OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. A.C. No. 4018.

March 8,
2005
FACTS: This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been
found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It
appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli
Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him.

The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent
of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents, but held guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-accused. As a
result of this finding, former President FVR issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached
by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned said AO before this Court through a petition
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the Office of the President did not have the
authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office and insisted that respondents violated the laws on
security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the
administrative complaint against him (herein respondent), but was dismissed for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order. Respondent MR was denied with finality.
On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had
proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious
threat to the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular
with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both
law and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of
Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented
by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his
office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation
of the Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the
various land titles involved in said dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment
suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order relative to the
transfer of venue of this case and penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of
Marawi City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President
was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the
professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, which pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of
law from a five-year suspension to a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that time, the matter had already been
endorsed to this Court.
ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the
employ of the government.
RULING: We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does
not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the
express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may,
however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of
the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of
his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge
of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature
cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we have previously
explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense
a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. Requesting Exemption From Payment of IBP Dues, B.M.
No. 1370, May 9, 2005
FACTS: On September 22, 2004, Atty Cecilo Arevalo, Jr. sought the exemption from the payment of
IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 in the years between 1977-2005. Atty. Cecilio Arevalo‘s
contention is that when he was admitted in the Philippines Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippines Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, and then migrated to and worked in, the USA until his
retirement in 2003. He maintained that he cannot be made to pay the IBP dues because, when he is
working in the Philippine Civil Service, the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice off one‘s profession
while in the Government service, also when he was in the USA the IBP dues cannot extend to him.
On November 16, 2004, the IBP submitted its comment, that the membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the roll of attorneys as long as
he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of
annual dues as determined by the IBP board of governors; the policy of the IBP board of governors of
no exemption of payment of annual dues is but an implementation of the Court‘s directives for all
members of the IBP to help defray the cost of integration of the Bar. It is maintained that there is no
rule allowing the exemption, of payment of annual dues as requested by Atty Arevalo, what is allowed
is the voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. What he could have done was to
inform the secretary of IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated, thus, reliving him from his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. On
February 25, 2005, in reply to the letter of the IBP, Atty. Arevalo questions the policy of the IBP board
of governors of the non-exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless
of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. Asserting that the said policy is a
suffers constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he
was inactive in the practice of law.
HELD: NO. The Integration of the Philippines Bar means that official unification of the entire lawyer
population, which requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua
non to the practice of law and retention of his name in the Roll of attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The Court stated that there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
in integration of the Philippine Bar. The fee required by the IBP is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP for the integration of the Philippine Bar to defray the expenses of regulation of
the profession, Lawyers, which no one is exempt.
In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao v. Severino G. Martinez, A.C.
No. 244, March 29, 1963
FACTS: Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged
him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who
caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's
name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for
examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required
pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended
Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the
credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation
therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Telesforo A. Diao, practically
admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the
educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
ISSUE/S: WON Diao be admitted to the Bar despite his misrepresentation.
HELD: No.Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations.
RATIO: Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940- 1941) of such college. Now, asserting he
had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously
certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. This
explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd
semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would
not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the
Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous"). The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;
taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
Tolosa VS Cargo
Facts; Complainant filed a disbarment case towards respondent claiming immorality. Alleging further
that Atty. Alfredo Cargo and his wife is having an affair and that his wife even left their conjugal home
to live and rent in a place paid by the respondent.
Several issues were also raised alleging immorality and altercations between the complainant and the
respondent.

Issue; WON Atty. Alfredo Cargo be disbarred.

Ruling; The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of the Solicitor General in not finding the
respondent guilty of immorality due to lack of sufficient evidence. However, the court ruled further to
WARN Atty. Alfredo Cargo and REPRIMAND him of conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and
an officer of the court.
Cerina B. Likong vs. Atty. Alexander H. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994
FACTS: Complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell L. Yap
pension checks which she regularly receives from the US government as a widow of a US pensioner.
The deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until her loan is fully paid. Cerina
likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get her pension checks from the
post office. About three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed the post office that
she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against Cerina. Respondent Alexander
H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared
for Cerina. Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does not bear the signatures of Cerina's
counsel, to allow the Yap to withdraw the pension checks. They likewise entered into a compromise
agreement without the participation of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated
that complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap and that they agreed that the amount would be
paid in monthly installments. Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions,
she was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two lawyers as she
was advised by Atty. Lim that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense
that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense
if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry
about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to
save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything. She alleged that she was
prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of LEGAL
ETHICS| ATTY. GUZMAN| CASE DIGESTS| CANONS 7-22| YEAR I BLOCK 2|14 mendacity
practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without authority, assumed to represent
complainant and connived in her defeat. Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had abandoned her
and it was upon her request that he made the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first
instructed Cerina to notify her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she
could not pay his attorney's fees. The compromise agreement prepared by respondent increased
Cerina‘s debt to Yap and the terms contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for violating Rule 8.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, constituting malpractice and grave misconduct.
RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated
in the complaint. There is no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to inform opposing counsel of the
compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the
alleged abandonment of Cerina by her counsel.Instead, even assuming that she was really
abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the
result was the execution of the compromise agreement which is grossly and patently
disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's conduct is unbecoming a
member of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 8.02 — A
lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
 Dallog-Galiciano v. Castro 474 SCRA 1

Facts: Atty. Dallong-Galicinao, a Clerk of Court of the RTC of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit against respondent Atty. Castro for
Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The cause of action stemed from the utterance of profane languages by the respondent against the
complainant in relation to a civil case where the respondent is a counsel causing embarrassment and humiliation to the
complainant.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has violated the CPR on conduct that adversely reflect on his fitnessto practice law

Held: The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. People are accountable for
the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done
cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

Vda de Victoria v. CA 449 SCRA 319

Every lawyer pledges to act with “candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

The Supreme Court granted petitioner Mario Victoria (Victoria) an extended period to file the petition, conditioned,
however, on the timeliness of the filing of the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari. It is
a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought
to be extended. Where a motion for extension of time is filed beyond the period of appeal, the same is of no effect since
there would no longer be any period to extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from the will have become
final and executory.

In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period to appeal had in fact expired
almost 10 months prior to the filing of Victoria’s motion for extension of time on April 10, 2001. The Registry Return
Receipt of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was
received by counsel for Victoria’s agent on June 5, 2000. Hence, Victoria had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file
an appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration.

In the same Decision, the Court noted that Victoria, with the aid of his counsel, Atty. Abdul Basar (Atty. Basar), made
misleading statements in his Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari and in his subsequent
Petition respecting the timeliness of his appeal and the status of the Resolutions of the CA.

Consequently, the SC ordered Victoria and Atty. Basar, to show cause, within 10 days from receipt of the Decision, why
they should not be held in contempt of court and disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Basar can be held liable in contempt of court and for misconduct

HELD:

As part of his or her oath, every lawyer pledges to act with ―candor, fairness and good faith to the court.‖ Thus, a
lawyer is honor bound to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation
and in his relations with his client, the opposing part and his counsel, and the court before which he pleads his client’s
cause.

Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility obligates lawyers to ―observe the rules of procedure and not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.‖

It is, therefore, lamentable that Atty. Basar, by misrepresenting the timeliness of an appeal from a final and executor
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, chose to disregard the fundamental tenets of the legal profession. In fact, from his
explanation, he was well aware that the reglementary period for appeal from the Decision of the RTC had already
lapsed, but he nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for review on certiorari.

Allied bank vs CA 416 SCRA 65

Facts:

Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking wherein it is agreed that the bank
reserves the right to transfer or assign respondent to other departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and
in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to the public.”Private respondent was promoted several
times and was transferred to several branches.

Petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City
having been stationed in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred
toBacolod. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal.Subsequently, petitioner bank
informed private respondent that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch but the respondent refused.

On 5 October 1994, Galanida received a memo that Allied Bank had terminated his services effective 1 September 1994.
The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) Galanida’s continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu
City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.

Labor Arbiter- Galanida’s transfer was inconvenient

NLRC- Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause.

CA- Affirmed NLRC ruling.

Issue:

w/n Galanida’s continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which
is a just cause for termination under the Labor Code.

Held:

The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.The phrase refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered
insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family” does not
appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. (misleading the court. Gawa gawa)

GR: The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement
of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employee’s salary, benefits
and other privileges.[24] In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the transfer is not
unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.Dosch case not applicable to the present case. The
transfer of an employee to an overseas post cannot be likened to a transfer from one city to another within the country.
Willful refusal to be transferred within the Philippines based on personal grounds was considered willful disobedience.

Zaldivar v. Gonzales 166 SCRA 316

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to
investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist
Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even
had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s
issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course”.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his
side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of
speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into
error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to
ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court
betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What
Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and
the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the
dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than
that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be
bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court
approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the
practice of law.

Paradero v. Abragan G.R. no 158917

Facts:
An Ejectment suit was filed against petitioner Paradero on the ground that the petitioner, without his consent and by
means of stealth, occupied and built a house on a lot registered in his name, located in Palao, Iligan City. After failure to
answer, respondent filed a Motion for judgment. The judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent and petitioner
was act vacate the lot, pay monthly rental, and reimburse the plaintiff for expenses of litigation. Petitioner filed a motion
for appeal as well as an urgent motion for reconsideration and/or lifting the order and Fixing of the Supersedeas Bond.
The motions were denied by the trial court.

Issue:
Should the Court allow the filing of the supersedeas bond by the herein defendant

Held:
The answer is in the negative. Defendant failed to show any good cause sufficient for this Court to exercise its discretion
in her favor. Her mere allegation that she has a meritorious defense is not the good cause contemplated in the
Tagulimot case. On the contrary, her failure to file a motion for fixing of the supersedes bond to stay execution pending
appeal from the time her counsel Atty. Lolito Jadman, filed the notice of appeal on June 26, 2002 to August 5, 2002
when she filed the motion to fix supersedeas bond is not consistent with her desire to stay execution of the judgment.
Her indifference, if not negligence, is indicative of lack of interest on her case.

Another issue: FORUM SHOPPING

There is forum shopping when, in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action
and relief sought. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present:

1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions;

2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

In the case at bar, the parties to the instant petition and in the one filed with the Court of Appeals are identical. The
rights asserted are the same, i.e., to maintain peaceful possession of the disputed lot pending final adjudication of the
case. Likewise, similar reliefs are prayed for — to nullify the order of execution pending appeal and the writ of
demolition, such reliefs being founded on the same facts — the ejectment case filed with the trial court. A judgment in
the present certiorari case on the validity of the order of execution pending appeal and the writ of demolition will pre-
empt and amount to res judicata on the petition for review before the Court of Appeals, questioning, inter alia, the
legality of the same order and writ with prayer for an award of damages.