Strategy & Leadership

Winning through innovation

Michael L. Tushman,
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 EDITOR'S NOTE: THIS ARTICLE IS BASED ON PROFESSOR TUSHMAN'S
WELL-RECEIVED PRESENTATION AT THE 1997 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., IN APRIL.
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Winning
Through
Innovation by Michael L. Tushman
Michael Tushman is Phillip Hettleman Professor of Business at the Graduate
School of Business, Columbia University. He is the co-author with Charles A.
O'Reilly III of Winning Through Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading
Organizational Change and Renewal (Harvard Business School Press, 1997).

S t r a t e g y & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997

14
 s e e m e d , had to die before
" I m a g i n e a valley in the westernmost part of they could be reborn.
the United States, a valley surrounded by T h e expected role of
universities. Lots of entrepreneurs rush
"Once a firm gains con-
managers and corporate
into this valley—most fail, a few succeed; officers is not to oversee
more technical change occurs, more entre­ trol if a productclassin the destruction of firms
preneurs come—most fail, a few succeed." so they can be reborn,
With these words, one of my doctoral stu­ an industry, if often it's to make sure that
dents began his dissertation. H e had conducted his death doesn't happen.
research on the 100-year history of the cement industry. Hayek, a Lebanese
T h e valley he is talking about is the Lehigh Valley in
begins to lose in the
immigrant, did what
Pennsylvania in the 1880s. T h e industry in that valley no Swiss manager was
showed exactly the same evolutionary structure as marketplace and excess prepared to do—he
Silicon Valley 100 years later and Switzerland between revolutionized the
1820 and 1980. It seems to make no difference whether profits are Swiss watch industry.
we're talking about cement in the Lehigh In industry after
Valley, mini-computers in California, or industry, leading
watches in Switzerland: the underlying
shifted elswhere." firms almost always
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structure of evolutionary success and become losers. In

failure tends to be the same over my view, their fail­
very long periods of time. ure is not driven
W h e n Winners B e c o m e L o s e r s by the wrong strat­
W. Edwards Deming, a past col­ egy, and it usually has little to do with technolo­
league of mine at Columbia, would gy. We have found that an effective way to get to
start his seminars with a list of indus­ the future is through long periods of incremental
tries and ask his students to cite the change and continuous improvement, broken by rad­
commonalties among them. (See box.) ical, revolutionary change that leads to further incre­
While they may have a number of features in mental change, which will be interrupted by a subse­
common, Deming's primary point was that these are quent revolutionary event. T h e s e revolutions are trig­
industries in which the leaders very quickly became gered by discontinuous environmental shifts, only one of
losers. H e would then impress the audience with the which might be technology.
importance of continuous improvement. But there is T h e time between the revolutionary events
another instructive point in looking at these industries: depends on the industry itself. In high-tech industries
once a firm gains control of a product class in an indus­ like computers, the time is very short; in low-tech indus­
try, it often begins to lose in the marketplace and excess tries like cement, it's long. But the underlying pattern
profits are shifted elsewhere. of incremental change followed by revolution applies
T h i s point is illustrated very clearly in the classic across industries.
story of the Swiss watch industry. In 1970, there were Long-term success has to do with managing streams
1600 firms gainfully employing 90,000 people in watch­ of innovation rather than singular innovation events.
making. At the time, the Swiss controlled about 90 per­ Driving innovation streams is like juggling a set of balls,
cent of the world's watch market. Within a ten-year peri­ and it requires multiple organizational architectures
od, half of those firms had gone out of business, and inside a single business unit.
roughly 50,000 people lost their jobs. T h i s was a busi­
ness catastrophe and a national catastrophe. WHAT DO THESE INDUSTRIES HAVE IN COMMON?
What happened? Did they have the wrong strategy? Watches Financial Services
T h e wrong technology? T h e wrong management? Or Automobiles Food Processors
was it just bad luck? In this case, watchmaking technol­ Industrial Robots
Cameras
ogy changed, but the Swiss didn't accept the change. Srereo Equipment
Color Television Sets
T h e y had invented the quartz movement, but they
Hand Tools Athletic Equipment
didn't take advantage of it. Ten years later, Nicholas
Radial Tires Consulting Services
Hayek, with help from the Swiss banks, created a new
Microwave Ovens Optical Equipment
Swiss firm, S \ I H , that used the new technology to
Machine Tools Medical Instruments
become the number-one watch producer worldwide—
Electric Motors Computer Chips
the maker of Swatch watches. T h e Swiss companies, it
Airlines Photocopiers

S t r a t e g y & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997

15
 The Evolution of Organizational Architectures
Leaders help their organizations clarify strategy—to make
choices about the breadth of product and service offer­
ings, target customers, technology strategy, competitive
timing, and the strategic intent, vision, or aspirations for a
business unit. In our book, Charles O'Reilly and I call
these the "axioms" of an organization. But strategy
and vision statements, by themselves, are just "Internal forces forstabilitythatWestern Union to invent
words; almost all firms these days have well-articu­
lated visions and strategies—relatively few execute.
Execution depends upon how managers use the and present success run headlong that "any business com­
organization's processes, structures, rewards, sys­
tems, roles, competencies, and culture. Success
comes in the short-term, because organizations are
managed for internal congruence and consistency.
Then, these organizations start to grow so they
can handle higher volume. But, the only way
they can handle high volume throughput
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is by installing structure, bureaucracy,
controls, systems, rewards, and pro­
cedures for resource allocation.
Whether a business is making
dinners, training students, or
assembling computer chips or
automobiles, the only way its
managers can develop internal
congruence for handling high
volume is by building these
technical systems in the service
of a strategy. That's good news for
today, but bad news for tomorrow,
because with structure, bureaucracy,
and systems also comes "structural
inertia."
Firms also get older. The older an
organization becomes, the more it
develops myths, stories, and histories.
People begin saying things like "experience teaches
us. . . ." When the world is shifting, experience does not
teach us well. The older an organization becomes, the
more its people tend to develop a paradigm of the way
work should be done and a certain pomposity and arro­
gance about what they are doing.
Inertia and arrogance are benign as long as the envi­
ronment is stable or moving incrementally. But when the
environment moves rapidly, inertia becomes profoundly
pathological. When an environment shifts in a discontin­
uous way, the response of high-inertia systems is almost
always increased conformity, increased commitment to
the status quo, and decreased vigilant problem-solving.
When refrigeration was introduced, the ice industry
responded with a 300 percent improvement in ways of
cutting, storing, and shipping ice. Xerox's initial
response to low-end Japanese competition was to make
more Xerox machines the way they had been making
Strategy & Leadership
them. In industry after industry, the response of first-
class players almost always has been pathological.
Structural inertia caused by factors located deep in the
technical infrastructure and executive team can make a
firm great today but can kill it tomorrow. At a company
called American Bell, Alexander Graham Bell worked
with the people at
the telephone. Company
executives, believing
munication without a
hard copy is a joke,"
demand c h a n g e . " gave away the patents to
a company soon to be
called AT&T.
To be successful over
time, a company must be
able to reorganize and rede­
fine itself to stay in sync
with external forces and
events. For example, General
Radio was formed in 1915 with a
particular strategy: it was a high-
price, high-quality, test-equipment
company. It was dominated by engi­
neering, and it had a loose functional
structure and a tradition of internal pro­
motion. Its strategy, structure, people,
and processes were internally congruent.
By the end of World War II, it was the
largest, most profitable test-equipment com­
pany in the world.
After the war, however, new firms like
Hewlett-Packard and Tektronics moved into
this product class. General Radio began to
decline, and by the early '70s, this once-great firm
had lost 80 percent of its market share. By 1972, it
had actually lost money. In 1973, a new general
manager took over. He changed the strategy to focus on
three product lines instead of 20. The balance of power
shifted away from engineering toward marketing and
operations, and the loose, functional organization took on
a complex, matrix structure. New executives were
brought in from the outside, and the name of the firm
changed to GenRad.
In one year, strategy, structure, people, and process
changed. It became a totally different organization. In the
long history of General Radio, we see a 55-year period of
continuous improvement, broken by a revolution, leading
to a period of incremental change. That revolutionary
break was driven by the imminent collapse of the firm.
Demography of the Senior Team
Structural inertia comes not only from organizational archi­
tecture but also from the executive team itself. Executive
J u l y / A u g u s t 1997
16
 succession is a powerful force in organizational revolution.
Some interesting research has shown that the performance
of a given firm is associated with the group age of its exec­
utive team—not the age of specific members of the team,
but how long the team has been in place. Very young
teams don't do well. Performance gradually improves until
the teams peak at an average group age of 3.5 years. As
senior teams get older, performance generally declines.
One of the cement companies in our research, the
Colorado Portland Cement Company, was founded in
1900. The company was led by a four-man senior team
that was in place for 32 years. Imagine the group process
within that team: old stories, not much conflict, not much
dissent. As long as the environment was stable, the con­
gruence between the company's strategy, structure, peo­
ple, and process was great. But when the economic crash
hit in 1929 and a new way of making cement came along
in the early 1930s, this team didn't have a clue, and the
company quickly went out of business. The inertia in the
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Managing Streams of Innovation
Great companies compete successfully over time by man­
aging innovation streams: processes for incremental, archi­
tectural, and radical innovations. These streams of innova­
tion allow them to enter new markets with existing prod­
ucts and to proactively introduce substitute products that
can create new markets and rewrite industry rules.
Managing streams of innovation requires an ambidex­
trous organization that can do two fundamentally differ­
ent things simultaneously and well. It calls for managers
who can maintain consistency and encourage continuous
improvement in current offerings, while at the same
time allowing the flexibility and experimentation that
help the firm create or respond to radical shifts in the
environment. The organization must host multiple, con­
tradictory structures and cultures held in alignment by a
single vision and management team. Ambidextrous orga­
nizations are usually decentralized but have strong finan­

cial and social controls.

senior team had to be part of the reason for the failure. Understanding the basic evolutionary cycles of a tech­
Successful companies must work to keep the group age of nology can help an organization predict the timing of
their executive teams relatively young. radical change. The cycle begins with a technological
Another factor for success is diversity in the senior discontinuity—the discovery or invention of a new possi­
team. For example, Prime Computer was a successful bility. (See Exhibit 1.) As the product class opens, there
company in the mini-computer product class through the is a high rate of innovation. When a dominant design is
late '80s. The company was born in 1971 and had a mix­ selected or an industry standard is established, variation
ture of skills at the top. There was a manufacturing per­ ceases. Now the product enters the retention stage—a
son, an R&D person, a marketing person—a heteroge­
neous team. This team decided to be a high-price, high-
quality, semi-conductor-memory, mini-computer firm sell­
ing through original equipment manufacturers (OEM). At
this point, Prime was dominated by engineering and had a
simple, functional organization. By 1975 the company had
$11 million in sales.
But in 1975 the first team left, and a new executive
team came in with new strategy, structure, people, and
process. Prime changed its product line; its target cus­
tomers changed from the OEMs alone to OEMs and end-
users; the balance of power shifted from engineering to
sales; and the structure and incentives of the organization
changed. Under its new leadership, the firm exploded in
its product class. It grew so rapidly that by 1981, its sales
reached $267 million.
In 1981, it happened again. New senior management
came in, and strategy, structure, people, and process
changed once more. Instead of a 15-year-old firm, the com­
pany evolved as three, completely different, five-year-old
firms: Prime I, Prime II, and Prime III. Each transition at
Prime was associated with revolutionary organizational
change and new senior teams.
Managing discontinuous change is fundamentally period of incremental change and architectural innova­
different from managing incremental change. The most tion. At the same time, process innovation begins with
successful teams can manage both. However, executive improvements in how the product is produced and deliv­
team succession is often associated with periods of ered. Eventually, another technological discontinuity
radical change. occurs and the cycles begin again.

Strategy & Leadership July/August 1997

17

"Every once in a while, the senior team must
make a bet. As leaders, they must break out
of the forces for stability that come from
today's success and be willing to make a bet
on these punctuated changes."
The automobile industry offers a wonderful example
of this evolutionary process. At the turn of century, there
were no automobiles. Then, there was tremendous varia­
tion with Stanley Steamers, internal combustion engines,
and battery-powered automobiles. At Ford there was the
Model A, the Model B, change and more change, until
Ford decided to make a bet on the Model T. The Model
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T wasn't the standard upfront, it became the standard, and
variation stopped. The internal combustion engine had
won the variation game. The cost of the car went from
$1500 to $500, and it became a car for the masses. This
standard was, in turn, substituted by General Motors'
fully enclosed auto.
The first juncture in the evolution of a product class is
the closing on a standard—the shift from an era of fer­
ment to an era of incremental change. That juncture is
crucial. When Windows became the dominant design in
the operating system of PCs, Apple and IBM dropped in
that product class, and Bill Gates became the single rich­
est person in the United States.
In the stage of variation, it's not a technology game
alone. It's partly technology, partly lobbying in
Washington, and partly coalitions with suppliers, vendors,
and customers. The consequences of losing control of a
core subsystem are catastrophic. Look at the world of
hand-held phones. There's a European standard, an
American standard, and a Japanese standard. One will
become the global standard. If you're Ericsson you want it
to be Ericsson; if you're Nokia you want it to be Nokia; if
you're Lucent you want it to be Lucent. This is a pro­
foundly political game that is crucial in the evolution of a
product class.
These ideas come from evolutionary biology, except
that this is not natural selection, it is competitively driven
selection in which actions taken by firms actually shape
the time path of technological change. These actions are
not taken inside the firm but on the environment out­
side—it's senior managers shaping the outside world.
After the standard is selected, there is a period of
incremental change. It's the period of bells, buzzers,
whistles, sizes, shapes, and packaging. This is the mature
stage of a product class that is driven by incremental
S t r a t e g y & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t 1997
18
product, service, and process innovation and is, in turn,
punctured by a subsequent substitution event. In this
stage, for example, if someone begins making the same
thing you make but at one-tenth the cost, you're fin­
ished. For example, when Pilkington developed the
float-glass process for making flat glass, the price went
from a dollar per sheet to a penny per sheet. In that
process revolution, the product itself was transformed.
Glass was no longer expensive—it became so cheap that
whole buildings could be made from it. Once the
Japanese figured out how to make a watch with an incre­
mental cost of almost zero, it was no longer a timepiece,
it became fashion. When one of these watches breaks,
the customer throws it away and buys five or six new
ones. Process discontinuities transform the product itself
and kick off the next evolutionary wave of variation,
selection, and retention. Across all industries, the timing
of these evolutionary cycles is getting tighter and tighter.
This innovation game also occurs at the subsystem
level of complicated products and services. For example,
every watch has several subsystems: something that pro­
vides energy, something that oscillates, something that
links the oscillation to the face, and a case to hold it all
together. In 1970, the actions of variation, selection, and
retention occurred in a battle to control a core subsys­
tem—the oscillation. A core subsystem is central to the
product—if it is removed it has cascading implications
for the rest of the product or service. A business unit
must never lose control of the core subsystems in its
products or services.
In real time, no one in the watch industry knew which
oscillation technology would become dominant—after the
fact, of course, everyone knew it was quartz. Technical
and social inertia in organizations often impede perceiving
the need for action as well as the action itself. Internal
forces for stability that come from a company's past and
present success run headlong into outside forces that
demand change. As a result, firms often find it difficult to
take a product to new markets, to add new subsystems to
an existing product, or to adjust to new technologies that
affect their products or services.
In juggling streams of innovation, today's managers
must deal with political issues, global competition, and
the time path of technological change in their particular
product classes. Revolutionary change, as described in
the General Radio example, is often reactive, driven by
a crisis in performance. In other cases such as Prime, rev­
olutionary change is driven proactively by the vision of a
strategic leader and his or her team, who follow external
events and are determined to move before change is
forced on them. At Prime, it was the board of directors
that provided that vision and energy. In multi-divisional
firms, it's often the corporate officers who see the need
for radical change.
 Building Luck into the Organization
Some firms win over time because they're systematically
more lucky than the competition. You actually can maxi­
mize the probability that your business unit will be more
lucky than its competition. Senior managers are paid
more than others in their companies because they must
make profound strategic bets on behalf of their firms. If
they make the wrong bet, even if it's at the right time
and executed well, their business units pay a severe
price. By building an ambidextrous organization, moni­
toring technology cycles, and managing streams of inno­
vation, an executive team can systematically make these
bets more effective than the competition.
Yet, these bets take place in a context of uncertainly. A
company called General Automation was three times larg­
er than Prime in 1974, and it faced the same competitive
turbulence. General Automation, too, had a visionary
manager, Larry Goshorn. Goshorn bet his company on the
silicon-on-sapphire technology. It turned out to be a poor
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bet, and he was asked to leave. A new executive came in
to bring the company back to where it was in 1974 and to
make up for five years of lost competitive time.
In retrospect, it is easy to say that Larry Goshorn was
a poor manager and Bill Fisher at Prime was a transfor­
mational leader, a visionary executive. We know from
some research in this area that in real time it is impossi­
ble to distinguish the fool from the hero; these "facts"
are only known after the fact. Indeed, the behavioral
characteristics of transformational leaders arc exactly the
same as the behavioral characteristics of failed managers!
Winning Through Innovation
In today's watch industry, Nicholas Hayek's firm is the
dominant watch producer worldwide. SMH controls the
low end of the market with Swatch, the middle with
Omega, and the high end with Blanepain. Hayek does it
by managing streams of innovation to shape the
product class.
To manage these streams of innovation as Hayek
does, one must build two fundamentally different orga­
nizational architectures in the same business unit to
operate, not sequentially, but at the same time. The
kind of strategy, structure, people, and process that are
required in a mature era of incremental change of a
product class is fundamentally different than the kind of
strategy, structure, people, and process required in an era
of ferment. It is not portfolio management, it is an
ambidextrous organization—an organization that has dif­
ferent cultures, structures, competencies, and processes
operating in the same business unit at the same time.
The only way to break out of the internal forces for
inertia is by juggling sets of competencies inside the
business unit, or by establishing alliances, joint ven­
tures, partnerships, or internal venturing—creating an
organization that has multiple strategies, multiple com­
petencies, and multiple structures. T h e world of varia­
Strategy & Leadership J u l y / A u g u s t
19
tion is a world of "please fail"—by making many small
mistakes, the organization learns. In this world, the
very language of quality may get in the way. Unless the
environment is stable, TQM maximizes short-term,
incremental improvement, yet truncates innovation
streams because it seeks to remove variance. Once you
make a bet on one of the variations, you begin to build
your luck. You enter the world of retention—the world
of "never make mistakes." T h e cost of mistakes in this
world is catastrophic. These worlds must be allowed to
operate in parallel within a given organization.
For the senior team who holds it all together, manag­
ing streams of innovation is like juggling three, four, or
five balls simultaneously. It takes great skill to be able to
articulate a single, clear vision for the enitre unit while,
at the same time, fostering multiple organizational struc­
tures within the unit.
Almost always, today kills tomorrow, big kills little,
and centralized kills decentralized. Today's mainframe
world tries to kill tomorrow's PCs. Given the learnings
from ambidextrous organizations, every once in a while
the senior team must make a bet. As leaders, they must
break out of the forces for stability that come from
today's success and be willing to make a bet on these
punctuated changes. Managers must build organizational
capabilities such that their firms are systematically more
consistent and lucky than the competition.
Innovation streams and puncutated change seem to be
a worldwide phenomenon. As companies move through
innovation streams, they find it is better to make these
revolutionary changes before being forced to make them.
When Percy Barnevik brought together ABB, he treated it
as a revolution, not as incremental change. IBM should
have begun its revolution ten years prior to Gerstner. The
Swiss should have done it ten years before Nick Hayek.
But organizational inertia was too powerful.
Today's senior teams must manage inherent inconsis­
tencies consistently if they are to manage innovation and
change. They must be architects, building fit, consistent,
and congruent structures and cultures to execute tasks in
the service of vision and strategy. They must be network
builders, shaping coalitions to manage revolutionary
change and to close on standards in a product class. And
they must be skilled artists as they juggle contradictory
strategies, structures, competencies, and cultures in the
service of both incremental and discontinuous innova­
tion. While difficult, great firms like Microsoft seem to
be able to build ambidextrous organizations and manage
discontinuous and incremental change in the service of
winning through innovation. ■
1997
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