Myla Ruth N.

Sara

Dimaporo v. Mitra
G.R. No. 179285, February 11, 2008

FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during
the 1987 congressional elections. He filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM.
The Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR
Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election, wrote a letter intending
to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was
not able to regain his seat in the Congress.

Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is
not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.
Grounds may be termed to be shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election
contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office

ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
another government position

HELD: No.
In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935
Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest
degree of responsibility and integrity.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an
office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the
mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto
resigned.
The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his
mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he
could be of better service.

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

Facts:
Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as citizen of United States of
America. Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted, and he subsequently executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of foreign citizenship. On November 2009, Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said
election. But prior from his declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua, one of the
 Myla Ruth N. Sara
contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the
Philippines, with a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-American and
a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has been using his American passport even after
renunciation of American citizenship. A division of the COMELEC ruled against Arnando but this decision was reversed
by the COMELEC en Banc stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile, Maquiling
petition that he should be declared winner as he gained the second highest number of votes.

Issue:
Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications
to run for public office.

Held:
Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation
but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position which makes him dual
citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s
flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who
seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the
public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. It is a
continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnando disqualified for any local elective position as provided by express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility of the
candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the Constitution are nugatory.
Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when
the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced. Hence among the qualified candidates for
position, Maquiling who garnered the highest votes should be declared as winner.

SANDOVAL VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000]

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the
Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the
municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected
congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the
Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a
verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate,
but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal
order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result
in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the
proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206
 Myla Ruth N. Sara
SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District
Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of
Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman."
SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman.

2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.

RULING: On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private
respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an
exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the
presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It
states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator,
and Members of the House of Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election
returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of
the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay
in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive
posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15
allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns
even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the simple
reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the
proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the
COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections."

We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter
and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with
illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered
without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that
COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it
rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations.

Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was
merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of
canvassers.

We cannot accept public respondent's argument.

Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC
was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include
the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors,
conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or
coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the
President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has
deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has
direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution
of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the
 Myla Ruth N. Sara
questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It
behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide
whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the
COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion,
so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is
conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore,
acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the
petitions filed by private respondent.

The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED.