Rule 87
Case No. 3530 against the same defendants in the
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G.R. No. L-28298
November 25, 1983
ROSITA SANTIAGO DE BAUTISTA, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Rosendo de Guzman, deceased husband and father of
the defendants-appellants, was the owner and
operator of a passenger jeepney bearing Plate No.
TPU-4013, which was driven by Eugenio Medrano Y
Torres. It was Medrano who drove the vehicle in a
negligent and reckless manner when the jeepney
turned turtle thereby injuring passenger Numeriano
Bautista, husband and father of plaintiffs-appellees.
Numeriano Bautista sustained numerous physical
injuries causing his demise.
Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was accused and
convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence by
the trial court. On May 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman
died.
Because plaintiffs failed to collect P3,000.00 from
Medrano as part of the award granted to them by the
trial court, they filed a complaint against defendants-
appellants. They demanded from Rosendo de Guzman
and from the defendants-appellants the payment of
the sums of P3,000.00 as subsidiary liability; P10,000.00
as actual exemplary and moral damages and Pl,000.00
as attorney's fees for the suit by reason of the death of
Numeriano Bautista as related above, but Rosendo de
Guzman and later the herein defendants-appellants
refused to pay the same.
Defendants-appellants filed a motion to dismiss
contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the litigation and that the
complaint stated no cause of action. In support of said
motion, they maintained that the suit was for a money
claim against the supposed debtor who was already
dead and as such it should be filed in testate or
intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such
proceedings, after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the
creditors should initiate such proceedings, that the
heirs could not be held liable therefor since there was
no allegation that they assumed the alleged obligation.
The lower court sustained the motion to dismiss on
May 11, 1953. However, on December 14, 1954.
plaintiffs-appellees filed with the same trial court Civil
former case, with analogous allegations as those
embodied in the first complaint but further allege that
on June 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died intestate
and that intestate proceedings were filed in the same
court and docketed therein as Special Proceedings No.
1303-P, wherein on April 20, 1953, a project of partition
was presented in and approved by said Court with the
five heirs receiving their shares valued at P2,294.05
each, and on May 14, 1953, said intestate proceedings
were closed.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss with the same
grounds as enumerated in the former case, adding the
ground of res judicata. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss and ruled in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs-appellees are barred to
file their claim before the intestate proceedings.
RULING:
Yes. The failure of herein plaintiffs-appellees to present
their claims before the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed
period constituted a bar to a subsequent claim against
the estate or a similar action of the same import.
The termination of the intestate proceedings and the
distribution of the estate to the heirs did not alter the
fact that plaintiffs-appellees' claim was a money claim
which should have been presented before the probate
court. The liability of the late Rosendo de Guzman
arose from the breach of his obligations under the
contract of carriage between him and the unfortunate
passenger. The obligations are spelled out by law but
the liability arose from a breach of contractual
obligations. The resulting claim is a money claim.
The only instance wherein a creditor can file an action
against a distributee of the debtor's asset is under
Section 5, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court.
Even under the above rule, the contingent claims must
first have been established and allowed in the probate
court before the creditors can file an action directly,
against the distributees. Such is not the situation,
however, in the case at bar. The complaint herein was
filed after the intestate proceedings had terminated for the benefit of the estate. But this provision has
and the estate finally distributed to the heirs. reference primarily to funds that are lost by
embezzlement or alienation, and it cannot be
UST GN/ BEDA: It has been ruled that the only instance understood as making the manager of a going concern
wherein a creditor can file an action against a liable for proceeds of sales applied by him to the
distributee of the debtor’s assets is under Rule 88, proper uses of the business, as occurred in this case.
Sec.5. The contingent claims must first have been The proof shows that the personal property other than
established and allowed in the probate court before the products of the mill, sold by Antholtz in the manner
the creditors can file an action directly against the mentioned, was sold with the consent of the manager
distributees. of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., and with the consent of
the administrator of Walter Toehl, and the proceeds of
these sales, as well as the proceeds of the products of
the mill, were applied by Antholtz to the obligations
#4 incurred by him in running the business, without the
improper diversion of a single cent.
G.R. No. L-31672 February 14, 1930
EUGEN MARSCHALL, as judicial administrator of the
estate of Walter Toehl, deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
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CARL ANTHOLTZ, ET AL.,defendants.
CARL ANTHOLTZ, appellant. G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
STREET, J.: TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA
assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA,
FACTS: ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS,
assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners, vs.
Walter Toehl was the manager of Behn, Meyer & Co COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA,
and also its chemist. He was also the owner of a parcel LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA,
of land located in Sta. Ana, Manila. Toehl contracted NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA,
Antholtz to manage the land as oil mill. The two agreed CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
that Antholtz would conduct the business in his own ORFINADA, respondents.
name. Meanwhile, Antholtz was the owner of A. Murray TINGA, J.:
& Co. Toehl assumed possession of the corporation
with a view to reviving it using the assets of the oil mill. FACTS:
After Toehl’s death, it was found that he was short in
his account with Behn to the extent of P150 Million. A On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without
claim was made against the estate of Toehl. Marschall a will in Angeles City
was appointed administrator of the estate, and the leaving several personal and real properties located in
present action was institute to recover possession of Angeles City, Dagupan City and
the oil mill property and hold Antholtz personally liable. Kalookan City. He also left a widow, respondent
Behn presupposes that Toehl and Antholtz were in Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he
collusion to put the money in the oil mill. married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had
seven children who are the herein
ISSUE: respondents.
Whether or not Antholtz is liable. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the
decedent left in mourning his
RULING: paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.

YES. Any person, before the granting of letters

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James
testamentary or of administration on the estate of a
and Lourdes Orfinada,
deceased person, embezzles, or alienates, any of the
legitimate children of Alfonso, discovered that on June
effects of such deceased person, such person shall be
29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
liable to an action in favor of the executor or
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial
administrator of such estate for double the value of the
Settlement of Estate of a
property sold, embezzled, or alienated, to be recovered
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint
for
Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of
Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid
complaint interposing the defense that the property
subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial
settlement pertained to
properties originally belonging to the parents of
Teodora Riofero and that the titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance
but the decedent had managed
to register them in his name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to
prosecute the rights belonging
to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of
the administration proceedings.
RULING:
YES. Even if administration proceedings have already
been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if
an administrator has not yet been appointed. The
heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment
of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a
suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the
rights and the properties of the decedent are violated
or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator,
jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if
the executor or administrator is unwilling or
refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the
act complained ofand he is made a party
defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to
seek judicial relief to recover property of the
estate is as compelling when there is no appointed
administrator, if not more, as where there is an
appointed administrator but he is either
disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty
parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no
the legal standing to sue for the recovery of property
of the estate during the pendency of
administration proceedings has three exceptions,
the third being when there is no appointed
administrator such as in this case.
the
G.R. No. 216756,
August 08, 2018
GENOVEVA P. TAN, DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY
MELCHOR P. TAN AS THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE DECEASED PETITIONER, Petitioner v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU
OF CUSTOMS, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Assailed in this Petition for Review1 on Certiorari are
the July 29, 2013 Decision2 and February 5, 2015
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which granted
the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 118442 and
denied herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
respectively.
In 2002, the herein respondent, through the Bureau of
Customs, filed an Amended Complaint4 for collection
of sum of money with damages and prayer for
injunctive writ against Mannequin International
Corporation (Mannequin) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, on the cause of action that
Mannequin paid its 1995-1997 duties and taxes using
spurious Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) amounting to
P55,664,027.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 02-102639 and assigned to Branch 8 of the Manila
RTC. The original complaint was amended to include
other individuals - among them herein petitioner
Genoveva P. Tan (Genoveva) - as one of the
defendants.
After the respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence followed by an urgent
manifestation with leave of court to allow her to
change the caption of her demurrer to that of a motion
to exclude and drop her from the case and/or dismiss
the same as against her.

ISSUE:

RULING:

Court denies the Petition.

With Genoveva's death, Civil Case No. 02-102639 need

not be dismissed. The action against her survives as it
is one to recover damages for an injury to the State.
Rule 87, Section 1 of the Rules of Court17enumerates
actions that survive against a decedent's executors or
administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real
and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to
enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property.

It goes without saying then that xxx Genoveva's

exclusion would virtually render the entire proceedings
a futile recourse as far as the petitioner is
concerned. Verily, even if petitioner Republic of the
Philippines wins this case, the government will end
up with a pyrrhic victory as it cannot recover even
a single centavo from the other defendants. On the
other hand, it would be the height of injustice, and
surely unacceptable, that those who were
responsible for this grand fraud and benefited
therefrom would laugh their way to the bank and
enjoy their loot with impunity. It was, thus, essential
for the public respondent to exercise extreme caution
in dealing with xxx Genoveva's Motion to Exclude. In
the end, though, the public respondent chose to
mechanically and blindly adhere to the presumption of
regularity of public documents without due regard and
consideration to the palpable inconsistencies that
those public documents, themselves, reveal. There was
obviously a failure to exercise sound, judicial discretion
on the part of the public respondent in this
respect.20 (Emphasis in the original)