Remedial Law Review II and for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
November 13, 2018 Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein petitioners were granted 10
Cases for Special Proceedings:
1. Republic v. Madrona, G.R. 163604, 6 May 2005;
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MADRONA
G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005
FACTS: In In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria
Malinao Jomoc, petitioner, the Ormoc City, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,
granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners
Report and accordingly declared the absentee spouse,
who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family
Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present must institute summary proceedings for
the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse,
without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absent spouse.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for declaration of the
presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding
HELD: Considering the aforementioned distinction, this
Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The
petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of
the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente
Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of
a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither
does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that
can be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject
Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999
disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued.
The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding,OSG should have filed, in addition to its
Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance
with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to
Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court .
2. Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 16 January 2001;
Manalo vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar and his 11
children. The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in
Tarlac. In November 1992, herein respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a
petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father
days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts
toward compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief were sought in the
complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for
the issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of the estate
belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil
action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It
is clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the
remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a
right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of
the Code Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions.
The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution
of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the petitioners
therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence, it must be
emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause
of action as in fact no defendant was pronounced therein.
3. Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, 14 March 2007
ROLANDO TING v. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO
518 SCRA 334 (2007), SECOND DIVISION
The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted an application filed by the Spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of a certain parcel of land. A
certificate of title was thereafter issued to Spouses Lirio. On February 12, 1997,
Rolando Ting filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an applicationfor
registration of title over the same lot. The RTC dismissed Ting‘s application on
the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for land registration should be barred for being
res judicata
Held:
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with
or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the
applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his
name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes
final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of
confirmation and registration. The land registration proceedings being in rem,
the land registration court‘s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza‘s applicationfor registration of the lot settled its
ownership, and is binding on the whole world including Ting.
Ting insists that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the
orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the
court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the
matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the
preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the
court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative
officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to
“extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings.”
As for Ting‘s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the December
10, 1976 decision became “extinct” in light of the failure of respondents and/or of
their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period,
the same does not lie.
Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers
to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and
his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought
to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforcesaid ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the
land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
4. Ong v PDIC, 18 August 2010;
5. In re Datukan Malang Salibo, 8 April 2015;
IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO v. WARDEN, GR No. 197597, 2015-04-08
Facts:
Salibo... suspected... to be Butukan S. Malang.[7]
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of
murder for allegedly participating in
Maguindanao Massacre.
Salibo presented himself before the police officer... to clear his
name.
explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could
not have participated in
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that...
time.
police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his
passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia
They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for
about three (3) days.
transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10
days.
alibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex,
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.
Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for
Habeas Corpus... questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty.
Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ
returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).
The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail
Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled
hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m.
hearing set on September 27, 2010.[21]... he trial court found that
Salibo was not "judicially charged"[29]... under any resolution,
information, or amended information. The Resolution,
Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not
charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was... also not
validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias
Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial
court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process
issued by a court.
trial court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and
ordered his immediate release from detention.
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
Decision... dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named
in the Alias Warrant... of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that
"[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
invoked[.]"
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,... As for respondent
Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in
court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named
in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have
pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information,
not a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Issues:
whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court... on petitioner
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court
of Appeals... whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Ruling:
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo
was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the
Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a
Motion to Quash Information, not a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
his court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the
"Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing
Saulo as legal basis
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition
for Habeas Corpus,... "acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits of the case[.]"
Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the
Court of Appeals.
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial
Court,... The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his
Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits"... of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The
decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the
decision of the trial... court, not of the Court of Appeals.
Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of trial courts,... respondent Warden correctly filed
the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before
the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that
he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo
was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station, he was... neither committing nor attempting to commit
an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also
not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest
petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right
to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for
habeas corpus may be issued.
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere... amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the
accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not
cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of
his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
Principles:
6. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778;
Villacicencio Vs Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at
night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or
to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation
to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that
the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted
by the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a
new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized
by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice
of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women
have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being
given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even
consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be
severely punished
7. Fletcher v. Director of BuCor, UDK14071, 17 July
2009;
8. Aquino v. Esperon, 174994, 31 August 2007;
G.R. No. 174994 August 31, 2007
In the Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of the person of ARMY
MAJOR JASON LAUREANO AQUINO
MARIA FE S. AQUINO vs. ESPERON
FACTS:
Major Aquino, along with several military men, allegedly met at the resthouse of Captain
Aldomovar near Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan to plot a breach of the Camp
Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to take over Camp Aquinaldo, as
well as the Headquarters of the Philippine Army. In the wake of the group’s alleged
withdrawal of support from the AFP chain of command and the administration of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was ordered arrested and confined at
the Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, upon
the order of Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, who was then the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the Army Inspector
General to conduct an investigation on the matter.
For this purpose, a panel of investigators was formed. During the investigation, Major
Aquino denied the accusations hurled against him.
The panel of investigators, found that the troop movement by some military personnel
from their respective stations to Manila was illegal, implicating Major Aquino.
The panel recommended thus:
1) all implicated officers therein mentioned be immediately relieved from their respective
posts; and
2) appropriate charges be filed before the General Court Martial against Major Aquino,
among other military officers/personnel, for violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin
or Create Mutiny); and Article 97 (Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to Good Order and
Military Discipline) of the Articles of War.
The Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) found the existence of probable cause
against Major Aquino, among other military officers.
Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order to the Commanding Officer to exercise custodial
responsibility of Major Aquino, together with the other implicated military personnel, and
to place them in confinement at the Philippine Army Detention Center, Camp Capinpin,
Tanay, Rizal. The same Order also designated the aforementioned Commanding Officer
to exercise direct supervision and control over the concerned detainees.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the CA, praying that the AFP Chief of
Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are acting in their
place and stead, be directed to immediately produce the body of Major Aquino and
explain forthwith why he should not be set at liberty without delay. The CA denied the
petition, ruling that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is futile because charges had
already been preferred against Major Aquino.
Petitioner’s MR was denied as well.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the confinement of Major Aquino is legal.
2. Whether or not habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions
of confinement
RULING:
1.
It bears stressing that subsequent to the preferment of charges under Article 70, the Judge
Advocate General of the General Headquarters of the AFP, issued Office Order Number
14-06, creating a Pre-trial Investigation Panel to investigate the case of Major Aquino and
his co-accused. In addition, the Office of the Judge Advocate General issued a subpoena
and a notice of pre-trial investigation to Major Aquino summoning him to appear in
person before the Pre-trial Investigation Panel. Furthermore, Major Aquino was given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and affidavits of his witnesses. More
significantly, Major Aquino was present during the scheduled investigation. His arrest
and confinement cannot be said to be without due process of law.
Perforce, we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner’s Petition
for Habeas Corpus for the person of Major Aquino.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled to it. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will
not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. Its essential
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a
person from it if such restraint is illegal. In the case at bar, Major Aquino stands charged
in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or
Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the
Articles of War. The legality of Major Aquino’s restraint having been settled, the
privilege of the writ is unavailing.
2.
While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
inquire into questions of violations of constitutional right, this Court, however, does not
find the conditions of Major Aquino’s confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the
instant Petition.
This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions
of confinement.
As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of
conditions of confinement; but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high
prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality
of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. It is not a
means for the redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief or damages. We reiterate
the pronouncement of this Court in Alejano v. Cabuay
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted
prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and
conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the
detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts
could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to
arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to
question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.
9. Ampatuan v. Macaraig, 29 June 2010;
AMPATUAN vs MACARAIG Case Digest
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG
G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010
FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was
killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded
the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1
Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition.
Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s
Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge
Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1
Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1
Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that
the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter
be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal
grounds.
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution
Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and
directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining
the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the
administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and
this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The
petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered
the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that
the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP,
and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the
active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF
PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND
THEREFORE, ILLEGAL.
HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing
of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as
the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that
a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is
entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully
deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
10. Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741;
Harden vs. Director of Prisons (81 Phil. 741)
Facts:
On July 12, 1941 Fred M. Harden was involved in a civil case with Mrs. Harden
concerning conjugal partnership, payment of alimony and accounting. A
preliminary injunction was issued restraining Mr. Harden from transferring or
alienating, except with consideration and consent of the court, all assets (money,
shares of stock, property, real, personal, whether in his name, her name or both)
in the partnership with Mrs. Harden. During 1946 however, Mr. Harden
transferred drafts and cash in overseas accounts. In the course of two years, he
received orders from the SC to return the amounts but Mr. Harden kept filing for
extensions. On March 24, 1948, he was committed to jail because of contempt
(failure to comply with the court’s orders of producing the amounts) and held
there until he can produce said amounts.
Issue:
Relevant: WoN the imprisonment sentence for Mr. Harden is excessive
punishment.
Irrelevant: WoN the property moved into foreign jurisdiction is still covered by
Philippine jurisdiction
Held and Ratio:
Relevant: No. Mr. Harden has “the keys to his prison” and his detainment is
something that he himself can end at any time. (Sec. 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court: When the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which is yet in
the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it)
Irrelevant: Yes. “While a court cannot give its receiver authority to act in another
state without the assistance of the courts thereof (53 C. J., 390-391) yet it may
act directly upon the parties before it with respect to the property beyond the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction, and hold them in contempt if they resist the
court’s orders with reference to its custody or disposition.”
Decision: Petition is denied.
Separate Opinion: Perfecto, J.
He believes that it is indeed an excessive penalty because of Mr. Harden’s claims
that it is beyond his power to comply with the court order and would thus result in
life imprisonment for Mr. Harden.
11. Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, 21 June 2005
SUSAN GO v. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, GR NO. 151876, 2005-06-
21
Facts:
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go
thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank
for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored
for the reason "account closed.
Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation
of BP 22
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of
the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision,
arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment
also, should have been imposed on... him.
The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in
favor of Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that (1) he was a first-
time... offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who
would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the
civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his
properties.[24]... questions of law
Issues:
whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted
Ruling:
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De
Joya v. Jail Warden
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which
allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment,
for convictions under BP 22.
Respondent sought the retroactive... effect of those rulings,
thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for
being excessive.
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22:
(1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one
year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the
check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both
such fine and... imprisonment, at the discretion of the court
When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith
or a clear mistake of fact... without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred
penalty.
Should the... judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such
penalty may be imposed
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of
imprisonment. The competence to amend the law belongs to the
legislature, not to this Court.
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the
benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is
not a "first time offender... t is the trial court's discretion to
impose any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-
2001 explains thus:... good faith or a clear mistake of fact...
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should
be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.
The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion,
and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each
case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would
best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to
impose imprisonment... would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000,
which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied
retroactively if favorable to the accused.
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable.
The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of
its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final
judgment.
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative
intent behind... the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely
urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the
law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he
acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence -- and such other... circumstance which the trial court
or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be
imposed.
Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it
serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is
addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual
circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate
penalty.
In... other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any
new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by
final judgment.
Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all
factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer
be done if the judgment has become final and executory.
Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the
lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-
2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of
his civil liability.[
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders
NULLIFIED.
Respondent's Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.
Principles:
writ of habeas corpus... required the imposition of a fine only... if
the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent.
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of
liberty.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is
under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment
However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when,
as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following...
exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the...
sentence as to such excess... it is merely... a rule of preference
as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar
circumstances of a case.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but
an offense against public order."
12. Adonis v Tesoro, 5 June 2013;
Habeas corpus; Libel
"The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person
from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of
personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief
for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is
not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a
valid judgment.18
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not
be allowed or discharge authorized, to wit:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.―If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in
criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final
judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his
sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on
December 11, 2007.19 While it is true that a convict may be released from
prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence;
the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the
disqualification of such convict from being released on parole.20
Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was
pending before the RTC Branch 14.21 In fact, even when the instant petition
was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ
under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the
respondent to deny his immediate release at that time.
13. Martinez v. Mendoza, G.R. 153795, 17 August
2006;
14. Lee Yick Hon v. Insular Collector of Customs, 41
Phil. 548, 30 March 21;
15. Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, 7 August 2009;
16. Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera, 28 July 2014;
17. Thornton v. Thornton, 16 August 2004;
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. 
No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a
Filipino. They were married and had one daughter. After
3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in
a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home
together with their daughter and told her servants that
she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition
for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in
Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in
Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them
and the barangay office issued a certification that
respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed
another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could
issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire Thus, Spouses
country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground Gallardo filed a petition for
that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA
8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts habeas corpus before the
exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it RTC. At the RTC, both
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the parties agreed to a shared
Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary custody of Maryl, where
Reorganization Act of 1980.)
the grandparents took
ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas custody of her during
corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light of the weekends. The Regional
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive Trial Court approved the
jurisdiction over such petitions. agreement. Unfortunately,
Spouses Gallardo took
HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of Maryl away and brought
the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its her to Samar. Hence, Noel
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving and Lydia filed a motion to
custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed cite in contempt Spouses
because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners
without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor Gallardo. They also filed a
could be transferred from one place to another and motion to dismiss the
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy petition for habeas corpus
since family courts take cognizance only cases within based on Rule 17 of the
their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would render it
meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and
Rules of Court, citing the
contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will plaintiff’s refusal to
result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect comply with a lawful order
the rights and promote welfare of children. of the court.
18. Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. 162734, 29 August
2006;
19. Ilusorio v. Bildner, 332 SCRA 169; The RTC cited Spouses
20. Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27 November
2009;
Gallardo in contempt and
dismissed the petition for
21. Facts: Maricel ran habeas corpus filed by
away from her parents them for mootness, since
Antonio and Rosita Maryl was already in their
Gallardo to live with her custody. Noel and Lydia
boyfriend. Maricel became filed a Motion for
pregnant and gave birth Reconsideration alleging
to Maryl Joy. Maricel's that the action should
boyfriend left her. Maricel have been dismissed
returned to her parents pursuant to Section 3,
but ran away again and Rule 17, of the Rules of
went to Noel and Lydia. Court. They prayed that
There, she entrusted to Maryl Joy be returned to
the two the custody of them to preserve the
Maryl, and left behind a status quo ante. The RTC
note relinquishing her denied the MR ruling that
parental rights over Maryl the sole purpose for the
in their favor. filing of the petition is to
cause the production
When Spouses before the Court of the
Gallardo learned about person of Maryl, not a
this, they tried to obtain determination of the
the custody of Maryl but legality or illegality of
Noel and Lydia refused. custody.
22.
23. Issue: Was the sole
purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus the
production of Maryl Joy
before the trial court and
that it would be moot
upon said production?
Held: No. Section 1,
Rule 102, of the Rules of
Court states that the writ
of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases where
the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from
the persons entitled
thereto. In cases involving
minors, the purpose of a
petition for habeas corpus
is not limited to the
production of the child
before the court. The main
purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus is to
determine who has the
rightful custody over the
child.
The RTC erred when it
hastily dismissed the
action for having become
moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial
court. It should have
conducted a trial to
determine who had the
rightful custody over Maryl
Joy. In dismissing the
action, the RTC, in effect,
granted the petition for
habeas corpus and
awarded the custody of
Maryl Joy to the Spouses
Gallardo without sufficient
basis.
It is true that Article 214
of the Civil Code states
that in case of absence or
unsuitability of the
parents, substitute
parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving
grandparent. Article 216
also states that in default
of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the
surviving grandparent
shall exercise substitute
parental authority over
the child. However, in
determining who has the
rightful custody over a
child, the child’s welfare is
the most important
consideration. The court is
not bound by any legal
right of a person over the
child.
There are three requisites
in petitions for habeas
corpus involving minors:
(1) the petitioner has a
right of custody over the
minor, (2) the respondent
is withholding the rightful
custody over the minor,
and (3) the best interest of
the minor demands that
he or she be in the
custody of the petitioner.
In the present case, these
requisites are not clearly
established because the
RTC hastily dismissed the
action and awarded the
custody of Maryl Joy to
Spouses Gallardo without
conducting any trial.
Case to the RTC for the
purpose of receiving
evidence to determine the
fitness of the Antonio and
Rosita to have custody of
Maryl Joy. (Bagtas vs.
Judge Santos, G.R. No.
 The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not
166682, November 27, proper as there was no enforced disappearance in this case.
2009)
24. As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v.
25. Sy v. CA, 27 December 2007; Pardico enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the
26. Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, 5 term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
June 2008, en banc;
27. Sps. Pador v. Arcayan, 12 March 2013;
28. Caram v. Segui, 5 August 2014; 1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form
of deprivation of liberty;

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. 2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner, acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

vs. 3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to

acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and,
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B.
CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the
respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that
Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition
before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr. is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo
rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

TOPIC: Writ of amparo

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her
from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her
parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
FACTS:

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the
Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all
eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo
marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that rule cannot be properly applied.
she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her
pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun
and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.
29. Mison v. Gallegos, 23 June 2015, e.b.
30. Navia v Pardico, 19 June 2012, e.b.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang 31. Ladaga v. Mapagu, 13 November 2012;
Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered 32. Santiago v. Tulfo, 21 Oct 2015, Perlas-Bernabe,
all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily J;
surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the 33. Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871,
DSWD. 18 February 2010;
34. De Lima v. Gatdula, 19 February 2013;
35. Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, 11 February
On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring
2010;
Baby Julian as “Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby
36. Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 15 November
Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was
2011;
then commenced.
37. Reyes v. Gonzalez, 3 December 2009;
38. Razon v. Tagitis, 3 December 2009, Brion, J;
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the 39. Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, 11 February
adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s 2010;
adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together. 40. Boac v Cadapan, 31 May 2011;
41. Gamboa v. Chan, 24 July 2012;
42. Manila Electric Co. v. Gopez-Lim, 5 October
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a 2010;
Memorandum to DSWD Assistant Secretary Cabrera informing her that the 43. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, 29 September
certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained 2014, Velasco, J;
finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed 44. Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 178933, 16
of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and September 2009;
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. 45. Republic v. Marcos, 4 August 2009;
46. Aranas v Mercado, 15 Jan 2014;
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of 47. Republic v. Nishina, 15 November 2010.
amparo before the RTC seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD: