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Coursework Notes

Michael J. Hogan – unify Europe, exporting free market ideals. A continuation of pre-war
economic policy. Eval using JF Dulles’ speech mentioned in Origins of the Cold War Martin
McCauley textbook. Overemphasises economic aspect – only managed to get plan through
Congress because of Soviet aggression. There are two sources. Primary evidence for idea that
European integration came from junior officials with Kindleberger’s piece. LEADER

Cambridge history of the Cold War – Leffler: security. See:


https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YbcawAbaG_IC&pg=PA74&lpg=PA74&dq=leffler+mars
hall+plan&source=bl&ots=bgT_9c9nUe&sig=QWQaP7LBDGraUHamvXxfwVhVY9c&hl=en
&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjd48PHutvKAhWH7BQKHe5IAAEQ6AEIPTAD#v=onepage&q=leff
ler%20marshall%20plan&f=false Steven Hurst book. ‘wage a cold war and win it’

US foreign policy and democracy promotion- Martin H. Folly: Dollar imperialism. ‘postwar
system was designed by the US mainly to implement laissez-faire’ p165. Did was the USSR
involved in a new system – it would be mutually beneficial.

Jeffrey Tucker – The Marshall Plan Myth: Coorporatism, statism etc. ‘internationalisation of
the New Deal’ LEADER

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were two aspects of the same new American foreign
policy that developed after the war. They emerged from different sources, trends, and priorities, but
they belonged to the same concept and they aimed at the same objectives. The Truman Doctrine
was a policy aimed to prevent communist aggression against states in the non-Soviet orbit, and the
Marshall Plan was a policy of reconstruction, aiming at the creation of sound economic conditions
and the removal of threats to the stability of the European countries[11].

Hence it is clear that the United States’ ‘friendly’ policies had strong political underpinnings. Milward
argues that the Marshall Plan aimed at “the total political reconstruction of Western Europe, not just
its recovery. The goal was the integration of Western Europe into one common economic area (…)
and its ultimate integration into one common political area”. Ultimately, the process would lead to a
‘United States of Europe’[12]. Willy Brandt said in a speech at Harvard University that the Marshall
Plan was productive proof that America needed a self-confident Europe capable of forming a
common political will, and that the United States was waiting for Europe to grow into an equal
partner with whom it could share the burden of responsibility for world affairs. [13]

The aid was not a matter of pure generosity, but a strategic policy which in the long-term would
benefit the American people. Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton, after
Marshall the most important U.S. official in that time, said that:

“Let us admit right off that our objective has its background in the needs and interests of the people
of the United States. We need markets - big markets, in which to buy and sell.”[14]

Hence, as Milward also notices, the object of United States aid policies was to save Europe - and so
making the future safe for U.S. society
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=nAGsAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=acheson+may
+require+analogous,+technical+and+military+aid+on+our+part&source=bl&ots=nuhwiaC3Y
V&sig=31T-xL9l7gavPn01jCTSEN-
V3VE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiw_v3j_9vKAhVIaQ8KHZHuDPMQ6AEIKzAE#v=onepage&
q=acheson%20may%20require%20analogous%2C%20technical%20and%20military%20aid%
20on%20our%20part&f=false

‘Recalling the Work of the Harriman Committee’ by Averal Harriman is good for primary
evidence re Czechoslovakia.

http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/jcws(marshall%20orig).pdf The
second work, published in 2005, takes a more modern approach to the subject partly due to
the wider scope of available sources since 1995. Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe’s
paper The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan depicts the actions
of the US not as defensive but rather as an indirect offensive advancement against the
spread of communism. See http://www.historyinanhour.com/2012/02/09/the-marshall-
plan-and-the-cold-war/

The early students of the Marshall Plan saw it as an unmitigated success of American
generosity. Criticism of the Marshall Plan, however, became prominent among historians of the
revisionist school, such as Walter LaFeber, during the 1960s and 1970s. They argued that the
plan was American economic imperialism, and that it was an attempt to gain control over
Western Europe just as the Soviets controlled Eastern Europe. Far from generosity, the plan
was the result of U.S. geopolitical goals.

Harbutt: The Cold War Era P.34 – ‘it was calculated, however, that they would withdraw then
presented with the prospect of comprehensive American auditing of the proposed aid funds’

Ambrose and Brinkley: Rise to Globalism p85 – ‘Kennan and the State Department did not
want Soviet participation and did all they could to prevent it while making it appear that a
genuine offer was being made’

https://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/faculty%20pages/Tyler/Marshall_Plan.pdf ‘The
Marshall Plan subsidised US businesses at the expense of the US taxpayer’ p71. Use to back up
Tucker

Vickers: Use to evaluate Hogan, or claim altruism.

http://marshallfoundation.org/library/collection/harry-b-price-papers/#!/collection=190

Harry Price: ‘The Marshall Plan and its meaning –p.4 -Marshall became convinced that the Soviet
government was stalling for time, that it was far from being ready to cooperate in any reasonable
scheme for lessening distress and tension in Europe, and that it was in fact doing all it could to make
the existing situation worse.’ P. 5 ‘To these, the recovery program was important chiefly as a means
of bolstering the economic strength of free peoples and their will and capacity to resist subversion’
LEADER
 Super Imperialism: Argues Cold War was designed specifically by liberals to defend their
concepts of commercial and political freedom.
 Says the original intention had been to include Russia, with and IMF quota of eventually $1.2
billion at Bretton Woods, ascribed to the USSR.
 In 1945 Morgenthau wrote to Roosevelt to propose comprehensive aid to Russia, ‘that will
have and long range benefits for the US and for Russia.’
 Eventually he sent memorandum to Roosevelt suggesting $10 billion 35 year loan, 2%
interest to buy U,S construction goods.
 Moscow could solve reconstruction problems by placing massive orders for industrial
equipment, would help the US deal with its own postwar reconversion problems, and would
begin to integrate the SU into the multi-lateral system of world trade to which Washington
attached such great importance.
 He says the US wand to create a world economy revolving around the United States,
furthermore there were no major obstacles to Soviet membership in the IMF- it was the
technical issues, which caused problems. Such as Article V requiring nations to report their
gold holdings, which the USSR hadn’t done since 1936.
 US strategists originally believed Soviet membership in the Breton Woods institutions was
necessary to guarantee political and postwar stability.
 Credit should also be given to USSR as representatives at Breton Words agreed, due to losses
in human life, property destroyed and part she played in WW.
 Morgenthau also thought these long-term credits, guaranteed U.S access to Russia’s Rich raw
materials, as well as developing a market for U.S consumer goods.
 Dexter White placed a great emphasis on the US need for raw materials, as stocks had
seriously diminished during the war.
 Since both economies ‘have been fundamentally restructured by the war,’ there are ‘new and
larger dimensions which foreign trade can assume.’ – shown by way Unites States was
acquiring one-third of its manganese ore, half its chrome ore and more than half its platinum
from the SU. – use his footnote
 ‘both are reluctant to underwrite the credit risks and to stabilise the currency of the small
nations affected.
 Alvin Hansen supported by Kissinger argue for a ‘Partnership of Strength.’
 With this giant Russia in both population and industrial development, Germany is not able to
challenge world peace again. Russia did not have and expansionist economy and he contends
did not threaten US export and international investment to the extent Britain did.
 USSR however did have some major fears such as the potential dictatorship of world
commerce by the U.S economy.
 Soviet spokesman made it clear that ‘they did not fight the deadliest war in history in order to
make the world safe for British merchants and American exporters, perhaps why they refused
the US invitation to participate in the projected International Conference on Trade and
Employment.
 Molotov in 1946 refuted the idea that the US was implementing the principle of ‘equal
opportunity’. As with countries like Romania enfeebled by the war, or Yugoslavia ruined by
Italian and German fascists this simple allows American capital to penetrate unhindered into
Romanian or Yugoslav industry, which will cause the deterioration of the national industry of
these countries.
 Prince observed Soviet spokesmen have emphasised that although the USSR is in dire need of
consumer goods, they refuse to accept offer, as this may affect their aim to strengthen
Sovietism within the Soviet Union boundaries and to expand Sovietism into the Soviet
‘security zones’ in Europe.
 The issue was, would the political and economic costs of reconstructing Russia and building
up its post-war power be justified by involving them in the post-war world economy
revolving around the US. Felt it would impair U.S commercial designs for the post-war
world.
 Therefore direct loans of the type and amount offered to Britain were not to Russia
 Main issue was all benefits such as US penetration of its home markets, would be undone by
fact USSR wanted to become world rival to America.
 Situation led to US fears Russian military conquest would threaten laissez-faire
expansionism, thus mutual security treaties were drawn up which evolved into the Cold War.
US didn’t want a cold war, but they didn’t want insecurity either.
 Issue was US had policy where if a country showed themselves to be unwilling to join, they
had to be isolated so they could not threaten the economic interrelationships on which US
plans for the postwar economy were based- deemed better to suspend trade and investment
relations with these countries than to permit the threat of state-controlled export monopolies
and their uneconomic pricing policies.
 Article basically argues the US had an all or nothing view of Communist membership in the
world economy so: liberal, economic and political ideals ended in a plan for US autocracy,
free trade gave way to blocism and protectionism, open investment policies turned to controls
over the international movements of capital.

Leading Historian 1: Harry Price – argues that MP was defensive act to protect free peoples. ‘The
Marshall Plan and its meaning –p.4 -Marshall became convinced that the Soviet government was
stalling for time, that it was far from being ready to cooperate in any reasonable scheme for
lessening distress and tension in Europe, and that it was in fact doing all it could to make the existing
situation worse.’ P. 5 ‘To these, the recovery program was important chiefly as a means of bolstering
the economic strength of free peoples and their will and capacity to resist subversion’

X-ref: Peter Engholm – in his paper How reasonably can it be argued that the United States ‘rescued’
Western Europe in the years 1945-51?: ‘the Marshall Plan was a policy of reconstruction, aiming at
the creation of sound economic conditions and the removal of threats to the stability of the
European countries’

Primary: Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford ‘we were concerned about preventing Soviet
control of larger areas of the world than they already controlled…An enormous vacuum had been
left in the free world by the end of World War III, and the Soviet Union was determined to move into
that vacuum. However, might want to justify his action – hardly likely to admit cynical motives.

-ve X-ref: Depended on Individual – Kennan and State department more concerned with anti-
Communism. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe – The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: plan ‘was intended to
affect not only the most obvious countries like France and Italy, but also the smaller states under
Soviet control’ ‘This was certainly how George Kennan conceived of the plan’

Primary: Kennan wrote ‘It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to
enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival,
not a partner, in the political arena’… ‘It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its
actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist
movement’ in his anonymous article ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ in 1947.

IJ: Traditionalist view is limited – clear that Kennan and state department had a different view.

Leading Historian 2: Jeffrey Tucker – ‘the egregious and perpetual use of foreign aid for domestic
political and economic purposes’ with his examples

X-Ref: Tyler Cowen – ‘The Marshall Plan subsidies US businesses at the expense of the US taxpayer’
‘The orginial Marshall Plan legislation required that at least half of all US-financed ECA goods to be
shipped in vessels of American registry with American insurance

Primary: Clayton ‘Let us admit right off that our objective has as its background the needs and
interests of the U.S. We need markets – big markets – in which to buy and sell’

-ve X-Ref: Leffler – ‘the Czech coup spurred a Republican Congress to pass the legislation to
implement the Marshall Plan’

Primary: Harriman – ‘the coup in Czechoslovakia in March created such concert that the
Congressional appropriation as authorizes was made’

IJ – Though it might have taken fear of Communism to convince congress and the public, there is
good reason to believe that the Marshall plan was conceived to help American business.

Leading Historian 3: Michael Hogan – unify Europe and export free market ideals – continuation of
pre-war project stretching back decades. In the context of p2 ‘America’s twentieth-century search
for a new economic order at home and abroad’ p19 ‘part of an American effort to remake the Old
World in the image of the new’ for example by ‘butting the web of exchange controls, quotas, and
import licenses and the tangled network of over two hundred bilateral trade and payments
agreements that stifled intra-European commerce’ p53 ‘European integration had become a goal to
be pursued with or without Soviet support’

X-Ref: Milward: The goal was the integration of Western Europe into one common economic area
(…) and its ultimate integration into one common political area

Primary: Dulles’ Speech: ‘Europe divided into small compartments cannot be a healthy Europe. All of
Europe’s economic potentialities need to be used and European markets should be big enough to
justify modern methods of cheap production for mass consumption.’ Eval: Dulles was not involved in
the Marshall Plan, viewed by Democrats as pro-German. (see Drawing the Line: The American
Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949)

-ve X-ref: Noam Chomsky: ‘in France and Italy…Marshall Plan aid was strictly contingent on exclusion
of Communists’ So for some countries containment was the main aim. http://zcomm.org/wp-
content/uploads/zbooks/www/chomsky/dd/dd-c11-s05.html Charles Maier gives the example:
‘Marshall Plan aid would be crucial in helping the new De Gasperi ministry, once the premier had
ousted the Communists, in surviving the economic turmoil to come.’ However, point out that
Communist exclusion was necessary to bring France and Italy into united Europe.

IJ: Nevertheless Hogan’s argument is very strong.

Leading Historian 4: Nevin Power: ‘Washington even overtly showed its imperialistic tendencies by
preventing recipient countries from trading certain materials with the East, all the while stockpiling
strategic material through the ECA.’
http://nevinpower.weebly.com/uploads/6/0/5/3/6053998/the_marshall_plan_-
_the_extension_of_empire.pdf

X-Ref : Kolko p360 of The Limits of Power ‘what Washington desired was the opportunity not only to
subsidize United States exports but to permanently influence and shape Western Europe’s internal
economic policies’ ‘Washington had no intention of operating within an organization such as UNRRA’

Primary: Vyshinsky in UN speech: 'United States government has moved towards a direct
renunciation of the principles of international collaboration and concerted action by the great
powers and towards attempts to impose its will on other independent states’

-ve X-Ref: LaFeber ‘no one in the State Department wanted the Soviets included’ ‘made Russian
participation improbable by demanding that economic records of each nation be open for scrutiny’.
Therefore the US wanted to be able to take the moral high ground to justify its policies in Western
Europe.

Or Use: Greg Behrmann points out, ‘Soviet Union was using UNRRA aid to compensate for supplies it
had plundered from Eastern Europe. There were reports that Communist parties were appropriating
supplies and doling them out…to firm up their political positions’ Shows maybe the Soviets were
being uncooperative.

IJ: US imperialism took a subtler form than Power thinks.

Leading Historian 5: Rhiannon Vickers p21 ‘the Marshall Plan was a projection of existing New Deal
thinking onto Europe’ p23 ‘many of the policy-planners…had been involved in the development and
implementation of the New Deal, and subsequently carried that tradition with them’ ‘based on the
premise that … politics could be replaced by the economics of growth’

X-Ref: Diana Kunz p164 ‘The New Deal had made America safe for capitalism; the Marshall Plan
would do the same for Europe’ ‘The first step was to remedy the ‘dollar gap’; Europe was
desperately short of the dollars needed for the American raw materials and parts that would lay the
groundwork for the continent’s reconstruction’

Primary: From SNWCC report ‘The conclusion is inescapable that…the world will not be able to
continue to buy U.S. exports at the 1946-47 rate beyond another 12-18 months’
-ve X-Ref: Lorraine M. Lees in Keeping Tito Afloat ‘Seizing this opportunity, the Truman
administration sought to "keep Tito afloat" by giving him military and economic aid. President
Truman hoped that American involvement would encourage other satellites to follow Tito's example
and further damage Soviet power.’ http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-01629-9.html

IJ: Nevertheless a strong argument – link to Hogan.

Overall Conclusion: Although Kennan and Congress might have been motivated primarily by anti-
Communism, they became convinced that the best way of going about this was by unifying Europe
and as Hogan says ‘remaking the Old World in the image of the New’.

Possible Extra Material: Charles Bohlen ‘We gabled that the Soviets could not come in and therefore
we could gain prestige…and let the Soviet Union bear the onus for withdrawing’ (see Kunz paper
p.165). Shows that it was the US who didn’t want to cooperate. Possible add: However, as Greg
Behrmann points out, ‘Soviet Union was using UNRRA aid to compensate for supplies it had
plundered from Eastern Europe. There were reports that Communist parties were appropriating
supplies and doling them out…to firm up their political positions’ Shows maybe the Soviets were
being uncooperative.

p.16 of The Origins of the Marshall Plan by John Gimbel: ‘the failure of the CFM in Moscow to
reach four-power agreement on the German and Austrian settlement – because of unacceptable
Soviet conditions, he said – required the United States to make a major policy decision’ OR ‘A stable
France would contribute to the frustration of socialists’ ‘a strong France would help maintain the
postwar balance of power in Europe’

Anthony Mustacich- ‘The Marshall Plan, as it was called, was no altruistic gesture stemming from
America’s noble spirit, but rather a way for American capital and products to penetrate European
markets’ http://www.globalresearch.ca/imperialism-the-cold-war-and-the-contradictions-of-
decolonization/5334692?print=1

Kolko p360 of The Limits of Power ‘what Washington desired was the opportunity not only to
subsidize United States exports but to permanently influence and shape Western Europe’s internal
economic policies’

William Cromwell p.424 criticises ‘blur between the results of the Marshall Plan (which did indeed
solidify the Western bloc) and the initial motivations of U.S. policy-makers’ ‘only a comprehensive
and coordinated European approach would provide confidence of success and would meet with
congressional acceptance’