Spouses Latip v.

Chua (Goodwill money, Baclaran store lease)

Facts: Respondent Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.

Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a
contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.

Spouses Latip asserted that Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg.. According to Spouses
Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the
occupation of the finished cubicles.

MeTC and RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Latip but CA reversed the decision. CA ,in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the
ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill
money to the lessor.

Issue: WON Judicial notice was proper.

Held: No. Judicial notice does not meet the requisite of notoriety.

SC reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, which cited State Prosecutors:

… Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in
the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact
of which the court has no constructive knowledge.

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial
notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay
goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie,
found that the practice was of “common knowledge” or notoriously known.

We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the
amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her
petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had
paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for
matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of
evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by
Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What need not be proved.

Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was
held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised
with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly
resolved in the negative.

Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the
documentary evidence signed by both parties – the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
New Sun Valley Homeowners Assoc. V Sangguniang Bgy of Sun Valley July 27, 2011

Facts:

The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096[3] on
October 13, 1998, entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to
Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic,"

The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed a Petition[5] for a
"Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0420. NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV
Resolution No. 98-096 would "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected homeowners acquired their properties
for strictly residential purposes";[6] that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and "a
peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public places";[7] and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the
character of the subdivision.

NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended Petition its Position Paper[13] dated July 21, 1998, which set forth its objection to the
opening of the subject roads for public use and argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the subject
roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to effect such an act

Issue:

WON the court should take judicial notice.

Ruling:

No

In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.
Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. [69]

Petitioner dared to question the barangay's ownership over the subject roads when it should have been the one to adduce evidence
to support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy. Petitioner did not submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership,
which, as pointed out by respondents, consisted of closing the subject roads that belonged to the then Municipality of Parañaque
and were already being used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to the subdivision's homeowners, and collecting fees from
delivery vans that would pass through the gates that they themselves had built. It is petitioner's authority to put up the road blocks
in the first place that becomes highly questionable absent any proof of ownership.

On the other hand, the local government unit's power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local
Government Code, Section 21

Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to
establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for. It even
wants this Court to take "judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in
Philippine society."[71] This is absurd. The Rules of Court provide which matters constitute judicial notice, to wit:

Rule 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.--A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.(1a)
The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not support its
petition for injunctive relief in any way.
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code,
the petition must be denied.
 State Prosecutors vs Muro,
Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the
ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar
involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in
the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2
newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign
exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive
Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the
pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the
newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his
part.

The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported to be a public knowledge
based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an
act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting
evidence thereby depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking
judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and
effect of the law.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the statement of the
president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is
no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the President’s announcement in the newspaper,
believing that the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes
a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be
published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the President’s statement was published in
the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take
judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the
law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is
not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common
knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the
course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that
the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was
not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The
court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing
the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless
with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in Special Proceeding No.
10279, issued an Order[4] granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[6] in so far as the January
11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity

On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion
for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos,
Republic v Marcos II, August 4, 2009

Facts:

On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in Special Proceeding No.
10279, issued an Order[4] granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[6] in so far as the January
11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity

RTC issued Letters of Administration[7] to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato.

Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.

Issue:

1. THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE DENIED
AND DISCLAIMED THE VERY EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS WILL

2.THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT ITS ORDER OF JANUARY 11, 1996, WHICH
ADMITTED THE MARCOS WILL TO PROBATE AND WHICH DIRECTED THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY IN
SOLIDUM TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS EXECUTORS OF SAID MARCOS WILL, WAS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE
REPUBLIC ALONE.

Ruling:

This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and instead, accepts the explanation given by respondents, to wit:

Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they are disclaiming the existence of the will, but because of certain
legal grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the requisite interest to institute it; (b) the original copy of the will was not attached
to the petition for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is not qualified to be
appointed as administrator of the estate.[43]

1.
Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel as they
merely acted within their rights when they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the probate proceedings. More
importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were
fit to serve as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of
discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTC's discretion.

2. Petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on their own evidence and that respondents offered no
evidence to show that they were qualified to serve as executors. [45] It is basic that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[46] Consequently, it was the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to
substantiate the grounds upon which it claims that respondents should be disqualified to serve as executors, and having
failed in doing so, its petition must necessarily fail
People vs Colorado

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Colorado was charged with the crime of rape. According to the information, sometime in December, 2002 in the
evening in Sitio x x x, Brgy. Iliw-Iliw, Burgos, Pangasinan, the accused, being the brother of AAA, inside their house, by means of
force, threats and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, a twelve (12)
years (sic) old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. Colorado pleaded "not guilty" upon arraignment.
During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:
(1) the existence of the Medico Legal Certificate and the Birth Certificate of AAA;
(2) that Colorado is a full-blood brother of AAA; and
(3) that Colorado and AAA lived under the same roof.

After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Records indicate that AAA was born on October 10, 1990. She was the second to the
youngest in a family of twelve siblings. Colorado was an older brother who lived with her, their parents and two other brothers, BBB
and CCC, in Burgos, Pangasinan.

AAA testified that sometime in December 2002, her parents attended a wedding celebration somewhere in Hermosa, Dasol,
Pangasinan, leaving behind AAA, Colorado and their two other brothers in the house. When their parents had not yet arrived in the
evening, Colorado committed the dastardly act against AAA. She was twelve (12) years old at that time, while Colorado was already
twenty-four (24) years old. He approached AAA, held her two hands, even threatened her with a knife and covered her mouth with a
handkerchief. He then removed AAA’s shorts and panty, inserted his penis into the young girl’s vagina, then made a push and pull
movement. AAA tried to resist her brother’s sexual aggression, but miserably failed despite her efforts because of her brother’s
greater strength. Colorado later left AAA, who put back her shorts and underwear, but remained awake because of fear and trauma
with what she had gone through. On that same night, Colorado raped AAA twice more, unmindful of the presence of their two other
brothers who were then sleeping inside the room where Colorado ravished AAA. In both instances, Colorado still threatened AAA
with a knife, removed her shorts and panty, inserted his penis into his sister’s vagina, then performed the push and pull movement.
Colorado warned AAA that he would stab her should she report to anyone what he had done. AAA then did not dare reveal these
incidents to anybody, until she had the courage to report them to their mother. Also in her testimony before the trial court, AAA
disclosed that she had been raped by Colorado when she was just nine (9) years old. She also revealed having been ravished on
different dates by another brother, DDD, and a brother-in-law.

A Medico-Legal Certificate prepared by Dr. Ma. Teresa Sanchez (Dr. Sanchez), Medical Officer III of the Western Pangasinan
District Hospital who examined AAA on January 10, 2003, contained the following findings:
=INTERNAL EXAM FINDINGS:
-Nonparous Introitus-
-Hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock position with bleeding-
-Vagina admits 2 fingers with slight resistance-
-Uterus small-
-(+) bleeding-
xxxx

Defense: He denied having raped AAA, arguing that he was not living with AAA in their parents’ house in December 2002. Allegedly,
he was at that time staying with an older sister in Osmeña, Dasol. Colorado claimed that on the night of the alleged incident, he was
fishing with his brother-in-law, and that they returned to Osmeña, Dasol in the morning of the following day.

The Ruling of the RTC: Finding Colorado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity.

CA: On appeal, he sought his acquittal by arguing that the hymenal lacerations discovered by AAA’s examining doctor, and
considered by the trial court in determining his culpability, could have been caused not by him, but by the sexual aggressions
committed by their brother DDD or their brother-in-law unto AAA. The CA affirmed Colorado’s conviction, but modified his civil
liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted on the basis that the hymenal lacerations discovered by AAA’s examining doctor
could have been caused not by him, but by the sexual aggressions committed by their brother DDD or their brother-in-law unto AAA.

HELD:
No. Colorado was charged with the crime of rape, qualified by the victim’s minority and her relationship to her ravisher, as defined
and penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code. During cross-examination, AAA remained
steadfast, unwavering and spontaneous. Significantly also, her testimony is supported by the medical evidence on record, which
showed that she had a laceration in her hymen and was thus in a non-virgin state. The Court finds no cogent reasons to overturn
these findings. Indeed, it was established that Colorado succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the victim, employing force, threat
and intimidation that allowed him to consummate his bestial act. AAA had positively identified Colorado as her rapist.

Colorado also questions the weight of Dr. Sanchez’s medico-legal certificate, arguing that AAA’s hymenal lacerations could have
resulted from the sexual aggressions allegedly committed against her by DDD and their brother-in-law. Such contention, however,
deserves no consideration, given that results of an offended party’s medical examination are merely corroborative in
character. As explained by the Court in People v. Balonzo, a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of
rape, as even a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is
merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. An accused can still be convicted of rape on the basis of
the sole testimony of the private complainant. Furthermore, laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and
irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the
context that is used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Thus, even granting that AAA’s lacerations were not caused by
Colorado, the latter could still be declared guilty of rape, after it was established that he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
the victim.