2.) G.R. No.

184740 February 11, 2010

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as Undersecretary of
the Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime
Industry Authority (MARINA), Respondents.

Facts

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation
of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA).

On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin
R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special
Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.1

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.2

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by
the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other office or employment.

On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA
vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.3 and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.4

Issue

whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.

Ruling

Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:

Sec. 7.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official
family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.39 [emphasis supplied.]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
3.) G.R. No. 164196 June 22, 2007

CONSTANTINO T. GUMARU, petitioner,

vs.
QUIRINO STATE COLLEGE, respondent

FACTS:

Quirino State College (QSC) through its President Julian ALvarez entered into an agreement with CT
Gumaru Construction for the construction of a building. Construction was in stages because budget was limited.
Gumaru sued QSC when it awarded contruction to another contractor. A private lawyer represented QSC. QSC
lost the case, and was ordered to pay Gumaru. QSC also didn't apeal, so a writ of execution was issued. The
Office of the Solicitor General came into the picture to act as counsel for QSC, moving to quash the writ. The
OSG should always be government's counsel. The court remanded the case since QSC wasn't properly
represented.

ISSUE:

 whether respondent state college was properly represented before the trial court;
 if in the negative, whether the lack of proper legal representation was enough to nullify the
proceedings;

HELD:

No. The OSG is mandated to act as the law office of the government. QSC is classified under the 1987
Admin Code as a chartered institution and is not a GOCC. OSG cannot refuse to represent the government, and
government agencies are admonished not to reject OSG services.

Yes, lack of proper legal representation justifies nullification. The state college should be given the
opportunity to present its defenses with the benefit of its statutory counsel, the OSG. A new trial would best
serve the interests of justice.
4.) G.R. No. 169080

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION,

vs.
MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIALCORPORATION),BLUE
RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING CORPORATION,FACTS:

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and IndustrialCorporation
(Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.

Infanta’s corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation and subsequently to its
present name, Macroasia Corporation.

After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and other mining
claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before thePanel of
Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.

Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek cancellation of mining
lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach),
in mining areas in Brooke’s Point.

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to Infanta’s (now
Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835hectares
located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brooke’s Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering another 4,040 hectares
in Barangay Mainit also in Brooke’s Point.

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia’s lease contracts.

Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.

Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field investigations, the POAgranted
the petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found theclaims of the others
indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasia’s mining areas. It upheld Blue
Ridge’s petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were
declared automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebach’s areas/mining
claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before the
MAB.

Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of appeal; thus, withrespect to
Lebach, the above resolution became final and executory.

The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the Mining
Lode/LeaseContracts of Macroasia.

However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previous decision, holding thatneither
the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered into by theDENR Secretary.
The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement wasexclusively lodged with the
DENR Secretary.

Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.

The CA Special 12thDivision affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive authority of
the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA alsodenied Celestial’s Motion
for Reconsideration.

While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridge’s petition; reversed and set aside the
Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining disputewithin the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power toresolve mining
disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser power to cancelmining agreements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to cancel miningcontracts
and privileges?

HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts
and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules
andregulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has
the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following
reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from hisadministrative
authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under Chapter I,Title XIV of Book IV
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development
of all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of
public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power to oversee,
supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit
powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral
agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB tocancel
or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel
or approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.

The DENR Secretary’s power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred
from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a
permit/mineral agreement/FTAA
5.) CRESPO VS MOGUL CASE DIGEST
FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was
set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the
arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the
CA. The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the
Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the
resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the
arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the
order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from the
Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of
the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to
the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated
for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the
fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or
otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
6.) KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD vs.
COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS CARLOS R. ALINDADA, LETICIA
V. IBAY, OLIVER B. BUTALID, and MARY ANNE B. COLAYCO, of the ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION

FACTS:

RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), was enacted on 8 June
2001 and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB and the
creation of the ERC.

At the time of the filing of this petition, the ERC was composed of Commissioner Fe B. Barin and Deputy
Commissioners Carlos R. Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay, Oliver B. Butalid, and Mary Anne B. Colayco (collectively,
Commissioners). The Commissioners assumed office on 15 August 2001. Pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9136,
the Commissioners issued the proposed Table of Organization, Staffing Pattern, and Salary Structure on 25
September 2001 which the President of the Philippines approved on 13 November 2001. Meanwhile, KERB
submitted to the Commissioners its Resolution No. 2001-02 on 13 September 2001. Resolution No. 2001-02
requested the Commissioners for an opportunity to be informed on the proposed plantilla positions with their
equivalent qualification standards.

On 17 October 2001, the Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A
portion of the guidelines reflects the Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the ERC employees vis-
a-vis Civil Service rules making Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, however, will have suppletory
application to the extent possible in regard to the selection and placement of employees in the ERC.

On 5 November 2005, KERB sent a letter to the Commissioners stating the KERB members objection to the
Commissioners stand that Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application in the selection
and placement of the ERC employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the
ERBs character as an economic regulator of the electric power industry.

KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its members, filed the present petition on 20
December 2001. KERB later filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Enjoin Termination of Petitioner ERB
Employees on 2 January 2002. However, before the ERC received KERBs pleadings, the Selection Committee
already presented its list of proposed appointees to the Commissioners.

In their Comment, the Commissioners describe the status of the ERB employees appointment in the ERC as
follows:

As of February 1, 2002, of the two hundred twelve (212) ERB employees, one hundred thirty eighty (138) were
rehired and appointed to ERC plantilla positions and sixty six (66) opted to retire or be separated from the
service. Those who were rehired and those who opted to retire or be separated constituted about ninety six
(96%) percent of the entire ERB employees. The list of the ERB employees appointed to new positions in the
ERC is attached hereto as Annex 1. Only eight (8) ERB employees could not be appointed to new positions due
to the reduction of the ERC plantilla and the absence of positions appropriate to their respective qualifications
and skills. The appropriate notice was issued to each of them informing them of their separation from the service
and assuring them of their entitlement to separation pay and other benefits in accordance with existing laws.

Petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board (KERB) seeks to declare Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 9136 (RA 9136), which abolished the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and created the ERC,
as unconstitutional and to prohibit the ERC Commissioners from filling up the ERCs plantilla.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition of the selection and appointment of employees of
the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) by the ERC Board of Commissioners was filed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether RA 9136 is uncosntitutuional.
2. Whether the creation of ERC abolishes ERB.
3. Whether RA 9236 violates the Security of Tenure of the ERB employees.
RULING:

1. No. All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To justify the nullification of a law, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. KERB failed to show any breach of the
Constitution.
2. Yes. A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to which the
power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries
with it the power to abolish. President Corazon C. Aquino, then exercising her legislative powers,
created the ERB by issuing Executive Order No. 172 on 8 May 1987.
3. No. The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. There should
not be any controversy if there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself. Section 38 of RA
9136 explicitly abolished the ERB. However, abolition of an office and its related positions is different
from removal of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts.
From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there
is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not
arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related
positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. A valid order of
abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An abolition
is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.[9] Abolition of an office
may be brought about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and
explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment.[10] Where one office is abolished
and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.[11] When
there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding office.
KERB asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB but there was merely a reorganization done
in bad faith. Evidences of bad faith are enumerated in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6656 (RA
6656),[12] Section 2 of RA 6656
7.) In Re: Rodolfo Manzano
166 SCRA 246

Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor
Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a
Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an
abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a
member of judiciary.

Issue:
Whether Judge Manzano is allowed to be designated to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or
Administrative functions.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the
Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions. Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear
meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which
adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs
of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy
of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

“Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its
performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive
officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive
action, of supervision or control.
8.) PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs. HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the Board of Communications (BOC), now the National Telecommunications
Commission, an application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu City for the purposes of rendering
international telecommunication services from Cebu City to any point outside the Philippines where it is
authorized to operate.

Meanwhile, the BOC granted petitioner provisional authority to establish a station in Cebu City
“subject to the condition that as soon as domestic carriers shall have upgraded their facilities”.

However, private respondent filed with the lower court a petition for declaratory judgment regarding
the proper construction of petitioner’s franchise, R.A. No. 4617. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but
said motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila erred in the interpretation regarding the proper
construction of petitioner’s franchise, R.A. No. 4617.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court erred in rendering the decision appealed from,
inasmuch as the same is contrary to the provisions of petitioner’s legislative franchise (R.A. No. 4617) as well
as the contemporaneous construction placed upon it by the governmental agency charged with its enforcement.

The Supreme Court state also that it is always timely to reiterate that: “the first and fundamental duty
of the courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed.

9.) G.R. No. 168129. April 24, 2007.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs. PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC.,

FACTS:

President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273, amending the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977 (Presidential Decree No. 1158) by imposing Value-Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of
goods and services. Before the effectivity of E.O. No. 273, respondent wrote the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR), petitioner, inquiring whether the services it provides to the participants in its health care
program are exempt from the payment of the VAT.

Petitioner CIR, through the VAT Review Committee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), issued
VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that respondent, as a provider of medical services, is exempt from the VAT
coverage.

Meanwhile, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716 (Expanded VAT or E-VAT Law) took effect, amending
further the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Then R.A. No. 8424 (National Internal Revenue Code of
1997) became effective. This new Tax Code substantially adopted and reproduced the provisions of E.O. No.
273 on VAT and R.A. No. 7716 on E-VAT.

The BIR sent respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in its payment of the VAT
and documentary stamp taxes (DST). Respondent filed a protest with the BIR, but petitioner sent respondent a
letter demanding payment of deficiency VAT and DTS for two consecutive years. Respondent filed a motion for
partial reconsideration of the above judgment concerning its liability to pay the deficiency VAT, the CTA
granted respondents motion. Petitioner seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA Resolution. Petitioner CIR filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the appellate court.

ISSUE:

Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting respondent from paying its VAT liabilities has retroactive
application.

HELD:

Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides that rulings, circulars, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application if to apply them would
prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits
material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2) where
the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on
which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

The CTA found that there is no showing that respondent deliberately committed mistakes or omitted
material facts when it obtained VAT Ruling No. 231-88 from the BIR. The CTA held that respondent’s letter
which served as the basis for the VAT ruling sufficiently described its business and there is no way the BIR
could be misled by the said representation as to the real nature of said business.

The Court of Appeals found that the failure of respondent to refer to itself as a health maintenance
organization is not an indication of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to make false representations. As the term
health maintenance organization did not as yet have any particular significance for tax purposes, respondent’s
failure to include a term that has yet to acquire its present definition and significance cannot be equated with bad
faith.

The Supreme Court agree with both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals that respondent acted in
good faith. It is thus apparent that when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in respondents favor, the term
health maintenance organization was yet unknown or had no significance for taxation purposes. Respondent,
therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for the two consecutive taxable years on the basis of
VAT Ruling No. 231-88.
10.) LANDBANK VS. LISTANA
408 SCRA 328

Facts:

Respondent Listana offered to sell his land in Sorsogon to the Government, through the DAR under the
CARL. DAR valued the property at P5, 871, 689.03 but Listana refused to sell at that price. An administrative
proceeding under the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) determined the just
compensation of the land at P10, 956,963 and ordered petitioner LANDBANK to pay the same to Lisana. A writ
of execution was issued by PARAD (Prov. Agrarian Reform Adjudicator) to which LANDBANK did not
comply. A Motion for Contempt was filed by Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LANDBANK.
PARAD granted the Motion for Contempt citing for indirect contempt and ordering the arrest of Alex A.
Lorayes, the MAnageer of the LBP. LBP obtained a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon to restrain DARAB from issuing the order of arrest. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Petitioner LBP then filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the PARAD’s order of contempt was invalid?

Held:

Yes. It was invalid for the following reasons: a.) the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a
verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not
initiated by the PARAD motu propio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent; b) neither the PARAD nor
the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant
of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to
cite persons for indirect contempr pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in
the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect
contempt cases. These matters ar still within the province of the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and
it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt. Thus, the order was reversed and set aside.
Petition granted.
11.) VIVO v MONTESA
24 SCRA 155

Facts:

Private respondents Juan, Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito, all surnamed "Calacday"
arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong, the first four on 18 November 1959, and the last three on 6 December
1959. Upon their arrival they sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, a board of special
inquiry, in its decisions of 7 and 11 December 1959, found them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen,
one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into this country. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of
them an identification certificate as a Filipino citizen. Sometime in February, 1963, however, Isaac Calacday
confessed before an immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons. He retracted his
confession in March, 1963, in an investigation in the Department of Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit of
anger, he disclaimed, under oath, paternity of the respondents because they refused to give him money (Annex
"I" to Answer). On 9 May 1963, Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest
against the herein private respondents, stating in said warrants their deportability under Section 37 (a) (1) and
Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, for
having entered the Philippines "by means of false and misleading statements and that they were not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission." The warrants directed any
immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show
cause, if any there be, why they should not be deported. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others
remained at large. On 26 April 1965, the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition, docketed as
Civil Case No. 60906, praying for three principal reliefs, namely: to restrain the arrest of those petitioners who
have not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all
the petitioners, all upon the claim that they are Filipino citizens. RTC granted the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings.

Held:

We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court is without jurisdiction to restrain the
deportation proceedings of respondents Calacdays. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the
Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613). That
jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have
reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of
citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions.
12.) SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. RODRIGUEZ
619 SCRA 176

FACTS:
On September 29, 2001, a shipment described as “agricultural product” arrived at Subic Bay Freeport
Zone. On October 23, the BOC issued a Memorandum stating that upon examination the shipment was found to
contain rice. The representative of the importer then stated that there was a “misshipment” and manifested
willingness to pay appropriate duties and taxes. The BOC then issued a Hold Order on October 25, 2001.
Despite several certifications for its clearance, Petitioner SBMA refused to allow the release of the rice
shipment. Hence, on June 11, 2002, the respondent-importers filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a complaint
for Injunction and Damages against SBMA.
The RTC in its 1st order issued indirect contempt cases against all the defendants and another order
considering the pending incidents in the injunction case. The RTC held that there should be prior determination
by the BOC on whether the 2,000 bags of imported rice were smuggled.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary or Permanent Injunction seeking to nullify and set aside the RTC Orders. The
CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit and affirming the Orders issued by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.

HELD:

The appeal was meritorious. As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the jurisdiction of
the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691. An action for injunction is a suit
which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the
commission or continuance of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act. It
has an independent existence, and is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot
exist except only as a part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. In an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Until the propriety of granting an injunction, temporary or perpetual, is determined, the court (i.e., the
RTC in this case) may issue a temporary restraining order. A TRO is an interlocutory order or writ issued by the
court as a restraint on the defendant until the propriety of granting an injunction can be determined, thus going
no further in its operation than to preserve the status quo until that determination. A TRO is not intended to
operate as an injunction pendente lite, and should not in effect determine the issues involved before the parties
can have their day in court.
The Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and the
regular courts cannot interfere nor can it enjoin these proceedings. This is the rule the moment the imported
goods are in the possession or control of the Customs authorities even if no warrant for seizure or detention had
previously been issued. The actions of the BOC are then only appealed to the CTA.

As clarified in Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, the rule that RTCs have no review powers over
such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive,
not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and
efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the
functions it has been instituted to perform.
13.) Carino vs. Capulong

Facts:

The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the respondent judge and prevent the
same in conducting further hearing thereof. Ama Computer College, Inc. (AMACC) took possession of the
premises of the former located at Marfori Heights, Davao City By virtue of a Contract of Lease with option to
buy entered into with Light Bringer School (LBS). The Regional Director Venancio R. Nava, Region IX-
DECS, received AMA's letter of intent to operate as an educational institution in Davao City Responding to the
said letter, Regional Director Venancio R. Nava reminded AMA of the provisions of the Rules and Regulations
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, that the filing of the application shall be at least one (1) year before the opening of
classes and the provisions of the Private School Law reiterated in the Educational Act of 1992 which prohibits
the operation of unauthorized schools or courses. Nevertheless, AMA proceeded to announce its opening
through news and print media, and thereupon, started to enroll students in elementary, secondary and tertiary
levels without the required authorization that must be secured first before the Department of Education Culture
and Sport (DECS). As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure of the said school with
the aid of the military as per agreement of two governmental agencies. The private respondent filed a case
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Davao to enjoin DECS from implementing the said closure pending the
approval of the request to operate the said school. The said request was denied by DECS for not complying the
requirements prescribed by the department. The said case was dismissed, the private respondent appeal before
the Court of Appeals (CA) which later affirmed the decision of lower court. The private respondent then filed
before the RTC OF Makati with the same cause of action now using the organization of the parents of their
students. The said court prescribed by the respondent judge issued the preliminary injunction sought by the
private respondent contended that the same should be permitted to operate because DECS is only performing a
ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS on the other hand contended that it exercises a
discretionary power in pursuant to the provisions of law with respect to the educational institutions.

Issue:
Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial of discretionary function.

Held :
The Supreme Court ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power with respect to the
issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution. The court further distinguished ministerial and
discretionary powers. A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts , in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.
The granting of license to operate is vested upon the judgment of DECS in securing the quality
education that an educational institution should provide pursuant to the constitutional provision on education
and the organic law authorizing said department to issue rules and regulations pertinent thereto.
14.) Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr.
188 SCRA 154
Facts:

Petitioner filed a qou warranto seeking reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA). In 1986, petitioner was designated by Minister Gonzales as a General Manager of the
for the PTA. The minister sought the approval of the president which was favored by the latter reason that he
was designated as general Manager by the Chairman of the PTA Board. In 1990, respondent was the new
Secretary of tourism and asked for the resignation of the petitioner. The president issued a memorandum to
Garrucho designating him as a general manager for the reason that the petitioner was not appointed by the
President as required by PD 564 but only by the Secretary of Tourism which was invalid. Petitioner contends
that he was validly appointed to the position since that the act of the minister Gonzales was also the act of the
president which presumes that the act of the department heads were the act of the president.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petitioner was validly appointed to his position.

Held:

No. PD. 564 clearly provides that the of the General Manager of the PTA shall be made by the president
of the Philippines, not by any other officer.

Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated.
Legally speaking it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion, which
because as an alter ego of the president. The appointment of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or
ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a
member of the cabinet.

An officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being he was
chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power
to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
15.) RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.

FACTS:

On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding
payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption
for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992.
MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects
of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount,
MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the
latter.

RULING:

Decision MODIFIED.

Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric
consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of
its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair
defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.

The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the
consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was
obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards
its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the
bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear
the consequences of such oversight.
16.) Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals

234 SCRA 348

Facts:

Supreme Court overruled Court of Tax Appeals decision that caterer’s tax under RA6110 is illegal
because it was vetoed by Former President Marcos and Congress had not taken steps to override the veto. SC
ruled in this case that the law has always imposed a 3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax
Code. Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is exempt from the 3%
on gross receipts because President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law).President
Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A because according to him it would1) shift the burden of taxation to the consuming
public and 2) restrain the development of hotels which are essential to the tourist industry. The protestation of
the club was denied by petitioners saying that Sec42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels,
motels, rest houses.” House of Ways and Means concurred with petitioners stating that veto message only seems
to object with certain portions of 191-A, and that can be gleaned by the reasons given by the President.

Issue:

Whether or not veto referred to the entire section or merely the 20% tax on gross receipts of operators
and proprietors of eating places within hotels, motels and rest houses.

Held:

President does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he could not have repealed the 2%
caterer’s tax. Court of Tax Appeals agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certain part. Court
of Tax Appeals mentioned that President can veto only an entire item, and not just words. The President
intentionally only vetoed a few words in Sec 191-A. Assuming that the veto could not apply to just one
provision but all would render the Presidential veto void and still in favor of petitioner. Inclusion of “hotels,
motels, rest houses” in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are items. President has the right to veto such item, that
which is subject to tax and tax rate. It does not refer to an entire section. To construe item as an entire section
would be to tie his hands to either completely agree with a section he has objections with or to disagree with an
entire section where he only has a portion he disagrees with.
17.) Blue Bar Coconut of the Philippines v. The Honorable Francisco S. Tantuico

G.R. No. L- 47051, July 29, 1988

Facts:

Sometime in 1976, the respondent acting chairman of the commission on Audit initiated a special audit of
coconut end-users companies, which include herein petitioners, with respect to the other CCSF levy collections
and the subsidies they had received. Respondent acting COA chairman now directed the chairman, the
administrator, and the military supervisor of PCA and the manager of CCSF in various letters to collect the short
levies and subsidies should the petitioners fail to remit the amount due.

The petitioners instituted the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction, contending that the respondents COA acting chairman Francisco Tantuico Jr. and PCA auditor have
absolutely no jurisdiction to: 1. Assess the CCSF levy against petitioners and to make them personally liable for
the payment thereof; 2. Cause the withholding of the payments of petitioners subsidy reimbursement claim; 3.
Set off petitioners subsidy reimbursement against alleged CCSF levy remittance shortage; 4. Institute a retention
scheme of subsidy reimbursement claims which adversely affect even companies not subject to levy; 5. Audit
private corporations like petitioner; and 6. Deny to the petitioners in effect their constitutional right to appeal to
the supreme court an adverse decision of the COA.

The Solicitor General filed a motion that the case be remanded to the commission on audit for appropriate
action consistent with the intention of P.D 623.

Issue:

Whether or not the case be remanded to the Commission on Audit.

Held:

Yes. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, to court find that there are no established facts presented
which are intimately related to the legal issues by the petitioners. The well settled principle is that this court is
not a trier of facts. “Its sole role is to apply the law based on the findings of facts before it.”

The principle of primary jurisdiction is to be applied; in cases involving specialized disputes, the trend has
been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence. In Pambujan Sur United Mine
Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., the court held that the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the Purposes of the
regulatory statute administered.
20.) MMDA vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT
G.R. No. 167514 (Dec. 16, 2009)

FACTS:
In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into
a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC)
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build
MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the
ownership would transfer to the Government.
In 1998, respondent Track works entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Track
works thereafter installed commercial billboards, signage and other advertising media in the different parts of
the MRT3.
In 2001, however, MMDA requested Track works to dismantle the billboards, signage and other
advertising media, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open
space. After Track works refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards
and similar forms of advertisement.
ISSUE:
Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signage etc. installed by
Track works on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.
RULING:
That Track works derived its right to install its billboards, signage and other advertising media in the
MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3
structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed,
MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the
MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case,
and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with Track works was a valid
exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Track works
Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Track works’ right to
install the billboards, signage and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should,
therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Track works’
billboards, signage and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove,
or destroy the billboards, signage and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Track works.
In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc, MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and MMDA v. Garin,
the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Track works’ billboards, signage and other advertising media.
The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signage and other advertising media
applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the
Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.
21.) SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, vs. PICOP RESOURCES INC.,
G.R. No. 164314 (September 26, 2008)

Facts:

PICOP filed with SEC an application for amendment of its Articles of Incorporation extending its
existence for another 50 years. PICOP paid the filing fee of P210.00 based on SEC Memorandum Circular No.
2, Series of 1994 (1994 Circular). The SEC, however, informed PICOP of the appropriate filing fee of P12
Million, or 1/5 of 1% of its authorized capital stock of P6 Billion.

PICOP posited that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 (1986 Circular) rules on the
specific subject matter of "Filing Fees for Amended Articles of Incorporation Extending the Term of Corporate
Existence” prescribed the filing fee as 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock, with the qualification that it
should not be less than P200.00 or more than P100,000.00. PICOP pointed out that no equivalent provision
appears in any of the subsequent SEC circulars such as the 1994 and 2001 circulars. Hence, the 1986 Circular
should prevail.

The SEC, on the other hand, contends that Circular No. 2, Series of 1990 (1990 Circular) removed the
filing fee ceilings provided for in the 1986 Circular. The SEC also enumerated the subsequent EOs and
Circulars which called for the increase in SEC fees and charges. The latest of these was the 2001 Circular, which
now prescribes the formula of 1/5 of 1% of the authorized capital stock.

When the matter was raised before the Office of the President, it was found out that the 1990 Circular
relied on by the SEC was only submitted to the UP Law Center on the same day that it filed its second motion
for reconsideration (January 23, 2004). The OP ruled, which was affirmed by the CA, that the 1990 Circular was
not effective at the time PICOP applied for the extension of its corporate term.

Issue:

WON the 1986 Circular should be applied in the matter of application filed by PICOP for extension of
its corporate existence.

Ruling:

The 1986 Circular is the proper basis of the computation since it specifically provided for filing fees in
cases of extension of corporate term. A proviso of the same nature is wanting in the other circulars relied on by
the SEC at the time PICOP filed its request for extension.

According to the SC, there was an evident violation of the due process requirement. It was admitted
that the SEC failed to satisfy the requirements for promulgation when it filed the required copies of the said
regulation at the UP Law Center only fourteen (14) years after it was supposed to have taken effect.

The SEC violated the due process clause insofar as it denied the public prior notice of the regulations
that were supposed to govern them. The SEC cannot wield the provisions of the 1990 Circular against PICOP
and expect its outright compliance. The circular was not yet effective during the time PICOP filed its request to
extend its corporate existence in 2002. In fact, it was only discovered in 2004, fifteen (15) days before the SEC
filed its second motion for reconsideration.
24.) SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. MERLINO E. RODRIGUEZ, 619 SCRA 176
G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010

FACTS:

On September 29, 2001, a shipment described as “agricultural product” arrived at Subic Bay Freeport
Zone. On October 23, the BOC issued a Memorandum stating that upon examination the shipment was found to
contain rice. The representative of the importer then stated that there was a “mis-shipment” and manifested
willingness to pay appropriate duties and taxes. The BOC then issued a Hold Order on October 25, 2001.
Despite several certifications for its clearance, Petitioner SBMA refused to allow the release of the rice
shipment. Hence, on June 11, 2002, the respondent-importers filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a complaint
for Injunction and Damages against SBMA.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

NO. The Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and
the regular courts can not interfere nor can it enjoin these proceedings. This is the rule the moment the imported
goods are in the possession or control of the Customs authorities even if no warrant for seizure or detention had
previously been issued. The actions of the BOC are then only appealed to the CTA. The Court also said that this
rule, which is anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government’s drive to
prevent smuggling and fraud and to collect correct duties, is absolute.
25.) Tauli vs. Santos, 200 SCRA 512
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991

Facts:

An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on
June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the
president.

Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of
several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.

Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in
the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.

Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new
one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department
of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his
resolution on September 5, 1989.

Issues:

1)Whether or not the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the
election of the officers of the FABC.

2)Whether or not the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest.

Ruling:

1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the
election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to
exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the
Administrative Code.

It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have
the appellate jurisdiction over it.

2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local
Government Code, the membership of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-
governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected
president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable
circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent
governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the
provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.

DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall
preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent
FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the
Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said
mandatory provision.

Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local
Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being
absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not
meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
26.) 231 SCRA 463 (G.R. No. 92285) March 28, 1994

PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and
A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, respondents.

**Doctrine of primary jurisdiction**

FACTS: PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI) is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree
planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations which supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for
production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in
industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of
incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products.

On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of
matches from Indonesia and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore on 19 April 1989. On 25 April
1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of Natural Resources and
Environment issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the
match industry at reasonable price."

On 5 May 1989, PTFI filed with the Regional Court of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with
prayer for a temporary restraining order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the
latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing and
releasing the importations.

On 14 June 1989, AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:

(a) The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code and not the regular court,
has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation or ascertain whether the conditions
prescribed by law for an importation have been complied with . . . . (and over cases of) seizure, detention or
release of property affected . . . . ;"

PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss. AJIC's motion to dismiss was denied. However, on 8 February 1990, on
motion for reconsideration by AJIC and despite the opposition of PTFI, the Court reconsidered its 28 July 1989
order and dismissed the case on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal
importations." Thus, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: The Regional Court of Manila has no jurisdiction over the case.

PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality of match importations may already
take the nature of an administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering
with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Peña, we held that —

. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and
a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
 administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932,
941 [1954].)

In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review
in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable . . . .

Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief sought by PTFI is to compel the
Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not
to seize is discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of mandamus. But this does
not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court if the Bureau of Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the court
cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is within its prerogative, except when
in the exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no
occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.

27.) G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

FACTS: The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled
case has filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays
for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in
ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor
Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay
of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions
and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and
applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial
peace has always been the rule.
 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR.

HELD: NO.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court. It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court
of justice, which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that
are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them. It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of
farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the
Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as
existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the
sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2,
section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries
established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose.

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights, which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights, which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial." It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced,
and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of
investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and
this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is
a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the
documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply
of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come
to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present
at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

28.) G.R. NO. L-7708 MAY 30, 1955

JOSE MONDANO, Petitioner, vs. FERNANDO SILVOSA, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and
OLIMPIO EPIS, Members of the Provincial Board, Respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential
Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and
(2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling.

On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial
governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report.

On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and
was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board.

On the same day, the provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner
from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over
his objection.aw library

The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from
further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of
suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effects.

In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the
executive and by virtue of the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control,
direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department
and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive Secretary, can exercise the power of control over the
Mayor.
2.Whether the Provincial Board upon filing by the Governor may proceed to hear the charges as the charges
involves moral turpitude.
HELD:

1. No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to
investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all Local Governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all localgovernments over which he has been granted only the power
of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by
him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not
extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as
may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for
that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.

2. No. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in
the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano’s office. If the issue is
not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case),
there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend
a mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him by the
Revised Administrative Code.
The petition is granted.
29.) G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992

J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, Petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, Respondents law library

FACTS:

Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"

The purpose of this act is to separate the police from the military to create a police force in line with
Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution which states the creation of "one police force, national in scope,
and civilian in character" because most of the key positions are being occupied by the military and to develop a
truly professional civilian police is to separate it from the military.

Petitioner herein however respectfully advances the view that RA 6975 emasculated the National
Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP),
thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and
the PNP were placed.

ISSUE:

Is the petitioner correct?

HELD:

No, To begin with, one need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law
that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices to lay at rest petitioner's
contention on the matter.aw library

This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano
vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." h virtual law library

Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." s virtual law library

Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of
the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department."

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized
Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a
system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in
large part subsidized by the national government.

Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national
police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the
Act in question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level.
30.) G.R. No. L-37052 November 29, 1973

EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NATIONAL STUD FARM; BOARD OF TRUSTEES, NATIONAL STUD FARM; PHILIPPINE
RACING CLUB, INC.: and BOARD OF STEWARDS PHILIPPINE, RACING, INC., defendants-
appellees.

The Plaintiff is the legitimate owner of a race horse named "King's Toss" which was duly and officially
registered on February 17, 1970 with defendant National Stud Farm and which certificate of registration was
issued by said defendant for said race horse, thereby acknowledging it to participate in horse races and
sweepstakes draws that were held and are being held in legally authorized racing, clubs or tracks.

“King's Toss” by virtue of its official registration as such, has since participated or taken part in horse races and
sweepstakes draws starting with its debut. King's Toss was declared eligible to participate and take part in the
actual race that was conducted on June 17, 1972, more particularly in Race No. 15 thereof, resulting in the
inclusion of said race horse in the racing list or program "Lucky Choice" for the scheduled race on June 17,
1972.

On June 17, 1972, the very day when plaintiff's race horse "King's Toss" was scheduled to participate in race
No. 15 at the racing tracks of defendant Philippine Racing Club, Inc., an announcement was made through the
public address system before the start of Race 13 that "King's Toss" is being scratched or excluded from taking
part in Race 15 where it is supposed to run that racing day.

A complaint was filed by the plaintiff alleging that such withdrawal or cancellation of the certificate of
registration of plaintiffs race horse was arbitrary and oppressive, due process being denied him in the absence of
a formal investigation or inquiry prior thereto. The Solicitor General filed an answer on behalf of the defendants
claiming the special defenses of immunity from suit as well as the lack of cause of action and the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies were interposed. Thus, the court dismisssed the complaint on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It added that the action was prematurely instituted. His
administrative remedy is to ask the Board of Trustees of National Stud Farm to reconsider its resolution
cancelling the certificate of registration of "King's Toss" and in case the reconsideration is denied, to appeal to
the Games and Amusements Board or to the Office of the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

HELD: NO.

Plaintiff is not unaware of the impress of authoritativeness affixed to the basic principle of administrative
remedies having to be fully utilized before resort to courts is allowable. Nonetheless, he would seek its operation
in the case at hand by the invocation of the alleged denial of due process. It is to be admitted that under certain
circumstances, such a plea would not go unheeded because of the inadequacy of the remedy that could be
supplied administratively.

Plaintiff, moreover, did know of the cancellation of the registration papers of his race horse on June 17, 1970,
but he moved for a reconsideration thereof prior to his going to court on June 21 of that year. Even without
according due weight to the allegation that protection of public interest did require such cancellation, a step that
can be taken without a hearing, the additional argument offered in such comment as to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies not being procedurally impossible does commend itself for approval thus: Appellant's
allegation that he could not have appealed to the Executive Secretary at the time he filed his complaint in the
lower court on June 21, 1972 is also inaccurate.
The reason for this short circuiting of administrative processes is not explained by appellant. He gives no reason
for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed there is none. The order of dismissal therefore, cannot
considered as being in derrogation of the due process guarantee.

Although there are exceptions, one of them being the invocation of the due process clause which is precisely the
basis from the judicial review sought by plaintiff before the lower court.
31.) ERNESTO S. MATA, as Secretary of National Defense, v. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, as
Judge of the CFI and VIRGINIA F. ESPIRITU, Respondents

On December 8, 1967, the Armed Forces of the Philippines issued invitations to bid for the supply of 300,000
yards of khaki cloth, cotton twill, local manufacture, brand new, with the usual reservation clause to the effect
that:

The AFP reserves the right, as the interest of the Government may require, to reject any or all bids and to waive
any technical defect or defects, and to accept such bids or offers as may be considered most advantageous to the
best interest of the Government.

Petitioners-spouses submitted the winning bid and were awarded the contract for the supply of the cloth.
Respondent Espiritu, a losing bidder, instead of filing a protest with the Secretary of National Defense, filed
with the CFI a petition seeking to compel by mandamus the Secretary and Undersecretary of National Defense
and the members of the AFP Bid and Award Committee to award to her the bid and execute the contract in her
favor. When the respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners and refused to
dissolve the same, the instant petition was filed.

In view of opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the petition for the issuance of said
writ was denied by the respondent Judge on October 10, 1968, on the ground that the issuance of said injunctive
writ "will cause great damage to respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent has cause of action against the petitioners since she failed to echaust the
administrative remedies.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Espiritu has no cause of action against the petitioners since
she failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the "General Conditions of the Invitation for Bids"
and was bound by the reservation clause which vested in the authorities concerned the discretion to ascertain
who among the bidders is the lowest responsible bidder. Such discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus.
The respondent judge, therefore, committed a grave abuse of discretion when she granted the injunction and
refused to dissolve the same.

Certiorari granted.
32.) CIR vs. Rosemarie Acosta
G.R. No. 154068 August 3, 2007

FACTS:

Acosta is an employee of Intel Manufacturing Phils. Inc. (Intel) and was assigned in a foreign country.
During that period Intel withheld the taxes due and remitted them to Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Respondent claimed overpayment of taxes and filed petition for review with Court of Tax Appeal (CTA).

However, the CTA dismissed the petition for failure to file a written claim for refund with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for review with the
CTA.

Further, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision reasoning that Acosta’s filing of an amended
return indicating an overpayment was sufficient compliance with the requirement of a written claim. Hence, said
matter was elevated to the Supreme Court (SC).

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance to the respondent’s petition for
review.

RULING:

A party seeking an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief but also to pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention
in order to give administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to court action. At the time respondent filed her amended return, the 1997,
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) was not yet in effect, hence respondent had no reason to think that the
filing of an amended return would constitute the written claim required by law.

CTA likewise stressed that even the date of filing of the Final Adjustment return was omitted,
inadvertently or otherwise, by respondent in her petition for review. This is fatal to respondent’s claim, for it
deprived the CTA of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Finally, revenue statutes are substantive laws and in no sense must with that of remedial laws. Revenue
laws are not intended to be liberally constructed.
33.) Merida Water District, et al vs. Francisco Bacarro, et al., G.R. No. 165993, September 30, 2008
Facts: On September 2002, after receiving a confirmation letter of its proposed water rates from the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), Merida Water District approved Resolution No. 006-02, implementing a
water rate increase of P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption. Thereafter, Merida Water District
issued notices of disconnection to concessionaires who refused to pay the water rate increase and did not render
service to those who opted to pay the increased rate on installment basis.
On February 13, 2003, respondents, consumers of Merida Water District, filed a Petition for Injunction,
etc. against petitioners before the RTC. Respondents sought to enjoin the petitioners from collecting payment of
P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption. Respondents alleged that this imposed rate was contrary
to the rate increase agreed upon during the public hearing. Respondents claimed that petitioners violated Letter
of Instructions (LOI No. 700 by: (1) implementing a water rate increase exceeding 60% of the current rate; and
(2) failing to conduct a public hearing for the imposed rate of P90.
On February 24,2003, Merida Water District, et al filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondents'
petition lacked a cause of action as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 198, the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended by P.D. Nos. 768 and 1479.
On February 26, 2003, one of the respondents questioned the legality of the water rate increase before
the National Water Resources Board (NWRB). Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC ruled in favor of the consumers
and held that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies due to the following circumstances, that by
imposing and collecting P90 for the first ten cubic meters of water consumption from its concessionaires,
petitioners: (1) failed to comply with the legal requisites of hearing and notice; and (2) violated LOI No. 700 for
prescribing a water rate increase of almost 100% from the previous rate. On March 8, 2003, petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order dated March 31.2003.
Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA affirmed the RTC's orders, upheld the RTC's jurisdiction and the
propriety of respondents' recourse to the trial court notwithstanding the rule on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied.

Issues: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over respondents' petition; and In the event of an affirmative answer of
the first issue, whether respondents' recourse to the trial court is proper despite their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Merida Water District, et al. and reversed and set aside the ruling of
the Court of Appeals that affirmed the RTC's decision.
PD No. 1479 provided that after review by the LWUA, a water concessionaire may appeal the same to
the NWRB, and the NWRB's decision may then be appealed to the Office of the President. Respondents failed
to exhaust administrative remedies by stopping their pursuit of the administrative process before the NWRB.
Their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, however, does not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. Non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies only renders the action premature, that the "claimed cause of action is not
ripe for judicial determination."
It is incumbent upon the party who has an administrative remedy to pursue the same to its appropriate
conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. Although the doctrine of exhaustion does not preclude in all
cases a party from seeking judicial relief, cases where its observance has been disregarded require a strong
showing of the inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm. Respondents justify their failure
to observe the administrative process on the following exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies: (1) patent illegality; and (2) a denial of due process. However, respondents fail to show that the
instant case merits the application of these exceptions.
34.) Edgar Valdez vs National Electrification Administration
Facts: On 13 March 1999, SUKELCO conducted elections for one member of the board of directors to represent
the Municipality of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Valdez and Seeres were the only candidates in the election. Later
that day, the District Election Committee (DECOM) proclaimed Seeres as the winner.
On 16 March 1999, Valdez filed a protest with the DECOM praying for the disqualification of Seeres and the
nullification of the election results in six precincts. Valdez alleged massive fraud, widespread cheating, and
serious election irregularities.

In an Order dated 19 March 1999, the DECOM recalled and cancelled the proclamation of Seeres and
restrained her from assuming the position of member of the board of SUKELCO. On 24 March
1999, Seeres filed her answer and a motion for reconsideration of the 19 March 1999 DECOM Order. On 28
April 1999, Seeres filed a motion to inhibit the DECOM from further hearing the protest.

On 2 July 1999, the DECOM denied the motions of Seeres and scheduled the case for presentation of
evidence.
Seeres appeal the decision of the DECOM to the NEA, which reversed the decision of the of the
DECOM.

Issue: 1. Whether the NEA validly assumed jurisdiction over the appeal of Seeres; and
2. Whether Valdez should have exhausted the administrative remedies provided by law.
Held: 1.In this case, Seeres appealed the DECOM Decision to NEA, Manila. Seeres failed to follow the rules on
appeal because the aggrieved party should appeal the DECOM Decision to the RE Center. If the decision of the
RE Center is still adverse, then appeal to the NEA is the next recourse.

The RE Center is the proper body clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal and where the appeal
must be filed within five days after receipt of the DECOM Decision. The erroneous filing of the appeal with the
NEA did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. The five day period having expired without Seeres filing
the appropriate appeal before the RE Center, Seeres lost or waived her statutory privilege to appeal and the
DECOM Decision became final and executory.

2.The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of
these exceptions is when only a question of law is involved. In this case, the issue of whether the NEA validly
assumed jurisdiction over the appeal of Seeres is one which calls for the interpretation and application of the
Guidelines on the Conduct of EC District Elections. Consequently, the Court of Appeals validly assumed
jurisdiction over the petition.
35.) Vigilar V. Aquino
639 SCRA 772, July 18,2011

Focus: Exceptions on the Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

Facts:

Respondent Aquino was invited to bid for a dike project in Pampanga. Respondent eventually won the
bid, and finished constructing the dike. However, petitioners Vigilar and government officials of the DPWH,
refused to pay petitioner the contract price. Petitioners refuse because the contract is void for violation of P.D.
1445, for absence of an appropriation. Respondent brought suit in the RTC, which petitioners sought to dismiss,
raising the non-suability of the state, as well as non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The lower court
ruled for the validity of the contract and ordered payment for the project. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the ruling of the lower court and declared the contract invalid.

Issues:

Whether or not the case should have been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Held:

No. Because the petition is without merit.

The rule for exhaustion of all administrative remedies admits of several exceptions. Some of these
obtain in the case at hand.

(1.) Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;

This is when further delay of respondent compensation will work injustice against him, as the government and
public has derived benefit from the dike constructed for almost two decades already.

(2.) Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;

The issue at hand is the validity of the contract, which is purely a question of law. As such, only the
courts may address the issue directly. And these are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of
the Commission on Audit or the DPWH.
36.) Rubio, Jr. V. Paras
455 SCRA 697, April 12,2005

Focus: When the issue involved is purely a Legal Question

Facts:

Petitioner Engr.Rubio provincial irrigation officer of the Nothern Leyte Irrigation Administration is accused by
respondent Paras the Administrator of the NIA and filed a prima facie case against him for, Grave Misconduct
by purchasing over priced materials, Oppression for causing the forced resignation or retirement of colleagues
and Violation of existing CSC law and rules of serious nature for failure to maintain a daily time card and
record. The formal charge also contained an order placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for a
period of 90 days effective upon his receipt thereof. Instead of filing his answer to the charges petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC alleging inter alia and that there was no appeal or other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to him.RTC dismissed the petition for the proper
remedy was to file a motion for the reconsideration of the formal charge and the order of preventive suspension
in the Office of the Administrator, or to appeal the same to the CSC. Instead of appealing the order to the CA
under rule 41.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that. Having determined that the
formal charge was evidently without legal basis, respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he refused to issue a temporary
restraining order and dismissed the petition on a clearly untenable ground that a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal was available to petitioner as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to
nullify the formal charge.CA dismissing the petition .

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s recourse to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court was inappropriate.

Ruling:

NO. Because the issues involved are not purely legal questions. The general rule is that the aggrieved party
is mandated to exhaust all administrative remedies available before resorting to judicial recourse. The tribunal,
either judicial or quasi-judicial must be given a chance to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. One
exception is when the issue involved is purely a legal question. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of the alleged facts.(Naguiat v. CA,412 SCRA 591). Indeed, in
charging the petitioner a new for acts which he had been previously charged, and which charges had already
been dismissed, the respondent acted contrary to law and with grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. The respondent even assumed jurisdiction over the same charges which were already the
subject of a COA special audit, as well as the other charges filed with and still pending in the CSC. Furthermore,
it even turned out that the said complaint had been dismissed by the CSC, and such order of dismissal had
become final and executory. In the interest of proper administration of justice, the respondent should have
waited for the outcome of the COA audit team’s investigation before charging the petitioner a new case.
Instead of dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, the RTC should have given due
course and granted the same, and nullified the formal charge and the Order of the respondent suspending the
petitioner from office.
37.) Naguiat V. CA
412 SCRA 591, Oct. 3, 2003

Focus: When the issue involved is purely a Legal Question : question of Law.

Facts:

The case arose when private respondent Aurora Queao filed a complaint before the Pasay City RTC for
cancellation of a Real Estate Mortgage she had entered into with petitioner Naguiat The RTC rendered a
decision, declaring the questioned Real Estate Mortgage void, which Naguiat appealed to the Court of
Appeals. After the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC decision, Naguiat instituted the present petition. Naguiat
questions the findings of facts made by the Court of Appeals, especially on the issue of whether Queao had
actually received the loan proceeds which were supposed to be covered by the two checks Naguiat had issued or
indorsed. Naguiat claims that being a notarial instrument or public document, the mortgage deed enjoys the
presumption that the recitals therein are true. Naguiat also questions the admissibility of various representations
and pronouncements of Ruebenfeldt, invoking the rule on the non-binding effect of the admissions of third
persons

ISSUE:

Whether or not the resolution of the issues presented before by Naguiat is a question of law or determination of
facts?

Ruling:

It is a determination of facts which the Supreme Court does not exercise in an appeal by certiorari.
Naguiat questions the findings of facts made by the Court of Appeals, especially on the issue of whether Queao
had actually received the loan proceeds which were supposed to be covered by the two checks Naguiat had
issued or indorsed. Under Rule 45 which governs appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be raised as
the Supreme Court. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect and are in fact generally binding on the Supreme Court. A question of law
which the Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.

Surely, there are established exceptions to the rule on the conclusiveness of the findings of facts of the
lower courts. But Naguiat case does not fall under any of the exceptions. In any event, both the decisions of the
appellate and trial courts are supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws.
44.) Divinagracia, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas
May 31, 1995

FACTS:
Filomena Mancita was appointed Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, in 1980
in a permanent capacity. When the Local Government Code (LGC) took effect, the office was renamed
Municipal Planning Development Coordinator (MPDC). The Sangguinang Bayan of Pili approved a Resolution
creating and organizing the Office of MPDC. Mancita held over the position until 1985.
Mayor Anastacio Prila notified Mancita that her services were being terminated on the ground that the Office of
MDC was abolished as a result of the reorganization of the local government of Pili. Respondent Priscilla
Nacario, the then Municipal Budget Officer (MBO), was appointed MPDC.
The local Budget Office, among others, was nationalized and placed under the DBM, hence, the authority to
appoint the Budget Officers devolved upon the Secretary of DBM. The position of MBO became vacant for
more than a year (March 1990-Sept 1991) due to the lack of a qualified candidate.
Petitioner Alexis San Luis, Cashier II of the DENR (started his career as casual clerk in 1977 and continued
rising from the ranks), was temporarily appointed MBO of Pili by DBM Sec. Guillermo Carague on Oct 1991.
By virtue of the 1991 LGC, control over the Local Government Officers Services was returned to the LGUs.
San Luis was reappointed to the same position in June 1992, in a permanent capacity, by petitioner Mayor
Delfin Divinagracia of Pili.
Mancita appealed her termination to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB: Mancita’s
termination was illegal. The Office of the MDC was abolished by the LGC of 1991, not by the reorganization of
the Municipality of Pili. Mancita was in fact qualified for the MPDC since the powers and duties of the two
positions were essentially the same. Mayor Divinagracia was ordered to reinstate Mancita and to pay
backwages. CSC: Appeal by Mayor Divinagracia dismissed.
Mayor Divinagracia informed Nacario that she was being terminated in compliance with the MSPB decision.
Nacario filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
praying for the annulment of the CSC Resolution. RTC issued a TRO. Mancita then filed a motion to dismiss
but this was denied. Then she filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the SC, which was
granted.
Pending the SC decision, Nacario asked the CSC about her status a s a permanent employee of the Municipality
of Pili after she had accepted the position of MPDC.
CSC: Mancita’s reinstatement was not a valid cause for Nacario’s termination, and since the latter was the
former MBO, she had the right to return to said position.
Mayor Divinagracia sought reconsideration of the CSC opinion, arguing that San Luis was validly appointed by
the DBM Secretary and confirmed by the CSC, hence, entitled to security of tenure.
CSC: Denied. Nacario is entitled to security of tenure. The reinstatement of Mancita to MPDC could not be a
valid cause for termination of Nacario. It relied on Sec. 13, Rule VI of the IRR of EO 292 (mandates the return
of an appointee, in a chain of promotions, to his former position once appointment is subsequently disapproved)
in directing restoration of Nacario to her former position.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sec. 13, Rule VI of the IRR of EO 292, is applicable to this case.
2. Whether the lateral transfer of Nacario was validly made in accordance with Sec. 5, par. 3, Rule Vii,
IRR of EO 2921. NO

RULING:
Petition dismissed. Incumbent Mayor ordered to reinstate Nacario to the Office of MBO of Pili and to order San
Luis to vacate said office without prejudice to his regaining his former position if legally feasible and warranted.
Ratio:1. Petitioners argue that the provision does not apply to this case because the rule covers only
appointments in a chain of promotions and not where a public officer was merely transferred to another position
of the same rank, grade and level. Public Respondents insist on the application of the automatic revision rule.
The term “chain of promotions” must not be interpreted in a literal, rigid and narrow sense, but must construed
liberally in favor of Nacario who merely accepted the position to accommodate her superior, unaware that her
new appointment would be disapproved.
SC: Under the provision, before a public official or employee can automatically be restored to her former
position, there must first be a series of promotions; second, all appointments are simultaneously submitted to the
CSC for approval; and third, the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position.
These requisites are not present in this case. The movement of Nacario from MBO to MPDC cannot be
considered a promotion, which connotes an increase in duties and responsibilities as well as a corresponding
increase in salary. Nacario’s movement was one of lateral transfer. The office of MPDC is not burdened with
more duties and responsibilities than the MBO. On the contrary, there was a reduction in her basic salary.
Moreover, Nacario admitted that the position of MBO and MPDC were of the same rank, salary grade and level.
This was attested to by the HR Management Officer of Pili, citing the Position Allocation List of the
municipality.
Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the
employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the commission.
45.) Republic, petitioner v. Lacap, respondent
517 SCRA 255 (G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007)

FACTS

Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with
modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed by Lacap
against RP.

Respondent Lacap doing business under the name of Carwin Construction, as the lowest bidder the respondent
acquired the contract for the concreting of Sitio Bahay Pare. Later on, a Contract Agreement was duly executed
by respondent and the petitioner. The personnel of the office of the District Engineer of San Fernando,
Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found out that the project was totally completed and
so the issuance of certificates thereof was made. The respondent sought to collect payment for the completed
project however it was disapproved by the District Auditor of COA on the ground that the contractor’s license
of the respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract.

On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before
the RTC.14

On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to
disapprove the claim.

Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order dated
March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.

On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State

Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the
contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit. CA affirmed the
decision but lowered interest to 6%.

ISSUE

Whether courts have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

Whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the execution of the contract is entitled or not to be
paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. A question of law could be resolved only
tentatively by the administrative authorities. Exhaustion of Administrative remedies does not does not apply
where nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done, such as where the issue does not require
technical knowledge and experience but one that would evolve in the interpretation and application of law.

A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him
from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides: “SEC. 35. Penalties. Any
contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or
contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work
within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the
Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or
revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced
to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning
rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does
not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already
expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent
should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the
fine prescribed under the law.
46.) Tan Veterans Backpay Commission

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Natividad Tan brouth a petition before the court of first instance of manila a varified petition
for mandamus against respondent veterans backpay commission, to declare deceased Lt, Tan chiat Bes alias Tan
Lian Lay a chines national who claims back right, privileges, and prerogative under Rep act no 304 as amended
by Republic act no 897 and second to give due course to the claim of petitioner that the petitioner is the widow
of the late Lt Tan Chiat Bes alias Tan Lian Lay and bonafide member of the 1st regiment of united states
chinesevolunter in the phil,,the secretaryy and chief of office staff, the veterans backpay commission sent a
letter to general vicente lopez of the united states chinese volunters in the phil apprising the latter that the
commission has reaffirmed its solution granting the backpay for alien members the AFP certified that deceased
veteran has rendered service as a recognized guerilla that after due deleberation respondent revoked its previous
stand and ruled that aleans are not intitled for backpay.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner need to exhaust administrative remedies before ressorting to court proceeding.

HELD; admintrative remidies;rule of exhoustion not to be invoked if party is in estoppel,,the respondent

commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhoustion of administrative remidies considering that in its
resolution, it declared that the opnions of the secretary of justice were advisory in nature,,which may either be
accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggreved party has the court for recourse there by
leading the petitione to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor whould be accepted by the
commission.
47.) De lara vs cloribel, 14 SCRA 269
FACTS
Plaintiff was granted license to log over area in claveria misamis oriental during the non renewall of plaintiff
license, p and b interprise co.inc. filed a similar application, having been approved over a forest area also
situated in clavaria, misamis oriental, immediately constructed a logging road which extended partially with in
the area covered by the plaintiff timber concession,plaintiff now secured for renewall of its timber licence where
the company protested such approval as it would couse conflict to the portion of the area, the director of forestry
overuled the protest hence, the same appealef to the sec of agriculture and natural resources, pendency of the
protest, plaintiff continued his logging operation and tresspass the construction made by the company, hence,
this instand action for injuction and damages befote the court of first instance which granted an ex parte of
preliminary investagation.
ISSUE:
Whrther or not the court of first instance commited a grave abuse of discretion in issuing ex parte the writ of
preliminary injunction.

HELD:
The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion as such general rule may be relaxed when its application
may cause great and irreporable damage which cannot otherwise prevented except by taking the oppurtunity
appropriate court action, the rule is applicableit, it should appear that an erreporable damage and injury will be
suffered by a party if he should await before taking court action of the administrative official concerned on the
matter
48.) LAND CAR, INC. vs.
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC. AND VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC.
G.R. No. 154377, 417 SCRA 307
December 8, 2003

FACTS:
On May 21, 1999, the petitioner applied to operate a public utility bus service with the LTRFB but the
respondents opposed the application on the ground the route being applied for was being served by them, and
there will be a cut-throat competition. The LTRFB granted the application and directed the issuance of the
Certificate of Public Convenience. Upon appeal, the DOTC Secretary reversed the LTRFB, enjoining the
petitioner from operating its buses along the contested route but the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Office of the President as well as a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition while the Office of the President ordered that the execution of
the order of the DOTC Secretary be stayed. Respondents appealed before the CA, alleging that the Office of the
President had no jurisdiction to issue such order in the absence of a law providing for an appeal from the DOTC
to the Office of the President. The CA granted the respondent’s petition and it also ordered the dismissal of the
appeal filed by the petitioner before the Office of the President based on forum-shopping and reinstated the
DOTC Secretary’s order.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA has the power to dismiss the appeal filed before the Office of the President.
Whether or not appellate court has decided a question in a way not in accord with applicable
jurisprudence.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the
Office of the President to review any determination or disposition of a department head. The doctrine requires
an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it
may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still
be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priory exhausted before the court’s judicial power is
invoked.
NO. The Office of the President validly acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing therewith of
the appeal by the petitioner, and said jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent recourse by the petitioner of the
certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals. It is the Office of the President, not the CA, which could
dismiss the case pending before that office.
The appellate court correctly ruled that the action of a department head bears only the implied approval of the
President, and the latter is not precluded from exercising the power to review the decision of the former pursuant
to the President’s power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Jurisdiction which has
attached in the first instance continues until the final resolution of the case.
49.) LETICIA CIPRIANO vs.
GREGORIO P. MARCELINO and the HONORABLE RAFAEL DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-27793, 43 SCRA 291
February 28, 1972

FACTS:
On May 5, 1966, the petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur an action for
mandamus to compel the respondent to pay her salary and also asked for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit. The petitioner served as a clerk in the office of municipal treasurer but she
resigned of the refusal to pay her salary corresponding to the period from September 1, 1965 to January 15,
1966. The respondent moved to dismiss upon the ground that she had not "exhausted all administrative remedies
before filing the present action,". The motion was granted and ordered the dismissal of the case. The petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can file such action without exhausting all administrative remedies.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies may also be
disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The theory that a party must first
exhaust his remedies in the administrative branch before seeking the aid of the strong arm of equity must give
way to the reality that a government employee must depend for the support of himself and his family upon his
salary, and were he to be deprived of that even alone for a few months, possibly even less, that must mean
starvation because more often than not, a government employee lives hand-to-mouth existence and therefore
were the dogmatic rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies be made to mean that he should wait for the
most final administrative decision in his case, the only logical result must be vital disaster to his dependents and
to himself, so that this is the reason why the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies has always been
understood to mean that the same have furnished a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
50.) JACINTO TIANGCO, and JOSE LAZARO vs.
FAUSTINA LAUCHANG
G.R. No. L-17598, 9 SCRA 125
September 30, 1963

ASUNCION HIZON vs. FAUSTINA LAUCHANG

G.R. No. L-17694
September 30, 1963

FACTS:
A consolidated case where in the petitioners filed a petitions for a writ of certiorari regarding the
decision of the CA, that the respondent under the law have preferential rights to repurchase the portion which
they respectively occupy and the application of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A parcel of land located
at Lot No. 10, Block No. 2 of the Tambobong Estate in the municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, was
formerly leased by the Archbishop of Manila to one Matea Suarez. Suarez sold her leasehold interest in the land
to Anacleto Lauchang, father of the respondent. Upon the death of Anacleto, his daughter took over the said
property by paying rents therefor to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila but it was suspended because the
Archbishop of Manila sold the Tambobong Estate to the Government of Philippines. Asuncion Hizon and the
petitioners are a sublessee of the respondent on the leased property and have their respective houses on it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exhaustion of all administrative remedies is tenable.
Whether or not the respondent under the law have preferential rights to repurchase the portion which
they respectively occupy.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent's failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is
untenable. It is well to recall that the lot, subject of the litigation, is not a part of the public domain, but of
private ownership acquired by the Government for resale to private persons, and for that reason any aggrieved
party may bring an action in court without the need of exhausting all administrative remedies.
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that Commonwealth Act No. 539. Section I of this Act provides that
the home lots into which the lands acquired thereunder are to be subdivided to promote its objective shall be
resold at reasonable prices and under such terms and conditions as may be fixed "to their bona fide tenants or
occupants or private at individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and
own lands in the Philippines. Thus, the first choice is given to the bona fide "tenants", the second to the
"occupants" and the last to private individuals".
51.) G.R. No. L-38962 September 15, 1986 (144 SCRA 116)IN RE: MOTION TO CORRECT
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-672 COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD.
FRANCISCA SOTO petitioner-appellant, vs.MARINA S. JARENO, JOSEFINA S. MEDEL and LILIA
S. ALILAIN, oppositors-appellees.

Facts: Sergio Serfino was married to Francisca Soto in January 1933. In 1939, he filed anapplication for a
homestead patent, describing himself as "married to Francisca Soto,"but in 1953, when the original certificate
over the homestead was issued, it was in favorof "Sergio Serfino, widower." Serfino died in 1965, and soon
thereafter the petitioner fileda motion with the Court of First instance of Negros Occidental
praying that hisdescription as a "widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two daughters ofthe
couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their parents were married in1933, the oppositors
nonetheless pointed out that their mother had abandoned them in1942 to live with another man. Later, they said,
she had adulterous relations with still asecond man by whom she begot eleven children. According to these
oppositors, it wastheir father himself who had described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had notheard
from the petitioner since 1942. The trial court originally granted the motion andordered the change prayed
for, but later it reconsidered its decision and held itselfwithout jurisdiction to act on the matter. Its
reason was that there was no observance ofthe doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The case was
elevated from theCA to the SC on a pure question of law.

Issue: Whether or not the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is sufficient ground to stripthe trial court of
jurisdiction to act on the case at bar

Ruling: NO. Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does notaffect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line ofdecisions. The only effect of non-
compliance with this rule is that it will deprive thecomplainant of a cause of action, which is a
ground for a motion to dismiss. If notinvoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the
courts can then takecognizance of the case and try it. The proper procedure is to institute the intestate
proceedings of the Sergio Serfino,where the appellant may file against its administrator the corresponding
ordinary actionto claim her alleged rights over the lot in question.
54.) Arrow Transportation Corp -vs- Board of Transportation and Sultan Rent-A-Car, Inc.

GR No. L-9655, 21 March 1975

63 SCR 193

FACTS:

Petitioner Arrow and private respondent Sultan are both domestic corporations. Petitioner is a holder of a
Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a public utility bus. Private respondent applied for the issuance of a
CPC to operate a similar service. Without the required publication, public respondent Board granted a
provisional permit to operate. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and cancellation of the provisional permit.
Before resolution of the motion, petitioner filed for herein petition arguing that there must be publication before
a provisional permit can be issued, with reference made to PD 101, which authorized the Board to grant
provisional permits when warranted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the provisional permit was legal.

HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. For a provisional permit to operate a public utility, an ex parte hearing
would suffice. The decisive consideration is the existence of public need. That was shown in this case,
respondent Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied of the pressing necessity for the grant of the
provisional permit sought.
The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy not only because of the importance of the issue
raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled. As was set forth in Executive
Order No. 101 which prescribes the procedure to be followed by respondent Board, it is the policy of the State,
as swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of
existing public motor vehicles and eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as well as
update the standard of those carrying such business, making it "imperative to provide, among other urgently
needed measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining, or modifying the lines and mode of
operation of public utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, may operate in this country

Petition dismissed
55.) GODOFREDO S. SISON, in his capacity as Deputy Administrator, Social Security
System, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DR. CONCEPCION O. LIM-TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 124086 June 26, 2006

Facts:

SSS Regional Office No. 6 in Cebu City ("SSS Cebu City Regional Office"), then managed by petitioner,
received several Medicare claims from respondent Dr. Concepcion O. Lim-Tan ("respondent") from August
1988 to April 1989. Respondent is the proprietor of LLMH in Valencia, Bohol and the administrator of PLMH
in Guindulman, Bohol. The claims were supposedly for the medical care services by the hospitals to persons
who represented themselves as SSS members or as dependents of SSS members.

Respondent made oral and written demands for payment upon petitioner. Petitioner told respondent that there
would be delays in the payment of her claims because there were irregularities which require further
investigation. In a demand letter dated 3 June 1989, without specifying the period for which she was claiming
for payment, respondent again asked petitioner for payment of her claims. Respondent premised her demand on
Medicare Circular No. 258, s. of 1988 ("Circular No. 258") dated 12 October 1988 but did not receive any word
from petitioner.

Respondent filed a civil case for Mandamus and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.
Respondent wanted petitioner to pay not only the Medicare claims, but also included interest on the claims,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. Sison filed an urgent motion for leave
of court to amend petition. He wanted to include the incumbent manager of SSS Cebu City Regional Office as a
formal party which the court granted the motion in an order.

Sison alleged that SSS Cebu City Regional Office found that several claims from LLMH and PLMH were
systematically tampered. However, petitioner did not file any action in court or with the Philippine Medical
Care Commission (PMCC) to suspend payment of respondent’s claims within 90 days of filing.

The trial court ruled that respondent has clearly shown her right to demand payment from petitioner.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the appellate court but it upheld the trial court’s decision and modified the
amount due. Dissatisfied with the appellate court’s ruling, petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari on
the decision of the appellate court.

Issues:

1. Whether petitioner can be compelled by mandamus to pay respondent’s claims.

2. Whether the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies

Ruling :

1. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of
judgment cannot be compelled by mandamus. It is nonetheless also available to compel action, when
refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment in a
particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper remedy in cases
where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. The
exception applies to the present case.

2. Application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is relaxed when a strong public
interest is involved. In addition to the protection and promotion of the people’s right to health, the
Constitution provides that:
 The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavour to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavour to provide free medical care to paupers.

The Court partly grants the petition. The Decision of the appellate court is affirmed with modification. Thus, the
case is remanded to the trial court for determination of the remaining amount of actual damages. In addition,
petitioner Godofredo S. Sison, in his personal capacity, must pay respondent Dr. Concepcion O. Lim-Tan
exemplary damages of P20, 000 and costs of the suit except attorney’s fees
56.) PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
CHINESE GENERAL HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, respondent.
G.R. No. 163123 April 15, 2005

FACTS:

On February 14, 1995, Republic Act No. 7875, otherwise known as An Act Instituting a National Health
Insurance Program for all Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation was approved
and signed into law.

Prior to the enactment of R.A. 7875. CGH (Chinese General Hospital) had been an accredited health care
provider under the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC), more popularly known as Medicare. It filed
its Medicare claims with the Social Security System (SSS), which, together with the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), administered the Health Insurance Fund of the PMMC. Thus, petitioner filed its claim
from 1989 to 1992 with the SSS, amounting to EIGHT MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO and 10/100 (P8,102,782.10).

Instead of giving due course to petitioners claims totaling to EIGHT MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO and 10/100 (P8,102,782.10), only ONE MILLION THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX and 32/100 Pesos (1,365,556.32) was
paid , representing its claims from 1989 to 1992 .

Petitioner again filed its claims representing services rendered to its patients from 1998 to 1999, amounting to
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO and
93/100 Pesos (P7,554,342.93). For being allegedly filed beyond the sixty (60) day period allowed by the
implementing rules and regulations, Section 52 of 7875, petitioners claims were denied by the Claims Review
Unit of Philhealth .

the Court of Appeals ordered herein petitioner Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) to pay
the claims in the amount of Fourteen Million Two Hundred Ninety-one Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-eight
Pesos and 71/100 (P14,291,568.71), principally on the ground of liberal application of the 60-day rule under
Section 52 of RA 7875s Implementing Rules and Regulations.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CGH is entitled to receive payment from Philhealth for services rendered from 1989 to
1992.

2. Whether or not the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to judicial
intervention.

HELD:

1. Yes, The state policy in creating a national health insurance program is to grant discounted medical
coverage to all citizens, with priority to the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women and children, and free medical care to paupers.
A careful reading of RA 7875 shows that the law itself does not provide for any specific period within
which to file claims, it was not RA 7875 itself but Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations which established the 60-day cut-off for the filing of claims.
Delay on the part of members is an ordinary occurrence. There is no need to make a mountain out of a
molehill as far as this particular point is concerned. To this day, members continue to encounter delay
in submitting their documents. There was therefore no compelling reason for the exacting and
meticulous enforcement of the rule when, in at least two instances, petitioner itself implemented it
liberally and on the same ground that it was using against respondent.
 2. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an administrative decision must first be
appealed to the administrative superiors at the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of
justice for review.

This doctrine, however, is a relative one and its flexibility is conditioned on the peculiar circumstances
of a case. There are a number of instances when the doctrine has been held to be inapplicable. Among
the established exceptions are

1) when the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
8) when strong public interest is involved;
9) when the subject of the controversy is private land;
10) in quo warranto proceedings
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay
respondents claims representing services rendered to its members from 1989 to 1992.
57.) PEDRO GRAVADOR, v. EUTIQUIO MAMIGO et al.
G.R. No. L-24989 July 21, 1967

FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros
Oriental. On August 15, 1964 he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through
the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he had
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.
Few days later the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school.
Petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the date of
his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed by
Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, alleging that they knew that the
petitioner was born on December 11, 1901. Further, they alleged that they were the neighbors of the late
petitioner's parents and were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was baptized a few weeks after his birth
.
On October 19, 1964, petitioner again wrote to the Division Superintendents of Schools, reiterating his claim
that he had not reached the age of 65 and enclosing some papers in support thereof.
On April 13, 1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental. He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of the Sta. Catalina
Elementary School and to order payment to him of not only his back salaries but also damages .
The trial court ruled in favor of the and accordingly granted his petition. As a result the petitioner was
reinstated.The respondents appealed .

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's action was prematurely brought because he had not availed of all administrative
remedies.

RULING:
No. Suit for quo warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one year. Before filing the case the
petitioner waited for eight months for the school officials to act on his protest. To require him to tarry a little
more would obviously be unfair to him since on April 13, 1965, when this case was filed, he had only four
months left within which to bring the case to court. There was neither manner nor form of assurance that the
decision of the Director of Public Schools would be forthcoming. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance would result in the nullification of the claim being
asserted.
58.) RAMON P. BINAMIRA, vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR.,

G.R. No. 92008. July 30, 1990.

FACTS:
In his petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his
security of tenure.
A memorandum designating Ramon Binamira as General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) on
April 7, 1986 was addressed and signed by the then Minister of Tourism and the Ex-officio Chairman of PTA.
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the same date.
The Minister sought the approval of the delegation to the president on April 10, 1986 and the same was
granted. Since then Binamira discharged duties as the PTA general manager and ex-officio vice chairman. On
January 2, 1990, Peter Garrucho, as the newly appointed secretary of tourism demanded for Binamira's
resignation which was pursuant to a memorandum that then Pres.Aquino sent to the former advising him of the
invalidity of the delegation of the position to Binamira as he was not appointed by the president which was what
was required under PD 564.PD 564 is the law that created the Ministry of Tourism. Under section 23-A of the
decree, the General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of
six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause. When Binamira was ousted, Garrucho took over his place as
general manager. Binamira filed a petition for quo warranto to question Garrucho's post and prayed for
reinstatement claiming unjust dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Binamira acquired a valid title to the disputed position and so has right to be
reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.

RULING:

No. Petitioner Binamira never acquired a valid title to the disputed position so he has no right to be re instated as
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.

Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, the appointment results in security of tenure. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in nature. The implication is
that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. It
is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. Also, where the person
is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered
only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
59.) 3.R. MARINO CORPUS, vs. MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR., ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-23721 March 31, 1965

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant, R. Marino Corpus, then holding the position of "Special Assistant to the Governor,
In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, was administratively charged by several employees in
the export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression,
conduct unbecoming of a public official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank.
As a result Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office effective on said date and created a three-man
investigating committee . In its final report , the investigating committee, finds that there is no basis upon which
to recommend disciplinary action against respondent, and, therefore, respectfully recommends that he be
immediately reinstated.
Later, the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would
be prejudicial to the best interests of the Central Bank and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his
suspension.
Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it. He filed an action
for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The trial court, rendered judgment declaring the Board resolution null and void, and
ordering, among others, the reinstatement of the herein petitioner and awarding him P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Both the petitioner and the respondents appealed the judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause
of removal.

RULING:
The court, cannot rely on the so-called "loss of confidence" as a reason for dismissal. And inasmuch as the
charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to follow the mandate that
“No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.)”. In the interest of the service , reasonable protection should
be afforded civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are "highly
technical," the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at
least demands that their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence
and deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists.
60.) EY Industrial Vs. Shen Dar

634 SCRA 363

Facts:

EY Industrial Sales is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, distribution and sale of air
compressors.

Shen Dar is a Taiwan-based foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of compressors.

From 1997-2004, EY Industrial imported air compressors from Shen Dar.

In 1997, Shen Dar filed a Trademark Application with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) for the mark
“Vespa” for the use of air compressors. It was approved in 2007.

In 1999, EY Industrial filed a Trademark Application also for the mark “VESPA” for the use of air compressors.
It was approved in 2004.

Shen Dar filed a Petition for Cancellation of the Industrial’s EYES COR with the Bureau of Legal Affairs
contending that: a. there was a violation of Section 123.1 (D) of the Intellectual Property Code which provides
that: A mark cannot be registered if it is identical to a mark with an earlier filing or priority date. b. EY
Industrial is only a distributor of the air compressors

On the other hand, EY Industrial alleged that it is the sole assembler and fabricator of VESPA air compressors
since the early 1990s and that Shen Dar supplied them air compressors with the mark “SD” and not “VESPA”

Issue: Whether the factual findings of the IPO are binding on the CA

Ruling: Yes. The general rule in this jurisdiction is that the factual findings of administrative bodies deserve
utmost respect when supported by evidence. However, such general rule is subject to exceptions. Proceeding by
analogy, the exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of factual findings of the Court of Appeals, enumerated
in Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, can also be applied to quasi-judicial bodies. The findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by this Court:

(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;

(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion;

(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied.)

The CA identified certain material facts that were allegedly overlooked by the BLA and the IPO
Director General which it opined, when correctly appreciated, would alter the result of the case. An examination
of the IPO Decisions, however, would show that no such evidence was overlooked.

There was no justifiable reason for the CA to disregard the factual findings of the IPO. The rulings of
the IPO Director General and the BLA Director were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The facts
cited by the CA and Shen Dar do not justify a different conclusion from that of the IPO. Hence, the findings of
the BLA Director and the IPO Director General must be deemed as conclusive on the CA.
64.) Office of the Ombudsman, represented by Hon. Aniano A. Desierto vs Heirs of Margarita Vda.
De Ventura

GR No 151800/605 SCRA 1, November 5, 2009

Facts:

Heirs of Margarita Vda. De Ventura (the Heirs) filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio and spouses
Edilberto and Celerina Darang. Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina to investigate the claims of
the Heirs agaist her former husband Edilberto. Celerina supported the report with public documents which she
falsified and Palacio issued a recommendation based on that report to award the landholding in dispute to
Edilberto.

The DARAB recommended that the charged against the respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The CA then took cognizance of the case and granted the provisional dismissal of the complaint against
respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 but denied the dismissal of the complaint for falsification of
public documents.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Ruling:

The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

That since the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases,
its ruling on the case is void.
65.) Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu vs. Alvin Agustine T. Ignacio

G.R. No. 167824 & 168622/622 SCRA 678, July 2, 2010

FACTS:

The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a naturalized Filipino citizen
sometime in 1959. The said petitioners, being minors at that time, were also recognized as Filipino citizens.
Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a complaint dated March 5,2004 for blacklisting and
deportation against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the basis that the
latter two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners having been issued
Canadian passports.

The trial court granted the application for preliminary injunction enjoining public respondents from further
continuing with the deportation proceedings. Respondent Atty. Ignacio filed a Petition for Certiorari, also with
the CA which the latter granted and annulled the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court stating
that the latter has no jurisdiction pending administrative proceeding in the Bureau of Immigration.

Hence, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 31, 2005 praying for
the reversal of the decision rendered by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA in its decision, does not apply in the present
case because it falls under an exception.

HELD:

In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a
respondent in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
such claim is correct. In the said case, the proof adduced by the respondent therein was so substantial and
conclusive as to his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention. In the present case there is substantial or
conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino citizens. Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as
to whether petitioners lost their Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains,
through the evidence adduced and undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos, unless
proven otherwise.

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by the administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction which are based on sound public policy and practical consideration are not inflexible rules. There
are many accepted exceptions such as:

(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
 (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction;

(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;

(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;

(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice;

(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;

(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;

(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;

(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

(k) when strong public interest is involved; and

(l) in quo warranto proceedings.

66.) KEPCO PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
G.R. No. 181858; November 24, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner KEPCO Philippines Corporation (Kepco) is a VAT-registered independent power producer engaged
in the business of generating electricity. It exclusively sales to National Power Corporation (NPC), an entity
exempt from taxes under Section 13 of RA No. 6395.

Kepco filed an application for zero-rated sales and subsequently approved.

In the course of doing business with NPC, Kepco claimed expenses reportedly sustained in connection with the
production and sale of electricity with NPC. Thereafter, Kepco filed before the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) a claim for tax refund covering unutilized input VAT payments attributable to its zero-rated
sales transactions. It also filed a petition for review before the CTA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the petition for review filed before the CTA is under RULE 45 of the rules of court?

RULING:

No. The Court has noticed that although this petition is denominated as Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Kepco, in its assignment of errors, impugns against the
CTA En Banc grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which are grounds in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Time and again, the Court has emphasized that there
is a whale of difference between a Rule 45 petition (Petition for Review on Certiorari) and a Rule 65 petition
(Petition for Certiorari.) A Rule 65 petition is an original action that dwells on jurisdictional errors of whether a
lower court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. A Rule 45 petition, on
the other hand, is a mode of appeal which centers on the review on the merits of a judgment, final order or
award rendered by a lower court involving purely questions of law. Thus, imputing jurisdictional errors against
the CTA is not proper in this Rule 45 petition. Kepco failed to follow the correct procedure. On this point alone,
the Court can deny the subject petition outright.
67.) CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES

Vs. EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH ROSE DE
GARCIA TERINGTERING,GR. No. No. 166803 October 11, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering and in behalf of her minor child
filed a complaint against Crewlink for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance,
damages and attorney’s fees.

Editha alleged that her husband entered into an overseas employment contact with Crewlink. He took a medical
exam and was declared fit to work. On April 9, 2001 Jacinto died due to drowning. Editha claimed for
compensation but was denied by Crewlink. She claimed that in order for her to get compensation it is enough
that Jacinto died during the term of his contract and while still on board. She asserted that Jacinto was suffering
from a psychotic disorder or mood disorder bipolar type. She further alleged that the death was not deliberate
and of his own will but as a result of a mental disorder.

Crewlink refused because Jacinto committed suicide. They alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice,
wherein he was saved the first time but was no longer saved the second time. Hence, Editha was not entitled to
the benefits.

On February 12, 2002 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit because Jacinto’s death was
directly attributable to him. One year after, Teringtering appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the
ruling of the labor arbiter. Teringtering then filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 before the court of
appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition filed is granted.

RULING:

No. In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of
any showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly
erroneous. We are not a Trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding
upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were
arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record.

The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for
the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an
injustice be caused to the employer. Hence, the rule is that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.
68.) HEIRS OF LUIS A. LUNA and REMEGIO A. LUNA, and LUZ LUNA-SANTOS, as
represented by their Attorneys-in-Fact, AUREA B. LUBIS

vs. RUBEN S. AFABLE, TOMAS M. AFABLE, FLORANTE A. EVANGELISTA, LEOVY S.

EVANGELISTA, JAIME M. ILAGAN, ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 188299: January 23, 2013

FACTS:

The heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, and Luz Luna-Santos (“Heirs”) are co-owners of a parcel of
land located in Brgy. Guinobatan,Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro which was subjected to compulsory
acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Respondents Ruben Afable, Tomas
Afable, Florante Evangelista, Leovy Evangelista, Jaime Ilagan, et al. (Afable, et al.) were identified by the DAR
as qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Hence, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were issued to them.
The heirs sought the cancellation of the said CLOAs before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Calapan
City. Their petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in question into a light intensity
industrial zone pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Calapan, thereby excluding the same from the coverage of the agrarian law. DARAB Calapan City ordered the
cancellation of the CLOAs.

Aggrieved, Afable et al. appealed to the DARAB Central Office and the latter ruled in their favor. The heirs
appealed the decision to the Office of the President which ruled that the parcel of land is excluded from the
coverage of CARP.

Then, Afable et al. appealed the Office of the President’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the
appeal. Hence, the heirs appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 21 validly classified the parcel of land from agricultural to non-
agricultural, and therefore, exempt from CARP?

RULING:

The land is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

POLITICAL LAW: power of local governments; police power

Local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands. Sec. 345 of RA No.
2264 (The Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. By virtue of
a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its
political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs.

The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and
reclassification is an exercise of police power. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the
residents of a locality.

Petition granted. The Decision of the Office of the President is REINSTATED.

69.) SUNSHINE TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED
Vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and REALUCIO R. SANTOS,
G.R. No. 116025. February 22, 1996
FACTS:
On 24 August 1989, petitioner Sunshine Transportation, Inc. hired private respondent Realucio R. Santos
(hereinafter Santos) as a bus driver on a probationary basis. After six months, the former then extended the latter
a regular appointment as Bus Driver Class C.
On 7 January 1992, Santos received a memorandum from the petitioner directing him to submit a written
explanation within 48 hours as to why he failed to report for his trip scheduled on 28 December 1991.
However, Santos claimed that on 2 January 1992, he applied for a leave of absence with the petitioners
Operations Manager Danilo Alvarado; but Alvarado tore the leave application, verbally terminated his services,
and even forced him off the premises. Santos then opted to mail his application for leave, also on 2 January
1992.Subsequently Santos received a letter of termination.
On 21 December 1992, Santos filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for (a) illegal suspension, (b)
illegal dismissal, (c) illegal deduction of Bicol trip allowance, (d) non-payment of salaries, overtime pay,
premiums for holidays, rest day and night shift, allowances, and separation pay. He also prayed for
reinstatement with back wages and moral damages.
On its part, the petitioner emphasized Santos misdeed.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio dismissed the complaint upon a finding that Santos was dismissed for
cause with due process and that he was not entitled to his money claims. Santos appealed to the NLRC and the
NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiters finding. Unsatisfied with the NLRC decision, the petitioner filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari against NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision
RULING:
In the first place, the petitioner has not shown that other than this special civil action under Rule 65, it has
no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance.
It is now settled in our jurisdiction that while it is true that the only way by which a labor case may reach
this Court is through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must, however, be shown
that the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 14, Rule VII of the
New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for reconsideration of
any order, resolution, or decision of the NLRC, constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy which the said
party may avail of. Accordingly, and in the light of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a
motion for reconsideration must first be filed before the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of.
In the case at bench, the records do not show and neither does the petitioner make a claim that it filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision before it came to us through this action. It has not, as
well, suggested any plausible reason for direct recourse to this Court against the decision in question.
70.). PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), represented by its Baguio City Economic
Zone Administrator, DIGNA TORRES,
vs.
ABRAHAM B. BORRETA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 59, and
BENEDICTO CARANTES

G.R. No. 142669 March 15, 2006

FACTS:

Carantes, private respondent, was charged with Violation of Section 301 in Relation to Section 213 of
Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building without Permit) in Information.

On December 8, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Carantes guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision. The Appellate Court’s Decision became final and executory on June 14, 1997.

On February 26, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of demolition. Carantes then voluntarily demolished one of
the structures built on the area and paid a fine of P5, 000.00.

In a Manifestation/Motion filed with the trial court, Carantes averred that the writ should be limited only to the
structure built "in or about the month of April 1991" as alleged in the Information and should not include the
one built by his father sometime in 1970. He prayed for the stay of execution.

On June 15, 1999, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from.The Court of Appeals’ Decision, which also speaks of
"structures," having become final and executory, let a writ be issued for the demolition of the other structure of
the accused subject of this case.

Carantes filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Thereafter, Carantes filed a Manifestation
(actually a second motion for reconsideration) that before the filing of the Information against him, a building
permit for the remaining structure was issued by the City Engineer of Baguio. In its Comment the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) maintained that it is the PEZA which has the authority to issue building
permits over structures built within its area.

The trial court, acting on Carantes’ Manifestation (or second motion for reconsideration), issued an Order
modifying the Appellate Court’s final and executory Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion under rule 65 of the rules of court

RULING:

Under Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon
a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

It is settled that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. The
court which rendered judgment has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution. The parties may not object
to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except under the following circumstances:

1) The writ of execution varies the judgment;

2) There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

4) It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;

5) The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or

6) It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
3. Constantino Gumaru vs.Quirino State College G.R.No.164196

Facts:Petitioner and Respondent entered into a constraction agreement for the erectment of said state
collge.Gumaru was not able to finish said building because defendants allegedly awarded it to another
contractor.Gumaru then sued defendants for damages.Acting on there behalf,Atty.Carlos Aggabao filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint because the venue was not proper.Having been denied,they were declared in
default because they failed to answer within the given period.The RTC then rendered its decision in favour of
Gumaru.However,OSG filed a motion to quash the execution prayed for by Gumaru for they were not notified
of said litigation.

Issue:1)Should the Stae College be given the opportunity to present its defense;

2)Is the OSG correct in saying that they should have been notified prior to the hearing;and 3)Who should be the
right counsel for the defendants.

Ruling:1)Quirino State College should be given the opportunity to present evidence for they were tried ex parte
having been no counsel in their behalf.

2)The OSG should have been notified because State College is their proper counsel. 3)As defined by the
provision the proper counsel that would best represent Quirino State College are lawyers of the Office of the
Solicitor General,authorized by the head of office.
15. RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.

FACTS:

On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding
payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption
for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992.
MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects
of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount,
MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the
latter.

RULING:

Decision MODIFIED.

Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric
consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of
its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair
defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.

The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the
consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was
obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards
its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the
bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear
the consequences of such oversight.
18. MCCI INDUSTR5IAL SALES CORPORATION V. SSANGYONG CORPORATION

536 SCRA 408

FACTS:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers
is the respondent, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional
headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. Two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and
facsimile and telocopy transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of
the steel product order to petitioner if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the
faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent again by fax.

Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the Regional Trail
Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under the
Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After respondent rested its case petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present
the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the
photocopies of the prof forma invoices presented by respondent |Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. no. 8792 because
the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that
from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro
forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and therefore the best evidence under
the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittal (specifically ST2-
POSTS0401—1and ST2-POSTS401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent
sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

ISSUE: Whether the print-out and /photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such?

HELD: Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rules, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means showing to reflect the data
accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the
functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an
“electronic data message or an electronic document.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers
to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.

The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic data” is copied from the Model Law
on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said
phrase is significant and pivotal.

Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning as the
term “electronic record” in the Canada Law. This construction of the term “electronic data message” which
excludes telexes or faxes except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the electronic Commerce Law’s
focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile
transmission are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper based information or data that is scanned,
sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. [I]n virtual or paperless environment, technically,
there is no original copy to speak of as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all aspects and
are considered as original. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with “electronic document” could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an
original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct
from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology,
like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data
message.”

[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document” as defined under the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
19. Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation,

117 SCRA 597

(Administrative Law, reasonableness, quasi-judicial power)

Facts:

The case is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order filed by the Taxi Cab Operators of Metro Manila seeking to declare the nullity of
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Board of Transportation. Board of Transportation issued Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years
old.

Pursuant to the BOT circular, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52
instructing the implementation of said circular and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed
and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the circulars on the ground that fixing the ceiling at 6 years is arbitrarily
and oppressive because the road worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to
which they are subjected and therefore their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the
time of the registration.

Issue: Whether or not a circular phasing out taxicabs more than 6 years old is unreasonable and arbitrary.

Held:

No. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly. The span of 6
years supplies that reasonable standard. By the time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair
return on investment obtained. Thye are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable
service to the public.

Taxicabs in Manila, compared to those in other places are subject to heavier traffic pressure and constant use.
38. INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. NLRC

Facts:

The instant petition seeks the reversal and/or modification of the resolution of public respondent NLRC
dismissing the appeals of petitioners and affirming then decision of POEA. This is a claim for death
compensation benefits filed by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, Seaman Jeremias Pineda, against
employer, Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the
Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.

Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessel, MV Amazonia, owned and operated by its
foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months
upon mutual consent of both parties. On October 2, 1989, he met his death when he was shot by a Thai
Policeman in Bangkok, Thailand.

The POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and
burial expenses. Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public respondent. In a Decision dated March
30, 1994, public respondent upheld the POEA.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can be held liable for the death of Seaman Jeremias Pineda?

Held:

Yes. The petitioners contention that the assailed resolution has no factual and legal basis is belied by the
adoption with approval by the public respondent of the findings of the POEA administrator, which recited at
length the reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda was mentally sick prior to his death and concomitantly,
was no longer in full control of his mental faculties.

The NLRC note that the petition suffers from serious procedural defects that warrant its being dismissed
outright. Petitioners acted prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration with the public
respondent before bringing the instant petition to this Court. This constitutes a fatal infirmity.

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning
employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said
worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowingly well that its employee had been
suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the
least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed
of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, respondents are hereby jointly and severally held liable
to pay the complainant the following amounts:

1. P130, 000.00 as death compensation benefits.

2. P18, 000.00 as burial expenses.
39. Lameyra v. Pangilinan
322 SCRA 117

FACTS:

Pedro C. Lameyra, petitioner was a janitor/messenger in the Municipal Hall of Famy, Laguna. Petitioner
received a letter from the mayor informing him that he is dropped from the roll of employees of the local
government unit pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission due
to the following reasons: 1. Insubordination; 2. AWOL.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Civil Service Commission alleging that he was a permanent employee
and that he was terminated without prior written notice of the charges and without investigation and hearing, in
violation of his security of tenure and due process.

The Civil Service Commission in Resolution No. 96-0828 dated February 6, 1996 dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the action of the Municipal Mayor in dropping him from the roll of employees for absence without
leave. Hence, the perititoner filed for a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same.
The Court stated that the Commission correctly ruled on the issues raised before it, and rejected the claim of
petitioner that he was denied his right to due process, as he had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, the Commissions findings are supported by substantial evidence.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals committ an error of law in ruling the case.

HELD:

Yes. Although it is clear from the Civil Service Memorandum Circular that no prior notice is required to drop
from the rolls an employee who has been continuously absent without leave for at least thirty days, petitioner
contests the finding that he was absent at all. He claims that he reported for work but was prevented form
signing the log book.

While it is settled doctrine that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected and this Court
should not be tasked to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body, it is axiomatic
that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial evidence. In view of the circumstances prevailing
in this case, the Civil Service Commission should have considered the new evidence annexed by petitioner to
his motion for reconsideration.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and let the case be remanded to the Civil
Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with the tenor of this decision.
51 G.R. No. L-38962 September 15, 1986 (144 SCRA 116)IN RE: MOTION TO CORRECT
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-672 COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD.
FRANCISCA SOTO petitioner-appellant, vs MARINA S. JARENO, JOSEFINA S. MEDEL and LILIA
S. ALILAIN, oppositors-appellees.

Facts: Sergio Serfino was married to Francisca Soto in January 1933. In 1939, he filed an application for a
homestead patent, describing himself as "married to Francisca Soto, "but in 1953, when the original certificate
over the homestead was issued, it was in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower." Serfino died in 1965, and soon
thereafter the petitioner filed a motion with the Court of First instance of Negros Occidental
praying that his description as a "widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two daughters of the
couple opposed the motion. While conceding that their parents were married in1933, the oppositors
nonetheless pointed out that their mother had abandoned them in1942 to live with another man. Later, they said,
she had adulterous relations with still a second man by whom she begot eleven children. According to these
oppositors, it was their father himself who had described himself as a widower in 1953 because he had not heard
from the petitioner since 1942. The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed
for, but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to act on the matter. Its
reason was that there was no observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The case was
elevated from the CA to the SC on a pure question of law.

Issue: Whether or not the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is sufficient ground to strip the trial court of
jurisdiction to act on the case at bar

Ruling: NO. Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-
compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a
ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the
courts can then take cognizance of the case and try it. The proper procedure is to institute the intestate
proceedings of the Sergio Serfino,where the appellant may file against its administrator the corresponding
ordinary action to claim her alleged rights over the lot in question.
52 WILLIAM H. QUASHA, petitioners,
vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION and MANILA POLO CLUB. INC., respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner prayed for the disapproval and cancellation of respondent club's amended articles and by-laws and
denial of its application to register its proprietary shares, and prayed for a restraining order meanwhile enjoining
it from selling and/or accepting any payments for the questioned proprietary shares. Respondent Commission
ordered the parties to appear before it on October 28, 1977 "to determine the propriety of the issuance of the
injunctive relief prayed for and the parties submitted the incident with their respective memoranda. In
November and December, petitioner made urgent representations for the immediate issuance of a restraining
order but it was only on December 22, 1977 that respondent commission issued its Order of the same date
denying injunctive relief "for lack of sufficient allegations in support of the prayer for the issuance of the
preliminary injunction and for obvious lack of merit." The petitioner then filed his petition directly with SC
claiming inter alia violation of petitioner's right to due process in that questioned order allegedly adjudged the
main issues which "should have been resolved [only] after a full-blown hearing on the merits and praying for the
issuance of a restraining order against enforcement of the questioned order and enjoining respondent club from
going on with the sale of proprietary shares and accepting payments for the same. The restraining order was
issued by the Court on December 27, 1977. Respondent Commission in its comment raised the question of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedy.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent commission erred in denying petitioners petition for injunctive relief against the
respondent club.

Ruling:

The questions raised by petitioner in his pending complaints with respondent commission warrant a full-blowing
trial' on the merits" after which the main issues may be duly adjucated as contended by him, and since
respondents likewise concur in this stand, the case will be remanded to respondent commission for such trial and
determination on the merits. Moreover, prescinding from the hearing officer's obiter dictum of obvious lack of
merit", the questioned order's main basis in denying injunctive relief was substantially that "the complainant
(petitioner herein) has not satisfactorily established his right to the restraining order prayed for ", the SC further
clarify that considering that the petitioner submitted the incident on the basis of his memorandum without
presentation of evidence, the Court holds that respondent commission did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in denying the restraining order prayed for.