for bread and beer”—
8. id-dan-nu mim-ma ma-la lu2mu-kin-nu
9. u2-ka-an-nu-šu2 1-en 30 a-na (8–10) whatever the witness
d
GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki establishes against him he shall
10. i-nam-din mri-mut A-šu2 ša2 mdEN- pay 30-fold to the Lady-of-
SEŠ-GAL2-ši Uruk.
YOS 6, 214:14; YOS 6, 204:10; AnOr 8, 39:15–16; YOS 7, 141:12; YNER 1, 2:11.
See the summary table for the different authorities mentioned.
48
For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding this case, see Renger, JAOS
91 (1971), pp. 494–503 and Wells, Testimony, p. 115.
11. A mDIL-SUR u3 mdNA3- (10–13) mRīmūt son of mBēl-

ŠEŠ-TIN-i A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- a a-šubši descendant of
NUMUN-DU Eda-ē ir and mNabû-a a-
12. A lu2ka-si-dak pu-ut mdNA3-KAR-ir bulli son of mNabû-zēra-ukīn
13. na-šu-u2 U4-mu lu2ŠA3.TAM u descendant of Kasidak assume
lu2
UMBISAG.ME ša2 E2.AN.[NA] responsibility for mNabû-ē ir.
14. re-eš-šu i-na-aš2-šu-u ib-ba-ku-nim-ma (13–15) The day that the
15. i-nam-di-su šatammu or the scribes of the
Eanna summon him, they shall
bring (him) and hand him over.
16. mu-kin-nu md30-KAM2 A-šu2
lu2
(16) Witnesses: mSîn-ēreš son of
ša2 mdNA3-MU-GIŠ A mDU3- m
Nabû-šumu-līšir descendant
DINGIR of Ibni-Ilī;
17. mIR3-dEN A-šu2 ša2 m il-la-a A (17) mArad-Bēl son of m illaya
m
MU-dPAP.SUKKAL descendant of Iddin-Papsukkal;
18. md
DI.KU5-ŠEŠ.ME-MU A-šu2 (18) mMadānu-a ē-iddin son of
ša2 mŠU A mši-gu-u2-a m
Gimillu descendant of Šigûa;
19. in-nin-MU-PAP A-šu2 ša2
md
(19) mInnin-šuma-u ur son of
m
MU-dNA3 A mki-din-dAMAR. m
Iddin-Nabû descendant of
UTU Kidin-Marduk;
20. md
NA3-IBILA-MU A-šu2 ša2 (20) mNabû-apla-iddin son of
m
DU3-d15 A mE2.KUR-za-kir m
Ibni-Ištar descendant of Ekur-
zākir;
21. mpir- u A-šu2 ša2 mtab-ne-e-a A (21) mPir u son of mTabnêa
lu2
ŠU.KU6 descendant of Bā iru.
22. mu-kin-nu49 mmu-ra-nu A-šu2 ša2
lu2
(22–23) Scribe: mMūrānu son
NA3-DU3-ŠEŠ
md
of mNabû-bāni-a i descendant
23. A mE2.KUR-za-kir UNUGki ITI of Ekur-zākir.
ŠE.KIN.KUD
24. U4 12-kam2 MU 12-kam2 dNA3- (23–24) Uruk. 12 Addaru II, year
IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki 12 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
Apart49from stipulating that a witness or an informer must establish

the case against mNabû-ē ir, the requirement of evidence also quotes
m
Nabû-ē ir’s own statement. mNabû-ē ir has stated that he received
eight šeqels for a “mountain cloak” and food. The thirty-fold penalty
applies only to any additional silver or gold that a witness can prove
49
The repetition of lu2mu-kin-nu is a scribal error. The text should read lu2UMBISAG.
m
Mūrānu is known to have been a scribe (Kümmel, Familie, p. 118).
158 chapter five
that he received. It seems that mNabû-ē ir made this statement in order

to justify his possession of the eight šeqels of silver. The statement seems
to be a formal declaration and suggests that it was made in response to
an accusation that is not recorded. If this is indeed the correct under-
standing, then the quotation of mNabû-ē ir’s statement indicates that
YOS 6, 191 was issued as part of the formal proceedings in which both
the accusation and the declaration in response were made. Other texts
that include similar quotations were probably written during similar
proceedings.50
Following the penalty pending evidence, YOS 6, 191 also records
that two men assume responsibility for mNabû-ē ir’s appearance. When
the šatammu and the scribes of the Eanna summon mNabû-ē ir, these
guarantors must bring mNabû-mukīn-zēri and hand him over to the
authorities. This stipulation provides additional evidence that YOS 6,
191 was written as part of an official hearing. In this text, and in oth-
ers with similar guarantees,51 it seems that the officials are involved in
the case from the very beginning. They hear (or perhaps even bring)
the charge against the accused, and they will decide if the evidence
requires the accused to be presented.
It is clear, then, that the penalties pending evidence were written
during formal adjudicatory proceedings in the wake of a suspicion of
wrongdoing. Thus, they definitely belong in a discussion of the adjudi-
catory process. Nevertheless, situating the penalties pending evidence
within that process remains difficult. Köhler and Peiser’s use of the
term “Vorentscheidung” (“preliminary decision”) to describe the penal-
ties pending evidence best characterizes the ambiguity that these texts
present.52 On the one hand, they are preliminary; they still require the
presentation of evidence before the penalty can be imposed. On the
other hand, they also seem to reflect a decision made in the face of a
suspicion or an accusation.
Some scholars see the penalties pending evidence as the reflection
of an intermediate stage towards a trial. Moore interprets the different
penalties pending evidence in TCL 12 as “accusations pending trial.”53
50
The relevant texts are: YOS 19, 98:7–8; GCCI 1, 380:6–8; TCL 12, 106:6–8;
YOS 6, 191:6–8; YOS 6, 204:1–7; YOS 6, 179:6–9; YOS 6, 193:3–6; YOS 6, 177:1–5;
AnOr 8, 39:10–12; AnOr 8, 61:7–17; YNER 1, 2:1–10.
51
YOS 6, 191:13–15; YOS 6, 214:12–13; YOS 6, 193:11–15.
52
53
See the headings in Moore, Documents.
Similarly, Cardascia interprets BE 9, 24 using the Latin juridical term

litis contestatio, which means “the final agreement of the parties to a suit
on the issue to be decided.”54 The texts that mention a summons by the
temple officials would support this line of interpretation: if ample evi-
dence would turn up, then the accused individual would be summoned
to face the officials. The difficulty with this interpretation, however, is
that these texts record the penalties to be imposed upon presentation
of evidence. It seems, therefore, that there is no opportunity for the
accused individual to make his case before the judges. These texts seem
to reflect the presumption that the accused individual is guilty, and that
there would not be any “trial” to clarify his status.
Other interpretations recognize the apparent finality expressed in
the penalties pending evidence. San Nicolò, like Köhler and Peiser
before him, labels these texts “Beweisurteile” (“evidence-judgments”).55
Similarly, Cocquerillat calls these texts “condamnations de principe” (“judg-
ments in principle”)56 and Beaulieu refers to them as “indictments.”57
All of these labels imply that the penalties pending evidence reflect the
fact that, to a certain degree, the case against the accused has already
been decided. As San Nicolò suggests, if the evidence was actually
provided, it would lead directly to the punishment of the accused “ohne
neurliche Urteilsfällung” (“without a new passing of sentence”).58 In the
wake of the accusation, the authorities issue their ruling, which will
take effect as soon as evidence can be provided. The penalties pending
evidence, according to this understanding, are not “summonses” that
require another appearance in court. Instead, they are the outcome
of a trial that has not yet reached a definite conclusion. The available
evidence is not sufficient to prove that the accused individual is guilty,
and the accused does not readily admit guilt, either. Nevertheless, the
accusation has created enough of a suspicion to warrant maintaining a
record against the accused, should the evidence prove that the accused
is actually guilty.
54
Cardascia, Archives, p. 184. For the definition of the Latin term, see Brian A.
Garner, ed. Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul, 1999), p. 945. Note that Cardascia’s label
suggests that a court has not yet been involved in the dispute or in the issuance of
the document.
55
Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 4, p. 85; San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 328–333. See
also Renger, JAOS 91 (1971), p. 500.
56
Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 83; pp. 85–86.
57
YOS 19, pp. 13–14.
58
San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 334.
160 chapter five
Summary Table 5.3 Penalties Pending Evidence

Text Charge Penalty Authority Place of Scribe Date
Composition
Nbk misappropriation 30-fold assembly — m

Mukīn-apli / 14 Nbk
104 of goods payment of elders of m
Bāniya
Šamaš
YOS misappropriation 30-fold — Babylon m
Ibni-Ištar/ 15.II.19
17, 32 of sheep payment m
Nabû- Nbk
zēra-ibni//
Šatammu
TCL misappropriation 30-fold — Šarrabanu m
Nabû-bāni- 4.[IX].[35]
12, 50 of animals payment a i/ mIbnaya// Nbk
Ekur-zākir
TCL misappropriation lu2sa-ar- rāb širki Babylon m
Nabû-bēlšunu 9.I.1 Amēl-
12, 60 of she-ass ri . . . iš- / mBēl-a a- Marduk
šu-u2 šubši // Amēl-
(“he is a Ea
thief ”)
TCL misappropriation 30-fold qīpu-official Uruk m
Nādin/ mBēl- 15.XIIb.3
12, 70 of tithe barley payment and šatammu a ē-iqīša// Ngl
of the Eanna Egibi
YOS unlawful 30-fold — Uruk m
Nabû-bāni- 25.II.8 Nbn
19, 97 purchase payment a i/ mNabû-
balāssu-iqbi //
Sîn-lēqi-uninnī
YOS misappropriation payment — Uruk m
Mušēzib- 26.II.8 Nbn
19, 98 of precious Marduk/
items m
Bēl-uballi //
Amēl-Ea
YOS unlawful fishing 30-fold administrator Uruk m
Ištar-mukīn- 8.IX.9 Nbn
6, 122 payment of Eanna apli / mInnin-
zēra-šubši
YOS unlawful fishing 30-fold administrator Uruk m
Ištar-mukīn- 8.IX.9 Nbn
6, 148 payment of Eanna apli/ mInnin-
zēra-šubši
YOS unlawful sale of 30-fold administrator Uruk m
Šumaya/ 19.V.10
6, 134 camel payment of Eanna m
Ibni-Ištar // Nbn
Ašlakku
YOS misappropriation 30-fold — Uruk m
Ina-tēšê-ē ir / 21.XII.11
6, 160 of barley payment m
Nabû-mušētiq- Nbn
uddê // Egibi
OIP misappropriation 30-fold — Uruk m
Balā u / mSîn- 20.V.12
122, of barley payment ibni // Rē i- Nbn
35 alpi
GCCI misappropriation payment adminisrator Uruk m
Balā u/ mSîn- 20.V.12
1, 380 of barley and šatammu ibni // Rē i- Nbn
of Eanna alpi

Composition
TCL misappropriation 30-fold administrator Uruk m

Balā u / mSîn- 23.V.12
12, of barley payment and šatammu ibni // Rē i- Nbn
106 of Eanna alpi
YOS misappropriation 30-fold šatammu of Uruk m
Kīnaya / 5.XIIb.12
6, 203 of gold payment Eanna m
Zēriya Nbn
YOS misappropriation 30-fold (šatammu and Uruk m
Mūrānu/ 12.XIIb.12
6, 191 of gold payment scribes of m
Nabû-bāni-a i Nbn
Eanna) // Ekur-zākir
YOS misappropriation 30-fold (šatammu) Uruk m
Mūrānu/ 12.XIIb.12
6, 214 of gold payment m
Nabû-bāni-a i Nbn
// Ekur-zākir
YOS misappropriation 30-fold qīpu, šatammu Uruk m
Nabû-mukīn- 11.IV.13
6, 204 of dates payment and ša mu i apli / PN Nbn
quppu ša šarri
of Eanna
Nādinu/ mBēl- 12.X.13
6, 179 of goods payment a ē-iqīša// Nbn
Egibi
YOS misappropriation 30-fold (šatammu of Uruk m
Nādin/ mBēl- 12.X.13
6, 193 of goods payment Eanna) a ē-iqīša// Nbn
Egibi
Lâbāši- 12.XI.13
6, 180 of hides payment Marduk/mBēl- Nbn
ē ir // ābi u
YOS misappropriation 30-fold šatammu and Uruk m
Nādin/ mBēl- 7.VII.16
6, 177 of dates payment administrator a ē-iqīša// Nbn
of Eanna Egibi
AnOr misappropriation 30-fold šatammu and Uruk m
Nādin/ mBēl- 29.XI.2 Cyr
8, 39 of produce payment administrator a ē-iqīša//
of Eanna Egibi
YOS unlawful sale or 30-fold — Uruk m
Gimillu / 16.V.3 Cyr
7, 24 receipt of barley payment m
Innin-zēra-
iddin
YOS unlawful receipt 30-fold — Uruk m
Nabû-mukīn- 23.VIII.3
7, 26 of barley payment apli/ mMarduk- Cyr
šuma-iddin //
Balā u
AnOr misappropriation i - u ša2 šatammu, Uruk m
Marduk-nā ir/ 23.IV. 8
8, 61 of cattle LUGAL administrator, m
Madānu-a a- Cyr
i-šad-da- 2 messengers iddin// Šigûa
du of Gobryas
162 chapter five

Composition
YOS misappropriation 30-fold administrator Uruk m

Arad-Marduk/ 10.V.3
7, 141 of sheep payment of Eanna m
Marduk-šuma- Camb
iddin //Bēl-
apla-u ur
YNER misappropriation 30-fold qīpu-official + [Uruk] m
Itti-Marduk- 12.IV.2 Dar
1, 2 of dates payment administrator balā u/ mNabû-
+ i- of Eanna mukīn-apli //
u ša2 Dābibī
LUGAL
i-šad-dad
BE 9, theft of sheep payment — Nippur m
Nusku-iddin/ 8.I.31
24 m
Arad-Gula Artaxerxes
5.D Summary Discussion of Texts-Types Calling for Evidence
The discussion until this point has presented three different text-types,
all of which serve as means of obtaining evidence:
1) The kunnu-summonses, which are apparently court orders that

require the summoned individual to “establish the case” against
other individuals.
2) The guarantees for testimony, in which the guarantors assume the
responsibility for establishing the case in order to clear themselves.
3) The penalties pending evidence, which are a means of requiring
evidence to substantiate a suspicion.
Examples from all three text-types suggest that they were composed
during formal proceedings. The requirement for evidence is the result
of a charge made in court. Whether the case will return to court is a
matter that remains open. Phrased in somewhat modern terms, all of
these texts raise the question of whether they were written during the
evidentiary phase of the trial or during the sentencing. As has been
seen above, there are those who interpret all three types of texts as
“summonses,” which implies that the case remains open and awaits a
final ruling. It may be, however, that all three text-types represent the
end of the court’s involvement. Accordingly, the kunnu-summonses may
not serve as summonses at all, but are, instead, “contracts” written by
the court for the parties after a complaint. Similarly, the guarantees for
testimony may also reflect the final result of proceedings. The court’s
involvement ends with the guarantor’s assumption of the obligation to
present the testimony. The penalties pending evidence may also reflect
the end of proceedings, if they are understood as sentences which will
take effect when evidence becomes available.
One difference between the kunnu-summonses and the guarantees for
testimony, on the one hand, and the penalties pending evidence, on the
other, is that while the summonses and guarantees specifically name
the person who must present the evidence, the penalties pending evidence
do not impose any obligation on any specific individual. The formu-
lation of the penalties pending evidence might be characterized as hypo-
thetical; the penalty applies on any day that a witness might come. Unlike
the kunnu summonses and the guarantees for testimony, they do not
require anyone to “bring” (abāku) the witnesses or establish the case.59
The kunnu-summonses and guarantees for testimony, on the other hand,
impose an obligation on particular individuals to present the evidence.
In relating these three text-types to the two other types of summonses,
the dabābu- and quttû-types, an additional factor that must be considered
is the imposition of a deadline. Both the dabābu- and the quttû-types of
summonses impose a deadline on which or by which the case is to be
settled. Penalties pending evidence do not specify a date on which or by
which the evidence must be brought, nor do most of the guarantees for
testimony. Most of the kunnu summonses impose deadlines, although
there are some that do not. Bruce Wells, whose analysis is summarized
in the discussion of Neo-Babylonian legal procedure in Raymond
Westbrook’s A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, uses the presence or
absence of a deadline to distinguish between the five text-types. Based on
this crucial factor, Wells characterizes all five text-types as follows:
There are a number of records attesting to the use of a conditional
verdict. The condition was almost always that another witness appear
before the court and offer testimony in support of a particular party’s
version of the facts. That party then had the responsibility for meeting the
condition by producing the additional witness. The verdict states that if
59
Note that YOS 17, 32:1; YOS 6, 160:1 and YOS 6, 180:1 designate the witness
as ša (“of ”) a named individual, who is apparently the accuser. In a way, then, these
texts do specify who is responsible for providing the testimony. Nevertheless, even these
texts do not require the named individual to bring the witnesses. Like other penalties
pending evidence, they govern the case in which a witness “comes.”
164 chapter five
the condition is fulfilled, that party wins the case; if not, victory would
be for the opposing party. If the accuser had established a prima facie
case, then the court would place the burden on the accused to produce
an exculpatory witness, often with a deadline to appear (e.g., Nbk 366:
one week). If a prima facie case had not been established in the court’s
opinion, as in the case of a thief who identifies the accused as receiver
of the stolen goods, the burden is on the accuser, with no deadline (cf.
YOS 6, 191, 214, and 235).60
According to this interpretation, all five text-types—the dabābu-, quttû-
and kunnu-summonses, the guarantees for testimony and the penalties
pending evidence—turn out to be different ways of recording a “condi-
tional verdict.” The main distinction to be made is between those texts
that include a deadline and those that do not. Whenever a deadline
is imposed, it is the accused who must bring “exculpatory witnesses.”
When a deadline is not imposed, it is the accuser who must bring the
witnesses.
The dabābu- and quttû-summonses support the correlation between
the imposition of a deadline and the placement of the burden to estab-
lish the case upon the accused individual. As has been demonstrated,
both of these types of summonses require a defendant (“the accused”)
to respond to the claim of a plaintiff (“the accuser”) on or by a certain
date. Wells indicates, however, that this correlation is correct “often,”
but not always. Several general kunnu-summonses provide examples of
exceptions to Wells’s proposed correlation. These general kunnu-sum-
monses do not impose penalties upon the summoned individuals and
thus do not indicate that they have been accused of any wrongdoing.61
Nevertheless, these texts do impose a deadline on which the sum-
moned individual must provide the evidence. These texts demonstrate,
then, that the inclusion of a deadline, does not, of itself, imply that an
“accuser has established a prima facie case” against the person who
must bring the evidence.62
60
Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, pp. 922–923. For the attribution of this
position to Wells, see p. 922 n. 46.
61
OIP 122, 34; Nbk 52; Nbk 183; Nbk 365; Nbk 419.
62
Wells clarifies his suggested correlation between the assignment of the burden
of presenting evidence and whether or not a prima facie case has been established
in Wells, Testimony, pp. 124–126. Wells’s interpretation of the textual evidence is not
entirely convincing. For instance, on p. 126 Wells posits that in YOS 6, 169 the accuser
is able to prove that he owns the sheep found in the accused’s possession and that as
a result, the accused is required to present exculpatory evidence. It is clear that the
accused is required to defend himself and that he is unable to show any “accounts for
The penalties pending evidence, which do not include a deadline,

support the correlation between the lack of a deadline and the place-
ment of the burden to establish the case upon the accuser. An accuser
who wished to see the accused individual pay the penalty would have to
present the necessary evidence. Wells’s interpretation, however, seems
to imply that, unlike in texts with deadlines, the evidence required by
all texts without deadlines would not be exculpatory. Yet there are
guarantees for testimony without deadlines in which the guarantors
must present the evidence because they themselves have been accused
of some wrongdoing.63 The evidence that is to be brought is, therefore,
also exculpatory. Thus, the absence of a deadline does not necessarily
imply that the accuser is above suspicion nor does it necessarily imply
that the evidence to be brought is not exculpatory.
Based on this discussion, Wells’s correlation between the presence
or absence of a deadline and the party who must bring the evidence
does not seem to hold true in all cases. In addition, by distinguishing
between functions based on the presence or absence of a deadline,
Wells ignores the stylistic differences between summonses, guarantees
and penalties pending evidence. Instead, his interpretation subsumes
all five text-types under the label of “conditional verdicts.” However,
the stylistic differences between summonses, guarantees and penalties
pending evidence may point to a functional difference. It is possible that
the summonses and guarantees impose an obligation on a particular
individual, and require the summoned individual or the guarantor
to actually take action. The penalties pending evidence, on the other
hand, may not require any additional action to be taken. It is not clear,
therefore, that the penalties pending evidence impose any obligation
upon the accuser.
proof ” (KA2 u3 i-da-ti ) (lines 14–17). However, the text itself does not mention that
the accuser has presented any “documents in his favor,” as Wells suggests. Taken on
its own, the text indicates that the action against the accused occurs simply because of
the accusation, not because the accuser has “established a prima facie case.”
63
Cyr 311, Sack, CuDoc, No. 80 and YOS 6, 208.
CHAPTER SIX
TEXT-TYPES ENSURING AN INDIVIDUAL’S PRESENCE
The two text-types that will be considered next are those meant to
ensure the presence of another individual: the abāku summonses and the
guarantees for an individual’s presence. Before turning to a description
of the two text-types themselves, however, some issues that arise from
their wording must be addressed. The formulation of both text-types
closely resembles the formulation of guarantees for regular debts. In
the Neo-Babylonian period, guarantees for regular debts may be for-
mulated in one of two ways.1 The first, known by the German term
Gestellungsbürgschaft (“presentation-guarantee”), requires the guarantors to
“bring” (abāku) the debtors and “give” (nadānu) them to the creditors. If
the guarantors do not present the debtors at the appointed time, then
the guarantors must repay the debt themselves.2 The second formulation
of the guarantee for debts, known as Stillesitzbürgschaft (“guarantee of
sitting still”), requires the guarantors to ensure that the debtors remain
available to repay the debt and do not go anywhere. The guarantors
must repay the debt if the debtors should escape.
The abāku-summonses and the guarantees for an individual’s pres-
ence closely resemble the Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees. Because of
this similarity, these two text-types raise the question of whether any
particular text is simply a guarantee for a regular debt and is thus
not pertinent to a discussion of adjudicatory procedure.3 In order to
address this question, the discussion of each text-type will identify
those particular features of the texts that move them out of the general
1
For the original distinction between the two types of guarantees see Koschaker,
Bürgschaftsrecht, p. 50.
2
See Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, pp. 42–45 and the the ensuing discussion of “Gestel-
lungsbürgschaft,” pp. 50–54; San Nicolò, “Bürgschaft,” RLA 2, especially p. 78; Joachim
Oelsner, “The Neo-Babylonian Period,” in Raymond Westbrook and Richard Jasnow,
eds. Security for Debt in Ancient Near Eastern Law (Leiden, 2001), p. 300 and Raymond
Westbrook, “Conclusions,” in Westbrook and Jasnow, eds. Security for Debt in Ancient Near
Eastern Law (Leiden, 2001), p. 329.
3
Similar problems arise from the Neo-Assyrian texts. See the discussion of “the
šumma texts” and “the texts headed by a date” in Jas, SAAS 5, p. 76 and p. 81.
168 chapter six
category of simple guarantees and into the category of texts pertaining

to adjudicatory proceedings.
Distinguishing between Gestellungsburgschaft guarantees for regular
debts and texts pertaining to legal proceedings is based on the assump-
tion that guarantees for debts were composed before the time that the
debt came due, rather than as part of the adjudicatory process for
default on a debt. It should be noted, however, that even the guarantees
for debts may have been the result of legal proceedings. One might
imagine that the guarantees were written only after the debt was due
and that the guarantee was assumed when the creditor had come to
court to demand payment from a defaulting debtor. All Gestellungs-
bürgschaft guarantees, then, may actually be abāku-summonses issued
by authorities to ensure payment of a late debt. Although this is a
plausible interpretation, the written evidence of most guarantees does
not seem to point to an adjudicatory context. Thus, only those texts
that do provide some additional evidence for an adjudicatory setting
will be considered in the present discussion.
Another group of guarantees that should also be considered at
this point is the guarantees for the release of a prisoner. In the Neo-
Babylonian period, imprisonment was usually a means of distraining a
defaulting debtor.4 Distraint was the creditor’s first step toward obtain-
ing payment. The purpose of the guarantee is to obtain release of the
debtor. Unlike standard guarantees for payment of debt, the guarantees
for the release of a prisoner were clearly written after the debtor had
already defaulted on the obligation.5 Therefore, all such guarantees for
the release of a prisoner apparently reflect a stage in the resolution of
a legal dispute pertaining to an unpaid debt. However, imprisonment
seems to have been a means of self-help for the creditor that did not
require resorting to official channels of adjudication. Thus, the guarantee
for the release of a prisoner would not require any official intervention,
either. To be sure, in cases concerning debts to official entities, such as
the Eanna, the line between official means of adjudication and self-
help may not be clear. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to situate the
guarantees for the release of a prisoner within an adjudicatory context,
these texts will not be considered in the present discussion.
4
For discussion of the purpose of imprisonment see Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, pp.
60–61; Petschow, Pfandrecht, pp. 35–39; and Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History,
p. 953 and p. 967.
5
Koschaker, Bürgschaftsrecht, p. 61.
text-types ensuring an individual’s presence 169
6.A Summonses to Present (abāku) an Individual
This type of summons requires the summoned individual to “bring”

(abāku) and “give” another individual to another party. Failure to do
so results in the summoned individual having to face a penalty. The
following is the basic outline of this type of summons:
I. Summons Clause
U4 X-kam2 ša2 ITI MN PN1 PN2 ibbakamma ana PN3 inamdin
On6 day X of month MN PN1 shall bring PN2 and give (him)
to PN3
II. Penalty Clause
kî lā ītabak . . .
If he does not bring (him) > Penalty against PN1
IV. Place of composition and date
In terms of composition, this outline closely resembles that of Gestel-

lungsbürgschaft texts that record the guarantor’s obligation to present the
debtor to the creditor for payment of the debt. Those texts require
the guarantor to “bring” (abāku) the debtor and “give” (nadānu) him to
the creditor. If the guarantor does not bring the debtor at the appointed
time, then the guarantor himself must repay the debt. Guarantees for
payment of debts may safely be excluded from the present study since
they were typical debt transactions, and so do not reflect an adjudica-
tory setting. In order to be considered an abāku-summons, a document
must indicate in some way that the reason for its composition involves
more than a simple debt. In terms of the outline above, PN1 (the sum-
moned individual) must bring PN2 and give him to PN3 because of
some wrongdoing.
YOS 7, 68 will serve as the first example of the abāku-summons.
This text requires the summoned individual to bring the gardener who
destroyed7 three date palms and present him to the administrator of the
6
See summary table 6.1 below for abāku-summonses which require the presentation
“by” (adi) a certain date, or do not specify any date at all.
7
In interpreting this text, San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 347 n. 1 and AHw. dâku
(p. 152) assign the verb dâku a meaning that seems to reflect their understanding of
the crime as intentional. CAD dâku 4 (D, p. 41) translates “to let (a date palm) die”
170 chapter six
Eanna. If he does not present the gardener, then the summoned indi-
vidual must pay for the three date palms. The text reads as follows:
1. A.ŠA3 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 (1–3) A field of the Lady-of-
UNUGki ša2 ina [X] Uruk that . . . at the disposal of
2. ša2 ina pa-ni mdNA3-SIG15 m
Nabû-damiq son of mNabû-ē ir,
A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-SUR from which 3 date palms were
3. ša2 3 gišGIŠIMMAR ina lib3- destroyed.
bi de-ku-
4. a-di U4 15-kam2 ša2 ITI ŠE (4–9) By 15 Addaru, he shall
lu2
NU.GIŠ.ŠAR bring the gardener who destroyed
5. ša2 gišGIŠIMMAR ina A.ŠA3 the date palms in the field of
ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki the Lady-of-Uruk that is at his
6. ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2 i-du-ku disposal, and give him to mNabû-
7. ib-ba-kam2-ma a-na šarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri.
8. mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG
LUGAL
9. i-nam-din ki-i la it-tab-kam2-ma
10. la id-dan-nu 3 MA.NA KU3. (9–12) If he does not bring (him)
BABBAR and does not give (him), he shall
11. ku-um da-a-ka ša2 pay the Lady-of-Uruk 3 mina of
giš
GIŠIMMAR silver for the destruction of the
12. a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki three date palms.
i-nam-din
13. mu-kin-nu mdINNIN-DU-A
lu2
(13–14) Witnesses: mIštar-mukīn-
A-šu2 apli son of mZēriya;
14. ša2 mNUMUN-ia2 mdna-na-a- (14–15) mNanaya-ēreš son of
KAM2 m
Gimillu.
15. A-šu2 ša2 mgi-mil-lu
16. [UMBISAG] mBA-[
lu2
(16) Scribe: mPN
17. UNUGki [ITI X U4 X-kam2 (17–19) Uruk. [Day X of MN
MU X] year X of ] Cyrus, king of Baby-
18. mkur-aš2 LUGAL TIN.TIRki lon, king of the lands.
19. LUGAL KUR.KUR
The mention of the destruction of the date palm in this text indicates
that the text should be included in the present discussion. It is clear
that the penalty of 3 mina of silver is not just a debt to the Eanna, but
which suggests that the crime was one of negligence rather than intentional damage
to the trees.
is, instead, the penalty for a crime.8 The imposition of the thirty-fold
penalty in other abāku-summonses is another indication that such texts
involve transgression of temple property rather than simple debts.9
The need to distinguish the abāku-summonses from standard Gestel-
lungsbürgschaft guarantees for debts comes to the fore with regard to
three texts from the Eanna archive that Cocquerillat labels “mandats
d’amener” (“orders to bring”): YOS 7, 109; YOS 7, 27; GCCI 2, 115.10
Cocquerillat presents all of these texts in a discussion of “les fraudes”
(“frauds”), which implies that all of the texts pertain to criminal activities
and are not simply guarantees for the payment of debts to the Eanna.11
Ostensibly, then, all three texts should be classified as abāku-type sum-
monses. The evidence of both GCCI 2, 115 and YOS 7, 109 supports
Cocquerillat’s classification. GCCI 2, 115 should be considered an
abāku-summons because it specifically mentions that the individual who
is to be brought owes five years of back-payments of estimated yields.
In YOS 7, 109 the people are to be brought to the administrator of
the Eanna on the very same day that the document was written. This
immediacy, together with the fact that it is the elders of the city who
must bring the people, suggests that the elders serve as more than simply
guarantors for eventual payment of a debt.12 On the other hand, YOS
7, 27 does not indicate that it was written because of any legal action
or wrongdoing. Although it is possible, as Cocquerillat implies, that this
text is also the result of fraudulent activity, it is also possible that it is
simply a guarantee for a payment due to the Eanna.13
Based on the discussion thus far, the abāku-summonses reflect the
following general situation. An individual (PN2) has been accused of
8
TCL 12, 89 also mentions killing a date palm. Similar texts mention theft (YOS
6, 123; TCL 13, 131; PBS 2/1, 85).
9
The following texts impose a thirty-fold penalty: TCL 12, 77; YOS 6, 152; YOS
7, 58. In YOS 7, 25:7–9 the penalty imposed is “bearing the punishment of Cyrus”
( i- u ša2 mku-ra-aš . . . i-šad-da-ad). Although the terminology clearly implies a penalty,
the precise nature of this penalty is not known. See San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), p. 336
n. 1 and Petschow, Pfandrecht, pp. 29–30, especially note 64.
10
TCL 13, 157, a fourth text in this group, is considered among the “guarantees”
because it includes the phrase pūtal našû.
11
12
Both facts are noted by Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 83, but are not specifically
presented as support for her interpretation of the text. See the summary table for
calculations of time spans between the date of composition and the date of appear-
ance in other texts. Note that longer time spans do not preclude the possibility that a
particular text involves a crime.
13
See San Nicolò, SBAW 1937, 6, p. 45 n. 6.
172 chapter six
a crime for which he faces a penalty. The summoned individual (PN1)

must bring the accused individual (PN2) to another party (PN3). If the
summoned individual does not bring the accused, then the summoned
individual himself faces the same penalty as the accused individual
was to pay.
The imposition of the penalty upon the summoned individual implies
that the summoned individual bears some responsibility for the crime
in question. For example, in YOS 7, 68, the text quoted above, the
date palms were destroyed in a field that is at the disposal of mNabû-
damiq. He is, therefore, ultimately responsible for the loss the gardener
caused and must face the penalty if he does not present the accused.
The summoned individual can, however, avoid having to pay for the
crime by presenting the accused. Thus, the situation surrounding the
composition of the abāku-summonses is similar to the situation sur-
rounding the composition of the exculpatory kunnu-summonses. In
both text-types, the summoned individual is the “first address” in the
pursuit of the penalty for the crime. In order to avoid payment of the
penalty, the summoned individual has accused another person. As a
result, an exculpatory kunnu-summons or an abāku-summons might be
composed. The exculpatory kunnu-summonses require the summoned
individual to “establish the case” against the person he has accused. The
abāku-summonses require the summoned individual to actually present
the person he has accused. Failure to comply with the requirements of
either text-type results in a penalty.
This situational similarity between the abāku-summonses and the ex-
culpatory kunnu-summonses is borne out by TCL 12, 77. In this text,
m
Nabû-nā ir must bring his shepherd to officials of the Eanna or face the
thirty-fold penalty for a dead branded ewe. The text reads as follows:
1. a-di ITI ŠE mdNA3-PAP A-šu2 ša2 (1–5) By the month of Addaru,
m
ša2-dNA3-šu2-u2 m
Nabû-nā ir son of mŠa-Nabû-šū
2. UTU-a-a lu2SIPA-šu2 ib-ba-
md
shall bring mŠamšaya, his shepherd
kam2-ma and, in the Eanna, give him over
3. ina E2.AN.NA a-na mdNA3- to mNabû-šarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri,
LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG.LUGAL and the qīpu-officials of the Eanna.
4. u3 lu2EN.MEŠ pi-iq-ne-e-tu4 ša2
E2.AN.NA
5. i-nam-din ki-i la i-tab-ku 30 e-en
6. ku-um 1-et U8 ša2 kak-kab-ti ša2 (5–10) If he does not bring (him),
ina sa-ar2-ti m
Nabû-nā ir shall pay the Lady-
7. ni-ik-si-tu-ma ina ŠU.2 mdNA3- of-Uruk 30 sheep for the ewe with
PAP am-ra-ti a star that was killed in treachery
8. u3 mdNA3-PAP iq-bu-u2 um-ma and found in the hands of mNabû-
md
UTU-a-a nā ir, and (about which) mNabû-
9. [it-ta-ak]-is mdNA3-PAP a-na nā ir said thus: “mŠamšaya [kill]ed
10. dGAŠAN ša2 Uruk i-nam-din (it).”
The penalty clause in this text confirms that mNabû-nā ir has to bring
his shepherd to the Eanna because mNabû-nā ir has accused him of
killing the sheep. The dead sheep was found in mNabû-nā ir’s possession,
so he is responsible for paying the penalty. He can avoid the payment
by presenting the shepherd whom he has accused.
The quotation of mNabû-nā ir’s statement in TCL 12, 77:8–9 suggests
that he has made his accusation against the shepherd in a hearing in
the Eanna. YOS 6, 123 describes just such a hearing:
1. 5 UDU.MEŠ ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 (1–3) 5 sheep belonging to the
UNUGki ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še- Lady-of-Uruk, branded with a
en-du star, which were seen in the flock
2. ša2 ina e-e-ni ša2 mki-na-a of mKīnaya son of mNergal-ina-
A-šu2 ša2 mdU.GUR-ina-SU 3- tēšê-ē ir descendant of Dannea—
¢SURÜ
3. A mdan-ne-e-a am-ra-a-ma
m
NUMUN-ia A-šu2
4. ša2 mTIN-su lu2NA.KAD ša2 (3–5) about 3 of which mZēriya,
d
GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 3 ina son of mBalāssu, the herdsman of
lib3-bi the Lady-of-Uruk said thus:
5. iq-bu-u2 um-ma ina sa-ar2-ti (5–6) “They were led away from
ul-tu e-ni-ia my flock in treachery.” In the
6. ab-ka-a ina UKKIN a-na assembly, he established (the case)
m
ki-na-a u2-kin-nu against mKīnaya.
7. 1-en 30.MEŠ e-e-ni ra-bi-ti (7–8) They decided that mKīnaya
ina UGU mki-na-a must pay 30–fold for the full-
8. par-su u3 2-ta e-e-ni re- i-it 5-ta grown sheep.
e-e-[ni]
9. ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-en-du ša2 (8–10) And (as for) the 2 sheep,
m
ki-na-a iq-bu-u2 the remainder of the 5 sheep
10. um-ma ul-tu ITI ŠE MU branded with a star, about which
7-kam2 mTAR-a-a m
Kīnaya said thus:
11. lu2SIPA ina e-ni-ia ip-te-qid (10–11) “Since the month of
m
TAR-a-a Addaru, year 7, mTAR-a-a, the
shepherd, deposited them in my
flock”—
174 chapter six
12. ib-ba-kam2-ma a-na mdNA3- (11–15) He shall bring mTAR-a-a

LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG- and give (him) to mNabû-šarra-
LUGAL u ur, the ša rēš šarri adminstrator
13. lu2EN pi-qit-tu2 E2.AN.NA of the Eanna and to the adminis-
14. u3 lu2EN.MEŠ pi-iq-ne-e-tu2 trators of the Eanna.
ša2 E2.AN.NA
15. i-nam-din ki-i mTAR-a-a la
i-tab-kam2-ma
16. la id-dan-nu DIŠ-šu e-e-ni it-ti (15–17) If he does not bring
e-e-ni-a m
TAR-a-a and does not give
17. 1-en 30 a-na dGAŠAN ša2 (him), he shall pay 60 sheep
UNUGki i-nam-din together with those (other) sheep,
30-fold (for the two sheep) to the
Lady-of-Uruk.
This text is actually composed of a decision record (lines 1–8) followed

by the abāku-summons (lines 8–17). The entire hearing takes place “in
the assembly.” The assembly first decides that mKīnaya must pay a
thirty-fold penalty for stealing three sheep. mKīnaya then claims that
the remaining two sheep were given to him by another shepherd. The
abāku-summons is issued in the wake of this accusation. mKīnaya must
present the shepherd to the administrators of the Eanna. If he does
not present the shepherd, then mKīnaya must repay the Eanna thirty
fold for those two sheep, as well.
The abāku-summonses presented thus far indicate that they were
issued following an accusation made during a formal hearing. Deter-
mining the legal function of these texts depends upon explaining the
purpose for “bringing” the individual. According to Moore, TCL 12,
77 and TCL 12, 89 are summonses “to present a man for trial.”14 The
high rank of the officials to whom the person must be brought sup-
ports Moore’s understanding of these texts as summonses to present
for trial.15 These high-ranking officials may have been the authorities
before whom the suspect would be tried.
Moore’s title implies that the fate of the person who must be
“brought” is yet to be determined by trial. This suggestion finds some
support from the formulation of the penalty clauses in both TCL 12,
77 and TCL 12, 89. The penalty in TCL 12,77 is for 1-et U8 ša2 kak-
14
Moore, Documents, p. 83 and p. 91. Moore addresses only TCL 12, 77 and TCL
12, 89. The application of her interpretation to other documents is an extension of
her original interpretation.
15
See summary table 6.1 for the authorities included in these texts.
kab-ti ša2 ina sa-ar2-ti ni-ik-si-tu-ma (“one ewe with a star that was killed
unlawfully”) and in TCL 12, 89 it is for da-a-ki ša2 gišGIŠIMMAR (“the
killing of the date-palm”). Both leave the guilt or innocence of the
person to be brought open to question; neither states that the person
to be brought has actually committed the crime. Similarly, in YOS 6,
123:8–17, it is not clear that the shepherd whom mKīnaya has accused
is actually guilty of the crime. In all of these examples, it is entirely
possible that the person to be brought will not have to make the pay-
ment. All that is certain is that the summoned individual is ultimately
responsible for payment.
However, not all abāku-summonses leave the guilt of the person to
be brought open to question. Several abāku-summonses make it clear
that the person to be brought is the person who has committed the
crime. Thus, in the first abāku-summons cited, YOS 7, 68, the person
to be brought is the “gardener who killed the date palm.”16 Similarly,
the penalty clause in PBS 2/1, 85 states that if the summoned indi-
vidual does not bring the accused (PN2), the summoned individual
must repay “the five oxen that mPN2 led away in theft” (5 GU4 ša2 ina
sa-aš2-tu4 mPN2 i-bu-uk).17 In all these cases, a trial to determine guilt,
as implied by Moore’s labels of TCL 12, 77 and TCL 12, 89, would
be unnecessary. Furthermore, in PBS 2/1, 85, the criminal is not to
be brought before any authorities, but rather he is to be given directly
to the person from whom he stole. These texts open room for further
debating the interpretation of all the abāku-summonses.
The outset of this discussion noted the similarities between the abāku-
summonses and the Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees for debts. Because
of these similarities, one may understand those abāku-summonses that
impose monetary penalties as a specific kind of Gestellungsbürgschaft
guarantee, one in which the debt is incurred because of a crime com-
mitted. The “summoned individual,” according to this interpretation,
is actually a guarantor. He guarantees that he will present the guilty
individual, who must pay for his crime. If the guarantor fails to pres-
ent the guilty individual, then he assumes responsibility for payment.
Augapfel adopts this interpretation in the heading preceding his edition
of PBS 2/1, 85, in which he refers to this text as a “Gestellungsbürgschaft
mit gleichzeitiger eventueller Schuldübernahme” (“presentation-guarantee with
16
YOS 7, 68:4–9.
17
PBS 2/1, 85:8–9. See also YOS 6, 152:1–6 and TCL 13, 131:4–6.
176 chapter six
concurrent assumption of penalty”).18 Augapfel’s interpretation may

apply to all the abāku-type summonses.19 Accordingly, these documents
are not summonses, but are guarantees for payment. The only unique
aspect of these documents is that the debt they mention was incurred
as the punishment for a crime.
It should be noted that according to both Moore and Augapfel the
abāku-summonses belong in the ‘tablet trail’ of texts that record adju-
dicatory proceedings. The difference between the interpretations lies in
how these documents functioned as part of the ‘tablet trail.’ According
to Moore, the abāku-summonses are a means of bringing a person to
trial. If this is the case, then they were composed before a case was
closed, as part of the ongoing proceedings. Augapfel’s understanding,
on the other hand, indicates that all the abāku-summonses were written
at the end of the proceedings and assume that the person to be brought
was guilty. They are not “summonses,” but are, instead, guarantees that
the penalty will be paid by the guilty party.
Before concluding the discussion of this text-type, there is one
additional text, Abraham, Business, No. 85, which must be considered
among the abāku-summonses. This text is unique because it does not
include a penalty for failure to hand over the criminals. The body of
this text, as transliterated by Abraham, reads as follows:20
1. U4 1–kam2 ša2 ITI SIG4 ša2 (1–7) On 1 Simānu, year X [of
MU X-[kam2 ša2 da-ri- -mu-uš ] Darius] king of Babylon king
2. LUGAL TIN.TIRki LUGAL of the lands, mArad-Bēl [son of
KUR.KUR mIR3-¢dENÜ [A-šu2 m
PN] descendant of Ē iru, shall
ša2 mPN] bring the thieves who . . . between
3. A me- e3-ru lu2sa-a-ri.MEŠ ša2 the rivers and the city of the qīpu-
ni-i[k . . .] official,20 having bound (?) (them),
4. i-na bi-rit ID2.MEŠ ina URU to the house of mMarduk-nā ir-
ša2 lu2qi2-pi apli and give (them) to mMarduk-
5. a-na E2 mdAMAR.UTU-na- ir- nā ir-apli.
IBILA ik-si-[ma? ]
6. ib-ba-kam2-ma a-na mdAMAR.
UTU-na- ir-IBILA
18
Augapfel, p. 92. Note, however, that Moore, Documents, p. 129 refers to TCL 13,
131 as a “summons to present at Eanna a man accused of theft.” Unlike the titles she
gives TCL 12, 77 and TCL 12, 89, this title does not mention any trial. Moore seems
to have recognized the difference between TCL 13, 131 and the other documents. Her
use of the term “summons,” however, suggests that she does not see TCL 13, 131 in
the light of other guarantees.
19
Augapfel does not mention any of these documents.
20
According to Abraham, Business, p. 364 the location “the city of the qīpu-official”
indicates that the theft described was of temple property.
7. i-nam-din e-lat ra-šu-tu ša2 (7–8) Apart from the obligation

md
AMAR.UTU-na- ir-IBILA due to mMarduk-nā ir-apli owed
8. ša2 ina mu - i mIR3-dEN by mArad-Bēl.
m
Arad-Bēl must “bring” and “give” thieves to mMarduk-nā ir-apli. As
in PBS 2/1, 85, the criminal is not handed over to any authority, but
directly to the person from whom he stole. Thus, it does not seem likely
that this text is a summons for a trial.
According to the notice at the end of the text, this obligation is
placed upon mArad-Bēl apart from his other obligation to mMarduk-
nā ir-apli. This may explain the reason for the composition of this
summons and for the apparent absence of a penalty. The concluding
notice implies that the present document carries some obligation, like
the other obligations that mArad-Bēl must pay to mMarduk-nā ir-apli.
This may indicate mArad-Bēl does indeed incur the obligation for the
theft if he does not present the thieves. As has already been noted
above, the abāku-summonses may, in fact, be guarantees for payment
of a penalty for theft. Thus, in Abraham, Business, No. 85, mArad-Bēl
guarantees that he will present the thieves, or else, it seems, he will
himself assume the obligation to pay the penalty.
6.B Guarantees for an Individual’s Presence
The second text-type ensuring an individual’s presence consists of

texts that, like other guarantees, use the term pūta našû. This text-type
records the fact that one individual (or a group of individuals) assumes
responsibility ( pūta našû) for the presence of another individual (or group
of individuals) at a particular time. Like the abāku-summonses (see sec-
tion 6.A above), the guarantees for an individual’s presence resemble
the Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for payment of a regular debt. Thus,
as with the abāku-summonses, the discussion must begin by identifying
those particular features of the guarantees for an individual’s presence
that indicate that any particular text belongs in the ‘tablet trail.’
The distinction between abāku-summonses and standard Gestel-
lungsbürgschaft guarantees is based on details, such as the mention of a
specific crime, that indicate that the individual who is to be ‘brought’
is suspected of some wrongdoing. Similar evidence may be mustered
to distinguish between the guarantees for an individual’s presence that
belong in the ‘tablet trail’ and standard Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantees
for debts. Apart from passing mentions of details, the penalties imposed
upon the guarantors for failure to discharge their obligation provide
Summary Table 6.1 abāku-Summonses
178
Text Wrongdoing “To” Whom Penalty Date Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe
m
TCL 12, killing of ša rēš šarri and 30-fold 13.IX.2 adi XII ≤ 76 Eanna Uruk Nabû-
77 branded qīpu-officials Nbn (3/9) days (Uruk) mukīn-apli /
m
ewe (12/23) Zēriya
m
TCL 12, cutting date administrator 1 mina 12.XII.8 adi 22.XII ≤ 10 Uruk Uruk Gimil-
89 palm of Eanna silver Nbn (3/25) days Nanaya /
m
(3/15) Nabû-šuma-
iddin //
Gimil-Nanaya
m
YOS 6, theft of administrators 30-fold 5.VIII.9 — — (Uruk) Uruk Nādin/
m
123:8–17 sheep of Eanna Nbn Bēl-a ē-
(10/29) iqīša // Egibi
chapter six
m
YOS 6, sale of gold šatammu; 30-fold 5.XIIb.12 Nisannu 6–35 (Uruk) Uruk Arad-Inninni
152 scribes of Nbn (3/29–4/ days / mIbni-Ištar
Eanna (3/23) 26) // Gimil-
Nanaya
YOS 7, cutting date ša rēš šarri 3 mina ?.?.? Cyr adi 15.XII ? (Uruk) Uruk ?
68 palms silver
m
YOS 7, ? (penalty of šatammu + i- u ša2 26.VII.3 adi 5.VIII ≤8 (Uruk) Uruk Gimillu/
m m
25 ī u ša šarri) administrator ku-ra- Cyr (10/28) days Innin-zēra-
of Eanna aš . . . i- (10/20) iddin
šad-da-ad
Text Wrongdoing “To” Whom Penalty Date Appearance Length Place of Place of Scribe
m
TCL 13, theft šatammu + payment 2.XIIb.3 [a-di] ? ? (Uruk) Uruk Nādin,
m
131 administrator of what Cyr (3/21) Kīnaya,
of Eanna thief [mMūrānu]
owes and mBalā u
m
YOS 7, 58 theft šatammu + 30-fold 12.XII.6 adi 20.XII ≤ 8 days (Uruk) Uruk Pir u /
m
(extortion?) administrator Cyr (3/7) Eanna-
of Eanna (2/27) šuma-ibni
m
GCCI 2, non- administrator payment 29.VII.0 Ara šamna 1–30 Uruk Āl-pî- illini Gimillu/
m
115 payment of of dates Camb (no date days Innin-zēra-
estimated (11/15) specified) iddin
yield (11/16–
12/15)
m
YOS 7, non- administrator payment 15.XII.1 15.XII 0 days (Uruk) Ālu-ša- Marduk-
109 payment of Eanna of arrears Camb U.MUK.ME nā ir/
m
of estimated Madānu-
yield a ē-[iddin]
// Šigûa
text-types ensuring an individual’s presence
m m
Abraham, bringing Marduk-nā ir- — 3+.XIIa.? 1.III.? Dar ≤ 113 House of Babylon Nabû-
m
Business, and handing apli (owner Dar (6/13 or or ≤ Marduk- balāssu-
No. 85 over thieves of stolen (2/21+ 6/16) 116 nā ir-apli iqbi//?
property?) or 2/18 +) days
179
m
PBS 2/1, theft Owner of 5 oxen 20.V.4 25.V (8/27) 5 days Nippur Nippur Enlil-apla-
85 stolen property Dar II u ur/
m
(8/22) Šuma-iddin
180 chapter six
the clearest means of distinguishing between the guarantees for an

individual’s presence and Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for loans. The
operative factor is whether or not the guarantee imposes a monetary
penalty. The presence of a monetary penalty indicates that the guaran-
tee is written in the wake of a debt. The person who i s to be presented
is a debtor who owes the amount stipulated as the penalty against the
guarantors. The guarantors must present the debtor or pay the debt
themselves. In contrast, the absence of a monetary penalty indicates
that the guarantors’ obligations are not the result of a debt that must
be paid. Thus, those guarantees that do not impose a penalty upon the
guarantor,21 or that impose an apparently non-monetary penalty like
“the punishment of the king” ( ī u ša šarri),22 are considered as records
of the adjudicatory process. If a guarantee for an individual’s presence
does impose a monetary penalty, it can only be considered as part of
the ‘tablet trail’ if it contains other evidence that it was written as part
of the adjudication of some wrongdoing.
YOS 7, 137 will serve as an example of this text-type. In this text,
two oblates assume responsibility for bringing five prisoners to Babylon.
The text reads:
1. du-um-mu-qu DUMU-šu2 ša2
m
(1–4) mDummuqu son of mBal iya
bal- i-ia LU2 uruša2-ad-mu [. . .]
m
of the city of Šadmu . . . whom
2. ša2 mde2-a-kur-ban-nu lu2pa-qu- m
Ea-kurbannu, the paqūdu-official
du ša2 UNUGki a-na UGU of Uruk, seized by order of mKal-
DUMU.SAL[-šu2] baya the paqūdu-official of Šadmu,
3. ša2 a-na KU3.BABBAR id-di-nu because of his (mDummuqu’s)
i-na ši-pir-ti ša2 mkal-ba-a lu2pa- daughter whom he (mDummuqu)
qu-du ša2 uruša2-ad-mu sold for silver;
4. i -ba-tu mKI-dna-na-a-i-ni-ia u3 (4–5) mItti-Nanaya-īnīya and
m
su-qa-a lu2APIN.MEŠ m
Sūqaya the fieldworkers of the
5. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 Lady-of-Uruk who abandoned
giš
APIN.ME-šu2-nu u2-maš-ši-ru their plows and fled;
u3 i-i -li-qu
21
YOS 6, 64; YOS 7, 111 and YOS 7, 115. In this last text, there are two guaran-
tors who must present one individual. The verb in the penalty clause (lines 8–11) is
in the singular (i-nam-din), which indicates that the penalty is not upon the guarantors
but upon the individual whom they must present.
22
YOS 7, 137 and YOS 7, 177.
6. a-nu-NUMUN-DU3 lu2pu- a-
md
(6–7) mAnu-zēra-ibni, the fuller,
a-a lu2GAL 10–tu4 ša2 dul-la-šu2 the chief of ten, who abandoned
u2-maš-ši-ru his work and fled and wasn’t seen
7. u3 i-i -li-qu-ma 2 MU.AN. for two years;
NA.MEŠ la in-nam-ru mu2-
ba-ru
8. lu2
RIG7 ša2 dIGI-DU ša2 uruu2- (7–8) mUbāru, an oblate of Ner-
dan-nu ša2 mdNA3-MU-GI.NA gal of Udannu;
lu2
UGULA E2.KUR.ME
9. ina E2 ki-li i -ba-tu PAP 5 (8–9) (all of ) whom mNabû-šuma-
lu2
ERIN2.MEŠ ša2 i-na E2 ki-li ukīn, the official in charge of the
a-ab-tu-ma temples, imprisoned.
(9) Total: 5 men who were
imprisoned.
10. mKI-dna-na-a-i-ni-ia u3 msu- (10–14) mItti-Nanaya-īnīya and
qa-a-a lu2APIN.ME mda-nu- m
Sūqaya the fieldworkers,
NUMUN-DU3 m
Anu-zēra-ibni, the fuller, the
11. lu2pu- a-a-a lu2RIG7.ME ša2 oblates of the Lady-of-Uruk and
d
GAŠAN UNUGki u3 mu2-ba- m
Ubaru, the oblate [of Nergal
ru lu2RIG7 of Udannu] said thus to mNabû-
12. [ša2 dIGI-DU ša2 uruu2-dan-nu] mukīn-apli the šatammu of the
a-na mdNA3-DU-IBILA lu2ŠA3. Eanna, mNabû-a a-iddin [the ša
TAM E2.AN.NA mdNA3-ŠEŠ- rēš šarri administrator] of the
MU Eanna and mRīmūt and mBau-
13. [ lu2SAG.LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit] ēreš, the [ judges]23 of the king:
E2.AN.NA u3 mri-mut u3 mba-u2-
KAM
14. [ lu2DI.KU5.ME] LUGAL iq-
bu-u2 um-<ma> mdu-um-mu-qu
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdbal- i-ia
15. [. . . a-na] ¢UGUÜ LUGAL la (14–16) “In prison, mDummuqu
a-ba-tu4 i-na E2 ki-li [. . .] son of mBal iya [sp]oke treason24
16. [. . . iq]-ta-bi mdNA3-DU-IBILA [aga]inst the king . . .
lu2
ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.[NA]
23
24
For the restoration of lu2DI.KU5.ME, reflected in the translation in Joannès, Justice,

23
No. 148 (p. 205) see Kümmel, Familie, p. 136 n. 198.

24
The restoration of this line and the translation of lā ābātu as “treason” follows
Joannès, Justice, p. 205 (“des paroles de lèse majesté”).
182 chapter six
17. [A mda-bi-bi] ¢u3Ü mdNA3-ŠEŠ- (16–21) mNabû-mukīn-apli, the

MU lu2SAG-LUGAL lu2EN šatammu of the Ean[na descen-
pi-qit E2.A[N.NA] dant of Dābibī] and mNabû-a a-
18. mdu-um-mu-qu mKI-dna-na- iddin the ša rēš šarri administrator
a-i-ni-ia msu-qa-a-a mda-nu- of the Eanna seized mDummuqu,
NUMUN-DU3 m
Itti-Nanaya-īnīya, mSūqaya,
19. u3 mu2-ba-ru i-na i -qa-a-ta i - m
Anu-zēra-ibni and mUbaru in
ba-tu-ma a-na mgi-mil-lu fetters and gave them to mGi-
20. lu2GAL 10-tu4 u3 mdNA3-ik- ur millu, the chief of ten, and
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdu-um-mu- m
Nabû-ik ur son of mDummuqu,
qu lu2RIG2.ME ša2 dGAŠAN the oblates of the Lady-of-Uruk.
UNUGki
21. id-di-nu pu-ut ma-a - ar-tu4 ša2 (21–22) mGimillu and mNabû-
lu2
ERIN2.ME-a 5 mŠU u3 ik ur assume responsibility for the
md
NA3-ik- ur keeping of these five men.
22. na-šu-u2 ib-ba-ku-ma i-na TIN. (22–23) They shall bring them
TIRki ina IGI mna-bu-u2-gu A- to Babylon and present them
šu2 ša2 mgu-ba-ru before mNabūgu son of Gobryas,
23. lu2NAM TIN.TIRki u3 lu2e-ber- the governor of Babylon and the
ID2ki u2-ša-az-za-az-zu-šu2-nu-tu Transeuphratene district.
ki-i man-ma ina lib3-bi-šu2-nu (23–25) If anyone among them
24. a-na a-šar ša2-nam-ma it-tal-ku goes to another place, mGimillu
m
ŠU u3 mdNA3-ik-[ ur i- u] ša2 and mNabû-ik[ ur] shall bear [the
LUGAL punishment] of the king.
25. i-šad-da-du ¢iÜ-na u2-šu-uz-zu (25–26) In the presence of
ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA lu2ŠA3. m
Nabû-mukīn-apli šatammu of the
TAM E2.AN.NA Eanna, son of mNādinu descen-
26. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mna-di-nu dant of Dābibī;
DUMU mda-bi-bi mdNA3- (26) mNabû-a a-iddin, the ša rēš
ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG-LUGAL šarri administrator of the Eanna.
lu2
EN pi-qit E2.[AN.NA]
27. mu-kin-nu mdUTU-DU-
lu2
(27) Witnesses: mŠamaš-mukīn-
IBILA DUMU-šu2 ša2 apli son of mMadānu-a ē-[iddin
md
DI.KU5-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-[MU descendant of ] Šigûa;
DUMU] mši-gu-u2-a
28. mla-a-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU (28–29) mLâbāši-Marduk son of
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mIR3-dEN m
DUMU me-gi-bi mmu-še- m
Mušēzib-Bēl son of mBalāssu
zib-dEN descendant of Egibi;
29. DUMU-šu2 ša2 mTIN-su (29) mNabû-apla-iddin son of
DUMU me-gi-bi mdNA3-IBILA- m
Bēl-uballi descendant of
MU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdEN- Ša- ābtīšu.
TIN-i DUMU lu2ša2 MUN-šu2
30. mŠU DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- (30–31) mGimillu son of mNabû-

MU-MU DUMU mŠU-dna- šuma-iddin descendant of Gimil-
na-a mdin-nin-MU-URI3 Nanaya; mInnin-šuma-u ur son of
31. DUMU mgi-mil-lu DUMU m
Gimillu descendant of Kurī;
m
kur-i mdKUR.GAL-LUGAL- (31) mAmurru-šarra-u ur son of
URI3 DUMU-šu2 ša2 mta-li-mu m
Talīmu;
32. mIR3-dAMAR.UTU DUB. (32) mArad-Marduk, the scribe,
SAR DUMU-šu2 ša2 son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin
md
AMAR.UTU-MU-MU descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur.
DUMU mdEN-IBILA-URI3
33. UNUGki ITI ŠE U4 30-kam2 (33–34) Uruk. 30 Addaru,
MU 3-kam2 mkam2-bu-zi-[ia] year 3 of Cambys[es], king of
34. LUGAL TIN.[TIR]ki Baby[lon], king of the lands.
LUGAL KUR.KUR
The imposition of the apparently non-monetary “punishment of the
king” is the clearest indication that this text is not a standard Gestel-
lungsbürgschaft guarantee for a debt. The text also specifies the crime
for which the guarantors must bring the prisoners to Babylon: one of
them, mDummuqu, has spoken treason against the king. The mention
of this crime is a clear circumstantial indication that it is not simply
a guarantee for a debt. YOS 7, 111, another text of this text-type
includes a similar indication of the wrongdoings to which it pertains.
The individuals to be brought in YOS 7, 111 are all involved in the
theft and killing of temple livestock.
Apart from the specific mention of a crime, the wording of the
guarantors’ obligation in YOS 7, 137 also points to circumstances other
than simple debts surrounding this guarantee. The guarantors must
present the individuals “before” (ina pāni ) Nabugu, the satrap’s son.25
The prepositional phrase, known from other adjudicatory contexts,
suggests that Nabugu is to conduct a hearing or investigation once the
parties arrive in Babylon.26 Similarly, some texts require the guarantors
to present the individuals upon summons by temple authorities, who
will, presumably, conduct a hearing of some sort.27 The wording of
25
For a similar use of the locution a-na pa-ni see YOS 7, 177:7.
26
For a similar understanding of why the guarantor must present the individual, see
San Nicolò’s interpretation of YOS 7, 115 in ArOr 4 (1932), p. 339. A similar reason
may also be implied in YOS 6, 64. Dougherty, who discusses both YOS 7, 137 and
YOS 7, 177, does not identify the authority’s role in either text. See Dougherty, AJSL
46 (1929–1930), p. 101 (YOS 7, 177) and Dougherty, Shirkûtu, p. 60 (YOS 7, 137).
27
Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155; YOS 6, 64; YOS 7, 111. Von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941),
p. 117 hints at an adjudicatory context for YOS 7, 111 by describing the text as “eine
Gestellungsbürgschaft, wahrscheinlich vor dem Tempelgericht” (“a presentation-guarantee, prob-
ably before the temple court”).
184 chapter six
the guarantors’ obligation in these texts makes it clear that they are
to present the individual not for payment of debt, but as part of the
adjudicatory process.
In YOS 7, 137, the circumstantial information (the mention of
treason and the indications that the prisoners are to be presented for
trial) complement the fact that it does not impose a monetary penalty
to clearly show that the text should not be considered a standard
Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantee. Texts that do impose a monetary penalty,
however, can only be removed from the category of Gestellungsbürgschaft-
guarantees if they provide the necessary information about circum-
stances. This may be illustrated by examining YOS 6, 194 and TCL
13, 157, two texts that, according to Cocquerillat’s reading, pertain
to fraud.28 Before the names of the witnesses and the scribes, YOS 6,
194 reads as follows:
1. pu-ut a-ba-ku ša2 mdNA3-ta-ad- (1–9) In the presence of
dan-na-URI3 m
Nabû-mušētiq-uddê and
2. ša2 ZAG ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA m
Mušēzib-Marduk, mBibēa son
ša2 KA2 i-¢ilÜ-tu4 of mNabû-udammiq assumes
3. ša2 MU 9-kam2 dNA3- responsibility to mNabû-mušētiq-
IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.TIRki uddê son of mBalāssu for bring-
4. a-na UNUGki a-na pa-ni mkal- ing mNabû-tadanna-u ur to Uruk
ba-a before mKalbaya by Tašrītu,
5. ina DU.ZU ša2 mdNA3-mu-še- regarding the estimated yield of
tiq-UD.DA dates of Bāb- iltu for year 9 of
6. u mKAR-dAMAR.UTU mbi- Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
be-e-a
7. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-SIG15 ina
ŠU.2 mdNA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA
8. A-šu2 ša2 mTIN-su a-di-i ITI
DU6
9. na-ši ki-i mbi-be-e-a (9–14) If mBibēa does not bring
10. mdNA3-ta-ad-dan-na-URI3 a-di m
Nabû-taddanna-u ur by Tašrītu,
ITI DU6 m
Bibēa shall pay according to the
11. la i-tab-ku a-ki-i ZAG ša2 mkal- estimated yield that mKalbaya
ba-a reported to mNabû-mušētiq-uddê
12. i-qab-bu-u2 ZU2.LUM.MA mbi- and mMušēzib-Marduk.
be-e-a
13. a-na mdNA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA u
m
KAR-dAMAR.UTU
14. i-nam-din
28
This text dates to year 10 of Nabonidus, and states that the guarantor
must bring the individual regarding (ša) “the yield of year 9 of Naboni-
dus.” If the guarantor fails to present the individual, then the guarantor
himself must pay the yield of the previous year. Cocquerillat deduces
that the person who is to be brought is under suspicion of attempting
to defraud the Eanna of the previous year’s yield.29
TCL 13, 157, the second guarantee for the presence of an individual
that Cocquerillat presents in the context of fraud, reads as follows:
1. md
a-nu-MU-DU3 A-šu2 ša2 (1–10) mAnu-šuma-ibni son of
md
NA3-SUR A mdNA3-šar- i- m
Nabû-ē ir descendant of Nabû-
DINGIR šar i-ilī and mŠamaš-zēra-iddin
2. u mdUTU-NUMUN-MU A- son of mA ulap-Ištar descendant
šu2 ša2 ma- u-lap-dINNIN A of Ekur-zākir assume respon-
m
E2.KUR-za-kir sibility to mNabû-mukīn-[apli]
3. pu-ut mdna-na-a-KAM2 A-šu2 šatammu of the Eanna, son of
ša2 mgi-mil-lu m
Nādin descendant of Dābibī
4. u mdUTU-SU A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- and mNabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš
ŠEŠ-SUM.NA šarri administrator of Ean[na] for
5. sa2 ZU2.LUM.MA NIG2.GA m
Nanaya-ēreš son of mGimillu
d
INNIN UNUGki and mŠamaš-erība son of mNabû-
6. a-na E2.AN.NA u2-qar-rab-bu- a a-iddin, who must bring the
u2-nu dates, property of Ištar of Uruk
7. ina ŠU.2 mdNA3-DU-[A] to the Eanna.
lu2
ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA
8. A-šu2 ša2 mna-din A mda-bi-bi u3
9. md
NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG-
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit
E2.AN.[NA]
10. na-šu2-u2 U4 7-kam2 ša2 ITI ŠU (10–11) On 7 Du ūzu they shall
ib-ba-ku-[nim-ma] br[ing] (them) and hand them
11. i-nam-din-nu-uš-šu2-nu-tu ki-i over.
a-na a-šar
12. ša2-nam-ma it-tal-ku- ZU2. (11–14) If they depart to another
LUM.MA place, they shall pay the Lady of
13. re- i ša2 ina mu - i-šu2-nu ina Uruk whatever (amount of dates)
e-peš NIG2.GA il-nu- turned up to their debit in the
14. a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki accounting.
i-nam-din-nu- 1-en pu-ut 2-i (14) Each assumes responsibility
na-šu-u2 for the other.
29
Note Dougherty’s earlier interpretation of YOS 6, 194 in AJSL 46 (1929–1930),
p. 86, which does not seem to imply fraud. Dougherty writes that a “question had
arisen as to the division of dates,” and that the purpose of the guarantee is “to have
the transaction concluded.”
186 chapter six
Cocquerillat points to a number of different factors that suggest that

the text pertains to fraud.30 The two men whom the guarantors must
present, mNanaya-ēreš and mŠamaš-erība, “are to deliver the dates,
property of Ištar of Uruk, to the Eanna” (ša2 ZU2.LUM.MA NIG2.
GA dINNIN UNUGki a-na E2.AN.NA u2-qar-rab-bu-u2-nu). Cocquerillat
identifies both men as intermediaries between the Eanna and the col-
lection center at Kār-Nanaya.31 Cocquerillat determines that the text is
not simply a guarantee for a debt of dates because the text was com-
posed eight months after the time designated for delivery of dates to
the Eanna. The Eanna’s accounts apparently reveal some discrepancy,
and the Eanna authorities (the šatammu and the administrator) suspect
fraud. The guarantors, one of whom, mŠamaš-zēra-iddin, is known to
have been a scribe in the Eanna,32 assume responsibility directly to these
officials. If they fail to present the suspects, the two guarantors must
themselves pay for whatever discrepancies have turned up.
In sum, a guarantee to present an individual may be distinguished
from a Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantee for a regular debt in one of three
ways. The first is the absence of a monetary penalty, which is the clearest
indication that a debt is not in question. The other two ways pertain to
the circumstances surrounding the promulgation of the guarantee, and
may be applied to texts that impose both non-monetary and monetary
penalties. The explicit or implicit mention of a wrongdoing because
of which the individual must be brought indicates that more than a
debt is in question. Similarly, the text may be distinguished from a
regular Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantee if it contains any indication that
the individual must be presented for a hearing of some sort.
The criteria established thus far provide sufficient indication that
a particular guarantee for an individual’s presence is an adjudicatory
record, part of the ‘tablet trail.’ The simple wording of the guarantee,
however, does not indicate whether or not the guarantee was issued in
a formal setting. This problem is best addressed by looking beyond the
wording of the guarantee to the additional information that the texts
provide. The first sample text above, YOS 7, 137, is clearly the result
30
31
According to Kümmel, Familie, p. 122, mNanaya-ēreš also held the title gugallû
(“canal inspector”) and served as a scribe of texts from the Eanna archive. Cocquerillat
does not consider his function in these positions in her analysis of the fraud.
32
Cocquerillat identifies both guarantors as scribes. Only mŠamaš-zēra-iddin son
of mA ulap-Ištar descendant of Ekur-zākir is listed among the scribes in Kümmel,
Familie (on p. 125).
of proceedings in the Eanna. It begins with a statement by four prison-

ers addressed to the šatammu, the administrator of the Eanna and the
royal judges. In addition to mentioning the authorities as part of the
proceedings, the text indicates that it was written ina DU.ZU (“in the
presence of ”) the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna. YOS
6, 194:5 uses the same preposition, which hints at a formal tribunal
leading to the guarantee in this text, as well. Although other texts are
not as descriptive, temple officials are present in all of them.33 This fact
suggests that all of the guarantees for an individual’s presence were
composed during formal hearings.
The last question that must be addressed is how the guarantees for
an individual’s presence function within the ‘tablet trail.’ Investigation
of this subject can proceed along the same lines as the investigation
of the legal function of the abāku-summonses because both text-types
impose similar obligations. The requirement of the guarantor to present
the individual is similar to the requirement of the summoned individual
to “bring” another individual. There are two main interpretations of
this requirement in the abāku-summonses, both of which also apply
to the guarantees for an individual’s presence. According to Moore,
the abāku-summonses are a means of bringing a person to trial at
a particular time. Thus, the guarantees would be another means of
assuring the individual’s presence at a hearing. According to Augapfel,
on the other hand, the abāku-summonses are actually guarantees that
the penalty will be paid by the guilty party. This would mean that the
guarantees for an individual’s presence belong within the broader set
of Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for payments of obligations resulting
from crimes.
In determining whether a particular guarantee for an individual’s
presence functions as a means of assuring the individual’s presence at
a hearing or as a guarantee for a payment there are two factors that
33
See summary table 6.2 for the officials involved. The presence of temple officials
in all the texts does not preclude the possibility that guarantees for an individual’s
presence were used in the course of private litigation, at least in theory. However, the
nature of the texts, especially the need to distinguish between the guarantees for an
individual’s presence and the Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees, makes it difficult to iden-
tify those that come from private litigation. It is, in fact, possible that some (if not all)
Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees were actually written after the debt was due, as part of
the adjudication of disputes over the unpaid debts, rather than at the time the debt was
incurred, as guarantees for initial payment on time. Those texts for which this might
be demonstrated would be examples of the use of the guarantees for an individual’s
presence in the course of private litigation.
188 chapter six
must be examined: the penalty which a particular text imposes and the
time frame it sets for the guarantor’s obligation. As has already been
noted, the penalties imposed may be either monetary or non-monetary.
Monetary penalties, like those imposed upon the guarantors in YOS
6, 194 and TCL 13, 157, suggest that the legal function of these texts
resembles that of other Gestellungsbürgschaft-guarantees for obligations.
The penalty represents an obligation that was incurred through some
wrongdoing; the guarantee is composed to ensure payment. In contrast,
those guarantees that impose no penalty on the guarantor, or apparently
non-monetary penalties, such as “the punishment of the king,” cannot
be guarantees for a payment. Instead, they are probably guarantees to
present the individual for a hearing.
The second factor that impacts the determination of the legal func-
tion of the guarantees for an individual’s presence is the time frame
the texts allow for the fulfillment of the obligation. When the guaran-
tees for an individual’s presence are examined from this point of view,
they fall into four categories: 1) Texts that specify a date on which or
by which the individual is to be presented;34 2) Texts that require the
individual to be presented upon summons, but do not specify any par-
ticular date;35 3) Texts without any designation of when the individual
is to be presented;36 and 4) Texts that create a period of obligation
by requiring presentation upon summons and specifying a date until
which the guarantor’s obligation applies.37 The implications of the first
three possible time frames will be discussed first. The discussion of the
fourth possibility will follow.
The first three possibilities reflect the requirement that the individual
be presented at a specific time (possibility 1), upon summons (possibility
2) or whenever possible (possibility 3). Those texts that specify a date
for the presentation (possibility 1) may, at least in theory, be inter-
preted either along the lines suggested by Moore or those suggested
by Augapfel. That is, they may be understood either as guarantees for
the individual’s appearance for a hearing on the particular date or as
guarantees for the payment of an obligation at that time. Among the
34
YOS 6, 194; TCL 13, 157; YOS 7, 170.
35
YOS 6, 64; YOS 7, 111. YOS 7, 170:11–14 requires the individuals to be pre-
sented when the administrator of the Eanna enters Uruk. Although the text does not
specifically state that the administrator will summon them, it does specify a time of
appearance in terms of the authorities and without specifying a date.
36
YOS 7, 115 and YOS 7, 137.
37
Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155; YOS 6, 213.
texts in the present discussion, texts that impose a deadline happen to

also be those that impose a monetary penalty upon the guarantors.
Thus, they are likely to be guarantees for the payment of obligations
by the deadline. One might, however, still imagine a text without a
monetary penalty but with a specific deadline. Such a text would only
require the guarantor to present the individual for a hearing by the
deadline, but would not require any payment.
Texts that only specify that the individual is to be presented upon
summons or that do not specify any date for appearance (possibilities 2
and 3 above) are less likely to be guarantees for a payment. The person
or authorities to whom the payment is to be made would probably wish
to specify a deadline for the payment. Thus, those texts that require
the individual to appear only when summoned, or that do not impose
a deadline at all, seem to require the individual to appear for a hear-
ing, as Moore suggests for the abāku-summonses. However, YOS 6, 206
demonstrates that Augapfel’s interpretation of the abāku-summonses as
guarantees for payment is not entirely irrelevant. This text requires the
presentation of the individual when the authorities summon him, and
also requires the guarantors to pay the individual’s debt to the Eanna
if they fail to present him. In this text, the individual will be summoned
not only for a hearing, but also for paying a debt.
In all three of the possibilities discussed thus far, the role of the
guarantor is similar to that of the summoned individual in the abāku-
summonses. The guarantor, like the summoned individual in the abāku-
summonses, must present an individual on a specified date or upon
summons by the authorities. The reason for presentation might be either
for a hearing or for paying a monetary obligation. The imposition of
a penalty upon the guarantor implies that, like the summoned indi-
vidual in the abāku-summonses, the guarantor is not randomly chosen
to ensure another person’s presence. Instead, one might imagine that,
like the summoned individual in the abāku-summonses, the guarantor
bears some initial responsibility. For example, as Cocquerillat notes,
the penalty that the guarantors in YOS 6, 194 face suggests that they
are also implicated in this crime.38 If this is so, then the guarantees,
like the abāku-summonses, are a means of allowing the guarantors to
avoid payment of the penalty.
38
190 chapter six
There are, however, texts that indicate that the guarantors are not
involved in any wrongdoing. Instead, they are responsible for bringing
the people because of their positions. In YOS 7, 137, the first sample
text above, the guarantors are the two officials to whom the šatammu
and the administrator place in charge of the five prisoners. Similarly,
in YOS 6, 64 the šatammu himself assumes responsibility for bringing
an individual to Babylon before the ša rēš šarri. In YOS 7, 111, one
of the guarantors is the notorious official mGimillu. He and another
person must present those involved in the killing of temple sheep to the
šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna. The text, however, does
not clarify whether mGimillu is the guarantor because he was himself
accused in these crimes, or whether it is simply because mGimillu served
as an official in the Eanna.
The discussion can now return to the fourth possible time frame, the
one which creates a period of obligation during which the authorities
might summon the individual. The guarantors must ensure that the
individual is available during this time. In terms of the discussion thus
far, the purpose of these guarantees might be either to ensure payment
of a debt upon summons or presence at a hearing. The creation of a
period of obligation means that the summons to repay the debt will
take place during this period or that the hearing will take place then.
At the end of the period of obligation, the individual and the guaran-
tors are free of any obligation.
There are two texts that create a period of obligation: Scheil, RA
14 (1917), p. 155 and YOS 6, 213. The body of YOS 6, 213, written
on 10 Abu, reads as follows:
1. pu-ut mkal-bi A-šu2 ša2 mZA- (1–6) mNūrea son of A ulap-
LAG2-e-a Ištar, his father, and mBalā u son
2. mZALAG2-e-a A-šu2 ša2 ma- u- of mNabû-ušallim descendant of
lap-d15 AD-šu2 Sîn-lēqi-uninnī assume responsi-
3. mba-la- u A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-GI A bility for mKalbi son of mNūrea
md
30-TI-ER2 to mIlī-rēmanni, the ša rēš šarri
4. a-di U4 10-kam2 ša2 ITI KIN administrator of the Eanna until
i-na ŠU.2 10 Ulūlu.
5. mDINGIR.MEŠ-re-man-ni
lu2
SAG.LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-ti
6. E2.AN.NA na-šu-u2 U4-mu
7. ša2 re-e-su in-na-šu-u2 (6–8) The day that he summons
8. i-ba-kan-nim-ma i-nam-din-nu him they shall bring him and
deliver him.
9. ki-i la i-tab-kan-nim-ma (9–11) If they do not bring (him)

10. la id-dan-ni and he is not delivered, they shall
11. i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-da-du bear the punishment of the king.
In this text, mKalbi’s father and another man assume responsibility to
the administrator of the Eanna for one month. Whenever the admin-
istrator summons mKalbi within the month, the two men must present
him. If they do not, they shall incur “the punishment of the king.”
The absence of a monetary penalty in this text indicates that the text
is not a Gestellungsbürgschaft guarantee for a monetary debt that mKalbi
owes to the Eanna. Instead, it seems that mKalbi must be presented for
a hearing which will take place within the month.
The body of Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155, before the names of the
witnesses and the scribes, reads as follows:
1. mre- e-e-ti A-šu2 ša2 mra- a (1–5) mRe ēti son of mRa a
2. A lu2ŠU. A u m¢BA-ša2Ü A-šu2 descendant of Bā iru and mIqīša
ša2 mki-na-a son of mKīnaya, the royal cattle
3. lu2mu-ša2-ki-il GU4 ša2 LUGAL fattener, assume responsibility for
a-di TIL m
Šamaš-zēra-ibni son of mBēl-ana-
4. ša2 ITI ZIZ2 pu-ut [GIR3] ša2 mātišu until the end of Šabā u.
md
UTU-NUMUN-DU3
5. A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-a-na-KUR-šu2
na-šu-u2
6. ki-i ul-tu U4 1–kam2 ša2 ITI (6–12) If mBēl-ušallim, qīpu-
AB official of the Ebabbar, summons
7. a-di TIL ša2 ITI ZIZ2 mdEN- m
Šamaš-zēra-ibni from 1 Tebē u
GI until the end of Šabā u (and) he
8. lu2qi2-i-pi ša2 E2.BABBAR.RA does not appear, mRe ētu and
re-eš m
Iqīša shall count 15 mina of sil-
9. mdUTU-NUMUN-DU3 it-ta- ver to the property of Šamaš.
šu-ma
10. la qer-bu 15 MA.NA KU3.
BABBAR
11. mre- e-e-ti u mBA-ša2
12. a-na NIG2.GA dUTU i-man-
nu-u2
The two guarantors in this text must guarantee mŠamaš-zēra-ibni’s
presence between 1 Tebē u and the end of Šabā u. If the qīpu-official
of the Ebabbar summons mŠamaš-zēra-ibni on any date within this
time, the two guarantors must ensure that he is available. If he is not,
then the guarantors face a very severe penalty of fifteen mina (nine
hundred šeqel) of silver.
192 chapter six
At first glance, the imposition of the monetary penalty suggests

that mŠamaš-zēra-ibni owes a debt of fifteen mina of silver. The two
guarantors must pay this penalty if he is not present to pay the debt
himself. However, the rather severe penalty suggests that the fifteen mina
are not just a debt that mŠamaš-zēra-ibni owes, but may be, instead,
misappropriated funds. The requirement that mŠamaš-zēra-ibni be
presented upon summons by the qīpu-official suggests that a hearing
regarding the misdeed will take place during the two-month period
between 1 Tebē u and the end of Šabā u. Alternatively, the hearing
might not pertain to the fifteen mina of silver at all. Instead, the silver
might be, as Dougherty suggests,39 simply a fine upon the two guaran-
tors for not presenting mŠamaš-zēra-ibni for a hearing pertaining to an
unmentioned subject.
Although both YOS 6, 213 and Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 create
a period of obligation during which the guarantor must present the
individual, the two texts differ from each other with regard to when
this period of obligation begins. In YOS 6, 213, this period begins
immediately with the composition of the text and ends one month
later. Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155, on the other hand, does not take
effect immediately. The text itself was composed on 21 Kislīmu, year
4 of Nebuchadnezzar. The guarantors’ obligations do not begin until
1 Tebē u, nine days later,40 and end at the end of Šabā u, the follow-
ing month.
The delayed onset of the period of obligation in Scheil, RA 14 (1917),
p. 155 and the requirement that the individual be presented upon
summons during a particular period of time raise certain difficulties
with both interpretations of the texts that have been considered thus
far. The creation of a period of obligation indicates that both YOS
6, 213 and Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 are written for the benefit of
the guarantors, rather than for the benefit of the summoning author-
ity. From the point-of-view of an issuing court, if all that is required
is presence upon summons, then there is no reason to delay the onset
of the guarantors’ obligation. Similarly, whether the purpose of the
official summons is for payment of a debt or for a hearing, there is no
39
Dougherty, AJSL 46 (1929–1930), pp. 90–91 n. 1 notes that the text imposes a
“heavy fine.”
40
See Parker and Dubberstein, Chronology, p. 27.
need to limit the power of the summoning authorities by specifying a

period of obligation.
If this understanding is correct, then the guarantors are actually not
free of their obligation once the time set in the texts passes. Instead,
the guarantors in both texts are actually obtaining a temporary release
of the individuals. During this time, the guarantors must be able to
account for the individuals upon the officials’ demand. If the guarantors
cannot account for the individuals, then the guarantors face the penalty
of fifteen mina of silver or the “punishment of the king.” After the time
passes, the guarantors must still return the individuals to their original
places, which is with the temple authorities. Accordingly, it might be
that neither Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 nor YOS 6, 213 is a prelude
to a hearing. Instead, both texts might be the written means of obtain-
ing a temporary release. The individuals who are to be “presented”
might actually be prisoners who are released temporarily and are to be
returned at the end of the guarantors’ terms of obligation.
In sum, there are two means of determining the legal function of
any particular guarantee for an individual’s presence: the penalty that
a particular text imposes and the time frame it sets for the guarantors’
obligation. In most texts, the guarantors’ obligation to present the indi-
vidual ends when they present the individual, on a specific date or in
response to an official summons. This indicates that the goal of these
guarantees is the presentation of the individual. To determine why the
individual must be presented, one must examine the penalty on the
guarantors. A non-monetary penalty implies a hearing of some kind,
while a monetary penalty raises the possibility that the individual is to
be presented to repay a debt. There are, however, texts in which the
guarantors’ obligation extends beyond the presentation upon summons.
These texts may also be means of guaranteeing the individual’s presence
at a hearing, with the only difference being that the texts indicate that
the hearing will take place before a certain date. However, these texts
may actually not envision any hearing at all, and are simply means of
ensuring that the individual will be returned to the authorities at the
end of a term of release.
Summary Table 6.2 Guarantees for Individuals’ Presence
194
Text Wrongdoing Guarantor’s Penalty Authority Scribe Place of Date

Obligation Composition
m
Scheil, RA 14 ? presence of 15 mina of silver qīpu-official of Šamaš- Sippar 21.IX.4 Nbk
(1917), p. 155 individual upon Ebabbar munammir/
m
summons Šamaš-mukīn-apli
// Šangû-Sippar
m
YOS 6, 64 ? presenting — šatammu Nādinu/ mBēl- Uruk 10.XII.4
individual in (guarantor) + a ē-iqīša// Egibi Nbn
Babylon upon administrator
summons of Eanna
(summoner)
m
YOS 6, 194 failure to pay presenting payment of [officials of Nabû-mušētiq- [Uruk] 30.V.10 Nbn
estimated yield individual by individual’s debt Eanna] uddê/ mBalāssu
Tašrītu
chapter six
YOS 6, 206 ? (debt to the presenting payment of debt šatammu, scribes mMūrānu / mNabû- Uruk 15.XIIb.12
Eanna) individual upon of Eanna; ša rēš bāni-a i // Ekur- Nbn
summons šarri in charge zākir
of king’s chest
m
YOS 6, 213 ? presenting i- u ša2 LUGAL administrator Gimillu /mInnin- Uruk 10.V.14 Nbn
individual upon i-šad-da-du of Eanna zēra-iddin
summons
m
YOS 7, 111 theft and killing presenting 4 — šatammu + Gimillu /mInnin- Uruk 13.V.1
of branded individuals upon administrator zēra-iddin Camb
sheep summons of Eanna
Text Wrongdoing Guarantor’s Penalty Authority Scribe Place of Date
Obligation Composition
m
YOS 7, 115 misappro- individual going 30-fold payment šatammu + Marduk-nā ir / Uruk 27.XII.1
m
priation of to Babylon (by summoned administrator Madānu-a ē- Camb
temple produce individual) of Eanna iddin // Šigûa
m
TCL 13, 157 failure to deliver presenting two payment of debt šatammu + Šamaš-mukīn-apli Uruk 3.IV.3 Camb
dates individuals on 7 of dates administrator / mNādin// Egibi
Du ūzu of Eanna
m
YOS 7, 137 treason presenting five [ i- u] ša2 LUGAL šatammu + Arad-Marduk/ Uruk 30.XII.3
m
prisoners in i-šad-da-du administrator Marduk-šuma- Camb
Babylon before of Eanna iddin // Bēl-apla-
Nabugu (+Nabugu) u ur
m
YOS 7, 170 theft of silver presenting two 1 mina of silver ša rēš šarri Šamaš-zēra-iddin/ Uruk 21.IX.4
m
cultic object individuals to for missing cultic A ulap-Ištar // Camb
administrator object Ekur-zākir
m
YOS 7, 177 ? individual (and i- u ša2 mgu-bar-ru šatammu of Nabû-mušētiq- Uruk 8.IV.5 Camb
guarantor) going i-šad-da-du Eanna uddê/ mNūrea//
to Babylon before (+Nabugu) Iddin-Papsukkal
Nabugu within the
month
text-types ensuring an individual’s presence
195
CHAPTER SEVEN
OTHER TEXT-TYPES
7.A Other Summonses
The summonses presented until this point have been divided into four
major types, based on the different obligations they place upon the sum-
moned individual. These four obligations—“arguing a case” (dabābu),
“ending a case” (quttû), “establishing a case” (kunnu) or “presenting”
(abāku) another individual—are not the only actions that a summons
may require. In addition to these four major groups of summonses,
there are other summonses that stipulate requirements using different
terms. These texts are described briefly in the present section.
The other summonses may be broadly divided between those that
impose a penalty on the summoned individual for failure to comply
and those that do not impose a penalty for failure to comply. As with
the four major types of summonses, the imposition of the penalty on
the summoned individuals indicates that they are initially responsible
for the penalty, but may avoid it by complying with the summons.
In VAS 6, 97, for example, the two summoned individuals have
guaranteed clear title to a sold slave. In the wake of a claim against
the sale, these two guarantors must present the claimant and have him
renounce his claim by a certain date or face a penalty. Similarly, in TCL
13, 161, the summoned individual is in possession of an escaped oblate
which he must hand over by a certain time or face a penalty.1
The role of the summoned individuals as the first responsible party
may also be seen in summonses that require the presentation of excul-
patory evidence. Unlike kunnu-summonses, which, at most, require the
presentation of witnesses to “establish the case,” these summonses
specify that another kind of evidence is to be brought. For example,
YOS 7, 113 requires mKiribtu, who owes 160 kur of dates to Ištar of
Uruk, to present proper documentation about the disposal of these
1
YOS 7, 44 is a similar text, in which a third party must remove an escaped oblate
from another person’s possession and bring him to the Eanna. See San Nicolò, SBAW
1937, 6, p. 27 n. 3.
198 chapter seven
dates. If he does not, he must repay the 160 kur of dates to the Lady-
of-Uruk.2 mKiribtu is summoned to bring the evidence because he is
the party responsible for the dates.
Other summonses require that a person appear before an author-
ity or face a penalty. In AnOr 8, 45 and AnOr 8, 46, the summoned
individual must appear before Gobryas the satrap. Although no reason
for this appearance is mentioned, the use of the prepositional phrase
ana pāni (“before”) in both texts suggests that the satrap is to play an
adjudicatory role.3 The wording of TCL 13, 222 makes the adjudicatory
context explicit by requiring the summoned individual to come to a royal
court to “establish a decision” ( purussâ šakānu) with the qīpu-officials.
These summonses raise the same questions of setting as the four main
types of summonses. As can be seen from summary table 7.1 below,
many of the texts were written with the involvement of authorities,
probably during a formal hearing of some kind. Because the required
actions differ from text to text, the setting in which the action is to be
performed must be considered separately for each text. Some texts,
such as those which require an appearance before the satrap, indicate
that there is to be some degree of formal proceedings. In other texts,
the absence of authorities can be interpreted to imply that the required
action might take place outside of a court.
Finally, there are three texts which, because they require an action
to be performed, resemble the summonses, but do not impose any
penalty for failure to comply: Evetts, Ner. 55; YOS 6, 144; and Dar
299. All of them require an individual to present another individual.
In YOS 6, 144 and Dar 299, the summoned individual must present
another individual to authorities for questioning. In Evetts, Ner. 55, the
people are to be brought “t[o] the gate of the crown prince’s house”
(a-[na] KA2 E2 DUMU.LUGAL) for the ša rēš šarri to settle accounts
with them. As can be seen from these requirements, these three texts
2
Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 1:1–7 also requires the presentation of a tablet as
evidence. Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268; Nbn 954; YOS 6, 202 and Dar 358
require an oath. VAS 6, 120 requires giving a tablet and imposes an oath as a penalty
for failing to do so.
3
For the use of a similar phrase (ina pāni ) with a similar function see Wunsch, AuOr
17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:6’.
other text-types 199
are preludes to formal procedures,4 and all are probably the result of
formal proceedings, as well. YOS 6, 144 specifically describes how a
thief was caught and turned over to the Eanna authorities, who turn
him over to one mNabû-mukīn-apli, who bears the title lu2GAL SI.MEŠ.5
The text ends with the following summons (lines 12–15):
12. . . . mdNA3-DU-A mdUTU-ki-i- (12–15) mNabû-mukīn-apli shall
ni lu2sa-ar2-ru bring mŠamaš-kīni, the thief, and
13. u lu2sa-ar2-ru-tu ša2 it-ti-šu2 ib- the thieves who were with him to
ba-kam2-ma m
Nabû-šarra-u ur the ša rēš šarri
14. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 and the administrators of the
lu2
SAG.LUGAL u lu2EN.MEŠ Eanna.
pi-qit-tan-ne-e-tu4 (15–16) He will carry out their
15. ša2 E2.AN.NA ib-ba-kam2-ma interrogation.
ma-ša2-al-ta-šu2-nu
16. i-šak-kan
Based on these lines, there are two possibilities to understand this text,
as well as Dar 299 and Evetts, Ner. 55. The absence of a penalty may
support interpreting them as agreements. On the other hand, these texts
might be an order by the court requiring the summoned individual to
present the person or they might be a contract stating that the sum-
moned individual agrees to present the person. The possibility that these
texts are court orders is supported by the involvement of officials.
7.B Promissory Oaths
Overall, the different types of summonses and guarantees and the

penalties pending evidence pertain to one of three goals: bringing a
case to trial, presenting evidence, or presenting a party to a case. The
discussion now turns to one additional text-type, the promissory oaths,
in which an individual assumes an obligation by swearing an oath. In
many respects, the four texts of this text-type achieve the same ends as
4
The specification of a date for appearance in Evetts, Ner. 55 and Dar 299 further
supports this understanding. Note that YOS 6, 144 does not include a date of appear-
ance, although it clearly states that there is to be a formal interrogation.
5
San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 288 n. 3 is uncertain about the reading of this title.
Based on the reading of /SI/ as ešēru (Borger, Zeichenliste, p. 89), one might propose the
reading rāb ešerti. Note that this reading is not listed by Labat, Manuel, p. 91. For the posi-
tion of this official in the cattle culture of Uruk, see Kümmel, Familie, pp. 52–53.
Summary Table 7.1 Other Summonses
Text Action required Authority Penalty Date Written Appearance Time Place of Place of Scribe
Date Span Appearance Composition
200
m
Joannès, oath — payment 15.X.30 Nbk — — — Borsippa Nabû-šuma-
Archives de (1/16) ibni / mNabû-
Borsippa, [šu]mu-līšir //
p. 268 Iliya
m
Evetts, bringing people ša rēš šarri — 9.IV.3 Ngl 10.IV (6/29) 1 day gate of Babylon Nabû-a ē-
Ner. 55 to settle (6/28) crown iddin/ mŠulaya
accounts prince’s // Egibi
house
m
YOS 6, 144 bringing administrators — 12.IV.9 Nbn — — (Uruk) Uruk Bazūzu/
m
individual for of Eanna; qīpu (7/10) Nādin
questioning officials
m
Nbn 954 oath — dropping 19.I.16 Nbn 20.I (5/3) 1 day “the magic Babylon Silim-Bēl/
m
claim (5/2) circle” Balāssu //
Dannêa
m
chapter seven
YOS 6, 202 oath — payment 10.VIII.16 16.VIII 6 days — Uruk Nādin/ mBēl-
Nbn (11/16) (11/22) a ē-iqīša //
Egibi
m
VAS 6, 97 Presenting — payment 28.IV.2 Cyr adi VI.2 Cyr < 90 — Babylon Liburu/
m
claimant (7/6) (10/5) days Nabû-zēru-līšir
// Nabûnaya
m
Stigers, presenting šatammu + transfer of 24.VI.2 Cyr adi 10.VIII < 73 (Uruk) Uruk Gimillu /
m
JCS 28 tablet administrator property (8/30) (11/12) days Innin-zēra-
(1976), + scribes of iddin
No. 1 Eanna
m
AnOr 8, 45 appearance satrap; i- i ša2 9.XII.4 Cyr I (4/8–5/6) 22–50 Babylon Uruk Pir u/
m m
before satrap šatammu + gu-bar-ra (3/17) days Eanna-šuma-
administrator ibni
of Eanna
Text Action required Authority Penalty Date Written Appearance Time Place of Place of Scribe
Date Span Appearance Composition
m
AnOr 8, 46 appearance satrap; i- u ša2 10.XII.4 Cyr I.5 Cyr 21–49 Babylon Uruk Arad-
m
before satrap šatammu + gu-ba-ru (3/18) (4/8–5/6) days Marduk/
m
administrator Marduk-
of Eanna šuma-iddin//
Bēl-apla-u ur
m
YOS 7, 44 handing over šatammu + payment 15.VII.5 Cyr [2]5.VII 10 days (Uruk) Uruk Gimillu /
m
escaped slave administrator (10/16) (10/26) Innin-zēra-
of Eanna iddin
TCL 13, EŠ.BAR it-ti qīpu-officials surrender (Camb or —(when — royal — —
lu2
222 TIL.LA.GID2. of Eanna; of Dar) authorities courthouse?
DA.ME ša2 šatammu property enter Babylon)
E2.AN.NA i-šak- of Eanna
kan
other text-types
m
YOS 7, presenting rāb limiti payment ?.?. 2 Camb adi 20.?.2 ? (Uruk) Uruk Gimillu /
m
113 documentation Camb Innin-zēra-
iddin
m
TCL 13, handing over šatammu + payment 21.X.3 adi 11.XII < 50 (Uruk) Uruk Nabû-
161 escaped slave administrator Camb (1/31) (3/21) days mukīn-apli /
m
of Eanna Marduk-šuma-
iddin // Balā u
m
VAS 6, 120 handing over — oath 29.V.2 Dar adi 10.VI.2 < 34 — Babylon Iddinna-Bēl/
tablet (8/28) Dar (10/6) days Aqar// Šippe
Dar 299 Bringing scribes of — 16.IV.11 adi 21.IV < 5 days— Babylon ?
201
individual for Ešitlam Dar (7/7) (7/12)

questioning
m
Dar 358 oath — payment 22.X.13 28.X (1/19) 6 days — Babylon Arad-Ba u
Dar (1/13) //Ašlāku
202 chapter seven
the summonses and guarantees. As will be seen below, in all four texts
the swearers obligate themselves to perform some of the same actions
as those required of the summoned individual or the guarantor. The
difference between the promissory oaths and summonses or guarantees
lies in the means by which the obligation is assumed. In these texts, the
obligation is assumed by means of an oath.
The four texts included in the present discussion are those that can be
shown to have emerged from an adjudicatory context. The evidence for
this comes from the self-imposed obligations expressed in the oath. The
four texts are: YOS 7, 50; VAS 6, 154; Dar 229 and YOS 7, 194, each
of which will be considered separately. YOS 7, 50 reads as follows:
1. md
a-nu-um-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 (1–6) mAnum-a a-iddin son of
m
NUMUN-tu2 m
Zērūtu descendant of Kurî
2. A mkur-i ina dEN dPA u a-da-e swore by Bēl, Nabû and the
LUGAL oaths of the king to mNidinti-Bēl
3. a-na mni-din-ti-dEN lu2ŠA3. šatammu of the Eanna son of
TAM E2.AN.NA m
Bēl-mukīn-zēri descendant of
4. A-šu2 ša2 mdEN-DU-NUMUN Dābibī and mBēl-a a-iddin the
A mda-bi-bi ša rēš šarri administrator of the
5. u mdEN-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. Eanna:
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit
6. E2.AN.NA it-te-me ki-i a-di (6–9) “By 5 Ara šamna I shall
7. U4 5-kam2 ša2 ITI APIN bring mKīnenaya, an oblate of
m
ki-ne-na-a-a the Lady-of-Uruk, and give (him)
8. lu2RIG7 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 to you.”
UNUGki
9. ab-ba-kam2-ma a-nam-dak-ka-
šu2-nu-tu
10. ki-i la i-ta-bak i- u (10–11) If he does not bring
11. ša2 ¢LUGALÜ i-ša-ad-[da-ad ] (him) he shall be[ar] the punish-
ment of the king.
12. lu2
mu-kin-nu mIR3-dAMAR. (12–13) mArad-Marduk son of
UTU A-šu2 ša2 m
Zēriya descendant of Egibi;
13. mNUMUN-ia A me-gi-bi (13–14) mArad-Bēl son of mNabû-
m
IR3-dEN šumu-līšir descendant of Iddin-
14. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-NUMUN- Papsukkal;
GIŠ A mMU-dPAP.SUKKAL
15. mIR3-ia A-šu2 ša2 mGAR-MU (15) mArdiya son of mŠākin-šumi
A mŠU-dna-na-a descendant of Gimil-Nanaya;
16. UMBISAG mdEN-na-din-A

lu2
(16–17) Scribe: mBēl-nādin-apli
A-šu2 ša2 mdŠU2-MU-MU son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin
17. A mdEN-A-URI3 UNUGki ITI descendant of Bēl-apla-u ur.
ZIZ2 (17–19) 30 Šabā u, year 5 of
18. U4 30-kam2 MU 5-kam2 Cyrus, king of Babylon, king of
m
ku-ra-aš2 the lands.
KUR.KUR.MEŠ
In this text, mAnum-a a-iddin swears that he will present an oblate of
the Lady-of-Uruk to the šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna.
If he fails to present the oblate, he will “bear the punishment of the
king.”
The obligation which mAnum-a a-iddin swears to fulfill closely re-
sembles the obligation imposed by the abāku-summonses and the guar-
antees for an individual’s presence.6 The absence of a monetary penalty
indicates that the oblate is not required to be presented to pay a debt.7
The fact that the oblate is to be presented to the Eanna authorities
raises the possibility that these authorities will conduct a hearing of
some sort. However, if such a hearing were intended, one would expect
a certain degree of urgency to be reflected in a short gap between the
date of the oath and the date by which the oblate is to be presented.
The text allows for the rather lengthy span of up to 239 days, which
does not seem to imply that a trial is to take place.
It may be that mAnum-a a-iddin swears an oath in order to obtain
a temporary release of the oblate. After 5 Ara šamna, he must
return the oblate to the Eanna. Thus, this text most closely resembles
the guarantees for an individual’s presence that create a period of
obligation. Alternatively, one may imagine that mAnum-a a-iddin is
obtaining rights to use the services of the oblate until 5 Ara šamna.
After this date, he must return the oblate to the Eanna authorities. If
this latter interpretation is correct, then the text bears only a surface
resemblance to the abāku-summonses or guarantees for the presence
of an individual. It is actually a contract that does not come from an
adjudicatory context.
6
A similar oath is recorded in AnOr 8, 79:1–8. The text records the fact that the
swearer did not meet his obligation and imposes a 1 mina penalty. See San Nicolò,
SBAW 1937, 6, pp. 45–47.
7
See also San Nicolò, SBAW 1937, 6, p. 45.
204 chapter seven
The next text to be discussed, VAS 6, 154, pertains to the presenta-

tion of evidence. It reads:8
1. mMU-dNA3 DUMU ša2 mdza- (1–4) mIddin-Nabû son of
b[a4-ba4-mu (A mIR3-GIR4- m
Z[ababa-iddin (descendant of
KU3)] Arad-Nergal)] swore by Bēl, Nabû
2. ina dEN dNA3 u mda-ri-ia-[muš and Dari[us the king] to mŠellebi
LUGAL] son of mIddin-Nabû descendant
3. a-na mše-el-le-<bi> DUMU ša2 of Nappā u:
m
MU-dNA3
4. A lu2SIMUG it-te-me ki-i a-di-i
5. U4 2-kam2 ša2 ITI DU6 al-la- (4–8) “By 2 Tašrītu I shall come
ak-am-ma and bring the receipt-documents
6. gi-i - a-nu a-na-aš2-šam-ma and show them to mŠellebi.”
7. a-na mše-el-le-bi
8. u2-kal-la-mu ki-i
9. la ¢ukÜ-te-¢li-muÜ <<MU>> (8–11) If he does not show (the
10. a-ki-¢iÜ u2-il3-¢ti-šu2Ü documents) he shall pay mŠellebi’s
KU3.¢BABBARÜ silver according to his promissory
11. ¢ša2Ü mše-el-le-bi id-¢dan-nuÜ note.
12. MU.DU mdAMAR.UTU-
lu2
(12–13) Witnesses: mMarduk-
¢NU?.ME? DUMU ša2Ü NU-ME? son of mNabû-a ē-
13. mdNA3-ŠEŠ.¢MEŠ-MUÜ A iddin descendant of Šumu-libši;
mlu2
MU-¢lib2-ši Ü
14. NA3-GI DUMU ša2
md
(14) mNabû-ušallim son of
AMAR.UTU-NUMUN-
md m
Marduk-zēra-ibni;
DU3
15. m
¢šiš Ü-ki DUMU ša2 EN-
md
(15) mŠirku son of mBēl-ē ir;
SUR
16. EN-bul-li -su lu2UMBISAG
md
(16) mBēl-bullissu, the scribe,
A mlu2GAL-DU3 descendant of Rāb-banê.
17. ¢TIN.TIRÜki ITI KIN U4 (17–19) Babylon. 28 Ulūlu, year
¢28-kam2Ü 28 of Dari[us] king of Babylon
18. ¢MUÜ 28-kam2 ¢mda-ri-iaÜ- and the lands.
[muš ]
19. LUGAL Eki u KUR.KUR
8
Readings and translation follow Baker, AfO Beiheft 30, No. 227.
This text apparently emerges from a dispute over the repayment of a

debt. mIddin-Nabû, the swearer in this text, has borrowed silver from
m
Šellebi. mŠellebi claims that he has not been repaid, while mIddin-Nabû
claims that he has repaid the debt. To support his claim, mIddin-Nabû
swears that he will bring the receipt-documents ( gi ānu) within four
days. If he does not bring the documents, mIddin-Nabû must repay
the debt.
The obligation to present evidence of having repaid the debt is similar
to the obligations imposed by the exculpatory kunnu-summonses (see
section 5.A above). Like mIddin-Nabû in VAS 6, 154, the summoned
individual in the exculpatory kunnu-summonses must also present excul-
patory evidence to prove his claim. The main difference between the
exculpatory kunnu-summonses and VAS 6, 154 lies in the way in which
this obligation is assumed. The discussion of the kunnu-summonses
demonstrated that this text-type is composed as a court order to present
evidence. In VAS 6, 154, no authorities are named and mIddin-Nabû
assumes the obligation himself. This difference between VAS 6, 154 and
the kunnu-summonses may point to a difference between the settings in
which they were composed. It is possible that, unlike the kunnu-sum-
monses, VAS 6, 154 is not the result of a court order issued during the
formal adjudication of a dispute. Instead, it may reflect an oath sworn
in an informal adjudicatory context. On the other hand, the fact that
no authorities are named does not necessarily mean that no authorities
are present. Therefore, one cannot ignore the possibility that the oath
is actually imposed in court by an unnamed authority.
The discussion of the kunnu-summonses addressed not only the ques-
tion of where they were written, but also the question of where the
evidence is ultimately to be presented. It demonstrated that the kunnu-
summonses might result in either a formal or an informal determina-
tion of whether or not the case had been “established.” This question
is relevant to VAS 6, 154, as well. mIddin-Nabû swears that he will
“bring the receipt documents and show them to mŠellebi.” The fact
that mIddin-Nabû must show the documents directly to mŠellebi seems
to suggest that no other authorities will be involved in rendering a final
evaluation. On the other hand, one might imagine that the “bringing”
refers to a separate, formal procedure in court, and that the documents
will be “shown” to mŠellebi there.
206 chapter seven
The third text to be considered is Dar 229, which reads as follows:

1. lu2
DUMU DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina (1–6) (These are) the mār banî
pa-ni-šu2-nu before whom mIqubu, the gar-
2. m
i-qu-bu lu2nu-gišKIRI6 dener, swore by Bēl, Nabû and
3. a-na mdAMAR.UTU-PAP-A Darius king of Babylon to
A-šu2 ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTU- m
Marduk-nā ir-apli son of
TIN m
Itti-Marduk-balā u:
4. A me-gi-bi ina dEN dNA3 u
m
da-ri-ia-a-muš
5. LUGAL Eki
6. it-te-me ki-i a-di-i U4 8-kam2
7. ša2 ITI ZIZ2 al-kam-ma dib- (6–8) “By 8 Šabā u I shall come
¢biÜ . . . and settle the case . . .”
8. u2-qa-tu-u2 mdNA3-na-¢ irÜ
9. A-šu2 ša2 mDU3-ia A lu2SU. A (8–9) mNabû-nā ir son of mBāniya
descendant of Bā iru;
10. AMAR.UTU-MU-MU A-
md
(10–11) mMarduk-šuma-iddin
šu2 ša2 mgu-za-nu son of mGūzānu descendant of
11. A mDU3-eš-DINGIR mdEN- Eppeš-ilī;
MU A-šu2 ša2 (11–12) mBēl-iddin son of
12. mdNA3-KAR-ZI.MEŠ A m
Nabû-ē ir-napšāti descendant of
m
dam-qa Damqa;
13. mIR3-ia A-šu2 ša2 mda-di-di-ia A (13–14) mArdiya son of mDa-
14. mna-ba-a-a mdEN-KAM A-šu2 didiya descendant of Nabaya;
ša2 (14–15) mBēl-ēreš son of mGin-
15. mgi-in-na-a naya;
16. mri-mut-dEN DUB.SAR (16–17) Rīmūt, the scribe, son
A-šu2 ša2 of mArdiya.
17. mIR3-ia Eki ITI ZIZ2 U4 (17–19) 6 Šabā u, year 7 of
6-kam2 Darius, king of Babylon, king
18. MU 7-kam2 mda-ri- -muš of the lands.
19. LUGAL Eki LUGAL KUR.
KUR
Although the wording of mIqubu’s oath is not entirely preserved, the
part that can be read indicates that mIqubu swears that he will “settle
a case” (dibba quttû) by (adi ) 8 Šabā u. The formulation of this oath
seems to recall the formulation of the quttû-type summonses (section
4.B above). This latter text-type imposes a penalty which is always an
obligation of the summoned individual to an opposing party if the
summoned individual fails to “settle” (quttû) his case. It was suggested
that the quttû-summonses, like the dabābu-summonses, are composed in
response to the opposing party’s claim against the summoned individual.
The quttû-summonses call for an informal settlement of a case, rather

than a resolution in court. This suggestion was based on four features
of the quttû-summonses: the use of the verb quttû rather than dabābu, the
absence of an official adjudicating authority, the requirement to appear
“by” (adi) but not “on” a specific date, and the relatively short time
span allowed for appearance. Dar 229, the promissory oath, exhibits
all four of these features as well but, unlike the summonses, does not
impose a penalty for failure to settle the case by the stipulated date.
Nevertheless, the use of the term dibbu (“case”) suggests that a legal
claim has in fact been made. mIqubu swears the oath “to” (ana) mMar-
duk-nā ir-apli, who is probably his opponent in the case. One might
imagine that mMarduk-nā ir-apli has actually stated a claim and, as a
result, mIqubu has had to swear the oath to ensure that the case will
be settled in a timely manner.9
The discussion of the promissory oaths will conclude by analyzing
one text, YOS 7, 194, in which the formulation of the oath includes
the verb dabābu, which suggests that it should be compared with the
dabābu-summonses (section 4.A above). However, as will be seen, the text
seems to have an entirely different purpose. The text reads as follows:
1. mka-re-e-a A-šu2 ša2 mdan-nu- (1–3) mKārēa son of mDannu-
d
U.GUR Nergal swore by Bēl, Nabû and
2. ina dEN dNA3 u mka-am-bu-zi-ia Cambyses, king of Babylon, king
3. LUGAL Eki LUGAL KUR. of the lands:
KUR it-te-me ki-i
4. a-di-i U4 2-kam2 ša2 ITI GAN (4–11) “By 2 Kislimu I shall
al-la-kam2-ma come and speak to mArad-Mar-
5. it-ti mIR3-dAMAR.UTU A-šu2 duk son of mMarduk-šuma-iddin
ša2 mdAMAR.UTU MU-MU descendant of mBēl-apla-u ur
A mdEN-IBILA-URI3 and mAmurru-šarra-u ur son of
6. u mdKUR.GAL-LUGAL- m
Talīmu and repay those dates,
URI3 A-šu2 ša2 mta-li-mu 36 kur, the remainder of the dates
7. a-dib-bu-ub u3 ZU2.LUM. of the imittu-yield of the field-of-
MA-a cut-brick belonging to the Lady-
8. 36 GUR re- i-it ZU2.LUM. of-Uruk.”
MA i-mit-tu4 A.ŠA3.MEŠ
9. NIG2.GA dGAŠAN UNUGki
ša2 DU6 a-gur-ru-tu4
10. ša2 MU 7-kam2 ša2 ina mu -
i-ia2 a-na
11. NIG2.GA E2.AN.NA e-et-ti-ru
9
The purpose of the oath may be compared, therefore, with the different functions
proposed for the quttû-summons discussed in section 4.B above.
208 chapter seven
12. mu-kin-nu m¢XÜ-[X A-šu2 ša2

lu2 (12–13) Witnesses: mPN1 [son of
PN2]
m m
PN2] descendant of Basiya;
13. A mba-si-ia2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ- (13–14) mNabû-a ē-[iddin son]
[MU10 A]-šu2 of mBēl-ūsāt descendant of Bēl-
14. ša2 mdEN-u2-sat A mdEN-u2-sat ūsāt;
15. md
UTU-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 (15) mŠamaš-a a-iddin son of
m
ki-na-a A lu2man-di-di m
Kīnaya descendant of Mandidi;
16. mkal-ba-a A-šu2 ša2 md
NA3-re- (16) mKalbaya son of mNabû-
man-ni rēmanni;
17. UMBISAG mda-nu-
lu2
(17) Scribe: mAnu-zēra-šubši son
NUMUN-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2 of mLâbāš.
m
la-ba-aš
18.uru
E2 U.WUK.MEŠ ITI APIN (18–21) Bīt-Uwuk. 25 Ara -
U4 25-kam2 šamna, year 8 of Cambyses, king
19. MU 8-kam2 mka-am-bu-zi-ia of Babylon.
20. LUGAL Eki LUGAL KUR.
10 KUR
As Cocquerillat has noted, this is one of several “documents occasionnels
relatifs aux perturbations survenant dans l’acheminement des récoltes vers l’Eanna”
(“occasional documents relating to disruptions that arise in the deliv-
ery of the harvests to the Eanna”).11 mKārēa has apparently failed to
deliver a quantity of dates, and, as a result, must swear that he will
deliver them by a certain time. In addition, mKārēa swears that he will
“speak” (dabābu) to two men, mArad-Marduk and mAmurru-šarra-u ur,
who are known to have been officials of the Eanna.12 Because the verb
dabābu is used, one might interpret the oath in this text as one which
accomplishes the same purpose as the issuance of a dabābu-summons.
Like the dabābu-summonses, the oath in this text might be a means
of getting mKārēa to “argue his case” against the claim of the Eanna
officials. However, the text itself does not indicate that there is any
dispute about the missed delivery. mKārēa swears that he will, without
any contest, deliver the dates. Furthermore, the text does not impose
a penalty for failure to appear before the officials, which, in line with
the dabābu-summonses, might have been understood as the disputed
10
Restoration follows Kümmel, Familie, p. 26 n. 30.
11
12
For this suggestion, see Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 81. For other references to these
two men, see the index entries in Kümmel, Familie, pp. 170–171.
obligation.13 Thus, it would be incorrect to translate the verb dabābu in

this text as “to argue a case,” and to interpret the oath as a preliminary
stage of the case. Instead, it seems that the oath comes from the end
of an investigation of some kind, which has concluded that mKārēa
has not met all his obligations. mKārēa must deliver the dates, and he
swears that he will do so, apparently without any further claims. He
will “speak” with the officials, perhaps to apprise them that he has met
the obligation.14
7.C Injunctions
This text-type imposes a penalty upon an individual if that individual

performs a particular action. They are formulated according to the
following basic outline:
I. Hypothetical Violation
kî/ina ūmu15 . . .
“On the day that” + action performed by PN
II. Penalty against PN
III. Witnesses
IV. Date
The legal function of the injunctions, then, is to impose a penalty

of some kind in order to prevent the performance of a particular
action.
Most of the texts impose a non-monetary penalty. 16 The discus-
sion will begin with these texts, and then turn to those injunctions
13
See the discussion in section 4.A above. Note that in YOS 7, 194, the word dīnu is
absent from the oath, as well. As has already been noted in the discussion of Abraham,
Business, No. 17 and No. 45, the absence of this noun does not preclude the possibility
that “arguing a case” is intended. Unlike YOS 7, 194, however, Abraham, Business,
No. 17 and No. 45 do impose a penalty for failure to appear. It is this penalty, rather
than the verb dabābu itself, that indicates that a disputed obligation is in question and
which distinguishes Abraham, Business, No. 17 and No. 45 from YOS 7, 194.
14
For the understanding of the idiom itti PN dabābu as “to speak with,” rather than
“to argue against,” see CAD dabābu 3a2’ and 3b2’ (D, p. 8).
15
UCP 9/1, 53:1 does not include the preposition ina before the word ūmu. YOS
19, 110:6 and BIN 1, 169:21 use kî (“if ”) instead of the prepositional phrase.
16
See summary table 7.3 at the end of this section for the various penalties
imposed.
Summary Table 7.2 Promissory Oaths
210
Text Guarantor’s Penalty Authority Date Written Date of Time Place of Place of Scribe
Obligation Obligation Span Obligation Composition
m
YOS 7, 50 Bringing i- u ša2 šatammu + 30.XI.5 Cyr adi 5.VIII ≤ 239 (Uruk) Uruk Bēl-nādin-apli /
m
oblate to ¢LUGALÜ administrator (2/26) (10/24) days Marduk-šuma-
šatammu and i-ša-ad- of Eanna iddin // Bēl-apla-
administrator [da-ad ] u ur
of Eanna
m
YOS 7, 194 come (alāku) — Officials of 25.VIII.8 adi 2.IX ≤ 6 days (Uruk) Bīt Uwuk Anu-zēra-šubši/
and state Eanna Camb (11/13) (11/19) Lâbāši
(dabābu)
claim
m
Dar 229 come (alāku) — — 6.XI.7 Dar adi 8.XI ≤ 2 days — — Rīmūt/ mArdiya
and settle (2/3) (2/5)
(quttû) case
m
chapter seven
VAS 6, 154 come (alāku) repayment — 28.VI.28 Dar adi 2.VII ≤ 4 days — Babylon Bēl-bulli su/
and show of debts (10/7) (10/11) Rāb-banê
receipts
which impose a monetary penalty. YOS 19, 110 will serve as a first
example:1718
1. mkur-ban-ni-dAMAR.UTU (1–4) mKurbanni-Marduk,
lu2
ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA šatammu of the Eanna, son of
2. A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN-ia A m
Zēriya descendant of Sîn-
md
30-da-ma-qu damāqu said thus to mBēl-kā ir
3. a-na mdEN-KAD3 A-šu2 ša2 son of m illaya descendant of
m
il-la-a Bēl-e ēru:
4. A mdEN-e- e-ru iq-bi um-ma
5. li-gi-in-ni a-na lu2RIG7.MEŠ (5–6) “You shall not cause some-
6. ul tu-ša-aq-bi ki-i lu2RIG7 one to recite the excerpt tablet to
the oblates!”18
7. a-na UGU dak-kan-ni-šu2 it- (6–9) If an oblate goes to his
tal-ku bedroom and he has the excerpt
8. u3 li-gi-in-ni ul-ta-qab-bu-u2 tablets recited, he shall bear the
9. i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-da-ad punishment of the king.
10. mu-kin-nu mIR3-dAMAR.
lu2
(10) Witnesses: mArad-Marduk
UTU A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN-ia2 son of mZēriya descendant of
A me-gi-[bi] Egibi;
11. mla-ba-ši-dAMAR.UTU-A-šu2 (11) mLâbāši-Marduk son of
ša2 mIR3-dEN A me-gi-bi m
12. mmu-ra-nu A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- (12) mMūrānu son of mNabû-bāni-
DU3-ŠEŠ A mE2-kur-za-kir a i descendant of Ekur-zākir.
13. lu2
UMBISAG mba-la- u A-šu2 (13) Scribe: mBalā u son of mSîn-
ša2 md30-DU3 A lu2SIPA GU4 ibni descendant of Rē i-alpi.
14. UNUGki ITI SIG4 U4 4-kam2 (14–15) Uruk. 4 Simānu, year 15
MU 15-kam2 of Nabonidus king of Babylon.
15. dNA3-IM.TUK LUGAL TIN.
TIRki
This text begins with the šatammu’s warning to mBēl-kā ir against having
someone recite excerpt tablets to the oblates. The injunction itself occurs
in lines 6–9 and consists of two parts: the hypothetical violation (“If an
oblate goes to his bedroom and he has [him] recite the excerpt tablets”)
and the penalty (“he shall bear the punishment of the king”). The legal
function of this text is rather apparent. The injunction is issued in order
to prevent mBēl-kā ir from having the excerpt tablets recited.
17
Readings follow Paul-Alain Beaulieu, “New Light on Secret Knowledge in Late
Babylonian Culture,” ZA 82 (1992), pp. 99–101.
18
This prohibition apparently pertains to the dissemination of forbidden knowldge.
See Beaulieu, ZA 82 (1992), pp. 106–107.
212 chapter seven
In YOS 19, 110, there are two factors that indicate that the action
is prohibited: the formulation of the penalty (item II in the scheme
above) and the quotation of the šatammu’s warning. The penalty is a
non-monetary negative consequence (“the punishment of the king”) for
committing the action. The non-monetary formulation distinguishes
this injunction, and others with similarly-worded penalties, from those
in which committing the hypothetical action results in a monetary pay-
ment. The non-monetary formulation indicates that the consequences
are to be construed as a penalty rather than as a simple payment.19
From comparison with other injunctions, it is clear that the šatammu’s
warning in YOS 19, 110 may be considered as background, rather than
as an integral part of the formulation of the injunction itself. It does,
however, provide additional internal evidence of the wrongful nature
of the prohibited action. In other injunctions, the formulation of the
hypothetical violation (item I in the outline above) may provide similar
evidence. For example, TCL 13, 142:12 uses the phrase qāt sa-bit-ti to
denote stolen items which may be found. Similarly, Cyr 307:4 prohibits
the action performed ina pi-ir- a-tu4 (“falsely”).20
The injunctions that impose a non-monetary penalty come either
from the Eanna at Uruk or the Ebabbar at Sippar, and were written by
scribes known to have served in these temples.21 Some mention temple
authorities in whose presence (“ina DU.ZU”) the injunction was writ-
ten,22 or list authorities as witnesses.23 Mentions of the temple authorities
suggest that the injunctions were issued during formal hearings. The
quotation of the šatammu’s warning in YOS 19, 110 may be the written
record of such a hearing. Similarly, YOS 7, 56 begins with a statement
by the individual against whom the injunction is issued. This statement
was probably made during a hearing, as well.
A second matter which must be addressed is when an injunction
would have been issued. In his discussion of YOS 19, 110, Beaulieu, who
is the first to use the term “injunction” to describe these texts, suggests
that the individual against whom it is written “was apparently caught
19
It is entirely possible that “bearing the sin of the king” entailed a monetary pay-
ment. Nevertheless, the formulation itself makes it clear that the consequences are a
penalty, rather than a payment for performing an action.
20
See AHw. piri tu, p. 866.
21
See the summary table for a list of the different scribes.
22
YOS 7, 77:8.
23
Cyr 307:10–11.
in flagrante delicto.”24 The very specific wording of YOS 19, 110 suggests
that this particular injuction was issued because the individual was
actually caught teaching forbidden knowledge. On the other hand, it
is also possible that YOS 19, 110, and other texts like it, were issued
in the wake of only a suspicion, rather than after the individual had
actually committed a misdeed. In either case, the injunctions serve as
a warning to the individual and provide the authorities with a grounds
for future action against the individual.
In the texts discussed so far, committing the hypothetical act has
non-monetary consequences. By their very nature, these consequences
clearly show that they are penalties. There are, however, two texts, one
from Uruk (UCP 9/1, 53) and one from Babylon (Nbn 682) in which
the performance of the hypothetical action results in a payment of
some kind rather than in a non-monetary penalty. In these texts, it
is difficult to determine whether this payment is actually a penalty or
simply a fee for performing the action. The discussion will address each
text separately in order to highlight the specific problems of each. The
text from Uruk reads as follows:2526
1. U4!-mu m i-bi-il 25 DAM ša2 (1–3) The day that ibil, wife
m
EN-NUMUN of mBēl-zēri, is seen with mŠulaya
2. it-ti mšu-la-a A-šu2 ša2 mIR3-a son of mArdiya—
3. it-tan-ma-ru26 ITI 10-GIN2
KU3.BABBAR
4. man-da-at-tu4-ša2 mšu-la-a (3–5) mŠulaya shall [pay] her
5. [i-nam-din] a-na dGAŠAN ša2 monthly wage of 10 šeqel of silver
UNUGki to the Lady-of-Uruk.
6. lu2
mu-kin-nu mdU.GUR-na- ir A- (6–7) Witnesses: mNergal-nā ir
šu2 ša2 son of mAqar-apli descendant of
7. ma-qar-A A mdEN-A-URI3 Bēl-apla-u ur;
8. m
na-din A-šu2 ša2 X-X-X A
md
(8) mNādin son of mPN descen-
md
EN-e- e3-ru dant of Bēl-e ēru;
24
Beaulieu, ZA 82 (1992), p. 106.
25
According to Lutz’s drawing, a vertical (masculine) determinative preceeds the
name of ibil, even though it is clear that she is a woman from the following DAM
and from the feminine suffix ša in line 4.
26
The verb it-tan-ma-ru is a 3ms form (with a subjunctive) instead of the expected
3fs form beginning with ta.
214 chapter seven
9. mli-ši-ru A-šu2 ša2 mgi-mil-lu A (9) mLīširu son of mGimillu

m
mu-še-zi-bu descendant of Mušēzibu;
10. u lu2UMBISAG mdINNIN-na- (10–11) and the scribe: mInnina-
NUMUN-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2 zēra-šubši son of mNanaya-a a-
iddin.
11. na-na-a-ŠEŠ-MU UNUGki
md
(11–13) Uruk. 17 Simānu, year
ITI SIG4 28 of Nebuchadnezzar, king of
12. U4 17-kam2 MU 28-kam2 Babylon.
d
NA3-NIG2.DU-URI3
13. LUGAL TIN.TIRki
This text imposes a monetary payment upon mŠulaya “the day that
ibil, wife of mBēl-zēri, is seen with mŠulaya son of mArdiya” (U4!-mu
m
i-bi-il DAM ša2 mEN-NUMUN it-ti mšu-la-a A-šu2 ša2 mIR3-a it-tan-
ma-ru). The payment is described as ibil’s “wages” (mandattu) of 10
šeqel per month, and must be paid to the Eanna. The obligation to
the Eanna indicates that ibil somehow belonged to the Eanna. Dan-
damaev views this text as a contract between mŠulaya and the Eanna.
He uses the text to prove that “temple slave women (including married
women) were also hired out as concubines.”27 The text may indeed
be a contract, but that it is for the hire of the woman as a concubine
cannot be proven based on the available evidence.
There are, however, features of UCP 9/1, 53 which suggest that it is
an injunction rather than a contract. The fact that ibil is mentioned
as mBēl-zēri’s wife may suggest that her “being seen” together with
m
Šulaya involves some illicit action. It may be that adultery is suspected.
However, the requirement to pay wages seems to indicate that it is the
ownership of ibil that is in question, rather than an illicit liaison
between her and mŠulaya. mŠulaya and the Eanna may disagree as to
who has the rights to ibil. If this is the case, then the purpose of the
text is to prevent Šulaya from claiming possession of ibil. Because the
obligation is to the Eanna, one may suggest that the text was issued as
an order from there, although the protagonists, the witnesses and the
scribe are not otherwise attested in the Eanna’s archives.28 Thus, there
is nothing precluding the possibility that the text is actually an agree-
27
Dandamaev, Slavery, p. 135.
28
The scribe is listed in Kümmel, Familie, p. 115, but the present text is the only
one in which he is attested. Other individuals in this text do not appear in Kümmel,
Familie.
ment between mŠulaya and the Eanna, in which mŠulaya indicates that
he has ceded any claim to ibil.
The second text which imposes a monetary obligation is Nbn 682,
which belongs to the Egibi archives from Babylon. Like the previous
text, the hypothetical action pertains to where a slavegirl, fAmtiya, “is
seen.” Before the names of the scribe and the witnesses, the text reads
as follows:29
1. ina U4-mu fGEME2-ia lu2qal-la-ta (1–5) On the day that fAm-
2. ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN tiya, slavegirl of mItti-Marduk-
A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU balā u son of mNabû-a ē-iddin
3. A me-gi-bi it-ti mgu-za-nu descendant of Egibi, is seen with
4. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-¢mu-še-ti Ü-iq- m
Guzānu son of mNabû-mušētiq-
<UD>.DA uddê descendant of Mudammiq-
5. A mKAL-dIM ta-at-na-mar-ri Adad or she is rumored to be
6. u ši-mu-us-su it-ti-šu2 with him—
7. it-te-še-mu-u2 U4-mu 3 (BAN2) (7–9) mGuzānu shall pay mItti-
ŠE.BAR Marduk-balā u her daily wage
8. man-da-at-ta-šu2 mgu-za-nu of 3 sūtu of barley.
9. a-na mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN
i-nam-din
The text, taken on its own, states that if mItti-Marduk-balā u’s slavegirl
f
Amtiya is found or is rumored to be in mGuzānu’s possession, mGuzānu
will have to compensate mItti-Marduk-balā u. The required compensa-
tion, of itself, does not necessarily indicate that it is a penalty. In fact,
this text, like UCP 9/1, 53, has been interpreted as a contract for the
slavegirl’s sexual services.30 However, by considering Nbn 682 together
with other texts concerning that particular slavegirl, Wunsch demon-
strates that it is not such a contract.31 Instead, one may surmise that
the text was composed under the following circumstances. The slavegirl
was found in mGuzānu’s possession, perhaps because mGuzānu has made
some claim to her or because she herself attempted to escape from mItti-
Marduk-balā u.32 The payment, therefore, is actually a penalty against
29
The present transliteration and translation follow Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998),
pp. 87–88.
30
Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 4, p. 29; Dandamaev, Slavery, p. 134.
31
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 70. For refutation of the use of the slavegirl
as a prostitute, see the comments to Nbn 679:5 in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998),
p. 87.
32
The slavegirl fAmtiya is involved in an escape attempt mentioned in the kunnu-
summons Nbn 679. See Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 70.
216 chapter seven
m
Guzānu to prevent the slavegirl from leaving mItti-Marduk-balā u’s
possession. The text does not mention any authorities who might have
imposed this penalty by issuing the injunction. Instead, as Wunsch has
suggested, mGuzānu has probably accepted this obligation on his own,
without the intervention of other authorities.33
Summary Table 7.3 Injunctions

Text Penalty Authority Scribe Place of Date
Composition
UCP payment of — m
Innina- Uruk 17.III.28 Nbk
9/1, 53 compensation zēra-šubši /
(for slave?) m
Nanaya-
a a-iddin
Nbn payment of — m
Nabû-nādin- Babylon 25.XII.12 Nbn
682 compensation a i / mKiribtu-
for slave Marduk //
Dābibī
YOS i- u ša2 šatammu m
Balā u / Uruk 4.III.15 Nbn
19, 110 LUGAL of Eanna m
Sîn-ibni //
i-šad-da-ad Rē i-alpi
YOS i- u ša2 mgu- — m
Gimillu / Uruk 28.II.6 Cyr
7, 56 ba-ru . . . i-šad- m
Innin-zēra-
da-ad iddin
YOS i- u ša2 mgu-ba- — m
Gimillu/ Uruk 11.III.6 Cyr
7, 92 ru . . . i-šad-da- m
Innin-zēra-
ad iddin
TCL i- i ša2 mgu- — m
Pir u / Uruk 12.IV.7 Cyr
13, 142 bar-ru . . . i-šad- m
Eanna-
da-ad šuma-ibni
Cyr 307 branding as ša mu i sūti m
Arad-Bēl/ Sippar 3.IV.8 Cyr
slave of Šamaš m
Bēl-ušallim
// Adad-
šammê
33
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), p. 70 writes that mGuzānu “obligates himself ”
(“verpflichtet sich”) to pay the wages.

Text Penalty Authority Scribe Place of Date
Composition
YOS mul-le-e a-na šatammu of m
Arad- Uruk 27.XII.8 Cyr
7, 77 mu - i-šu2 Eanna Marduk/
un-da-al-lu m
Marduk-
(“just desert”) šuma-iddin //
Bēl-apla-u ur
BIN i- u ša2 mgu- šatammu + m
Širiktu- Uruk 17.IX.0 Camb
1, 169 ba-ru . . . i-šad- adminis- d
KU3.SUD/
da-du trator of m
Balā u
Eanna;
8 mār banî
BIN 2, i- u ša2 adminis- m
Gimillu/ Na ibāta 23.V.3 Camb
116 LUGAL trator of m
Innin-zēra-
i-šad-da-du- Eanna iddin
PART II
NEO BABYLONIAN ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE

In Part I, the primary focus was to analyze the legal function of the
different text-types that were generated during the course of adjudi-
cation of disputes in the Neo-Babylonian period. Each text-type was
situated within the framework of the adjudicatory process. Texts that set
the courtroom scene, such as the decision records and the preliminary
protocols, served as the background against which other text-types, such
as the summonses and the guarantees, were interpreted.
The typological discussion in Part I mentioned a number of proce-
dures, such as summoning and interrogation. However, in the interest
of maintaining a focus on the legal function of text-types, the discus-
sion did not offer a complete picture of Neo-Babylonian adjudicatory
procedure. In addition, the typological discussion did not consider the
differences between the adjudicatory procedures pertaining to temple
property and those pertaining to private litigation. Part II addresses
these issues.
Each of the following two chapters considers the process in a differ-
ent context. Chapter 8 addresses the process as it is reflected in private
records, especially the “Royal Judges style” decision records. Chapter
9 addresses the process that is reflected in texts from temple archives,
particularly from the Eanna. Generally speaking, private records can
best be described as the records of the adjudication of civil cases; they
reflect the attempts of individuals to find redress for wrongdoings against
them by other individuals. Temple records, on the other hand, reflect
the temple’s own prosecution of mishandling of its property. This dif-
ference gives the proceedings in the temple a different character, which
warrants a separate description.
The discussion of legal procedure follows a hypothetical case from its
initiation to its conclusion. It is structured around the decision records,
which provide a complete and organized narrative of the adjudication
of cases by authorities. The discussion of each stage of the trial begins
with an analysis of the information derived from the decision records.
It is therefore important to consider the nature of the information that
the decision records provide.
The decision records present the adjudication of a dispute as a series
of consecutive actions in “real time.” Prima facie, it seems that these
actions take place at one judicial session, which begins when the case
is initiated and ends when the judges render their decision. The reality,
however, must have been different. The numerous preliminary protocols,
222 chapter eight
mostly from the Eanna, but also from private archives, indicate that
adjudicatory actions can occur separately. Each action—registering a
complaint, hearing testimony, collecting physical evidence—might leave
behind separate documentation, even before it is mentioned in a deci-
sion record. The decision records, therefore, should not be understood
as a minute-by-minute account of the trial proceedings. Instead, they
should be understood as a condensed narrative of the events leading,
over time, to the decision.
The decision records remain, however, a useful framework into which
one can fit the preliminary protocols and documents from the other
text-types. An action that the decision records might cite in a single
word or phrase may be reflected in an entirely separate text-type. The
discussion, therefore, will begin with the evidence available from the
decision records, but will, when possible, move on to consider the evi-
dence from other text-types. It will use these text-types to flesh out the
condensed narrative that the decision records present. The correlation
between the decision records and texts of other text-types results in a
clearer picture of how cases were adjudicated in the Neo-Babylonian
period.
An additional goal of the discussion of adjudicatory procedure will
be to identify the terminology associated with each particular action in
the trial. Thus, the discussion of each action will specify the different
phrases that describe it. In this manner, the following discussion will
also serve as a legal glossary of sorts.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE ADJUDICATION OF PRIVATE DISPUTES:

THE “ROYAL JUDGES” DECISION RECORDS
AND OTHER TEXTS
8.A The Scene
The term for a “case” or “lawsuit” is dīnu. The clearest evidence for
this definition comes from the endings of several “Royal Judges” style
decision records, in which the names of the judges are introduced with
the formula ina EŠ.BAR dīni šuāti (“at the decision of this case”). The use
of the anaphoric pronoun šuāti (“this,” meaning “the aforementioned”)
indicates that the term dīni refers to the matter whose adjudication is
described in the particular decision record.
The resolution of a case may occur in several different settings. In
the broadest terms, one may distinguish between those cases resolved
formally in the presence of adjudicating authorities and those resolved
informally. The discussion of the settlement text-type (section 2.C above)
considered some of the evidence for the informal resolution of disputes.
One notable feature of this text-type is that individuals designated as
“witnesses” ( lu2mukinnū) or mār banî, rather than as judges, observe the
proceedings. The textual evidence, however, does not allow for a more
detailed discussion of informal adjudication.
Leaving aside the informal settlements, then, the discussion may turn
to address formal adjudicatory settings.1 Some summonses indicate
that cases are to be argued ina bīt dīni ša šarri “in the king’s court of
law.”2 One literary text, CT 46, 45, which W. G. Lambert has entitled
“Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice,” states that the king “built anew
the courts of law” (E2 di-i-nu eš-šiš ib-nu).3 The use of the verb banû (to
build) with bīt dīni as its direct object indicates that the bīt dīni was a
1
The discussion in this paragraph is based, in part, on Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook,
ed., History, pp. 918–919.
2
YOS 7, 31:9–10; TCL 13, 222:5–6.
3
CT 46, 45:ii, 26. See W.G. Lambert, “Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice,” Iraq 27
(1965), p. 5.
224 chapter eight
structure of some kind that, in the case of this literary text, had fallen
into disrepair and needed to be rebuilt. It is there, presumably, that
the royal judges (dayyānū ša šarri ) hear cases.4 The decision records
themselves, however, do not mention this location.
The identification of these formal adjudicatory venues raises the
question of the “staging” of the courtroom dramas described in the
decision records. Many of the texts mention the appearance of litigants,
witnesses and evidence “before” (ma ar, ina pāni ) the judges. Further
spacial implications of these prepositions are difficult to reconstruct
from the texts.
Some texts indicate that the authorities have an individual stand
before them. For example, after the plaintiff presents his case, Nbn 13
describes the summoning of the defendant as follows:
5. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 LUGAL (5–6) The king’s judges heard (the
6. iš-mu-ma mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU plaintiff’s statement) and brought
ub-lu-nim-ma ma- ar-šu2-nu uš- m
Nabû-a ē-iddin and had him
ziz-zu stand before them.
Descriptions like this one5 indicate that individuals would stand when
appearing “before” the judges. Unfortunately, not much more can be
said about the courtroom setting based on the descriptions in the legal
texts. Despite the fact that texts often describe cases in vivid detail, this
depth of description does not detail the courtroom setting.
8.B The Initiation of the Case: dīna gerû and Similar Terms
In order to learn more about the initial stages of the case in the Neo-
Babylonian period, one must turn to the opening lines of decision
records. The typological discussion identified two “Royal Judges” styles.
Comparison between “Royal Judges style A” and “Royal Judges style
B” demonstrated that the main difference between the two occurs in
the opening lines, in which the case is initially presented. The begin-
nings of the two “Royal Judges” style decision records were outlined
as follows:
4
Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, p. 55 notes the existence of the bīt dīni but argues
that “most commonly, the court met at the gate of the temple, an administrative build-
ing, or city.” The texts considered in this book do not regularly mention the gate as
the locus of adjudication, but do not preclude this possibility, either.
5
For other examples see Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–11; Cyr 332:17–19.
the adjudication of private disputes 225
“Royal Judges Style B” “Royal Judges Style A”

I. Presentation of the Case I. Plaintiff’s Statement
A. Confrontation between parties A. Opening (includes mention
(sometimes including subject of of plaintiff and adjudicating
case) authority)
B. Appearance before authorities B. Quotation of Plaintiff’s
Statement
C. Statements before authorities C. Imperative to authority
Whereas “Royal Judges style A” begins with the plaintiff’s statement,

“Royal Judges style B” begins by mentioning a confrontation between
both parties (element IA) followed by a specific mention of the appear-
ance before the judges (element IB).
Although “Royal Judges style A” begins with the plaintiff’s statement
to the judges, a closer examination reveals that the decision records
written in this style actually describe the beginning of the case in two
different ways. According to one description, the plaintiffs alone appear
in court to speak to the judges, while in the second description both
the plaintiffs and the defendants appear together. The opening section
of Nbn 13 is typical of the first group. It reads as follows:
1. fbe-li-li-tu4 DUMU.SAL-su ša2 (1–3) fBēlilitu, daughter of mBēl-
md
EN-u2-še-zib A lu2šip-ri ušēzib descendant of Šipri said
2. a-na lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3- thus to the judges of Nabonidus,
na- -id LUGAL TIN.TIRki king of Babylon:
taq-bi
3. um-ma ina ITI NE MU 1-kam2 (3–5) “In the month of Abu,
md
U.GUR-LUGAL-URI3 in the first year of Neriglissar,
LUGAL TIN.TIRki mba-zu-zu king of Babylon, I sold my slave,
4. qal-la-a a-na 1/2 MA.NA m
Bazūzu, to mNabû-a ē-iddin,
5 GIN2 KU3.BABBAR a- son of mŠulaya, descendant of
na mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU Egibi for 1/2 mina 5 šeqel of
DUMU-šu2 ša2 silver. He wrote a promissory note
5. mšu-la-a DUMU me-gi-bi ad- and did not pay the silver.”
din-ma u2-il3-ti3 i-il-ma KU3.
BABBAR la id-di-nu lu2DI.KU5.
MEŠ ša2 LUGAL
6. iš-mu-ma mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU (5–6) The king’s judges heard and
ub-lu-nim-ma ma- ar-šu2-nu uš- brought mNabû-a ē-iddin and
ziz-zu had him stand before them.
226 chapter eight
Like most “Royal Judges style A” decision records, this text begins with
the simple statement PN ana AUTHORITY iqbi umma (“PN said thus to
AUTHORITY”). The mention of the authorities in this introductory
sentence suggests that the case is initiated when fBēlilītu, the plaintiff,
addresses the authorities in court, rather than elsewhere. The fact that
after fBēlilītu states her claim the judges “bring” (abālu) mNabû-a ē-
iddin before them indicates that both parties are not present in court
when the case is initiated. Instead, the plaintiff states her claim in a
separate appearance before the judges.
A different picture emerges from a second group of “Royal Judges
Style A” decision records. In contrast to the texts like Nbn 13, the texts in
this second group clearly indicate that the plaintiffs bring the defendants
to court when they speak to the judges. For example, in Nbn 356, the
plaintiff, a widow named fBunanītu, states her claim against her late
husband’s brother, mAqab-ili. At the end of her statement, fBunanītu
declares a-na ma -ri-ku-nu ub-la-aš2 (“I have brought him before you).6
Similarly, in the beginning lines of two other “Royal Judges style A”
decision records, the verb abālu (“to bring”), referring to the plaintiffs’
“bringing” of the opposing parties, precedes the verb qabû.7
The contrast between the two groups also manifests itself in the
plaintiffs’ imperative to the judges. In some of the texts in which the
plaintiffs appear alone, the plaintiffs name the defendant and demand
“it-ti DEFENDANT ep2-šu2 di-i-ni” (“Judge my case against the DEFEN-
DANT!”).8 In those texts in which both litigants appear together,
the plaintiffs refer both to themselves and the defendants by stating,
“purussâni šuknā” (“establish our decision!”).9
In the two scenarios just described, the action may take place in one
of two ways. In some cases, the plaintiffs bring the defendants when
stating the case to the judges. In others, the defendants are not present
when the plaintiffs state their case, so the court must summon them
6
Nbn 356:28. Similar notices occur in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:18–19;
YOS 19, 101:24; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:6. See also Wunsch, AfO
44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:2’.
7
Durand, Textes babyloniens No. 60:8; Cyr 312:5.
8
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:8–9 (Note the variant form of the verb epēšu in
the imperative, which reads it-ti DEF. ip-ša2-in-ni di-i-ni ); YOS 6, 92:20; Cyr 332:17
(partially restored); OIP 122, 38:27–28. BIN 2, 134:11–12 has a variant formulation
of the imperative which reads it-ti DEFENDANT EŠ.BAR-a-ni šu-kun (“establish our
decision against the DEFENDANT!”). The imperative is absent in Nbn 13.
9
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:20; Nbn 356:28; YOS 19, 101:25; Wunsch,
AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:6; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:2’.
afterwards. These two scenarios point to a stage in the proceedings even

before the case comes to court and the plaintiffs address the judges. At
this earlier stage, the plaintiffs must have approached the defendants with
the complaint and demanded that they appear in court. Sometimes,
presumably because the defendants comply with the plaintiffs’ demands,
the plaintiffs are able to bring the defendants before the authorities. In
these situations, the defendants are already present when the plaintiffs
speak to the judges, so there is no need for the court to summon them.
However, the defendants may not always agree to appear in court. If
this occurs, the plaintiffs state their case to the judges even though the
defendants are not present. In these situations, the statement of the
case is not just the formal initiation of the trial; it is also the plaintiffs’
demand that the authorities compel their opponents to appear.10
Thus, the descriptions of disputes in the “Royal Judges style A” deci-
sion records are not entirely complete. The disputes do not begin when
the plaintiffs register a complaint in court. Rather, the complaint takes
place outside the court, in a separate procedure between the plaintiffs
and the defendants. The plaintiff’s address in the opening lines of the
“Royal Judges style A” occurs only after the initial complaint has been
lodged.
Unlike the “Royal Judges style A” texts, decision records written in
“Royal Judges style B” do not simply begin with the plaintiff’s state-
ment. Instead, they include a notice of an initial confrontation between
the parties before the plaintiff’s address to the judges. For example,
Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69, a “Royal Judges Style B” decision record,
begins as follows:
1. ¢fbuÜ-na-ni-tu4 DUMU.SAL- (1–3) fBunanītu daughter of
su ša2 mGAR-MU DUMU m
Šākin-šumi descendant of Eppeš-
m
DU3-eš-DINGIR ilī brought suit against mBēl-apla-
2. a-na mdEN-IBILA-MU iddin son of mNabû-šumu-līšir
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-MU- descendant of Mudammiq-Adad.
SI.SA2 DUMU mKAL-dIM
3. di-i-nu tag-re-e-ma a-na ma- ar
m
mu-še-zib-dEN lu2GAR-UMUŠ
TIN.TIRki
10
In YOS 6, 92:20, the plaintiff makes this demand explicit. It seems that only one
of the two defendants has appeared in court. Thus the plaintiff states to the judges:
i-na-an-na mPN1 ma- ar-ku-nu bi-lu it-ti mPN1 u mPN2 “ip?”-šu2 di-i-ni (“Now, bring mPN1
before you, and judge my case against mPN1 and mPN2!”).
228 chapter eight
4. DUMU mUGU-DINGIR- (3–4) They arrived before

GAL-dAMAR.UTU lu2DI. m
Mušēzib-Bēl, the šākin- ēmi of
KU5.MEŠ u ši-bu-tu4 URU Babylon son of mEli-ili-rabi-
ik-šu-du-ma Marduk, the judges and the elders
of the city.
5. dib-bi-šu-nu u2-ša2-an-nu-ma (5–6) They related their arguments.
f
bu-na-ni-tu4 taq-bi f
Bunanītu said thus:
6. um-ma
In these lines, four verbs describe the beginning of the case, before
any litigant’s speech is quoted. The description begins with the verbal
phrase dīna gerû (“to bring suit”), conjugated in the feminine singular,
with fBunanītu, the plaintiff, as its subject. The verbs kašādu and šunnû,
both in the plural, follow, indicating that the two parties “arrived” in
court and “related” their arguments to the authorities. It is only after all
these actions have taken place that the verb qabû introduces fBunanītu’s
address to the authorities.
One way to understand these lines is to interpret the verbal phrase
dīna gerû as a general, introductory phrase. The actions that follow, begin-
ning with the arrival in court, all explain the verbal phrase dīna gerû;
they detail how fBunanītu “brought suit.” The verb dīna gerû, however,
has no specific procedural meaning. According to this interpretation,
the description above is similar to the description in the “Royal Judges
style A” decision records. The quotation of the plaintiff’s address to the
judges, introduced by the verb qabû, is the first procedure recorded in
the text. The complaint procedure, in which fBunanītu first confronted
her opponent, must have taken place, but it is not described in the
decision record itself.
The beginning of Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42, another “Royal Judges
style B” decision record, seems to support this interpretation of the
opening lines as an introduction, rather than as the notice of a separate
procedure. The text, which pertains to a dispute between three brothers
and their uncle, begins as follows:
1. [ md
AMAR.UTU-MU-ib-ni (1–3) [mMarduk-šuma-ibni,
md
NA3-mu-š ]e-ti-iq-UD.DA m
Nabû-muš]ētiq-uddê and mBēl-
u3 mdEN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-SUM. a ē-iddin sons of mNabû-apla-
NA DUMU.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3- iddin . . . and mNabû-balāssu-iqbi,
IBILA-S[UM.NA] their father’s brother, came to
2. [. . . ] u3 mdNA3-TIN-su-iq-bi blows against each other concern-
ŠEŠ AD-šu2-nu a-na UGU ing the division of shares; they
za-a-zu zi-it-ti had a legal case.
3. [. . . a]- a a- a im-ta - u-u2-ma
ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni
4. [. . . a-na] mdEN-re-ma-an-ni (4) They arrived [before] mBēl-

DUMU lu2man-di-di lu2GAR. rēmanni descendant of Mandidi,
UMUŠ TIN.TIRki ik-šu-du-ni- the šākin ēmi official of Babylon
im-ma and
5. [. . .] lu2GAR.UMUŠ TIN. (5–6) . . . the šākin ēmi official of
TIRki u3 lu2AB.BA.MEŠ URU Babylon and the elders of the
DUMU.MEŠ TIN.TIRki a-ma- citizens of Babylon [hear]d their
ti-šu-nu matters.
6. [iš-mu]-u2 mdAMAR.UTU-MU- (6) mMarduk-šuma-ibni said thus:
ib-ni i-qab-bi um-ma
In these lines the verbal phrase dīna rašû (“to have a legal case”) precedes
the verb kašādu, in much the same way that the verbal phrase dīna gerû
precedes the verb kašādu in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69. In Wunsch, BA
2, No. 42, just as the verbal form im-ta - u-u2-ma refers to both sides of
the case (the brothers and their uncle), the phrase ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni refers
to both sides, as well. Accordingly, it seems that the phrase functions as
an introductory heading to all the proceedings that follow. One might
argue that the verbal phrase dīna gerû in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69 has
a similar introductory, rather than procedural, function. Any complaint
procedure that has taken place is not recorded in the text itself.
There is, however, room to question this conclusion. First, rather
than serving as an introduction, the verbal phrase ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni in
Wunsch BA 2, No. 42 could refer to a procedure involving both par-
ties that takes place before they arrive in court. Furthermore, even if
the phrase ir-šu-u2 di-i-ni is introductory, it is conjugated in the plural,
unlike the verb tagrêma in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69, which is singular.
Whereas it is possible that the phrase iršû dīnī introduces the narration
of the entire case, because the phrase in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69 is
conjugated in the feminine singular, it might refer to a specific action
that only fBunanītu has performed. The phrase dīna gerû, then, is not
a general introduction but is, rather, the specific, technical term for a
procedure that has taken place before the case comes to court.
The formulation of other “Royal Judges style B” decision records
supports the procedural, rather than general, interpretation of the ver-
bal phrase dīna gerû. These other texts use other verbs before the verb
kašādu, but, like the verb gerû in Dalley, Edinburgh No. 69, the subjects
of these other verbs are the plaintiffs alone. In Wunsch, CM 20, No.
112 the verb ragāmu (“to raise a claim”) precedes the verb kašādu, and
in Nbn 495, the verbal phrase paqāri šubšû (“to bring a claim”) occurs
before the “arrival” (kašādu) of the litigants in court and before the
plaintiff addresses the royal judges. The fact that the plaintiffs are
230 chapter eight
the subjects of these verbs suggests that these verbs, unlike the verbal
phrase iršû dīnī in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42, are not introductions to the
proceedings, but refer, instead, to a specific action taken by the plaintiffs
before their arrival in court.
The somewhat different formulation of two other “Royal Judges style
B” decision records, Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254
and Nbn 1113, provides further supporting evidence for the procedural
interpretation of the introductory verbs. The introductory lines of Nbn
1113 will illustrate:
1. [mba-ri-ki-DINGIR].MEŠ IR3 (1–2) [mBariki-il]ī, the silver-
pu- u-ru KU3.BABBAR ša2 fga- redeemed slave of fGagaya,
ga-a DUMU.SAL-su daughter [of mPN]
2. [ša2 mPN] ša2 MU 35–kam2 (2–4) who, in year 35 of Nebu-
md
NA3-NIG2.DU-URI3 chadnezzar, king of Babylon,
LUGAL TIN.TIRki was pledged for 1/3 mina 8 šeqel
3. [m]ŠEŠ-nu-u2-ri A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- of silver by mA u-nūri son of
na-din-ŠEŠ a-na 1/3 MA.NA 8 m
Nabû-nādin-a i—
GIN2 KU3.BABBAR
4. ¢paqÜ-du e-nin-ni ir-gu-mu um- (4–6) now brought suit (saying)
ma DUMU ba-ni-i a3-bat ša2 thus: “I am a free man held by
md
EN-re-man-ni m
Bēl-rēmanni the third charioteer
5. [taš ]-li-šu2 ša2 ŠU.2 mdUTU- of mŠamaš-mudammiq son of
SIG5–iq A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-na-din- m
Nabû-nādin-a i and fQudāšu,
ŠEŠ daughter of mA u-nūri.”
6. u fqu-da-šu2 DUMU.SAL-su
ša2 mŠEŠ-nu-u2-ru a-na-ku i-na
ma- ar
7. SUKKAL lu2GAL.MEŠ u3
lu2
(6–8) Before the sukkallu, the
DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-I
lu2
“great ones” and the judges of
LUGAL TIN.TIRki Nabonidus king of Babylon they
8. di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma argued (their) case.
This decision record begins with a description of mBariki-ilī’s status,
followed by the verb ragāmu, indicating that he “brought suit.” As has
already been argued, the fact that mBariki-ilī is the subject of this verb
indicates that the verb refers to a specific action. The formulation of
this text and of Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254, how-
ever, uses more than just a verb to describe this action. In both texts,
the verb ragāmu, followed by the word umma, introduces a direct quote
of the plaintiffs’ statements. This direct quote illustrates the nature of
this procedure, which occurs before the “arguing” (dabābu) before the
judges: it is the process in which the plaintiff states the complaint.
The evidence just presented precludes the introductory, rather than

procedural, interpretation of the verbs that precede the plaintiff’s state-
ment in “Royal Judges style B.” Even the expression dīna rašû, which
seems to be introductory in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42, can refer to a specific
legal procedure. Thus, the terms dīna gerû in Dalley, Edinburgh No. 69,
ragāmu in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 and other texts, paqāri šubšû in Nbn
495, and dīna rašû in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42 are, apparently, legal terms
for the complaint procedure with which every case begins.
The procedural interpretation of the opening verbs in “Royal Judges
style B” allows for a better understanding of the difference between
“Royal Judges style A” and “Royal Judges style B.” The difference does
not mean that different procedures have taken place. According to both
styles, the case is initiated in a procedure that takes place before the
plaintiffs address the judges. The only difference between the two styles
is whether or not the initial complaint procedure is actually recorded in
the text. “Royal Judges style B” begins the narration of the case with
a notice of the complaint procedure (dīna gerû and the like). “Royal
Judges style A” begins the narration one stage later, with the plaintiff’s
statement in court. Even in this style, however, it is clear that the case
has already been initiated with a complaint procedure.
The discussion above has identified four terms for the complaint
procedure that initiates the case: dīna gerû, ragāmu, dīna rašû and paqāri
šubšû. This identification has been based on an analysis of these verbs
as they occur at the beginnings of “Royal Judges style B” decision
records. Some of these verbal phrases also occur at the beginnings of
other texts, such as the non-stylized decision records, conclusions and
settlements. In all these texts, these phrases seem to refer to the same
complaint procedure that takes place before the arrival in court.11
11
Examples of these phrases from texts that are not “Royal Judges style B” deci-
sion records are: dīna gerû—McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:1–2 (noun restored) and BIN
1, 141:1–4; ragāmu—Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129:20–23; PBS 2/1,
140:1–13 and Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 110:2 (restored by Stolper); paqāri šubšû—Rut-
ten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103:13–14 (see restorations in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 85)
and Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106:8–14. In addition to these phrases, the terms paqāru
šakānu ( Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, pp. 251:5–8) and puqquru (YOS 19, 100:8–9; see
also YOS 6, 18) occur in similar positions. Note that all the verbs related to paqāru are
used in cases that pertain to land. Nbn 495, which pertains to slaves, is an exception.
The cognate verb baqāru occurs regularly in Old Babylonian texts, where it might have
a specialized usage for claims pertaining to property, as opposed to personal claims. For
discussion, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 262–294 and Raymond Westbrook’s
review of Dombradi, Darstellung, in Or. 68 (1999), pp. 125–126.
232 chapter eight
Thus, based on the “Royal Judges” style decision records and other
texts from private archives, it is clear that the case is initiated with a
complaint procedure known by terms such as dīna gerû and ragāmu. This
procedure, in which the plaintiffs inform the defendants of the claim,
takes place before the parties arrive in court. Unfortunately, there is
insufficient evidence to determine the setting in which the complaint
procedure takes place. One might imagine that it takes place in an
informal setting in which only the plaintiffs and defendants are pres-
ent. On the other hand, the procedure might actually take place in
another court.12
8.C Summoning the Defendant
The complaint procedure with which the case begins can result in a
number of different actions. According to the descriptions in the “Royal
Judges” style decision records, the case goes from the complaint stage
directly to the court. If both litigants appear before the court, then the
case goes to trial immediately. However, if the complaint procedure is
unsuccessful, then the plaintiff alone appears in court to demand that
the court summon the defendant.
The case described in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13 is an example
of a case in which the plaintiff states his case in the absence of the
defendant. The plaintiff is a cook named mIna- illi-abulli. He tells the
judges of Neriglissar that he had originally been given to the priestess
f
A ata in order to pay off a debt of 42 šeqels of silver. Upon fA ata ’s
death, fBanât-ina-Esagil inherited the debt-claim. Ten years after the
original debt was contracted, mIna- illi-abulli claims that fBanât-ina-
Esagil has been repaid and that he should no longer be in her service.
The presentation of the claim and the judges’ first action in response
to it, read as follows:
1. [ m]ina-gišMI-KA2.GAL-i (1–3) mIna- illi-abulli, the cook,
lu2
MU ALDIM A-šu2 ša2 son of mA ušunu, the oblate of
m
a- u-šu2-nu lu2RIG7 Ištar of Uruk, approached the
2. ša2 dINNIN UNUGki lu2DI.KU5. judges of Neriglissar, king of
MEŠ ša2 mdU.GUR-LUGAL- Babylon, (saying) thus:
URI3 LUGAL TIN.TIRki
12
For additional discussion of this question, see Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness,
p. 68.
3. im- u-ru um-ma 10 MU.AN. (3–5) “Because, 10 years (ago),

NA.MEŠ-a ma- u-šu2-nu m
A ušunu, my father, gave me as
AD-u2-a a pledge for 2/3 mina 2 šeqel of
4. ku-um 2/3 MA.NA 2 GIN2 silver, to fA ata , the priestess, I
KU3.BABBAR i-na pa-ni had been serving her.”
f
a- a-ta-a
5. fsa-gi-it-tu4 maš-ka-nu ki-i iš-ku-
na-an-ni a-pal-la -šu2
6. fa- a-ta-a šim-ta u2-bil-šu-ma (6) “fA ata died.”
ar2-ki U4
7. fba-na-at-E2.SAG.IL2 ta-ap-pa- (6–8) “Afterwards, she left every-
qid-ma a-di U4-mu an-na-a thing to fBanât(ina)-Esagil. Until
8. man-da-at-tu a-na-ad-din-šu2 it-ti today, I pay mandattu to her.”
f
ba-na-at-E2.SAG.IL2 (8–9) “Judge my case against
9. ip-ša2-in-ni di-i-ni lu2DI.KU5. f
Banât-(ina)-Esagil!”
MEŠ a-ma-tu4 mina-gišMI-KA2.
GAL-i
10. iš-mu-ma fba-na-at-ina-E2.SAG. (9–11) The judges heard mIna-
IL2 i-bu-ku-nim-ma illi-abulli’s words and brought
11. i-na ma- ar-šu2-nu uš-zi-iz-zu f
Banât-ina-Esagil and stood her
before them.
As has already been noted, the plaintiff states his claim to the judges
without the defendant’s presence. Based on the fact that the judges
respond by having the defendant come before them, it seems that the
plaintiff’s goal in approaching them is to compel his opponent to appear.
The complaint procedure (see section 8.B) has been unsuccessful, and
so the plaintiff turns to the court.
The judges’ response to mIna- illi-abulli is described as follows: They
“hear” (šemû) his claim, and respond to it by “bringing” (abāku) the
defendant and having her stand (šuzuzzu) before (ina ma ar) them. In
other “Royal Judges style A” decision records, the verb abālu, instead of
abāku, is used to indicate that the judges “bring” the defendant before
them.13 Both verbs refer to a process in which the judges apparently
compel the defendant to appear.
13
Nbn 13:5–6; Cyr 332:17–19; OIP 122, 38:28–30. The verb occurs with the
authorities as its subject and apparently after the plaintiff’s statement in Wunsch, BA
2, No. 44:9’–12’ and Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–20’. In YOS 6, 92:20, the verb abālu
occurs in the plaintiff’s imperative to the authorities, which reads in part i-na-an-na
m
PN1 ma- ar-ku-nu bi-lu (“Now, bring mPN1 before you!”). The verb that indicates the
authorities’ response occurs at the end of line 22, which is broken. All that is legible
in Dougherty’s drawing before the break is u2-še?-, which might be restored u2-še?-[bi-lu]
234 chapter eight
Taken alone, and even in the context of decision records, the verbs
abālu and abāku, do not describe how the judges “bring” the defendants.
For a better understanding of exactly how the abālu or abāku proce-
dure takes place, the discussion must turn to another text-type: the
dabābu-type summons (see section 4.A). If a document of this text-type
achieves its goal, then an individual would appear in court. Thus, one
might plausibly suggest that when the decision records state that the
authorities “bring” the defendant before them, the implication is that
the authorities issue a dabābu-type summons.
The suggested correlation between the description of summoning
the defendants in the decision records and the composition of a dabābu-
summons finds further support in a connection between the wording
of the summonses and the descriptions in the decision records. The
dabābu-summonses require the summoned individual to “argue” (dabābu)
against an opposing party’s claim. In the decision records, the action
that follows the “bringing” (abāku/abālu) of the defendant is “argu-
ing” (dabābu) the case. For example, in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13,
the “Royal Judges” style text quoted at the beginning of the present
section, after the judges “bring” (abāku) the defendant, the text states
“they argued (their) case” (dīna idbubūma).14 It seems, therefore, that the
formulation of the dabābu-summonses and the “Royal Judges” decision
records complement each other. The summonses clearly state that the
reason the summoned individual must “go” (alāku) to court is to “argue”
(dabābu) against a claim. In their narration of the actual proceedings,
the decision records attest to the same sequence of events: once the
defendant is “brought” (abālu/abāku) the two parties “argue the case”
(dīna dabābu). The fact that the same verb describes the similar outcomes
of both the summonses and the “bringing” of the defendant in the
decision records indicates that there is more than a coincidental relation-
ship between the two text-types. Rather, it seems that the dabābu-type
summonses are written record of the summoning procedure.*
(“they brou[ght]”). The problem with this restoration is that the name mPN1 does not
occur in the text leading up to this verb, so mPN1 is probably not the object of the
verb. Because the defendant and the plaintiff are present in the action that follows
the break, however, it seems that the defendant was “brought,” even if the text does
not state as much.
14
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:11.
* For the oral nature of this procedure, see the discussion in 10.E below.
8.D Oral Arguments: dīna15 dabābu
The actions described until this point in the procedural discussion

are undertaken by the plaintiffs or by the judges in response to them.
Once both parties to the case are present in court, the trial continues
with the presentation of oral arguments to the judges. This procedure
is described by the term dīna dabābu (“to argue the case”), as may be
seen in the following excerpt from Nbn 1113, a “Royal Judges style
B” decision record:
1. [ mba-ri-ki-DINGIR].MEŠ IR3 (1–2) [ mBariki-il]ī, the silver-
pu- u-ru KU3.BABBAR ša2 redeemed slave of fGagaya,
f
ga-ga-a DUMU.SAL-su daughter [of mPN]
2. [ša2 mPN] ša2 MU 35-kam2 (2–4) who, in year 35 of Nebu-
md
NA3-NIG2.DU-URI3 chadnezzar, king of Babylon,
LUGAL TIN.TIRki was pledged for 1/3 mina 8 šeqel
3. [ m]ŠEŠ-nu-u2-ri A-šu2 ša2 of silver (by) mA u-nūri son of
md
NA3-na-din-ŠEŠ a-na 1/3 m
Nabû-nādin-a i—
MA.NA 8 GIN2 KU3.BAB-
BAR
4. ¢paqÜ-du e-nin-ni ir-gu-mu um- (4–6) now raised a claim thus: “I
ma DUMU ba-ni-i a3-bat ša2 am a free man . . . of mBēl-rēmanni
md
EN-re-man-ni the third charioteer of mŠamaš-
5. [taš ]-li-šu2 ša2 ŠU.2 mdUTU- mudammiq son of mNabû-nādin-
SIG5-iq A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-na- a i and fQudāšu, daughter of
din-ŠEŠ m
A u-nūri.”
6. u fqu-da-šu2 DUMU.SAL-su ša2
m
ŠEŠ-nu-u2-ru a-na-ku i-na ma-
ar
15
When this noun occurs as the grammatical direct object of the verb dabābu, it
is usually spelled di-i-ni. Gwyneth Hueter, Grammatical Studies in the Akkadian Dialects
of Babylon and Uruk 556–500 B.C. (University of Oxford Ph.D. Thesis, 1996), p. 181
notes that “if the CV sign chosen by the scribe has the historically correct vowel it
is probably the indication of a good scribal education.” The usual spelling di-i-ni for
the noun functioning as the direct object of the verb dabābu could be interpreted as
the historically correct oblique plural, perhaps referring to the oral arguments of both
sides. Therefore, the correct transliteration of di-i-ni should be dīnī. However, because
Neo-Babylonian scribes are usually not consistent in their writing of vowels at the
ends of words, the present transliteration does not assign any significance to the [i]
vowel in the usual written form in Neo-Babylonian. Instead, the transliteration uses
the expected Old Babylonian singular accusative form dīna. This transliteration is sup-
ported by the fact that the noun dīnu is apparently grammatically singular, rather than
plural, when it refers to “the case.” See Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12 (di-in-šu2-nu
u2-par-su-ma, “they judged their case”) and Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34 (di-in-šu2-
nu di-ni, “their case is judged”).
236 chapter eight
7. SUKKAL lu2GAL.MEŠ u3
lu2
(6–8) Before the sukkallu, the
DI.KU5.MEŠ ša2 mdNA3-I
lu2
“great ones” and the judges of
LUGAL TIN.TIRki Nabonidus king of Babylon they
8. di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma dib-bi-šu2-nu argued (their) case.16 They heard
iš-mu-u2 their arguments.
16
Like other “Royal Judges style B” texts, Nbn 1113 begins with a verb—in
this case ragāmu—that describes the complaint procedure. mBariki-ilī is
the only subject of the verb ragāmu since he is the only one making the
complaint. The verbal form that follows the statement of the claim,
di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma, is apparently plural.17 It refers not only to mBariki-ilī,
but also to his opponents. Other “Royal Judges style B” decision records
use the verbal phrase dīna dabābu in a similar manner. The phrase refers
to an action performed by both sides of the dispute, even though the
opening verbs (those that describe the complaint procedure) refer only
to the plaintiffs.18
In the “Royal Judges style A” texts, a similar example of the use of
the phrase occurs in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13. As has already been
noted, the plaintiff in this case states his claim without the defendant’s
presence, since it is the judges who summon the defendant before them.
The text, following the plaintiff’s statement, reads as follows:
9. lu2
DI.KU5.MEŠ a-ma-tu4 mina- (9–11) The judges heard mIna-
giš
MI-KA2.GAL-i illi-abulli’s words and brought
f
Banât-ina-Esagil and stood her
before them.
16
The plural translation understands the [u] before the enclitic -ma in the form
id-bu-bu-ma as a marker of the 3mpl; the word should be normalized idbubūma. Note,
however, that in line 4 of this very text, where the plaintiff is the only logical subject,
the scribe writes ir-gu-mu (with an anomalous final [u]) for the expected 3ms form irgum.
This anomalous spelling does not affect the plural interpretation of the form id-bu-bu-
ma. Neo-Babylonian scribes commonly use CV signs for expected VC signs, but this
practice seems to be limited to the word’s final consonant. Thus, the form ir-gu-mu
should be taken as a 3ms form, while the form id-bu-bu-ma can still be considered a
plural. See Hueter, Grammatical Studies, p. 218.
17
See footnote to lines 6–8 in the translation.
18
Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:3’–8’ (Note the spelling id-bu-bu-
u2-ma in line 8’). Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69:1–5 begins with the 3fs form dīna tagrêma,
followed by the 3mpl form dibbīšunu ušannû (“they related their arguments”). Although
this text uses a different phrase, it provides a clear demonstration that the first verbal
phrase refers only to the plaintiff, while the second verbal phrase refers to both parties.
See also McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38:1–3, where the initial verb, referring only to the
plaintiff, is ig-re-e-ma, followed by the phrase di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma, in the plural.
10. iš-mu-ma fba-na-at-ina-E2.SAG.

IL2 i-bu-ku-nim-ma
11. i-na ma- ar-šu2-nu uš-zi-iz-zu (11) They argued (their) case.
di-i-ni id-bu-bu-ma
12. di-in-šu2-nu u2-par-su-ma (12) They (the judges) decided
their case.
As in Nbn 1113, the verbal form idbubūma is apparently plural.19 The
verbal phrase occurs only after the defendant is summoned to court.
It clearly denotes a procedure that involves both litigants.20
The use of the verbal construction dīna idbubūma is not the only way
the decision records might indicate that the oral arguments have taken
place. A number of texts use only the plural noun dibbū, cognate to
the verb dabābu, in referring to the “arguments” that the judges “hear”
(šemû). The use of the noun dibbū alludes to the oral arguments proce-
dure without actually employing the verbal construction dīna dabābu. For
example, YOS 19, 101 begins with the plaintiff’s statement, in which
he details his complaint and declares that he has brought the defendant
before the judges. The relevant section of the text reads as follows:
24. i-na-an-na i-na ma -ri-ku-nu ub- (24–25) “Now, I have brought
la-aš2 him before you. Establish our
decision!”
25. EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na lu2DI.KU5. (25–26) The judges heard their
MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu arguments.
26. iš-mu-u2
Unlike the earlier examples, the verb dabābu does not occur in this text.
Instead, the cognate noun dibbū seems to refer to the oral argument
procedure. The use of the plural possessive suffix -šunu makes it clear
that even though only the plaintiff has been quoted, both parties have
made arguments that the judges have heard. The noun itself refers to
the arguments that both sides have made. Consequently, it should be
19
The orthography of this text presents the same problems as Nbn 1113. In Scheil,
RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:3 the scribe writes im- u-ru for the expected 3ms im ur. See the
footnote to the translation of Nbn 1113:6–8.
20
A similar use of the verbal phrase dīnī dabābu may plausibly be reconstructed in
YOS 6, 92:23, which would read mPN1 u mPN2 di-i-ni ina pa-ni-šu2-nu [id-bu-bu]. If this
reconstruction is correct, then the phrase clearly refers to an action performed by both
parties to the dispute, since the names of both (mPN1 and mPN2) would be the subjects
of the reconstructed verbal form id-bu-bu.
238 chapter eight
construed as a plural.21 Thus, there are two terms associated with the
procedure of presenting oral arguments to the judges. The term dīna
dabābu refers to the entire procedure, which involves both litigants. The
term dibbū refers to the arguments presented by both litigants.
In addition to its placement in the middle of the “Royal Judges”
style decision record, the phrase dīna dabābu also occurs in the opening
lines of a number of “Royal Judges” decision records. For example,
Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59 begins as follows:
1. di-i-ni ša2 mre-man-ni-dEN A-šu2 (1–5) The case regarding fBābunu
ša2 mte-rik-LUGAL-ut-su and her children, members of the
2. a-na mu - i fba-bu-nu u3 household of mNabû-mukīn-apli
DUMU.MEŠ-šu2 UN.MEŠ E2 son of mAmurru-šuma-iddinam,
3. ša2 mdNA3-<mu>-ki-in-IBILA which mRēmanni-Bēl son of
DUMU-šu2 ša2 mdKUR.GAL- m
Tērik-šarrūssu argued against
MU-id-di-nam m
Nabû-mukīn-apli, before the
4. it-ti mdNA3-DU-IBILA a-na ma- judges of Nabonidus, king of
ar lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ Babylon, thus:
5. ša2 mdNA3-na- -id LUGAL TIN.
TIRki id-bu-bu um-ma
Unlike other occurrences of dabābu in this section, the subject of the
verb in the example above, and in two others like it,22 is the plaintiff
alone.23 One might, therefore, assume that the verb refers only to the
plaintiff’s statement that follows. The earlier discussion of the phrase
dīna dabābu, however, indicates that the verb describes a procedure that
includes more than just the plaintiff’s claim.
According to this understanding, opening lines like those of Durand,
Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59 are different from the beginnings of most
of the other “Royal Judges” style texts (see section 8.B above). Most
texts begin the description of the case with the plaintiff’s initial actions.
These actions may be the presentation of the case to the judges, denoted
by the verb qabû (style A), or a complaint procedure, denoted by verbs
like dīna gerû or ragāmu (style B). On the other hand, opening lines like
21
The noun dibbū is used similarly in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:8’–9’; Wunsch, AfO
44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:20; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:3’; TCL 12,
86:11–12; Nbn 356:29; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:7; BIN 2, 134:19–20.
In Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:19–20, the noun amâtu (“words”) occurs instead
of dibbū, but refers to the arguments presented by both litigants.
22
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5; Nbn 1128.
23
The verb id-bu-bu is a 3ms + subjunctive governed by the relative particle ša in
line 1. For the singular verb in a clause with subjects combined by itti, see von Soden,
GAG §132e.
those of Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59 begin the narration of

the case at a later stage in the proceedings, when both parties have
arrived in court and make their oral arguments.
8.E The Presentation of Evidence:

“Establishing the Case” (kunnu) and the Means of Evidence
In addition to oral arguments, the litigants may also present other evi-
dence during the course of the trial. The verb kunnu (“to establish [the
case]”) is the term used for that part of the proceedings in which the
litigants present evidence to support their claims. The verb can occur on
its own, without any additional information regarding the evidence that
is presented. One example of this usage of the verb occurs in Weidner,
AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5, a case of treason against Nebuchadnez-
zar. The text states that the king himself proved the case against the
treasonous man: qul-lul-ti i-pu-šu ina pu ur ummāni eli-šu u2-ki-in-ma (“in
the assembly of the people, he [= the king] established against him [=
the treasonous man] the crime that he committed”).24 The verb kunnu
simply indicates that Nebuchadnezzar “established the case” but does
not indicate how he did so. Similarly, the verb occurs without any
additional information in a number of kunnu-type summonses. The
summoned individual is required simply to “establish the case,” but the
texts do not state any additional procedural requirements.25
The procedure of establishing the case by presenting written evidence
is described in a number of different texts. Some texts describe a litigant
“showing” (kullumu) a document to the authorities.26 Usually, however,
the verb šasû (“to read”) is used in reference to documentary evidence.
For example, Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:21 describes the
reading of documentary evidence in the presence of the judges as fol-
lows: ¢rikÜ-su šu-a-tu2 ma-¢ arÜ-šu2-nu iš-tas-su-ma (“they read that contract
24
Weidner, AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5:17–18.
25
Nbk 52; Nbk 227; Nbk 266. For discussion of the kunnu-type summons, see sec-
tion 5.A above.
26
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5:7–12; Nbn 13:7–8; Wunsch, AuOr 17–18
(1999–2000), pp. 241–254:15’. The verb is used in the negative when the litigant is
unable to show the necessary evidence. See Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58/59:14–16;
Cyr 332:23–24.
240 chapter eight
in their presence”).27 The preposition ma ar and the anonymous plural

form of the verb that is used in this text, and in others like it, appar-
ently indicate that the judges do not read the documents themselves.
Instead, one might imagine that the court scribes read the documents
aloud to the judges. The absence of the preposition ma ar in other texts
suggests that, in these particular cases, the judges themselves “read”
(šasû) the documents.28
In addition to written evidence, oral testimony may be presented, as
well. The verb kunnu itself can, at times, refer to this specific procedure.29
This specific usage of kunnu is demonstrated by the opening lines of
Nbn 679, a kunnu-type summons, which read as follows:
1. ina ¢U4Ü-mu GEME2-ia qal-la- (1–5) On the day that fAmtiya,
¢tu4Ü slavegirl of mItti-Marduk-balā u
2. ša2 mKI-dAMAR.UTU-TIN son of mNabû-a ē-iddin, descen-
A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU dant of Egibi, establishes (the
3. A me-gi-bi a-na mZALAG2-d30 case) against mNūr-Sîn, son of
A-šu2 ša2 m
Šamaš-a a-iddin descendant of
4. mdUTU-ŠEŠ-MU A lu2GAL- Rāb-banê, (saying) thus:
DU3 tu-uk-tin-nu (5) “You heard of my es[ca]pe!”
5. um-ma e-le-[qi2]-ia še-ma-a-ta
In this text, the verb kunnu is followed by the word umma, which intro-
duces the precise statement that fAmtiya will make. From its use in Nbn
679, it is clear that the verb kunnu can refer not only to “establishing
the case,” in general, but also to the specific procedure of presenting
oral testimony.
The use of the verb kunnu to indicate the presentation of specifically
oral testimony is implied in the following passage from Nbn 13.30
27
Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. 241–254:16’–17’; Dalley, Edinburgh, No.
69:23–24; Nbn 1128:7–10; Nbn 68 (in the presence of witnesses); Wunsch, AfO 44/45
(1997–1998), No. 21:18’; Nbn 356:29–30; YOS 19, 101:25–29; Wunsch, AfO 44/45
(1997–1998), No. 19:7–8; YOS 19, 92 (ina DU.ZU); TCL 12, 119:10–14; BIN 2, 134:41
(restored); Cyr 332:20–23; Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, pp. 128–129:29–30.
28
Nbn 1113:8–14; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–12’; OIP 122,
38:28–30.
29
See CAD kânu A 4 (K, p. 159).
30
For a brief description of this text and complete bibliography of earlier discus-
sions, see Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), p. 96.
7. NA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU rik-si
md
(7–8) mNabû-a ē-iddin showed
ša2 <it-ti> fbe-li-li-tu4 the judges the contract which he
8. ir-ku-su-ma KU3.BABBAR contracted with fBēlilitu indicating
ŠAM2 mba-zu-zu i- i-ru-uš that he had repaid the remaining
iš-ša2-am-ma lu2DI.KU5.ME silver of the price of mBazūzu.
u2-kal-lim
9. u mNUMUN-ia mNA3-MU- (9–10) And mZēriya, mNabû-
SI.SA2 u me-tel-lu KU3.BAB- šumu-līšir and mEtellu established
BAR ša2 fbe-li-li-tu4 the amount of silver that their
AMA-šu2-nu e -re-tu4 mother was repaid.
10. ina IGI lu2DI.KU5.ME u2-
kin-nu
These lines describe how both mNabû-a ē-iddin and fBēlilitu’s sons
establish that fBēlilitu has been paid. mNabû-a ē-iddin proves his case
by “showing” (kullumu) the relevant documents. fBēlilitu’s sons, on the
other hand, prove their case by an action denoted by the verb kunnu,
without any mention of documents. The contrast between the verbs
in this passage suggests that in Nbn 13, at least, the verb kunnu refers
specifically to oral testimony, rather than the presentation of docu-
mentary evidence.
The term for oral testimony is the noun mukinnūtu, related to the verb
kunnu and the noun mukinnu (“witness”). The specifically oral character of
mukinnūtu is illustrated by Nbn 1113:25, in which a speaker’s statement
is introduced by the verb apālu (“to respond”). After the quotation, the
text states [ lu2SUKKAL lu2GAL].MEŠ u3 lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ mu-kin-nu-[ut]-
su iš-[mu-ma] (“[The sukkallu, the great] ones and the judges he[ard]
his testim[ony]”). The verb šemû, which apparently follows the noun,
reinforces the fact that mukinnūtu is something that has been spoken and
can therefore be heard.31
The verb kunnu occurs in a number of contexts that provide some
additional procedural details about the presentation of oral testimony.
Several kunnu-type summonses require the summoned individual to
“bring his witnesses” (mukinnīšu ibbakamma) in order to “establish the
case.”32 In some decision records, the verb kunnu follows the verb ša ālu
(“to question”), which suggests that the procedure involved questioning
31
A similar restoration of the verb šemû is reflected in the translation of Wunsch,
BA 2, No. 45:35’ in Wunsch, BA 2, p. 159.
32
Nbk 183; Nbk 361; Nbk 363; Nbk 365; Nbk 366; Nbk 419.
242 chapter eight
by the judges, as well.33 However, not all instances of the verb kunnu
follow the verb ša ālu, which indicates that kunnu can take place without
questioning, as well. The verb often describes an action that takes place
in the presence of the adjudicating authorities.34 But the presence of
these official authorities may not have been required in all instances. As
Köhler and Peiser have suggested, the kunnu-summonses may, in fact,
call for a private hearing of testimony (Privaternehmung), outside of the
official adjudicatory process.35
The result of the kunnu procedure is denoted by the G-stem verb
kânu. In the D-Stem, the verb kunnu has a factitive sense (literally
“to make firm,” thus “to establish”). Thus, the G-stem expresses the
intended result of the kunnu procedure: when a person “establishes”
(kunnu) a case, the facts of the case “are established” (kânu). This use
of the verb kânu is illustrated by the following citation from Dalley,
Edinburgh, No. 69.
24. . . . 1 1/2 MA.[NA KU3.BAB- (24–26) 1 1/2 m[ina of silver],
BAR] the nudunnû of fBunanītu, and 5
25. nu-dun-nu-u2 ša2 fbu-na-ni-tu4 minas of silver, the nudun[nû ] of
u3 5 MA.NA KU3.BABBAR f
Etellitu, were established in their
nu-dun-[nu-u2] presence.
26. ša2 fe-tel-li-tu4 ma- ar-šu-nu
i-kun
This passage follows a description of the judges’ examination of two
documents, one that shows that fBunanītu is owed a nudunnû of 1 1/2
mina of silver and one that shows that fEtellitu is owed a nudunnû of 5
mina of silver. The use of the G-stem verb kânu implies that the kunnu
procedure has taken place, even though the verb kunnu itself does not
actually appear. The procedure in this case involved the presentation
of written evidence, rather than oral testimony, to the judges.36
33
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12–18; YOS 19, 101:29–31; Wunsch, BA 2, No.
48:11–20. The presence of the verb ša ālu as a preliminary to the kunnu procedure
indicates that questioning can take place either before or after evidence is actually
presented. For more on ša ālu and the questioning procedure see section 8.H.
34
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12–18; Nbn 13:9–10; YOS 19, 101:30–31;
Wunsch, Altorientalische Forschungen 24 (1997), pp. 231–241:7–8; BA 2, No. 48; BE 8/1,
107:13–14.
35
Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 1, p. 31. See the discussion of this possibility in sec-
tion 5.A above.
36
For a similar usage of the verb kunnu to refer to the presentation of documentary
evidence see YOS 6, 92.
8.F The “Hearing” of Oral Statements: šemû
In the “Royal Judges” style texts, the verb šemû (“to hear”), with the
judges as its subject, refers to the “hearing” of oral statements. Objects
of the verb include the nouns mukinnūtu (“testimony”),37 amâtu (“words”)38
and dibbū (“arguments”),39 followed by a reference to the speaker by
means of a possessive pronominal suffix or a proper name.40 Because
these objects all refer to utterances that might actually be heard, one
might suggest that the verb šemû is used rhetorically and does not add
any procedural information. It simply spells out the implication of the
fact that the parties have spoken in court: the judges “hear” what has
been spoken. Alternatively, it is possible that the verb šemû refers to an
actual procedure.
The typical formulation and position of the šemû-clause bring to the
fore the question of whether the verb has a rhetorical or procedural
meaning. In its usual formulation, the šemû-clause indicates that “the
judges heard their arguments” ( lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu iš-mu-u2).
Most often, it occurs immediately after the plaintiff’s statement, and
marks the transition between the presentation of the arguments and
the judicial actions. For example, in Nbn 356:41
28. a-na ma -ri-ku-nu ub-la-aš2 (28) “I have brought him before
EŠ.BAR-a-ni šuk-na you. Establish our decision!”
29. DI.KU5.MEŠ dib-bi-šu2-nu
lu2
(29) The judges heard their argu-
iš-mu-u2 up-pa-nu u3 rik-sa-a-tu2 ments.
30. ša2 fbu-na-ni-tu4 tu-ub-la ma- ar- (29–30) They read before them
šu2-nu iš-tas-su-ma the tablets and contracts which
f
Bunanītu brought.
37
Nbn 1113:25.
38
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–10; Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp.
241–254:26–27; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–19’; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No.
60:19–20; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:23; OIP 122, 38:29; Wunsch, BA 2,
No. 44:9’–10’; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47:10’–12’.
39
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5:15; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No.
6; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:17–18; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No.
21:3’; TCL 12, 86:11–12; Nbn 356:29; YOS 19, 101:25–26; BIN 2, 134:19–20; Nbn
1113:8; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:9’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–10’.
40
In Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. 874:14–16, the name of the litigant is the object. In
Nbn 13:5–6, the verb šemû occurs without an object; it refers to the plaintiff’s statement,
which occurs in the immediately preceding lines.
41
For other examples, see Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:20; Wunsch, AfO
44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21:3’; TCL 12, 86:11–12; YOS 19, 101:25–26; Wunsch, AfO
44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:7; BIN 2, 134:19–20 (once the case arrives before higher
authorities); OIP 122, 38:28–29.
244 chapter eight
Although there is only one plaintiff, and only her statements are recorded
in the preceding lines, the plural possessive on the noun dibbīšunu indi-
cates that the judges “heard” arguments of both parties.42 In light of
this, one might assume that additional, unrecorded arguments were
made by the defendant. The verb šemû, on its own, might not refer to
anything besides the fact that the judges heard these oral arguments as
well as those that are recorded on the tablet.43 But the transitional posi-
tion of the clause suggests that the verb šemû refers to the first judicial
procedure after the presentation of arguments. The phrase dibbīšunu
išmû might mean that the judges engaged in a deliberative procedure
of “considering the arguments” before taking further action.44
Non-typical positions of the šemû-clause present further complica-
tions to interpreting the verb. There are “Royal Judges style B” texts
in which the clause appears at the very beginning of the proceedings,
just after the description of the confrontation between the parties and
their arrival in court.45 Even though no statements have been quoted,
the verb ragāmu does appear in these texts before the verb šemû.46 Thus,
the verb šemû might refer to a procedure of evaluating statements made
but not actually recorded. Alternatively, the statement that the judges
“heard their arguments” might be a summary of the procedures that
are narrated subsequently, without any reference to a specific proce-
dure.47 Similarly, there are texts in which the šemû-clause occurs after
42
Note that this is not the case in texts in which the possessive suffix is singular,
rather than plural. These texts make it clear that all the judges “hear” is the plaintiff’s
statement. For examples, see Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:9–10; Wunsch, BA 2, No.
44:9’–10’; Wunsch BA 2, No. 47:10–12.
43
The connection between the presentation of arguments and the šemû-clause is
most apparent in Nbn 1113, where the phrase dīni idbubūma immediately precedes the
phrase dibbīšunu išmû.
44
In terms of its position in the decision records, the šemû-clause should be com-
pared with the dīnam šū uzu clause of Old Babylonian decision records. The Old
Babylonian clause may refer to a procedure of granting the trial a hearing, and it
is possible that the Neo-Babylonian clause, at least in its typical position, refers to a
similar procedure. For discussion of the meaning of the Old Babylonian clause, with
references to earlier literature, see Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 312–320 and Fortner,
Adjudicating Entities, pp. 92–130.
45
Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:9’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:9’–10’. In BIN
2, 134:19–20, a “Royal Judges style A” text, the clause opens the description of the
proceedings once they have been moved to the court of the šākin ēmi.
46
Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112:7’; Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989–1990), No. 1:7’.
47
A similar interpretation probably applies to Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:6’. According
to Wunsch, the line reads [. . . id ]-bu-bu-u2-ma di-in-šu-nu i-¢mur ?-ru? Ü. Based on its position
just after an initial confrontation between the plaintiff and defendant, this line seems
to be a variant of the typical šemû clause. The formulation with dīnu (and apparently
a number of judicial actions are recorded, even near the end of the
recorded proceedings.48 A procedural interpretation of the clauses in
these texts makes sense; the procedure of “hearing” can take place
at any point, even near the end of the trial. On the other hand, the
proximity to quoted statements leaves the rhetorical interpretation open.
This latter interpretation would be further supported by the fact that
the texts include an additional notice of the judges “deliberating” just
prior to the decision itself.49 It would be strange for these two delibera-
tive procedures to take place so closely together. A distinction between
the šemû procedure at the end of the case and this second deliberative
procedure is not readily apparent from the available evidence.
8.G Obtaining Evidence
As has already been seen, the litigants themselves often present their
own evidence to the judges in court. At times, however, the judges
may require additional evidence. The specific procedure by which the
evidence is obtained begins with a demand for the evidence by the
authorities. For example, in Nbn 1128, a decision record that pertains
to an unpaid debt, the judicial actions are described as follows:
7. u2-il3-ti3 ša2 mdNA3-ŠEŠ.MEŠ- (7–10) They read before them the
bul-li debt-note of mNabû-a ē-bulli ,
8. AD ša2 mdNA3-ga-mil ša2 UGU father of mNabû-gāmil, owed by
m
na-di-nu AD ša2 mmu-še-zib- m
Nādinu, father of mMušēzib-Bēl,
d
EN for which his house was pledged.
9. ša2 E2-su maš-ka-nu a-ab-tu ma-
ar-šu2-nu
10. il-tas-su-u2 lu2sar-te-nu u lu2DI.
KU5.MEŠ
without the verb šemû, which would probably have begun with /iš/ rather than /i/)
suggests that the line refers to the proceedings that follow. Note, however, that the phrase
as restored could have a specific procedural reference, as well. The other restorations
suggested in Wunsch, BA 2, p. 158 admit either possibility.
48
Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:17–18; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13,
219:23; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:19–20.
49
mitluku in Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219:28 and Durand, Textes babylo-
niens, No. 60:38; šitlumu in Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:18. For discussion,
see section 8.J below.
246 chapter eight
11. rik-su u i-da-tu ša2 e- i-ru mmu- (10–12) The sartennu and the
še-zib-dEN judges demanded from mMušēzib-
12. i-ri-šu-ma la ub-la Bēl the contract and the “signs”
indicating repayment, but he did
not bring (them).
m
Nabû-gāmil, the plaintiff, presents the notes that indicate that mNādinu,
father of the defendant, mMušēzib-Bēl, owed a debt to mNabû-gāmil’s
father, mNabû-a ē-bulli . After the judges hear the note read, they
“demand” (erēšu) evidence from the defendant that the debt has been
repaid, but he is unable to “bring” (abālu) any. The verb erēšu refers to
the specific procedure by which the authorities “demand” evidence.
The verb bu û (“to search”) seems to refer to a similar procedure in
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44:20’–22’, in which the authorities of Kutha seek
additional “signs” (idātu) to prove a certain individual’s status.50
In addition to demanding evidence from the litigants themselves, the
authorities might seek testimony on their own. For instance, Durand,
Textes babyloniens, No. 60 describes how the judges of Nabonidus “bring”
(abālu) a sēpiru-scribe to read the mark on the hand of a slavegirl whose
ownership is disputed. Similarly, the judges in Wunsch, AfO 44/45
(1997/1998), No. 21 “bring” (abālu) a person who apparently provides
additional corroborative evidence.51
These examples from the decision records indicate that the judges
might, at times, require additional evidence to be presented. They might
“demand” (erēšu) it from one of the litigants or they might “bring”
additional witnesses before them. These notices in the decision records
may correspond to the composition of the kunnu-type summonses (see
section 5.A above). This type of summons requires the summoned
individual to “establish the case” (kunnu). One might, therefore, interpret
this text-type as the written expression of a demand by an adjudicating
authority that additional, corroborative evidence be presented.52
50
The judges may seek additional proof because the individual cannot bring an
actual adoption tablet. See the discussion in Wunsch, BA 2, p. 154.
51
For discussion, see Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), p. 72.
52
Another possibility that should be considered is that the judges issue the kunnu-
summonses before the trial, in order to obtain preliminary evidence. According to this
understanding, the kunnu-summonses are not written during the trial, but, instead, attest
to an earlier investigative procedure to obtain preliminary evidence.
8.H Questioning the Litigants: ša ālu53
One of the actions performed by the judges to obtain information,

either before or after the presentation of evidence, is designated by
the verb ša ālu (“to question, to interrogate”). The authorities are the
subject of the verb and the individual they interrogate is the object.
This individual is usually the defendant,54 although the object of the
verb may also be the plaintiff 55 or other individuals who might be able
to provide information relevant to the matter at hand.56
Often the verb occurs without any additional information about what
the action entails. For example, in Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:12, the
text simply states fba-na-at-ina-E2.SAG.IL2 iš-ta-lu-ma (“they questioned
f
Banât-ina-Esagil”).57 In some texts, however, the verb ša ālu introduces
a quotation of the question that the authorities pose, as in the following
example from Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:
6. DI.KU5.MEŠ
lu2
(6–7) The judges interrogated
7. m
re-man-ni-dEN iš-ta- -a-lu m
Rēmanni-Bēl thus:
um-ma fba-bu-nu
8. NIN-ka ul-tu im-ma-ti ki-i (7–9) “Since when has fBābunu,
E2mdKUR.GAL-MU-MU your sister, been part of the
9. AD ša2 mdNA3-DU-IBILA ši-i household of mAmurru-šuma-
iddinam, father of mNabû-mukīn-
apli?”
53
The verb occurs both with and without a -t- infix. Examples with the infix include:
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:13; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59:7; TCL 12,
86:13. Examples without the infix include: Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60:16; YOS
19, 101:30; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:8; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL
13, 219:13–14.
54
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219; Wunsch,
BA 2, No. 48; YOS 19, 101; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19; Cyr 312; Cyr
332.
55
Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. 58/59.
56
Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60 (slavegirl in question); Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45
(creditors); Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48 (parties to a settlement).
57
Other examples of the verb ša ālu alone are: Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:7’–9’; Wun-
sch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19:8; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–20’; Durand, Textes
babyloniens, No. 60:15–16; YOS 19, 101:29–30; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13,
219:13–14; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 37:3’; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48:11–13,
16–17; Cyr 312:10; Cyr 332:19.
248 chapter eight
This quotation demonstrates that ša ālu, as the verb itself implies, refers
to a process in which the authorities address a question to an individual
who appears in court.58
In addition to the verb ša ālu itself and the quotation of questions
in texts, the surrounding descriptions offer some further insight into
how the procedure is carried out. In several texts, the procedure occurs
after the authorities summon (abālu) the individual who is questioned.59
After the actual questioning is mentioned, the individual’s response may
be introduced by the verb qabû (“to speak”),60 which indicates an oral
response. The verb kunnu (“to establish”) may also be used, followed
by either an actual quotation of testimony61 or by a summary of what
was “established.”62 Sometimes, but not always, the response is given
under oath, which is designated by the term nīš DINGIR.MEŠ/DN
zakāru.63
Texts also describe questioning without using the verb ša ālu to refer
to the procedure. Instead, the text may quote the authorities’ question
introduced by the verb qabû, rather than ša ālu. For example, in Wunsch,
BA 2, No. 44, two women are questioned. The description of their
questioning reads as follows:
8’. [U.GUR-NUMUN-DU3]
md
(8’–10’) m[Nergal-zēra-ibni],
9’. GAR.UŠ4 GU2.DU8.Aki
lu2
the šākin ēmi of Kutha and the
u3 UKKIN lu2GU2.DU8. assembly of Kutha heard mNabû-
Aki.[MEŠ] kēšir’s statement and
10’. a-ma-a-ti mdNA3-ke-šir3 iš-tim-
mu-u2-ma
58
Wunsch reconstructs the verb ša ālu in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:9’, where it has
two individuals, mRīmūt and m illaya, as objects. The continuation of the text records
m
Rīmūt’s oath in response, but indicates that m illaya is “sick” (ma-ru-u -ma) and that he
apparently does not arrive to swear the oath (see Wunsch, BA 2, p. 160). If Wunsch’s
reconstruction of the situation is correct, then the verb ša ālu refers to an action per-
formed without the presence of one of the people being questioned. This text also
raises the possibility that the action is separate from the oath in response.
59
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48;
Cyr 332.
60
Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 58/59; Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60; Wunsch,
CM 20, No. 90/TCL 13, 219; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 19.
61
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48.
62
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13; YOS 19, 101.
63
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:23’ (dŠamaš); Cyr 312:11 (DINGIR.MEŠ).
11’. fdam-qa-a u3 fbu-ra-šu2 a-na (11’–12’) brought fDamqaya and

ma -ri-šu2-nu f
Burāšu before them and said to
12’. u2-bil-lu-nim-ma iq-bu-ši-na-a-ti them thus:
um-ma mi-nam-ma
13’. md
NA3-ke-šir3 a-na la DUMU (12’–13’) “Why did you turn
ša2 mdNA3-SUR tu-tir-ra m
Nabû-kēšir into a non-son of
m
Nabû-ē ir?”
14’. iq-ba-a um-ma it-ti AMA-šu2 (14’–15’) They said thus: “He
a-na E2 mdNA3-SUR entered Nabû-ē ir’s household
15’. i-ter-bi with his mother.”
The procedure described in this excerpt begins immediately after the
šākin ēmi and the assembly evaluate (šemû) the plaintiff’s statement. The
two women are summoned (abālu) before the adjudicating authorities.
The authorities’ speech to the two women begins with the word mīnamma
(“why”), which clearly indicates that the authorities are posing a ques-
tion to the women.64 The fact that the question is introduced by qabû
(“to speak”), rather than by ša ālu, raises the possibility that ša ālu has
a specific, procedural meaning that is applied only to certain kinds of
questions, and that other questions are introduced by qabû. A glance
at the usage in the Eanna material shows that questions introduced by
qabû do not seem to be distinguished from questions introduced by ša ālu
in terms of form,65 content66 or the response obtained. Furthermore,
in one text from the Eanna, the question posed is introduced by the
64
See also Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47:13–15 which also contains a question posed
by the authorities that begins with mīnamma and is also introduced by the verb qabû,
rather than by ša ālu.
65
YOS 7, 128:21–23 includes a similarly worded question (beginning with mīnamma),
but introduced by ša ālu, instead of qabû. See also YOS 6, 225:9–11.
66
TCL 13, 170 includes a question introduced by qabû (lines 8–11) followed by a
question introduced by ša ālu (lines 14–17). The use of qabû may be explained by the
fact that the first question ends with an order to the person addressed: mi-nam-ma a-na
lu2
ŠA3.TAM u lu2SAG.LUGAL! ša2 ina pa-na-tu-u2-a paq-du ul taq-ba u3 ul-tu UGU ša2 a-na-ku
paq-da-ak-ka ul taq-ba- en-na mim-ma ša2 ina ŠU.2-šu ta-mu-ur i-šam2-ma kul-lim-an-na-a-šu2
(“Why did you not report to the šatammu or the ša rēš šarri who was appointed before
me and why did you not report it after I was appointed? Now, whatever you see in
his possession bring and show us!”). The phrase introduced by ša ālu is apparently a
question, although it does not contain any internal indication that it is. It reads: mim-
ma ša2 mPN ša2 E2 ŠU.2 ina mu - i-ku-nu u2-še- u-u2, and should probably be translated,
following Moore, Documents, No. 170, “(Is there) anything that mPN took out from
the storehouse in your charge?” In both Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44 and Wunsch, BA 2,
No. 47, the questions introduced by qabû include only questions, without any order
at their ends.
250 chapter eight
phrase fPN iš- -al-u2-ma iq-bu-u2-šu2 um-ma (“They interrogated fPN and
said thus to her”).67 In this example, the verb qabû seems to explain
the action described by ša ālu, since what the authorities “say” (qabû)
is a question. Therefore, it seems that qabû and ša ālu do not refer to
different kinds of questioning.
8.I Oaths
The use of oaths, in general, during the Neo-Babylonian period has

already been surveyed by Joannès.68 This subject is, understandably,
quite broad, and thus merits a more complete study than may be
accomplished in the present context. The present discussion will, there-
fore, primarily focus on the administration of oaths as an evidentiary
procedure.69
There are two terms for swearing an oath: nīš ili [u šarri ] zakāru
(literally, “to pronounce the oath of the god [and the king])”70 and ina
DN u adê ša RN temû (“to swear by DN and the oaths of RN”).71 The
words of the actual oath are usually quoted, and may be introduced
by the term iqbi umma (“said thus”) or by the word kî. The oath itself
may be formulated in one of two ways, which Joannès calls the “posi-
tive” and “negative” forms.72 The “positive” form is to be interpreted
as one would any other statement. The oath implies that the statement
is true as recorded. The “negative” form, on the other hand, implies a
self-imposed curse upon the swearer if the assertion under oath is true.
The oath, therefore, implies that the opposite of what is actually stated
67
YOS 19, 91:21–23
68
F. Joannès, “La pratique du serment à l’époque néo-babylonienne,” in Sophie
Lafont, ed. Jurer et maudire: pratiques politiques et usages juridiques du serment dans le Proche-
Orient ancien (Méditerranées 10–11, 1996), pp. 163–174.
69
The promissory oaths, discussed in section 7.B above, show another, non-eviden-
tiary context in which oaths might occur during the adjudicatory process.
70
An example of this formula, including both god and king, occurs in Wunsch,
AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12:1. Variations include: nīš DINGIR.MEŠ u LUGAL zakāru
(Dar 260:19); nīš DN zakāru (Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:10’, 23’; Wunsch BA 2, No.
46:19’–20’).
71
Dar 260:19; BE 10, 9:26–27 (ina DINGIR.MEŠ u LUGAL temû ); Stolper, Entre-
preneurs, No. 109:17–18 (restored as ina DINGIR.MEŠ u LUGAL temû). The verb temû
without any surrounding context also occurs in Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45, 33’.
72
Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 171.
is true. One must rely on context to determine whether the “positive”

or “negative” oath is intended.
An oath may be taken in response to questioning by the judges
(ša ālu).73 However, as the discussion of the questioning procedure has
shown (section 8.H above), not every questioning by the judges results
in an oath. Furthermore, an oath may be applied without “question-
ing,” as well.
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44 provides a good description of the proce-
dure for administering the oath. In this text, mNabû-kēšir presents his
complaint against fDamqaya and fBurāšu to the šākin ēmi official and
the assembly of Kutha. mNabû-kēšir claims that he has received land
and a slave as inheritance from mNabû-kēšir, but that fDamqaya and
f
Burāšu have not given it to him. The šākin ēmi and the assembly ques-
tion the two women, who argue that mNabû-kēšir is not an actual son
of mNabû-ē ir. According to the two women, mNabû-kēšir was not born
into the family, but rather he entered the household as a slave together
with his mother. mNabû-kēšir counters this claim by citing a tablet in
which fDamqaya instructed the scribe to include him as a witness and
called him a son of mNabû-ē ir.74 After mNabû-kēšir’s response, the
judges call for the scribe who wrote the tablet and another witness.
The text reads:
22’. md
U.GUR-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 (22’–25’) They brought mNergal-
m
DU3-a a a-iddin son of mIbnaya descen-
23’. DUMU lu2ŠIDIM lu2DUB. dant of Itinnu, the scribe, and
SAR u3 m il-la-a A-šu2 ša2 mdU. m
illaya son of mNergal-a a-iddin
GUR-¢ŠEŠ.MUÜ descendant of Sîn-karābi-išme the
24’. DUMU md30–SISKUR2- [wit]ness on the [tablet] before
ŠE.GA lu2[mu]-kin-nu ¢ša2Ü them and
[ imDUB] (25’–26’) had them swear an oath
25’. u2-bil-lu-nim-ma niš dUTU u3 of Šamaš and the tablet reed in
qa-an up-[ p i. . .] the assembly and . . . proo[fs. . .]
26’. i-na UKKIN u2-ša2-az-ki-ir-šu-
nu-ti-ma i-da-[tu4 . . .]
73
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:23’; Cyr 312:11. See also Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’–
20’.
74
For more on this text and the complicated relationship between the protagonists,
see Wunsch, BA 2, pp. 153–154.
252 chapter eight
27’. ki-i la ki-i pi-i ša2 fdam-qa-a (27’–29’) “(May we be cursed)

AMA AD ša2 mdNA3-¢ke-šir3Ü if we inscribed (the name of )
28’. mdNA3-ke-šir3 A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- m
Nabû-kēšir, son of mNabû-
KAR-ir DUMU mda-bi-bi ē ir, descendant of Dābibī, as
a-na a witness in the tablet, not in
29’. lu2mu-kin-nu-tu ina imDUB accordance with the word of
ni-iš- u-ru f
Damqaya, mother of Nabû-
kēšir’s father!”
m
Nergal-a a-iddin, the scribe, and m illaya, the witness, confirm mNabû-
kēšir’s argument by swearing that they did not write his name in the
tablet without fDamqaya’s directive. In this text, the verb abālu (“to
bring”) refers to a procedure in which the judges summon the people
who are to swear.75 This procedure is also attested in a number of
summonses in which the summoned individual must swear an oath or
face a penalty.76
Besides summoning the individual who is to swear, the example
above suggests that authorities might also play a role in the actual
administration of the oath. The use of the Š-stem form of the verb
zakāru (šuzkuru) indicates that the authorities caused the individual to
take an oath.77
8.J The Conclusion of the Trial: Deliberation (mitluku)

and Decision (purussû)
Several “Royal Judges” style decision records indicate that after the
examination of evidence, the judges “deliberate” (mitluku). Apart from
the use of this verb in some, but not all, “Royal Judges” texts, this stage
of the proceedings does not seem to have left any independent records
which would offer a more complete picture. Nevertheless, based only
on the well-established meaning of the verb mitluku (“to consult one
another”), one can suggest that the judges confer before pronouncing
the sentence. The implications of the absence of a mitluku-clause in some
decision records are more difficult to determine. One might imagine
75
For another example of the same procedure, see Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:18’
(abāku).
76
Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268; Nbn 954; Dar 358.
77
See also Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:19’–20’.
that the judges’ deliberation takes place but goes unrecorded. One
might, however, also argue that the judges do not always “deliberate,”
and that the mitluku-clause occurs only when they do.
The general term for “decision” is purussû (EŠ.BAR), which occurs
in the phrase that introduces the names of the authorities in a number
of “Royal Judges” style decision records. This phrase indicates that the
authorities named were present “ina purussê dīna šuāti” (“at the decision
of this case”). The formulation of the authorities’ actual decision,
however, varies according to the circumstances of the case. The verb
nadānu (“to give”), for example, is used to express the awarding of
ownership to one of the parties.78 In some texts, the judges “confirm”
(šuzuzzu) the litigants’ status according to documentary information.79
The verb parāsu (“to decide”), related to the noun purussû (“decision”),
occurs in the phrase eli PN iprusū (“they decided that PN must pay,”
or, more literally, “they decided to the debit of PN”).80 The phrase
then goes on to specify what the judges determine that the named
individual must pay.
The purpose of the decision record, as was noted in section 1.A
above, is to serve as a permanent record of how a particular case was
decided. However, the decisions, as they are recorded in the decision
records, create obligations that must still be met. For example, in Nbn
356 the judges decide the order in which different creditors are to
be repaid. Similarly, in Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69, the judges’ ruling
includes the long-term arrangement for the support of a husband. Thus,
although the decision records show that a case has been decided, they
do not indicate that the parties have complied with the decision. This
final step, as has already been discussed in the previous chapter, is not
recorded in the decision records themselves, but, instead, in documents
of the text-type known as the conclusion (see section 2.A).
78
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 5:16–19; Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos.
58/59:22–23; Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 21 (pp. 90–91):21’; TCL 12,
122:3’ (restored).
79
Nbn 356:34–35; OIP 122, 38:42–45.
80
See, for example, YOS 19, 101:33 and Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90:31.
254 chapter eight
8.K Adjudicating Authorities: Royal Judges81
8.K.1 Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus in Babylon

A number of texts attest to the activities of individuals who are des-
ignated lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (= dayyānū) ša2 LUGAL (šarri ) (“judges of the
king”).82 This term indicates that there was a specific judicial position
of “royal judge,” that was somehow associated with the king. Alongside
this general term, the royal judges are also designated by the more
specific term lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (= dayyānū) ša2 (“judges of ”) followed by
the name of the king.
The royal judges are most frequently attested in texts from Babylon
during the reigns of Neriglissar and Nabonidus. These judges are the
subject of an extensive study by Cornelia Wunsch, which will serve as
the basis for the present discussion.83 In her work, Wunsch examines
the names of the royal judges as they appear at the end of the so-called
“Richterurkunden” (“judicial documents”), a group of texts which includes
both dispute documents (mostly decision records) and land sales. In these
texts, the royal judges, as a group, are designated “judges of Neriglis-
sar” or “judges of Nabonidus.” The name of a particular judge may
be identified by the title lu2DI.KU5 following his personal name.84 By
studying these names, Wunsch assembles a “directory” of all the judges
of Neriglissar and Nabonidus in Babylon, including the judges’ seals,
and lists the dates of each judge’s service. By doing so, Wunsch arrives
at a detailed description of the office of royal judge.
Wunsch observes that individual royal judges of Neriglissar and
Nabonidus did not hear cases alone. Instead, cases were heard by “judi-
cial councils” (Richterkollegien), which consisted of several royal judges and
81
Several adjudicating authorities, and not just the royal judges, may preside over
decisions recorded in the “Royal Judges” style. For a preliminary overview of these dif-
ferent adjudicating authorities see Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, History, pp. 916–920. For
discussion of the role of the king, see Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, pp. 58–59.
82
The term occurs in the body of the following texts: Nbn 668:13; Wunsch, AuOr
17–18 (1999–2000):15’, 20’; AnOr 8, 37:8; AnOr 8, 50:9; YOS 7, 159:2; YOS 7,
189:14. The phrase should probably be restored in YOS 7, 137:14, as well. See Küm-
mel, Familie, p. 136 n. 198 and the translation in Joannès, Justice, No. 148 (p. 205). This
term also occurs following the names of the judges in Cyr 301:12–13.
83
Wunsch, AOAT 252, pp. 557–597.
84
Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 558.
sometimes included other officials, as well.85 Wunsch determines that

there was a strict hierarchy within these councils based on seniority; a
judge could advance only with the departure of a more senior judge.86
The judges’ family names are well attested in business documents of the
period, which indicates that they came from economically influential
families.87 Usually, judicial councils included only one representative
of any particular family.
The number of judges on a council varies, which indicates that not
all the royal judges had to be present to constitute a council. Judges may
be absent from texts known to have been composed during their time
of service. For example, the judge mNergal-ušallim descendant of Šigûa
is listed as the first judge in a number of texts from years 9 through 14
of Nabonidus. Nevertheless, he is not listed among the judges in Nbn
356 (26.VI.9 Nbn). Similarly, Wunsch lists a number of cases in which
a judge is absent because of a conflict of interest.88
The above description of the institution of the royal judges is a sum-
mary of Wunsch’s conclusions. Wunsch limits her study to the royal
judges attested in certain documents from Babylon during the reigns of
Neriglissar and Nabonidus. Judicial councils of royal judges, however,
are known from other places and under other kings. Therefore, a survey
of the attestations of royal judges outside of Babylon during the reign
of Neriglissar and Nabonidus is in order. The survey will begin with
judges of Nabonidus and Neriglissar known from outside Babylon. Then
it will turn to consider the evidence for royal judges at other times, first
under later kings and then under earlier kings. A list of all individuals
named as “judges” occurs at the end of this section.
8.K.2 Judges of Neriglissar and Nabonidus outside Babylon

As Wunsch herself notes, the titles “judges of Neriglissar” and “judges
of Nabonidus” are attested outside of Babylon, in Uruk, Tapšu u, Bīt-
šar-Bābili and Bāb-nār-Šamaš.89 In the texts from these locations, the
judges are clearly designated lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ ša RN (“judges of RN). In
85
Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 568 and the chart on pp. 570–571. See below for discus-
sion of the other officials.
86
87
88
In the chart in Wunsch, AOAT 252, pp. 570–571, the conflict of interest is
indicated by the sign <–>.
89
Wunsch, AOAT 252, p. 567 n. 33.
256 chapter eight
one text from Borsippa (Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. 874) the title lu2DI.KU5
follows the names of all the individuals at the end of the text, but there
is no other indication that the judges are royal judges. Nevertheless,
Wunsch considers these judges to have been royal judges, as well.90
The names of the judges who heard cases outside Babylon during the
reign of Nabonidus and Neriglissar are different from those who heard
cases in Babylon at the same time. This indicates that the institution
of “royal judges” was localized to some degree, with different judges
functioning in different places. One might imagine that each locality,
like Babylon, had its own group of royal judges, who functioned in
councils. Because of sparse attestation, however, not much can be said
about the organization of the judges into councils.
Three texts, two from Bīt-šar-Bābili (Nbn 1113 and TCL 12, 120)
and one from Bāb-nār-Šamaš (Nbn 738), do provide some evidence for
the organization of judicial councils outside Babylon. The royal judge
m
Šuma-ukīn plays a role in all three texts. In Bāb-nār-Šamaš, he and
a sukkallu named mSîn-šēzib oversee the release of a slave together with
other (unnamed) judges. In one text from Bīt-šar-Bābili (Nbn 1113, a
“Royal Judges style B” decision record), the judge mŠuma-ukīn and the
sukkallu mSîn-šēzib decide a case together with another judge named
m
Nergal-a a-u ur, a kizû named mKiribtu, and a group named the
“Great Ones” (lu2GAL.MEŠ). These same authorities, without the suk-
kallu, oversee the return of a deposit in another text from Bīt-šar-Bābili
(TCL 12, 120), along with the qīpu official of the Esagil and another
kizû named mMušēzib-Bēl. The texts from both Bīt-šar-Bābili and Bāb-
nār-Šamaš were written by the same scribe, mIle i-Marduk descendant
of mEppeš-ili. This evidence suggests that the royal judge mŠuma-ukīn
served as a “circuit judge” with his own scribe, mIle i-Marduk.91 The
two would travel between places on the circuit, sometimes together
with the sukkallu, and would join the local adjudicating authorities to
constitute a judicial council.
90
This is apparent from the fact that Wunsch takes Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. 874 as
evidence for the existence of a judicial council of royal judges in Borsippa during the
reign of Nabonidus. See discussion of this argument below.
91
For discussion of this scribes career, see Sholom E. Holtz, “The Career of a
Neo-Babylonian Court Scribe,” JCS (forthcoming).
8.K.3 Royal Judges during the Reign of Cyrus and Cambyses

The institution of the royal judges does not end with Nabonidus, the last
Neo-Babylonian king. Based on the title alone, one might expect that
there would have been some change in the office with the termination
of the Babylonian monarchy under the Persian conquest. Despite some
apparent association with the king, however, the royal judges continue to
function even during regime changes.92 The textual evidence indicates
that there continued to be royal judges even once Mesopotamia fell
under Persian control. Two dabābu-type summonses (AnOr 8, 37 and
AnOr 8, 50) dating to the reign of the first Persian emperor, Cyrus,
require an individual to go to Babylon and argue a case before the
“judges of the king.” Another dabābu-type summons (YOS 7, 31) also
dating to the reign of Cyrus requires the summoned individual to go
to Babylon from Uruk and argue his case “in the king’s court of law”
(ina E2 di-i-ni ša2 LUGAL). There are decision records from cases heard
by the “judges of Cyrus” in Sippar (Cyr 301), Babylon (Cyr 312) and
Uruk (OIP 122, 38). As Wunsch points out, there are at least three
judges who are known to have been “judges of Nabonidus” and who
continue their careers as “judges of Cyrus” in Babylon.93
During the reign of Cyrus’s successor, Cambyses, the evidence for
the office of the royal judges comes from the Eanna archives at Uruk.
A dabābu-type summons (YOS 7, 189) from the reign of Cambyses
requires the summoned individual to bring his slaves to Uruk and argue
his case before the “judges of the king.”94 Two judges of Cambyses
are known by name. One judge, mBau-ēreš, is first attested as a “judge
of Cyrus” in OIP 122, 38, a “royal judges” style decision record from
Uruk. During the reign of Cambyses, he and another judge, mRīmūt,
are apparently called “judges of the king” in YOS 7, 137:14.95 mRīmūt
92
See Wunsch, AOAT 252, pp. 572–574.
93
The three judges are mNabû-balāssu-iqbi, mRīmūt-Bēl, mNabû-etel-ilāni. See
94
VAS 6, 99, as read by San Nicolò-Ungnad NRV No. 700, is a dabābu-type summons
written in Sippar during the reign of Cyrus which requires the summoned individual
to go to Babylon “to the sartennu and the judges” (a-na sar-te-e u lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ) and
argue a case. The evidence presented by Wunsch, as well as the evidence from Uruk
during the time of Cambyses, discussed below, indicates that royal judges often carry
the simple title “judge.” If this is the case, then VAS 6, 99 is further evidence for the
institution of royal judges in Babylon during the reign of Cyrus.
95
For this reading, see Kümmel, Familie, p. 136.
258 chapter eight
is also called a “judge of the king” in YOS 7, 159, a preliminary pro-

tocol which records proceedings he oversees.
m
Rīmūt and mBau-ēreš, the two royal judges from Uruk during the
time of Cambyses, also issue the decision in YOS 7, 161, an Eanna style
decision record dated to 12.XII.3 Camb. Both men are already known
to have been “judges of the king” before this text was written, yet in
this text they bear only the title “judges” ( lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ), without the
additional designation “of the king” (ša2 LUGAL). Wunsch has observed
that, under earlier kings, the title lu2DI.KU5, even without the addi-
tion of the words ša LUGAL, can be used to identify the royal judges
of Nabonidus.96 The evidence of YOS 7, 161 shows that Wunsch’s
observation applies not only to texts from Babylon during the reign of
Nabonidus. It seems that in Uruk during the reign of Cambyses, as
well, royal judges may also simply be called “judges.”
8.K.4 Royal Judges after the Reign of Cambyses

In the legal texts considered in this book, the most explicit attestations
of the royal judges end with the reign of Cambyses. In published texts
from the reign of his successor, Darius I, the terms “judges of the
king” and “judges of Darius” do not occur. There is, however, some
evidence to suggest that even though the title itself is not known from
this period, the office of royal judge nevertheless continued. One sum-
mons from Uruk (TCL 13, 222), which probably dates to the reign of
Darius I,97 mentions E2 DI.KU5 ša2 [LUGAL] (“the [king]’s court of
law”), assuming correct restoration. Presumably, then, there continued
to be “judges of the king,” as well.
There are also numerous individuals who appear in judicial set-
tings in texts from the reign of Darius I who bear the title lu2DI.KU5
(“judge”). As has already been seen above, Wunsch’s observation that
this shorter title designates royal judges holds true not only for the
judges of Nabonidus in Babylon, which are the ones considered by
Wunsch, but also for royal judges of Cambyses in Uruk. By extending
this observation and applying it to texts from the reign of Darius, one
96
97
For discussion of the dating of this text to the reign of Darius I, see Kümmel,
Familie, p. 141 n. 245.
may argue that the individuals who bear the shorter title lu2DI.KU5
are also royal judges. This argument is supported by the similarities
between the texts considered by Wunsch and the texts from the reign
of Darius. Therefore, a brief review of some of Wunsch’s evidence is
in order.98
One of the texts Wunsch includes in her discussion is Nbn 355. This
text is a debt note that ends with the following notice:
14. i-na ma- ar mdU.GUR-GI (14–16) The debt-note was
md
NA3-MU-GI.NA drawn up before mNergal-ušallim,
15. mdEN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-MU mdEN- m
Nabû-šuma-ukīn, mBēl-a ē-
KAR-ir mdNA3-TIN-su-iq-bi iddin, mBēl-ē ir and mNabû-
16. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ u2-il3-tim e-lat balāssu-iqbi, the judges.
Based on this notice alone, one would know only that the five men
named are judges, but not necessarily that they are “judges of the king.”
However, the names of these five men occur in other contexts in which
they are clearly called “judges of Nabonidus.” For example, in Nbn
356, a “Royal Judges” style decision record from a case presented “to
the judges of Nabonidus, king of Babylon,” their names appear with
the title “judge.” Therefore, Wunsch concludes that whenever the title
lu2
DI.KU5 appears alone, even if there is no other indication of the
presence of royal judges, the title lu2DI.KU5 designates royal judges.
As a result, Wunsch considers the judges named in Böhl, Leiden Coll.
3 No. 874 to be royal judges of Nabonidus, even though their names
occur with only the title lu2DI.KU5 and without any other indication
that they are royal judges.99
Notices similar to the one cited from Nbn 355 occur in a number
of texts from the reign of Darius. For example, the end of BE 8/1,
107, a debt note written in Babylon and dated to 18.XI.6 Dar, reads
as follows:
98
Wunsch herself does not explicitly make the case for the use of the title lu2DI.
KU5 to refer to royal judges. The discussion is based on the different texts Wunsch
includes as part of her discussion.
99
Wunsch AOAT 252, p. 568 n. 33.
260 chapter eight
19. ina ma- ar mdNA3-na-din-ŠEŠ (19–21) The debt-note was drawn

m
EN-šu2-nu mba-ga- i-in up before mNabû-nādin-a i,
20. na-din md30-SIG5-iq map-la-a u
m m
Bēlšunu, mBaga in, mNādin, mSîn-
md
NA3-ZI-tim-URI3 mudammiq, mAplaya and mNabû-
21. lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ mMU-dNA3 napištim-u ur, the judges and
lu2
si-pi-ri u2-il3-ti e-let m
Iddin-Nabû, the alphabet scribe.
As in the notice from Nbn 355, the title lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ follows the
names of seven judges “before” (ina ma- ar) whom the note was written.
In the case of Nbn 355, other texts indicate that the judges named in
it are actually royal judges of Nabonidus. In the case of BE 8/1, 107,
however, there are apparently no texts that indicate that the judges are
judges of Darius. Nevertheless, Wunsch’s observation about the use of
the title lu2DI.KU5 to designate royal judges may apply to BE 8/1, 107.
If so, then these seven men named in it, and in other notices like it,100
are royal judges of Darius.
Some additional support for interpreting the title lu2DI.KU5 as an
indicator of royal judges during the reign of Darius comes from Dar
410, a decision record written in Babylon. This text is the result of a
dispute between fIna-Esagil-ramât and her grandson, mMarduk-nā ir-
apli, about a particular house on ubur street in Babylon. The notice
of the appearance before the judges reads as follows:101
4. . . . fina-E2.SAG.IL2-ra-mat (4–7) fIna-Esagil-ramât, daugh-
DUMU.SAL ša2 mze-ri-ia A ter of mZēriya descendant of
m
na-ba-a-a Nabaya, came to court before
5. a-na ma- ar mKI-dNA3-TIN m
Itti-Nabû-balā u and his col-
u3 lu2ki-na-at-te-e-šu2 lu2DI.KU5. leagues, the judges, regarding that
MEŠ house, against mMarduk-nā ir-
6. a-na mu - i E2 šu-a-tim a-na apli, son of [ mItti]-Marduk-balā u
md
AMAR.UTU-na- ir-IBILA descendant of Egibi.
DUMU ša2
7. [ mKI]-dAMAR.UTU-TIN A
m
e-gi-bi a-na di-i-ni tu-te-lu- -ma
In these lines, the title lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ (“judges”) refers to mItti-Nabû-
balā u “and his colleagues” ( lu2ki-na-at-te-e-šu2), who are unnamed. As
noted earlier, Wunsch has observed that the royal judges of Nabonidus
100
Similar notices occur in Dar 149:13–14 (Opis); Joannès, Archives de Borsippa,
p. 251:16–17 (Borsippa).
101
Readings follow those in Wunsch, CM 3, No. 353 (pp. 293–294). For more on
this case, see Vitali A. Beljawski, “Die Sklavenelite des Hauses Egibi,” Jahrbuch für
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1973/1, p. 142 and p. 144.
functioned in judicial councils. The term lu2kinattêšu (“his colleagues”)

in Dar 410 may refer to such a council. Thus, mItti-Nabû-balā u and
his colleagues may have been members of a judicial council of royal
judges.102
8.K.5 Royal Judges under Nebuchadnezzar II

As is the case with the legal texts from the time of Darius, the legal
texts from the time of Nebuchadnezzar II, at the very beginning of the
Neo-Babylonian period, do not specifically mention “judges of the king”
or “judges of Nebuchadnezzar.” Some legal texts refer to unnamed
“judges,” who, based on the conclusions reached above about the use
of the title, may have been royal judges.103 One memorandum including
a decision (Nbk 109) from the time of Nebuchadnezzar begins with
the following sentence:104
1. [an-nu-tu] lu2da-a-ne-e (1–6) [These are] the judges
2. [ša2 mDUB-NUMUN] A-šu2 before whom mŠāpik-zēri son
ša2 mNUMUN-tu2 of mZērūtu and mBalā u son of
3. [u3 mba]-la- u DUMU fna-si-ka- f
Nasikātu . . . of the šāpiru of the
tu4 Sealand argued the case of the
4. [. . .] ša2 lu2KIN KUR tam-tim house—
5. [di]-i-ni ša2 E2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu
6. id-bu-bu
None of the names at the end of this text, however, has the title lu2DI.
KU5. In fact, several of the names recorded at the end of the memo-
randum have other titles, such as the šākin ēmi of Uruk (line 19) and
the šangû of Ur (line 20).105
Although legal texts with more explicit mention of “judges of
Nebuchadnezzar” have not come to light as yet, this does not mean
that the institution of “royal judge” did not exist. Other texts from
Nebuchadnezzar’s reign indicate that he, like other Mesopotamian
102
Unnamed “judges” ( lu2DI.KU5) are also mentioned in Dar 53:11 and VAS 4,
87:11 (along with the sartennu).
103
Nbk 116:5 and VAS 6, 43:2.
104
For more on this text see Köhler u. Peiser, Rechtsleben 2, 24.
105
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45:5’ mentions lu2DI.KU5.MEŠ, and gives the impression
of being a fragment of a “Royal Judges” style decision record. Wunsch, BA 2, p. 161
dates the text to the reign of Neriglissar or Nebuchadnezzar. If the Nebuchadnezzar
date is correct, then the text may include additional evidence for “judges of Nebu-
chadnezzar.”
262 chapter eight
kings before and after him, associates his kingship with the institution
of justice. The literary text “Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice” extols
the king for his accomplishments in correcting the judicial system,
which, under earlier kings, had become corrupted.106 As has already
been noted, the text specifically mentions that the king “built anew the
court of law.”107 One assumes, then, that this “court of law” is the bīt
dīni ša šarri (“the king’s court of law”), known from later texts, and that
the “judges of the king” heard cases here.
A similar association between the king and justice, which supports the
possibility that Nebuchadnezzar had royal judges, appears in Weidner,
AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5. This text describes how Nebuchadnez-
zar handles a case of treason against him. The relevant section of the
text reads:108
(7–15) i-na ūmi šu-ma mdna-bi-um- (7–15) At that time, Nebuchad-
ku-du-ur2-u2- u-ur šar ba- nezzar—king of Babylon, judi-
bi-i-liki ru-bu-u muš-ta-a-lu cious prince, shepherd of wide
re-e2-a-um nišê ra-ap-ša2-a- humanity, who, like Šamaš, exam-
tim ša2 ki-ma dšamši i-ba- ines all lands, establisher of truth
ar-ru-u2 gi-mir ma-ti-ta-an and justice, who removes the evil-
mu-ki-in ki-it-tim u3 mi-ša2- doer and the enemy—saw the evil
ru mu- a-al-li-iq ra-ag-gu deeds of mBaba-a a-iddin,
u3 za-ma-nu ep-še-e-ti mdba-
ba4–a a-iddina le-em-ne-e-ti
it-ta-a - a-al-ma
(16) ri-kil-ta-šu ik-šu-ud (16) he intercepted his plot.
(17–18) qul-lul-ti i-pu-šu ina pu ur (17–18) In the assembly of the
ummāni eli-šu u2-ki-in-ma people, he established the crime
he committed against him.
(19–20) ag-giš ik-kil-me-šu-ma la (19–20) He gazed at him angrily,
ba-la -su iq-bi-ma napišti-šu he commanded that he not live,
ik-ki-su he slit his throat.
Nebuchadnezzar’s participation in judicial proceedings dramatically
demonstrates that the king is mukīn kittim u mīšarī (“establisher of truth
and justice”). The king, according to this text, does not simply execute
106
Lambert, Iraq 27 (1965), pp. 1–11. For recent discussion and confirmation of
Lambert’s dating of this text to the reign of Nebuchadnezzar, see Paul-Alain Beaulieu,
The Reign of Nabonidus (New Haven, 1989), pp. 4–5.
107
CT 46, 45:ii, 26.
108
The present transcription follows Weidner’s. The photograph in AfO 17 (1954–
1956) is not clear enough to read.
m
Baba-a a-iddin. Instead, Nebuchadnezzar is described as any other
litigant might be; he “establishes” (kunnu) the crime in an assembly
before ordering the traitor’s death. Put in somewhat modern terms,
this text is the king’s affirmation of the importance of “due process,”
in some form. The existence of “royal judges,” who, at least by title,
would be associated with the king, is entirely consistent with the desire
to be perceived as a “king of justice.”
Table 8.1 Directory of Individuals Designated lu2DI.KU5

(In Chronological Order)
Numbers in parentheses indicate the position of the judge’s name in texts in

which more than one judge is named. Names marked with an asterisk* include
an indication that they are the names of royal judges. Names in underlined
type also occur as names of judges of Nabonidus listed in Wunsch, AOAT 252,
pp. 575–586. Any judges of Neriglissar or Nabonidus listed in this directory
are either not listed by Wunsch or are known as judges of Cyrus, as well.
Name Text Place Date

[PN] / mNabû-ē ir VAS 6, 171:18 (1) Dilbat 2.II.?
[PN] / mA ē-iddin- VAS 6, 171:19 (2) Dilbat 2.II.?
Marduk// Šigûa
[PN]/ mItti-Marduk- VAS 6, 171:20 (3) Dilbat 2.II.?
balā u// Dābibī (?)
m
Bēl-a ē-iddin/ VAS 6, 171:20 (4) Dilbat 2.II.?
m
Zēriya
m
Nabû-ē ir-napšāti, Nbk 109:15–16 (1) Babylon 6.I.17.Nbk
qīpi of the Sealand
m
Nabû-šuzzizanni, Nbk 109:17–17 (2) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
šanû of the Sealand
m
Marduk-erība, šākin Nbk 109:19 (3) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
emi of Uruk
m
Imbi-ili the šangû Nbk 109:20 (4) Babylon 6.1.17 Nbk
of Ur
m
Bēl-uballi / mMar- Nbk 109:21–22 (5) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
duk-šuma-ibni, qīpi
of A ulla
m
Aplaya/ mŠūzubu// Nbk 109:23 (6) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
Bābūtu
m
Mušēzib-Bēl/ Nbk 109:24–25 (7) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
m
Iddin-a i// Bābūtu
m
Mušēzib-Marduk/ Nbk 109:26–27 (8) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
m
Iddin-a i//
Ša-nāšīšu
264 chapter eight
Table 8.1 (cont.)

m
Bāniya/mAplaya, Nbk 109:28–29 (9) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
scribe of the temple
of Amurru
m
Šamaš-ibni the šangû Nbk 109:30 (10) Babylon 6.I.17 Nbk
of Amurru
[mNabû-balās]su-iqbi/ Scheil, RA 12 (1915), Uruk 11.IX.2 Ngl
m
Marduk-nā ir* pp. 1–13:38 (1)
m
Nabû-ē ir-napšāti/ Scheil, RA 12 (1915), Uruk 11.IX.2 Ngl
m
Ša-Nabû-šû* pp. 1–13:39 (2)
m
Nabû-rā im-šarri/ Durand, Textes babyloni- Tapšu u 26.XI.2 Nbn
m
A ušunu* ens, 58 (1)
m
Marduk-ušallim/ Durand, Textes babyloni- Tapšu u 26.XI.2 Nbn
m
Zēriya* ens 58:28 (2)
m
Arad-Bēl/ mMarduk- Durand, Textes babyloni- Tapšu u 26.XI.2 Nbn
irība* ens 58:29 (3)
m
Bēl-a ē-irība/ Durand, Textes babyloni- Tapšu u 26.XI.2 Nbn
m
Kudurri // Adad- ens 58:30 (4)
šammê*
m
Šuma-u ur Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. Borsippa 2.V.10 [Nbn]
874:18 (1)
m
Balāssu Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. Borsippa 2.V.10 [Nbn]
874:19 (2)
m
Nabu-šuma-u ur Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. Borsippa 2.V.10 [Nbn]
874:20 (3)
m
Nabû-šuma-ukīn Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3 No. Borsippa 2.V. 10 [Nbn]
874:21 (4)
m
Nergal-a a-u ur* Nbn 1113:29 (2) Bīt-šar- 17.VIII.? Nbn
Bābili
TCL 12, 120:23 (1) Bīt-šar- 5.VI.17.Nbn
Bābili
m
Šuma-ukīn* Nbn 1113:29 [1] Bīt-šar- 17.VIII.? Nbn
Bābili
Nbn 738 (seal) TCL 12, Bāb-nār- 15.XI.13 Nbn
120:24 (2) Šamaš 5.VI.17 Nbn
Bīt-šar-
Bābili
m
Bēl-nā ir/ mNabû- Cyr 301:12a (1) Sippar 21.II.8 Cyr
apla-iddin// Sîn-ilī*
m
Nabû-nā ir/ Cyr 301:13 (2) Sippar 21.II.8 Cyr
m
aza-X-ili*
m
Nabû-apla-iddin* Cyr 312:32 (1) Babylon 11.V.8 Cyr
Table 8.1 (cont.)

m
Nabû-balāssu-iqbi* Cyr 312:32 (2) Babylon 11.V.8 Cyr
m
Kabti-Marduk* Cyr 312:32 (3) Babylon 11.V.8 Cyr
m
Nabû-ušallim* Cyr 312:33 (4) Babylon 11.V.8 Cyr
m
Rīmūt-Bēl* Cyr 312:33 (5) Babylon 11.V.8 Cyr
m
Nabû-etel-ilāni* Cyr 312:33 (6) Babylon 11.V.8 Cyr
m
Bau-ēreš* OIP 122, 38:46 (+seal) Uruk 16+.IV.9 Cyr
YOS 7, 161:7–8 (2) Uruk 12.XII.3 Camb
YOS 7, 137:13–14 (2) Uruk 30.XII.3 Camb
m
Rīmūt* YOS 7, 159:2 Uruk 24.IV.3 Camb
YOS 7, 161:7–8 (1) Uruk 12.XII.3 Camb
YOS 7, 137:13–14 (1) Uruk 30.XII.3 Camb
m
Ša-Nabû-šū Dar 149:13–14 (1) Opis ? 22.XII.4 Dar
m
Nergal-iddin Dar 149:13–14 (2) Opis ? 22.XII.4 Dar
m
Nabû-nādin-a i BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (1) Babylon 18.XI.6 Dar
m
Bēlšunu BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (2) Babylon 18.XI.6 Dar
m
Baga in BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (3) Babylon 18.XI.6 Dar
m
Nādin BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (4) Babylon 18.XI.6 Dar
m
Sîn-mudammiq BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (5) Babylon 18.XI.6 Dar
m
Aplaya BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (6) Babylon 18.XI.6 Dar
m
Nabû-napištim-u ur BE 8/1, 107:19–21 (7) Babylon 18.XI.6 Dar
m
Itti-Nabû-balā u Dar 410:5 (1) Babylon 10.VIII.15 Dar
m
Mušallim-Marduk// Joannès, Archives de Borsippa 9.I.32 Dar
Rīmūt-Ea Borsippa, p. 251:16 (1)
m
Bēl-ittanni//Bēl- Joannès, Archives de Borsippa 9.I.32 Dar
e ēru Borsippa, p. 251:17 (2)
CHAPTER NINE
THE ADJUDICATORY PROCESS IN THE EANNA
The previous chapter described the adjudicatory process as it is pre-

sented in the “Royal Judges” decision records and other texts that
pertain primarily to litigation between private individuals. The corpus
of Neo-Babylonian legal texts, however, also includes records of the
adjudicatory process in cases pertaining to temple property. Textual
records of proceedings pertaining to the Eanna at Uruk are particularly
abundant, although there are also texts from the Ebabbar at Sippar.
The present discussion draws mainly on the Eanna material, with only
occasional reference to other texts.
The adjudicatory process in the temples has a different purpose from
the adjudicatory process that pertains to private property. The main rea-
son for adjudicatory proceedings in the temples is the protection of the
temples’ interests. The people who are judged are usually suspected of
mishandling temple property in some way. Temple functionaries identify
these suspects, but the cases that follow are not between the functionar-
ies themselves and the suspects. Rather, the functionaries act on behalf
of the temples as institutions.1 Thus, the adjudicatory process is more
similar to modern day criminal proceedings, in which an institution,
rather than an individual, protects its interests by prosecuting crimes.
Consequently, the trial in the Eanna is not just a means of obtaining
payment for damages to property. It is, instead, a trial for wrongdoings
that are prosecuted as crimes against the temple. This aspect of the
adjudicatory process in the Eanna is manifest in the thirty-fold penalty
that is regularly imposed against those found guilty of mishandling the
Eanna’s property.2 The imposition of this penalty clearly indicates that
the Eanna is not simply interested in restoring the goods in question.
Rather, the penalty reflects the Eanna’s interest in punishing (and pre-
sumably thus preventing) any transgression against it.
1
To be sure, the temple functionaries may also be concerned with avoiding prosecu-
tion themselves and protecting their own jobs within the bureaucracy. Fundamentally,
however, the adjudicatory system in the temples serves the interests of the temples.
2
For discussion of the penalty see San Nicolò, ArOr 4 (1932), pp. 327–344.
268 chapter nine
Despite the fundamental difference between the two processes of adju-

dication, the process in both settings is carried out in a basically similar
manner. This similarity stems from the common needs of adjudication,
and is reflected in the similar text-types that make up the ‘tablet trail’
from both processes. Therefore, the description of certain procedures
in the temple context will resemble the description of the same pro-
cedure in the private context. Nevertheless, at the risk of repetition,
the discussion will consider the same procedures again, and will note,
when relevant, that the procedure is essentially the same.
9.A The Scene
Unlike the “Royal Judges” decision records, the “Eanna style” decision
records do not typically refer to the “case” itself with the term dīnu.
Nevertheless, this seems to have been the term for proceedings that
take place in the temple context. YOS 19, 90, although broken, is an
“Eanna style B” decision record in which the term dīnu apparently
refers to a “case” involving shepherds of the Eanna.3
Adjudicatory procedures often take place “in the assembly” (ina
UKKIN). Because the cases pertain to the temple’s property, it seems
reasonable to assume that the assembly meets in the temple, although
this is not stated in the texts themselves. The preposition ina (“in”) in
the phrase ina UKKIN could refer to a specific location within the
temple, but it could also refer simply to the gathering of the members
of the assembly.4
Litigants, witnesses and evidence appear “before” (ma ar, ina pāni ) or
“in the presence of ” (ina DU.ZU) the authorities. The paucity of details
3
The text states an-nu-tu lu2mu-kin-ne-e ša2 ina pa-ni-šu2-nu mPN1 . . . di-i-ni i-dab-bu-u2-¢ubÜ
(“these are the witnesses before whom mPN1 argued a case . . .”) (YOS 19, 90:4–9). For
the identification of one of the protagonists in this text, mSîn-ibni son of mNanaya-ēreš,
as a herdsman in Uruk, see Kümmel, Familie, p. 74.
4
As noted by Magdalene, Scales of Righteousness, pp. 55 n. 26, TCL 12, 117 records
the names of the mār banî “before” (ina pāni ) whom a man drew a dagger against the
ša rēš šarri administrator of the Eanna. The action takes place “in the great gate of
the Eanna” (ina KA2.GAL-i ša2 E2.AN.NA). The text then states that “the assembly”
( lu2UKKIN) tied up the dagger as evidence. The text clearly indicates that some action
takes place in the great gate. However, it does not explicitly state that the mār banî and
the administrator were at the great gate of the Eanna for an adjudicatory process when
the dagger was drawn. Furthermore, it does not explicitly state that the assembly that
tied up the evidence did so in the great gate.
the adjudicatory process in the eanna 269
about the courtroom setting, already noted in the previous chapter,

extends to the texts from the Eanna, as well. Other than the prepo-
sitional phrases already mentioned, it is difficult to derive any further
information about the “staging” of the proceedings in the Eanna.5
9.B The Initiation of the Case: Accusations
In the “Eanna” style decision records, as well as in many of the prelimi-

nary protocols from the Eanna, the description of the case begins with
an accusation made before the authorities. For example, the beginning
of YOS 7, 128, after the names of mār banî, reads as follows:
9. DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-
lu2
(9–10) The mār banî before whom
ni-šu2-nu mdINNIN-a-lik-pa-ni m
Ištar-ālik-pāni, an oblate of
lu2
RIG7 dINNIN UNUGki Ištar of Uruk, a herdsman of
10. na-qi2-du ša2 dINNIN UNUGki
lu2
Ištar of Uruk, said thus:
iq-bu-u2-um-ma
11. mEN-šu2-nu lu2RIG7 dINNIN (11–16) “When mBēlšunu, an
UNUGki DUMU-šu2 ša2 oblate of Ištar of Uruk, son of
12. ZALAG2-e-a a-na ši-gi-il-ti a-na
m m
Nūrea unlawfully went down
¢U8. I.AÜ into the (flock of ) ewes of Ištar
13. NIG2.GA dINNIN UNUGki ša2 of Uruk which is at my disposal,
ina IGI-i-a ki-i u2-ri-du he led away and killed 1 ewe
14. 1-et TA U8. I.A ša2 kak-kab-tu2 branded with a star, from the
šen-de-e-ti flock of Ištar of Uruk, which is at
15. ul-tu U8. I.A NIG2.GA dINNIN my disposal.”
UNUGki ša2 ina IGI-i-a ki-i i-bu-
ka?-mi
16. it-te-kis a-na mu - i ki-i aq-ba-aš2- (16–20) “When I said to him
šu2 um-ma U8. I.A thus regarding (this): ‘You must
17. ša2 kak-kab-tu4 AN.BAR la ta-nak- not kill the iron-starred sheep!’
kis qaq-qa-da-a ki-i ip- u-ru he uncovered my head, choked
18. i-na ku-dur2-ra ša ti-ik-ki!-šu2 i -ta- me (with) the kudurru of his neck
qa-an-ni u3 and said thus: ‘In this way, they
19. i-qab-ba- um-ma lib3-bu-u2 a-ga-a will cast a neck-kudurru of the
m
gu-ba-ru workmen upon mGobryas and
20. u3 mpar-nak ku-dur2-ra ti-ik-ku ša2 m
Parnak!’ ”
lu2
ERIM2.MEŠ i-na-ad-du-u2
5
See Oberhuber, Florenz, No. 155:11 where the verb īzuzu apparently indicates
that the speakers “stand” in the assembly.
270 chapter nine
This case opens with the herdsman’s accusation made to a group of mār
banî. He accuses mBēlšunu of stealing and killing a ewe and of choking
him. These lines and others like them in other Eanna style decision
records6 and preliminary protocols7 indicate that the adjudicatory
procedure in the Eanna begins with an accusation. In these text-types
the accusation begins the description of the entire adjudication of a
case. There do not seem to have been any procedures, either in court
or outside of it, before this stage.
Based on this, it is possible to suggest that the accusatory depositions
belong to this initial stage in the proceedings, as well. Texts of this text-
type record only the speakers’ accusations that other individuals have
committed some wrongdoing (see section 3.C.1 above). Given their
contents, it seems reasonable to assume that they were composed at
the very beginning of the adjudicatory process. There are, of course,
accusatory depositions that seem to have been composed in response
to an accusation. These belong to a later stage in the trial, when the
accused individual has already appeared in court and responds to
the accusation. Nevertheless, those accusatory depositions that do not
indicate that the speakers are actually accused individuals might be
considered the product of this stage of adjudication.
9.C Investigative Procedures in the Eanna
YOS 7, 7 is a multi-part decision record that pertains to various items

misappropriated by mGimillu, a notoriously corrupt official of the
Eanna.8 One section of this decision record, regarding two misappro-
priated cows, reads as follows:
6
For other examples, see: YOS 6, 225:1–7; YOS 7, 66:1–8; TCL 13, 170: 1–7. In
YOS 7,7, the decision record pertaining to several different charges against the same
corrupt official, the case described in lines 43–50 (regarding a cow) also begins with
an accusation. See YOS 7, 7:43–48.
7
YOS 6, 235:1–12; YOS 6, 156:4–8; YOS 7, 88:15–21; AnOr 8, 47// TCL 13,
138:11–17; YOS 7, 97:3–7; YOS 7, 102:3–9; Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2:3–11; YOS 7,
159:4–6; YOS 7, 158:5–8; YOS 7, 149:4–9.
8
For more on this text, see San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 61–77. For a similar
description, see YOS 7, 158, a poorly preserved preliminary protocol. The legible
sections of the text seem to contain a report about misappropriated livestock and the
order to confiscate them and to present the shepherds who sold them.
30. 2 AB2.GAL.MEŠ ša2 kak-kab-tu4 (30–36) 2 cows, [branded]

[še-en-du] ša2 U4 1-kam2 ša2 ITI with a star, which, on 1 Ulūlu,
KIN [year 1] of Cyrus, king of the
31. [MU 1-kam2 9 m]ku-ra-aš2 lands, mNabû-bāni-a i son of
LUGAL KUR.KUR ša2 mdNA3- [mX-X]-iq-bi descendant of
DU3-ŠEŠ A-šu2 ša2 Kurī reported to mAnu-šarra-
32. [ mX-X]-iq-bi A mku-ri-i a-na mda- u ur [the qīpi official of ] the
nu-LUGAL-URI3 Eanna, mNabû-mukīn-zēri, the
33. [ lu2qi2-pi ša2] E2.AN.NA mdNA3- šatammu of the Eanna [son of
DU-NUMUN lu2ŠA3.TAM m
Nādinu] descendant of Dābibī,
E2.AN.NA m
Nabû-a a-iddin, the ša rēš šarri
34. [A-šu2 ša2 mna-di ]-nu A mda-bi-bi [administra]tor of the Eanna and
md
NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG. the scribes of the Eanna—
LUGAL
35. [ lu2EN pi-qit]-tu4 E2.AN.NA u3
lu2
UMBISAG.MEŠ ša2 E2.AN.
NA
36. iq-bu-u2 lu2qi-i-pi lu2ŠA3. (36–37) The qīpi-official, the
TAM mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU u3 šatammu, mNabû-a a-iddin and
lu2
UMBISAG.ME the scribes sent word concerning
37. a-na mu - i AB2.GAL.MEŠ šu- those cows.
a-tim iš-pu-ru-u2-ma 2 AB.GAL.
ME
38. ša2 kak-¢kabÜ-tu4 še-en-du ul-tu E2 (37–40) They brought two cows
m
gi-mil-lu branded with a star out of
39. i-bu-ku-nim-ma ma- ar mna-di-nu m
Gimillu’s house and presented
lu2
GAR.UMUŠ UNUGki them before mNādinu, the šākin
40. UKKIN lu2TIN.TIRki.MEŠ u3 ēmi of Uruk and the assembly
lu2
UNUGki-a-a uš-šu-zi-zu-ma of the Babylonians and the
Urukians.
41. 60-šu AB.GAL.MEŠ ku-mu 2 (41–42) They decided that
AB.GAL.MEŠ ša2 kak-kab-tu4 [ mGi]millu must pay 60 cows for
42. ¢šeÜ-[en-du e]-l[i mgi ]-mil-lu ip- the 2 cows [branded] with a star.
ru-su
According to these lines, this case begins when mNabû-bāni-a i makes
his report to the qīpi-official, the administrator, the šatammu and the
scribes. These officials send orders for the cows to be confiscated. The
actual adjudication does not begin until the two cows are presented
before a different group of authorities, namely the šākin ēmi of Uruk
and the assembly of Babylonians and Urukians. It is this second group
that renders the decision in the continuation of the text.
9
Date restored based on Cocquerillat, Palmeraies, p. 102.
272 chapter nine
One might argue that the purpose of the pre-trial investigation is

simply to get the misappropriated goods—the two branded cows—back
to the Eanna. However, if this was the only purpose of the investigation,
then it would probably be unnecessary for the text to specifically state
that the cows were presented before the assembly. It seems, therefore,
that there is a specific procedural need for the cows to be presented. If
so, then the pre-trial investigation serves a double purpose: to recoup
the Eanna’s property and to ensure that the misappropriated goods are
present during the adjudicatory proceedings that follow. The Eanna
officials issue orders for the confiscation of the items in question in
order to achieve both ends.
The role of the Eanna officials in the collection of evidence is reflected
in a number of preliminary protocols that describe an investigative
procedure, similar to the one in the excerpt above from YOS 7, 7, in
which the officials of the Eanna impound evidence in advance of a
trial.10 For example, YOS 7, 88 reads as follows:
9. lu2
DUMU -DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina (9–15) The mār banî before whom
IGI-šu2-nu ma-na-E2.AN.NA- m
Ana-Eanna-turru, the gatekeeper
tur-ru of the king’s storehouse, mRīmūt,
10. lu2
NI.DU8 ša2 E2 šu-tum3-mu the gatekeeper of the imu-gate
LUGAL mri-mut and mLā-qīp, the reedworker, son
11. lu2
NI.DU8 ša2 KA2 i-mu u mla- of mRīmūt, said thus to mNidinti-
qip lu2AD.GUB5 Bēl, the šatammu of the Eanna, son
12. A-šu2 ša2 mri-mut a-na mni-din-ti- of mNabû-mukīn-zēri descendant
d
EN of Dābibī and mNabû-a a-iddin
13. lu2
ŠA3.TAM E2.AN.NA A-šu2 the ša rēš šarri administrator of the
ša2 mdNA3-DU-NUMUN A Eanna:
m
da-bi-bi
14. u3 mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG-
LUGAL EN pi-qit-ti E2.AN.
NA
15. iq-bu-u2 um-ma mba-si-ia A-šu2
ša2 mdNA3-ki-šir
16. lu2
RIG7 ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 (15–17) “mBasiya son of mNabû-
UNUGki ša2 ina E2 <šu>-tum3- kišir, the oblate of the Lady-of-
mu LUGAL Uruk who was held in the king’s
17. a-ab-tu si-mir-re-e-šu2 AN.BAR storehouse, opened his iron fetters
ip-ta- ar il-ta-su-um and ran.”
10
A similar procedure of collecting and preserving evidence is attested in Durand,
Textes babyloniens, No. 6, a text from Dilbat. See Matthew Stolper, “Late Achaemenid
Texts from Dilbat,” Iraq 54 (1992), pp. 123–125 and Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alex-
ander: A History of the Persian Empire, trans. P. T. Daniels (Winona Lake, Indiana, 2002),
pp. 601–602.
18. u3 ar2-ki-šu2 ki-i ni-li-su-mu (18–19) “And afterwards, while we

19. pa -ri AN.BAR a-na mu - i-i-ni were running (after him), he drew
it-ta-as-si an iron sword against us.”
20. ina KA2 i-mu ki-i ni-i -ba-tu-šu2 (20–21) “When we seized him at
a-na E2.AN.NA the imu-gate, we brought him
into the Eanna.”
21. nu-ul-te-rib-šu2 u3 pa -ri ša2 mu - (21–22) The assembly inspected the
i-šu2-nu is-su- u sword which he drew against them.
22. lu2
UKKIN i-mu-ru pa -ri (22–23) They bound up the iron
AN.BAR iš-ku-su ik-nu-ku sword, sealed it and deposited it in
23. u3 ina E2.AN.NA ip-qi-du the Eanna.
This text records the proceedings that accompany the recapture of an
escaped oblate of the Lady-of-Uruk. Three men come before the Eanna
officials and report that the oblate opened his fetters and attempted to
escape. While the three men were chasing after him, the oblate drew
a sword against them. The men have, apparently, brought the sword
before the Eanna officials and the assembly. The officials inspect it
(amāru), bind (rakāsu) and seal (kanāku) it, and deposit ( paqādu) it in the
Eanna. The text itself does not state why this is done, but, as San Nicolò
suggests, it seems that the officials are preserving the corpus delicti for use
as evidence in the case against the oblate.11
A similar procedure, in the wake of a theft, is recorded in AnOr
8, 27. Before the names of five witnesses, the scribe and the date, the
text reads as follows:
1. mlu-u-da-a-nu A-šu2 ša2 mib-ni- (1–4) mLū-dānu son of mIbni-
[dINNIN A mPN ša2] [ Ištar descendant of mPN whom]
2. mdil-ta-meš-ba-ra-ku! A-šu2 ša2 m
Iltameš-baraku son of mNabû-
md
¢NA3Ü-¢NUMUNÜ-[ X ] zēra-[ X] caught in (an act of ) theft
3. ina sa-aš2-tu4 i -ba-ta-aš2-šim-ma and gave him to mNergal-nā ir son
a-na mdU.GUR-PAP of mNanaya-ibni.
4. A-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-DU3 id-di- (4–5) Without interrogation he said
nu-uš ša2 la ma-aš2-a-a-al-tu4 thus:
11
San Nicolò, Wenger AV, pp. 16–17. San Nicolò’s comment comes as part of his
discussion of YOS 7, 97, which describes a similar procedure. In the course of this
discussion, he lists several other examples of the preservation of evidence. YOS 6,
222 should be added to this list. For discussion of this text, see Denise Cocquerillat,
“Recherches sur le verger du temple campagnard de l’Akītu (KIRI6 allat),”WO 7
(1973–1974), pp. 113–114.
274 chapter nine
5. iq-bi um-ma a-¢naÜ-[ku] mmu- (5–14) “mMurašû son of mZēra-

ra-šu-u2 A-šu2 ša2 mNUMUN- ibni, mIštar-a a-iddin son [of PN],
DU3 m
Basiya and mInnin-a ē-iddin
6. mdINNIN-ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 sons of mIbni-Ištar and I—at night,
[ša2 . . .] mba-si-a u mdINNIN- when we cut a hole in the house
na-ŠEŠ.ME-MU of mNergal-nā ir son of mNanaya-
7. A.MEŠ ša2 mib-ni-dINNIN ina ibni, which is near the Takkiru
mu-ši ni-ik-su a-na canal, when we entered and took
8. E2 mdU.GUR-na- ir A-šu2 ša2 1 iron-tipped spade, an iron a[x],
md
na-na-a-ib-ni 3 iron shovels, a mu ipetu garment,
9. ša2 ina UGU id2tak-ki-ru ki-i 1 kur of barley and 1 kur of dates,
ni-ik-ki-su we deposited it with mZēra-ibni,
10. ki-i ni-ru-bu 1 na-aš2- i-ip-tu4 father of mMu[rašû], descendant of
ap-pa-tu4 AN.BAR Bā iru, who was with us.”
11. [ka-la]-ab-ba-tu4 AN.BAR 3
mar AN.BAR.MEŠ u3 tug2mu-
ip-e-tu4
12. 1 (GUR) ŠE.BAR 1 GUR
ZU2.LUM.MA
13. ki-i ni-iš-šu-u2 a-na mNUMUN-
DU3 AD ša2 mmu-[ra-šu-u2]
14. lu2ŠU. A ša2 it-ti-ni ni-ip-ta!-
qi2-id
15. 1 na-aš2- i-ip-tu4 ša2 kak!-kab-tu4 (15–18) They placed 1 spade,
še-en-¢deÜ-[e-ti ] brand[ed] with a star, which they
16. ša2 ul-tu E2 mdU.GUR-na- ir to[ok] from the house of mNergal-
iš-šu-[u2 . . .] nā ir [ . . .], w hich mIltameš-baraku
17. ša2 mdil-ta-meš-ba-ra-ku ina took from his (= mLū-dānu’s)
ŠU.2-šu2 iš-ša2 hands,12 the property he (= mLū-
18. SU.2 i-bit-ti-šu2 ina E2.AN.NA dānu) stole, in the Eanna.
iš-ku-nu
19. ina DU.ZU ša2 mdNA3- (19) In the presence of: mNabû-
LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG- šarra-u ur, the ša rēš šarri,
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 administrator of the Eanna;
E2.AN.NA
20. mgab-bi-DINGIR.MEŠ- (20) mGabbi-ilī-šarra-u ur, the qīpu
LUGAL-URI3 lu2qi2-i-pi ša2 -official of Eanna;
E2.AN.NA
21. mNUMUN-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM (21–22) mZēriya, the šatammu of
E2.AN.NA A-šu2 ša2 mib-na-a Eanna son of mIbnaya descendant
22. A me-gi-bi of Egibi.
12
The present translation of the relative clause ša2 mdil-ta-meš-ba-ra-ku ina ŠU.2-šu2
iš-ša2 understands the prepositional phrase ina ŠU.2 to mean “from the hands” and the
possesive -šu as referring to nū-dānu. It is also possible to take the prepositional phrase
The proceedings in this text take place “in the presence” (ina DU.ZU)
of the administrator, the qīpu-official and the šatammu of the Eanna.
m
Iltameš-baraku has caught a thief named mLū-dānu robbing the house
of mNergal-nā ir.13 The thief, in his confession, names his accomplices
and mentions all the items that they stole from mNergal-nā ir. One of
the stolen items, a branded spade, is placed (šakānu) in the Eanna.
The purpose of “placing” (šakānu) the spade in the Eanna is not
stated in the text. Because the spade is branded, and because it seems
to be the only object that is placed in the Eanna, one might assume that
this text simply records the return of the Eanna’s property. If so, then
AnOr 8, 27 does not belong in the present discussion of the collection
of evidence before a trial. However, the earlier discussion of YOS 7, 7
suggested that the presentation of the items in question seems to have
been a requirement of the adjudicatory process. One might, therefore,
argue that the spade is “placed” (šakānu)14 in the Eanna in order to be
brought out when the thief is tried.
The fact that Eanna authorities play an active role in the collection
of evidence at this stage of the proceedings reflects the prosecutory
character of the adjudicatory process in the Eanna. Judges in cases
pertaining to private property do not seem to have played a similar
role in collecting evidence before the case arrives in court. Instead, the
judges may call for additional evidence, but it is up to the parties them-
selves to present it. In contrast, the Eanna authorities, who represent
the interests of the institution, make special efforts to ensure that their
case against an accused criminal is as strong as possible.
9.D Summoning in the Eanna
Like the “Royal Judges” style texts, the “Eanna” use the verbs abāku and
abālu to refer to the procedure of summoning (literally, “bringing”) an
ina ŠU.2 to mean “in, with the hands” and to take mIltameš-baraku as the antecedent
of the possesive -šu. Accordingly, the translation would be “which mIltameš-baraku
brought with his (own) hands.”
13
At the time of this document’s composition, mNergal-nā ir was serving in the
administrative function of the ša mu i sūti (see Joannès, Justice, p. 213 and Kümmel,
Familie, p. 105).
14
The verb šakānu, of itself, can bear either meaning. It is used in the context of
preserving evidence in YOS 7, 102, which pertains to a letter written on parchment
containing evidence against the notorious official, mGimillu. The letter, like the sword
in YOS 7, 88, is bound, sealed and placed in the Eanna. The relevant section of the
text reads (YOS 7, 102:24–27): ši-pir-tu4 . . . iš-ku-su ik-nu-ku u ina E2.AN.NA iš-ku-nu. See
San Nicolò, Wenger, AV, p. 17.
276 chapter nine
individual before the authorities (see section 8.C above). For example,
YOS 6, 225 reads as follows:
1. md
AMAR.UTU-MU-URI3 u3 (1–3) mMarduk-šuma-u ur and
SU-ba-dAMAR.UTU A.MEŠ
m m
Erība-Marduk sons of mBēl-
2. ša2 mdEN-TIN-i A mbu-u2-šu ša2 uballi descendant of Būšu said
a-na mNUMUN-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM thus to mZēriya, the šatammu
E2.AN.NA of the Eanna, son of mIbnaya
3. A-šu2 ša2 mib-na-a A me-gi-bi u3 descendant of Egibi, and to the
lu2
UMBISAG.MEŠ ša2 E2.AN. scribes of the Eanna:
NA
4. iq-bu-u2 um-ma 4 (BAN2) 3 QA (4–7) “When mAdad-nūru son of
ŠE.GIŠ.I3 mdIM-nu-u2-ru m
Nâdu gave mMarduk-šuma-ibni
5. A-šu2 ša2 mna-a-du a-na mdAMAR. son of mBēl-ērib descendant of
UTU-MU-DU3 A-šu2 ša2 mdEN- Dannea 4 sūtu 3 qa of linseed,
SU saying, ‘Give it to the Eanna,’ he
6. A mdan-ne-e-a ki-i id-di-nu um-ma did not give the linseed; he took
a-na E2.AN.NA the linseed (for himself ).”
7. i-din ŠE.GIŠ.I3 a-na E2.AN.NA
ul id-din ŠE.GIŠ.I3 it-ta-ši
8. mNUMUN-ia lu2ŠA3.TAM (8–9) mZēriya, the šatammu of
E2.AN.NA mdAMAR.UTU- the Eanna brought mMarduk-
MU-URI3 mSU-ba-dAMAR. šuma-u ur, mErība-Marduk and
UTU m
Marduk-šuma-ibni.
9. u3 mdAMAR.UTU-MU-DU3 (9–10) In the assembly, he
i-bu-kam-ma ina UKKIN mdŠU2- interrogated mMarduk-šuma-ibni
MU-DU3 iš- a-a-al as follows:
10. um-ma
In this text, two brothers, mMarduk-šuma-u ur and mErība-Marduk,
accuse mMarduk-šuma-ibni of misappropriating linseed. The šatammu,
to whom the accusation is made, responds by “bringing” all three men
and interrogating mMarduk-šuma-ibni, the accused.15 The verb abāku
denotes the summoning procedure in this text. It occurs in similar
contexts in other Eanna style decision records;16 the verb abālu may
also be used.17
15
Note that the šatammu also summons the two accusers. Thus, this text implies that
the accusation is made in a separate appearance before the šatammu.
16
TCL 12, 119: 9–10 (following presentation of accusatory evidence); TCL 13, 132:
4, 7–8 (twice, in response to two accusations); YOS 7, 128:21–22.
17
YOS 19, 91:21 and YOS 7, 97:10–12. The first text is an “Eanna style B” deci-
sion record that begins with the “bringing” of an individual for interrogation, but not
in response to any recorded claim. The second is a preliminary protocol.
In addition to the terms abālu and abāku, the idiomatic expression rēša
našû (literally, “to lift the head”) should also be considered in a discus-
sion of the summoning procedure in the Eanna. The translation of this
idiom as “to summon” is commonly accepted, so that it is unnecessary
to restate the philological evidence.18 The term itself does not occur in
the decision records or preliminary protocols, but appears in a number
of documents of another text-type, the guarantees for an individual’s
presence. These guarantees are known only from the Eanna.19 They
state that the guarantor must “bring” (abāku) an individual when the
authorities “summon” the individual (rēssu inaššû).20 The typological
discussion of the guarantees for an individual’s presence showed that
one of the reasons that the individual might have to be brought is for
a hearing before the officials. Thus, like the verbs abālu and abāku, the
expression rēša našû belongs among the terms that describe the process
by which the authorities have a defendant brought before them. The
expression rēša našû, however, refers only to the beginning of the pro-
cess, when the authorities “summon” the individual. As a result of rēša
našû, the defendant must still be “brought” before the authorities. The
verbs abālu and abāku, on the other hand, refer to the entire process of
“bringing” the defendant. As a result of these actions, the defendant
stands before the authorities.
YOS 7, 159, a preliminary protocol, provides some further insight
into how this stage of the proceedings took place. The text begins with
m
Bazūzu’s accusation that mLâbāši stole a cow branded with the mark
of the Lady-of-Uruk.21 The text reads:
1. mba-zu-zu A-šu2 ša2 mdUTU-MU- (1–3) mBazūzu son of mŠamaš-
DU lu2NA.KAD ša2 AB2. šuma-ukīn, the herdsman of the
GU4. I.A cattle of the Lady-of-Uruk who
2. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 said thus before mRīmūt, the judge
ina ma- ar mri-mut lu2DI.KU5 of the king22 and mIle i-Marduk,
LUGAL the scribe:
3. u3 mDA-dAMAR.UTU
lu2
UMBISAG iq-bu-u2 um-ma
18
See CAD našû A 6c (N1, p. 107).
19
See section 6.B above.
20
Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155; YOS 6, 64; YOS 6, 206; YOS 6, 213; YOS 7, 111.
The term also occurs in BIN 1, 113, a kunnu-type summons.
21
For further discussion of this text see von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941), pp. 117–120.
22
Note that a royal judge is involved in proceedings that clearly pertain to the
Eanna’s property.
278 chapter nine
4. 1 AB2.GAL ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-en- (4–6) “When 1 cow, branded with

de-e-ti ul-tu AB2.GU4. I.A-ia a star, from my herd lagged behind
5. ina mu - i ID2 LUGAL ki-i ta- at the king’s canal, mLâbāši son of
am-mi-ir-ku-u2 mla-a-ba-ši m
Kūnaya descendant of Šangû-
6. A-šu2 ša2 mku-na-a A lu2E2.MAŠ Ninurta, without my consent, led it
d
MAŠ ša2 la-nu-u2-a i-ta-bak-šu2 away.”
7. DI.KU5.ME lu2DUMU! šip-ri
lu2
(7–8) The judges sent a messenger
a-na mu - i mla-a-ba-ši iš-pu-ru-ma to mLâbāši, but he was not found;
8. la in-na-mir i -liq he escaped.
The text describes a procedure in which the judges respond to the
accusation by sending a messenger to the accused. One might imagine
that the messenger’s purpose is to summon the accused to a hearing,
although the text does not explicitly say so.23 If this assumption is cor-
rect, then it is possible that the messenger is sent with a court-issued sum-
mons requiring mLâbāši to appear in court. Thus, the action described
in this text best fits the term rēša našû, although the term itself does not
actually appear. As has already been suggested, the term rēša našû refers
to the first part of the summoning procedure, before the summoned
individuals actually appear. Had mLâbāši not escaped, the procedure
would have been successful. Accordingly, the text might never have
mentioned the messenger. Instead it might have used the verbs abāku
or abālu to denote that mLâbāši was “brought” to court.
9.E The Answer of the Accused Individual:

Confession and Counter-Accusation
Once the investigative procedures have taken place, the trial itself is
underway. The accused individuals answer the accusation. They may
confess. This is illustrated in the following example from YOS 7,7, the
multi-part decision record pertaining to the misdeeds of the notorious
m
Gimillu:
23
This assumption is supported by the texts from Nuzi, which indicate that the
summoning procedure involved sending an official of the court to “call” (šasû) the sum-
moned individual. The procedure is discussed in Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 13–14.
For examples of texts that describe the procedure, see Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 195,
n. 45.
96. 1 ka-lum ša2 mdNA3-DIB-UD.DA (96–97) 1 lamb (about) which

A-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-MU m
Nabû-mušētiq-uddê son of
97. lu2NA.KAD ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 m
Nanaya-iddin, the herdsman
UNUGki iq-bu-u2 um-ma ina ITI of the Lady-of-Uruk said thus:
KIN MU 17-kam2
98. it-ti e-e-nu ina re-e- u ša2 ina mu - (97–100) “In Ulūlu, year 17,
i-ia together with the sheep from
99. a-na E2.AN.NA aš2-pu-ru mgi-mil- the remainder (of the debt) that
lu ina ŠU.2 mdINNIN-ŠEŠ.MEŠ- I owed and sent to the Eanna,
SU m
Gimillu led (this sheep) away
100. ŠEŠ-ia i-ta-ba-ak u3 mgi-mil-lu e-li from mInnin-a ē-erība, my
brother.”
101. ram-ni-šu2 u2-kin-ni um-ma ka-lum (100–101) mGimillu established
šu-a-tim a -ta-bak . . . (the case) against himself thus:
(101) “I led away that lamb . . .”
The proceedings described in this selection begin when the herdsman
reports (qabû) that mGimillu “led away” (abāku) a lamb that the herds-
man had sent to the Eanna. mGimillu apparently received the lamb
but never actually delivered it to the Eanna. The phrase e-li ram-ni-šu2
u2-kin-ni (“he established [the case] against himself ”) describes mGimillu’s
confession. This term occurs in numerous Eanna texts that refer to
similar confessions in response to accusations.24
Instead of confessing to a crime, the accused individuals may also
answer the accusation with a counter-accusation. For example, after
the names of five mār banî, YOS 6, 131 reads as follows:
5. DUMU.MEŠ DU3-i-<a> ša2 ina
lu2
DU.ZU-šu2-nu presence mAnim-a ē-u ur the
6. mda-nim-ŠEŠ.MEŠ-URI3 lu2A-KIN messenger of the crown prince
ša2 DUMU-LUGAL said thus to mNabû-šarra-u ur
7. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 lu2SAG- the ša rēš šarri administrator of
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 the Eanna:
8. E2.AN.NA iq-bu-u2 um-ma 2 AB2.
GAL
24
YOS 7, 7:49; YOS 7, 7:106–107; YOS 7, 7:113–114; YOS 7, 42:11–15; YOS
7, 78:11–13; YOS 7, 97:10–12; Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2:13. The verb qabû (“to say”),
instead of eli ramnišu kunnu, describes the confession in Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–
101:10. However, the connection to the verb kunnu is maintained in lines 18–22, which
refer to the confession as lu2mu-kin-nu-tu . . . e-li ram-ni-šu2-nu (“the testimony . . . against
themselves”). For the suggestion that the term eli ramnišu kunnu refers to confessions
obtained through maš altu-torture see San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 72 and the discus-
sion of the maš altu procedure below (section 9.G).
280 chapter nine
9. 1 AB2.TUR PAP 3 GU4. I.A ša2 (8–14) “When mBau-ē ir son of

ina qa-pu-ut-tu4 m
Bāniya showed me 2 cows and
10. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ša2 ina 1 small cow, total: 3 bovines
IGI mba-ni-ia from the pen of the Lady-of-
11. A-šu2 ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-SU mba- Uruk at the disposal of mBāniya
u2-SUR <<A-šu2>> son of mMarduk-erība, by the
12. A-šu2 ša2 mba-ni-ia ki-i u2-kal-li-man- order of the prince, when I led
nu them away I entrusted them to
13. ina a-mat DUMU LUGAL ki-i m
Bau-ē ir.”
a-bu-ku a-na
14. mdba-u2-SUR ap-te-qi2-id
15. u mba-u2-SUR a-na mdNA3- (15–16) And mBau-ē ir said thus
LUGAL-URI3 iq-bu-u2 to mNabû-šarra-u ur:
16. um-ma AB.GAL-am3 3-ta ša2 mda- (16–19) “mAplaya son of
nim-ŠEŠ.ME-URI3 m
Nabû-tabni-u ur unlawfully
17. lu2A KIN ša2 DUMU LUGAL ip- took away from me the 3 cows
qi-du map-la-a which mAnim-a ē-u ur,
18. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-tab-ni-URI3 a-na the messenger of the king,
ši-gi-il-tu2 entrusted to me.”
19. ina ŠU.2-ia i-ta-bak
This text is classified as an accusatory deposition because it does not
record any proceedings beyond the accusations. However, it amply
demonstrates the initiation of the case through accusation and the
accused individual’s answer with a counter-accusation. The case begins
when the messenger of the crown prince declares that mBau-ē ir was
given three cows, which are now, apparently, missing.25 mBau-ē ir, who
is now held responsible for the cows, then accuses mAplaya of stealing
those three cows. mBau-ē ir’s accusation is actually an attempt to clear
himself of guilt by placing the blame on mAplaya.
By answering the accusation with a counter-accusation, the accused
individuals seek to clear their own names. However, simply making a
counter-accusation does not end their responsibility. Instead, they must
prove their counter-accusation. This responsibility finds expression
in the text-types that require individuals to support a claim, such as
the kunnu-summonses, the guarantees for testimony and the penalties
pending evidence, as well as in the text-types that require individuals
to present another individual, such as the abāku-summonses and the
guarantees for an individual’s presence. The typological discussion of
25
The case may actually begin with an accusation against the messenger himself.
If this is so, then the messenger’s declaration is itself a counter-accusation.
these text-types demonstrated that the individuals who must meet the
requirements in these text-types are, in some cases, themselves accused
individuals. The exculpatory kunnu-summonses and the guarantees for
testimony obligate these accused individuals to substantiate their coun-
ter-accusations by “establishing the case” (kunnu). Similarly, the abāku-
summonses and the guarantees for an individual’s presence require the
accused individuals to present the individuals against whom they have
leveled the counter-accusation.
The typological discussion has already presented much of the
evidence supporting the correlation between the accused individual’s
answer to the accusation and the issuance of the kunnu-summonses
(section 5.A), the guarantees for testimony (section 5.B), the abāku-sum-
monses (section 6.A) and the guarantees for an individual’s presence
(section 6.B). Therefore, just one example will be cited. The example
is an excerpt from YOS 7, 35, a multi-part text pertaining to branded
livestock that has been found in the unlawful possession of mGimillu.26
m
Gimillu justifies his possession of a lamb and a ewe by saying that
he, in apparent innocence, received them as a deposit from a shepherd
named mMušēzib-Bēl. mGimillu is then required to establish the case
against mMušēzib-Bēl, whom he has accused of misappropriating the
sheep. The relevant section of the text reads:
14. u3 1-en pu- al 1 U8 ša2 mgi-mil-lu (14–15) And (as for) the lamb and the
15. iq-bu-u2 um-ma mmu-še-zib- ewe about which mGimillu said thus:
d
EN ip-te-qid “ mMušēzib-Bēl deposited (them with
me)”—
16. a-di U4 15-kam2 ša2 ITI ŠE (16–17) By 15 Addaru, mGimillu
m
gi-mil-lu mKAR-dEN shall establish (the case) against
17. u2-kan-na a-na E2.AN.NA m
Mušēzib-Bēl and give (the sheep) to
i-nam-din the Eanna.
18. ki-i la uk-tin-nu 60-šu e-e-nu (18) If he does not establish the case
a-na E.AN.NA i-nam-din (against him), mGimillu shall pay 60
sheep to the Eanna.
This excerpt illustrates how a kunnu-summons might be the immediate
result of a counter-accusation. Although mGimillu has claimed that he
is innocent by accusing mMušēzib-Bēl, mGimillu will not be considered
26
This is not the notoriously corrupt official with the same name, who also plays
a role in this text; it is he who brings the initial accusation. For more on this text, see
von Bolla, ArOr 12 (1941), pp. 113–115.
282 chapter nine
innocent until he can establish the case against mMušēzib-Bēl. If mGi-

millu cannot establish the case, then he remains liable for the 30-fold
payment for the misappropriated sheep.
9.F “Establishing the Case”: kunnu
Mere accusations are not sufficient cause for the Eanna authorities to
impose a penalty upon accused individuals; the accuser must “establish
the case” (kunnu) against the accused. This requirement is illustrated in
the following excerpt from YOS 6, 123:
1. 5 UDU.MEŠ ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 (1–3) 5 sheep belonging to the
UNUGki ša2 kak-kab-tu4 še-en-du Lady-of-Uruk, branded with a star,
2. ša2 ina e-e-ni ša2 mki-na-a A-šu2 which were seen in the flock of
ša2 mdU.GUR-ina-SU 3-¢SURÜ m
Kīnaya son of mNergal-ina-tēšê-ē ir
3. A mdan-ne-e-a am-ra-a-ma descendant of Dannea—
m
NUMUN-ia A-šu2
4. ša2 mTIN-su lu2NA.KAD ša2 (3–5) about 3 of which mZēriya, son
d
GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki 3 ina of mBalāssu, the herdsman of the
lib3-bi Lady-of-Uruk said thus:
5. iq-bu-u2 um-ma ina sa-ar2-ti ul-tu (5–6) “They were led away from my
e-ni-ia flock in theft.”
6. ab-ka-a ina UKKIN a-na mki- (6) In the assembly, he established
na-a u2-kin-nu (the case) against mKīnaya.
7. 1-en 30. MEŠ e-e-ni ra-bi-ti ina (7–8) They decided that mKīnaya
UGU mki-na-a must pay 30-fold for the full-grown
8. par-su sheep.
This excerpt describes the initiation of the case with mZēriya’s accusa-
tion that the sheep found in mKīnaya’s flock were actually stolen. The
verb qabû is used to describe the procedure of accusation. The verb
kunnu denotes a separate action of “establishing the case” that occurs
only after the initial accusation has been made. The narrative in YOS
6, 123 implies that the penalty is imposed upon mKīnaya as a result of
this second action, and not simply on the basis of the accusation.
The connection between the counter-accusation and the issuance of
kunnu-summonses (see section 9.E above) demonstrates the need for a
case to be “established” before a penalty can be imposed. This need
is also reflected in another text-type, the penalties pending evidence
(see section 5.C above). Texts of this text-type come mostly from the
Eanna archives. They impose a penalty upon accused individuals should

a witness or informer establish the case against them. The typological
discussion (s.c) suggested that these texts might be the result of accu-
sations that are not accompanied by sufficient evidence. The accusers
have stated their accusations, but, once the cases come to trial, they
cannot establish their case. Thus, only accusations remain at the end
of this trial. They will result in a penalty only once additional evidence
can be presented.
In the Eanna, the actual procedure denoted by the verb kunnu
resembles the procedure of the same name described in the previous
chapter (section 8.E above). It seems to have entailed the presentation
of oral testimony (mukinnūtu). The verb kunnu often describes an action
that takes place in the presence of the Eanna assembly.27 In some of
these texts, the statement described by the verb kunnu is made under
oath28 or as the result of questioning (ša ālu).29 However, not all instances
of the verb kunnu indicate that the testimony was given under oath or
following interrogation.
In addition to oral testimony, written evidence may also be presented
as part of this stage of the trial. One text states that the authorities “see”
(amāru) a document.30 The authorities may also “read” (šasû) documents
themselves,31 or the documents may be read “before” (ma ar) or “in the
presence of ” the authorities.32
One interesting example that sheds some additional light on how the
kunnu procedure takes place in the Eanna occurs in AnOr 8, 56. This
text begins with a slavegirl’s declaration that she belongs to mLāqīpi.
Her claim, however, is contested by mBēl-lē i. His claim and the ensuing
action by the authorities are described as follows:
27
YOS 6, 123:6; YOS 6, 231:9–10; YOS 6, 156:8–20; AnOr 8, 47:18–19 (mār banî);
YOS 7, 78:11–13; YOS 7, 97:10–12; Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2:1; Spar, AOAT 203, No.
2:13; YOS 7, 140:21–22. In YOS 7, 7:56–57; YOS 7, 7:69–70; YOS 7, 7:91–94 the
presence of the assembly is mentioned. Note, however, that in the following sections of
YOS 7, 7, the verb kunnu occurs without the mention of the assembly: YOS 7, 7:49;
YOS 7, 7:106–107; YOS 7, 7:137–138; YOS 7, 7:145; YOS 7, 7:106–107; YOS 7,
7:113–114; YOS 7, 7:128–129.
28
YOS 6, 231:9–10; YOS 6, 156:13–14; YOS 7, 140:21–22.
29
YOS 6, 156:8–20; AnOr 8, 47:18–19.
30
YOS 7, 91.
31
YOS 6, 116:10.
32
YOS 19, 92 (ina DU.ZU); TCL 12, 119:10–14; BIN 2, 134:41 (restored).
284 chapter nine
7. u EN-le-e 2-u2 ša2 si-im-
md lu2 lu2
(7–10) And mBēl-lē i, the deputy
ma-gir of the simmagir sent testimony to
8. IGI-ut2-tu a-na mdNA3-DU- m
Nabû-mukīn-apli the šatammu of
IBILA lu2ŠA3.TAM E2.AN. the Eanna and mNabû-a a-iddin the
NA administrator of the Eanna thus:
9. u mdNA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2EN pi- (10) “She is my slavegirl.”
qit-tu4 E2.AN.NA
10. iš-pu-ru um-ma fqal-lat-a iš-ši-i
11. md
NA3-DU-IBILA u3 mdNA3- (11–14) mNabû-mukīn-apli and
ŠEŠ-MU m
Nabû-a a-iddin gave fAbi-ūl-tīdi
12. fa-bi-ul-ti-di a-na mMU-dNA3 to mIddin-Nabû son of mRīmūt, the
A-šu2 ša2 mri-mut messenger of mBēl-lē i, based on the
13. A-KIN ša2 mdEN-DA ina
lu2
testimony of mBēl-lē i the deputy of
IGI-ut-tu2 ša2 mdEN-DA the simmagir . . .
14. lu22-u2 ša2 lu2si-im-ma-gir id-di-
nu . . .
m
Bēl-lē i claims that the slavegirl belongs to him. The text uses the word
mukinnūtu (“testimony”) to describe his claim, but does not use the verb
qabû or kunnu to introduce his statement. Instead, the text states that
m
Bēl-lē i has “sent” (šapāru) his testimony with a “messenger” ( lu2A-KIN=
mār šipri ). Even though it is clear that mBēl-lē i himself does not appear
in court, the text quotes his claim in the first person, as if he himself
were speaking. This fact apparently indicates that mBēl-lē i’s own words
have been written down in a document that the messenger brings before
the authorities. Although this text seems to be exceptional, it neverthe-
less demonstrates that the individual giving “testimony” (mukinnūtu) did
not have to actually appear in court.
9.G Questioning and Interrogation: ša ālu and maš altu
The texts from the Eanna describe two procedures by which the authori-
ties may confront accused individuals in order to obtain information
from them. These two procedures are designated by the verb ša ālu
and the noun maš altu. The ša ālu procedure is similar to the procedure
described by the same verb in the texts from private archives (see sec-
tion 8.H above). The verb usually describes how the authorities ques-
tion the accused,33 although the authorities may also question anyone
33
YOS 6, 225; TCL 12, 119; YOS 6, 156; YOS 7, 128; YOS 7, 149; YOS 7, 140;
YOS 7, 146. CT 2, 2 describes the questioning of two suspects in the Ebabbar at Sippar.
who can provide relevant information.34 The verb may occur alone,35
or may include a quotation of the question posed.36 The individual
who is questioned may be summoned before the questioning.37 The
individual’s response may be quoted, introduced by the verb qabû38 or
by the verb kunnu.39 Sometimes, but not always, the ša ālu procedure
results in testimony under oath.40
In addition to the procedure denoted by the verb ša ālu, which seems
to denote a questioning procedure similar to the one described in texts
from private archives, the Eanna texts also attest to a procedure des-
ignated by the noun maš altu (“interrogation”). A good example comes
from YOS 6, 144, a summons to present a number of thieves to the
administrator of the Eanna, who will “conduct their interrogation”
(maš alta šakānu).41 The text reads as follows:
1. mUTU-ki-i-ni lu2sa-ar-ru ša2 6-ta (1–4) mNergal-īpuš, the guard,
GU4 AB2.GAL.MEŠ caught mŠamaš-kīni, the criminal,
2. ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki ina sa- who, in theft, led away 6 cows
ar2-ti ul-tu GU4 AB2.GAL.MEŠ belonging to the Lady-of-Uruk
md
NA3-na-din-MU from the cows of mNabû-
3. A-šu2 ša2 map-la-a lu2SIPA-u2 ša2 nādin-šumi son of mAplaya, the
d
GAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i-bu-ku shepherd of the Lady-of-Uruk.
4. U.GUR-DU3-uš lu2EN.NUN i -
md
bat-ma a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3

5. SAG-LUGAL lu2EN pi-
lu2
(4–7) He sent him to mNabû-šarra-
<<pi>>-qit-tu4 ša2 E2.AN.NA u ur, the ša rēš šarri administrator
m
gab-bi-DINGIR.MEŠ-LUGAL- of the Eanna, to mGabbi-ilī-šarra-
URI3 u ur, the qīpu official of the Eanna
6. lu2qi-i-pi ša2 E2.AN.NA u3 lu2EN. and to the administrators of the
MEŠ pi-qit-tan-ni-tu4 Eanna.
7. ša2 E2.AN.NA iš-pur-aš2-šu u3
md
NA3-LUGAL-URI3 a-na
34
YOS 19, 91 (owner of slave in question); TCL 13, 170 (guards associated with
suspected guard).
35
TCL 12, 119:9–10; AnOr 8, 47:18–19; YOS 7, 149:11–12; YOS 7, 146:15–16;
YOS 7, 140:9–11.
36
YOS 19, 91:21–23; YOS 6, 225:9–11; YOS 7, 128:21–23; TCL 13, 170:14–16.
37
YOS 19, 91; YOS 6, 225; TCL 12, 119; YOS 7, 128; YOS 7, 140.
38
YOS 19, 91; YOS 6, 225; YOS 7, 149; YOS 7, 146; YOS 7, 140.
39
AnOr 8, 47 (qabû + kunnu); YOS 7, 128.
40
YOS 6, 156:8–14; TCL 13, 170:19.
41
For a similar example of an order from the Eulmaš at Akkad, see Michael Jursa,
“Akkad, das Eulmaš und Gubāru,” WZKM 86 (1996), pp. 197–211.
286 chapter nine
8. md
NA3-DU-A lu2GAL-SI.MEŠ (7–8) mNabû-šarra-u ur handed
id-din-uš-šu2 um-ma him over to mNabû-mukīn-apli,
the rab ešerti saying thus:
9. a-lik-ma lu2sa-ar2-ru-tu ša2 it-ti-šu2 (9) “Go! Let him tell you (the names
lu-kal-lim-ka-ma DU-ka of ) the criminals who were with
him and confirm (them) for you!”
10. UTU-ki-i-ni iq-bu-u2 um-ma
md
(10) mŠamaš-kīni said thus:
EN-I u mdEN-ŠEŠ-ME-BA-ša2
md
(10–12) “mBēl-na id and mBēl-
11. A.MEŠ ša2 m a-am-ma-ru-ru u a ē-iqīša sons of m ammaruru
m
ri- e-e-tu4 A-šu2 ša2 m a-gi-ra- and mRi ētu son of m agira were
with me.”
12. it-ti-ia mdNA3-DU-A mdUTU-ki- (12–15) mNabû-mukīn-apli shall
i-ni lu2sa-ar2-ru bring mŠamaš-kīni, the criminal,
13. u lu2sa-ar2-ru-tu ša2 it-ti-šu2 ib-ba- and the criminals who were with
kan2-ma him to mNabû-šarra-u ur the ša rēš
14. a-na mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 šarri official and the administrators
lu2
SAG.LUGAL u lu2EN.MEŠ of the Eanna.
pi-qit-tan-ne-e-tu4 (15–16) He will carry out their
15. ša2 E2.AN.NA ib-ba-kam-ma ma- interrogation.
ša2-al-ta-šu2-nu
16. i-šak-kan
m
Šamaš-kīni, a thief, is caught and brought before the administrator of
the Eanna. The administrator hands the thief to mNabû-mukīn-apli,
and the thief names three other accomplices to the crime. The maš altu
procedure, performed by the administrator, will take place when mNabû-
mukīn-apli brings all four thieves.
In order to better understand this procedure, one may turn to a
number of texts from the Eanna at Uruk that have the word maš altu
in their headings.42 One such example is YOS 6, 223:
1. ma-ša2-a-a-al-tu4 ša2 mMU-dSU (1–2) Interrogation of mIddin-
A-šu2 ša2 mDU3-dINNIN Ištar son of mIbni-Ištar (during)
2. ša2 iq-bu-u2 um-ma 8 ½ GIN2 gir2- which he said as follows:
u2 KU3.GI ina ŠU2.2 lu2ERIN.ME (2–3) “8 ½ šeqel and 1 gerû of
3. a-na KU3.BABBAR an-da- ar u3 gold I purchased from the people
a-na KU3.BABBAR a-na lu2ERIN. for silver, and I sold to the people
ME at-ta-din for silver.”43
YOS 6, 77; YOS 6, 137; YOS 6, 223; VAS, Neue Folge 4, No. 126; YOS 7, 42.
42
Note the discrepancy between the sum in line 2 (8 ¹³⁄²⁴ šeqel of gold) and the tally
43
of the sums enumerated (9 5⁄16). See San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 295 n. 2.
4. lu2
ŠA3.TAM u lu2UMBISAG.ME (4–5) The šatammu and the scribes
ša2 E2.AN.NA a-na mMU-dSU of the Eanna said thus to mIddin-
5. iq-bu-u2 um-ma KU3.GI ma-la ina Ištar:
ŠU.2 lu2ERIN.ME (5–6) “Tell us whatever gold you
6. ta-am- u-ru u3 a-na lu2ERIN.ME purchased from the people and
ta-ad-di-nu KA2.MEŠ qi2-ba-an- the specific amounts you gave to
na-šu2 people.”
7. mMU-dSU iq-bi (7–8) mIddin-Ištar said thus:
8. um-ma ½ GIN2 mi-šil bit-qa KU3. (8–9) “I received ½ šeqel and
GI ina ŠU.2 mdNA3-PAP half of one eighth of a šeqel of
9. A-šu2 ša2 mŠEŠ.ME-MU an-da- gold from mNabû-nā ir son of
ar 3-ta 4-tu2.ME ina ŠU.2 m
A ē-iddin.”
10. mina-SU 3-SUR A-šu2 ša2 mIR3- (9–10) “I received ¾ (šeqel)
ia2 an-da- ar from mIna-tešê-ē ir son of
m
Ardiya.”
11. 2 GIN2 KU3.GI ina ŠU.2 mdEN- (11–12) “I received 2 šeqel of
ŠEŠ-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- gold from mBēl-a a-šubši son of
BA-ša2 m
Nabû-iqīša in Babylon.”
12. ina TIN.TIRki an-da- ar
13. 1 GIN2 KU3.GI ina ŠU.2 mdNA3- (13–14) “I received 1 šeqel of
DU-NUMUN lu2KU3.DIM gold from mNabû-mukīn-zēri,
14. an-da- ar the goldsmith.”
15. KU3.GI ša2 mMU-dSU iq-bu-u2 (15–16) This is the gold about
um-ma a-na KU3.BABBAR which mIddin-Ištar said thus: “I
16. a-na lu2ERIN.ME at-ta-din sold it for silver to the people.”
17. 3 GIN2 KU3.GI a-na mda-nim- (17) 3 šeqel of gold to mAnim-
ŠEŠ-MU A-šu2 ša2 mmu-še-zib a a-iddin son of mMušēzib.
18. 2 GIN2 KU3.GI a-na mdNA3-mu- (18–19) 2 šeqel of gold to
še-tiq-UD.DA A-šu2 m
Nabû-mušētiq-uddê son of
19. ša2 mdAMAR.UTU-MU-DU3 m
Marduk-šuma-ibni.
20. ITI DIRI ŠE.KIN.KUD U4 (20–21) 4 Addaru II, year 12 of
4-kam2 MU 12-kam2 dNA3- Nabonidus, king of Babylon.
IM.TUK
21. LUGAL TIN.TIRki
After the heading, which indicates that mIddin-Ištar is being interro-
gated,44 the text records his statement. Following his initial statement,
44
This is the usual meaning of ma-ša2-a-a-al-tu4 ša2 PN. However, note that in YOS 6,
137:1 the phrase clearly means “interrogation by PN (of another individual).” This can
be seen from lines 12–13, in which PN, a ša rēš šarri, interrogates the two thieves.
288 chapter nine
the text records the officials’ demand that he give a detailed account45
of the gold he handled. mIddin-Ištar names the people from whom he
received gold and specifies the amounts he received and then names the
people to whom he sold gold for silver and specifies the amounts he sold.
As San Nicolò has noted in his initial study of the maš altu texts, it is
always an accused individual who is subject to the procedure in texts
that bear this heading.46 Thus, in YOS 6, 223, the example above,
the procedure takes place because mIddin-Ištar has been accused of
mishandling gold belonging to the Eanna.47 The record of the maš altu
procedure may include a quotation of the accused individual’s confes-
sion, as in the case above. However, at least one text with the heading
maš altu, YOS 6, 77, simply lists the items that are obtained as the result
of the interrogation of a gatekeeper. Therefore, it seems that the purpose
of the maš altu procedure is not only to obtain a confession, but also to
obtain goods that have been misappropriated or stolen.
The texts presented thus far do not describe how the maš altu proce-
dure achieves its desired ends. In attempting to address this question, San
Nicolò associates the maš altu texts with the fact that in almost all cases
pertaining to theft or misappropriation from the Eanna, the accused
individual confesses to the crime. Based on this, San Nicolò suggests
that the Eanna authorities use physical torture to obtain confessions and
that the noun maš altu refers to this procedure.48 More recently, Jursa
has confirmed San Nicolò’s suggestion by pointing to Seleucid era texts
that mention a device called simmiltu ša maš alti (“ladder of interroga-
tion”) in the context of a procedure involving judges.49 Although the
45
For this interpretation of the logogram KA2.MEŠ, see CAD bābu A6a (B, p. 26).
46
47
See San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), pp. 294–298. For other inquiries into the handling
of gold in the Eanna that took place later in the same month of the same year see
Renger, JAOS 90 (1971), pp. 501–503.
48
San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 72; pp. 301–302. San Nicolò suggests that the term
eli ramnišu kunnu (“to establish about oneself ”), which frequently occurs in Eanna decision
records, refers to confessions obtained in a maš altu procedure. One might expect, then,
that the term would appear in the maš altu texts, as well. The term, however, occurs
only once in a text labeled maš altu, (YOS 7, 42:11–12). Even in this text, there are two
other statements that are introduced by qabû, rather than eli ramnišu kunnu. Furthermore,
both AnOr 8, 27 and YOS 7, 78 describe confessions made ša lā maš alti (“without
interrogation”). It is, therefore, difficult to say that all confessions described by the term
eli ramnišu kunnu are obtained through torture. Rather, the frequency of confessions
might be attributed to the accused individual’s desire to avoid torture.
49
Jursa, WZKM 86 (1996), p. 199. See also Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., His-
tory, p. 924. It should be noted that stronger evidence for the use of the “ladder of
interrogation” in the Neo-Babylonian and Persian eras would be desirable.
references occur in much later texts, Jursa suggests that the “ladder”
was used in the Eanna already in earlier times.
It has already been noted that the texts with the term maš altu in their
headings describe a procedure involving the Eanna authorities and an
individual accused of a crime. Two other texts, YOS 7, 78 and AnOr
8, 27, record confessions by individuals who have been accused but
who make their statements ša2 la maš alti (“without interrogation”).50 In
these texts, it seems that the procedure might have been used against
the accused individuals but, in actual fact, is not. The phrase ša2 la ma-
ša2-a-a-al-tu4 (“without interrogation”) also occurs in YOS 7, 10:2. In
this text, it introduces a statement by a slave who accuses his master’s
son of stealing a cumin mill. The text itself does not indicate that the
slave has been accused of any crime, but the term ša2 la ma-ša2-a-a-al-
tu4 (“without interrogation”) suggests that the maš altu procedure would
have been carried out if it had been necessary. Given the possibility that
the maš altu procedure involved torture, it is difficult (but not impossible)
to imagine that it would have been used against innocent witnesses.
Instead, the implication that maš altu would have been used suggests that
the slave in YOS 7, 10 and the individuals in YOS 7, 78 and AnOr 8,
27 are not entirely beyond suspicion.
Because the Eanna texts employ both the noun maš altu and the
related verb ša ālu, one question that must be addressed is the relation-
ship between the two terms. There are texts that include both the noun
and the verb, in which the verb ša ālu describes the action of maš altu.51
One might conclude, therefore, that the verb ša ālu, even without
the noun maš altu, refers to a maš altu procedure. There are, however,
several factors that suggest that the noun maš altu refers to a specific
procedure that is different from the procedure described by the verb
ša ālu alone. First, as has already been noted, the maš altu procedure,
unlike the verb ša ālu, has the specific goal of obtaining a confession
and the misappropriated items, and thus probably involved torture of
the accused. Furthermore, as San Nicolò has suggested, the existence
of a separate term maš altu šakānu seems to indicate that it refers to a
procedure that is different from the procedure denoted by ša ālu.52 Based
on these factors it seems that maš altu refers to a specific interrogation
50
YOS 7, 78:3; AnOr 8, 27:4.
51
YOS 6, 77:28; YOS 6, 137; Jursa, WZKM 86 (1996), pp. 197–211:4.
52
290 chapter nine
procedure. This procedure is different from the procedure described

by ša ālu alone, which refers to questioning that takes place during the
regular course of a hearing.53
In sum, ša ālu and maš altu refer to two procedures by which the
adjudicating authorities obtain information. The general term is the
verb ša ālu, which describes the “interrogation” of different parties to
a case during the course of a trial. The related noun maš altu refers to
a specific procedure used to obtain confessions from accused individu-
als. This procedure is attested in a more limited set of texts and may
have taken place as part of the gathering of physical evidence, even
before the trial itself.54
9.H Oaths
The terms for swearing an oath in the Eanna texts resemble those
mentioned in the previous chapter’s discussion of oaths in the texts
from private archives (see section 8.I above). The terms used in the
Eanna texts include nīš ilī [u šarri ] zakāru (“to pronounce the oath of
the gods [and the king])55 and ina DN u adê ša RN temû (“to swear by
DN and the oaths of RN”).56 As is the case with the texts from private
archives, the words of the actual oath are usually quoted, and may be
introduced by the term iqbi umma (“said thus”) or by the word kî. The
oath itself may be formulated in either the “positive” form, which
implies that the statement made is true, or the “negative” form, which
implies that the opposite of what is stated is true.57
Oaths administered during the course of proceedings serve one of
two functions. In some cases, the oaths have an evidentiary function;
they serve as a means of obtaining information to be used as evidence
in deciding the case. In other cases, individuals may be summoned to
swear an oath in response to an accusation. In these situations the oaths
serve an exculpatory function; by swearing, the individuals attempt to
clear themselves of the charge.
53
This conclusion is reached by San Nicolò, ArOr 5 (1933), p. 301 and echoed in
Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 922.
54
For this suggestion, see Oelsner, et al., in Westbrook, ed., History, p. 922.
55
YOS 6, 224:19–20; TCL 13, 170:18–19. The variant nīš DN zakāru occurs in
TCL 13, 179:14–15.
56
An example of this basic formula occurs in YOS 7, 152:1–4. Variations include
ina DN u RN temû (TCL 13, 181:9–10).
57
Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 171.
The evidentiary function of the oath is illustrated by YOS 6, 224, a

preliminary protocol that describes the proceedings regarding mŠamaš-
šuma-iddin’s status as an oblate as follows:
15. . . . mdUTU-MU-MU iq-bi (15–16) mŠamaš-šuma-iddin said
thus:
16. um-ma fba-bu-nu DUMU.SAL-su (16–18) “ f Babūnu daughter of
ša2 mSUM.NA-dAMAR.UTU m
Iddin-Marduk is aware of the
17. e-e-mu ša2 fsi-lim-dINNIN AMA- matter of fSilim-Ištar, my mother,
ia u3 f ar-ši-na-na AMA AMA-ia and f aršinana my mother’s
18. ar- a-at ina ŠU.2 ur- a-a-ni mother. Find out from her!”
lu2
GAR.UMUŠ UNUGki lu2ŠA3.
TAM E2.AN.NA
19. u3 lu2SAG.LUGAL fba-bu-nu i-bu- (18–19) The šākin ēmi of Uruk, the
ku-nim-ma niš DINGIR.MEŠ u3 šatammu of the Eanna and the ša
LUGAL rēš šarri brought fBabūnu to them.
20. i-na UKKIN ta-az-za-ku-ur ki-i (19–20) She swore by the gods
a-na-ku kak-kab-ti u3 ar2-ra-a-tu4 and the king in the assembly:
21. ina mu - i rit-ti ša2 f ar-ši-na-na (20–24) “(May I be cursed if ) I
f
qal-lat ša2 mSUM.NA-NUMUN did not see the star and brand
22. ŠEŠ AD-ia AMA AMA ša2 on the hand of f aršinana the
md
UTU-MU-MU ša2 mSUM. slavegirl of mIddin-zēri, my
NA-NUMUN ŠEŠ AD-ia father’s brother, mŠamaš-šuma-
23. i-na pa-na-at ša2 tul-la-du a-na iddin’s mother’s mother, whom
lu2
šir-ku-tu a-na m
Iddin-zēri, my father’s brother,
24. dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki u2-zak-ku- dedicated to the širku service of
šu2 la a-mu-ru the Lady-of-Uruk, before she
gave birth.”
Prompted by mŠamaš-šuma-iddin, the šatammu and the administrator of
the Eanna “bring” (abāku) fBabūnu in order to determine mŠamaš-šuma-
iddin’s status. She makes this determination by swearing that she has
seen the brands on mŠamaš-šuma-iddin’s grandmother’s hand. In this
particular example, mBabūnu’s oath is purely evidentiary. She is brought
before the authorities simply in order to provide information.
In contrast with the evidentiary function of the oath illustrated by
YOS 6, 224, the oath in the following decision record has an exculpa-
tory function. Two copies of the decision record exist and are edited
as YOS 6, 169 and YOS 6, 231. The relevant section of the text reads
as follows:58
58
Line numbering follows YOS 6, 231. The text is a composite transcription.
292 chapter nine
1. 2 UDU ka-lum ina lib3-bi 1 (1–5) 2 lambs, one branded with a

ša2 kak-kab-ti še-en-di star, and 1 goat. Total: 3 sheep, which
2. u3 1 MAŠ2-TUR PAP 3 m
Zumbu son of mNanaya-ēreš, the
UDU.NITA2 ša2 mzu-um-bu herdsman of the Lady-of-Uruk led
3. A-šu2 ša2 mdna-na-a-KAM away from the flock of mA i-līti son
lu2
NA.KAD ša2 dGAŠAN ša2 of mIlūya-kīni, and (said) thus:
UNUGki
4. ul-tu e-e-nu ša2 mŠEŠ-li-ti-
5. A-šu2 ša2 mDINGIR.MEŠ-ia-
ki-ni i-bu-ku um-ma
6. UDU.NITA2 ša2 dGAŠAN (6) “They are sheep of the Lady-of-
ša2 UNUGki ša2 qa-pu-ut-ti-ia2 Uruk from my pen.”
šu2-nu
7. m
ŠEŠ-li-ti- ina UKKIN iq-bi (7) mA i-līti said thus in the assembly:
um-ma
8. m
ba-zu-zu lu2SIPA ša2 mzu-um- (8–9) “mBazūzu, mZumbu’s shepherd
bu ina pa-[ni-ia] deposited them with [me].”
9. ip-te-qid-su-nu-tu mba-zu-zu (9–11) They brought mBazūzu and,
i-bu-ku-nim-ma in the assembly, he swore by the god
10. ina UKKIN niš DINGIR u3 and the king, and established against
LUGAL iz-ku-ur-[ma] m
A i-līti :
11. mŠEŠ-li-ti- u2-kin ki-i
12. UDU.NITA2 a-na mŠEŠ-li-ti- (11–13) “(May I be cursed if ) I gave
at-[ta-din] m
A i-līti any sheep or deposited
13. u3 ina pa-ni-šu2 ap-qi-du anything with him.”
The authorities “bring” (abāku) mBazūzu to the assembly because mA i-
līti has named him as the one who removed the sheep from mZumbu’s
flock and deposited them with mA i-līti . mBazūzu swears that he has not
given any sheep to mA i-līti , and thus clears himself of the charge.
The examples above of both the evidentiary and exculpatory oaths
show that the authorities might “bring” (abāku) the individual who is
to swear an oath. Apart from the use of this verb in descriptions of
proceedings, summoning to swear an oath is also attested in a group of
summonses, mostly from outside the Eanna, in which the summoned
individual must swear an oath or face a penalty.59 The imposition of
the penalty in these summonses implies that the oath is exculpatory,
like the one in the second example above.
59
Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268; Nbn 954; YOS 6, 202; Dar 358.
Besides “bringing” the individual who is to swear, the authorities

might also play a role in the actual administration of the oath. Several
texts use the Š-stem form of the verb zakāru (šuzkuru) to indicate that the
authorities caused the individual to take an oath.60 For some insight into
the implications of this causative form, one might turn to Spar, AOAT
203, No. 1, which describes how the authorities order an individual to
swear. The relevant section of the text reads as follows:
8. NA3-ŠEŠ-MU lu2SAG.
md
(8–10) mNabû-a a-iddin the ša rēš
LUGAL lu2EN pi-qit-tu4 E2.AN. šarri administrator of the Eanna
NA said thus to mŠullumu son of
9. a-na mšul-lu-mu A-šu2 ša2 m
Nabû-mukīn-apli:
10. mdNA3-DU-IBILA iq-bi um-ma
11. i-na mku-ra-aš2 LUGAL TIN. (11–12) “Swear by Cyrus king of
TIRki Babylon, king of the lands:”
12. LUGAL KUR.KUR ti-me ki-i (12–13) ‘(May I be cursed if )
DUMU-u2-a I have seen my son who has
13. ša2 ta-bal i-ta-ba-lu a-mu-ru stolen!’ ”
The šatammu and the administrator of the Eanna order mŠullumu
to swear that he has not seen his son. Their instructions include the
formulation of the oath itself as mŠullumu is to swear it, with the verb
(āmuru) in the first person singular. This text seems to describe the oath
procedure as it is taking place, and indicates that the procedure begins
with an order by the authorities.61 The causative form that occurs in
other texts may refer to just such an order.
Other details about how the oath was administered, such as the
use of religious symbols in invoking the gods, have been discussed by
Joannès.62 To conclude the present discussion of the oath, as well as
the discussion of evidence, in general, it is useful to present Joannès’s
observations about the place of oaths within the hierarchy of evidence.
Joannès demonstrates that witnesses’ testimony and other evidence
outweigh the evidence of an oath. Joannès proves that the testimony of
witnesses is preferred over an oath from YNER 1, 2, a penalty pending
60
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44:25’-26’; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46:19’–20’; YOS 6, 156:13–14.
Note that in all of these cases the oath occurs in the context of “interrogation”
(ša ālu).
61
Note, however, that mŠullumu’s own words do not match the oath as it is formulated
by the authorities. See Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), pp. 170–171.
62
Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), pp. 172–174. See also, Oelsner, et al., in
Westbrook, ed., History, pp. 924–925.
294 chapter nine
evidence text. This text begins with an oath sworn by mGimillu affirm-
ing that he has not sold or given away dates from the crop of year 1
of Darius. The text then states:
8. ina U4-mu lu2mu-kin-nu uk-te-nu-uš (8–10) On the day that a witness
1-en 30 establishes (the case) against him,
9. a-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki i- he shall pay 30-fold to the Lady-
nam-di-in of-Uruk. He shall bear the guilt of
10. i- u ša2 LUGAL i-šad-dad the king.
Even though mGimillu has sworn an oath, he has not, apparently,
cleared himself of guilt entirely. If testimony of a witness becomes
available, mGimillu will face the penalty. Thus, this text illustrates how
the evidentiary power of an oath does not stand up to the evidence
provided by witnesses.63
The proof that other evidence, and not just testimony, outweighs
an oath comes from the continuation of YOS 6, 169 and YOS 6,
231, cited earlier in this section. After mBazūzu, the shepherd who has
been accused of misappropriating the sheep, swears that he has done
no wrongdoing, the authorities rule against his accuser, mA i-līti . This
ruling is preceded by the following notice:
14. KA2 u3 i-da-ti (14–17) mA i-līti showed the
15. ša2 UDU.NITA2 ša2 mba-zu-zu assembly no accounts for
a-na mŠEŠ-li-ti-[ ] proof (indicating) that mBazūzu
16. ip-qi-du mŠEŠ-li-ti- a-na UKKIN deposited with mA i-līti .
17. la u2-kal-lim
The reason for the ruling against mA i-līti is the fact that he is unable
to “show” (kullumu) any “accounts for proof ” (bābu u idāti ) to support
his claim. This notice implies that if mAhi-līti had been able to present
such evidence, he would have succeeded in his claim.64
63
Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 169. For similar examples of penalties
pending evidence following an oath see AnOr 8, 61 and BIN 2, 116.
64
Joannès, Méditerranées 10–11 (1996), p. 169–170. Other examples of the use of
oaths in the absence of documentary evidence are presented in Oelsner, et al., in
Westbrook, History, p. 924.
9.I The Decision
Once the necessary evidence has been presented, the Eanna authorities
are able to reach their decision. Unlike the decision records pertaining to
private litigation, the “Eanna style” decision records do not use the verb
mitluku to describe a procedure in which the authorities “deliberate.”
However, logic alone would suggest that some deliberative procedure
does take place before the decision is reached. This suggestion is sup-
ported by the notice in Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101:18–26 that
the authorities reach their decision “in accordance with the testimony”
(kî pî mukinnūti ). By recording the basis for the decision, the text indi-
cates that the judges gave deliberate consideration to the evidence, in
this case the testimony.
The decision itself reflects the subject matter of the case.65 Because
most of the Eanna decision records pertain to cases of misappropria-
tion, the decision is usually the thirty-fold penalty. If, in the estimation
of the Eanna authorities, the accused individuals are found guilty of
misappropriating the Eanna’s property, the authorities impose the thirty-
fold penalty upon them. This decision is reached throughout YOS 7, 7,
the multi-part decision record pertaining to the misdeeds of mGimillu.
One example from that text reads as follows:
86. UD5-a 1 1-en 30 30 e-e-nu (86–87) (For) that 1 goat, they
87. e-li mgi-mil-lu ip-ru-su decided that mGimillu must pay 30-
fold: 30 of the flock.
The verbal phrase eli PN parāsu (“they decided that PN must pay,” or,
more literally, “they decided to the debit of PN”) denotes the decision
procedure, as it does in some decision records pertaining to private
litigation. The thirty-fold penalty itself is expressed with the term 1-en
30 (“30-fold”),66 followed by the total owed by the criminal.
The decision records end with the decision. They do not state whether
or not the parties actually comply with the decision. Based on the
discussion of the adjudication of disputes pertaining to private prop-
erty, one might imagine that the parties’ compliance would have been
recorded in a separate text-type, namely the conclusions. Unfortunately,
the records from the Eanna have not, as yet, yielded texts of this text-
65
See summary tables 1.3 and 1.4.
66
The term occurs with the addition of the word adi, in the form 1-en a-di 30 in
Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101:22 and YOS 7, 161:9.
296 chapter nine
type. Nevertheless, it seems likely that such texts did once exist, since
the need for this text-type probably existed in the Eanna, as it did in
other adjudicatory settings.
9.J The Adjudicating Authorities in the Eanna
In the Eanna decision records, the main authorities bear the titles
lu2
šatammu, lu2SAG.LUGAL lu2bēl piqitti and lu2qīpu. The names of these
adjudicating officials, along with their titles, occur in two places in the
decision records and preliminary protocols from the Eanna: within the
description of the proceedings and among the personal names recorded
at the beginning (“style B”) or the end (“style A”) of the texts. In “style
A” texts, the names of officials are sometimes introduced by the term ina
DU.ZU (= ušuzzu, “in the presence of ”).67 These specific officials often
function together with “the assembly of Babylonians and Urukians”
(UKKIN lu2TIN.TIRki.ME u lu2UNUGki-a-a),68 sometimes simply called
“the assembly” (UKKIN=pu ru).69
In addition to the authorities and the assembly, the Eanna texts also
record the names of individuals who are designated lu2mukinnū (“wit-
nesses”). The “Eanna style A” decision records may include both the
names of officials, which are introduced with the term ina DU.ZU (“in
the presence of ”), as well as names designated lu2mukinnū (“witnesses”).
In these texts, the names introduced by ina DU.ZU (“in the presence
of ”) precede the names designated lu2mukinnū (“witnesses”). 70 The
“Eanna style B” decision records begin with personal names followed
by the transitional phrase lu2mukinnū ša ina pānišunu (“the witnesses before
whom . . .”) or the equivalent lu2DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša2 ina pānišunu (“the
mār banî before whom . . .”).
The “Eanna style B” decision records bear a close resemblance to
other texts that open with a record of witnesses before whom an action
takes place. As has long been noted, most recently by von Dassow, the
purpose of documents written in this manner seems to be to record
67
See the discussion of the “Eanna style A” decision records (section 1.C above)
and summary tables 1.3 and 1.4. For a discussion of the term ina DU.ZU, see von
Dassow, “Witnesses,” p. 13.
68
See, for example, YOS 6, 92:21–22; YOS 7, 128:21–22; TCL 13, 147:8–13.
69
The equivalence between the two terms is implied in the use of the complete
term in YOS 7, 7:37–38 and the shorter term in the remainder of the text.
70
See, for example, Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101:27–34.
witnesses who could attest that a particular action or transaction was

performed.71 In the “Eanna style B” decision records, the action to which
the witnesses attest is the decision of a case. The witnesses, according
to this interpretation, are observers of a decision made “before” them.
There is, however, reason to believe that the witnesses play more than
the role of simple observers. For example, after the names of twelve
witnesses, YOS 19, 91 reads as follows:
12. lu2
MU.DU.MEŠ ša2 ina pa-ni- (12–21) The witnesses before
šu2-nu mdNA3-LUGAL-URI3 whom mNabû-šarra-u ur, the
lu2
SAG.LUGAL ša rēš šarri administrator of the
13. lu2
EN pi-qit-ti ša2 E2.AN.NA Eanna brought fIna-Esagil-bēlet
f
ina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let daughter of mNabû-zēra-šubši son
14. ¢DUMU.SALÜ-su ša2 mdNA3- of mAbi-ilu, before their assembly
NUMUN-GAL2-ši A-šu2 ša2 [rega]rding fBānītu-râmat, her
m
a-bi-i-lu slave, [whom] she [ded]icated to
15. [a-na] mu - i fdDU3-tu4-ra-mat the kalûtu-service to the Lady-of-
f
qal-lat-i-šu2 [Uruk]. And, among the children
16. [ša2] a-na lu2ka-lu-u2-tu2 a-na [to whom] fBānītu-râmat gave
d
GAŠAN ša2 [UNUGki] birth, mBāniya, son of mNabû-
17. [taš]-ru-ku u3 ina DUMU.MEŠ nā ir-apli, brother72 of fIna-Esagil-
[ša2] fd¢DU3-tuÜ-ra-mat bēlet, sold, fGāmiltu, her (fBānītu-
18. tu-li-du fga-mil-tu DUMU.SAL- râmat’s) daughter, to mNabû-
su mDU3-i[a] mušētiq-uddê son of mUmāšu for
19. A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3-PAP-A ŠEŠ ša2 silver.
f
ina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let
20. a-na mdNA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA
A-šu2 ša2 mu4-ma-a-šu a-na KU3.
BABBAR id-di-nu
21. a-na UKKIN-i-šu2-nu u2-bil-lam-
ma fina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let
22. iš- -al-u2-ma iq-bu-u2-šu2 um-ma (21–22) They questioned fIna-
mi-nu-u2 i-da-ti Esagil-bēlet, and said thus to her:
23. [ša2] fdDU3-tu4-ra-mat fqal-lat-ka (22–23) “What are the signs [that]
ši-i fina-E2.SAG.IL2-be-let f
Bānītu-râmat is your slave?”
71
See von Dassow, “Witnesses,” pp. 10–11. Von Dassow’s position is based on the
discussion of such lists in San Nicolò-Ungnad, pp. 607–609. See also Jursa, Neo-Baby-
lonian Legal and Administrative Documents, p. 10.
72 f
Ina-Esagil-bēlet’s father is mNabû-zēra-šubši (line 14). mBāniya’s father is mNabû-
nā ir-apli (line 19). Therefore, it seems that mBāniya is actually fIna-Esagil-bēlet’s
step-brother.
298 chapter nine
24. ina UKKIN-i-šu2-nu taq-bu-u2 (23–24) In their assembly, fIna-

um-ma ina MU 13-kam2 dNA3- Esagil-bēlet said thus:
NIG2.DU-URI3
25. LUGAL TIN.TIRki MU.AN. (24–33) “In year 13 of
NA ša2 u-zi-ra-tu4 mdNA3- Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon,
NUMUN-GAL2-ši the year of the uzirtu-insects,
26. AD-u2-a fdDU3-tu4-ra-mat lu2qal- m
Nabû-zēra-šubši, my father, gave
lat-su a-na nu-dun-nu-u2 me fBānītu-râmat, his slave as my
27. id-dan-na u ana-ku ina ud lib3-bi- nudunnû, and I, of my own volition,
ia2 a-na ka-lu-tu4 gave her to the kalûtu-service of
28. ¢aÜ-na dGAŠAN ša2 UNUGki the La dy-of-Uruk . . . they a dded
al-ta-rak-šu2 [X-X]-šu2 ša2 a-na (?) her (to the rosters) of the
29. [dGAŠAN] ša2 UNUGki u-ra?- [Lady]-of-Uruk. She gave birth
di?-u2- šu2 3 DUMU.MEŠ 2 to 3 children—2 males and [one
NITA.MEŠ femal]e, among (them) fGāmiltu,
30. [1 SA]L ta-at-ta-lad ina ŠA3 fga- [whom mBāniy]a son of mNabû-
mil-tu2 nā ir-apli, my brother, sold
31. [ša2 mDU3-i ]a A-šu2 ša2 mdNA3- fraudulently to mNabû-mušētiq-
PAP-A ŠEŠ-ia [uddê f ]or s ilver.”
32. [. . .] ina šur-qu a-na mdNA3-mu-še-
tiq-[UD.DA]
33. [ a]-na KU3.BABBAR it-ta-din
md
NA3-mu-še-tiq-UD.DA
34. [. . .] tu4 ul ra-ši fga-mil-tu (33) mNabû-mušētiq-uddê . . .
35. [. . .]-ti it-ti dGAŠAN ša2 (34) h as n o . . . fGāmiltu
¢UNUGkiÜ (35) . . . with t he La dy-of Ur uk
Following Beaulieu’s understanding, lines 33–35, although damaged,
contain a decision,73 for which this text is considered among the “Eanna
style B” decision records. The prepositional phrase ina pānišunu in line
12 suggests, as has already been mentioned, that the witnesses simply
observe the proceedings overseen by the ša rēš šarri administrator. How-
ever, the fact that the administrator is the only authority named raises
difficulties in interpreting the plural possessives at the end of the word
UKKIN-i-šu2-nu (“in their assembly”) in lines 21 and 24. The witnesses
themselves must be the members of this assembly. The defendant is
brought before them and it is they who question her.
A similar situation is described in YOS 7, 128, another “Eanna style
B” decision record. Instead of the designation lu2mu-kin-nu following
73
For discussion, see Beaulieu, YOS 19, pp. 3–4. Note that Beaulieu designates this
text as a “deposition.” This book reserves that term for texts containing only testimony.
the personal names, this text uses the equivalent transitional sentence
lu2
DUMU.DU3.MEŠ ša ina pānišunu (“the mār banî before whom . . .”). The
interrogation of the defendant is described thus (lines 21–24):
21. UKKIN lu2DUMU TIN. (21–22) The assembly of Babylonians and
TIR u UNUGki lu2ki-niš-tu4 Urukians, the collegium of the Eanna
E2.AN.NA mEN-šu2-nu brought mBēlšunu, and questioned him in
22. i-bu-ku-nim-ma ina UKKIN the assembly, saying thus:
iš-ša2-al-lu-ma iq-bu-šu2 um-
ma
23. mi-nam-ma UDU. I.A ša2 (23) “What iron-starred sheep did you lead
kak-kab-tu4 AN.BAR tab-¢uk away and kill?”
ta-nakÜ-kis
In lines 21–22, the body that “brings” (abālu) the defendant is called “the
assembly of Babylonians and Urukians, the collegium of the Eanna.”
They question him “in the assembly” (ina UKKIN). From these lines
alone, it would seem that the mār banî named at the beginning of the
decision record are simply observers of the assembly’s questioning and
the decision. However, it appears (despite breaks in lines 28–30) that
the decision is made by a body known as UKKIN lu2DUMU.DU3 (“the
assembly of the mār banî ”). It seems, therefore, that the mār banî form
at least part, if not all, of the assembly who question the defendant
and come to the decision.74
Closer examination of the evidence of the “Eanna style B” decision
records reveals the adjudicating role of the individuals designated as
either lu2mukinnū or lu2mār banî. Thus, the role of the named individuals
in these texts is not the same as the role of the named individuals in
other, formally-similar types of texts. The named individuals are not
simply there to observe and attest to the decision that was made. In the
“Eanna style B” records, at least, the named individuals were among
those who actually decided the case.
Like the “Eanna style B” decision records, the “Eanna style A” deci-
sion records also name individuals designated as lu2mukinnū. One might
suggest that these individuals, like the ones in the “Eanna style B” deci-
sion records, also served in some adjudicating capacity. For example,
in Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101, the text separates the witnesses,
74
Additional support for the identity of the “assembly of the mār banî ” and the
“assembly” mentioned in lines 21–22 may come from the restoration of line 24. Based
on Tremayne’s drawing, the line may be restored mEN-šu2-nu ina [UKKIN lu2DUMU.
DU3] UGU ram-ni-šu2 u2-kin-[ni . . .
300 chapter nine
designated by the term lu2mukinnū, from the authorities (the šatammu and
the administrator) whose names follow the phrase ina DU.ZU. The
decision itself is made “in the assembly,” which indicates that people
other than just the šatammu and the administrator were involved. Based
on the evidence of the “Eanna style B” decision records, it is possible
to argue that the individuals designated as “witnesses” are actually
members of the assembly. Other “Eanna style A” decision records in
which only the designation lu2mukinnū is used may describe a similar
situation, especially in those texts that mention the adjudicatory activi-
ties of an assembly.
CHAPTER TEN
THE NEO-BABYLONIAN TABLET TRAIL

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Until this point, the discussion of Neo-Babylonian court procedure

has been primarily synchronic; it has focused on texts pertaining to
one particular period in Mesopotamian history. The Neo-Babylonian
litigation records, however, are just part of a long history of legal writ-
ing in Mesopotamia. In order to properly understand the Neo-Baby-
lonian texts, then, one must also consider them diachronically, that is
together with litigation records from other periods in the history of
Mesopotamian law.
The results of this comparative examination are obviously relevant to
a general understanding of the history of legal procedure in the ancient
Near East. Any diachronic history, legal or otherwise, can only be writ-
ten by studying records from several different periods. More specifically,
however, comparative study is directly relevant to the understanding
of the Neo-Babylonian litigation records themselves. The comparative
approach promises to shed light on aspects of legal procedure that may
not be fully understood based only on the Neo-Babylonian texts. The
discussion in the earlier chapters reached conclusions about text-typol-
ogy and legal procedures based only on the internal evidence that the
Neo-Babylonian litigation records provide. The identification of parallel
texts and legal procedures among other ancient Near Eastern litigation
records provides corroborative evidence for these conclusions. From this
perspective, the purpose of the comparative approach is to support the
interpretation of the Neo-Babylonian material by referring to similar
legal phenomena in earlier periods in Mesopotamia.
This chapter does not undertake a comprehensive comparative
discussion of the Neo-Babylonian litigation records, which would
require reviewing all the litigation records from all other periods in
Mesopotamian history as well as those from neighboring Near Eastern
societies. Instead, this chapter hews closer to the focus of the earlier
parts of the study. It identifies textual parallels to the Neo-Babylonian
text-types and points to some of the procedural parallels that can be
identified in the textual record from earlier periods. To do so, it draws
302 chapter ten
on the existing studies of pre-Neo-Babylonian court procedure which

were surveyed in the introduction to this book. All of these studies
have recognized the need for text-typology, which makes the results
they provide particularly useful.
10.A The Decision Record
10.A.1 The Legal Function of the Decision Record

The long history of the decision record begins with the very oldest
records from Mesopotamia that pertain to adjudication, the Neo-Sume-
rian texts known by the title d i. t i l. l a (“completed legal matter”).
Falkenstein, who studied the texts with this title, classified some of them
as “Prozeßprotokollen” (“protocols”). This classification refers to texts that,
like the Neo-Babylonian decision records, mention a dispute between
two parties and the matter under dispute, as well as the decision of
the adjudicating authorities.1 Typological studies of texts from later
periods have identified similar text-types, as well. These include the Old
Babylonian “lawsuit records,” as Fortner labels them,2 or Dombradi’s
“Urkunden über Prozeßverfahren” (“documents regarding trial proceedings”),3
and the texts from Nuzi that Hayden calls “lawsuits.”4
The modern identification of the decision record is confirmed by
the existence of ancient terms that seem to refer to this specific text-
type. In the Neo-Babylonian period, the term uppi dīni (“tablet of legal
proceedings”) is used for this text-type.5 Dombradi and others have
recognized that the term uppi lā ragāmim (“tablet of no contest”) is used
to describe many of the Old Babylonian decision records.6 Similarly,
the scribes at Nuzi designated the “lawsuit” texts as uppi ša lē ûti (“tablet
1
Falkenstein, Neusumerische Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, p. 15.
2
The criteria of the “lawsuit records” are summarized in Fortner, Adjudicating Enti-
ties, p. 71.
3
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 166.
4
Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 72–171. Jas, SAAS 5, classifies the Neo-Assyrian texts
according to strictly formal criteria (see Jas, SAAS 5, pp. 2–3). This non-functional
typology does not result in a separate Neo-Assyrian text-type equivalent to the Neo-
Babylonian decision record. However, Postgate’s classification, cited in Jas, SAAS 5,
p. 3 n. 11, might yield a Neo-Assyrian parallel.
5
See section 1.A above.
6
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 165–166 and Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 2,
p. 119 n. 681 and p. 143 n. 945.
the neo-babylonian tablet trail in comparative perspective 303
of prevailing”).7 These native terms demonstrate that the identification

of the decision record is not simply a modern convention. Instead, the
ancient scribes themselves apparently recognized the decision record as
a distinct text-type with its own designation. Thus, the identification of
the features of the decision record is relevant not only for the purposes
of text typology, but, more importantly, results in the description of a
natively recognized genre of legal writing.
Of the three native terms for the decision record—Old Babylonian
uppi lā ragāmim, Nuzi’s uppi ša lē ûti and Neo-Babylonian uppi dīni—the
Neo-Babylonian term is the least descriptive. Although the term uppi
dīni (“tablet of legal proceedings”) does refer to the contents of the deci-
sion record, it does not properly describe this text-type’s legal function
as the prevailing parties’ records decisions in their favor. On the other
hand, the terms uppi lā ragāmim and uppi ša lē ûti are accurate expres-
sions of the reasons for which decision records were composed. The
term uppi ša lē ûti (“tablet of prevailing”) points to the most important
fact written in the decision record: that one of the parties prevailed in
a legal case. The term uppi lā ragāmim (“tablet of no contest”) expresses
the reason for which the decision record was composed: to prevent
reopening of the legal case.
Although the Neo-Babylonian term uppi dīni does not inherently
express the legal function of the decision record, it is nevertheless clear
that the Neo-Babylonian decision records share the same legal function
as their older counterparts. The typological discussion demonstrated
that the Neo-Babylonian decision records are written to provide the
prevailing parties with evidence of a legal decision in their favor. The
need for proper documentation of a decision stems from a concern with
preventing future claims against the prevailing party. Some Neo-Babylo-
nian decision records state this concern explicitly. One example occurs
in Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), No. 6:32–35, which describes
how the judges give the prevailing party, mBēl-rēmannu, the tablet as
a record. The text states:
32. ¢i-naÜ up-pi KI.LAM-šu2 uš- (31–32) They reaffirmed mBēl-
ziz-¢zuÜ [u2] aš2-šu2 ma-ti-ma rēmannu’s (rights) in his tablet of
sale.
7
Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 199 n. 96.
304 chapter ten
33. [la sa- a]-ri-im-ma la ra-ga-mu (32–35) And in order to prevent

lu2
DI.KU5.MEŠ [reneg]ing and bringing a suit
34. [ up-pi ] iš- u-ru-ma i-na in the future, the judges wrote a
na4
KIŠIB-šu2-nu [tablet], [si]gned it with their seals,
35. [ib]-ru-mu-ma a-na mdEN-re- and gave it to mBēl-rēmannu.
man-nu [id-din]-nu
Similarly, a number of Neo-Babylonian texts state that the judges give

that particular record, marked with their seals, to the prevailing party
“so that (the decision) will not be changed” (ana lā enê).8
As might be imagined, the need to prevent future claims against
the prevailing party, expressed in the quotations above, does not sud-
denly emerge in the Neo-Babylonian period. The Akkadian terms uppi
lā ragāmim and uppi ša lē ûti allude to this concern. Furthermore, the
formulation of pre-Neo-Babylonian decision records reveals that these
texts are written with the same concern in mind.9 In the Neo-Sumerian
d i. t i l. l a texts, this concern is addressed by what Falkenstein calls the
Verzichterklärung (“declaration of renunciation of future claims”) which
is made under oath or symbolized by “dragging the cloak” (t u g2.u
r3).10 Similarly, the Old Babylonian decision records often end with
notices regarding future litigation. Dombradi refers to these notices
as Schlußklauseln (“end clauses”). Below are some of the forms of the
Schlußklauseln that Dombradi identifies, followed by one example of each,
all drawn from actual Old Babylonian decision records:11
8
Scheil RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13:34–36; Dalley, Edinburgh 69:44; Nbn 1128:26–28;
Durand, Textes babyloniens Nos. 58/59:23–25. For similar expressions, see Wunsch, BA
2, No. 9:9–12; Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251:10–12. See the remarks on Durand,
Textes babyloniens Nos. 58/59:23–25 at the beginning of the typological discussion.
9
For decision records pertaining to reopened cases, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1,
pp. 184–188 and R. Pfeiffer and E. A. Speiser, One Hundred New Selected Nuzi Texts
(AASOR 16) (New Haven, 1936), No. 71.
10
Falkenstein, Neusumerische Gerichtsurkunden, Vol. 1, p. 79.
11
All of the examples are drawn from texts that Fortner classifies as “lawsuit records”
and that Dombradi classifies as Zivilprozesse (“civil trial proceedings”) documents. The
only exception is TCL 1, 104, which Fortner classifies as a “lawsuit record,” but which
Dombradi does not cite as an example in her typology. The Schlußklauseln listed here
are those that are most directly relevant to the concern with future litigation. In all,
Dombradi identifies six forms of Schlußklauseln that occur mainly at the end of Zivil-
prozesse documents (Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 113). For Dombradi’s typological
system, see the introductory chapter and Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 161–204. The
Zivilprozesse-type is described in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 169–188. All cunei-
form transcriptions follow Fortner.
1) Invalidation of previous documents ( epi-clause)

Example (TCL 1, 104:26–28):
ul-la-nu-um <DUB> A.LA-ti-šu-nu DUB i-¢i Ü-[tum] ša i-na qa2-ti-šu-nu
i-li-a-am sa-ar i-pi2
Apart from the tablet of their inheritance portion, any fraudulent
tablet that shall turn up in their hand is false; it is invalid.
2) The uppi lā ragāmim (“tablet of no contest”)-clause
Example (CT 2, 39:8–12):
da-ia-nu . . . ku-nu-kam ša la ra-ga-mi u2-še-zi-bu-šu
The judges . . . made him issue a sealed document of no contest.
3) Renunciation-clause (“Verzichtsklausel ”)
Example (CT 2, 46:23–27):
u2-ul i-ta-ru-ma a-na PN1 u2-ul i-ra-ga-mu MU dUTU dA-a dAMAR.UTU
u3 30-mu-ba-li2-i IN.PAD3.DE3.EŠ
(That) they shall not turn and shall not raise a claim against PN1 they
swore by Šamaš, Aya, Marduk and Sin-Muballi .
4) Sanction clause
Example (Greengus Ishchali, No. 25:26–27):
ra-gi-im i-ra-ga-mu ¢1Ü MA.NA KU3.BABBAR I3.LA2.E
Any claimant that raises a claim shall pay 1 mina of silver.
All of these clauses are written to prevent future litigation in some
way. The first clause invalidates any additional tablets, that is, any
additional evidence that may be presented. In the second, the judges
order the litigant who has lost the case to renounce, in writing, any
further claim. In the third, the litigants who lose the case swear that
they will not reopen the case. The fourth clause prevents subsequent
claims by imposing a fine on any future claimant. Despite these dif-
ferences, however, all four clauses reflect the same concern with the
reopening of the case.12
In addition to the Old Babylonian examples, clauses intended to
prevent the reopening of the lawsuit occur in decision records from
the Mesopotamian periphery, as well. One example, drawn from a text
written at Emar (Meskene), reads as follows.13
12
Compare these clauses with LH §5, in Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Meso-
potamia and Asia Minor (Atlanta, 1997), p. 82.
13
Akio Tsukimoto, “Akkadian Tablets in the Hirayama Collection (III),” Acta Sumero-
logica 14 (1992), No. 44:8–13. For the dating and background of the texts from Emar
306 chapter ten
ur-ra-am še-ra-am mPN1 a-na UGU- i mPN2 la-a i-ra-gu-um u3 mPN2 a-na mPN1
la-a i-ra-gu-um ša i-ra-gu-um up-pu an-nu-¢u2Ü i-la- -e-šu2
In the future, PN1 shall not raise a claim against PN2 and PN2 shall
not raise a claim against PN1. Whoever raises a claim—this tablet shall
prevail over him.
Like the Old Babylonian Schlußklauseln, this quotation expresses the
same concern with reopening the lawsuit found in some of the Neo-
Babylonian decision records. Its formulation clearly demonstrates that
the purpose of writing the decision record is to prevent any future
litigation. The tablet, i.e., the evidence the tablet records, will “prevail”
(le û) over any future claimant.
10.A.2 The Form of the Decision Record

The native terms for the decision records and the statements contained
in the decision records demonstrate that the Neo-Babylonian texts share
a common legal function with their earlier counterparts. Comparative
examination of the Neo-Babylonian texts demonstrates that the decision
records share formal compositional characteristics with Mesopotamian
analogues, as well.
The comparative study of the structure of the decision record benefits
from Dombradi’s extensive work on the Old Babylonian material. In
her study, Dombradi identifies the outline of a text-type that she calls
the Zivilprozeß-type of Prozeßverfahren (“the civil-trial type of documents
regarding trial proceedings”).14 By identifying this outline, Dombradi
demonstrates that, contrary to the regnant scholarly opinion, Old
Babylonian decision records are not freely-composed.15 Instead, when
the Old Babylonian scribes recorded legal decisions, they followed an
identifiable compositional framework.
see Jean-Claude Margueron and Marcel Sigrist, “Emar” and John Huehnergard, “Emar
Texts” in Eric M. Meyers, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East, Vol.
2 (New York, 1997), p. 236–239. For examples of notices with similar intent in decision
records from other locations and times see: Jas, SAAS 5, No. 10:7–10 (Assyria); MDP
22, 160:13–43 (Elam); W. W. Hallo and H. Tadmor, “A Lawsuit from Hazor,” IEJ 27
(1977), pp. 1–11:7–9 (Hazor); PRU 3, pl. 99 (pp. 71–72):7–15 (Ugarit).
14
This outline is an adaptation of the outline presented in Dombradi, Darstellung,
p. 170, based on the discussion in Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 33–160. Note that not
all of the components are present in every text.
15
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 4, pp. 161–164.
The Neo-Babylonian decision records, in general, and especially

those written in the “Royal Judges” styles, demonstrate that the Neo-
Babylonian scribes, like their Old Babylonian predecessors, followed
certain frameworks in composing the decision records. There are, of
course, important differences between the Neo-Babylonian and Old
Babylonian outlines. Among the most striking differences is the fact that
Dombradi considers the notice about compliance part of the decision
record. Neo-Babylonian decision records, on the other hand, do not
include notices of compliance; the Neo-Babylonian texts with this kind
of notice belong to a separate text-type.16 Furthermore, whereas the
Old Babylonian texts always include some “ending clauses,” the Neo-
Babylonian texts usually do not. Dombradi’s outline also ends with the
names of witnesses, while the outline of the “Royal Judges” styles ends
with the names of judges.
Despite these notable differences, however, the overall structures of
the Old Babylonian and Neo-Babylonian outlines are similar. Like the
Neo-Babylonian decision records, the Old Babylonian texts begin with
introductory clauses, which often include verbal phrases, like dīna gerû,
that refer to an initial confrontation between the parties. These deci-
sion records continue with the narration of the proceedings in court,
including actions like summoning and questioning, followed by the final
decision.17 Similarly, the abundance of lawsuit records from peripheral
sites such as Nuzi, Emar, Alalakh and Ugarit show that decision records
in the Middle Babylonian period also include the same information
and follow the same three-part outline of introduction—actions in
court—decision.18
Because of their general structure, the decision records in the Old,
Middle and Neo-Babylonian periods provide a comprehensive pic-
ture of the adjudicatory process in each period. The comprehensive
description that these texts provide, however, is ancillary to their legal
function of serving as private individuals’ proof of a ruling in their
favor. The form provides more information than is necessary to fulfill
the function of the decision records. A much simpler document could
16
Note, however, that in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 170, this section of the
outline is considered “optional” ( fakultativ).
17
See the outline presented in Dombradi, Darstellung, p. 170 and the discussion of
the different legal phrases in Dombradi, Darstellung, pp. 33–160. Although Dombradi’s
outline is quite complex, the basic three-part structure is maintained.
18
For examples from Nuzi and Ugarit see the texts edited in Joannès, Justice, pp.
141–169.
308 chapter ten
have recorded a ruling in favor of the prevailing party. Even though

it is clear that the decision records are not minute-by-minute accounts
of court proceedings, they do seem to resemble court protocols, which
would have been kept as a public record, rather than documents writ-
ten for private individuals. Yet, it seems that the decision records in
all periods were not held by courts, but were, in fact, held in private
archives.19 This contradiction between the form of the decision records
and their function suggests that the form is not simply a means of
fulfilling the decision records’ legal function. In other words, the form
does not seem to have arisen only in response to the needs of keeping
records; a simpler form could have met these needs.20
Even though the form of the decision records is not the most practi-
cal means of fulfilling their legal function, Babylonian decision records
written at different times continue to fulfill the same legal function
with the same form. Because the form does not seem to be an intui-
tive response to the legal need for a decision record it seems that the
form did not arise independently to meet the same need in different
periods. Instead, there seems to be a historical connection between
the Babylonian decision records from the different periods. One might
suggest that the form of the Akkadian decision record is part of the
wider phenomenon that has been called the Mesopotamian “stream of
tradition.”21 Cuneiform scribes, whose training included the composition
19
The texts from Nuzi provide the strongest support for this interpretation. Many
of the decision records come from the Te ip-tilla family archive, which was discovered
in a private house. See Joannès, Justice, p. 142 and Pedersén, Archives, pp. 24–26. For
discussion of the provenance of the Old Babylonian texts, and the suggestion that they
belong to private, rather than public archives, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Volume 1, pp.
9–10. The internal evidence of the “Royal Judges” decision records points in the same
direction. Unfortunately, the archeological data that might confirm the assigning of texts
to private archives is still lacking. For discussion, see Pedersén, Archives, pp. 181–213.
20
It should be noted that recording the actions in court, and not just the decision,
might have had a functional purpose, as well. A document with this information
could serve as a record of the evidence presented during the proceedings and could
prove that the decision was reached according to proper procedure. Nevertheless, the
formulaic character of the decision record, in all periods, cannot be denied and war-
rants historical consideration.
21
A. Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization (Chicago,
1977), p. 13. Oppenheim uses the term to describe the “corpus of literary texts,”
which comprise the “first level” of cuneiform texts. Opposite these are, according to
Oppenheim, texts from the “second level” that are “used to record the day-to-day
activities of the Babylonians and Assyrians.” Ostensibly, decision records come from
the “second level.” If the suggestion above is correct, then decision records illustrate
Oppenheim’s observation that “one has to realize that the texts of the second level
of legal documents, maintained this tradition throughout the long his-

tory of Akkadian law and legal writing.
10.B Settlements
In addition to the decision records, the Old Babylonian documents

include records of disputes settled out of court. Like their Neo-Baby-
lonian counterparts, these texts begin with dispute terminology (such as
the verbs ragāmu or baqāru) but do not mention any adjudication of the
dispute before authorities.22 This text-type reflects a situation in which a
dispute is settled without the intervention of legal authorities. Dombradi
labels this text-type vorprozessualen Vergleiche (“pre-trial settlements”).23
The discussion of the Neo-Babylonian settlements raised a number
of possibilities regarding the formality of the proceedings described in
the settlements and the degree to which adjudicating authorities are
involved. One possibility raised was that the dispute terminology in the
settlements refers to a formal pre-trial procedure involving adjudicat-
ing authorities.24 The Old Babylonian texts, which use similar dispute
terminology, raise the same possibility, but Dombradi rejects it.25 In
addition to the arguments that she presents, one may point to the
existence of a separate Old Babylonian text-type that actually describes
disputes brought before adjudicating authorities but which were settled
before the authorities reach a decision. Dombradi calls this text-type
the imtagrū-formulary of the decision record, in which the verbal form
imtagrū (“they agreed with each other”) describes the mutual agreement
between the disputing parties.26 According to Fortner, several of these
texts are “unfinished suits” which detail “litigations which are resolved
at the place of the oath and therefore are not returned to the judges
could never have been written without that cultural continuum maintained so effectively
by the scribal tradition.”
22
Note, however, that two of the texts that Dombradi includes in her table of pre-
trial settlements (Meissner, BAP 80 = Si 3 and VAS 8, 109 = Si 63) do mention judges.
Dombradi’s discussion in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 2, p. 149 n. 1011 does not fully
explain why these two texts should be classified as “pretrial” records.
23
24
See section 2.C above.
25
26
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 176–177. Also see Dombradi’s discussion of the
mitguru-Prozesshandlungen in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 197–198.
310 chapter ten
for verdict or decision.”27 It is this separate text-type that is used to

record disputes ended after a formal complaint but before the judges
render a decision. In contrast, the pre-trial settlements, which do not
mention the judges at all, reflect disputes resolved even earlier in the
adjudicatory process, before a complaint had to be brought before
legal authorities.
10.C Preliminary Protocols and Records of Statements in Court
As was already noted in the introduction to this book, all studies of

Mesopotamian court procedure distinguish between texts that describe
entire trials and texts that describe only part of the proceedings. Thus, in
her study of the Old Babylonian material, Dombradi separates “Urkun-
den über Prozeßverfahren” (“documents regarding trial proceedings”) from
“Urkunden über Prozeßhandlungen” (“documents regarding trial actions”).
The first group consists of texts that describe the entire course of a trial
and the second consists of those texts that describe only one specific
action.28 Similarly, Fortner distinguishes between what he calls “law-
suit records” and “associated documents.” “Lawsuit records” contain
“ ‘core’ proceedings” and are separate from “associated documents” that
“surround and support litigious activity” by detailing “ancillary legal
actions.”29 Hayden, in his study of court procedure at Nuzi, separates
“lawsuits,” which describe entire cases, from “declaration tablets,” which
27
Fortner Adjudicating Entities, p. 77. Note that Fortner’s typology distinguishes between
texts that simply record an appearance before the judges followed by an agreement
(“lawsuit records” proper) and texts that also mention an oath (“unfinished suits”).
Dombradi’s typology does not distinguish between these two situations.
28
29
Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 2. For the complete list of the features of “lawsuit
records,” see Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 71, especially item “f,” and n. 1. Note, how-
ever, that Dombradi and Fortner do not always agree on which texts describe complete
trials and which texts describe only part of the proceedings. For example, Dombradi,
Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 176 classifies all but one of the texts that Fortner, Adjudicating
Entities, p. 77 considers “associated documents type A” among the Prozeßverfahren (“trial
proceedings”) types, rather than among the Prozeßhandlungen (“trial actions”) types. Note
that Dombradi places these texts in the same type with several other texts (BE 6/1, 6;
CT 4, 13a; CT 47, 12/12a; CT 48, 1; VAS 7, 7/VAS 7, 152) that Fortner, Adjudicat-
ing Entities, pp. 73–76 classifies as “lawsuit records.” Also compare the classification
of TCL 11, 245 in Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 188 n. 1038; Vol. 2, p. 152 and
Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, p. 78.
record testimony or other statements in court, and which may have

“formed the brief upon which the decision was based.”30
The distinction between texts that describe entire trials and texts
that describe only part of the proceedings emerges primarily from the
actions that the texts describe. In the texts from Nuzi, this distinction
in content results in a formal distinction between the opening lines
of the “lawsuits” and the opening lines of the “declaration tablets.”
Generally speaking, the “lawsuits” begin with the statement “PN1 itti
PN2 ina dīni ana pāni dayyānē ītelûma” (“PN1 appeared with PN2 in court
before the judges”).31 “Declaration tablets,” on the other hand, come
in two forms, one that begins “lišānšu ša PN” (“declaration of PN”) and
one that begins umma PN (“thus [said] PN”). Both of these forms are
introductions to the quoted statements that follow in the text.32
In contrast to the texts from Nuzi, in the Old Babylonian corpus
the formal distinction between texts that describe entire trials and texts
that describe only part of the proceedings is not a direct consequence
of the contents of the different texts. Instead, in the Old Babylonian
material, the formal difference occurs in the placement of the names
of the witnesses. Dombradi observes that in Prozeßverfahren-texts, the
names of the witnesses always occur at the end, after the narration
of the entire proceedings. Many of the Prozeßhandlungen-texts, however,
have the names of the witnesses at the beginning, followed by a formula
that introduces the description of the specific action.33
To a certain extent, similar formal distinctions can be made between
the Neo-Babylonian decision records and preliminary protocols. The
“Royal Judges” styles are formally distinct from other text-types. The
evidence of the texts from the Eanna, however, points in the opposite
direction. The only feature that distinguishes the “Eanna” style deci-
sion records from the preliminary protocols is a record of an actual
decision. In terms of form, however, the formulation of the “Eanna”
style decision records is not distinct from the formulation of prelimi-
nary protocols. Unlike the texts from Nuzi, the Neo-Babylonian texts
30
Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 175. For description of this type, as well as others, see
Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 172–181. Note, however, that the sections devoted to the
“lawsuits” also include some texts of other types.
31
32
For discussion of the differences between the lišānšu and umma “declaration tablets”
see Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 172–177.
33
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 21–22. For the placement of the names of wit-
nesses in specific Prozeßhandlungen-texts, see Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, pp. 191–199.
312 chapter ten
are not easily distinguished based on opening words. And unlike the
Old Babylonian texts, the distinction between decision records and
preliminary protocols is not manifest in the placement of the names
of the witnesses. There are preliminary protocols in which the names
of the witnesses appear at the beginning (style B) as well as at the end
(style A), just as there are Eanna decision records with names at the
end (style A) and at the beginning (style B).
10.D Memoranda
The Neo-Babylonian memoranda were meant for the scribe’s own

use, to serve in the composition of more formal documents. They
are defined by the absence of a scribe’s name and by the appearance
of the words ta sistu lā mašê (“Memorandum, not to be forgotten”) in
many of them. The closest parallel to the Neo-Babylonian designation
ta sistu lā mašê (“Memorandum, not to be forgotten”) occurs in the
texts from Nuzi.34 A number of litigation records from Nuzi end with
the two-word description uppi ta silti (“memorandum tablet”). Hayden
demonstrates that from the point-of-view of composition and contents,
the memoranda from Nuzi closely resemble the “lawsuit records.” The
only difference between them and the “lawsuit records” from Nuzi is
that the memoranda lack the decision of the judges.35 Unlike the Neo-
Babylonian memoranda, the memoranda from Nuzi include the name
of the scribe and are sealed. Thus, despite the similarity in terminology,
the memoranda from Nuzi and the Neo-Babylonian memoranda serve
different functions. The Neo-Babylonian texts are an informal note,
while the the texts from Nuzi are a formal record of a trial awaiting
a decision.36
34
For disucssion of the Old Babylonian memoranda, see Dombradi, Darstellung,
Vol. 1, p. 201.
35
Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 177. See also Hayden’s discussion of the memoranda
listed in Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 204 n. 143.
36
For a closer parallel to the Neo-Babylonian use of the memoranda in a text that
is not a litigation record, see Gerfrid G. W. Müller, “Ein Massenprozeß in Nuzi? Zur
Bedeutung von uppi ta silti,” ArOr 67 (1999), pp. 221–230.
10.E dabābu-Type Summonses
In the Neo-Babylonian decision records, the procedure of summon-

ing the defendant to court is described by the verbs abāku or abālu (“to
bring”), without much additional information about how this procedure
was carried out. The discussion of this text-type suggested that the
dabābu-type summonses are a written record of the summons proce-
dure. Although the records from Nuzi do not include actual dabābu-type
summonses, the “lawsuit records” do include a description of the sum-
moning procedure itself. In the records from Nuzi, the verb šasû (“to
call, to summon”) denotes the procedure of summoning a defendant to
court. According to descriptions in several texts, this procedure involved
sending a group of named court officials, known as the manzadu lu, to
order the defendant to come to court.37 The explicitly oral nature of
the procedure at Nuzi raises the possibility that a similar oral sum-
moning may have accompanied the issuance of the written dabābu-type
summonses in the Neo-Babylonian period.38 If this is correct, then the
dabābu-type summonses are not the written means of summoning the
defendant. Instead, they are written records that the oral summoning
procedure had actually occurred, or that a higher court had authorized
this procedure.39 Conversely, the existence of the Neo-Babylonian
dabābu-type summons as a written document raises the possibility that
similar documents were issued by the courts at Nuzi.
The closest textual analogues to the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type
summonses are two Neo-Assyrian texts from a lawsuit regarding a
donkey and other property: Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4 and Jas, SAAS 5, No.
54.40 Although the beginning of the latter is broken, what remains of
37
The manzadu lu would call the summoned individual three times and would report
the summoned individual’s response after each time. The procedure is discussed in
Hayden, Court Procedure, pp. 13–14. For examples of texts that describe the procedure,
see Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 195, n. 45.
38
See, for example, the procedure described in YOS 7, 159.
39
The fact that many of the dabābu-type summonses come from temple, rather than
private, archives, suggests that they were not delivered to private individuals. However,
the possibility that a (now lost) copy was actually delivered to the summoned individuals
should not be ruled out entirely.
40
For the correlation between the two texts, and discussion of the different items
besides the donkey see Jas, SAAS 5, p. 15 and p. 84. Jas, SAAS 5, No. 15 may be a
third analogue to the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summons. It does not use the verb
dabābu, but it does require litigants to “approach” (qarābu) an authority (the šaknu) on
the day that a named individual arrives. If they do not comply with this requirement,
one litigant must pay the other a penalty of one mina of silver.
314 chapter ten
the body of the text closely resembles the formulation of a Neo-Baby-

lonian dabābu-type summons:
2’. ina URU ni-nu-¢aÜ [ina (2’–5’) . . . in Nin eveh, s hall a rgue a
UGU] case [regarding] a male donkey and
regarding 10 šeqel of silver against
3’. ANŠE.NITA2 ina UGU 10
(the c laim of ) mA i-pada son of
GIN2 KU3.BABBAR m
Zan î.
4’. TA mPAP-i-pa-da A mza-an-
i-i
5’. de-e-nu i-DUG4.DUG4 šum2- (5’–9’) If he is not present at his
ma lawsuit, mLaqīpu shall repay a
donkey with its cart and ½ mina of
6’. a-na de-ni-šu2 la kar-me
silver to mA i-pada.
7’. ANŠE.NITA2 a-di tal-lak-te-
šu2
8’. ½ MA.NA KU3.BABBAR
m
la-qi-pu
9’. a-na mPAP-i-pa-da u2-šal-lam
Laqīpu must argue his case in Nineveh or make a payment to mA i-
pada. Like the Neo-Babylonian texts, this text also consists of two
clauses, a summons clause (lines 2’–5’), which requires the summoned
individual to “argue the case” (de-e-nu i-DUG4.DUG4) against his oppo-
nent, and a penalty clause (lines 5’–9’), which imposes a penalty upon
the summoned individual for failure to argue.
The formulation of Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4, the other Neo-Assyrian
text pertaining to this lawsuit, is somewhat different. The body of the
text does not contain a summons clause. Instead, it consists only of a
penalty clause, which begins as follows:
BE-ma ina U4 1-kam2 ša2 ITI GU4 mla-qi2-pi mmu-še-zib-dPA TA mPAP-pa-
da . . . la i-da-bu-<bu> la ip-ru-su
If, on 1 Ayyāru, mLaqīpi (and) mMušēzib-Nabû . . . do not argue against
(the claim of ) mA i-pada (and) they do not reach a decision . . . 41
41
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4:3–6.
The result, according to the text, is that mLaqīpu must pay mA i-pada
a double penalty.42 The nature of the obligation that this text imposes
is analogous to the obligation imposed by the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-
type summonses. Even though the Neo-Assyrian text does not contain
a summons clause, the penalty clause makes it clear that the text’s pur-
pose, like the purpose of the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type summonses,
is to obligate litigants to argue.
In addition to its significance as a typological parallel to the Neo-
Babylonian summonses, Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4 provides comparative
evidence for the legal function of the summonses. As was noted earlier,
the Neo-Babylonian texts have been interpreted either as contracts
between two parties or as summonses issued by adjudicating authorities
(4.A above). The discussion in the typological section mustered the
evidence in favor of interpreting the Neo-Babylonian texts as sum-
monses. The first lines of Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4, before the body of the
text, support this interpretation. These lines describe the text as “the
judgment which Arbaya, the mayor of Kal a, imposed” (de-e-nu <ša>
m
ar-ba-a lu2 a-za-nu ša2 urukal- a e-mid-u-ni ).43 This heading makes it
clear that the text was issued after the mayor had heard mA i-pada’s
complaint against mLaqīpi. Thus, the text is not simply an agreement
between the two parties to argue the case, but is, instead, the record
of a decision by an adjudicating authority.44
Another Neo-Assyrian text that sheds light on the dabābu-type sum-
monses is Jas, SAAS 5, No. 46. This text records the conclusion of a
dispute over a debt. Lines 4–8 describe some of the proceedings that
came before the case’s conclusion. They read as follows:
4. e-ger2-tu ša de-e-ni (4–7) They wrote a document
of proceedings between them,
5. ina bir-tu-šu2-nu is-sa-a -ru
stating: ‘When mPN arrives, he
6. ma-a ki-ma mPN will establish ( justice) between
them.’
42
The exact nature of this double payment is not clear, nor is the role of mMušēzib-
Nabû, who is mentioned in the protasis but not in the apodosis of the penalty clause.
See Jas, SAAS 5, p. 15.
43
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4:1–2. Jas, SAAS 5, No. 15:1–3 provides similar evidence, if one
assumes that the reason the litigants must “approach” the šaknu is for a hearing.
44
A similar conclusion emerges from JEN 390 (edited with discussion in Hayden,
Court Procedure, pp. 92–95), a memorandum from Nuzi that describes the proceedings
which lead the judges to order a defendant to appear. See Hayden, Court Procedure, p. 52.
316 chapter ten
7. it-tal-ka ina bir-tu-šu2-nu u2-kan

8. mPN it-ti-in (8) mPN judged (the case).
According to these lines, before the case was actually judged, a prelimi-
nary document was drawn up to indicate that mPN would judge the case.
The formulation of this document, as it is quoted in lines 6–7, does not
resemble the precise formulation of the Neo-Babylonian dabābu-type
summonses: it does not mention any obligation of litigants to “argue a
case” nor does it mention a penalty. Of course, the Neo-Assyrian docu-
ment itself was probably longer than the quotation, and its unquoted
sections may have been closer to the Neo-Babylonian analogues. Even
if this was not the case, however, it is reasonable to assume that the
Neo-Assyrian document, like the dabābu-type summonses, required the
litigants to make their cases once the adjudicator had arrived.
At first glance, the verb in line 5 (is-sa-a -ru) seems to indicate that
the opponents themselves wrote the document, after reaching an agree-
ment on their own. Jas, however, construes the ambiguous verb as an
anonymous plural expressing the passive (“was written”). According to
Jas, these lines are a description of “the issuing of a preliminary court
document.”45 The Neo-Assyrian term for the document that was drawn
up, e-ger2-tu ša de-e-ni, supports Jas’s interpretation. This term resembles
the Neo-Babylonian term for the decision record, uppi dīni. In the
Neo-Babylonian term, the noun dīni refers to what is described in the
decision record: the entire proceedings and to the decision in court.
The appearance of the same noun in the Neo-Assyrian term suggests
that the document was also drawn up as part of a court procedure.
Furthermore, the word dēnu occurs in the first lines of Jas, SAAS 5, No.
4, the Neo-Assyrian analogue to the dabābu-type summons discussed
above. There, the word describes the summons itself as a “judgment.”
Thus, the document described in Jas, SAAS 5, No. 46, was drawn up
as a record of the decision of an adjudicating authority, not as an
agreement between the litigants.
45
Jas, SAAS 5, p. 72.
10.F Text-Types Calling for Evidence
The typological discussion identified three main text-types which are

the different means of calling for the presentation of evidence: the
kunnu-type summonses, the guarantees for testimony and the penalties
pending evidence. These text-types belong to the procedures for obtain-
ing evidence that are described in the Neo-Babylonian decision records
and preliminary protocols. Both the Old Babylonian texts and the texts
from Nuzi describe similar procedures as part of their narrations of
legal disputes. Like the Neo-Babylonian texts, several Old Babylonian
texts use the verb erēšu to indicate that the judges “demand” evidence
from one of the litigants.46 One text from Nuzi, JEN 344, records the
actual wording of the judges’ demand for witnesses from the litigant
and their imposition of a penalty for failure to bring them.47 Another
related text from Nuzi, JEN 355, indicates that the judges give the
litigant five days in which to bring his witnesses or face the penalty.
In addition to the information available from litigation records,
Hammurabi’s Code also provides information on the judicial demand
for evidence. CH 13 reads as follows:
šum-ma a-wi-lum šu-u ši-bu-šu la qir-bu da-a-nu a-da-nam a-na ITI 6-kam2
i-ša-ak-ka-nu-šum-ma šum-ma i-na ITI 6-kam2 ši-bi-šu la ir-di-a-am a-wi-lum
šu-u2 sa-ar a-ra-an di-nim šu-a-ti it-ta-na-aš-ši
If that man’s witnesses are not present, the judges shall set a time of six
months for him. If he does not present his witnesses in six months, it is
that man who is a liar. He shall bear the penalty of that case.
The situation described in this law48 is analogous to the situation in
which an exculpatory kunnu-type summons would have been composed.
In the law, a man has made a claim which remains to be proven by
witnesses. The judges allow him six months to prove his claim. If he
fails to present the witnesses, then he faces a penalty. The kunnu-type
summonses are composed under precisely these circumstances; they are
the written means of obligating claimants to substantiate their claims.
This similarity between the law and the circumstances surrounding the
promulgation of the kunnu-type summonses suggests that the kunnu-type
46
Dombradi, Darstellung, Vol. 1, p. 87 (c) (witnesses) and p. 89 (b) (tablets).
47
JEN 344:16–24.
48
For additional details on this law and its relationship to the earlier laws, see G. R.
Driver and John C. Miles, The Babylonian Laws, Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1956), pp. 95–105.
318 chapter ten
summonses are the documentary manifestation of the judges’ action

in the law. In other words, one may suggest that when the judges “set
a time,” they do so by means of a document that resembled a kunnu-
type summons.
As with the dabābu-type summonses, a close textual analogue to the
Neo-Babylonian kunnu-type summonses comes from the Neo-Assyrian
corpus.49 Jas, SAAS 5, No. 53 apparently pertains to a dispute over
whether or not a debt of 37 šeqel of silver has been repaid. The main
legible portion of the text, as it has been reconstructed by Jas, reads
as follows:
4. IGI.MEŠ-šu2 u2-ba-la TA [x x x] (4–7) . . . will bring his witnesses,
5. u2-ka-nu ki-i 37 [GIN2.MEŠ KU3. with [. . .] they will establish
BABBAR] that mNinurta-a u-u ur gave
6. mdMAŠ-PAP-PAP a-na mm[u-tak-kil- m
M[utakkil-Marduk] 37 [ šeqel
d
ŠU2] of silver].
7. i-din-u-ni šum-[ma IGI.MEŠ-šu2] (7–9) If they establish (the
8. uk-tin-nu ma-a [lu2LUL] case) saying, “he is a debtor,”
9. šu-u mdMAŠ-PAP-PAP [x x] m
Ninurta-a u-u ur [ will . . .].
10. šum-ma IGI.MEŠ i-tu-[bil] (10–12) If he brin[gs]
11. KU3.BABBAR a-di ru-bi-šu2 witnesses, m[Ninurta-a u-u ur]
md
[MAŠ-PAP-PAP] will g[ive] mMutakkil-Marduk
12. a-na mmu-tak-kil-dŠU2 i-[dan] the silver with its interest.
This text governs three situations: if mNinurta-a u-u ur brings witnesses
to establish that he has paid the debt (lines 4–7); if the witnesses testify
that m Ninurta-a u-u ur is actually a debtor (lines 7–9); or if mMutakkil-
Marduk brings witnesses that mNinurta-a u-u ur still owes him the debt
(lines 10–12).50 The inclusion of all three of these possibilities indicates
that at the time of the text’s promulgation, neither m Ninurta-a u-u ur
nor mMutakkil-Marduk was able to substantiate his claim. This text,
then, is a Neo-Assyrian equivalent to the Neo-Babylonian general kunnu-
type summons. It was composed in order to obtain witnessed testimony
to substantiate disputed claims.
This chapter has explored some of the points of contact between the
Neo-Babylonian tablet trail and litigation records from earlier periods.
The identification of parallel text-types and procedures situates the
49
See also Jas, SAAS 5, No. 30 and the discussion on p. 49. For summonses to
oaths, see SAAS 5, No. 55 and No. 56.
50
For this interpretation of the text, see Jas, SAAS 5, p. 83.
Neo-Babylonian texts within the broader spectrum of cuneiform law.

This allows one to consider the historical relationship between the legal
practices in different periods. Are the procedural similarities the result
of the universal needs of legal systems or do they attest to a deeper
continuity? This question comes into sharp focus with regard to the
tablet trail itself. Do similarly-worded text-types reflect a tradition of
legal writing? The evidence may require distinguishing between the
decision records and other text-types. The decision records are attested
throughout the history of cuneiform law and show strong connections
in both form and function between the texts in different periods. This
suggests that they were composed in a manner influenced by tradition.
The parallels between other text-types attest to the fact that courts
throughout the history of cuneiform law documented not only their
final decisions, but also various other stages of the adjudicatory process.
Nevertheless, the poor attestation of the other text-types and the formal
variation between the parallels warrant questioning the influence of
tradition in their composition.
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INDEX OF CUNEIFORM TEXTS CITED
AASOR 16, No. 71 304 (n.) Böhl, Leiden Coll. 3, No. 874 44; 243
Abraham, Business, No. 17 119 (n.); (n.); 256; 259; 264
123–128; 209 (n.) BRM 1, 70 115 (n.)
Abraham, Business, No. 45 119 (n.);
124–128; 209 (n.) Camb 329 90; 97; 99
Abraham, Business, No. 85 176–177; Camb 412 63–66
179 Camb 426 115–116
AnOr 8, 21 102 (n.); 107; 111 CH 13 317
AnOr 8, 27 91; 273–275; 288 (n.); 289 CT 2, 2 99; 101; 284 (n.)
AnOr 8, 37 122 (n.); 123 (n.); 126; CT 2, 39 305
254 (n.); 257 CT 2, 46 305
AnOr 8, 38 94 CT 4, 13a 310 (n.)
AnOr 8, 39 151 (n.); 155 (n.); 158 (n.); CT 46, 45 223 (n.); 262 (n.)
161 CT 47, 12/12a 310 (n.)
AnOr 8, 45 198; 200 CT 48, 1 310 (n.)
AnOr 8, 46 198; 201 Cyr 184 66
AnOr 8, 47 (=TCL 13, 138) 94; 270 Cyr 199 107; 112
(n.); 283 (n.); 285 (n.) Cyr 243 112
AnOr 8, 50 122; 127; 254 (n.); 257 Cyr 293 113 (n.); 115–116
AnOr 8, 55 115–116 Cyr 301 27 (n.); 34 (n.); 44; 254 (n.);
AnOr 8, 56 95; 283–284 257; 264
AnOr 8, 61 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 153 (n.); Cyr 307 212; 216
158 (n.); 161; 294 (n.) Cyr 311 143 (n.); 148; 151; 165 (n.)
AnOr 8, 79 63 (n.); 66; 203 (n.) Cyr 312 34; 35 (n.); 37 (n.); 44; 148;
226 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.); 251 (n.);
BE 6/1, 6 310 (n.) 257; 264–265
BE 8/1, 29 74 (n.); 77; 79 Cyr 318 115–116
BE 8/1, 48 126 Cyr 328 102 (n.); 105; 109
BE 8/1, 107 242 (n.); 259–260; 265 Cyr 329 90 (n.); 95
BE 9, 24 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 153; 159; Cyr 332 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 44; 65;
162 224 (n.); 226 (n.); 233 (n.); 239 (n.);
BE 9, 69 70 (n.); 71 (n.); 73 240 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.)
BE 10, 9 83; 250 (n.)
BIN 1, 113 134 (n.); 135–137; Dalley, Edinburgh, No. 69 25 (n.); 38;
140–142; 145; 277 (n.) 45; 227–229; 231; 236 (n.); 240 (n.);
BIN 1, 141 79 (n.); 83; 231 (n.) 242; 253; 304 (n.)
BIN 1, 142 99; 101 Dar 53 261 (n.)
BIN 1, 169 209 (n.); 217 Dar 128 102 (n.); 109
BIN 2, 108 114 (n.); 115–116 Dar 149 260 (n.); 265
BIN 2, 115 (=YOS 7, 23) 102 (n.); Dar 159 132
105; 108 Dar 187 115 (n.)
BIN 2, 116 217; 294 (n.) Dar 189 125 (n.); 127
BIN 2, 134 34; 36 (n.); 40 (n.); 44; 226 Dar 229 130–131 (n.); 202; 206–207;
(n.); 238 (n.); 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 210
(n.); 283 (n.) Dar 260 79–81; 83; 250 (n.)
330 index of cuneiform texts cited
Dar 299 198–199; 201 MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 4 126;

Dar 358 198 (n.); 201; 252 (n.); 292 (n.) 128 (n.); 130–131 (n.)
Dar 410 64; 67; 260–261; 265 MacGinnis, Iraq 60 (1998), No. 9 90
Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 6 272 (n.) (n.); 91
Durand, Textes babyloniens, Nos. McEwan, LB Tablets, No. 38 70 (n.); 71
58/59 23–25; 34–35; 36 (n.); 41; (n.); 72; 231 (n.); 236 (n.)
238–239; 243 (n.); 245 (n.); 247–248; MDP 22, 160 306 (n.)
253 (n.); 264; 304 (n.) Meissner BAP 80 309 (n.)
Durand, Textes babyloniens, No. 60 34;
35 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 37 (n.); 43; Nbk 52 129 (n.); 134 (n.); 138 (n.);
57–59; 226 (n.); 238 (n.); 243 (n.); 245 144; 164 (n.); 239 (n.)
(n.); 246; 247 (n.); 248 (n.) Nbk 104 151 (n.); 160
Nbk 109 77; 79; 261; 263–264
Evetts, Ner. 36 83 Nbk 116 261 (n.)
Evetts, Ner. 55 198–200 Nbk 183 133 (n.); 134 (n.); 138 (n.);
144; 164 (n.); 241 (n.)
Figulla, Iraq 13 (1951), pp. 95–101 Nbk 227 142; 144; 239 (n.)
47–52; 55; 61; 279 (n.); 295; 296 (n.); Nbk 266 134 (n.); 135 (n.); 140–141
299 (n.); 142; 144; 239 (n.)
Nbk 344 111
GCCI 1, 380 151–152 (n.); 153 (n.); Nbk 361 134 (n.); 144; 241 (n.)
155 (n.); 158 (n.); 160 Nbk 363 144; 241 (n.)
GCCI 2, 115 171; 179 Nbk 365 134 (n.); 138–139; 141 (n.);
GCCI 2, 195 113 142; 144; 164 (n.); 241 (n.)
Greengus Ishchali, No. 25 305 Nbk 366 133 (n.); 134 (n.); 135 (n.);
138 (n.); 143 (n.); 145; 164; 241 (n.)
Hallo-Tadmor, IEJ 27 (1977), pp. Nbk 379 129; 132
1–11 305 (n.) Nbk 419 138 (n.); 141 (n.); 143 (n.);
145; 164 (n.); 241 (n.)
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 4 313–316 Nbn 13 27 (n.); 34 (n.); 35; 36 (n.);
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 10 306 (n.) 40; 41; 122 (n.); 224–226; 233 (n.);
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 15 313 (n.); 315 (n.) 239 (n.); 240–241; 242 (n.);
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 30 318 (n.) 243 (n.)
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 46 315–316 Nbn 64 44
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 53 318–319 Nbn 68 99–101; 240 (n.)
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 54 313–314 Nbn 69 113
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 55 318 (n.) Nbn 102 120–122; 126
Jas, SAAS 5, No. 56 318 (n.) Nbn 343 143 (n.); 148–150
JEN 344 317 Nbn 355 26; 259–260
JEN 355 317 Nbn 356 32; 42; 226; 238 (n.); 240
JEN 390 315 (n.) (n.); 243–244; 253; 255; 259
Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 251 25 Nbn 495 39 (n.); 40; 46; 229; 231
(n.); 63; 67; 231 (n.); 260 (n.); 265; Nbn 668 70–72; 254 (n.)
304 (n.) Nbn 679 134 (n.); 137–138; 145; 215
Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 268 198 (n.); 240
(n.); 200; 252 (n.); 292 (n.) Nbn 682 213; 215–216
Joannès, Archives de Borsippa, p. 276 128 Nbn 738 256; 264
(n.); 131–132 Nbn 954 198 (n.); 200; 252 (n.); 292 (n.)
Jursa, Das Archiv des Bēl-Rēmanni, Nbn 958 110; 113
pp. 128–129 64; 67; 231 (n.); 240 (n.) Nbn 1113 38 (n.); 39 (n.); 45; 230;
Jursa, WZKM 86 (1996), pp. 197–211 235–237; 240 (n.); 243 (n.);
285 (n.); 289 (n.) 244 (n.); 256; 264
index of cuneiform texts cited 331
Nbn 1128 25 (n.); 35; 38 (n.); 40; 45; TCL 12, 50 151 (n.); 160
238 (n.); 240 (n.); 245; 304 (n.) TCL 12, 60 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 160
TCL 12, 70 151 (n.); 154–156; 160
Oberhuber, Florenz, No. 155 92; 269 (n.) TCL 12, 77 171 (n.); 172–175; 176
OIP 122, 34 134 (n.); 138 (n.); 141 (n.); 178
(n.); 144; 164 (n.) TCL 12, 86 34 (n.); 42; 238 (n.); 243
OIP 122, 35 154; 160 (n.); 247 (n.)
OIP 122, 38 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); TCL 12, 89 171 (n.); 174–175; 176
37 (n.); 44; 122 (n.); 226 (n.); 233 (n.); (n.); 178
240 (n.); 243 (n.); 253 (n.); 257–258; TCL 12, 96 143 (n.); 148; 149 (n.);
265 150; 163 (n.)
TCL 12, 106 155 (n.); 158 (n.); 161
PBS 2/1, 85 171 (n.); 175; 177; 179 TCL 12, 117 93; 268 (n.)
PBS 2/1, 126 133 (n.); 134 (n.); 145 TCL 12, 119 47 (n.); 60; 240 (n.); 276
PBS 2/1, 140 67; 231 (n.) (n.); 283 (n.); 284 (n.); 285 (n.)
PRU 3, pl. 99 305 (n.) TCL 12, 120 256; 264
TCL 12, 122 26 (n.); 43; 70; 72; 253 (n.)
Roth, AfO 36/37 (1989/1990), TCL 13, 125 102 (n.); 105; 109
No. 1 38 (n.); 39; 46; 240 (n.); 243 TCL 13, 131 171 (n.); 175 (n.); 176
(n.); 244 (n.) (n.); 179
Rutten, RA 41 (1947), pp. 99–103 63 TCL 13, 132 90; 94; 276 (n.)
(n.); 64; 66; 231 (n.) TCL 13, 133 94
TCL 13, 134 109; 120 (n.)
Sack, CuDoc, No. 77 112 TCL 13, 138 (=AnOr 8, 47)
Sack, CuDoc, No. 78 112 TCL 13, 142 212; 216
Sack, CuDoc, No. 80 143 (n.); 147–148; TCL 13, 147 47 (n.); 61; 296 (n.)
149 (n.); 150; 165 (n.) TCL 13, 157 171 (n.); 184–185; 188; 195
Scheil, RA 12 (1915), pp. 1–13 25 (n.); TCL 13, 161 197; 201
34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 37 (n.); 38 (n.); TCL 13, 170 48 (n.); 61; 249 (n.); 270
41; 224 (n.); 226 (n.); 232–234; 235 (n.); 285 (n.); 290 (n.)
(n.); 236–237; 242 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 TCL 13, 179 96; 290 (n.)
(n.); 247; 248 (n.); 264; 304 (n.) TCL 13, 181 98; 290 (n.)
Scheil, RA 14 (1917), p. 155 183 (n.); TCL 13, 212 74 (n.); 78–79
188 (n.); 191–194; 277 (n.) TCL 13, 219 (=Wunsch, CM 20,
Spar, AOAT 203, No. 1 93; 293 No. 90) 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 37 (n.); 43;
Spar, AOAT 203, No. 2 96; 270 (n.); 243 (n.); 245 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.);
279 (n.); 283 (n.) 253 (n.)
Spar, AOAT 203, No. 3 95 TCL 13, 222 198; 201; 223 (n.); 258
Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 1 198 (n.); Tsukimoto, Acta Sumerologica 14 (1992),
200 No. 44 305 (n.)
Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 6 112 TuM 2–3, 213 132
Stigers, JCS 28 (1976), No. 39 111
Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 106 70 (n.); UCP 9/1, 53 209 (n.); 213–216
71 (n.); 73; 231 (n.)
Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 109 70 (n.); VAS 4, 87 73; 261 (n.)
71 (n.); 73; 250 (n.) VAS 6, 38 74 (n.); 77–79
Stolper, Entrepreneurs, No. 110 64; 67; VAS 6, 43 261 (n.)
231 (n.) VAS 6, 45 110; 113
VAS 6, 89 74–77; 79
TCL 1, 104 304 (n.); 305 VAS 6, 97 197; 200
TCL 9, 102 28 (n.) VAS 6, 99 118 (n.); 122–123; 126;
TCL 11, 245 310 (n.) 257 (n.)
332 index of cuneiform texts cited
VAS 6, 120 198 (n.); 201 Wunsch, BA 2, No. 46 14 (n.); 44;

VAS 6, 127 81–83 233 (n.); 243 (n.); 247 (n.); 248
VAS 6, 154 202; 204–205; 210 (n.); 250 (n.); 251 (n.); 252 (n.);
VAS 6, 171 63; 66; 263 293 (n.)
VAS 6, 253 113; Wunsch, BA 2, No. 47 14 (n.); 44; 243
VAS 7, 7/VAS 7, 152 310 (n.) (n.); 244 (n.); 249 (n.)
VAS 8, 108 309 (n.) Wunsch, BA 2, No. 48 14 (n.); 72; 122
VAS, Neue Folge 4, No. 126 93; 286 (n.) (n.); 242 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.)
Wunsch, CM 20, No. 59 83
Weidner, AfO 17 (1954–1956), pp. 1–5 Wunsch, CM 20, No. 84 14 (n.); 43
72; 239; 262 Wunsch, CM 20, No. 90 (=TCL 13,
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), 219)
No. 5 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 36 (n.); 41; Wunsch, CM 20, No. 112 14 (n.);
238 (n.); 239 (n.); 243 (n.); 253 (n.) 25–26; 38 (n.); 39 (n.); 46; 229; 231;
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), 238 (n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.)
No. 6 25 (n.); 32; 41; 226 (n.); 238
(n.); 239; 243 (n.); 303–304 YNER 1, 2 155 (n.); 158 (n.); 162;
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), 293–294
No. 13 44; 70; 72 YOS 6, 18 (=YOS 19, 100) 83; 231
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), (n.)
No. 19 43; 226 (n.); 238 (n.); 240 YOS 6, 57 102 (n.); 111
(n.); 243 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.) YOS 6, 64 180 (n.); 183 (n.); 188 (n.);
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), 190; 194; 277 (n.)
No. 20 42 YOS 6, 77 91; 286 (n.); 288; 289 (n.)
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), YOS 6, 79 108
No. 21 32–33; 36 (n.); 42; 226 (n.); YOS 6, 88 102 (n.); 111
238 (n.); 240 (n.); 243 (n.); 246; YOS 6, 92 34 (n.); 35 (n.); 42; 55–56;
253 (n.) 226 (n.); 227 (n.); 233 (n.); 237 (n.);
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), 242 (n.); 296 (n.)
No. 22 44 YOS 6, 108 143 (n.); 150
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), YOS 6, 116 92; 100; 283 (n.)
No. 23 44 YOS 6, 122 152–153; 155 (n.); 160
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997/1998), YOS 6, 123 48 (n.); 60; 171 (n.);
No. 25 44 173–175; 178; 282; 283 (n.)
Wunsch, AfO 44/45 (1997–1998), YOS 6, 131 102 (n.); 106–108;
No. 37 44; 247 (n.) 279–280
Wunsch, Altorientalische Forschungen 24 YOS 6, 134 151 (n.); 153 (n.); 155 (n.);
(1997), pp. 231–241 242 (n.) 160
Wunsch, AuOr 15 (1997), No. 12 YOS 6, 137 91; 286 (n.); 287 (n.); 289 (n.)
90–91; 250 (n.) YOS 6, 144 198–200; 285–286
Wunsch, AuOr 17–18 (1999–2000), pp. YOS 6, 148 155 (n.); 160
241–254 27 (n.); 38 (n.); 39 (n.); 45; YOS 6, 152 171 (n.); 175 (n.); 178
198 (n.); 230; 236 (n.); 239 (n.); 240 YOS 6, 153 142; 145; 148 (n.)
(n.); 243 (n.); 254 (n.) YOS 6, 156 93; 270 (n.); 283 (n.); 284
Wunsch, BA 1, pp. 356–357 126 (n.); 285 (n.); 293 (n.)
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 9 25 (n.); 64; 66; YOS 6, 160 151 (n.); 160; 163 (n.)
304 (n.) YOS 6, 169 (=YOS 6, 231) 48 (n.); 60;
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 42 14 (n.); 38 (n.); 164 (n.); 283 (n.); 291–294
39 (n.); 45; 228–231 YOS 6, 175 150
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 44 14 (n.); 44; 233 YOS 6, 177 151 (n.); 158 (n.); 161
(n.); 243 (n.); 244 (n.); 246; 248–249; YOS 6, 179 151 (n.); 158 (n.); 161
251–252; 293 (n.) YOS 6, 180 151 (n.); 161; 163 (n.)
Wunsch, BA 2, No. 45 14 (n.); 44; 241 YOS 6, 183 107 (n.); 111
(n.); 244 (n.); 247 (n.); 248 (n.); 250 YOS 6, 191 151 (n.); 156–158; 161;
(n.); 251 (n.); 261 (n.) 164
index of cuneiform texts cited 333
YOS 6, 193 151 (n.); 158 (n.); 161 YOS 7, 102 96; 270 (n.); 275 (n.)
YOS 6, 194 184–185; 187–188; 189; YOS 7, 106 96
194 YOS 7, 107 112
YOS 6, 202 198 (n.); 200; 292 (n.) YOS 7, 109 171; 179
YOS 6, 203 151 (n.); 155 (n.); 161 YOS 7, 111 180 (n.); 183; 188 (n.);
YOS 6, 204 151 (n.); 152 (n.); 155 (n.); 190; 194; 277 (n.)
158 (n.); 161 YOS 7, 113 197; 201
YOS 6, 206 189; 194; 277 (n.) YOS 7, 115 180 (n.); 183 (n.); 188 (n.);
YOS 6, 208 143 (n.); 146–147; 150; 195
165 (n.) YOS 7, 128 62; 249 (n.); 269–270;
YOS 6, 213 188 (n.); 190–194; 276 (n.); 284 (n.); 285 (n.); 296 (n.);
277 (n.) 298–299
YOS 6, 214 151 (n.); 155–156 (n.); YOS 7, 137 180–184; 186; 188 (n.);
158 (n.); 161; 164 190; 195; 254 (n.); 258; 265
YOS 6, 222 91; 273 (n.) YOS 7, 140 86–88; 98; 283 (n.); 284
YOS 6, 223 85 (n.); 92; 286–288 (n.); 285 (n.)
YOS 6, 224 92; 290 (n.); 291 YOS 7, 141 151 (n.); 155–156 (n.); 162
YOS 6, 225 48 (n.); 60; 249 (n.); 270 YOS 7, 146 97; 284 (n.); 285 (n.)
(n.); 276; 284 (n.); 285 (n.) YOS 7, 149 97; 270 (n.); 284 (n.);
YOS 6, 231 (=YOS 6, 169) 285 (n.)
YOS 6, 235 92; 164; 270 (n.) YOS 7, 152 97; 290 (n.)
YOS 7, 7 47 (n.); 54; 55 (n.); 60; YOS 7, 153 115–116
269–272; 275; 278–279; 283 (n.); YOS 7, 158 96; 270 (n.)
295; 296 (n.) YOS 7, 159 96; 122 (n.); 254 (n.); 258;
YOS 7, 10 102 (n.); 103–104; 108; 289 265; 270 (n.); 277–278; 313 (n.)
YOS 7, 14 108 YOS 7, 161 47 (n.); 52; 55–56; 59; 61;
YOS 7, 18 116 86; 88–89; 258; 265; 295 (n.)
YOS 7, 22 112 YOS 7, 165 114–116
YOS 7, 23 (=BIN 2, 115) YOS 7, 170 188 (n.); 195
YOS 7, 24 151 (n.); 161 YOS 7, 177 180 (n.); 183 (n.); 195
YOS 7, 25 171 (n.); 178 YOS 7, 189 121; 122 (n.); 127; 254
YOS 7, 26 151 (n.); 161 (n.); 257
YOS 7, 27 171 YOS 7, 192 134 (n.); 137–138; 140
YOS 7, 31 118; 120; 123 (n.); 126; (n.); 145
223 (n.); 257 YOS 7, 194 202; 207–210
YOS 7, 35 133 (n.); 136 (n.); 140–141; YOS 7, 198 98
145; 281–282 YOS 17, 32 151 (n.); 154; 160;
YOS 7, 42 94; 279 (n.); 286 (n.); 288 (n.) 163 (n.)
YOS 7, 44 197 (n.); 201 YOS 17, 320 78–79
YOS 7, 50 202–203; 210 YOS 19, 90 62; 268
YOS 7, 56 212; 216 YOS 19, 91 62; 250 (n.); 276 (n.); 285
YOS 7, 58 171 (n.); 179 (n.); 297–298
YOS 7, 66 48 (n.); 50; 54; 55; 62; 270 (n.) YOS 19, 92 92; 100 (n.); 240 (n.);
YOS 7, 68 169–172; 175; 178 283 (n.)
YOS 7, 77 212 (n.); 217 YOS 19, 95 111
YOS 7, 78 90; 95; 279 (n.); 283 (n.); YOS 19, 97 151 (n.); 160
288 (n.), 289 YOS 19, 98 151–152 (n.); 153 (n.);
YOS 7, 88 93; 270 (n.); 272–273; 275 (n.) 158 (n.); 160
YOS 7, 91 94; 100 (n.); 283 (n.) YOS 19, 100 (=YOS 6, 18)
YOS 7, 92 216 YOS 19, 101 28–32; 43; 226 (n.); 237;
YOS 7, 96 143 (n.); 146 (n.); 151 240 (n.); 242 (n.); 243 (n.); 247 (n.);
YOS 7, 97 95; 270 (n.); 273 (n.); 276 248 (n.); 253 (n.)
(n.); 279 (n.); 283 (n.) YOS 19, 110 209 (n.); 211–213; 216
INDEX AND GLOSSARY OF AKKADIAN
TERMS DISCUSSED
abāku (“to bring,” used to denote dīnu (“case, lawsuit”) 10; 78; 119;
summoning) 90; 134; 142 (n.); 163; 124–125; 128; 209 (n.); 223; 268;
167–168; 197; 233–234; 241; 275; 315–316
277–278; 291–292; 313 dīna dabābu (“to argue a case”) 40;
type of summons 142 (n.); 79; 234–238; 314
167–177; 187; 189; 197; 203; dīnam dânum (Old Babylonian term for
280–281 “to judge a case”) 7 (n.)
abālu (“to bring,” used to denote dīna epēšu (“to judge a case”) 34
summoning) 34; 226; 233–234; 246; dīna gerû (“to bring suit”) 39; 79; 82;
248–249; 251–252; 275; 277–278; 224; 228–232; 238; 307
299; 313 dīna rašû (“to have a legal case”) 39;
adi (“by” a certain date) 130; 206–207 229–231
alāku (“to go, to come”) 118; 234 dīnam šū uzum (Old Babylonian
amāru (“to see, to inspect”) 273; 283 term for “to instruct regarding a
amātu (“words, statements”) 35; 243 case”) 7 (n.); 244 (n.)
ana (“to”) 102; 119; 133; 207
ana ma ri (“before” the judges) 34; 40 erēšu (“to demand”) 246; 317
ana pāni (“before, in the presence
of ”) 183 (n.); 198 ī u ša šarri/ša RN (“punishment of the
awātam amārum (Old Babylonian term for king/of RN”) 171 (n.); 180
“to see to the matter”) 7 (n.)
idātu (“signs, proofs”) 246; 294
baqāru (Old Babylonian term for “to inanna (“now”) 39
raise a claim”) 7 (n.); 309 ina ma ar (“before, in the presence
bīt dīni (“court of law”) 119; 223; of ”) 37; 40; 63–64; 233
257–258; 262 ina pāni (“before, in the presence
bu û (“to search”) 246 of ”) 77–78; 82; 99–100; 102;
119; 183; 198 (n.); 224; 268; 296;
dabābu (“to argue a case”) 77–78; 298–299
82; 118; 121; 124–128; 130; 197; dabābu ina pāni (“to argue in the
208–209; 230; 234–238; 313 (n.) presence of ”) 77–78
itti PN (“against PN”) 120; 209 (n.) mukinnū ša ina pānišunu (“the witnesses
type of summons 117–131; 140; before whom”) 54; 296
163–164; 206–208; 257; 313–316 ina piršāti (“falsely”) 212
dayyānu (lu2DI.KU5) (“judges”) 65; 77; ina qāt šibitti (“in possession of stolen
254 goods”) 153
ša šarri/ša RN (“of the king”/“of ina sarti (“unlawfully”) 104
RN” denoting “royal judges”) 27 ina ša āri uppi šuāti (“at the writing of
(n.); 224; 254–263 this tablet”) 37–38
dibbu (“argument”) 35–36; 119; 124; ina šemê dīni šuāti (“at the hearing of this
128; 207; 237; 243–244 case”) 37
dibbīšunu šemû (“to hear their ina ūmu (“on the day that”) 134; 151;
arguments”) 30; 33; 35; 243–244 209
dibba quttû (“to end a case, to ina ušuzzu (DU.ZU) (“in the presence
settle”) 129; 206 of ”) 51; 54; 89–90; 100–102;
index and glossary of akkadian terms discussed 335
128 (n.); 140; 155; 187; 212; 240 (n.); parāsu (“to decide”) 50; 253; 295
268; 275; 283 (n.); 296; 300 pu ru (UKKIN) (“assembly”) 110; 268;
itti (“with,” often in adversarial sense of 296
“against”) 119; 125 puqquru (“to claim”) 110; 231 (n.)
īzuzu (“to stand”) 269 (n.) purussû (EŠ.BAR) (“decision”) 35 (n.);
252–253
kanāku (“to seal”) 273 ina purussê dīni šuati (“at the decision
kašādu (“to arrive, to catch”) 40; 90; of this case”) 31; 33; 37–38; 223;
228–229 253
kašādu ana mu i (“to proceed purussâ šakānu (“to establish a
against”) 82 (n.) decision”) 34; 198
kî (“if, when, that”) 134; 209 (n.); 250;
290 qabû (“to speak, to say”) 34; 104
kinattû (“colleagues”) 260–261 (n.); 113; 228; 238; 248–250; 279;
kullumu (“to show”) 133 (n.); 239; 241; 282; 290
294 PN iqbi umma (“PN said thus”) 34;
kunnu (“to establish, to testify”) 90; 101–102; 226; 250
133–143; 197; 239–242; 248; 263; quttû (“to end, to settle”) 119 (n.); 130;
279; 282–283; 288 (n.) 197
type of summons 132–143; type of summons 117; 128–132;
149–150; 162–164; 172; 197; 205; 163–164; 206–207
239; 242; 246; 277 (n.); 280–282;
317–319 rēša našû (“to summon”) 277
ragāmu (“to bring suit”) 7 (n.); 39; 81;
lā ābātu (“treason”) 181 (n.) 229–232; 236; 238; 309
lišānšu (ša) (“declaration of,” form of text rakāsu (“to tie, to bind”) 273
at Nuzi) 311
šakānu (“to place, to present”) 78; 275
ma āru (“to approach) 34 šasû (“to call, to read”) 278 (n.); 283;
ma ar (“before, in the presence 313
of ”) 224; 240; 268; 283 šemû (“to hear, to evaluate
maš altu (“interrogation”) 90; 279 (n.); arguments”) 35–37; 233; 237; 241;
284–290 243–245; 249
mitluku (“to deliberate”) 30; 33; 36; 38; šunnû (“to relate”) 228
245 (n.); 252–253; 295 šuzkuru (“to cause to speak, to impose an
mukinnu (“witness”) 51; 54; 65; 78; 89; oath”) 293
99; 134; 223; 241; 296; 298–300 ša ālu (“to question”) 241–242;
mukinnūtu (“testimony”) 107; 115; 143; 247–251; 283–285; 289–290; 293 (n.)
241; 243; 283–284; 295
ta siltu/ta sistu (“memorandum”) 74;
našû (“to carry, to bring”) 100 76–77; 312
pūta našû (“to assume responsibility, to ta sistu lā masê (“memorandum, not to
guarantee”) 133; 143; 171 (n.); be forgotten”) 74; 99; 312
177 temû (“to swear”) 113; 290
rēša našû (“to summon”) 277–278 ina DN u adê ša RN temû (“to swear by
nadānu (“to give, to pay, to hand DN and the oaths of RN”) 250;
over”) 167–168; 253 290 (n.)
nīš DINGIR.MEŠ zakāru (“to pronounce uppi dīni (“tablet of legal
the oath the gods”) 248; 250–251; proceedings”) 26; 302–303; 316
290
umma (“thus”) 230; 311
paqādu (“to deposit”) 273
paqāri šubšû (“to raise a claim”) 39 (n.); zakû (“clear”) 138; 155
229; 231

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Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Neo-Babylonian court procedure / edited by Shalom Holtz.

Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by

printed in the netherlands

PART I: FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF TEXTS

Chapter One Decision Records .............................................. 23

Chapter Two Other Text-Types Including the Resolution of

Chapter Three Preliminary Protocols and Records of

3.C.2 Depositions of Testimony ................................ 107

Chapter Four The dabābu- and quttû-Type Summonses .......... 117

Chapter Five Text-Types Calling for Evidence ...................... 133

Chapter Six Text-Types Ensuring an Individual’s Presence .. 167

Chapter Seven Other Text-Types ........................................... 197

PART II: NEO BABYLONIAN ADJUDICATORY

Chapter Eight The Adjudication of Private Disputes:

8.H Questioning the Litigants: ša ālu ................................. 247

Chapter Nine The Adjudicatory Process in the Eanna ......... 267

Chapter Ten The Neo-Babylonian Tablet Trail in

10.E dabābu-Type Summonses ............................................. 313

Bibliography ................................................................................ 321

This book began as a 2006 University of Pennsylvania doctoral dis-

I have begun work on this anthology, provisionally entitled Neo-Babylonian

544 Belfer Hall

"‫ג' לפרשת "ואנכי אהיה ﬠם פיך‬

Summary Table 1.1 “Royal Judges Style A” Decision

The abbreviation of references follows Erica Reiner and Martha Roth,

Abraham, Business Kathleen Abraham, Business and Politics under the

A. Neo-Babylonian Legal and Administrative Texts: Their Contents

The textual legacy of southern Mesopotamia during the seventh,

This book adopts the broader use of the term ‘Neo-Babylonian.’ It

particular text to a particular archive usually cannot be based on where

B. Litigation Records: The Study of the “Tablet Trail”

The documents that survive from the Neo-Babylonian period attest

the decision as proof of ownership.14 Temple archives provide records

C. Studies of Litigation Records from Earlier Periods

Litigation records written in cuneiform are attested beginning in the Ur

• Adam Falkenstein’s Die Neusumerischen Gerichtsurkunden (1956);

All of these studies attempt to describe the adjudicatory process, or at

Falkenstein’s work is based on Sumerian court records from the Ur

Prozeßverfahren”) and “documents regarding trial actions” (“Urkunden über

Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 170–570.

Fortner, Adjudicating Entities, pp. 171–172.

a contract, with or without a penalty clause, helps us to understand the

Jas’s first classification of the Neo-Assyrian texts is based on formal

D. Need for the Present Study

In contrast with the abundance of studies of legal procedure in ear-

Babylonian legal proceedings before Wunsch’s comment and of some

G. J. P. McEwan’s edition of the texts in the Royal Ontario Museum

practices. It is true that the text-edition of a museum’s collection might

benefited from prosopographical monographs, which are indispensable

century has already seen an apparently renewed interest in the subject.

pertaining to the testimony of witnesses. Wells uses the litigation records

The proposed reconstruction of the ‘tablet trail’ of adjudicated cases

types, the discussion will also distinguish between different compositional

Apart from achieving a comprehensive text typology, the typological

FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF TEXTS

1.A The Legal Function of the Decision Record

On 26 Šebā u, year 2 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon, Rēmanni-Bēl

9. AD ša2 mdNA3–DU-IBILA ši-i (9–10) mRēmanni-Bēl said thus:

and her daughters to sell the land to mNabû-a ē-iddin. mNabû-a ē-

of decision records will be presented after the discussion of the “Royal